(Fwd) A PREFERENDUM DEMO
isk...@cdp.uucp
Milosevic in power - he would always win the referenda. The
referendum is good in a society with free media, and other
democratic institutions firmly established. Otherwise it is just a
rubber stamp for the will of the populist dictator.
ivo
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
From: "Dzemal Sokolovic" <Dzemal.S...@isp.uib.no>
Subject: A PREFERENDUM DEMO
INSTITUTE FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA
K o n j i c
Bosnia-Herzegovina
The third international Seminar
"Democracy and Human Rights in Multi-ethnic Societies"
Time: 3-7 July, 2000
Place: Konjic, B&H
Dear colleagues,
Below please find the Peter Emerson`s proposal to organize PREFERENDUM DEMO
in the course of our Seminar. I myself strongly underpin his idea to enrich
our event. You are kindly requested to forward all your suggestions,
comments, proposals and requirements directly to him:
peme...@deborda.freeserve.co.uk
Best wishes,
Dzemal Sokolovic
=====================================================================
Dear Dzemal,
OK, let me suggest the following as an initial circular, and we can see what
folks think about that, and proceed from there.
THE PREFERENDUM - A PROPOSAL
To quote Oslobodjenje, "...su svi ratovi u bivsoj Yugoslaviji poceli nekim
referendumom" {"...all the wars in the former Yugoslavia started with a
referendum"} (7.2.99, p 11). Given the threat/promise of a referendum in
Kosovo that was made in Ranbouillet, in stark contrast to the Badinter
ruling on Kosova's 1991 referendum, we might also conclude that the recent
war in Serbia was also prompted by talk of a referendum.
The (simple) majority vote is the most primitive decision-making process
ever invented, apart that is, from that which it often provokes, violence.
In every plebiscite on self-determination, the use of such a
'for-or-against' referendum has, in effect, disenfranchises those who might
otherwise want to vote for compromise. In effect, therefore, the democratic
process as currently practiced 'forces' people either to abstain, that or,
as in war, to take sides.
How odd, then, that the Dayton Agreement should suggest that "Each chamber
shall by majority vote..." {Annex 4, Article IV, para 3(b)}, albeit with
certain provisos for national interests and so on. Would it not have been
better, however, to have advocated a different means of decision-making?
They are all aware of weighted majority voting, and since the advent of the
Belfast Agreement, they also know of consociational majority voting. Both
of these methodologies, however, are based on the supposed existence of only
two alternatives: black or white, A or B, and in any lands of ethnic
division, both are likely to lead to an impasse. Such was the fate of
Czechoslovakia, and such too was the demise of the three-sided veto system
used in Bosnia in 1990. Of other voting methodologies, unfortunately, few
politicians and diplomats are aware of even their existence. And fewer
still realise that the Borda preferendum is the only voting decision-making
methodology which a majority cannot dominate. If, however, Bosnia and other
lands are to survive, even at local council level, then the use of a Borda
preferendum on all matters of controversy may in fact be part of the answer.
Accordingly, it is proposed to hold a Borda preferendum at this year's
meeting in Konjic. The count procedure is on disc, so the only technology
which is definitely required is an ordinary PC. But now let us consider how
best to run a demonstration.
The first necessity is a good number of people, and some thorny question on
which a policy decision must be taken. (The last experiment in Belfast
discussed the problem: "what should be the international community's
response to the violence in Kosovo?") The topic can be of a most serious
nature, or it can relate to some equally emotive but non-constitutional
question such as cloning, genetic engineering, or even budget proposals.
Should we debate some international theme, or would it be better to discuss
some local controversy?
At the outset, all concerned should be asked to choose a team of, say, three
persons to act as independent, non-voting consensors. During the course of
the debate, these consensors will decide which proposals comply with
international human rights charters and which may therefore be 'on the
table'. If technology permits, they will display and constantly up-date a
summary of these on a computer screen via a data-projector (but that might
be asking a bit too much); we might just have to rely on an overhead projector!
As the debate draws to a close, the chairperson will ask all concerned if
they feel their own particular proposal has been included in the final list
of options (on the screen); if so, that list becomes the ballot paper for
the Borda preferendum, and all concerned then proceed to the vote.
Next, while the participants go and have lunch or somesuch, a small team of
tellers feeds these votes into the computer which, after a micro-second or
two, produces the results. The consensors should then prepare some
histograms (see "The Politics of Consensus") to show in pictorial terms just
how superb or consensual or divisive or useless each of the various options
are regarded.
In the anslysis, it is also possible to show just what would have been the
result if a different methodology had been used - majority voting, STV,
Condorcet and so on. The theory is given in "Beyond the Tyranny of the
majority", but it's still good for folks to see just how many 'democratic'
decisions can be deduced from one voting profile!
That's it Dzemal. By all means send that off to all and sundry, and we'll
see what happens.
Peter.
=====================================================================