22 Years After Tiananmen, Tank-man Still Mystery.
Peter Terpstra
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uieND7g2ye0&NR=1&feature=fvwp
On June 4th, 1989 tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square crushing a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration. A
mystery still surround a man who defied a column of tanks during that bloody day. (June 3)
--
Demystifying Mao
MAO: The Unknown Story.
by Jung Chang & Jon Halliday Jonathan Cape Pages 814. £ 25
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050717/spectrum/book6.htm
rst0wxyz
nut sicko Son-Of-Bitch and racist bigoted Tibetan Clown wants to
B-B-Q himself, I will donate "FREE GAS". Go suck your Dalai and
fuck your yaks and kiwis, you big fat asshole
rst0wxyz
tfkmjk6262
respond to the post or continue proving you are a fifity cent rent boyr
"rst0wxyz" <rst0...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:e175f2ef-625b-49f9...@h36g2000pro.googlegroups.com...
rst7
~
OM MONEY MONEY OM
the GOLDEN TRUTH.
http://tinyurl.com/4xmlkxb
China's claims over Tiananmen Square backed
Malcolm Moore, The Daily Telegraph: Friday, June 3, 2011
Secret cables from the United States embassy in Beijing have shown there
was no bloodshed inside Tiananmen Square when China put down student
pro-democracy demonstrations 22 years ago.
The cables, obtained by Wikileaks and released exclusively by The Daily
Telegraph, partly confirm the Chinese government's account of the early
hours of June 4, 1989. It has always insisted that soldiers did not
massacre demonstrators inside the square.
Instead, Chinese soldiers opened fire on protesters outside the centre
of Beijing as they fought their way towards the square from the west of
the city.
Three cables were sent from the U.S. embassy on June 3 in the hours
leading up to the final confrontation.
The cables described the "10,000 to 15,000 helmeted, armed troops"
moving into the city, some of whom were "carrying automatic weapons".
At the same time, "elite airborne troops" and "tank units" were said to
be moving up from the south.
The army came up against "an elaborate system of blockades", described
in a cable from May 21, 1989, which allowed students to "control much of
central Beijing".
Inside the square, a Chilean diplomat who was positioned next to a Red
Cross station, was on hand to give his U.S. counterparts an eye-witness
account of the final hours of the pro-democracy movement.
"He watched the military enter the square and did not observe any mass
firing of weapons into the crowds, although sporadic gunfire was heard.
"He said that most of the troops which entered the square were armed
only with anti-riot gear - truncheons and wooden clubs; they were backed
up by armed soldiers," a cable from July 1989 said.
Leaders of the protest urged the students to leave the square, and the
Chilean diplomat relayed that "once agreement was reached for the
students to withdraw, linking hands to form a column, the students left
the square through the south-east corner".
"Peter Terpstra" <pe...@dharma.dyn-o-saur.com> wrote in message
news:3168859.37XWh4sQ1X@Dharma...
Peter Terpstra
> Truth is not from you, but your masters,
> OM MONEY MONEY OM
> the GOLDEN TRUTH.
If you hate religions you can have such opinions the source is CCP
propaganda.
Yes mister Bryson, but must be a fake name too...
Kind Regards,
Peter
rst0wxyz
crazy nut sicko Son-Of-Bitch and racist bigoted Tibetan Clown wants to
The Progressive Voice
on the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. They posit that anywhere
from 500 - 3000 people were killed. see post below
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/index.html
On Jun 4, 12:01 am, "~" <~...@happy.com> wrote:
> Truth is not from you,but your masters,
> OM MONEY MONEY OM
> the GOLDEN TRUTH.
>
> http://tinyurl.com/4xmlkxb
> China's claims over Tiananmen Square backed
> Malcolm Moore, The Daily Telegraph: Friday, June 3, 2011
>
> Secret cables from the United States embassy in Beijing have shown there
> was no bloodshed inside Tiananmen Square when China put down student
> pro-democracy demonstrations 22 years ago.
as usual bullshit, propaganda. by the US MNC China Lobby
here's the official declassified accounts and it is an understatement
of the casulties:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/13-01.htm
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/14-02.htm
thomaswheat1975
Tiananmen Square, 1989
The Declassified History
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/index.html
A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chinese army crackdown in and around Tiananmen Square on June 4,
1989 had an enormous effect on the course of U.S.-China relations. The
deaths of democracy protesters resulted in U.S. sanctions, suspensions
of high-level contacts, and a halt in the transfer of military
technology. The controversy continues to this day, as demonstrated by
the reaction of many concerning President Clinton's decision to appear
in the square with Chinese leaders during his June 1998 trip to
China.
This Electronic Briefing Book is divided into five sections, each with
links to the documents. Click on any of the links below to jump to
that section:
Documents 1-6: Student Demonstrations in 1985-86
Documents 7-11: On the Brink
Documents 12-29: The Crackdown
Documents 30-35: The Aftermath
Postscript 1999: Ten Years after Tiananmen
Return to the Introduction
Documents 1-6: Student Demonstrations in 1985 and 1986
The student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 were not the
first time in the 1980s that Chinese authorities were faced with
organized demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with their rule.
In late 1985, and again in late 1986, Beijing and Shanghai were the
site of student protests. Students carried banners with slogans such
as "Law, Not Authoritarianism" and "Long Live Democracy."
In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression,
demonstrators have often seized upon politically tolerable causes--
such as anti-Japanese sentiment or the commemoration of a popular
Chinese leader--as vehicles to gather together and express their
dissatisfaction with the policies of the Chinese government. Document
1, a U.S. embassy cable, suggests possible meanings of a tepid anti-
Japanese demonstration in Tiananmen Square following a Sino-Japanese
volleyball game on November 20, 1985. Embassy officials note that
perhaps "someone wanted to stir up trouble to embarrass the
authorities," and that "the semi-holiday atmosphere among the students
at the square ... points to a lack of fear of retribution."
A subsequent cable (Document 2) reports the arrest of 23 of the
students who were suspected "ringleaders" of the November 20
demonstration. "The authorities," the cable notes, "knew whom to look
for because they had infiltrated both preparations for the
demonstration and the demonstration itself." Furthermore, "one armed
police installation, shortly before last week’s demonstration, ‘looked
like it was preparing for a war.’"
Document 3, a U.S. embassy report from late December 1985, notes that
two student demonstrations had occurred in Beijing in the last several
days. These demonstrations concerned student issues, the presence of
the PLA on campus, as well as nuclear testing in Xinjiang province.
The cable comments that "we do find a bit astonishing a demonstration
in China ... on nuclear weapons testing."
The following December a new round of demonstrations, this time
explicitly calling for political reforms, sprang up in China’s cities.
Document 4, a U.S. embassy cable from December 24, 1986, reports on a
small student demonstration in Beijing on the evening of December 23,
1986. The cable cites an editorial in the People's Daily, the state
news daily, expressing sympathy with the students but making it clear
that "the limits of official toleration were being approached." Later
in the cable, embassy officials note that "political stability has
always been a critical consideration in China. There can be no doubt
that the authorities will crack down, and crack down hard, if
stability seems to be being called into question."
Document 5, an intelligence summary from U.S. Pacific Command, reports
that thousands of protesters filled Tiananmen Square on New Year’s Day
1987, and that, "Some 24 ‘troublemakers’ reportedly were taken away by
the police for ‘education and examination.’" On January 17, another
intelligence summary (Document 6)reports that noted reformer and
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang had resigned, apparently
"a result of the recent student demonstrations."
This would not be the last time that the fate of Hu Yaobang would be
associated with student demonstrations. His death on April 15, 1989
proved to be the catalyst that brought about the massive
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. The demonstration that had begun
as an expression of grief over the loss of a popular political figure
had, by April 26, taken on a decidedly political character. On that
day People’s Daily published an editorial noting that,
After the memorial meeting, an extremely small number of people with
ulterior purposes continued to take advantage of the young students’
feelings of grief for Comrade Hu Yaobang... This is a planned
conspiracy and a disturbance. Its essence is to, once and for all,
negate the leadership of the CPC [Chinese Communist Party] and the
socialist system... All comrades in the party and the people
throughout the country must soberly recognize the fact that our
country will have no peaceful days if this disturbance is not checked
resolutely.1
Documents 7-11: On the Brink
On May 20, the Chinese leadership imposed martial law on the Beijing
Municipality and appeared to be moving toward the use of force to
clear the square.2 Nevertheless, U.S. officials were still hoping to
see the standoff between the government and the student demonstrators
resolved peacefully. While the documentary record is far from
complete, Document 7, a heavily excised summary transcript of a May 23
meeting in Washington between President George Bush and Wan Li,
Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People’s
Congress, indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations did
come up at their meeting. Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short his U.S.
visit and, on May 27, publicly endorsed the government’s martial law
order.3
As the crowds continued to gather in Tiananmen Square in the days
following the death of Hu Yaobang, hard-liners in the party leadership
prepared to move against both the students and the more conciliatory
leaders within the party itself.4 Document 8, a State Department
intelligence summary submitted to the Secretary on the morning of June
2, notes that hard-liners "remain unable to resolve the leadership
crisis or to remove students from Tiananmen Square." The next day’s
morning intelligence summary (Document 9) reports on the first use of
force on both sides--with the police firing tear gas on crowds
gathered near Tiananmen and the crowds retaliating by stoning the
police.
The next two documents report on developments at Tiananmen shortly
before the PRC employed force against the protesters. Document 10
describes the "unorganized retreat" of a first wave of lightly armed
soldiers, and notes that it might have been intended "to prove that
much stronger force will be necessary to regain control." Document 11,
reporting the advance of more heavily equipped soldiers toward the
city center, concludes by noting that the fact that the troops are
helmeted and are armed with automatic weapons "suggest[s] that the
force option is real."
Documents 12-29: The Crackdown
It would not be long after the U.S. Embassy in Beijing warned that the
use of force was an option that it began reporting the PLA's attacks
on demonstrators. That reporting, as well as information obtained by
other means, is summarized in Document 12, a cable from the U.S.
embassy in Beijing. The cable notes that troops, using automatic
weapons, had advanced in tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and
trucks from several directions toward Tiananmen Square. The cable also
reports that the American Embassy believed that the 50-70 deaths
reported in the foreign media were probably much too low. It also
notes that several American reporters "were severely beaten by Chinese
troops on Tiananmen Square." As events in Beijing unfolded, the
American Embassy provided a near-continuous flow of reporting, based
on the accounts of newsmen, residents, and the observations of embassy
officials.
The Secretary of State’s intelligence summary for the following
morning (Document 13) reports that "deaths from the military assault
on Tiananmen Square range from 180 to 500; thousands more have been
injured." It also describes how "thousands of civilians stood their
ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire, and
demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov
cocktails."
In addition to providing information on the events of June 4, the
cables provide dramatic examples of the kinds of intelligence provided
by diplomatic reporting. Document 14, an embassy cable from June 4,
reports on confrontations between soldiers and protesters, some of
which ended in deaths, and vandalism by military personnel, who one
source claimed were breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other
buildings. On the same day, another cable from the U.S. Embassy
(Document 15) reports, among other things, the statement of a Chinese-
American who had witnessed the crackdown who claimed that, "The
beating to death of a PLA soldier, who was in the first APC to enter
Tiananmen Square, in full view of the other waiting PLA troops,
appeared to have sparked the shooting that followed." In addition to
these eyewitness accounts of the crackdown, other cables (Document 16)
also provide information on PLA troop positions and casualty
estimates.
One section of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 5th
(Document 17), titled "After the Bloodbath," focuses on developments
in Beijing. It reports that "troops continued to fire indiscriminately
at citizens in the area near Tiananmen Square." It also notes the
destruction of a large number of military vehicles, threats to execute
students, and the potential for violent resistance by students. The
intelligence report also provides details on the worldwide reaction to
the massacre, noting the unanimous condemnation of the "bloody
repression" by foreign leaders, "regardless of ideology."
After the square had been cleared Chinese Army troops continued to
occupy the city5, with continuing reports of sporadic gunfire and
interfactional fighting among PLA units. The possibility that units of
the PLA would turn on each other was raised in the June 6th edition of
the Secretary of State's Morning Summary as well as embassy cables
from June 5-6. An embassy cable from June 5 (Document 18) reports that
armored units from the PLA's 27th Army "seem poised for attack by
other PLA units," and notes that a "western military attaché" largely
blames the 27th for the June 3 massacre, and says that the 27th "is
accused of killing even the soldiers of other units when they got in
the way." The June 6 edition of the Secretary of State's Morning
Summary (Document 19) states that the 27th Army is "being blamed for
the worst atrocities against civilians during Saturday night's attack
on Tiananmen Square," and also notes that "some clashes between
military units reportedly have occurred." Document 20, an embassy
cable from June 6, refers to "persistent rumours of splits among the
military and fighting among military units."
Meanwhile, as embassy officials continued to report on the events on
the ground, the State Department went to work assessing the political
ramifications of the crackdown. Document 21, the Secretary of State's
Morning Summary for June 7, discusses the reaction of Asian leaders to
the violence, and reports rumors "that at least some leaders may have
envisioned an outcome that would blame most atrocities on the 27th
Army, relieve its top commanders, and remove senior officials who
ordered armed action against civilians."
The June 7 summary also reports that PLA troops had fired shots in the
direction of U.S. embassy apartments, an incident covered in greater
detail in Document 22, an embassy cable from June 7. It reports that
as a PLA troop convoy was passing near the embassy residence, "Heavy
automatic weapons fire ... was heard ... Emboffs [U.S. Embassy
officials] reported bullets shattered the windows of many apartments
in the Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound."
An "Uneasy Calm" returned to being by June 8, according to the
Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 9 (Document 23). It
reports on missing dissidents, police actions at universities, martial
law directives, and the first public appearance of Premier Li Peng
since the massacre. Shortly thereafter, the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research published an Intelligence Brief titled
"Current Situation in China: Background and Prospects" (Document 24).
The document observes that "at the heart of the crisis in China is the
power struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping," and goes on to
analyze the various elements of that struggle.
The first appearance of Deng Xiaoping since the crackdown was reported
in Document 25, the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 10,
noting that "Deng Xiaoping’s public appearance yesterday ... signified
his endorsement of martial law and the military’s action against the
population." The Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 14
(Document 27) reports on the efforts of the Chinese leadership to
demonstrate unity and portray a return to normal government
operations, even while continuing the crackdown on the alleged leaders
of the demonstrations, reports of which were then appearing in the
Chinese press. By June 21, the Morning Summary (Document 29) was
reporting that, "More than 1,500 have been arrested ... including at
least six of the 21 ‘most wanted’ student leaders."
The June 14 Morning Summary and the one for the following day address
one of the many problems in U.S.-Chinese relations that resulted from
the Tiananmen crisis--the U.S. Embassy's decision to provide sanctuary
for Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi in the days following the crackdown.
The June 15 Morning Summary (Document 28) notes that the treatment of
the issue in the Chinese media indicates that it represents an
important conflict of interest with the United States. Arrest warrants
for Fang and his wife had been issued by Chinese security forces on
June 11 and an embassy cable sent on that day (Document 26) reports
that Chinese radio and television announcers had read a "letter" on
the air "which accused the US government of supporting rebels and
providing refuge for the ‘criminal who created this violence.’"
Documents 30-35: The Aftermath
As the day-to-day crisis atmosphere faded, the U.S. sought to come to
a precise understanding of the events and determine how they would
affect China's future and U.S.-Chinese relations. Reports based on the
accounts of eyewitnesses (Document 30 and Document 31) represent an
effort by the American Embassy in Beijing to provide a concise
description of the events that led up to the deaths at Tiananmen
Square and to "set the record straight." Document 31 is based on the
eyewitness accounts of embassy officials, western reporters and
diplomats, and U.S. students present on or near Tiananmen Square. In
its introduction it notes that while civilian casualties probably did
not reach the figure of 3,000 used in some press accounts, "they
surely far outnumbered official figures." The body of the cable
consists of three parts: a précis of events, an analysis of the extent
and causes of military and civilian casualties, and a chronology of
developments from 3 p.m. on June 3 to shortly after noon on June 4. A
final note states that "Sporadic killing continued at least through
Wednesday, June 6."
In the days immediately following the crackdown, U.S. and Chinese
officials were already sensitive to how recent events would impact the
bilateral relationship. On June 5, President Bush had announced the
imposition of a package of sanctions on China, to include "suspension
of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of
weapons," and the "suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese
military leaders." Document 32, an embassy cable sent three weeks
later, notes that a military official had lodged a formal complaint
that "strongly protested recent U.S. military sanctions," and had
canceled the planned visits of U.S. military officials. Embassy
officials felt this to be a "measured response to U.S. sanctions,"
indicating that the official "did not adopt a confrontational attitude
and emphasized that both sides should take a long-term view of the
military relationship." Two days later, on June 29, the State
Department prepared "Themes," (Document 33), in support of
Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and national security
adviser Brent Scowcroft, who were to leave the next day on a secret
trip to China to meet with Deng Xiaoping. "Themes" provided the
framework for the discussions the two emissaries would have with Deng.
It focused on the global strategic benefits of the U.S.-PRC
relationship for both sides, the impact Chinese "internal affairs"
could have on the relationship (characterizing the American people as
being "shocked and repelled by much of what they have seen and read
about recent events in China"), Bush's view of the importance of the
long-term relationship between the US and PRC, and the impact that
further repression could have on US relations with China. As Scowcroft
later remembered, "The purpose of my trip ... was not negotiations--
there was nothing yet to negotiate--but an effort to keep open the
lines of communication."6
By late July INR analysts continued to update the situation in China
under martial law and also had the opportunity to address the impact
of the crisis on China. Document 34, a July 26 status report discusses
developments since the crackdown. An intelligence research report
(Document 35) asks "how did China get to this point?," explores the
impact of the crisis on China's domestic and foreign policy, and
measures the international reaction to the crackdown. Among the
judgments reached is that the situation in China would remain
unsettled "at least until Deng Xiaoping and other party elders die."
Scowcroft and Eagleburger returned to Beijing in December 1989 to
brief Chinese leaders on President Bush’s summit meeting with Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta and to "explore the possibility
of developing a ‘road map’ toward better relations."7 In the interim,
Bush--in a concession he hoped would elicit a positive response from
the Chinese government--had vetoed legislation permitting Chinese
exchange students to remain in the US until the Chinese government
improved its human rights record.8 Despite these concessions, the Bush
administration soon realized that their efforts had not borne fruit.
Scowcroft later recalled their disappointment:
After the Chinese released only a handful of dissidents ... it became
apparent that the entire, slow process was grinding to a halt--and we
had no significant steps to point to in order to justify any
normalization of our strained relations... It is my sense that one of
the most dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe--the fall of Nicolae
Ceausescu--was the main reason.9
The Chinese had watched anxiously as communist regimes fell in Eastern
Europe in the fall of 1989 but were apparently unmoved until the
bloody end of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. "When Ceausescu was
toppled," Scowcroft recalled, "I believe the Chinese leaders panicked.
It had appeared to me that they had taken great comfort from his
apparent impregnability."10 China, Premier Li Peng told his American
emissaries at the December meeting, had witnessed similar eruptions
during the Cultural Revolution. "Had we not adopted the resolute
measures on June 4," he added, "the present situation in China would
be even more turbulent today."11
Postscript 1999: Ten Years After
In the months preceding the ten-year anniversary of the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations Chinese government and party officials have
reexamined and often revised the official version of the military
crackdown. In April 1999, Zhu Muzhi, the president of the China
Society for Human Rights Studies (a government think tank) observed
that, "If the way we handled the Tiananmen crisis was incorrect, we
would not have today’s prosperity. China would be in chaos. The people
would have risen and resisted the government." He added that, "At that
time, the police were poorly equipped ... They had never witnessed
such large-scale protests ... They did not have rubber bullets then
nor gas masks... The only weapons they had were their guns."12
In a slightly more conciliatory gesture during his U.S. tour,
President Zhu Rongji told reporters that, "The episode in 1989
[happened] because they wanted democracy but they didn’t want the rule
of law. That’s why it happened." Zhu--who as mayor of Shanghai in 1989
was credited with peacefully resolving the demonstrations there--thus
became the first senior Chinese leader to acknowledge the democratic
aspirations of the demonstrators.13
Document 1: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, A Student Demonstration of Sorts in Tiananmen Square
(November 21, 1985)
In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, citizens
have often used "legitimate" causes to express dissent in socially
acceptable terms. One notion that often has official support is the
expression of anti-Japanese sentiment. So it was in November 1985,
when anonymous flyers appeared urging Beijing students to stage a
rally at the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese volleyball match. While
nationalistic in tone, the flyer decried the Japanese "economic
invasion" of China and also those Chinese "princes" (a clear reference
to members of the Chinese Communist Party) who have risen to power
during this time of "uneven development." Although the demonstration
was apparently rather tepid, this document points to the possibility
that "someone wanted to stir up trouble and embarrass the
authorities." Embassy comments also note the curious fact that
although the flyer was "not very complimentary toward the Communist
Party … the authorities, who clearly know about the call for a
demonstration in advance … let it proceed."
Document 2:Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State,
Wash DC, Government Arrests Student Demonstrators (November 25, 1985)
While the first document downplays the importance of the November 20
demonstration, another cable, reporting the reaction of Chinese
authorities in the subsequent five days, draws more significant
lessons. In the cable, Embassy officials report information gleaned
from an unidentified source that Chinese security forces have detained
more than 100 students and arrested 23 suspected "ringleaders"
involved in the demonstration. According to the source, "The
authorities knew whom to look for because they had infiltrated both
preparations for the demonstration and the demonstration itself." The
fact that the authorities had been so concerned about controlling the
demonstration, the cable concludes, "reflects the extent to which the
Communist Party has lost the initiative on campus."
Document 3: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, More Student Demonstrations (December 23, 1985)
Demonstrations again sprang up in December 1985, and students were
increasingly bold in their expressions of dissatisfaction with various
government policies. In one of the demonstrations, at the Beijing
Agricultural University, students decried the stationing of a PLA unit
on the university campus. The document also reports another incident,
that the cables authors call "astonishing," which involved several
hundred students from the Bejing Central College of Nationalities who
were protesting the nuclear weapons testing program in Xinjiang
Province in western China.
Document 4: From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash
DC, Student Demonstrations Update (December 24, 1986)
Demonstrations again occurred in late-1986, and Embassy reports were
increasingly fearful that Chinese authorities would crack down on the
students and set back the pace of political reform. The cable notes
how the recent spate of demonstrations provoked criticism from the
Chinese government who warned that the adoption of "overly energetic
methods" to express views could affect stability and interfere with
societal functions. The cable also reports the views of several
different sources, whose identities remain classified, warning about
the possible repercussions for the cause of freedom in China if the
students do not proceed more cautiously. One source reportedly told
U.S. officials that "the senior leadership was fully focusing on the
demonstrations," and that "they had multiple sources of information,
including both party and government channels." Another source, in a
dinner conversation with U.S. Ambassador Winston Lord, warned that
"opponents of political liberalization in the leadership would use the
protests to underline the dangers of democracy." The document warns
that if the demonstrations become too strident, and particularly if
they are staged in Beijing, "then the entire affair could become a net
liability for reform with seriously negative policy consequences." "A
severe crackdown," the cable ominously concludes, "would be
inevitible."
Document 5: IPAC Daily Intelligence Summary 1-87, China: Student
Demonstrations (January 2, 1987)
Demonstrations continued into January 1987 when 3,000 students defied
a government ban and staged a protest in the vicinity of Tiananmen
Square in Beijing. This intelligence summary from U.S. Pacific Command
notes that 24 "troublemakers" associated with the illegal protest were
apparently detained by police for "education and examination."
Document 6: IPAC Daily Intelligence Summary 10-87, China: Hu Yaobang
Resigns (January 17, 1987)
Later that same month, on January 17, 1987, another Pacific Command
intelligence summary reported the resignation of Hu Yaobang, from his
post as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. An advocate
of both economic and political reforms, the summary notes that Hu’s
resignation "is probably the result of the recent student
demonstrations." After his death in April 1989 students gathered in
Tiananmen Square to mourn the loss of a respected leader. What began
as a profound expression of sorrow, however, would soon develop into
the massive pro-democracy demonstration that occupied Tiananmen Square
in the period preceding the crackdown of June 3-4, 1989.
Document 7: Memorandum of Conversation, [George Bush] Meeting with Wan
Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress and Member of the Politburo, People’s Republic of China (May
23, 1989)
By May 20, 1989, with no peaceful resolution of the crisis in sight,
the Chinese government declared martial law in Beijing, hoping to
intimidate the protesters to clear the square. Nevertheless, U.S.
officials were still hoping to see the standoff between the government
and the student demonstrators resolved peacefully. Three days after
the declaration, U.S. President George Bush met with the Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Wan Li, in
Washington. While the documentary record is far from complete, this
document, a heavily excised summary transcript of their conversation,
indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations did come up
at their meeting. "The President," the transcript shows, "asked how
the Chairman sees the present situation playing itself out." Wan’s
reply has not yet been declassified, but he apparently commented on
some aspect of the demonstrations, prompting Bush to ask "if this was
just a handful of all those demonstrators." Shortly thereafter, Wan
cut short his U.S. visit and, on May 27, publicly endorsed the
government’s martial law order.
Document 8: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 2, 1989,
China: Stalemate Continues
On the day before the crackdown began, the Beijing city government
tightened restrictions on the foreign media reporting on the Tiananmen
Square demonstration, and the Chinese leadership was becoming
increasingly frustrated with the persistence of the student
demonstrators and their refusal to clear the square. This document, a
morning intelligence summary prepared that day by the State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research for Secretary of
State James A. Baker (the first of several included in this Briefing
Book), discusses these issues and also the leadership crisis facing
the Chinese government in the midst of the demonstrations. The summary
notes that students expect that the "Goddess of Democracy" statue they
erected in the square would "anger top leaders and prompt a response."
"The students," the document continues, "may hope an overreaction by
authorities will breathe new life into their flagging movement."
Document 9: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 3, 1989,
China: Police Use Tear Gas on Crowds
The initial moves against the students suggested to many that the
Chinese leadership was still, as of the morning of June 3, committed
to a relatively peaceful resolution to the crisis. This document
describes two incidents that in retrospect may have convinced Chinese
authorities that the use of force was necessary. The document reports,
according to various sources, that "approximatley 5,000 unarmed troops
… were turned back by students and citizens as they attempted to
advance on foot to Tiananmen Square." Later in the day Beijing police
fired tear gas on crowds gathered near the Zhongnanhai leadership
compound, but the report suggests that this was an "accidental rather
than a premeditated effort to escalate the level of force beyond that
used unsuccessfully earlier in the day." With respect to the
disorderly withdrawal of the military units earlier in the day, the
summary notes that "the obvious confusion of many of the soldiers
suggests they were unprepared for the outpouring of opposition their
movements triggered."
Document 10: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 27: Martial Law with Chinese
Characteristics (June 3, 1989)
This cable provides fascinating eyewitness accounts of the
disorganized and confused retreat of PLA soldiers from the center of
Beijing after their advance on Tiananmen Square was halted by crowds
of demonstrators on the morning of June 3. The document describes how
the soldiers were ridiculed by Chinese citizens and scolded by elderly
women who called them "bad boys" and "a disgrace to the PLA." One U.S.
official quoted in the document described the events as "a Chinese
version of Napolean’s retreat from Moscow." Embassy officials
speculate that the soldiers were to have been used to cordon off the
square while regular police units would have moved on the crowds with
clubs in an effort to clear the square. The document suggests that the
episode galvanized the demonstrators, encouraging them to resist
further attempts to move them from the square.
Document 11: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 28: Ten to Fifteen Thousand Armed Troops
Stopped at City Perimeter by Human and Bus Barricades (June 3, 1989)
The tension in Beijing had increased sharply by the late afternoon of
June 3 when ten to fifteen thousand fully equipped troops in large
truck convoys moved toward the city center. Unlike the previous units,
these troops were helmeted and armed with automatic weapons
suggesting, as this cable does, "that the force option is real." The
document describes the movement of these troops toward the vicinity of
Tiananmen Square from several different directions, noting that, "The
population appears hostile to PLA movements into the city."
Document 12: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S.
Embassy Beijing, and All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, TFCHO1: SITREP
1, 1700 EDT (June 3, 1989)
By the evening of June 3 the crackdown had begun in Beijing, and the
State Department created a special task force in Washington,
designated by the heading "TFCH01," to coordinate information on the
situation in China. This document, the first in this series of
SITREPs, updates U.S. embassy and consular personnel around the world
on the first violent clashes with demonstrators as PLA troops "using
automatic weapons advanced in tanks, APC’s [Armored Personnel
Carriers], and trucks from several directions toward the city center."
Casualties, according to the estimates of U.S. Embassy personnel,
appear high. The cable also notes that Under Secretary of State Robert
Kimmitt had called on PRC Ambassador Han Xu to express "deep regret at
the use of force."
Document 13: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 4, 1989,
China: Troops Open Fire
The violence that occurred on the night of June 3-4 is summarized in
this State Department morning intelligence summary for June 4. "Two
weeks after martial law was declared," the report observes, "the
government again controls the symbolic center of the country." The
document describes how civilians turned out in massive numbers and
fought for seven hours to prevent the troops from advancing on the
square. In the face of overwhelming numbers of heavily armed troops,
the summary notes, "thousands of civilians stood their ground or
swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire, and
demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov
cocktails."
Document 14: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 32: The Morning of June 4 (June 4, 1989)
The crackdown continued through the night, and by early morning June
4, as this cable reports, the PLA was in control Tiananmen Square.
Based on eyewitness accounts of the violence, this SITREP is the
Embassy's initial effort to provide some detail on the final PLA
assault on the approximately 3,000 demonstrators who had not yet left
the square. "Some 10,000 troops," the document says, formed a ring
around the square, and "a column of about 50 APC, tanks, and trucks
entered Tiananmen from the east." Demonstrators shouted angrily, the
cable states, and "PLA troops in Tiananmen opened a barrage of rifle
and machine gun fire." Another column of military vehicles entered
soon thereafter, and more gunfire ensued, "causing a large number of
casualties." The document also describes violent PLA clashes with
demonstrators on Changan Boulevard, the main thoroughfare in the
Tiananmen area, and in other parts of Beijing. Embassy officials also
report conversations with angry citizens, some "claiming that more
than 10,000 people had been killed at Tiananmen." One woman claimed to
have witnessed a tank running over 11 people. She also told Embassy
officers that she had seen PLA troops "breaking the windows of shops,
banks, and other buildings."
Document 15: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 33: June 4 Afternoon and … (June 4, 1989)
As the PLA moved to consolidate its hold on the city center in the
immediate aftermath of the crackdown, Embassy officials watched
closely as tanks, APCs, and trucks passed by the U.S. diplomatic
compound, moving west toward Tiananmen Square, reporting these
movements back to the State Department. In the space of one hour on
the early morning of June 5, this cable reports, "more than seventy
tanks moving at a fast speed passed the diplomatic compound heading
toward the square." Sources also report the presence of large numbers
of burned out military vehicles scattered around the city. The
document forwards some early casualty estimates, and also reports on
the release of ten foreigners who had been detained by Chinese public
security, including several journalists. Most intriguing, however, is
a report, attributed to a Chinese-American who witnessed the Tiananmen
Square violence, claiming that, "The beating to death of a PLA
soldier, who was in the first APC to enter Tiananmen Square, in full
view of the other waiting PLA soldiers, appeared to have sparked the
shooting that followed."
Document 16: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S.
Embassy Beijing, China Task Force Situation Report No. 3 - Situation
as of 1700 EDT, 6/4/89 (June 4, 1989)
As reports flowed in from the embassy in Beijing, the State
Department's China task force was busy updating other diplomatic and
consular posts around the world on the situation in Beijing. This
SITREP reports the current situation in Beijing where, "The PLA is
mopping up isolated resistance," and notes that "casualty estimates
vary from 500 to 2600 deaths, with injuries up to 10,000." The cable
also discusses the foreign reaction to the recent events, noting
especially that, "Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui called in AIT
[American Institute in Taiwan] chief David Dean in Taipei to hear his
appeal for the US to join in condemnation and consideration of
sanctions."
Document 17: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 5, 1989,
China: After the Bloodbath
By the morning of June 5 (Eastern Standard Time) the "severity of the
assault" had become clear to U.S. officials. This intelligence
summary, prepared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, reports that, "Troops shot indiscriminately into crowds of
unarmed civilians, including women and children, often with automatic
weapons… Foreign journalists report seeing fleeing protesters shot in
the back." The document notes the large number of destroyed military
vehicles littering the Beijing streets, and reports that an
undisclosed entity had "secured a university campus where students had
captured an armored personnel carrier, and issued a warning that
executions of students would begin tonight."
Document 18: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 35: June 6, 0500 Hours (June 5, 1989)
Two days after the crackdown, this report from the U.S. Embassy stated
that a western military attaché had told the U.S. military
representative that one PLA unit, the 27th Army, "was responsible for
most of the death and destruction at Tiananmen Square on June 3." The
27th, the cable notes, was commanded by the nephew of PRC President
Yang Shangkun, a noted hardliner, and was even accused of killing
"soldiers from other units run over by the 27th APC's and tanks." The
document also indicates that a large contingent of soldiers from the
27th had taken up position on a highway overpass, "and seem poised for
attack by other PLA units."
Document 19: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 6, 1989,
China: Descent into Chaos
By the morning of June 6, it appeared to some in the State Department
that the situation in Beijing was teetering on the brink of political
chaos or even civil war. This Department of State morning summary
describes clashes among different PLA units, with sources claiming
that in many cases the soldiers were sympathetic with the
demonstrators and often complicit in the destruction of their own
military vehicles. "At least some of the troops still entering
Beijing," the document notes, "are arriving without authorization and
are intent upon attacking the 27th Army." The document also appears to
be anticipating an intensification of the current leadership crisis,
reporting rumors that senior leader Deng Xiaoping has died or is near
death, and an attempt on the life of Premier Li Peng by one of his own
security guards in the Great Hall of the People. Moreover, Shanghai
also appeared to be heading toward some kind of violent military
crackdown as PLA troops assembled outside the city, ready to move on
striking citizens if necessary.
Document 20: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 37: June 7, 0500 Hours Local (June
6, 1989)
In this document, Embassy officials report continuing large-scale
troop movements around Beijing amid persistent but unconfirmed rumors
of splits and clashes among Chinese military units near the Nanyuan
Airport. The cable also reports the harassment of citizens by troops
trying to enforce martial law.
Document 21: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 7, 1989,
China: Tense Standoff Continues
By the time the State Department had put together this intelligence
summary for the Secretary on the morning of June 7, many of the rumors
generated in the past two days we refuted. "Despite numerous reports
alleging or predicting clashes between military units in Beijing," the
summary begins, "available evidence suggests that few—if any—
significant engagements have occurred." Reports of Deng’s death also
appear to have been fabrications. The document also mentions that
Chinese troops had fired their weapons in the direction of the U.S.
diplomatic compound, shattering windows in three of the apartments,
and reports rumors that "some leaders may have envisioned an outcome
that would blame most of the atrocities on the 27th Army, relieve its
top commanders, and remove senior officials who ordered armed action
against civilians."
Document 22: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 38: June 7, 1900 Hours (June 7,
1989)
This intriguing cable describes a sequence of events that occurred as
a large convoy of troops from the 27th Army passed near the
Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound and U.S. embassy residences on their
way out of the city as part of a major troop rotation. In what was
later explained as a search for a sniper, the troops sprayed the
compound with automatic weapons fire. One witness, the document notes,
"said the unit was from Shenyang and that they had been on the square
on the night of June 3-4." The soldiers appeared to be aiming "at or
above rooftops, but soldiers lowered their sights (but did not fire)
at any spectators who did not cower immediately behind nearby
protective cover." The cable explains that the military had apparently
chosen to replace "the much-hated 27th Group Army unit" with the 20th
in a move "apparently intended to improve relations between the
military and the residents of the city." The incident has provoked
speculation that the shootings may have been staged as a response to
the package of sanctions against China announced by President Bush in
June 5, or the decision to grant refuge to dissident Fang Lizhi, an
outspoken critic of the Chinese regime, in the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing.
Document 23: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 9, 1989,
China: Uneasy Calm
Five days after the violence, this intelligence summary indicates
that, "Numerous arrests can be expected," and that the military
appears poised to take over the university campuses. The document
suggests that Chinese leaders have initiated a defensive campaign
combining mass arrests and detentions with vehement denials that there
were heavy civilian casualties during the military crackdown,
"focusing instead on attacks and atrocities against the police and
soldiers." With regard to the brewing leadership crisis, the report
cites a "reliable source" who says that "Zhao [Ziyang] is still in
Beijing and in the custody of the hard-liners."
Document 24: Department of State Intelligence Brief, "Current
Situation in China: Background and Prospects" (Ca. June 10, 1989)
One week after the bloody crackdown of June 3-4, State Department’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued this brief, explaining the
current situation within the context of the Chinese leadership crisis
that had been broiling for two years and especially "the power
struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping." The document suggests
that only Communist Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang "seemed to understand
the depth of public grievances and the urgent need to address them in
some realistic fashion," and that hard-liners in the leadership saw
the crackdown as an opportunity to undermine his leadership and
restore a more authoritarian government. Thus Deng split with Zhao,
his protégé, and "gave carte blanche to Yang Shangkun and Li Peng to
enforce martial law and quash the demonstrations." Commenting on
prospects for future political reforms, the document asserts that,
"There is probably little residual faith that the government can be
counted on to move forward on demands for political freedoms, an open
and accurate press, and an end to official corruption."
Document 25: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 10, 1989,
China: Mixed Signals on Purge
On June 9, Deng Xiaoping made his first public appearance since May
16, expressing his support for the military measures imposed on the
demonstrations. This document explores the meaning of his speech, and
also reports that Chinese authorities continue to round up suspected
"counterrevolutionaries" and search for evidence to use against those
responsible for the turmoil. The authors comment that although most
Chinese leaders blame a small number of instigators for stirring up
the population, "that ‘tiny group’ is likely to include thousands of
bureaucrats, intellectuals, students, and labor activists."
Document 26: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 49, June 12, 0500 Local (June 11, 1989)
As it became apparent that the U.S. Embassy had no intention of
handing over dissident Fang Lizhi, who had taken refuge their on the
night of June 5, the Chinese government, in the words of this cable,
"stepped up its anti-US rhetoric." Chinese authorities had issued an
arrest warrant for Fang and his wife, Li Shuxian, the day before,
charging them with "crimes of counter-propaganda and instigation
before and during the recent turmoil." The U.S. Embassy was accused of
harboring the "criminal who created this violence," and was warned of
the potentially harmful consequences for U.S.-China relations.
Document 27: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 14, 1989,
China: Back to Business, But Crackdown Continues
Ten days after the crackdown Chinese leaders appeared to be trying to
portray a return to business as usual in Beijing, despite the
continuing widespread arrests of students and political activists
suspected as instigators of the Tiananmen demonstrations. This
document describes the sudden public emergence of many top Chinese
officials—including some associated with ousted party chief Zhao Ziyang
—in an apparent show of support for the military crackdown. The report
also comments that "Beijing’s efforts to sell the official version of
recent events and win bureaucratic compliance with the new hardline
regime conflict with US attempts to limit repression and honor Fang
Lizhi’s request for protection."
Document 28: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 15, 1989,
China: Accusation over Fang Lizhi
Policy makers in Washington were clearly concerned as the Fang Lizhi
episode threatened to further disrupt Sino-American relationship
beyond its current strains. This morning intelligence summary leads of
with a discussion of Chinese media reports about the affair, noting
that "the article takes care to limit blame to 'certain US
personages,' 'a handful of people in the United States,' 'some US
media, particularly the Voice of America,' and the 'US Embassy in
Beijing.'" The document also reports on fears in Hong Kong over how
the colony will be governed after returning to mainland Chinese rule
in 1997. "Locals are worried that Beijing could in the future limit
civil rights in Hong Kong by declaring martial law or a state of
emergency."
Document 29: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 21, 1989,
China: Swift Justice
Washington policy makers also kept close tabs on the continuing
crackdown and arrest of persons associated with the demonstrations.
This intelligence report leads off with a discussion of recent arrests
and executions, noting that, "More than 1,500 have been arrested …
including at least six of the 21 'Most Wanted' student leaders." The
document also anticipates a Communist Party Central Committee plenum
that will ratify the removal of party secretary Zhao Ziyang, and name
a new leader.
Document 30: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, Eyewitness Account of June 4 PLA Tank Crushing 11
Students and Related Early Morning Events in Tiananmen Square (June
22, 1989)
This extraordinary document provides the detailed account of a source
who witnessed firsthand the violence at Tiananmen Square on the night
of June 3-4. The source indicated that the students had believed that
the soldiers would be firing rubber bullets and that "he had a
sickening feeling when he noticed the bullets striking sparks off the
pavement near his feet." His and other eyewitness descriptions
represent an effort by diplomatic reporters to gather evidence about
the crackdown and get the story straight. Most impressive in the
account is the source’s graphic description of a PLA tank crushing 11
students under its wheels on the morning of June 4. Comments at the
end of the document indicate that the source’s version dovetails with
the comments of other sources, concluding that, "We find his account
of that episode credible. His accounts of other incidents are worth
recording as other evidence becomes available."
Document 31: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, What Happened on the Night of June 3/4? (June 22,
1989)
This document, as its authors state in the outset, "attempts to set
the record straight" about the events of the night of June 3-4.
Contrary to earlier reports in the western media, the cable asserts
that many if not most of the deaths associated with the crackdown
occurred on Changan Avenue and other streets surrounding the square,
rather than on Tiananmen Square itself. The document calls the notion
that the military could have suffered more casualties than civilians
"inconceivable," but holds that "civilian deaths probably did not
reach the figure of 3,000 used in some press reports," but believes
that the figure put forward by the Chinese Red Cross of 2,600 military
and civilian deaths with 7,000 wounded to be "not an unreasonable
estimate." The cable concludes with a detailed, hour-by-hour
chronology of the events of the night of June 3-4.
Document 32: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of
State, Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No. 65, June 27, 1700 Local (June 27,
1989)
This Embassy cable sent three weeks after President Bush announced a
package of sanctions against the PRC, informs that a Chinese military
official had lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. defense attaché
that "strongly protested recent U.S. military sanctions." The document
notes that, in response to the military sanctions, the official had
canceled the planned visits of U.S. military officials and the
discontinuation of exchanges of military personnel and the suspension
of visits with the U.S. defense attaché. Embassy officials felt this
to be a "measured response to U.S. sanctions," indicating that the
official "did not adopt a confrontational attitude and emphasized that
both sides should take a long-term view of the military
relationship."
Document 33: State Department document entitled "Themes" (June 29,
1989)
On June 30, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger embarked on a secret
mission to Beijing that, according to Scowcroft, was meant to "keep
open the lines of communication" between the U.S. and China. This
extraordinary document is a list of themes prepared for their meetings
with Chinese leaders. The document shows that the administration
stressed his personal interest in the maintenance of good relations,
and the interest of both countries in continuing strategic
cooperation. The Bush administration wanted to make clear that a harsh
crackdown a dissidents would make the broader relationship more
difficult to manage in the U.S. Although the way in which the PRC
deals with those of its citizens involved in the recent demonstrations
is "an internal affair," the document stresses that how American
people view and react to that behavior is also "an internal affair."
Emphasizing the importance of the long-term relationship, the document
notes that the president "wants to manage short-term events in a way
that will best assure a healthy relationship over time."
(Document provided by Jim Mann)
Document 34: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
"Status Report on Situation in China as of July 26, 1989"
Nearly two months after the crackdown of June 3-4 martial law still
prevailed in Beijing with, according to this brief status report,
"between 100,000 and 200,000 troops" remaining in the area. This
document provides a broad sketch of the bleak situation in China,
covering martial law, arrests and executions, the leadership crisis,
the mood of the Beijing population, the faltering economy, and China's
foreign relations. "Rivalries within the Politburo," the report
suggests, "are likely to heighten as the economy worsens and Deng and
other party elders sicken or die."
Document 35: State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
"China: Aftermath of the Crisis" (July 27, 1989)
This document, an intelligence research report, asks: "How did China
get to this point?" The report explores in detail the impact of the
crisis on China's domestic and foreign policy, and measures the
international reaction to the crackdown. The report also provides
brief biographic sketches of China's new leaders including Jiang
Zemin, Song Ping, Li Ruihuan, and Ding Guangen. Among the judgments
reached is that the situation in China would "remain unsettled at
least until Deng Xiaoping and other party elders die."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 ."It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Disturbances,"
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) editorial, April 26, 1989, Reprinted in
Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc Lambert. Beijing
Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict, The Basic Documents.
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), pp. 206-208.
2 .The order, issued by Li Peng, Premier of the State Council, on May
20 stated that, "In view of the serious turmoil in Beijing
Municipality ... the State Council has decided to enforce martial
law ... so as to check the turmoil with a firm hand...", Beijing
Spring, pp. 315-316; On May 24, executive vice chairman Yang Shangkun
spoke to the Central Military Commission: "Although martial law has
been declared, some of the martial law tasks have in fact not been
carried out... We can no longer retreat and must launch an
offensive... If any troops do not obey orders, I will punish those
responsible according to the military law.", "Main Points of Yang
Shangkun’s Speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting of the Central
Military Commission," Ming pao (Enlightenment) (Hong Kong), May 29,
1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 320-327.
3 .Beijing Spring, p. 401.
4 .On April 25, senior party leader Deng Xiaoping stated that,
"Comrade Yaobang was weak and retreated; he did not truly carry
through the campaign against bourgeois liberalization... He was weak
in the face of bourgeois liberalization... Now the posthumous
evaluation is too high." South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 31,
1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, p. 204-205; Zhao Ziyang, one of
Hu’s protégés, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (and
effectively only second to Deng Xiaoping) was also receiving harsh
criticism from senior leaders. On May 24, President Yang Shangkun
noted that, "Zhao’s attitude was the same as Hu Yaobang’s... The
current events are related to the failure to thoroughly carry out the
struggle against bourgeois liberalization and the failure to oppose
spiritual pollution." Beijing Spring, p. 325.
5 .On June 6, State Council Spokesman Yuan Mu, appeared on television
to speak about the "shocking counterrevolutionary rebellion." He
stated that "We have achieved the initial--or shall we say first step--
victory in crushing the rebellion. The rebellion has not been
completely quelled, however... I wish to make it clear that we should
not have mercy for those who planned the riots and those behind-the-
scenes organizers of the riots, because the contradictions between
them and us are of an antagonistic nature." Source: Beijing Television
Service, June 6, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 363-376.
6 .Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 110; At the meeting Deng reportedly told
Scowcroft that "China will persist in punishing those instigators of
the rebellion and its behind-the-scenes boss in accordance with
Chinese laws. China will by no means waver in its resolution of this
kind. Otherwise how can the PRC continue to exist?" A World
Transformed, p. 107.
7 .A World Transformed, p. 174.
8 .The Chinese, for their part, had lifted martial law, gave vague
assurances on missile sales, accredited a Voice of America
correspondent, and had released a small number of detainees.
9 .A World Transformed, pp. 178-179.
10 .A World Transformed, p. 179.
11. A World Transformed, p. 175.
12 ."China’s Growth ‘Justified Tiananmen Crackdown,’" The Straits
Times (Singapore), April 11, 1999, p. 19.
13 ."Students wanted democracy: Zhu," South China Morning Post, April
15, 1999, p. 1.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Return to the introduction
rst9
The Progressive Voice
maybe I'll retract my statement that 1989 Tiananmen Square was a
massacre of approximately 1500 people. here are the links to the
official declassified US state department documents on the CCP brutal
repression of chinese democracy activists.
here's the official declassified accounts and it is an understatement
of the casulties:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/13-01.htm
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/14-02.htm
thomaswheat1975
On Jun 11, 6:45 pm, AntiDabianchenVirus <wuso...@rocketmail.com>
wrote:
> On Jun 11, 6:05 pm, The Progressive Voice <thomaswheat1...@gmail.com>
> wrote:> This is a crock of shit, here are the original declassified docuements
> > on the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.
>
> (remainder of troll post trash snipped)
>
> Your whole life has been NOTHING but wild guesses, wrong assumptions,
> and infantile insults at people who don't share your ignorant views.
> That is why you need consolation from an alien "mystic" who promises a
> better life than the miserable one you are living.
>
> Proof that you, Tom Jigme Wheat, aka "The Progressive Voice", are a
> LIAR - nothing you say is of any value:
>
> On the 17th of February, 2011, you accused me of advocating the
> overthrow of American democracy, and "just a loud mouth with a one
> inch rice dick":
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/talk.politics.tibet/msg/3535c4db40a011...
>
> I have since then asked you to prove it and you couldn't. All you
> could do was beat around the bush and assume:
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.china/msg/555a9caec9d9e24b...
>
> making further accusations: "that makes you a foreign agent of the CCP
> in my book. If your here on a visa it will be soon revoked":
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.china/msg/f7d716c7958c0743...
> , knowing full-well That I am an American and that I support the
> American democracy in the USA:
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.china/msg/8e211f9563fe6443...
> .
> On the 5th of March, 2011, you finally admitted:
>
> "I cant prove that you want to see america overthrown"
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.china/msg/eca9ae060e064bc3...
>
> You are so dumb that you didn't even know the United States has
> different time zones:
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.china/msg/9353ea9cd1e264ba...
>
> When confronted again, all you could say was "go suck up to your
> racist friend house nigger"
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/soc.culture.china/msg/4da8eea9e620ae9e...
>
> You yourself have thus proven that you are a LIAR!
>
> Quod erat demonstrandum.
rst9
The Progressive Voice
maybe I'll retract my statement that 1989 Tiananmen Square was a
massacre of approximately 1500 people. here are the links to the
official declassified US state department documents on the CCP brutal
repression of chinese democracy activists.
here's the official declassified accounts and it is an understatement
of the casulties:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/13-01.htm
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/14-02.htm
thomaswheat1975
On Jun 11, 7:43 pm, The Progressive Voice <thomaswheat1...@gmail.com>
> > Quod erat demonstrandum.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
rst9
Steve Hayes
<thomasw...@gmail.com> wrote:
>as usual you are full of shit. Produce the wikileaks docuements and
>maybe I'll retract my statement that 1989 Tiananmen Square was a
WHO are you calling "full of shit"?
Accusing all sorts of people you don't know and have never met of being "full
of shit" for no reason at all is unlikely to get anyone to take anything you
say seriously.
Go and troll somewhere else.
--
Steve Hayes from Tshwane, South Africa
Web: http://hayesfam.bravehost.com/stevesig.htm
Blog: http://methodius.blogspot.com
E-mail - see web page, or parse: shayes at dunelm full stop org full stop uk
The Progressive Voice
a link showing the alleged Wikileaks documents, that allegedly purport
to say that the US government eye witness accounts confirmed that
there were no mass causalties of democracy protesters in 1989
Tiananmen Square, Beijing, I will assume that he is just a partisan,
crypto fascist corporate communist, until evidence of the contrary..
On Jun 12, 3:45 pm, The Progressive Voice <thomaswheat1...@gmail.com>
> > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
rst9
Steve Hayes
<thomasw...@gmail.com> wrote:
>Steve Hayes must be a chinese communist sympathiser, until he produces
>a link showing the alleged Wikileaks documents, that allegedly purport
>to say that the US government eye witness accounts confirmed that
>there were no mass causalties of democracy protesters in 1989
>Tiananmen Square, Beijing, I will assume that he is just a partisan,
>crypto fascist corporate communist, until evidence of the contrary..
Assume what you like, my china.
I haven't a clue what you're talking about.
AntiDabianchenVirus
> On Wed, 15 Jun 2011 17:39:09 -0700 (PDT), The Progressive Voice
>
> >Steve Hayes must be a chinese communist sympathiser, until he produces
> >a link showing the alleged Wikileaks documents, that allegedly purport
> >to say that the US government eye witness accounts confirmed that
> >there were no mass causalties of democracy protesters in 1989
> >Tiananmen Square, Beijing, I will assume that he is just a partisan,
> >crypto fascist corporate communist, until evidence of the contrary..
>
> Assume what you like, my china.
>
> I haven't a clue what you're talking about.
>
Neither does he.
Tom Jigme Wheat
> OM MONEY MONEY OM
> the GOLDEN TRUTH.
>
> http://tinyurl.com/4xmlkxb
> China's claims over Tiananmen Square backed
> Malcolm Moore, The Daily Telegraph: Friday, June 3, 2011
>
> Secret cables from the United States embassy in Beijing have shown there
> was no bloodshed inside Tiananmen Square when China put down student
> pro-democracy demonstrations 22 years ago.
>
> The cables, obtained by Wikileaks and released exclusively by The Daily
> Telegraph, partly confirm the Chinese government's account of the early
> hours of June 4, 1989. It has always insisted that soldiers did not
> massacre demonstrators inside the square.
english newspaper is largely a right wing tory propaganda machine, and
wikileaks is generally disposed to left wing ideologies. Until I see a
link from the actual wikileaks site, I can assume that the CCP, is
just astroturfing propaganda about how they never killed a thousand
people in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which in fact they did.
here's the official declassified accounts and it is an understatement
of the casulties:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/13-01.htm
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/14-02.htm
thomaswheat1975
>