Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.
Dismiss

Calcutta near-riot on Muharram

85 views
Skip to first unread message

Soumitra Bose

unread,
Jun 6, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/6/96
to

What happened in Kolkata?

Details are the first casualty in any propagandist environ.With
BJP in the offing , and especially in the face of its ignominous
defeat in the eastern and north-eastern states , they are
desparate to start some sort of "panga" to fight out the
syncretic pride of Bengalees. The tradition of starting the
henious most conspiracy and counter-putsch from the bastion of
people's unity is not new in India .Indira started in in 1957 in
kerala.Birla,Khaitan,Singhania and Goenka started pumping in
money in the "byamagars" of Gopal Pa(n)tha (meaning goat) and
Ram Pa(n)tha in Kolkata and culminated in the blood-shed of
1946.Even with a decade long preparation they could not incite
enough the bengalees then they funded the Sikhs and
Muslims(through Jamat and Muslim league in the Shayma-Nazimuddin
ministry) to make Kolkata the hell it turned out ,well they
achieved the partition against the chagrin of most
BEngalees.They kept on trying ever since. They tried this time
in Ekbalpur. Added to this was the internal political dynamics
of the non-bengali muslim community , there sub-terrainean
"conversion" from sunni to shiasim for one day of the year,
their teaming up against both the hindus ,dalits and mostly the
bengali muslims (their principal contenders in the tailoring and
garment industry), their ever increasing dream of a greater
lebensraum into the heart of South-24 Pargana and in Uluberia
across the river, all these gave rise a bed-partner in
convenience between the Jamat (The islamic students front in
particular) of Khidderpore,Ekbalpur,Moninpur and the Viswa Hindu
Porishad among the Bihari-expatriat Dalits of Dompara (the next
neighbourhood). Planned mop up of BEngali muslims and Bengali
Hindus from the region along with a deliberate ghettoisation of
the pauperised populace at the behest of the DADAs around had
complicated the issue. In the aftermath of the BAbri massacre
all the 35 people butchered belonged to hapless Hindus and
Bengali Muslims.With this backdrop we should view what happened
in Ekbalpur. Every year Moharram processions are lead through
common main roads and more through urbanized hindus areas as it
is very dangerous to rout them through Sunni areas. This time
also that was the plan . This time JAmat leaders wanted to lead
them through Dompara a predominanty DAlit neighbourhood with
known hoodlums of BJP ruling the neighbourhood. But there were
no way out through Dompara , one can not make Dompara a
throughfare. The actual target was the huge hinterland of
BEngali muslim areas of 24 Pargana behind that , these people
not only being Sunnis but also being Bengalees and supporting
Left parties have become an eye-sore to the Parhezgar Muslims of
Ekbalpur . Immediately joined in the leaders of RSS in Dompara
where they were taking shelter from the previous night.The plot
was simple , let the Shias and Sunnis fight it out and become
weak the BJP would show look how barbarians are the muslims
they can only stay cool under a Hindu rule- the same Lucknow
formula.The plot for Jamat was even simpler.Muslims in BEngal
had to be re-purified thru bloodshed and brought back to the
fundamentalist bandwagon. The Muharram procession persisted in
going through.People from the hinterlands too came pouring in
both from 24 PArganas and Howrah , almost everyone knew that
there is something in the offing even before the procession
started.Para-military had to be called , they fired
indiscriminately killing six rallyists .Even the local people
say that it is ok to sacrifice 6 to save at least 60,000 if riot
broke out between BEngalees and Shias(Bengalees hardly have any
Shia among them) , Hindus would join and no one knows what would
have happened .To top it all the rallyists started looting and
arsoning all the neighbourhood business establishments. Jyoti
BAbu with his typical snooty reckless burocratic attitude
replied "what should the police do when there is looting ?" .Now
here is the situation . People died , the leaders made hay .A
big disaster averted and once again the reckless Congress
leadership (who recently won Kolkata seats thru muslim votes on
slogan of job reservation for the ono-bengali-speaking muslim
minorities) let their goons do a little bit of "usual business"
of looting .Once again people have started praising the lefts
for no good job of themselves, once again the social fascists
got another shot in the arm by default, by the stupid acts of
the "right". Once again the most recalcitrant general person
would disgustingly say "CPM to monder bhalo".How long will this
shit go on? Well I guess , till the people take up the
leadership and the leaders follow suit.

Supratik Das

unread,
Jun 10, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/10/96
to


On 6 Jun 1996, Soumitra Bose wrote:

> What happened in Kolkata?
>
> Details are the first casualty in any propagandist environ.With


Good conspiracy theory. Ideal material for a political thriller or a
masala film. Don't get me wrong. It could well be true. I have two
questions: a) What is the source of this theory? Newpapers, magazines, etc.
b) BJP goons making Shias and Sunnis fight. Complicated theory. I thought
that the region is a Congress (I) stronghold and a more plausible
explanation would be that the Congressis as usual are trying to turn the
Muslims against the Left Govt. by creating this incident.


Regards,
Supratik

Soumitra Bose

unread,
Jun 11, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/11/96
to

In <Pine.SUN.3.91.960610...@alsys1.aecom.yu.edu>

Supratik Das <d...@aecom.yu.edu> writes:
>
>
>
>On 6 Jun 1996, Soumitra Bose wrote:
>
>> What happened in Kolkata?
>>
>> Details are the first casualty in any propagandist environ.With
>
>
>Good conspiracy theory. Ideal material for a political thriller or a
>masala film. Don't get me wrong. It could well be true. I have two
>questions: a) What is the source of this theory? Newpapers, magazines,
etc.
>b) BJP goons making Shias and Sunnis fight. Complicated theory. I
thought
>that the region is a Congress (I) stronghold and a more plausible
>explanation would be that the Congressis as usual are trying to turn
the
>Muslims against the Left Govt. by creating this incident.
>
>
>Regards,
>Supratik

Source are the reports of the fact-finding mission of APDR.PUCL and
some journalists of Aajkal(of course as a part of PUCL).
b) Nowhere it is said BJP "making" the SHias and Sunnis fight . it is
said that the preparations of BJP in the DOMPAra between two big
communities in Ekbalpur and the hinterland was eying to fishing in the
troubled waters of Shia and Sunni fight.
C) Nowhere it is said that Congress may not be involved, but the active
involvement of Congress goons were not very obvious , they could be
very well trying to fish too..and even why not KAlimuddin Shams's gang
too, how can one be sure ?Congress sure mobilized the non-bengali
speaking muslims under the banner of job reservations , so you could
very well be right , your conjectures could very well have happened
true .

Arindam Banerjee

unread,
Jun 12, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/12/96
to

soum...@ix.netcom.com(Soumitra Bose ) writes:

How long will this
>shit go on? Well I guess , till the people take up the
>leadership and the leaders follow suit.

Thank you for your article.
However, I am not clear as to who you think actually started
the trouble (without going back to history of Congress
manipulation and BJP motives). Looks like the culprit was
the Jamaat? They did not follow the set route?

If they started the trouble why should we blame anyone else?

To your final question there is of course no answer, but
I am also unclear as to what you mean by "people taking up
the leadership". How will they do that? You want the leaders
to follow the people, now does that mean extensive reliance on
opinion polling as is the custom in Western countries?

Regards,

Arindam Banerjee

Soumitra Bose

unread,
Jun 13, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/13/96
to

In <4plmvm$k...@pegasus.trl.OZ.AU> bane...@newsserver.trl.oz.au

(Arindam Banerjee) writes:
>
>soum...@ix.netcom.com(Soumitra Bose ) writes:
>
>How long will this
>>shit go on? Well I guess , till the people take up the
>>leadership and the leaders follow suit.
>
>Thank you for your article.
>However, I am not clear as to who you think actually started
>the trouble (without going back to history of Congress
>manipulation and BJP motives). Looks like the culprit was
>the Jamaat? They did not follow the set route?
>
>If they started the trouble why should we blame anyone else?
>
>To your final question there is of course no answer, but
>I am also unclear as to what you mean by "people taking up
>the leadership". How will they do that? You want the leaders
>to follow the people, now does that mean extensive reliance on
>opinion polling as is the custom in Western countries?
>
>Regards,
>
>Arindam Banerjee


\it was undoubtedly the Jamaat and the Congressi Muslim goons who
started it all , but the BJP of the Dompara jumped immidiately into
it.Well always such a situation can become dangerous when two parties
come face to face.

Taking up people's leadership could be achieved by the people's
institution like the para committees and Gram samities and resistance
forces .In the after math of the Babri massacre , the Bengal villages
unitedly rose up and maintained a strict vigil against any outsiders ,
nothing happened in the countryside, it went bad only in the same
Ekbalpoor area .

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 13, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/13/96
to

Arindam Banerjee <bane...@newsserver.trl.oz.au> wrote:
>
>To your final question there is of course no answer, but
>I am also unclear as to what you mean by "people taking up
>the leadership". How will they do that? You want the leaders
>to follow the people, now does that mean extensive reliance on
>opinion polling as is the custom in Western countries?

Very good question, and one which opens a can of worms.

The short and simple answer to this question is "direct democracy",
as opposed to "indirect democracy", as we currently have, which
is not much better than "no democracy at all".

How can we have direct democracy? To answer that question, I will
refer you to my posts on anarcho-syndicalism. Very briefly, direct
democracy means running everything through decentralized workers'
councils (in the case of production) and through consumers'
co-operatives (in the case of housing, banks, etc) on the one-man,
one-vote principles. The basic principle is that people get to
decide _directly_, on a daily basis, how to set policy, rather
than elect one person who decides for them over the next five years.

This will of course have several consequences. First of all, direct
democracy can work only when the units are small (this is why the
immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).
Secondly, such a society will mean that the nation-state as we know
it will cease to exist, which IMO would be a good thing.

Apratim Sarkar

unread,
Jun 13, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/13/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>This will of course have several consequences. First of all, direct
>democracy can work only when the units are small (this is why the
>immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
>each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).

Mote pNashsho!? Ki production habe e'i lokbal niye (tribal dance'r
baire)? Ekta steel plant toiri kara jabe ki?

Incidentally restriction'ta implemented holo kibhabe? 501 hoye gele
jabai na split?

Apratim.

PS: Sayan, ja bala'r shab SCB'te, mone achhe to? Private email
pathalei post kore debo, INS, UN, NATO ki RSS/BHP'keo pathate pari,
mone rekho ...

--
Likhlam Bichitra Das'ke Disclaimer: The opinions expressed are
"Bohudin dekhini akash'ke| are my own and shouldn't be construed in
Ushno tomar smriti ekhono any way to represent that of my employer.
Amar e hriadyer flask'e|"

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 13, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/13/96
to

asa...@us.oracle.com (Apratim Sarkar) writes:

>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>>This will of course have several consequences. First of all, direct
>>democracy can work only when the units are small (this is why the
>>immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
>>each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).

> Incidentally restriction'ta implemented holo kibhabe? 501 hoye gele
> jabai na split?


501 hobe-tai ba ki kore? Chhele-pile na korar daashkhot diye
co-operative-e dhukte hoy. Tarpor waiting list-e naam likhiye
boshe thaka. Keu morle waiting list-er prothomjon-er daak
poDe.

Mohamaari laagle co-operative-e baaji poDe, mod-er bonya
boye jay. She boDo shukh-er somoy.


Sambit

hello

unread,
Jun 13, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/13/96
to Soumitra Bose

only a test

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 14, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/14/96
to

Apratim Sarkar <asa...@us.oracle.com> wrote:
>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>
>>This will of course have several consequences. First of all, direct
>>democracy can work only when the units are small (this is why the
>>immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
>>each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).
>
> Mote pNashsho!? Ki production habe e'i lokbal niye (tribal dance'r
> baire)? Ekta steel plant toiri kara jabe ki?

Have you done any reading on the Mondragon co-operatives? I recommend
that you do so. The Mondragon co-operatives were started in the 1950s
in the Basque autonomous region of Spain by a veteran of the Spanish
Civil War. Today they have a net worth of more than $ 3 billion. The
co-operatives consist of banks, hospitals, schools, housing and factories
producing electronics, consumer durables and, YES, steel plants (the
Basque country is rich in iron ore).

Whenever a co-operative membership exceeds 500, two co-operatives are
created in the place of the old one. Thus, the co-operative movement
keeps growing, while individual co-operatives continue to enjoy direct
democracy with member participation at every level.


>
> Incidentally restriction'ta implemented holo kibhabe? 501 hoye gele
> jabai na split?

Until the 1960s there was no upper limit on the size of the individual
co-operatives within the Mondragon group. Then gradually it was discovered
that direct democracy was not feasible in co-operatives with very large
membership. So the Mondragon general assembly (which consists of
representatives of all the co-operatives within the Mondragon group)
voluntarily decided, through the usual democratic decision-making process,
to limit the maximum membership of each co-operative to 500.

You should really read up on Mondragon. It is a fascinating
story and will make you rethink about your default assumptions in a lot of
ways.

-Sayan.

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 14, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/14/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> 501 hobe-tai ba ki kore? Chhele-pile na korar daashkhot diye
> co-operative-e dhukte hoy. Tarpor waiting list-e naam likhiye
> boshe thaka. Keu morle waiting list-er prothomjon-er daak
> poDe.
>
> Mohamaari laagle co-operative-e baaji poDe, mod-er bonya
> boye jay. She boDo shukh-er somoy.

Sambit,

Do you realize that it only makes you look like a fool when you post
without doing any reading and without any background knowledge of
what you are talking about?

Check out my reply to Apratim.

-Sayan.

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 14, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/14/96
to

bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Sambit,

>Do you realize that it only makes you look like a fool when you post
>without doing any reading and without any background knowledge of
>what you are talking about?

Shotti bolte ki, aage korini. Tobe ebar korlum. Bujhlum
besh kharap laage! Tumi ki kore addin chaliye jachchho
Sayan?


>Check out my reply to Apratim.

Apratim tomake onyo thread khule probhuto proshno korechhe.
Tobe tomar opor amar probol bhorsha, jaani tumi tomar pokkhe
shubidhejonok proshnogulo-r uttor debe aar bakigulo paati
chepe jaabe. Shei bhorshar shutre-i aami kichhu sorol
proshno raakhi.

bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Apratim Sarkar <asa...@us.oracle.com> wrote:

>>>(this is why the
>>>immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
>>>each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).

>> Mote pNashsho!? Ki production habe e'i lokbal niye (tribal dance'r
>> baire)? Ekta steel plant toiri kara jabe ki?

>The Mondragon co-operatives were started in the 1950s
>in the Basque autonomous region of Spain by a veteran of the Spanish
>Civil War. Today they have a net worth of more than $ 3 billion.


Inital capital koto chhilo, elo kotha theke?

>The
>co-operatives consist of banks, hospitals, schools, housing and factories
>producing electronics, consumer durables and, YES, steel plants (the
>Basque country is rich in iron ore).


Factory-gulo-r, especially, steel plant-er sommondhe
kotokgulo info chaile asha kori debe.

1. Number of employee.
2. Output volume.
3. Net Revenue (before tax, salary etc.)
4. Net profit.
5. Market segment. Maane product kara kene?
6. Management structure. Company decision kibhabe neowa
hoy.
7. Operating efficiency.
8. Employee reward policy. Salary day kina, promotion/raise
hoy kina ityadi. Hole sheta ke/kara decide kore.

Apatoto eigulo-i dao.

(Hard facts, hNya? Tomar naake-kaanna "US-er pNaaji
bNyabshayee-ra oNder bhNalo thNakte dNichchhe nNa" juDle
please onyo para-y dio.)


>Until the 1960s there was no upper limit on the size of the individual
>co-operatives within the Mondragon group. Then gradually it was discovered
>that direct democracy was not feasible in co-operatives with very large
>membership. So the Mondragon general assembly (which consists of
>representatives of all the co-operatives within the Mondragon group)

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Do I need to say more, Sayan?


Sambit

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 15, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/15/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
>>The Mondragon co-operatives were started in the 1950s
>>in the Basque autonomous region of Spain by a veteran of the Spanish
>>Civil War. Today they have a net worth of more than $ 3 billion.
>
> Inital capital koto chhilo, elo kotha theke?

I do not have the exact dollar value of the initial capital at my
fingertips. However, the initial capital was raised by borrowing
money from the local Basque vilagers. They didn't get any loans
from banks etc. because this was under the Franco regime, and Franco
was hostile towards any local Basque activity as the Basques had
opposed him almost to a man during the civil war. As the Basque
villages were generally rather poor, the initial capital cannot
have been very large.

> Factory-gulo-r, especially, steel plant-er sommondhe
> kotokgulo info chaile asha kori debe.
>
> 1. Number of employee.

Variable, but always less than 500.

> 2. Output volume.

Large; they export steel all over Europe.

> 3. Net Revenue (before tax, salary etc.)
> 4. Net profit.

Will look up and post.

> 5. Market segment. Maane product kara kene?

The products are sold all over Spain. They are also exported
to different countries in Europe.

> 6. Management structure. Company decision kibhabe neowa
> hoy.

This is a very interesting question, one which I was interested in
when I started reading about Mondragon.

There are two kinds of co-operatives within the Mondragon group: producing
co-operatives and consuming co-operatives. Producing co-operatives are
the ones which produce goods (steel plants, manufacturing plants) and
consuming co-operatives are those which provide services (hospitals,
universities, schools and housing). Producing co-operatives are run by
workers' councils using direct democracy. Each producing co-operative
has to contribute a fixed percentage (10%, if I recall correctly) of
its profit to the consuming co-ops. Consuming co-ops are run by the
members of the co-op as well as delegates from the producing co-ops.

> 7. Operating efficiency.

Can you explain what you mean by the term?

> 8. Employee reward policy. Salary day kina, promotion/raise
> hoy kina ityadi. Hole sheta ke/kara decide kore.

First of all, it is not a _employee_ reward policy, -- in a co-op
there is no distinction between employer or employee. Everyone is
a _member_ of the co-op. One way of thinking about it is that you
are both employer and employee, because you both collectively own
the co-op and work in it.

Co-op members pay themselves a salary. The salary varies depending
on the nature of work, BUT -- this is what I found very interesting
-- they have a rule that under no circumstance would the least paid
worker's hourly rate be less than one-third the highest paid woker's
hourly rate.

When you become a co-op member in Mondragon, you automatically own a share
in the co-op. However, this share-ownership differs from normal capitalist
shareholding in two respects: (1) the share is not "private property";
you cannot sell it off to another party. (2) Every co-op member owns
an equal share in the co-operative; thus unlike a normal shareholding
company where decisions are taken on the basis of one-share, one vote,
in Mondragon decisions are taken on the basis of one person, one vote.

When you leave the co-op, you relinquish the share, but you get to keep
the increase in value of the share since you joined (or you have to pay the
decrease in value of the share). This is the incentive -- the co-op
member has a stake in higher productivity because his or her gains will
be higher when she leaves the co-op if the co-op has been doing well.


> (Hard facts, hNya? Tomar naake-kaanna "US-er pNaaji
> bNyabshayee-ra oNder bhNalo thNakte dNichchhe nNa" juDle
> please onyo para-y dio.)

There is no need for that. During the global recession in the early
1980s, the Mondragon group continued to post profits every year, and
they set a record of sorts by not downsizing any of the constituent
co-ops and by not laying off a single employee throughout the recession.

>>Until the 1960s there was no upper limit on the size of the individual
>>co-operatives within the Mondragon group. Then gradually it was discovered
>>that direct democracy was not feasible in co-operatives with very large
>>membership. So the Mondragon general assembly (which consists of
>>representatives of all the co-operatives within the Mondragon group)
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> Do I need to say more, Sayan?

Yes, you do, because you misunderstood what I meant by "representative"
above. In the Mondragon general assembly any member from any co-op is
free to attend and vote. In practice however not all members attend
the general assembly (some members would perhaps spend time on the
beach or with their families), and so whoever attends the general
assembly represents their respective co-operative.

-Sayan.

P.S. Sambit, I am assuming that you are asking for this information
because you are generally interested in knowing the answers and hence
I have provided the answers. However, I think that you had better
think about being a little more polite when you ask questions. You
will find people much more inclined to answer you when you ask your
questions in a polite and respectful way. Thank you.

Soumitra Bose

unread,
Jun 15, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/15/96
to

>The short and simple answer to this question is "direct democracy",
>as opposed to "indirect democracy", as we currently have, which
>is not much better than "no democracy at all".
>
>How can we have direct democracy? To answer that question, I will
>refer you to my posts on anarcho-syndicalism. Very briefly, direct
>democracy means running everything through decentralized workers'
>councils (in the case of production) and through consumers'
>co-operatives (in the case of housing, banks, etc) on the one-man,
>one-vote principles. The basic principle is that people get to
>decide _directly_, on a daily basis, how to set policy, rather
>than elect one person who decides for them over the next five years.
>

>This will of course have several consequences. First of all, direct

>democracy can work only when the units are small (this is why the

>immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
>each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).

>Secondly, such a society will mean that the nation-state as we know
>it will cease to exist, which IMO would be a good thing.
>
>
>
>


Very good example , there are ways of direct democracy or participative
democracies through production and distribution units , each competing
with the others.

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 16, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/16/96
to

bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>>
>>>The Mondragon co-operatives were started in the 1950s
>>>in the Basque autonomous region of Spain by a veteran of the Spanish
>>>Civil War. Today they have a net worth of more than $ 3 billion.
>>
>> Inital capital koto chhilo, elo kotha theke?

>I do not have the exact dollar value of the initial capital at my
>fingertips.

Is it possible to get the dollar amount, say, within
5% accuracy?

>However, the initial capital was raised by borrowing
>money from the local Basque vilagers. They didn't get any loans
>from banks etc. because this was under the Franco regime, and Franco
>was hostile towards any local Basque activity as the Basques had
>opposed him almost to a man during the civil war. As the Basque
>villages were generally rather poor, the initial capital cannot
>have been very large.

Considering your assumption to be true, there was a
generation of wealth from outside the co-operative,
selling their product "all over Spain" and also
exporting to "different countries in Europe". If I
assume here that the buyers are not all co-operatives
then it is for sure that the MCs competed in the
general "capitalist" market and generated wealth and surplus?
And where did the surplus go (3 billion dollars)? It was shared
by the members of the co-operative(s). Ei obdi thik aachhe?

Ta'le akta "western corporation"-er shonge, ei dik
diye dekhle, MC-r tofat-ta kothay? MC-r shareholder-ra
co-operative-e thake aar WC-r shareholder-ra thaake na,
ei karon-e?

>> Factory-gulo-r, especially, steel plant-er sommondhe
>> kotokgulo info chaile asha kori debe.
>>
>> 1. Number of employee.

>Variable, but always less than 500.

Being an engineer by training, please don't talk like
a layman. 10-o 500-r theke kom, 490-o.

Jodi jana na thake tahole ami opekkha korbo Sayan.
5% accuracy-te figure-ta dile-i cholbe.


>> 2. Output volume.

>Large; they export steel all over Europe.

Baaaah. Output volume: Large. Let me quote you:

"Do you realize that it only makes you look like a fool
when you post without doing any reading and without any
background knowledge of what you are talking about?"

Ami opekkha korte paari Sayan. Go, and do some reading,
PLEASE.

>> 3. Net Revenue (before tax, salary etc.)
>> 4. Net profit.

>Will look up and post.

Thank you. I'll wait.


>> 5. Market segment. Maane product kara kene?

>The products are sold all over Spain. They are also exported
>to different countries in Europe.

>> 6. Management structure. Company decision kibhabe neowa
>> hoy.

>This is a very interesting question, one which I was interested in
>when I started reading about Mondragon.

>There are two kinds of co-operatives within the Mondragon group: producing
>co-operatives and consuming co-operatives. Producing co-operatives are
>the ones which produce goods (steel plants, manufacturing plants) and
>consuming co-operatives are those which provide services (hospitals,
>universities, schools and housing). Producing co-operatives are run by
>workers' councils using direct democracy. Each producing co-operative
>has to contribute a fixed percentage (10%, if I recall correctly) of
>its profit to the consuming co-ops. Consuming co-ops are run by the
>members of the co-op as well as delegates from the producing co-ops.

Who are the members of the workers' council? How exactly
does it work in the steel plant (let's confine our discussion
within the domain of steel plant)? How does the budget
allocation work for different departments? Target production
ki bhabe thik kora hoy?

>> 7. Operating efficiency.

>Can you explain what you mean by the term?

Dhoro akta machine 1" dia-r lohar ball toiri kore. Machina-ta
ghontay 100-ta ball toiri korte paare.

Dhoro aar akta machine oi 1" dia-r ball niye shegulo-r
dia komiye .5" kore day. Ei machine-tao ghontay 100-ta
ball process korte paare.

Ebar akta plant-e dhoro ei duto machine-i shudhu aachhe.
Karkhana-ta jodi akghonta chole 100-ta .5" dia-r ball
produce korte paare, ta'le karkhana-tar operating
efficiency 100%. Jodi 66-ta kore ta'le 66%.

Plant efficiency hisheb onek bhabe kora jay. Measure-gulo
_motamuti_ comparable.


>> 8. Employee reward policy. Salary day kina, promotion/raise
>> hoy kina ityadi. Hole sheta ke/kara decide kore.

>Co-op members pay themselves a salary. The salary varies depending
>on the nature of work,

Kon kaaj-er ki salary ki kore thik hoy? Gono-vote-e?

Karur konodin maine baaDe? Keu konodin chhuti nay? Karur
kono boss/supervisor aachhe? Keu kauke kono kaaj korte
nirdesh dite paare?


>When you become a co-op member in Mondragon, you automatically own a share
>in the co-op. However, this share-ownership differs from normal capitalist
>shareholding in two respects: (1) the share is not "private property";
>you cannot sell it off to another party. (2) Every co-op member owns
>an equal share in the co-operative; thus unlike a normal shareholding
>company where decisions are taken on the basis of one-share, one vote,
>in Mondragon decisions are taken on the basis of one person, one vote.

>When you leave the co-op, you relinquish the share, but you get to keep
>the increase in value of the share since you joined (or you have to pay the
>decrease in value of the share). This is the incentive -- the co-op
>member has a stake in higher productivity because his or her gains will
>be higher when she leaves the co-op if the co-op has been doing well.

Onek "capitalist" company je employee-der share day, sheta-r
theke MC-r tofaat-ta kothay. Tumi co-operative chhaDle tomar
financial gain hobe share beche. Duto system-i profit-driven.

Borong capitalist system-e flexibility beshi, share bechte
hole company chhaDte hobe na.


>P.S. Sambit, I am assuming that you are asking for this information
>because you are generally interested in knowing the answers and hence
>I have provided the answers.

I don't think that you have provided the answers. Output
volume "large" and number of employee is anything between
0 and 500 cannot qualify as answers to me in this kind of
discussion.


>However, I think that you had better
>think about being a little more polite when you ask questions. You
>will find people much more inclined to answer you when you ask your
>questions in a polite and respectful way. Thank you.


Byapar-ta arektu gobhirbhabe bhabbar cheshta koro Sayan.
Proshno-ta politeness-er noy, chornic amasha-r.

Dhoro X lok-ta US corporation-er lomohorshok shoshonkahini
rattirbela niyomito poDe chronic amasha bNadhiye phelechhe.
Y-er akta post X (taar amasha-jonito kaorne) right spirit-e na
nite pere "boka" bole khisti korlo. Y tokhon X-ke kichhu
proshno korle (hoyto ektu chNachhachhola kore) sheta-r
jonne mul dayitto kaar? Y-er politeness-er obhab na
X-er chronic amasha?

Bhabo Sayan, bhabo.


Sambit

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 16, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/16/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> Considering your assumption to be true, there was a
> generation of wealth from outside the co-operative,
> selling their product "all over Spain" and also
> exporting to "different countries in Europe". If I
> assume here that the buyers are not all co-operatives
> then it is for sure that the MCs competed in the
> general "capitalist" market and generated wealth and surplus?
> And where did the surplus go (3 billion dollars)? It was shared
> by the members of the co-operative(s). Ei obdi thik aachhe?

Yes.

>
> Ta'le akta "western corporation"-er shonge, ei dik
> diye dekhle, MC-r tofat-ta kothay? MC-r shareholder-ra
> co-operative-e thake aar WC-r shareholder-ra thaake na,
> ei karon-e?

No, that is not the source of the difference.

The difference is in the following aspects (consider a producing co-op):

1) In a capitalist corporation, shareholders and employees are different groups
of people. You can be an employee and a shareholder at the same time, but
there exist shareholders who are not employees, and employees who are not
shareholders. Thus, in the case of a capitalist corporation, it makes
sense to talk about "empoyers" and "employees" (because the shareholders
as a group employ the workers as a group).

In a co-operative, there is no distinction between shareholder and
"employee". Anyone who works in a co-op also owns the co-op as an equal
partner, and vice versa. The co-op does not admit of the possibility that
there will exist workers who do not own and owners who do not work,
whereas a corporation does admit of that possibility (in fact that is
the norm for most corporations).

This is the fundamental difference.

2) As a consequence of (1) above, you have direct democracy in a co-op because
the policy-setting body is constituted entirely of workers. Because each
co-op member owns equal shares, every memeber has equal voting power (unlike
corporations, where the voting power is one-share-one vote rather than one
person-one-vote).

> Who are the members of the workers' council? How exactly
> does it work in the steel plant (let's confine our discussion
> within the domain of steel plant)? How does the budget
> allocation work for different departments? Target production
> ki bhabe thik kora hoy?

The councils of each co-op consists of every member in the co-op who has equal
voting rights. Budget allocation and setting targets are done through voting
majority decision prevails). Sometimes members from other co-ops (who have
expertise in a particular area) are invited to come and talk before the council
to explain the issues on which they are voting, but they are strictly in an
advisory capacity -- the final decision rests with the council after they had
gotten to hear both sides of the issue. (I watched a video documentary on
Mondragon recently in which they showed footage showing exactly how the
process works in real life. I will hunt out details of the documentary for you
so that you can also watch it.)


>
> Kon kaaj-er ki salary ki kore thik hoy? Gono-vote-e?

Yes.

> Karur konodin maine baaDe? Keu konodin chhuti nay? Karur
> kono boss/supervisor aachhe? Keu kauke kono kaaj korte
> nirdesh dite paare?

Yes. There are chains of command, but what the chains of command should be,
have been decided through voting. Anyone can introduce a motion on the floor
of the council to have a chain of command modified. If the motion passes,
the chain will be modified.

> Onek "capitalist" company je employee-der share day, sheta-r
> theke MC-r tofaat-ta kothay. Tumi co-operative chhaDle tomar
> financial gain hobe share beche. Duto system-i profit-driven.

The difference is that in a capitalist corporation, it is not a _necessary_
condition that in order to be a member you also have to own share, and vice
versa. There can be employees without ownership of shares and there can be
shareholders who are not employees. If E is the set of employees and S the set
of shareholders, in a capitalist corporation S and E can be disjoint or
they can partially overlap. In Mondragon, the two sets are _identical_.

> Y-er akta post X (taar amasha-jonito kaorne) right spirit-e na
> nite pere "boka" bole khisti korlo.

I did not call you a "fool". I know that you are not one. I said that you "look
like a fool" when you post meaningless things without doing the necessary
background research.

The two things are different.

I will look up the answers to your outstanding questions from the library of
our co-op. You will get your answers within 8-10 days.

-Sayan.

Arindam Banerjee

unread,
Jun 17, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/17/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:


>The short and simple answer to this question is "direct democracy",
>as opposed to "indirect democracy", as we currently have, which
>is not much better than "no democracy at all".

I would not be too sure of that. It sounds rather like the old
Communist slogan "Yeh Azaadi Jhoota Hai".

>How can we have direct democracy? To answer that question, I will
>refer you to my posts on anarcho-syndicalism. Very briefly, direct
>democracy means running everything through decentralized workers'
>councils (in the case of production) and through consumers'
>co-operatives (in the case of housing, banks, etc) on the one-man,
>one-vote principles. The basic principle is that people get to
>decide _directly_, on a daily basis, how to set policy, rather
>than elect one person who decides for them over the next five years.

Running EVERYTHING? Defence, monetary policy, import-export...?

>This will of course have several consequences. First of all, direct
>democracy can work only when the units are small (this is why the
>immensely successful Mondragon co-operatives of Spain restricted
>each co-operative to a membership of not more than 500 people).
>Secondly, such a society will mean that the nation-state as we know
>it will cease to exist, which IMO would be a good thing.

How do you think your band of 500 people will fare against militant
fundamentalist forces?
Nation-states may or may not be a good thing, but they do guarantee
some sort of peace for the people. A minimum unit of 500 - well,
they cannot even withstand robbers, let alone highly trained
mercenaries.
The moment your band of 500 decides that for protection they need to
unite with other bands of 500, they are once again ascending from the
tribal state to nation state - exactly as now. Why regress?

Arindam Banerjee
Disclaimer: My opinions do not involve my employer

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 17, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/17/96
to

Arindam Banerjee <bane...@newsserver.trl.oz.au> wrote:

>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>>The short and simple answer to this question is "direct democracy",
>>as opposed to "indirect democracy", as we currently have, which
>>is not much better than "no democracy at all".

>I would not be too sure of that.


In India today, roughly 1 in 3 people do not get to eat enough to
provide the bare daily minimum of 1200 calories per day. Yes, elite
people like you or me who do telecom research or write computer
software, have it good under the current power arrangements in India.
But what has it given India's poor? What has it given the children
who did not have the good luck like us to be born into the elite class?


>Running EVERYTHING? Defence, monetary policy, import-export...?

Once the nation-state ceases to exist, the above may not be important.

>The moment your band of 500 decides that for protection they need to
>unite with other bands of 500, they are once again ascending from the
>tribal state to nation state - exactly as now. Why regress?

Your conclusion does not follow from your premise. Why on earth does
forming a temporary alliance with other communities against a common
enemy, make a regression to nation-state-hood inevitable?

Take an analogous example from history: the city-states of ancient
Greece, such as Athens and Sparta, often formed temporary alliances
against common enemies (e.g. against the Persians at Thermopylae).
Such alliances did not lead to amalgamation of the city-states into
a nation-state. Why then should co-operative communities uniting
against common enemies necessarily lead to re-emergence of the
nation-state? It is not clear to me at all.

N. Tiwari

unread,
Jun 17, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/17/96
to

On 6 Jun 1996, Soumitra Bose wrote:

> What happened in Kolkata?
>
> Details are the first casualty in any propagandist environ.With

Soumitra:

There is a saying (lokokti) in Hindi:

sawan key andhey ko hara hee haraa hee dikhtaa hai.

(A person, blinded in rainy season, sees only green).

For all I knew, the BJP, the communal party it is, can
never get a foothold in the 'bhadra'-lok. Now you seem
to say atleast a bit opposite. Or is it that the bhadra-
lok is fallible too.

Guess what, who created the E. Bengal. Not Curzon, and
not BJP either.

--
Nachiketa Tiwari

=====================================================
750 Tall Oaks Drive 118 Patton Hall
Apt. # 3600 I Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA 24060. Blacksburg, VA 24061.
(540)-951-3979 (540)-231-4611
=====================================================

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 17, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/17/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

> In a co-operative, there is no distinction between shareholder and
> "employee". Anyone who works in a co-op also owns the co-op as an equal
> partner, and vice versa. The co-op does not admit of the possibility that
> there will exist workers who do not own and owners who do not work,
> whereas a corporation does admit of that possibility (in fact that is
> the norm for most corporations).

> This is the fundamental difference.

All these are very good. But, here, we pause for a second to
look back to find what the real objective of a _producing_
co-op is. If it is to implement "direct democracy",
then the co-op may be working great. But
then why do we need *producing* co-op for that? As the name
suggests production must be the main objective of the
co-op.

Now if optimizing the production is the main objective, than how
does it matter whether the show is run by direct democracy, as
long as, the output is optimized and everybody shares the
profit/income equally among themselves. I have a strong feeling
that a hierarchical organizational structure is better suited than
a strictly horizontal org. structure for running such businesses.

As your claim goes, the members of the co-operative share
the profit equally among themselves, unlike a "capitalist"
corporation. Now, for the time being let us forget about the
internal mechanics of the co-op. The steel produced by the
co-op is coming to the market. It has a price-tag on it, which
is also driven by profit. So, from an external buyer's POV,
here is another organization selling its product and making
profit like any other "capitalist" organization. So from his
POV, there is no difference between the two. The only two guiding
parameters for his decision to buy this steel or that are
quality of the steel and the price. And as I have already
pointed out (and will stick to that unless refuted by solid data)
that a hierarchical org. structure will run a plant more efficiently
(and thereby producing cheaper priced steel and making better use
of the natural or other resources) than a strictly
horizontal structured management, keeping other things constant.


>The councils of each co-op consists of every member in the co-op who has equal
>voting rights. Budget allocation and setting targets are done through voting
>majority decision prevails). Sometimes members from other co-ops (who have
>expertise in a particular area) are invited to come and talk before the council
>to explain the issues on which they are voting, but they are strictly in an
>advisory capacity -- the final decision rests with the council after they had
>gotten to hear both sides of the issue.

So, the basic assumption is that _anybody_ can take a right
decision in some specialized/technical field just by hearing
the both sides' view; mind you the decision must be pretty
difficult to take as they are seeking external expertise.

Another point here that should be taken into account that,
suppose it requires 5 minutes to take a paricular decision,
specialist-nonspecialist alike (which I strongly disagree).
If the president of the compnay and four VPs would have
taken the decision, it would only take 25 man-minutes.
Whereas in a horizontal structure the decision-taking itself
takes 2500 man-minutes, which is more than 40 man-hours (for
simplicity, I am ignoring the time to perform other
"democratic" paraphernalia). What a utter wastage of resource!!

After hearing what you've said it seems to me that it's a
perfect debate hall and everybody is being as democratic as
possible and the main goal - the production - gets a distant
back seat.

>(I watched a video documentary on
>Mondragon recently in which they showed footage showing exactly how the
>process works in real life. I will hunt out details of the documentary
>for you
>so that you can also watch it.)

Will love to get the pointer. Thanks.


>> Kon kaaj-er ki salary ki kore thik hoy? Gono-vote-e?

>Yes.

See above. Our Janitor may think that the engineers are
a bunch of jokers, who sitting in front of computers and
munching chips, do nothing. The packers may think so, the
receiving guys may think so, the cafeteria attendants may
think so, the machinists may think so...The result? The
engineers pay-check. Are you familiar with different
motivational theories?

BTW, do you have any data on the personnel turnover of the
plant, in other words, the avg. number of years a person
(I am specially interested in information for technical
people) stays with the producing co-op?


>> Karur konodin maine baaDe? Keu konodin chhuti nay? Karur
>> kono boss/supervisor aachhe? Keu kauke kono kaaj korte
>> nirdesh dite paare?

>Yes. There are chains of command, but what the chains of command should be,
>have been decided through voting. Anyone can introduce a motion on the floor
>of the council to have a chain of command modified. If the motion passes,
>the chain will be modified.

See above. Democracy it may be, but utterly amateurish.


>The difference is that in a capitalist corporation, it is not a _necessary_
>condition that in order to be a member you also have to own share, and vice
>versa. There can be employees without ownership of shares and there can be
>shareholders who are not employees. If E is the set of employees and S the set
>of shareholders, in a capitalist corporation S and E can be disjoint or
>they can partially overlap. In Mondragon, the two sets are _identical_.

But I guess my question is how does it help:

1) People except the members of that particular set of the
co-op.

Why don't you understand that, wrt the people outside the
co-op. these people are privileged in the same way as the
shareholders of a "capitalist" company.

But, in a "capitalist" company, even if I don't have the
right expertise, I can go to the share-market, buy shares
and enjoy the profit of a company which is being managed
by people who are experts in that field. On the other hand,
I can apply my expertise and help managing another company
in another field whose shares are held by the employees
of the first company.

>I will look up the answers to your outstanding questions from the library of
>our co-op. You will get your answers within 8-10 days.

Thanks.


Sambit


Soumitra Bose

unread,
Jun 18, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/18/96
to

In <4q4crc$1...@solaris.cc.vt.edu> nti...@rs3.esm.vt.edu (N. Tiwari)
writes:
>
> On 6 Jun 1996, Soumitra Bose wrote:
>
>> What happened in Kolkata?
>>
>> Details are the first casualty in any propagandist environ.With
>
>Soumitra:
>
>There is a saying (lokokti) in Hindi:
>
>sawan key andhey ko hara hee haraa hee dikhtaa hai.

What a wonderful note this is to come from a BJP. I write in the two
SCBs , as I am interested in them , here I get a artistic rebuttal in
Hindi , (still they could not get a bengali to write in the SCBs,) well
Non-bengalees are very much welcome here in our SCBs , the only
expectation is that they would know a little bit of Bengal's history or
civilisation.Since that is too much to ask from a BJP brain , I guess
we have to get contented with this.

>
>(A person, blinded in rainy season, sees only green).
>
>For all I knew, the BJP, the communal party it is, can
>never get a foothold in the 'bhadra'-lok. Now you seem
>to say atleast a bit opposite. Or is it that the bhadra-
>lok is fallible too.
>

It is true , we call in bengalee "Bhadroloker Chele" cannot be a hate
campaigner , so that is why they are no where in Bengal .And they are
even less in the villages ,as bengal's country side is more conscious.

>Guess what, who created the E. Bengal. Not Curzon, and
>not BJP either.
>

Yes Bengal was divided by the non-bengali speaking Banias who funded
Hindu MAhasabha and the hindu leaders of Congress, For the names and
amount they funded and the role palyed please check out Joya
Chatterjee's BEngal divided-The Hindu communalism.

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 18, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/18/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> All these are very good. But, here, we pause for a second to
> look back to find what the real objective of a _producing_
> co-op is. If it is to implement "direct democracy",
> then the co-op may be working great. But
> then why do we need *producing* co-op for that? As the name
> suggests production must be the main objective of the
> co-op.
>
> Now if optimizing the production is the main objective, than how
> does it matter whether the show is run by direct democracy, as
> long as, the output is optimized and everybody shares the
> profit/income equally among themselves. I have a strong feeling
> that a hierarchical organizational structure is better suited than
> a strictly horizontal org. structure for running such businesses.

You have raised a very nice question here -- the question of what is
the "real objective" of an organization.

Based on reading about and watching live footage of life in Mondragon,
and also based on my own 3-years' experience of living in a co-operative,
I would say that "optimizing the production" is NOT the sole or main
objective of a co-op; it is just one among several objectives. The main
objective is to secure the well-being of the co-operative members. Members
of a co-operative believe (and based on my own experience of living in
a co-op, I can attest to this) that an individual's well-being depends
on that individual's empowerment; that is, on the extent to which he or
she has control over things in life which affect him or her. Because of
the direct democratic process that exists in a co-operative, it is YOU
as co-op member who gets to set the rules, collectively with other members.

Why is production important? Surely, production is important because
the things that get produced secure the well-being of humans. Production
for production's sake makes no sense -- it leads you to the abyss of
the king in Tagore's Raktakarabi or to that of Jontroraj Bibhuti in
Tagore's Muktodhara.

You are quite right in saying that hierarchical chains of command and
control are more "efficient" than democratic process. This is exactly
the reason why under dictatorships, trains usually run on time. Direct
democracy is more fractious, more complicated and yes, more "inefficient".
You are probably correct in saying that it is superficially "inefficient"
in optimizing, say, production volume. However, it IS efficient in securing
the well-being of those who practise it. In turn, this well-being translates
into greater productivity, because empowered, satisfied and happy individuals
usually work better than those less empowered. This is borne out by the
example I gave earlier: how throughout the recession of the eighties
Mondragon factories continued to keep posting profits even though not
a single worker was laid off.

>
> As your claim goes, the members of the co-operative share
> the profit equally among themselves, unlike a "capitalist"
> corporation. Now, for the time being let us forget about the
> internal mechanics of the co-op. The steel produced by the
> co-op is coming to the market. It has a price-tag on it, which
> is also driven by profit. So, from an external buyer's POV,
> here is another organization selling its product and making
> profit like any other "capitalist" organization. So from his
> POV, there is no difference between the two.

Quite right. From the external observer's point of view, there is no
difference between Mondragon and a capitalist enterprise. It is important
to understand that Mondragon is not in the business of changing society.
It is not a radical group out to challenge capitalism. That is not its
mission. It is just a group of people who have come together to work
co-operatively with internal direct democracy. In so doing, they have
succeeded in providing us with some inkling, a rough model, of how a society
of the future could look like.

> So, the basic assumption is that _anybody_ can take a right
> decision in some specialized/technical field just by hearing
> the both sides' view; mind you the decision must be pretty
> difficult to take as they are seeking external expertise.

Yes; because everyone has a stake in the viability of the co-op,
one can expect that if they don't understand the issue at all if
it is so technical and complicated, they will probably think it wise
to go by the advisors' counsel in such cases. But the important thing
is that the final decision-making authority is vested with the members.


>
> Another point here that should be taken into account that,
> suppose it requires 5 minutes to take a paricular decision,
> specialist-nonspecialist alike (which I strongly disagree).
> If the president of the compnay and four VPs would have
> taken the decision, it would only take 25 man-minutes.
> Whereas in a horizontal structure the decision-taking itself
> takes 2500 man-minutes, which is more than 40 man-hours (for
> simplicity, I am ignoring the time to perform other
> "democratic" paraphernalia). What a utter wastage of resource!!

Sure; in the co-op where I live, we sometimes have prolonged meetings
which leaves everyone exhausted. But we happily pay this price, because
it means that everyone gets a fair hearing and all viewpoints get a
chance to be aired. Note also that this is why the Mondragon co-operatives
have deliberately decided to keep their size small.

As I said before, dictatorships are much more efficient than democracies
because no one else (except dictators) has to do any decision-making.
What fun! Everyone can go put to the beach and play :-) But do we prefer
dictatorships for that reason?


> After hearing what you've said it seems to me that it's a
> perfect debate hall and everybody is being as democratic as
> possible and the main goal - the production - gets a distant
> back seat.

No, because everyone's survival depends on maintaining the viability
of the production, it provides an incentive to members not to do
anything that jeopardizes production.

> See above. Our Janitor may think that the engineers are
> a bunch of jokers, who sitting in front of computers and
> munching chips, do nothing. The packers may think so, the
> receiving guys may think so, the cafeteria attendants may
> think so, the machinists may think so...The result? The
> engineers pay-check. Are you familiar with different
> motivational theories?


A co-op which can't decide on a reasonable salary structure will
soon collapse because people will leave. Because co-op members
know this, it is highly unlikely that they will be unreasonable.
If they are unreasonable and continue to fight, that particular
co-op will obviously go in the red and soon cease to exist. Thus
the process of natural selection will take care that co-ops which
are perverse enough to have unreasonable policies will not survive
very long (however in practice this will usually not be necessary).

> BTW, do you have any data on the personnel turnover of the
> plant, in other words, the avg. number of years a person
> (I am specially interested in information for technical
> people) stays with the producing co-op?
>

No, I do not have this data, but will try to find it.

> See above. Democracy it may be, but utterly amateurish.
>

Then you have to come up with an explanation of how such an "amateurish"
organization like Mondragon has been doing so well for so many years.


>
> But I guess my question is how does it help:
>
> 1) People except the members of that particular set of the
> co-op.

It does not. As I said before, Mondragon is not in the business
of saving the planet.

> Why don't you understand that, wrt the people outside the
> co-op. these people are privileged in the same way as the
> shareholders of a "capitalist" company.

Quite so. The people in Mondragon are not a bunch of wild-eyed
anarcho-syndicalists out to change human society as we know it.
They are people like you and me who put their self-interest first.
They just happen to think that co-operation and internal direct
democracy are suitable means to secure that self-interest. In doing
so, they have provided us with a model of what a non-capitalist
society might look like in the distant or not-so-distant future.


-Sayan.


Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 18, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/18/96
to

bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>The main
>objective is to secure the well-being of the co-operative members.

If the basic necessities are fulfilled, the sense of
well-being is just a state of mind.


>Members
>of a co-operative believe (and based on my own experience of living in
>a co-op, I can attest to this) that an individual's well-being depends
>on that individual's empowerment; that is, on the extent to which he or
>she has control over things in life which affect him or her. Because of
>the direct democratic process that exists in a co-operative, it is YOU
>as co-op member who gets to set the rules, collectively with other members.

That's what you think.

CASE I: A major decision for the co-op is accepted through
voting, the result being 300-200. That means there are
those 200 people in the co-operative who haven't got
what they wanted.

CASE II: In a corporation of 500 employees, a certain decision
is being taken by top management. 200 employees don't like
the decision, but rest 300 like it.

As far as _a_ person from the set of 200 (or 300) is concerned,
is there any difference? No.

So, if you start your argument with, "capitalism is bad,
co-operative structure is best" and set your mind that way,
it results in your so-called well-being, but not in any
absolute terms.


>Direct
>democracy is more fractious, more complicated and yes, more "inefficient".
>You are probably correct in saying that it is superficially "inefficient"
>in optimizing, say, production volume. However, it IS efficient in securing
>the well-being of those who practise it.

Which is, IMO, a mental conditioning.


>In turn, this well-being translates
>into greater productivity, because empowered, satisfied and happy individuals
>usually work better than those less empowered.

Assumption 1: More empowerment, more happiness.

Highly questionable. Person X getting M dollars an hour
and "empowered" (in your sense, which actually is not an
empowerment to me), person Y getting N dollars an hour
and "unempowered" and M<N. Assumption 1 fails for a finite
(N-M) value.


Assumption 2: Empowered, satisfied and happy individuals


usually work better than those less empowered.

There is a limit to the amount of work that a normal human
being can perform. (Equivalent to walking 5 miles/hour on
a leveled road without load) True, that a happy individual
works "better" than an individual, who is unhappy. But, here
you are applying assumption 1, which is highly questionable.

Secondly, in a highly automated manufacturing plant, the
overall productivity is becoming less and less dependant
upon the individual productivity.

>This is borne out by the
>example I gave earlier: how throughout the recession of the eighties
>Mondragon factories continued to keep posting profits even though not
>a single worker was laid off.

This puzzles me. If the economy is sluggish, who they were
selling to?


>Quite right. From the external observer's point of view, there is no
>difference between Mondragon and a capitalist enterprise.

Internally also, if you forget about the conditioning of mind,
there is no difference between the two except that the co-op is
less efficient than the other.


>Sure; in the co-op where I live, we sometimes have prolonged meetings
>which leaves everyone exhausted. But we happily pay this price, because
>it means that everyone gets a fair hearing and all viewpoints get a
>chance to be aired. Note also that this is why the Mondragon co-operatives
>have deliberately decided to keep their size small.

1000 jon-er co-op hole ki hobe, bhabte-i shiure uthchhi.


>As I said before, dictatorships are much more efficient than democracies
>because no one else (except dictators) has to do any decision-making.

Please don't use false analogies. We are debating
about the resultant efficiencies between the two systems.
Dictatorship can never make a producing economy more
efficient. At least there is no guarantee.


>No, because everyone's survival depends on maintaining the viability
>of the production, it provides an incentive to members not to do
>anything that jeopardizes production.

That's even more true in a "capitalist" organization. If
I fail to produce, I'll lose my job right away.

But in a co-op I may think, there are 499 persons to
cover me up - let me read scb instead. (e.g. Indian
public sector).


>A co-op which can't decide on a reasonable salary structure will
>soon collapse because people will leave. Because co-op members
>know this, it is highly unlikely that they will be unreasonable.

But didn't you say that the highest paid person cannot
get more than three times the lowest paid person? To me,
then, either one is over-paid or the other is under-paid.
And that's why I asked you about the personnel turn-over.

>> BTW, do you have any data on the personnel turnover of the
>> plant, in other words, the avg. number of years a person
>> (I am specially interested in information for technical
>> people) stays with the producing co-op?
>>

>No, I do not have this data, but will try to find it.

That will be a very interesting piece of info. Hoyto dekha
jaabe, co-op co-op-i aachhe, kintu bochhor bochhor
khol-nolche paalte jay! :) Just speculating.

>> See above. Democracy it may be, but utterly amateurish.

>Then you have to come up with an explanation of how such an "amateurish"
>organization like Mondragon has been doing so well for so many years.

There may be lots of explanations. Without data which cannot
construed (even with data I am not claiming that_I_ can).

It can also be that the co-op is nothing but a "capitalist"
corporation with a facade of co-op! In which case the
results are very rational.


>> 1) People except the members of that particular set of the
>> co-op.

>It does not. As I said before, Mondragon is not in the business
>of saving the planet.

Aar "capitalist" corporation-gulo "saving the planet"-er
jonne boli-prodotto? Mairi aarki!


>They are people like you and me who put their self-interest first.

Aye, pothe esho.


>They just happen to think that co-operation and internal direct
>democracy are suitable means to secure that self-interest.

That's precisely what I want to point out, "they THINK ..."

>In doing
>so, they have provided us with a model of what a non-capitalist
>society might look like in the distant or not-so-distant future.

Or never.


Sambit


Arindam Banerjee

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) wrote:
>
> Arindam Banerjee <bane...@newsserver.trl.oz.au> wrote:
>

> In India today, roughly 1 in 3 people do not get to eat enough to
> provide the bare daily minimum of 1200 calories per day. Yes, elite
> people like you or me who do telecom research or write computer
> software, have it good under the current power arrangements in India.

So are we expected to feel guilty?
The point is, have we done worse with democracy over the last 50 years?
The answer to that may be that 50 years ago 2 people in 3 did not
get enough to eat.
We definitely could have done better, and if the Soviet Union or
Communist China existed, the path could have been pointed out by
certain people who are not now that way so eloquent.

> But what has it given India's poor? What has it given the children
> who did not have the good luck like us to be born into the elite class?

Democracy, even as it is today, is still their best hope. It can be
improved of course, and we have to see how. The better options have
to be chosen, and that means rejecting commune-type solutions that
never worked in Russia or China.


> >Running EVERYTHING? Defence, monetary policy, import-export...?
>
> Once the nation-state ceases to exist, the above may not be important.

Ah! The grand Communist dream! Once it ceases to exist....
How the hell will it?
If all people do XYZ, then!
And if they don't shoot them. Murder is fine if it is for common good!
Millions after millions.
That is the story told by the skull heaps in Cambodia.


>
> >The moment your band of 500 decides that for protection they need to
> >unite with other bands of 500, they are once again ascending from the
> >tribal state to nation state - exactly as now. Why regress?
>
> Your conclusion does not follow from your premise. Why on earth does
> forming a temporary alliance with other communities against a common
> enemy, make a regression to nation-state-hood inevitable?

I am afraid that here I may not have been very clear. I meant
why should we regress from the current nation-state to tribal state.

>
> Take an analogous example from history: the city-states of ancient
> Greece, such as Athens and Sparta, often formed temporary alliances
> against common enemies (e.g. against the Persians at Thermopylae).
> Such alliances did not lead to amalgamation of the city-states into
> a nation-state. Why then should co-operative communities uniting
> against common enemies necessarily lead to re-emergence of the
> nation-state? It is not clear to me at all.
>

Did these city-states have a total population of 500?
Were they democratic?
Did they have slavery?
Did women have the vote?
Did the men really want to vote?
How did the slaves "rope in" the voters?
So is your example analogous?

My point was that a completely independent co-operative of 500 is
a completely unfeasible idea, given ground realities.
Why, they could not even trade properly - let alone defend themselves.

Anyway, no more from me on this theme.

Arindam Banerjee
Disclaimer: My employer is not responsible for my opinions


Arindam Banerjee

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

soum...@ix.netcom.com(Soumitra Bose) wrote:
>
> In <4plmvm$k...@pegasus.trl.OZ.AU> bane...@newsserver.trl.oz.au
> (Arindam Banerjee) writes:
> >
> >soum...@ix.netcom.com(Soumitra Bose ) writes:
> >
> >How long will this
> >>shit go on? Well I guess , till the people take up the
> >>leadership and the leaders follow suit.

> Taking up people's leadership could be achieved by the people's


> institution like the para committees and Gram samities and resistance
> forces .In the after math of the Babri massacre , the Bengal villages
> unitedly rose up and maintained a strict vigil against any outsiders ,
> nothing happened in the countryside, it went bad only in the same
> Ekbalpoor area .

Now this is a fine idea.
The main problem here is financial empowerment.
Funds have to go from higher levels to para levels.
Besides there is the question of enthusiasm.
It is all very well for a para to unite against foreign sources,
but it is difficult to sustain such enthusiasm.
On the plus side, we have increasingly cheap computer and telecom
power, which can be used to distribute information and make policies
after doing on-line voting. Resource monitoring, project overseeing
and damage control will become much easier and better co-ordinated.
This way, down at the para level we will have real democracy. The
leaders can have their ears literally tweaked by the elderly ladies
of the para for infractions.

I had published an essay dealing with the above in 1989. At that
time no one understood. There was total incomprehension
about the power of computer communications, and what they could do
to curb corruption and improve efficiency, and provide superior
democratic systems.

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

Arindam Banerjee <a.ban...@trl.oz.au> wrote:
>
>> In India today, roughly 1 in 3 people do not get to eat enough to
>> provide the bare daily minimum of 1200 calories per day. Yes, elite
>> people like you or me who do telecom research or write computer
>> software, have it good under the current power arrangements in India.
>
>So are we expected to feel guilty?

No, because this is a _systemic_ consequence of the current nature and
distribution of power in our society, and is not the result of our
individual action.

If there is any reason to feel guilty, it is not because we had it good,
but because we did not make any effort to ensure that the distribution
of power in society changed.

>The point is, have we done worse with democracy over the last 50 years?
>The answer to that may be that 50 years ago 2 people in 3 did not
>get enough to eat.

You misrepresent my position completely.

Sure, with the indirect democracy that we have, we have done better
than what it was 50 years ago, although we have not done enough. What this
shows is that we need _more_ democracy to get where we want, in short
we need _direct democracy_ in place of the indirect democracy we have now.

>We definitely could have done better, and if the Soviet Union or
>Communist China existed, the path could have been pointed out by
>certain people who are not now that way so eloquent.

And those people (i.e. the Indian communists) would have been dead
wrong. Communism is as contrary as capitalism to the idea of direct
democracy that I espouse. I oppose _both_ capitalism and communism.

>Democracy, even as it is today, is still their best hope. It can be
>improved of course, and we have to see how. The better options have
>to be chosen, and that means rejecting commune-type solutions that
>never worked in Russia or China.

Completely agreed. Note that the co-operative-based, syndicalist,
solution that I suggested is NOT a solution a la Russia or China,
because those solutions were not democratic (they were based on
top-down central planning and centralized decision-making), whereas
my solution is based on direct democracy growing from the bottom up.

Your problem is that you think (rather like the Hindutva-badees)
that anyone who opposes capitalism necessarily supports communism.
I support neither.


>> >Running EVERYTHING? Defence, monetary policy, import-export...?
>>
>> Once the nation-state ceases to exist, the above may not be important.

>Ah! The grand Communist dream! Once it ceases to exist....

Your attempt to tar me with the C-word brush is rather pathetic.

Your logical fallacy here is of the following type.

If A, then B.
Given : B
Fallacious conclusion : A

Your chain of reasoning here is as follows:

If X is a communist, then X believes that the state will
cease to exist.

X believes that the state will cease to exist.

Fallacious conclusion : X is a communist.

The fallacy in the above lies in the fact that there could be other reasons
why X thinks that the state will cease to exist.

>How the hell will it?
>If all people do XYZ, then!

>And if they don't shoot them. Murder is fine if it is for common good!

I didn't say it. Why are you putting words in my mouth?

You are underestimating people's rationality (if it is in people's
interest to do XYZ, then most rational people will do XYZ of their
own free will).

>Millions after millions.
>That is the story told by the skull heaps in Cambodia.

Irrelevant, because a Pol Pot type solution was NOT what I suggested.

>> Take an analogous example from history: the city-states of ancient
>> Greece, such as Athens and Sparta, often formed temporary alliances
>> against common enemies (e.g. against the Persians at Thermopylae).
>> Such alliances did not lead to amalgamation of the city-states into
>> a nation-state. Why then should co-operative communities uniting
>> against common enemies necessarily lead to re-emergence of the
>> nation-state? It is not clear to me at all.
>>
>Did these city-states have a total population of 500?
>Were they democratic?
>Did they have slavery?
>Did women have the vote?
>Did the men really want to vote?
>How did the slaves "rope in" the voters?
>So is your example analogous?

Yes, it is analogous. For an analogy to be valid, it is not necessary
that the two analogues be congruent in every minute detail (if they were
so, they would have been identities, not analogues!) What is important
is whether the differences between the analogues violate the point of the
analogy or not. I refer you to the Chapter on Analogy (Chapter 10) of the
book "Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning and Discovery" by John
H. Holland et al. In the third paragraph on page 299 of this book, the
authors explain the fallacy that you just made: whether a difference
between analogues invalidates the analogy, depends on whether that difference
is a _structure-preserving difference_ or a _structure-violating difference_.

>My point was that a completely independent co-operative of 500 is
>a completely unfeasible idea, given ground realities.
>Why, they could not even trade properly - let alone defend themselves.

Well, here you make a subjective, theological statement which is
unfalsifiable. It is a matter of faith to you that this idea is
unfeasible, and so you cannot even admit of empirical validation
even when an existence proof is provided you (in the form of Mondragon
co-operative). Obviously any argument with you is futile after this
point.

-Sayan.


sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
>>The main
>>objective is to secure the well-being of the co-operative members.
>
> If the basic necessities are fulfilled, the sense of
> well-being is just a state of mind.

A concrete example will help to make clear why I think that
empowerment and collective decision-making from the bottom-up
is necessary for well-being.

Consider the Bhopal disaster of 1984. The fact that Methyl Isocyanate was
being stored in Union Carbide's Bhopal plant, was never communicated to
the workers of the plant. The workers did not decide to store the lethal
chemical and indeed they were never consulted, because Union Carbide
being a capitalist factory, workers did not have any say in setting policy.
The policy decision to store MIC in the Bhopal plant was taken by the
company management, most likely siting in another continent, and none of
those decision-makers were affected by the gas leak. Evidently, if the
workers were in charge of setting policy through an empowered direct
democracy, they would not have chosen to store the hazardous chemical
without proper safeguards and thus endanger their own lives and that of
their families. This will suffice to illustrate why I feel that empowered
decision-making from the ground up, and not policy-making from the top
down, is more conducive to securing human well-being.

>>Members
>>of a co-operative believe (and based on my own experience of living in
>>a co-op, I can attest to this) that an individual's well-being depends
>>on that individual's empowerment; that is, on the extent to which he or
>>she has control over things in life which affect him or her. Because of
>>the direct democratic process that exists in a co-operative, it is YOU
>>as co-op member who gets to set the rules, collectively with other members.
>
> That's what you think.
>
> CASE I: A major decision for the co-op is accepted through
> voting, the result being 300-200. That means there are
> those 200 people in the co-operative who haven't got
> what they wanted.

Sure, that happens. But those 200 people at least got a chance to air their
views during open debate. Secondly, in a non-democratic workplace, one
person (the boss) can override the decision of all the 500 people. Which is
better?

> CASE II: In a corporation of 500 employees, a certain decision
> is being taken by top management. 200 employees don't like
> the decision, but rest 300 like it.
>
> As far as _a_ person from the set of 200 (or 300) is concerned,
> is there any difference? No.

Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over
a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).

>>Direct
>>democracy is more fractious, more complicated and yes, more "inefficient".
>>You are probably correct in saying that it is superficially "inefficient"
>>in optimizing, say, production volume. However, it IS efficient in securing
>>the well-being of those who practise it.
>
> Which is, IMO, a mental conditioning.

One could equally well say that, mutatis mutandis, your belief that increased
production volume is the sole determinant of well-being is also a mental
conditioning.

> This puzzles me. If the economy is sluggish, who they were
> selling to?

It seems to me that it was your mental processes that were a bit sluggish
when youwrote this line :-)

The economy being sluggish does not mean that no steel was being consumed
anywhere!

> But in a co-op I may think, there are 499 persons to
> cover me up - let me read scb instead. (e.g. Indian
> public sector).

The co-op is _very_ different from the public sector. Why? In the public
sector, you essentially have the government underwriting you. In other
words, the persons who are "covering you up" in the public sector situation
are _all_ citizens of India -- this is why there is so little accountability.
But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are only the remaining
499 people, and no one else -- a several orders of magnitude difference in
scale. Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.

>>It does not. As I said before, Mondragon is not in the business
>>of saving the planet.
>
> Aar "capitalist" corporation-gulo "saving the planet"-er
> jonne boli-prodotto? Mairi aarki!

Of course they are not. But their collective actions collectively have
the result of slowly destroying the planet.

>>They just happen to think that co-operation and internal direct
>>democracy are suitable means to secure that self-interest.
>
> That's precisely what I want to point out, "they THINK ..."

Well, their track record so far certainly seems to support what they think.

>>In doing
>>so, they have provided us with a model of what a non-capitalist
>>society might look like in the distant or not-so-distant future.
>
> Or never.

That is possible. But that would be sad, because it is quite clear that if
a planet-wide capitalist society in its present form exists much longer, we
will all be dead by, say, 2030 A.D. due to the devastating environmental
consequences (such as global warming) of pursuing superprofits.

Apratim Sarkar

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over
>a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
>then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
>time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
>scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
>decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
>decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).

Ashadharan namiyechho anko'ta, binomial distribution maal'ta puro
gule kheyechho dekhchhi! Achchha Sayan, bhasha bhasha opinionated
kathabarta besh chalachchhilo chalao na, anko-fanko'r modhye asha'r
darkar ki? Jano na anke subjective guppi chale na? Vote'e jeta'r
probability o'i 0.5'i thakbe.

The maths, indeed, are simple. Kintu at least higher secondary
level'r education'ta darkar probability'te. Jao giye N. G. Das magao.
Tateo jodi bujhte na paro to bujhiye debo.

Apratim.

Apratim Sarkar

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:

>A concrete example will help to make clear why I think that
>empowerment and collective decision-making from the bottom-up
>is necessary for well-being.
>
>Consider the Bhopal disaster of 1984. The fact that Methyl Isocyanate was
>being stored in Union Carbide's Bhopal plant, was never communicated to
>the workers of the plant. The workers did not decide to store the lethal
>chemical and indeed they were never consulted, because Union Carbide
>being a capitalist factory, workers did not have any say in setting policy.
>The policy decision to store MIC in the Bhopal plant was taken by the
>company management, most likely siting in another continent, and none of
>those decision-makers were affected by the gas leak. Evidently, if the
>workers were in charge of setting policy through an empowered direct
>democracy, they would not have chosen to store the hazardous chemical
>without proper safeguards and thus endanger their own lives and that of
>their families. This will suffice to illustrate why I feel that empowered
>decision-making from the ground up, and not policy-making from the top
>down, is more conducive to securing human well-being.

Debatable. Lok'e anek shomai sheer negligence theke unnecessary
risk nei. Jemon, seatbelt na bNedhe gari chalano, ki mal kheye.
Kimba dharo unnecessary speed kara. Ekmatro fine'r bhai lok'ke
pate rakhte pare. I.e. aingata restriction (Europe ar USA'r
speed limit ar driving related fatality compare karo). Ekhon sheti
ki corporation ki cooperative dui'r khetrei projojyo. Lok'e nijer
bhalo ato bujhle ain kore seatbelt bNadhte bolte hoto na, heroin
cocaine'o be-aini korte hoto na.

>>>Members
>>>of a co-operative believe (and based on my own experience of living in
>>>a co-op, I can attest to this) that an individual's well-being depends
>>>on that individual's empowerment; that is, on the extent to which he or
>>>she has control over things in life which affect him or her. Because of
>>>the direct democratic process that exists in a co-operative, it is YOU
>>>as co-op member who gets to set the rules, collectively with other members.
>>
>> That's what you think.
>>
>> CASE I: A major decision for the co-op is accepted through
>> voting, the result being 300-200. That means there are
>> those 200 people in the co-operative who haven't got
>> what they wanted.
>
>Sure, that happens. But those 200 people at least got a chance to air their
>views during open debate.

Thik achhe, dharo debate febate holo, tarpare manager eshe decision
nilo, ta'ale cholbe?

>Secondly, in a non-democratic workplace, one
>person (the boss) can override the decision of all the 500 people. Which is
>better?

Depends. Manager'r decision'ta'i jodi thik hoi, shetai bhalo.
Ar jodi bhul hoi, in time amon management bhoge chole jabe, tumi
jemon bolechhile dhap'r commune bhoge chole jabe bhalogulo thakbe,
thik temni.

>> CASE II: In a corporation of 500 employees, a certain decision
>> is being taken by top management. 200 employees don't like
>> the decision, but rest 300 like it.
>>
>> As far as _a_ person from the set of 200 (or 300) is concerned,
>> is there any difference? No.
>
>Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over
>a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
>then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
>time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
>scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
>decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
>decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).

Eta niye to ja bala'r bolei diyechhi.

>> But in a co-op I may think, there are 499 persons to
>> cover me up - let me read scb instead. (e.g. Indian
>> public sector).
>
>The co-op is _very_ different from the public sector. Why? In the public
>sector, you essentially have the government underwriting you. In other
>words, the persons who are "covering you up" in the public sector situation
>are _all_ citizens of India -- this is why there is so little accountability.
>But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are only the remaining
>499 people, and no one else -- a several orders of magnitude difference in
>scale. Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
>level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.

So you will think twice and then let them down, problem'ta kothai?
Jaddin na chakri jaba'r bhai ashchhe.

>That is possible. But that would be sad, because it is quite clear that if
>a planet-wide capitalist society in its present form exists much longer, we
>will all be dead by, say, 2030 A.D. due to the devastating environmental
>consequences (such as global warming) of pursuing superprofits.

Baaji hoye jak!?

Apratim.

PS: Sambit, just boredom theke likhlum. Tomar client bhangiye nebar
plan nei. Tumi'o ja bala'r bolo, the more the merrier.

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 20, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/20/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>> CASE I: A major decision for the co-op is accepted through
>> voting, the result being 300-200. That means there are
>> those 200 people in the co-operative who haven't got
>> what they wanted.

>Sure, that happens. But those 200 people at least got a chance to air their
>views during open debate.

Ta'te ki chhN*** galo? Lok-gulo ja cheyechhilo kintu pelo na
taar dukkho-ta bemalum haowa hoye jaabe?


>Secondly, in a non-democratic workplace, one
>person (the boss) can override the decision of all the 500 people. Which is
>better?

Prothomoto, "non-democratic workplace"-e 500 jon-er _decision_-er
proshno-i uthchhe na, override to dur-er kotha.

Ditiyoto, 500 jon-i jodi ak decision nay, ta'le that decision
must be too obvious to take. Boss-o sheta override korbe na.
Jodi kore, natural selection-e boss-er chakri not hoye jaabe.


>> CASE II: In a corporation of 500 employees, a certain decision
>> is being taken by top management. 200 employees don't like
>> the decision, but rest 300 like it.
>>
>> As far as _a_ person from the set of 200 (or 300) is concerned,
>> is there any difference? No.

>Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over
>a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
>then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
>time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
>scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
>decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
>decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).

Sayan "tumi onke tero". :)

Dhoro tomar democratic process. Shekhane akta vote hole, duto
group consider kora jaak: majority aar minority. Any person
X's prob. of getting included in any of these groups in any
particular round of election is 0.5 - assuming a random decision
making process(BTW, eta random distribution noy, binomial dist.).

Suppose there will be three eletions for three differnt
motions. What is the probability that the person
will be included in the majority group either 2 times or
3 times out three elections? Right?

Prob. = {Combination(3,2) + Combination(3,3)}* (0.5)^3

= 0.5


>>>Direct
>>>democracy is more fractious, more complicated and yes, more "inefficient".
>>>You are probably correct in saying that it is superficially "inefficient"
>>>in optimizing, say, production volume. However, it IS efficient in securing
>>>the well-being of those who practise it.
>>
>> Which is, IMO, a mental conditioning.

>One could equally well say that, mutatis mutandis, your belief that increased
>production volume is the sole determinant of well-being is also a mental
>conditioning.

Tomar guliye jachchhe Sayan. I never said that increased
production volume is the sole determinant of well-being.
Mukhe kotha gNuje dio na.

Ami bolechhi, production volume na baaDle, jotoi worker-der
empower koro, tara je timir-e shei timir-ei theke jaabe.
Aar bolechhi, capitalist system-er theke co-op system-e
production kom hobar shomosto loophole royechhe, uporontu,
co-op-e worker-ra je capitalist system-er theke beshi shukhe
thakbe-i taar-o kono nishchoyota nei.

Orthat, co-op-e beshi shuke-o roilo na, production baDar je
suphol shegulo-o bhog korlo na, karon production baaDchhei
na.


>> But in a co-op I may think, there are 499 persons to
>> cover me up - let me read scb instead. (e.g. Indian
>> public sector).

>The co-op is _very_ different from the public sector. Why? In the public
>sector, you essentially have the government underwriting you. In other
>words, the persons who are "covering you up" in the public sector situation
>are _all_ citizens of India -- this is why there is so little accountability.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Tahole, eta accountability-r proshno. Akta co-op-er 300 jon-er
majority akta major decision bhul nile taar jonne accountable
ke?


>But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are only the remaining
>499 people, and no one else -- a several orders of magnitude difference in
>scale.

But still there are 499 people to cover me up. Capitalist
org.-e kotojon aachhe bole tomar mone hoy?

>Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
>level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.


Bangla jatra naki?

>>>It does not. As I said before, Mondragon is not in the business
>>>of saving the planet.
>>
>> Aar "capitalist" corporation-gulo "saving the planet"-er
>> jonne boli-prodotto? Mairi aarki!

>Of course they are not. But their collective actions collectively have
>the result of slowly destroying the planet.

Monche abar bibek-er probesh.


>>>They just happen to think that co-operation and internal direct
>>>democracy are suitable means to secure that self-interest.
>>
>> That's precisely what I want to point out, "they THINK ..."

>Well, their track record so far certainly seems to support what they think.

Boi-er ba video casstte-er detailgulo dao na. BTW, egulo
tritiyo kono niropekkho party-r lekha ba tola to? Noile
kintu ami tomake GM-er company profile-er video cassette
dekhabo. Dekhbe prithibi-ta ki sundor.

>>>In doing
>>>so, they have provided us with a model of what a non-capitalist
>>>society might look like in the distant or not-so-distant future.
>>
>> Or never.

>That is possible. But that would be sad, because it is quite clear that if
>a planet-wide capitalist society in its present form exists much longer, we
>will all be dead by, say, 2030 A.D. due to the devastating environmental
>consequences (such as global warming) of pursuing superprofits.

"We all" bolte shudhu exeisting scb-ite-der bolchho, na somogro
manobjaati? In any case, duto-tei bet phyala jay.


Sambit

Prantik Mazumder

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

In article <4qd2l4$k...@gandalf.rutgers.edu>,

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>>But that would be sad, because it is quite clear that if
>>a planet-wide capitalist society in its present form exists much longer, we
>>will all be dead by, say, 2030 A.D. due to the devastating environmental
>>consequences (such as global warming) of pursuing superprofits.
>
> "We all" bolte shudhu exeisting scb-ite-der bolchho, na somogro
> manobjaati? In any case, duto-tei bet phyala jay.
>
>
> Sambit
>

2030 obdi thakbi Babul?...Nathuboudi-r bish-chop aar Dhiren-er
Sidhdhi-guli to taholey britha gelo....Bhalo thakees!

Prantik

--
Prantik Mazumder
Dept. of Mechanical Engineering
Iowa State University, Ames
IA 50011

Ph: 515-294 6954 (off)
515-292 3410 (res.)

email: pra...@iastate.edu
homepage: http://www.iastate.edu/~prantik

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
>>Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over
>>a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
>>then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
>>time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
>>scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
>>decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
>>decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).
>
> Sayan "tumi onke tero". :)

Ei-jonye-i to tomader rekhechhi :-) I didn't study statistics at the
H.S. level, incidentally, so I don't have a copy of N.G. Das. Perhaps
I should ask Apratim to lend me his copy :-) However, see below.

>
> Dhoro tomar democratic process. Shekhane akta vote hole, duto
> group consider kora jaak: majority aar minority. Any person
> X's prob. of getting included in any of these groups in any
> particular round of election is 0.5 - assuming a random decision
> making process(BTW, eta random distribution noy, binomial dist.).
>
> Suppose there will be three eletions for three differnt
> motions. What is the probability that the person
> will be included in the majority group either 2 times or
> 3 times out three elections? Right?
>
> Prob. = {Combination(3,2) + Combination(3,3)}* (0.5)^3
>
> = 0.5

You are right in pointing out that the worst-case value is indeed 0.5
(this assumes that the decision-making process is completely random).

However, my point is still valid, because the average-case situation
will be significantly better. Why? Because the decision-making process
will usually be better than random (it is a likely assumption that
in most cases most workers will have the same self-interest). Further,
the extent to which the decision-making process is better than random
in the direct-democracy scenario will be greater than the extent to
which the decision-making process will be better than random in the
decision-by-executive-fiat scenario (the assumption being that workers'
self-interests are more correlated with each other than workers' self
interest and separate-management's self-interest are correlated; I think
that this is a reasonable assumption). Thus in the average-case scenario
direct-democracy still wins over separate-management, and in the worst
case they are tied.

An empirical validation of this is provided by the near-absence of any
kind of worker unrest in Mondragon (the only time there was a strike
was before the 500-employee cap was established, and after that there
has never been a single strike, stoppage or industrial action).


Apratim Sarkar

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

I worte:

>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>
>>Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over
>>a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
>>then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
>>time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
>>scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
>>decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
>>decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).
>

> Ashadharan namiyechho anko'ta, binomial distribution maal'ta puro
> gule kheyechho dekhchhi! Achchha Sayan, bhasha bhasha opinionated
> kathabarta besh chalachchhilo chalao na, anko-fanko'r modhye asha'r
> darkar ki? Jano na anke subjective guppi chale na? Vote'e jeta'r
> probability o'i 0.5'i thakbe.

Actually amar Sayan'r proti arektu fair haowa uchit chhilo. Amar
dharona o jeta bolte chaichhilo, jodi dhore neowa jai je person X
votes "rationally" p% of the time, and others do the same, if p > 50
tahole "rational" decision neowa habe more than p% of the time, if
we go by majority rule; OTOH ruler'r veto thakle only p% of the time
ta neowa habe (assuming that the ruler also votes "rationally").
Also as p increases, the probability of a composite "rational"
decision increases at a much faster rate. Kintu gero holo p = 50 dhore
nile kono labh nei, composite probability o'i 0.5'i theke gelo. Ar
p < 50 hole, ahem, Ramrajya anibarja. Jemon Churchill bolechhilen, in
democracy people get what they deserve. Shude ashole.

["Rationally" ki ta niye subjective takk'r modhye ami dhukte chai na.
Sayan tumi ota niye loRe jao. Tabe N. G. Das'tao bhulo na.]

Apratim.

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>>better?
>
> Prothomoto, "non-democratic workplace"-e 500 jon-er _decision_-er
> proshno-i uthchhe na, override to dur-er kotha.
>
> Ditiyoto, 500 jon-i jodi ak decision nay, ta'le that decision
> must be too obvious to take. Boss-o sheta override korbe na.
> Jodi kore, natural selection-e boss-er chakri not hoye jaabe.
>

Fallacious argument. Consider a counterexample that disproves your
scenario. Suppose that a factory-owner wants to relax safety standards for
workers because that will increase his profit margin. The workers all
collectively disagree with this (because this endangers their lives), but
the boss goes ahead because this is profitable to him. Note that in this case
(i) the workers have taken a collective decision, but do not have the
power to enforce it because the workplace is non-democratic and (ii)
neither the boss or the foreman who enforces the boss's order is going
to lose their job. Rather, it is any worker who does not comply with
the boss's wish, who's going to lose his or her job.

>>The co-op is _very_ different from the public sector. Why? In the public
>>sector, you essentially have the government underwriting you. In other
>>words, the persons who are "covering you up" in the public sector situation
>>are _all_ citizens of India -- this is why there is so little accountability.
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> Tahole, eta accountability-r proshno. Akta co-op-er 300 jon-er
> majority akta major decision bhul nile taar jonne accountable
> ke?

The co-op as a whole will learn from that experience and will
not make that mistake in the future. The accountability that we
were talking about was about accountability for dishonest acts
(such as work-shirking), not accountability for honest mistakes.

>>But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are only the remaining
>>499 people, and no one else -- a several orders of magnitude difference in
>>scale.
>
> But still there are 499 people to cover me up. Capitalist
> org.-e kotojon aachhe bole tomar mone hoy?

If we are talking about work-shirking, then why should the 499 members
cover you up at all? In our co-op, for example, we have expulsion procedures
for members who repeatedly shirk their responsibilities. We have expelled
members in the past (through democratic vote) for non-cooperative behavior.

>>Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
>>level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.
>
>
> Bangla jatra naki?

Snide comments are not a substitute for reasoned argument.
>
> Monche abar bibek-er probesh.
>
Same comment as above.

> Boi-er ba video casstte-er detailgulo dao na. BTW, egulo
> tritiyo kono niropekkho party-r lekha ba tola to? Noile
> kintu ami tomake GM-er company profile-er video cassette
> dekhabo. Dekhbe prithibi-ta ki sundor.

The video cassette is a tape of a BBC program documentary on Mondragon.
The last time I checked, BBC was not owned by Mondragon co-operatives.

-Sayan.

Apratim Sarkar

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>Arindam Banerjee <a.ban...@trl.oz.au> wrote:
>>
>>> In India today, roughly 1 in 3 people do not get to eat enough to
>>> provide the bare daily minimum of 1200 calories per day. Yes, elite
>>> people like you or me who do telecom research or write computer
>>> software, have it good under the current power arrangements in India.
>>
>>So are we expected to feel guilty?
>
>No, because this is a _systemic_ consequence of the current nature and
>distribution of power in our society, and is not the result of our
>individual action.

Omni responsibility eRiye gele to? Khao Robbar shakalbela bacon-bhaja
ar dim commune'e boshe boshe duniya'r koti-koti bubhukkhu manush'r
katha na bhableo cholbe, tomar ki? Takhan bollei holo o paRa'r
Podu'o to kheyechhe, ami to eka noi - chhih! O bacon tomar gala diye
naame ki kore Sayan?

Indranil DasGupta

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

Apratim Sarkar (asa...@us.oracle.com) wrote:
: I worte:


: Actually amar Sayan'r proti arektu fair haowa uchit chhilo. Amar

: dharona o jeta bolte chaichhilo, jodi dhore neowa jai je person X
: votes "rationally" p% of the time, and others do the same, if p > 50
: tahole "rational" decision neowa habe more than p% of the time, if
: we go by majority rule; OTOH ruler'r veto thakle only p% of the time
: ta neowa habe (assuming that the ruler also votes "rationally").
: Also as p increases, the probability of a composite "rational"
: decision increases at a much faster rate. Kintu gero holo p = 50 dhore
: nile kono labh nei, composite probability o'i 0.5'i theke gelo. Ar
: p < 50 hole, ahem, Ramrajya anibarja. Jemon Churchill bolechhilen, in
: democracy people get what they deserve. Shude ashole.

: ["Rationally" ki ta niye subjective takk'r modhye ami dhukte chai na.
: Sayan tumi ota niye loRe jao. Tabe N. G. Das'tao bhulo na.]

: Apratim.


Sayan-babu onke ektu kNacha bole tumi ar Sambit ki onake niye ja ichchhe
tai korbe? Eta mone rekho, tomra shobai Engineer!

Akhon je-bhabe onko-ta phNedechho tate tomar uttor-i jothartho!!!

Indranil.

PS: Churchill-ke asshole bole dile?

Indranil DasGupta

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

Apratim Sarkar (asa...@us.oracle.com) wrote:
: bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

: >Statistically there is a difference, if you track decisions taken over


: >a period of time. The maths are simple: If the boss decides by fiat,
: >then for a given worker X, her desired decision would be taken 50% of the
: >time (assuming random distribution). In a democratic decision making
: >scenario, also assuming random distribution, ceteris paribus, X's desired
: >decision would be taken at least more than 50% of the time (since any
: >decision has to have numeric majority in order to pass).

: Ashadharan namiyechho anko'ta, binomial distribution maal'ta puro


: gule kheyechho dekhchhi! Achchha Sayan, bhasha bhasha opinionated
: kathabarta besh chalachchhilo chalao na, anko-fanko'r modhye asha'r
: darkar ki? Jano na anke subjective guppi chale na? Vote'e jeta'r

: probability o'i 0.5'i thakbe.

: The maths, indeed, are simple. Kintu at least higher secondary
: level'r education'ta darkar probability'te. Jao giye N. G. Das magao.
: Tateo jodi bujhte na paro to bujhiye debo.

: Apratim.


Sayan-babur post amar server-e nei. Kintu mone hochchhe onko-ta uni
thik-i korechhilen Apra. Dhoro vote neoa hocchchhe ekta binomial
choice-er upor. `0' bhalo na `1' bhalo. Dharo worker-er shonkhya `n'. Tie
jate na hoy shejonyo bijoD `n' neoai bhalo. Ebar quality of democracy
bole ekta jinish bhaba jak. Q=Sum over i (i X P(i) ), P(i) = probability
of decision going in favour of `i' workers. `i' jabe `0' theke `n'
porjonto.

Q(1) jodi decision by fiat-er quality hoy ar Q(2) jodi decision by
voting-er quality hoy tahole random distribution-er khetre:
(Q(2)-Q(1))/Q(1) dNarachhe Combinatorial[(n-1),(n-1)/2]/(2^(n-1)).

Gheme gelaam. Eshob ki ar e boyeshe poshay?

Indranil.


Indranil DasGupta

unread,
Jun 21, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/21/96
to

sayan bhattacharyya (bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu) wrote:
: Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:
: >

: > Dhoro tomar democratic process. Shekhane akta vote hole, duto


: > group consider kora jaak: majority aar minority. Any person
: > X's prob. of getting included in any of these groups in any
: > particular round of election is 0.5 - assuming a random decision
: > making process(BTW, eta random distribution noy, binomial dist.).
: >
: > Suppose there will be three eletions for three differnt
: > motions. What is the probability that the person
: > will be included in the majority group either 2 times or
: > 3 times out three elections? Right?
: >
: > Prob. = {Combination(3,2) + Combination(3,3)}* (0.5)^3
: >
: > = 0.5

: You are right in pointing out that the worst-case value is indeed 0.5


: (this assumes that the decision-making process is completely random).

Sambit, tomar onko-ta highly bhul. Sayan-babu dhorte paren ni oboshyo!
Ekta Hint dichhi, abar koshe dekho.

You said: "Any person


X's prob. of getting included in any of these groups in any
particular round of election is 0.5 - assuming a random decision
making process(BTW, eta random distribution noy, binomial dist.)"

Giving equal probability of 0.5 to being in either a majority or a minority
group is devil's math. Onko-ke nijer daroyan baniye dile naki?

Suppose there are 3 guys taking one vote on a binary issue. There are 4 possible
coalitions:
1) All three agree.
2)A,B agree. C disagrees.
3)B,C agree. A disagrees.
4)C,A agree. B disagrees.

A wins three times out of four.

I gave an explicit expression in my previous post. If you take the limit
`n' -> infinity you get zero (use Stirling's formula). However `n' is
never more than 500. For `n' of the order of 500, the ratio I computed
must be very small though. But then, as Sayan-babu says, there is more
to it than random probabilities.


Indranil.

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 22, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/22/96
to

Apratim Sarkar <asa...@us.oracle.com> wrote:

>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>>
>>Consider the Bhopal disaster of 1984.

>>Evidently, if the


>>workers were in charge of setting policy through an empowered direct
>>democracy, they would not have chosen to store the hazardous chemical
>>without proper safeguards and thus endanger their own lives and that of
>>their families. This will suffice to illustrate why I feel that empowered
>>decision-making from the ground up, and not policy-making from the top
>>down, is more conducive to securing human well-being.
>
> Debatable. Lok'e anek shomai sheer negligence theke unnecessary
> risk nei. Jemon, seatbelt na bNedhe gari chalano, ki mal kheye.
> Kimba dharo unnecessary speed kara. Ekmatro fine'r bhai lok'ke
> pate rakhte pare. I.e. aingata restriction (Europe ar USA'r
> speed limit ar driving related fatality compare karo). Ekhon sheti
> ki corporation ki cooperative dui'r khetrei projojyo. Lok'e nijer
> bhalo ato bujhle ain kore seatbelt bNadhte bolte hoto na, heroin
> cocaine'o be-aini korte hoto na.

The important thing here is : choice. Under direct democracy, workers at
least have the CHOICE and the opportunity to take decisions that are conducive
to their self-interest. They may, occasionally, make a stupid choice, as we
all do from time to time, but I do not see how on earth that can be used as
an argument to deny them any kind of choice whatsoever.

Besides, most people most of the time do act in a way that serves their
self-interest (in the language of economics: they maximize their utility
function all the time; or, as we in artificial intelligence are fond of
saying, any intelligent agent follows the principle of bounded rationality,
to use Herbert Simon's phrase).

-Sayan.


sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 22, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/22/96
to

Apratim Sarkar <asa...@us.oracle.com> wrote:

>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>>Arindam Banerjee <a.ban...@trl.oz.au> wrote:

>>>> In India today, roughly 1 in 3 people do not get to eat enough to
>>>> provide the bare daily minimum of 1200 calories per day. Yes, elite
>>>> people like you or me who do telecom research or write computer
>>>> software, have it good under the current power arrangements in India.
>>>
>>>So are we expected to feel guilty?
>>
>>No, because this is a _systemic_ consequence of the current nature and
>>distribution of power in our society, and is not the result of our
>>individual action.
>

> Omni responsibility eRiye gele to? Khao Robbar shakalbela bacon-bhaja
> ar dim commune'e boshe boshe duniya'r koti-koti bubhukkhu manush'r
> katha na bhableo cholbe, tomar ki? Takhan bollei holo o paRa'r
> Podu'o to kheyechhe, ami to eka noi - chhih! O bacon tomar gala diye
> naame ki kore Sayan?
>

du'chokh buje jao


du'chokh buje jao, kichhu cheye dekho na
du'kan buje jao, kichhu shune dekho na
koto ki korchhe loke koto kichhu bolchhe loke
jao bhule jao kichhu mone rekho na!

mone rakha boRo bipod kothay kothay mone poRe
sedin oi o-paRa-te ke jeno gechhe more
kibhabe more gechhe cheye jodi dekhe thako
othoba pother dhare achomka shune thako
se chhilo tomar amar motoi ekTa dibyi manush
chhilo tar chhele meye bichhanay meyemanush
chhilo tar ekTa matha duTo hat dukhani pa
moyla jamakapoR keche dito paRar dhopa
khide pele khide peto tomar amar motoi taro
mil chhilo aro onek gNojamil-o bolte paro!

eri majhe ekTa omil bheeshon rokom omil chhilo!
mas dui age hoTHat lokTar chakri gelo,
phole ki holo jano --- dorkar ki ?

na, jeno na, janle loke bolbe ki?
loke khachhe na bhable gorom bhate ghee
ki kore choTkabo aar,
ke khabe amar khaabar ?

(Suman Chattopadhyay)


Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 22, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/22/96
to

dgu...@buphy.bu.edu (Indranil DasGupta) writes:


>Sambit, tomar onko-ta highly bhul. Sayan-babu dhorte paren ni oboshyo!
>Ekta Hint dichhi, abar koshe dekho.

Amar onke akta gNoja aachhey. Actually,
ami akta case consider korini, kintu shei case-ta ghotar
probability is very less, jodio finite. Sombar office-e giye
program likhe maal-ta nababo, haate kosha oshombhob.

Sambit


Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 22, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/22/96
to

bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Sambit Basu <sam...@gandalf.rutgers.edu> wrote:

>Suppose that a factory-owner wants to relax safety standards for
>workers because that will increase his profit margin.

Safety standard komale profit baaDbe: erokom akta correlative
model aachhe naki? Thakle janao.

Industrial safety-r onek hyapa, bujhle. Ichchhe korle-i keu
regulatory enforcement-ke kNachkola dekhate paare na. Dekhale
OSHA-ra eshe company-r baap-er naam khogen kore debe.

(Doya kore koyekta haate gona disastrous accident-er udahoron
diye co-op system-er jouktikota bojhate jeo na)


>The workers all
>collectively disagree with this (because this endangers their lives), but
>the boss goes ahead because this is profitable to him. Note that in this case
>(i) the workers have taken a collective decision, but do not have the
>power to enforce it because the workplace is non-democratic and (ii)
>neither the boss or the foreman who enforces the boss's order is going
>to lose their job. Rather, it is any worker who does not comply with
>the boss's wish, who's going to lose his or her job.

Right. Kintu boss aar foreman dujon-er komor-e doDi poDbei,
chakri-o jaabe.

Safety measures gupi kore deowa ki chhele-r haat-er moa naki?

Prothom-e bolle co-op-er overall productivity beshi, dekha
gyalo tomar jukti-te phuto. Akhon dhorechho safety. Erpor
ki ashchhe? Housekeeping?

>>>The co-op is _very_ different from the public sector. Why? In the public
>>>sector, you essentially have the government underwriting you. In other
>>>words, the persons who are "covering you up" in the public sector situation
>>>are _all_ citizens of India -- this is why there is so little accountability.
>> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>
>> Tahole, eta accountability-r proshno. Akta co-op-er 300 jon-er
>> majority akta major decision bhul nile taar jonne accountable
>> ke?

>The co-op as a whole will learn from that experience and will


>not make that mistake in the future.

If they get a chance again to take that decision at all. Co-op
dhoro uthe-i gyalo, oi bhul decision-er jonne!


>The accountability that we
>were talking about was about accountability for dishonest acts
>(such as work-shirking), not accountability for honest mistakes.

OK, then let's talk about accountability for dishonest
acts now. Shekhetre, co-op-e ke accountable, and to whom?
Loop-ta ki kore kaaj kore?

>> But still there are 499 people to cover me up. Capitalist
>> org.-e kotojon aachhe bole tomar mone hoy?

>If we are talking about work-shirking, then why should the 499 members


>cover you up at all?

Aager post-e tumi bolle:

"But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are
only the remaining 499 people, and no one else -- a several
orders of magnitude difference in scale."

Ei post-e bolchho:

"If we are talking about work-shirking, then why should the 499
members cover you up at all?"

Areta chance dilum. Ebar kintu last chance, bhebe bolo.

Abar dekho, aager post-e likhechhile,

"Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a
social level, so you would usually think twice before letting
them down."

Aar ei post-e lihechho:

>In our co-op, for example, we have expulsion procedures
>for members who repeatedly shirk their responsibilities. We have expelled
>members in the past (through democratic vote) for non-cooperative behavior.

Orthat lok-er-a "let others down" (Hoyot baar duyek bhebe-i),
which contradicts what you'd tried to say in your previous
post.

>>>Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
>>>level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.
>>
>>
>> Bangla jatra naki?

>Snide comments are not a substitute for reasoned argument.

Neither is emotional and sentimental verbiage.

[>>>Of course they are not. But their collective actions collectively have

>>>the result of slowly destroying the planet.}

>> Monche abar bibek-er probesh.
>>
>Same comment as above.

Ditto.


>> Boi-er ba video casstte-er detailgulo dao na. BTW, egulo
>> tritiyo kono niropekkho party-r lekha ba tola to? Noile
>> kintu ami tomake GM-er company profile-er video cassette
>> dekhabo. Dekhbe prithibi-ta ki sundor.

>The video cassette is a tape of a BBC program documentary on Mondragon.


>The last time I checked, BBC was not owned by Mondragon co-operatives.

Aar boi? Kothay pabo?

Sambit

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 22, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/22/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@eden.rutgers.edu> wrote:

>bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>
>>Suppose that a factory-owner wants to relax safety standards for
>>workers because that will increase his profit margin.
>
> Safety standard komale profit baaDbe: erokom akta correlative
> model aachhe naki? Thakle janao.

Sure. Ignoring worker safety issues usually increases owner profits. For
example, most western garments manufacturers these days have their products
manufactured by subsidiaries or subcontractors in third world countries under
atrocious worker safety conditions (windowless converted warehouse-type
buildings without adequate ventilation). They often will not even install
fans in the workplace. In a well-known case a few years ago one such
garment factory in Manila was burnt down trapping all employees inside because
the building had bnot been fitted with adequate exits. It is also well-known
that manufacturers who have their computers assembled in Indonesia and Malaysia
do not provide workers with protective maska to keep costs down, and thus
expose workers constantly to soldering fumes which are a known carcinogen.

For more discussion of such practices, look at this week's Time magazine,
or the Op-ed page of the New York Times on June 14, for discussions of
how the shoe company Nike and the clothing company that makes the Kathy Lee
Gifford line of jeans, exploit third world labor in pursuit of profit
maximization. (Since both NYT and Time are very mainstream newspapers, I
hope you won't be as dismissive of their reportage as you are of anything
that I say).


> Right. Kintu boss aar foreman dujon-er komor-e doDi poDbei,
> chakri-o jaabe.

Not in third world countries, where enforcement standards are lax and
laws exist only on paper. Further, since such inspection can only be done
by the government, there is a double bind and a conflict of interest
because teh government is dependent on the revenue provided by the
corporation. If it starts creating too much pressure to the corporation
to enforce standards properly, the corporation will threaten to pull out
and relocate to another country where standards are more lax.

In fact, this issue clearly illustrates the danger of non-democratic
institutions. Since foreign corporations are not accountable to the
government (or can escape accountability through threats of relocation),
they effectively start emerging as alternate non-democratic loci of power
within the body politic. This is why direct democracy in the workplace is
urgently needed.

> Safety measures gupi kore deowa ki chhele-r haat-er moa naki?

Yes, when the transnational corporation you are dealing with has enormous
clout and money power (some transnationals have an annual budget which
exceeds the total GDP of the third world nations they have relocated their
factories to).

>
> Prothom-e bolle co-op-er overall productivity beshi, dekha
> gyalo tomar jukti-te phuto. Akhon dhorechho safety.

As usual you are misrepresenting me. I still hold that productivity in
a co-op is good and in fact Mondragon's example shows that it is better
than many corporations. When you contested this, I said that even if one
assumes, for arguments' sake only, that productivity will be less for a co-op,
there would still exist other reasons for preferring a direct democratic
workplace to a non-democratic one.

> OK, then let's talk about accountability for dishonest
> acts now. Shekhetre, co-op-e ke accountable, and to whom?
> Loop-ta ki kore kaaj kore?

In every successful co-op, there are organizational review committees. I
sit on a ORC in my own co-op myself, where I live. We evaluate performance
and periodicaly place reports before the membership. It is the task of the
ORC to be vigilant and thus prevent anyone from ripping off the co-op.

>>> But still there are 499 people to cover me up. Capitalist
>>> org.-e kotojon aachhe bole tomar mone hoy?
>
>

> Aager post-e tumi bolle:
>
> "But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are
> only the remaining 499 people, and no one else -- a several
> orders of magnitude difference in scale."
>
> Ei post-e bolchho:
>
> "If we are talking about work-shirking, then why should the 499
> members cover you up at all?"
>
> Areta chance dilum. Ebar kintu last chance, bhebe bolo.

Your confusion stems from your inability to understand that the first
quote is above is about a counterfactual scenario : precisely _because_
there are fewer people that can "cover you up" (in the sense of their
productivity masking your non-productivity), the chance is less that
your work-shirking will go unnoticed.

>
> Abar dekho, aager post-e likhechhile,
>
> "Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a
> social level, so you would usually think twice before letting
> them down."
>
> Aar ei post-e lihechho:
>
>>In our co-op, for example, we have expulsion procedures
>>for members who repeatedly shirk their responsibilities. We have expelled
>>members in the past (through democratic vote) for non-cooperative behavior.
>
> Orthat lok-er-a "let others down" (Hoyot baar duyek bhebe-i),
> which contradicts what you'd tried to say in your previous
> post.

You forget the word "usually" in my first quote. I did not use the word
"always". In fact, there has only been one expulsion in course of the three
years that I have lived in my co-op.

>>>>Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
>>>>level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bangla jatra naki?
>
>>Snide comments are not a substitute for reasoned argument.
>
> Neither is emotional and sentimental verbiage.

Where was the emotion and the sentiment? I was stating some bald facts.

> Aar boi? Kothay pabo?

Be patient. I need to make a trip to the Library of our co-op, which is
housed in another part of the campus.


-Sayan.


Indranil Dasgupta

unread,
Jun 23, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/23/96
to

sayan bhattacharyya wrote:
[..]

> se chhilo tomar amar motoi ekTa dibyi manush
> chhilo tar chhele meye bichhanay meyemanush

[..]

Ei miletei podyo mati Alokranjan hole bNachaten
Kimba Sunil Anglo-Saxon har chhNiDe aktukro muktoy -
amar pitathakur shunechhi neat modye mukh aNchaten
bhojyo-drobyo bolte amar biuli dal , akbaati shukto |

- Shakti Chattopadhyay.

IDG.

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 23, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/23/96
to

bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Sambit Basu <sam...@eden.rutgers.edu> wrote:

>> Safety standard komale profit baaDbe: erokom akta correlative
>> model aachhe naki? Thakle janao.

>Sure. Ignoring worker safety issues usually increases owner profits.

How? The example that you have provided is not an example
of safety violation.


>For
>example, most western garments manufacturers these days have their products
>manufactured by subsidiaries or subcontractors in third world countries under
>atrocious worker safety conditions (windowless converted warehouse-type
>buildings without adequate ventilation). They often will not even install
>fans in the workplace.

I don't think any employer of any "corporate" organization
will do this in order to increase the profitability. Because,
these actually will reduce the productivity. There is a subject
called "ergonomics" or "human engineering", which deals
with these issues. It takes care of proper designing of
workplace, because productivity, it has been found, is directly
proportional to the comfort in which the worker is working. So,
an employer trying to reduce cost by this is actually acting in
proverbial "pound foolish, penny wise" manner.

So, in other words, ignoring safety and other such issues will
actually harm the profitability of the employer.


>(Since both NYT and Time are very mainstream newspapers, I
>hope you won't be as dismissive of their reportage as you are of anything
>that I say).

(Eta kintu amar opor obichar korle Sayan. Tumi ak saheb-er
lekha ekti propagandist rochona pathiyechhile, ami gNaigNui
koray mene niye bolle je tarpor theke bachhai kora lekha pathabe.
Bole tarpor arek saheb (@mit.edu)-er lekha uddhar kore pathale, ja
kichhu bold statement-e bhora - as usual, substantiaion chhaDa.
Ami sheta-teo gNaigNui korechhi bole, amake publicly erokom
opobaad debe? Chhih!)


>> Right. Kintu boss aar foreman dujon-er komor-e doDi poDbei,
>> chakri-o jaabe.

>Not in third world countries, where enforcement standards are lax and
>laws exist only on paper.

Tomar abar guliye jachchhe Sayan. Amra capitalist system
vs. co-op system niye kotha bolchhilum - tar actual
implementation niye noy. I totally agree that tumi ja ja
violation-er kotha bolchho, shegulo hoy, and that's
not because those are inherent to capitalist production
system (I'm talking strictly from a Production/Industrial
Engineer's POV, and not from an economist's POV, as
I'm not trained in that area.), but because greed is an inherent
human quality (and I'm hoping that you'll post the article that
you mailed to me and IDG.) and there is no check for corruption.

>Further, since such inspection can only be done
>by the government, there is a double bind and a conflict of interest
>because teh government is dependent on the revenue provided by the
>corporation.

True. But government is also dependent on taxes paid
by the citizens. In a democratic process the law passes
through the opposition too, which consists of the
representatives of people. There are checks and balances
there.

>> Safety measures gupi kore deowa ki chhele-r haat-er moa naki?

>Yes, when the transnational corporation you are dealing with has enormous
>clout and money power (some transnationals have an annual budget which
>exceeds the total GDP of the third world nations they have relocated their
>factories to).

See above.


>> Prothom-e bolle co-op-er overall productivity beshi, dekha
>> gyalo tomar jukti-te phuto. Akhon dhorechho safety.

>As usual you are misrepresenting me. I still hold that productivity in
>a co-op is good and in fact Mondragon's example shows that it is better
>than many corporations.

I am still waiting for productivity data. For comparison,
take the best productivity value of all the co-ops and
compare it with the best productivity value of all
"capitalist" orgs.


>When you contested this, I said that even if one
>assumes, for arguments' sake only, that productivity will be less for a co-op,
>there would still exist other reasons for preferring a direct democratic
>workplace to a non-democratic one.

And you are yet to prove that.

[Re: productivity, you wrote:

"You are quite right in saying that hierarchical chains of

command and control are more "efficient" than democratic process."]


>> OK, then let's talk about accountability for dishonest
>> acts now. Shekhetre, co-op-e ke accountable, and to whom?
>> Loop-ta ki kore kaaj kore?

>In every successful co-op, there are organizational review committees. I
>sit on a ORC in my own co-op myself, where I live. We evaluate performance
>and periodicaly place reports before the membership. It is the task of the
>ORC to be vigilant and thus prevent anyone from ripping off the co-op.

Your co-op's example doesn't fit here, because you don't
produce anything, and if I remember correctly, we agreed
to restrict our discussion to "productive co-op" only.

Also, what about the unseccessful co-ops? If there are n
unsuccessful co-ops (n>1) for every successful co-op, then
definitely this system is a failure.

>>>> But still there are 499 people to cover me up. Capitalist
>>>> org.-e kotojon aachhe bole tomar mone hoy?
>>
>>
>> Aager post-e tumi bolle:
>>
>> "But in a 500-person co-op the people "covering you up" are
>> only the remaining 499 people, and no one else -- a several
>> orders of magnitude difference in scale."
>>
>> Ei post-e bolchho:
>>
>> "If we are talking about work-shirking, then why should the 499
>> members cover you up at all?"
>>
>> Areta chance dilum. Ebar kintu last chance, bhebe bolo.

>Your confusion stems from your inability to understand that the first
>quote is above is about a counterfactual scenario : precisely _because_
>there are fewer people that can "cover you up" (in the sense of their
>productivity masking your non-productivity), the chance is less that
>your work-shirking will go unnoticed.

But that still doesn't justify your statement of "why should the
^^^^^^^^^^


499 members cover you up at all?"

In other words, the
system will work on the classical reward-punishment basis,
and not on some implicit assumptions like, "...everyone's

survival depends on maintaining the viability of the production,
it provides an incentive to members not to do anything that

jeopardizes production." (as you said in one of your posts in
this particular thread).

Brahmishaak sMritibhrongsho-r obyortho daowai, FYI.


>> Abar dekho, aager post-e likhechhile,
>>
>> "Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a
>> social level, so you would usually think twice before letting
>> them down."
>>
>> Aar ei post-e lihechho:
>>
>>>In our co-op, for example, we have expulsion procedures
>>>for members who repeatedly shirk their responsibilities. We have expelled
>>>members in the past (through democratic vote) for non-cooperative behavior.
>>
>> Orthat lok-er-a "let others down" (Hoyot baar duyek bhebe-i),
>> which contradicts what you'd tried to say in your previous
>> post.

>You forget the word "usually" in my first quote. I did not use the word
>"always". In fact, there has only been one expulsion in course of the three
>years that I have lived in my co-op.

And your co-op is not even a "production co-op". I am at a
point of believing that your logic is always based on
stray examples.


>>>>>Further, you are interacting daily with those 499 people on a social
>>>>>level, so you would usually think twice before letting them down.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bangla jatra naki?
>>
>>>Snide comments are not a substitute for reasoned argument.
>>
>> Neither is emotional and sentimental verbiage.

>Where was the emotion and the sentiment? I was stating some bald facts.

1. "Of course they are not. But their collective actions

collectively have the result of slowly destroying the planet."

2. "...because it is quite clear that if a planet-wide

capitalist society in its present form exists much longer, we
will all be dead by, say, 2030 A.D. due to the devastating
environmental consequences (such as global warming) of pursuing
superprofits."

These are "emotional and sentimental" because you have not
substantiated your statements by facts that CLEARLY shows
that capitalism _alone_ is responsible for "environmental
consequences (such as global warming)".

So much for your "bold facts".

>> Aar boi? Kothay pabo?

>Be patient. I need to make a trip to the Library of our co-op, which is
>housed in another part of the campus.


OK.


Sambit

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 24, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/24/96
to

Sambit Basu <sam...@eden.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> I don't think any employer of any "corporate" organization
> will do this in order to increase the profitability. Because,
> these actually will reduce the productivity. There is a subject
> called "ergonomics" or "human engineering", which deals
> with these issues. It takes care of proper designing of
> workplace, because productivity, it has been found, is directly
> proportional to the comfort in which the worker is working. So,
> an employer trying to reduce cost by this is actually acting in
> proverbial "pound foolish, penny wise" manner.
>
> So, in other words, ignoring safety and other such issues will
> actually harm the profitability of the employer.

I don't think you can make a blanket statement like that. Basically,
this is an optimization problem -- lowering safety keeps costs down
while increasing employee safety and comfort putatively increases
productivity and hence profits. So we have two contrary forces at work
here, which is why this is an optimization problem.

The solution to this optimization problem will obviously depend on
actual figures involved. The scenario you painted above makes sense
when "per employee" costs are high (i.e. when we are dealing with a
high-wage labor force). This is the situation in most of the western
world. Because workers in the West are (relatively) well-paid, it may make
sense for employers to get a little more productivity out of them, even
at the cost of increased expenditure for comfort. But in a low-wage
labor force, which is the case in most of the third world, the solution
to this optimization problem will shift in the other direction.


> (Eta kintu amar opor obichar korle Sayan. Tumi ak saheb-er

> Ami sheta-teo gNaigNui korechhi bole, amake publicly erokom
> opobaad debe? Chhih!)

You are right. I am retracting the statement, which was unfair to you.

>>> chakri-o jaabe.
>
>>Not in third world countries, where enforcement standards are lax and
>>laws exist only on paper.
>
> Tomar abar guliye jachchhe Sayan. Amra capitalist system
> vs. co-op system niye kotha bolchhilum - tar actual
> implementation niye noy. I totally agree that tumi ja ja
> violation-er kotha bolchho, shegulo hoy, and that's
> not because those are inherent to capitalist production
> system

In my view, "those" _are_ "inherent to capitalist production
system" (for reasons outlined below; this argument is based on
the line of thought in the book "Beyond the Veil of Economics:
Essays in the Worldly Philosophy" by the economist Robert Heilbroner,
a lucid book that I highly recommend reading).

I fully agree that we are talking "ideal systems" here, not "actual
implementations". However, my point is precisely that this is an
inherent, _systemic_ , consequence of capitalism, not a result of
non-ideality in actual implementation. Why? For the following reasons:

(1) Because of its
very nature, capitalism as a system requires that profits be generated
and continually ploughed back into the means of production.

(2) Not only must profits be generated to satisfy (1), but profits
must also be _maximized_ continually, as whoever makes more profits
will outpace the competition.

(3) Continued generation of profit requires that differentials in
the level of development exist : this is the only way in which
a more developed region, class or group can keep generating the
superprofits necessary to make self-sustaining. Thus, as long as
capitalism exists, there will be "more developed" and "less developed"
regions, classses or groups.

(4) As a consequence of the disparity described in (3), less developed
entities will have less bargaining power vis-a-vis the more developed
entities. (For example, labor has less bargaining power than capital-owner,
a third-world government has less bargaining power than a first-world
government, etc, etc.). Since lax standards benefit capital-owners (the
more advantaged entity in the bargaining process) whereas tighter standards
benefit labor (the less advantaged entity in the process -- the one with
fewer bargaining chips), the inner dynamics of capitalism (even "ideal"
capitalism) inexorably dictate a state of affairs in which enforcement
standards are bound to be lax.

For example: if a certain third world country enforces its standards
very strictly (and thus raises the cost of production for a transnational
corporation), the corporation will immediately pack up and relocate to
another third world country where standards are more lax and hence profits
are higher.

>>Further, since such inspection can only be done
>>by the government, there is a double bind and a conflict of interest
>>because teh government is dependent on the revenue provided by the
>>corporation.
>
> True. But government is also dependent on taxes paid
> by the citizens. In a democratic process the law passes
> through the opposition too, which consists of the
> representatives of people. There are checks and balances
> there.

True enough -- and in certain cases popular pressure will indeed force
the government to rein in the forces of capital to a certain extent
(Enron is a case in point). But because, increasingly, it is tax paid
by corporations that forms the bulk of the government's revenue (in
1994 Nani Palkivala went as far as to suggest the abolition of personal
income tax in India ), this cannot happen in any sustained or systematic
way. As soon as a government tries to rein in big corporations, they will
be toppled (recall what happened to Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954
and to Allende in Chile in 1973 -- both of them were toppled essentially
because their policies brough them in conflict with big multinational
corporations).


> [Re: productivity, you wrote:
>
> "You are quite right in saying that hierarchical chains of
> command and control are more "efficient" than democratic process."]

Note that I used the word "efficient" in quotation marks.

Incidentally, why is the burden of proof on me? It is you who are
suggesting that capitalist command-and-control production is more
productive than syndicalist democracy-from-below production. So it
behooves _you_ to provide the data in support of your claim.

I have already provided evidence in support of _my_ view : the fact
that Mondragon maintained profitability without laying off a single
employee during the recession of the 80's, while capitalist steel
plants by and large were both posting losses as well as being forced to
downsize during this period. As far as I am concerned, this is good
enough evidence for me. If you are dissatisfied with the evidence, it
is you who will have to do the research in support of _your_ point of
view. I cannot do your research for you.

>>In every successful co-op, there are organizational review committees. I
>>sit on a ORC in my own co-op myself, where I live. We evaluate performance
>>and periodicaly place reports before the membership. It is the task of the
>>ORC to be vigilant and thus prevent anyone from ripping off the co-op.
>
> Your co-op's example doesn't fit here, because you don't
> produce anything, and if I remember correctly, we agreed
> to restrict our discussion to "productive co-op" only.

The concept of organizational review does not have in it any element,
so far as I can see, that limits its relevance to only producing co-ops
or only service co-ops.

> Also, what about the unseccessful co-ops? If there are n
> unsuccessful co-ops (n>1) for every successful co-op, then
> definitely this system is a failure.

Since I do not have the statistic about the success rates of co-ops,
I will not press this point. However, it is interesting to see that,
by your own logic, you must then surely regard capitalism as a
"failed system", considering that of the many start-up companies based
on venture capital that are floated each year, only a bare few eventually
"make it".

> But that still doesn't justify your statement of "why should the
> ^^^^^^^^^^
> 499 members cover you up at all?"
>

I really do not understand why my use of the word "should" should indicate
the consequences that you ascribe to it. I genuinely fail to comprehend your
point here. Maybe it is just because of my poor English skills.

>>You forget the word "usually" in my first quote. I did not use the word
>>"always". In fact, there has only been one expulsion in course of the three
>>years that I have lived in my co-op.
>
> And your co-op is not even a "production co-op". I am at a
> point of believing that your logic is always based on
> stray examples.

Well, my examples are from my own experience of living in a co-op. I
have also had the experience of working in a corporation. Now tell us
about your experiences on which you base your examples. How many
years of first-hand experience do you have about co-operatives?

Also, I fail to see in what way the distinction between producing
co-ops and service co-ops invalidates this particular example. In our
co-op too we have to work (cook, clean, maintain the place). So we
have to deal with the same issues of work and potential work-shirking
that any producing co-op will also have to deal with.

>>Where was the emotion and the sentiment? I was stating some bald facts.
>
> 1. "Of course they are not. But their collective actions
> collectively have the result of slowly destroying the planet."
>
> 2. "...because it is quite clear that if a planet-wide
> capitalist society in its present form exists much longer, we
> will all be dead by, say, 2030 A.D. due to the devastating
> environmental consequences (such as global warming) of pursuing
> superprofits."
>
> These are "emotional and sentimental" because you have not
> substantiated your statements by facts that CLEARLY shows
> that capitalism _alone_ is responsible for "environmental
> consequences (such as global warming)".
>
> So much for your "bold facts".


See the beginning of this post for an explanation of the environmental
consequences of capitalism.

-Sayan.


P.S. I have reached the conclusion that this debate is unproductive for me.
I think you are more interested in scoring points and nit-picking
than in substantive discussion. As a result, I am bowing out of this
discussion. You or anybody else can enjoy the satisfaction of having
the last word.

I will however post the book references I promised,
on this newsgroup, as they may be of general interest.


sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 24, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/24/96
to

sayan bhattacharyya <bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu> wrote:
>
>For more discussion of such practices, look at this week's Time magazine,
>or the Op-ed page of the New York Times on June 14, for discussions of
>how the shoe company Nike and the clothing company that makes the Kathy Lee
>Gifford line of jeans, exploit third world labor in pursuit of profit
>maximization. (Since both NYT and Time are very mainstream newspapers, I
>hope you won't be as dismissive of their reportage as you are of anything
>that I say).


Also see the article on transnational corporations and their links to
human rights abuses in third world countries, in the Op-Ed page (page A11)
of today's (Jun 24) New York Times.


Apratim Sarkar

unread,
Jun 24, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/24/96
to

In article <4qgr91$d...@news.eecs.umich.edu> bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>Apratim Sarkar <asa...@us.oracle.com> wrote:
>
>>bhat...@krusty.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:
>>>
>>>Consider the Bhopal disaster of 1984.
>
>>>Evidently, if the
>>>workers were in charge of setting policy through an empowered direct
>>>democracy, they would not have chosen to store the hazardous chemical
>>>without proper safeguards and thus endanger their own lives and that of
>>>their families. This will suffice to illustrate why I feel that empowered
>>>decision-making from the ground up, and not policy-making from the top
>>>down, is more conducive to securing human well-being.
>>
>> Debatable. Lok'e anek shomai sheer negligence theke unnecessary
>> risk nei. Jemon, seatbelt na bNedhe gari chalano, ki mal kheye.
>> Kimba dharo unnecessary speed kara. Ekmatro fine'r bhai lok'ke
>> pate rakhte pare. I.e. aingata restriction (Europe ar USA'r
>> speed limit ar driving related fatality compare karo). Ekhon sheti
>> ki corporation ki cooperative dui'r khetrei projojyo. Lok'e nijer
>> bhalo ato bujhle ain kore seatbelt bNadhte bolte hoto na, heroin
>> cocaine'o be-aini korte hoto na.
>
>The important thing here is : choice. Under direct democracy, workers at
>least have the CHOICE and the opportunity to take decisions that are conducive
>to their self-interest. They may, occasionally, make a stupid choice, as we
>all do from time to time, but I do not see how on earth that can be used as
>an argument to deny them any kind of choice whatsoever.

What made you think that I was suggesting that? You said that empowered
decision-making is more conducive to securing human well-being, I
provided a few counter examples. I do not see you refuting any,
however in a classical display of jerking the knee you claimed
that I was arguing to deny workers "any kind of choice whatsoever".
When I was doing nothing of that sort! Straw man argument kore kore
brain cell more jachchhe, na ki? Ar tar baire kichhu bhabte paro na?

>Besides, most people most of the time do act in a way that serves their
>self-interest (in the language of economics: they maximize their utility
>function all the time; or, as we in artificial intelligence are fond of
>saying, any intelligent agent follows the principle of bounded rationality,
>to use Herbert Simon's phrase).

Dekho Sayan ami AI niye kichhu bolte chai na kintu amar graduate
training jehetu Algorithms'e bhasha bhasha katha amar ekdam bhalo
lage na. Ami ekkhuni tomar "most of the people ..." etc.'r proman
chaite jachchhilam kintu tomar training'r katha mone rekhe bhablum e
niye ar katha na baRanoi bhalo. Bishwashe milai boshtu, prochur
faith na thakle AI'te research kara khub shakto, so OK, tomar bhalo
tomate thak, duniya'r lok'e cigarette kheye high cholestorel
khabar kheye (shab jeneshune) jiban dharan koruk ar tumi tomar
self-interest serve karar bishwas niye thako.

>-Sayan.

Apratim.

Sambit Basu

unread,
Jun 25, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/25/96
to


bhat...@heron.eecs.umich.edu (sayan bhattacharyya) writes:

>Incidentally, why is the burden of proof on me?

Because YOU are questioning the validity of an
existing system.


>It is you who are
>suggesting that capitalist command-and-control production is more
>productive than syndicalist democracy-from-below production. So it
>behooves _you_ to provide the data in support of your claim.

Really?

Sayan, tumi du-din ontor ontor gaan-er thread,
kobita-r thread, ranna-r thread-e - political thread-er
kotha to baad-i dilum - eshe, tomar "syndicalist democracy"
je capitalism-er tulonay koto bhalo shei niye olpo ducharte
baani SCB-te chheDe jaabe. Jei chepe dhorlum, "Kano bhalo
bolo" omni byapar-ta promaan korar day amar. Bah bhai bah!

Nobody is guilty unless proven. Capitalism-o.

Capitalism-ke utkhaat korte gele to bhai TOMAKEI bojhate
hobe replacement-ta better. Oboshyo na korle-i ba ki,
logically je kotha bolte hobe she mathar dibyi aar
ke kobe diyechhe, kaajei "kaar gowal, ke day dhNoa!!"


>I have already provided evidence in support of _my_ view : the fact
>that Mondragon maintained profitability without laying off a single
>employee during the recession of the 80's, while capitalist steel
>plants by and large were both posting losses as well as being forced to
>downsize during this period. As far as I am concerned, this is good
>enough evidence for me. If you are dissatisfied with the evidence, it
>is you who will have to do the research in support of _your_ point of
>view. I cannot do your research for you.

Dyakho bhai ami capitalism niye besh aachhi. Tumi-o tomar
syndicalism-er evidence niye shukhe thako, ami tomay khNochate
jaabo na. Kintu tumi amake jodi bhasha bhasha
buli diye syndicalism-e dikkha debar mohan broto nao, aar sheta
jodi amar julum mone hoy, ami proof/data chaibo-i. Ami ki tomar
co-op-e capitalism phiri korte jachchhi?

>P.S. I have reached the conclusion that this debate is unproductive for me.

Ei bhabe debate theke palano-ta tomar purono hoye
gyachhe, notun kichhu bhabte paarchho na? Atleast,
"abbulish, ami aar khelbo na" bolle-o ektu byaparta
notun hobe, chhelemanushi oboshyo ak-i thake.


> I will however post the book references I promised,
> on this newsgroup, as they may be of general interest.


You had promised to post some relevant data also. Shall I
assume that as you are retiring from the debate, the promise
will become null and void?



Sambit

sayan bhattacharyya

unread,
Jun 27, 1996, 7:00:00 AM6/27/96
to
Apratim Sarkar <asa...@us.oracle.com> wrote:

>Katha ghuriyo na. Mone rekho hajar Suman shunleo o'i bacon je bish she
>bish'i theke jabe.

Kotha ghurolam kothay ???

The Suman song was in _support_ of your position, not in opposition to you.
I would have thought that you'd have the intelligence to figure that out.
Maybe you did not read the song.

I posted that song in a spirit of self-criticism. The song says exactly what
you write in the above quoted sentence. I am not defending my personal
lifestyle on soc.culture.bengali, and have never done so in the past, and I
freely admit that it leaves much to be desired. Your point about bacon is
well-taken.

At the same time, I also
believe that substantial discussion on s.c.b. should be based on substantial
issues and not based on the participants' lifestyles.


-Sayan.

0 new messages