Sri Lanka Vows to Drive out Hindoo AtankVadis from East Coast
VognoDuut923
Civilians flee fighting, troops kill 6 rebels
Reuters, Afp, Colombo
Sri Lanka's security forces are determined to drive the Tamil Tigers
from a stretch of the east coast the rebels control under a 2002 truce, the
military said yesterday, to the worry of international ceasefire monitors.
In fresh violence security forces shot dead at least six Tamil Tiger
rebels during a confrontation in Sri Lanka's restive eastern province,
officials said yesterday.
The troops and a group of fighters from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) clashed near Poonani on Wednesday night and security forces
recovered the bodies of six Tigers, a military official in the area said.
The clash came as Sri Lanka's army chief vowed to drive out Tiger
guerrillas from the island's east as dozens of civilians fled their shelters
Wednesday amid a lull in long-range attacks.
The commander of the army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, said the
military had captured two guerrilla defence lines inside their Vakarai
stronghold, according to the state-run Dinamina newspaper.
Troops and rebels have been locked in fierce artillery duels in the
northeastern districts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa in recent weeks, and
around 35,000 civilians are stuck in camps behind rebel lines in and around
the Tiger-held town of Vakarai.
The United Nations has urged both sides to halt fighting that has
killed more than 3,000 civilians, troops and rebel fighters this year, but
the military and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have ignored the call.
"We want to get the LTTE out of this area and free the civilians,"
military spokesman Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe told Reuters, referring to
a 14 mile stretch of coast in the eastern districts of Trincomalee and
Batticaloa.
"The LTTE are firing artillery and mortars toward civilian settlements
and camps in Trincomalee south and keeping 35,000 people as human shields,"
he added. "So we have to respond to that threat as a countermeasure. We will
control most of the coastline in the east."
Analysts suspect the government wants to drive the Tigers out of the
east completely and then concentrate on rebuilding damaged, long-neglected
infrastructure in the area while confining the Tigers to their northern
stronghold.
Samarasinghe said more than 1,000 civilians had fled Tiger territory
near Vakarai overnight and said troops had killed five rebels and freed a
soldier as the Tigers had tried to move him south to areas of land they
control inland.
The Tigers say dozens of civilians have been killed by army artillery
fire in and around Vakarai since Saturday, while the army blames the rebels
for putting them in harm's way.
The Tigers were not immediately available for comment on the plan of
the military, which has already driven them back from terrain they had held
south of the strategic harbour of Trincomalee since the 1990s.
nkdat...@bigmailbox.net
> Sri Lanka Vows to Drive out Hindoo AtankVadis from East Coast
Bangladesh's Terrorism Posing Global Menace .....
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr171.html
United States Institute Of Peace (Report # 171)
August 2006 | Special Report No. 171
The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh
Summary
* Bangladesh has generally been heralded as a stable, democratic Muslim
state that has made great strides in economic and human development.
Following the restoration of democracy in 1990, it carried out three
largely free and fair general elections in 1991, 1996, and 2001.
* Since 1999, attacks by Islamist militants have been increasing. They
have targeted opposition politicians, scholars, journalists, members of
the judiciary, religious minorities, and members of the Islamic
Ahmadiyya sect.
* Recent years have seen a deepening crisis in governance with
continued politicization of civil society, deterioration of judicial
independence, and diminishing rule of law and respect for human rights.
* Until very recently, the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Khaleda
Zia (backed by two Islamist parties) denied the existence of Islamist
militancy in Bangladesh, dismissing these charges as "hostile
propaganda," designed to besmirch the country's reputation. Following a
countryside terrorist attack in August 2005 and recent suicide
bombings, the government has begun cracking down on selected
individuals.
* Indian observers and policymakers are concerned about the activities
of Bangladeshi Islamists. They accuse Dhaka of exacerbating the ongoing
insurgencies in India's Northeast by turning a blind eye to growing
illegal immigration. They also contend that Bangladesh is cooperating
with Pakistan to target India.
* In light of these developments, questions persist about the
government's dedication to respond decisively to Islamist terrorism,
conduct free and fair elections in 2007, and address the deterioration
in the rule of law and respect for human rights.
Because of Bangladesh's regional importance and the implications of
internal security developments, the United States has limited policy
options to promote its regional goals and ensure democratic elections.
Introduction
On November 29, 2005, some ten people, including two police officers,
were killed in suicide bombings in the towns of Chittagong and Gazipur,
Bangladesh. In the Gazipur incident, the suicide bomber, dressed as a
lawyer, had entered the office of the local bar association. These two
attacks came as part of a spate of bombings in November that had cost
the lives of two lower court judges and two court employees. The
previous attacks, it is widely believed, were the work of the recently
banned Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM), a pro-Taliban, Wahabi-oriented
organization.
Map of Bangladesh. (Courtesy University of Texas Libraries)The attacks
on the judiciary were the apogee of a series of lethal assaults that
have taken place in Bangladesh in the past several years. Almost all
can be traced to a range of Islamist organizations that have been
operating with impunity. For example, Islamist militants are alleged to
be responsible for the February 2005 assassination of S.A.M.S. Kibria,
a former foreign secretary and foreign minister. They also were
implicated in the death of a prominent opposition politician, Ivy
Rehman, and an aborted attempt in August 2004 on the life of Sheikh
Hasina Wajed, the parliamentary opposition leader.
In the past several years, Islamist militancy in Bangladesh and
tensions with India have attracted the attention of journalists,
scholars, and some policymakers in the United States and elsewhere. The
ruling coalition (backed by two Islamist parties, the Jamaat-i-Islami
and the Islamic Oikye Jote) of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has
vigorously denied that Islamist militancy in Bangladesh is on the rise.
Instead it has dismissed these charges as "hostile propaganda,"
designed to besmirch Bangladesh's reputation as a moderate Islamic
state.
Substantial numbers of Indian observers and policymakers have taken a
markedly different position. With equal vigor they have sounded the
alarm about the activities of radical Islamists in Bangladesh. They
also have accused Bangladesh of exacerbating tensions in India's
Northeast by turning a blind eye to growing illegal immigration into
India and by cooperating with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI-D) in nefarious designs against India.
Bangladesh, which lacked a tradition of militant Islamism, has indeed
moved in that direction in recent years, as Eliza Griswold showed in
her New York Times Magazine article (January 23, 2005). The rise of
Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh and their possible ties to
Pakistan should be of concern to U.S. policymakers. Given the weak
governance and lack of political order in Bangladesh, the increase in
Islamist militancy could easily turn it into a fertile area for various
radical groups to take root and flourish. On the regional level, the
emergence of such groups could worsen already strained relations with
India. They also could adversely affect U.S. security interests if
Islamist insurgents from Southeast Asia and the Middle East come to see
Bangladesh as a possible haven, especially as they face U.S. pressure
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
India, too, has concerns about the involvement of Bangladesh in its
troubles in the Northeast, which could create an opportunity for
Pakistani involvement. The empirical basis for this assertion is
limited and partial: Unequivocal evidence of Pakistani involvement is
hard to establish, and most of the assertions about Pakistani
involvement come from Indian sources. However, given the increasing
cooperation between Washington and New Delhi on issues of
counterterrorism and intelligence, the United States should take these
claims seriously.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh identifies several areas of concern,
including the prevention of and response to terrorism, development of
democratic systems, and respect for American values. But the United
States has yet to develop sophisticated and effective means to promote
its goals in Bangladesh-a serious problem that needs immediate
attention. What are some ways the United States could promote its
varied goals in the country?
Judicious Use of "Public Shaming" Still Works.
As one of Bangladesh's principal aid donors, the United States is in a
position to exert considerable pressure on the current government in
Dhaka. This form of pressure is likely to work even though Bangladesh,
in a technical sense, no longer depends upon foreign aid. However, the
government of Bangladesh sees the flow of foreign assistance to the
country as an emblem of international recognition. Restricting or
denying assistance (or making credible threats to do so) in response to
failure to make good progress toward U.S. goals will have a "shaming
effect." Public shaming remains one of the few effective levers to
change policy within the government. Needless to say, this lever needs
to be applied strategically to retain its usefulness.
Strategic Conditionality of Economic Assistance.
The United States could identify elements of its economic assistance
package that could be made contingent on Bangladesh's progress toward
political reform, rule of law, and protection of minority and other
human rights. U.S. programs in Bangladesh include child survival and
health, development assistance, economic support, foreign military
financing, International Military Education Training, and-until
recently-the Peace Corps. (Because of security concerns, the Peace
Corps suspended its mission in Bangladesh in early 2006.) In FY2005,
these programs totaled nearly $64 million.
Innovative and More Comprehensive and Effective Programs.
At the same time, the United States should fund new and more effective
programs to improve Bangladesh's educational system, police and
paramilitary training, and judiciary reform. Although there is no
current U.S. funding for general police training and judicial reforms
in Bangladesh, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
requested $2.9 million for FY2007 to support Sesame Street-based
programs and primary education. These are probably not sufficient to
deal with Bangladesh's massive educational challenges and should be
expanded in focus to include increased access to primary and secondary
education.
Consistent Public and Private Exhortation.
The United States should continue to exhort Bangladesh privately and
publicly to address its most serious problems. This exhortation must
also be specific, consistent, and direct. Simultaneously the United
States can exert pressure through multilateral aid consortia.
Bangladeshi regimes appear to respond to well-orchestrated,
multilateral pressures. For example, in early 2005, a donors'
conference co-chaired by the World Bank, the European Union, and the
State Department convened in Washington. Displeased with the situation
in Bangladesh, the donors threatened to levy sanctions against Dhaka.
The message was not lost on the government: Soon after this meeting, it
began an unprecedented crackdown on the militant groups it repeatedly
had denied even existed.
Ensure Free and Fair 2007 Elections.
The United States must focus its attention on the upcoming 2007
elections in Bangladesh. It is essential to all U.S. policy goals that
the elections be conducted without harassment, intimidation, and
violence and that an orderly post-election transition take place. Thus
far, numerous irregularities have come to light, including alleged
manipulation of election commission and caretaker government personnel,
as well as the election commission's creation of a deeply flawed
voters' list. The high court struck down this new voters' list and
ordered the government to revise the 2001 list, but questions remain
about the current government's intention to hold free and fair
elections.
New Tools for Election Monitoring.
Not only are election-monitoring missions essential, but monitors
should be authorized to measure potential indicators of fraud, such as
suspiciously high numbers of registered voters or lopsided victory
margins. For example, monitors should ascertain how many votes could be
cast in an hour, to determine after tallying if tampering took place.
With this information, the United States and other international
partners could recommend corrective measures during, rather than after,
the elections.
Harmonize International Policy Approaches.
The United States should continue to increase its coordination with
other countries and multilateral agencies in Bangladesh to deal with
the various challenges presented by Dhaka. Since the government
exploits differences among donors, it is imperative for the
international community to make concerted efforts to lessen gaps
between their respective goals. In this regard, the United States
already has begun turning to India on regional issues. But it must
pursue this strategy carefully. The United States should pay heed to
India's concerns about illegal immigration and Bangladeshi (and
potentially Pakistani) support for the ULFA and other insurgent groups.
Nevertheless, it also must unequivocally, if quietly, urge India to
address longstanding political grievances in its northeastern region.
Elegant solutions are in short supply, and many of these suggestions
may entail various kinds of political and diplomatic costs. However,
the cost of inaction surely will be higher if Bangladesh continues on
its current trajectory of poor governance, corruption, diminished
respect for human rights and rule of law, and increasing Islamist
militancy.
About the Report
The Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention of the United States
Institute of Peace commissioned this report in recognition of the
rising importance of domestic developments in Bangladesh and their
impact on South Asian security. Since 1999 Islamist militants have
unleashed a campaign of terror that has gone virtually unchecked. At
the same time, governance, rule of law, and provision of justice seem
in short supply. Indian security agencies see connections between
terrorism in India and groups operating in Bangladesh. The report is
based partly on field research and interviews the author conducted in
the region in August 2005.
==================================================================
http://www.newagebd.com/2006/aug/25/edit.html#1
New Age, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Friday, August 25, 2006
EDITORIAL
The many faces of Islamist militancy
Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Hizbut Touhid and and Harkatul Jihad are
names that send a chill down the spine of a patriotic citizen. Yet they
are there, working clandestinely, semi-clandestinely or openly as it
suits them and dealing new shocks to the nation. Their apparent
invincibility is matched by the government's leniency and ambivalence
towards them, all protestations of launching a drive against terrorists
notwithstanding. This official duplicity over an issue that poses a
threat to the survival of this country as a modern polity, is
outrageous and painful. The proposed official recognition to quomi
madrassahs is a great fillip to Islamist militancy and alongside this
misadventure events of gravely disturbing import are unravelling.
Terrorists are not properly chargesheeted, cases are not vigorously
pursued and they are too easily let off. Banned organisations can
negotiate with the government and can hold rally under changed banner
with the government's full knowledge. These are only some of the
instances of the authorities' sincerity. If the authorities are
indeed sincere then they have all along been giving wrong signal to
their quarry.
Seven terrorists of Hijbut Touhid including two of their 'amirs'
had been held in Chittagong but no case could be filed even in 13 days
due to some mysterious reason. The decision of their interrogation by
the joint interrogation cell in Dhaka was also rescinded for u nnknown
reason, according to a Bangla daily. The terrorists have been shown
arrested under Section 54 which means that they cannot be kept in
detention indefinitely unless cases are filed. It appears from the
report that approval of the higher authorities for dealing firmly with
case is not available yet.
Leaders of Harkatul Jihad, an Islamist militant group which had been
banned last October threw an open challenge to the country by gathering
at a rally at Baitul Mokarram mosque last Friday under a new banner of
Sachetan Islami Janata (conscious Islamic people). Their leaders have
been quoted by the media as saying that they were able to hold their
rally after long negotiation with the government at all levels and were
assured by the government that they would not be arrested. A leader of
the rally reportedly said that he had informed the PMO, the IG Police
and the intelligence agencies about the rally. The state minister for
home, however, told the media that he was unaware about the rally as he
was away from the capital and the intelligence agencies had not
apprised him. Then is there ambiguity and contradiction within the
government over the drive against terrorism? One Sachetan leader boldly
proclaimed over the electronic media that they aim to go to power by
contesting in future elections if not the next one. If today the
militants directly or indirectly made themselves junior partner in the
government, there is no reason to assume that they will always remain
junior partner.
Seeing the ever-growing aggressiveness of the militant groups and
the hesitant and ambiguous position of the government some quarters ask
if the country has turned into a sanctuary for the militants. According
to a report there are 95 militant groups in the country and only four
have been banned, and that too nominally perhaps. Under different names
and in different forms they have penetrated all tiers of society,
including the administration, the universities, banking and health
sector. They are receiving patronage and protection of powerful
elements in the government and finance from unknown sources. Emboldened
by the government's insouciance they are leading the country to the
edge of a precipice from which a retreat shall be ever more difficult.
==================================================================
http://www.newagebd.com/2006/aug/24/front.html#1
New Age, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Thursday, August 24, 2006
Harkat-ul-Jihad elements find new home
By Arif Newaz Farazi
The top leader of an Islami Oikya Jote faction is now in Pakistan to
raise funds for Sachetan Islami Janata (conscious Islamic public), a
new Islamist forum, whose key members are known for running militant
activities across Bangladesh.
Mufti Ezharul Islam is well known to most Islamic organisations in
Pakistan, Maulana Mostafa bin Hossain, vice-president of the IOJ
faction said. 'That's why he went to raise funds ahead of the
upcoming national elections.'
His next destination is Iran, sources in the faction told New Age.
Many leaders and activists of the banned Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
have joined hands with Bangladesh Khelafat Andolan (caliphate movement)
after the Islami Janata programme near Baitul Mukarram on Friday.
'We took them on board, as different intelligence agencies and the
government have assured the leaders of the banned organisation that
they will not be arrested or harassed if they go by the government's
instructions,' Kazi Azizul Haque, international affairs secretary of
the movement, said.
Maulana Ahmed Ullah Ashraf, son of Hafejji Hujur, who launched the
movement, echoed his views. 'They clearly had the green signal from
the government to stage a rally. Besides, they are no longer members of
the banned organisation.'
He refused to be drawn into a debate over the movement taking on
board people who were involved in militant activities. 'We welcome
anyone who believes in our ideology, which does not have any room for
armed revolution, as Islam does not permit armed revolution.'
The Bangladesh chapter of Harkat-ul-Jihad formally was established
in 1992 with an aim to establish Islamic rule and announced that those
who had fought the then Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan were working
with the organisation.
The organisation drew inspiration from the International Islamic
Front of Osama bin Laden. Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid was given
the charge of the organisation.
However, there was a conflict between Sheikh Farid and Mufti Hannan
in 1997. Nejam-e- Islami Party chief Mufti Ezaharul Islam backed Sheikh
Farid and Maulana Mohiuddin, editor of monthly Medina, backed Mufti
Hannan.
The organisation initially used the office of Jago Mujahid, an
Islamic publication, at Khilgaon in the capital city.
Later, it shifted their office to the top floor of 116/1 Naya Paltan
under the supervision of the Nejam-e-Islami chief Mufti Ezaharul Islam.
Apart from its ties with Afghanistan-based militant groups, it
maintained connections with Harkat-ul-Jihad and some other militant
groups in Pakistan.
It stepped up its activities after the Awami League came to power in
June 1996 and conducted its first open operation, an abortive attempt
to kill poet Shamsur Rahman at his residence in Dhaka on January 18,
1999.
Earlier on February 19, 1996, law enforcers arrested 41 of its
activists with illegal firearms in Cox's Bazar. The arrested were
sentenced to life imprisonment by a court but all of them came out on
bail from the High Court after the four-party alliance assumed power in
October 2001.
Abdur Rouf, who was arrested along with 25 associates by the Rapid
Action Battalion at Bhaluka in Mymensingh on August 2, was one of the
41 militants.
In one of their major operations, the outfit planted a 76-kilogram
bomb at the venue of a public meeting of the then prime minister Sheikh
Hasina at Kotalipara in Gopalganj on July 20, 2000. Intelligence
agencies spotted the bomb before the public meeting was to take place.
The outfit is also suspected to have links to some major blasts,
including the one during Pahela Baishakh celebrations at Ramna Batamul
in Dhaka.
The Rapid Action Battalion arrested the Bangladesh operations
commander of the organisation, Mufti Hannan, in Anandanagar of Madhya
Badda on October 1, 2005.
Hannan told journalists that he did not have to flee the country as
the former home minister, Altaf Hossain Choudhury, had assured him that
there was 'nothing for him to fear'. Altaf, however, denied
Hannan's claim.
==================================================================