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"NEHRU RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN"

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Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

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Feb 6, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/6/97
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Paresh C Thakker wrote:

:CMP was rejected not only by Nehru but whole of congress unanimously (by 15
:to 1), the main reason was the stubborn nature of Jinnah. He knew that by
:no means he can gain any power in United India. Also, language of the CMP
:draft was quite vague, and it was intentionally worded that way by Sir
:Stafford Cripps to get both the parties (congress & league) approval.

:Azad narration can not be taken at its face value. He was quite biased
:against many of the Congress leaders at that time, moreover, he wanted to be
:India's first premier and was reprimanded by Gandhi for his unwillingness
:to vacate congress president's post in 1946.

:Source: Patel's biography by Rajmohan Gandhi . pg 350-375.

Dear Mr.Thakker,

Sorry for the delay in replying to your post. I have located the biography
of Patel by Rajmohan Gandhi. Let me quote from it.

"Cripps's ingenuity rose to the occassion. He prepared an award designed to
reconcile the irreconcilable. Adopted by his colleagues, it became the
Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16."

[ Source: Patel-A Life by Rajmohan Gandhi, Navajivan Publishing House,
Ahmedabad, page 360]

Please note the date May 16.

"Delighted that Jinnah's "main demand of Pakistan is buried for ever" and
that "his demand for parity is not accepted" Patel would have at once
accepted the May 16 Plan but for two things. One, it did not give a strong
centre. Two, he did not know how to cope with Section 19. Assam's
Congressmen were up in arms, and Vallabhbhai himself rebelled against the
prospect of Assam being "overwhelmed". He was less particular about the
N.W.F.P., a Congress province no doubt but also, after all, a Muslim one."
[Ibid, page 362]

Here, note the concern for Assam and some (albeit little) concern for
N.W.F.P. We shall have more to say about these later. Also note the desire
for a strong centre.

"Congress deferred a reply to the Raj. It wanted to see how Jinnah was going
to respond-and it awaited the second half of the Mission's package, the
proposal for an Interim Government."
[Ibid, page 363]

"Then came the British Delegation's "award" announced on June 16, a council
of 14 individuals who were named. They comprised 6 Congress Hindus (Nehru,
Patel, Prasad, C.R, Mahtab and Jagjivan Ram), 5 League Muslims led by
Jinnah; Baldev Singh as a Sikh, N.P.Engineer as a Parsi and John Matthai as
a Christian.
The reduction in the League's proportionate strength was an improvement but
Congress was still being treated as a Hindu body. The award was rejected but
by no means instantly. the WorCom was tempted by the possibility of a 9-to-5
majority against the League: that the minorities would back Congress seemed
a reasonable assumption.....
Though seemingly most affected by a Congress Muslim's exclusion from the
June 16 list, Azad not only did not object to it, he became in fact "the
leader of the point of view" that Congress should not break on this
question."
[Ibid. Page 363-364]

Do note that Azad in this case did not try to get power for himself.

"[On June 23,1946] Vallabhbhai and the three Britons talk from about 8 a.m
for half an hour. .....He tells them that ...Congress was going to reject
June16. P.L asks Patel if he realizes that in that case Jinnah would be
invited, ...to help form a government. Vallabhbhai asks if Congress too
would be invited to play that role if it accepted May 16. Cripps and P.L say
that it would. Securing the crucial confirmation, Patel tells them, without
authority yet with absolute certainty-that Congress will accept May 16"
[Ibid: Page 366]
The three Briton's referred to above are the three members of the Cabinet
Mission-Cripps, Pethick-Lawrence and Alexander. P.L is Pethick-Lawrence. Do
note the prime concern in Patel-power for Congress.

"At noon the WorCom sends its long awaited answer to the Raj. June 16 is
rejected but May 16 is accepted"
[Ibid: Page 367]

Thus we see that the rejection of the Cabinet Mission proposal that you
wrote of in your post was the rejection of June 16 proposal. But the
Congress Working Committee did accept the May 16 proposal. This is the
proposal that was referred to in Azad's "India wins Freedom" as the proposal
which was accepted by both Muslim League and Congress and which was later
sabotaged by Jawaharlal. Azad's description thus is vindicated.

"Jawaharlal blundered at the start of his Presidency. ...at a press
conference he again said that Congress would be "completely unfettered by
agreements" ....Jinnah was up in arms. Describing Nehru's remarks as "a
complete repudiation..." of May 16, he asked HMG to "remove the impression
that the Congress has accepted the long term scheme". When the Raj declined
to do this, Jinnah got the League to to revoke its acceptance of May 16 and
launch "direct action to achieve Pakistan"."
[Ibid: pp 372-373]

We once again see that Azad's verson is being corroborated here.

I would like to make some more points.

1. About the Muslim "atrocities" against Hindus.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We often hear about how the Muslim "atrocities" against the Hindus led
invariably to partition. About the August 16 , 1946 riots in Calcutta, Patel
spoke of "a good lesson for the League, because I hear that the proportion
of Muslims who have suffered death is much larger." [Ibid: Page 376]. Often
mention is made of the riots in Noakhali.
"Early in October, about 300 Hindus had been killed in Noakhali district in
Eastern bengal. Temples were destroyed, women raped and many Hindus forcibly
converted to Islam......Exploiting the tales of woe that Hindu refugees
brought from Noakhali, trouble makers in Bihar launched a massacre of
Muslims. Around 7000 were killed,...The Bihar carnage was sadly followed by
the killing on November 8 of about a thousand Muslims at Garhmukteshwar in
Western U.P." [Ibid: page 378]
My point is that atrocities were not only done by Muslims. The estimates
would indicate that Hindu brutalities were much larger in magnitude. I am no
fan of Jinnah. He was a politician in his cynical search for power. But so
were Nehru and Patel.

2.About Nehru's actions being motivated by his deeper understanding that the
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
League would have sabotaged the Cabinet Mission in any case.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This argument is given by Raghu Sheshadri. I have decided not to respond to
his post because his arguments are only semantic word play and he never
cites a reference himself. However, in response to the above argument let me
quote the following
[10 March 1947]"Nehru was telling Wavell in private that 'through the
Cabinet Mission Plan was the best solution if it could be carried
through-the only real alternative was thepartition of Punjab and Bengal"
["Modern India-1885-1947" by Sumit Sarkar, Macmillan India, 1983. Page 436]

Thus we see that Nehru, after sabotaging Cabinet Mission Plan was shedding
crocodile tears over it. It also shows that the justification given by the
apologists of Nehru is false.

3. About Assam
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Nehru-Patel-Congress spent much time in protesting how grouping would be
unfair to Assam and N.W.F.P. Let us hear how Sylhet was partitioned out of
Assam.

"The Sylhet referendum was held in July 1947. It was virtually a vote on
the twin issues of the reorganisation of India on a communal and of the
province of Assam on a linguistic basis. Sylheti Hindus who had for
decades agitated for a re-union with Beng al now clung to Assam. On the
other hand, Sylheti Muslims who were, on political considerations
consistently opposed to the move since 1928, now reversed their position.
Some local scheduled caste leaders, too, sided with them. The local
Jamiat-ul-Ulema, led by Husain Ahmad Madani, remained consistently opposed
to the idea of Pakistan and advised all Muslims of the district to vote
for an undivided Assam. Though otherwise influential, they failed to make
any impact at all on the Muslim voters. On the Sylheti question, the
Assamese public opinion, too, remained understandably cold, but consistent
with its earlier stand. ....."the only alternative to the state of things
is", wrote Bardoloi to Patel in February 1946,"to separate the Bengali
distri ct of Sylhet and a portion of Cachar from Assam and join these with
Bengal-a consummation to which the Assamese people are looking forward for
the last 70 years". Bardoloi let the Cabinet Mission to understand in
April that Assam would be quite prepared t o hand over Sylhet to Eastern
Bengal. A year later, under the changed circumstances, it was no longer
possible for the APCC to say this so openly. However, the Congress control
of the Assam administration was so 'correctly' exercised that it hardly
provided any advantage to the local congress during its campaign in Sylhet
to win the referendum. It was indeed a lifetime's opportunity for the
Assamese leadership 'to get rid of Sylhet' and carve out a linguistically
more homogenous province. When the results of the referendum were
declared, ther e was a feeling of relief in the Brahmaputra Valley. It was
widely suggested there that the Bengali-speaking plains portion of Cachar
district, at the least its Hailakandi subdivision, and also the four
Bengali speaking thanas of the Dhubri subdivision-th e stronghold of
Bhasani, should have been transferred to Pakistan. The Sylhet leaders were
discouraged when they tried to salvage a portion of the district through
an effective representation to the Boundary Commission". [Source:Planter
Raj to Swaraj-Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam 1826-1947
by Amalendu Guha, Indian Council of Historical Research, 1977, pp 319-320]

4.About N.W.F.P
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The apologists of Nehru and Congress, also claim that he sabotaged Cabinet
Mission because he was worried about the fate of Assam and NWFP in Muslim
League dominated Group B and C, I would quote the following about the
treatment meted out to NWFP and Khan Abdul Gaffer Khan, the Frontier Gandhi.
This quote is from the book "Modern India-1885-1947" by Sumit Sarkar,
Macmillan India, 1983, page 449. I have earlier showed how Sylhet was put
into Pakistan to accomodate Assamese Chauvinism.

"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Congress leadership in
1947 let down very badly indeed the Pathans who had supported the national
movement so consistently from the late 1920s. Though the existing N.W.F.P
assembly had a Congress majority and had voted in favour of joining the
Constituent Assembly, a plebiscite was still forced on the province on the
question of choice between joining India or Pakistan. The Congress High
Command protested but did not make it a breaking point (as Nehru had
successfully done on Plan Balkan) nor did it insist either on a decision by
universal franchise, or on inclusion in the choice before voters of the
independent Pakthoonistan option. The N.W.F.P Congress eventually decided to
boycott the plebiscite in protest- and N.W.F.P went to Pakistan by a vote of
50.99% of the total, very limited electorate of 572,798 (i.e. by the
decision of just 9.52% of the total population of the province). The
Frontier Gandhi would later declare with justice that he and his movement
had been 'thrown to the wolves' by the congress leadership."
--
Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

Mohan

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Feb 7, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/7/97
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After hearing these raging debates about the creation of pakistan,
bangladesh, the conflicts in Assam, kashmir, sri lanka etc which have
resulted in losses of life for pieces of real estate, I have come to
the conclusion that the best way of having an united South Asia is a
divided south asia.
It is very true that people band together when they have a common
cause like fighting the british. However once things are settled and
they get political power, there is always bound to be a dispute on how
the spoils are to be divided. It may be linguistic, it may be caste
based, it may be relegion based(like the creation of Pakistan) or it
may be race based. It does not matter. When there are many diverse
groups around, there is bound to be insecurity among the less populous
groups and in a situation like S Asia, where the divisions are
vertical(i.e relegious for example) and horizontal(i.e linguistic for
example) and add a third dimension to it i.e the division of upper and
lower castes, every group will find itself in the minority and
therefore insecure and seeking to find their place in such a society
via being represented in a government.
Unfortunately a single centralized government based on a nationwide
popular vote, however well meaning does not have room to give political
power equally to all these diverse groups. Therefore in order to have a
sucessful southern asia, the founding fathers instead of thinking up a
single entity(or 2 entities like India and Pakistan) should have had
much more vision and instead created a confederation of South Asian
States. To some extent the framers of the Indian constitution did just
that, they did not make the Sri Lankan mistake of creating a unitary
state, instead they did define India as a union of states. They however
did not go far enough in this. In particular they made 2 mistakes.
First they thought of only India as we know it now, but hindsight is
20/20. The second mistake was the concentration of excess power in the
central government and using the states in a auxilary role. The price
in terms of loss of resources and lives, not withstanding the conflicts
between India and Pakistan and also the raging wars in Kashmir and
Panjab have been heavy.
The following model in my opinion would have worked.
1. A true confederation of South Asian States
2. By south Asian States, I mean not just the states that constitute
India today, but also what is Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan,
Nepal and Sikim.
3. Each state to be an independent Nation in all respects, including
having their own constitution, levying their own taxes, having their
own set of laws, nad everything an independent nation has, with the
exception of Foreign affairs and defence.
4. A common "United Federation Government", whose job it is to
co-ordinate the relationship betweeen the states, manage the foriegn
affairs of the entire federation and enable the federation to act as a
single trading block.
5. An army to be formed by the federation to which each state in the
federation would contribute according to what it feels it can(each
contributing state would pay for its own army and pool money to buy
equipment in some negotiated propotion).
6. The head of the united federation government would play a role not
very different from the secretary general of the UN, and the job will
be made available to every member state by rotation on an annual basis
and the each state will contribute one or equal number of members to
this governing council. No nationwide elections to this job and this
job should carry no glamour.
7. Real power will be with the states.
8. States can further sub divide at will, by holding plebiscites in
specific regions based on a minimum required collected signatures.
9. Formation and subdivisions of states be governed by the federal
council. The only requirements for each state to be a member of the
federation is that they have some form of democratic government with
approval from the federal council and uphold set standards of human
rights.
10. Free movement of goods and services between states but subject to
the laws of the induvidual states.
I know everyone is going to laugh and say that it is utopia. Yet
what exists today may not be utopia, it certainly is a nightmare. We
cannot predict where the next conflict is going to flare. Through the
entire cold war, the superpowers played one nation against the other to
achieve their goals, while we like fools took sides to settle our
tribal conflicts and what could be the worlds most potent common market
now has very little currency for its goods and services. Last but not
least bcos the south asian nations are eternally embroiled in some
conflict or another(civil or external) resources that can be used to
feed our teeming masses are being thrown away to make nuclear bombs
that we dare not use in fear of our own anhilation.
Mohan

Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

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Feb 7, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/7/97
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Raghu Seshadri (sesh...@cup.hp.com) wrote:
: x-no-archive: yes
: Nalinaksha writes -
: : 2.About Nehru's actions being motivated by his deeper understanding that the
: : League would have sabotaged the Cabinet Mission in any case.

: : This argument is given by Raghu Sheshadri. I have decided not to respond to


: : his post because his arguments are only semantic word play and he never
: : cites a reference himself. However, in response to the above argument let me

: Great error here. I remember that argument -
: basically it came down to if "paving the way"
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
: is the same as "the cause of". You say it is,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
: and I gave you several examples to show
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
: it isn't. Why is my argument word play and
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
: yours isn't ?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
My observations on the above:

1.You have just attached labels to phenomenon without defining the
characteristics in any way. If both A and B precede X and if X would not
have occurred had either of A or B had not occurred, then either you call
both A and B to be the "cause" of X or you call both A and B to be
"paving the way" for X. But it is intellectually dishonest to call A the
cause and B the paving of the way. In the context of the present
discussion, the partition would not have occurred had Jinnah not made his
Pakistan demand. Partition also would not have occurred had Jawaharlal
not sabotaged cabinet mission plan.

2. Your examples of "cause" vs "paving the way" is just that- word play.
You have not differentiated how does one identify which event
is a "cause" and which is a "paving the way".

3. About the difference between your argument and mine-I cite my
references, you don't.

4. Coming to the issue at hand, I have established that

a)Congress (both working committee and AICC) had accepted Cabinet
Mission plan.
b)Muslim League had accepted the Cabinet mission plan.
c)Nehru unilaterally repudiated the Cabinet Mission plan and put Muslim
League in a corner for more militant action.

If you say that Nehru did what he did because Muslim League would have
dishonoured the agreement any way, then you are nothing but an apologist.

I would expect you to tell us

a)A definition (not an example) of paving the way and cause

b)Establish that the facts were something other than what I had stated in
4 above.

If your response contain the usual verbiage and "Sheshadrilogic" then I
am going to ignore it.


: To repeat, your account on the computer
: paves the way for you to post. But is the
: account the cause of your post ? No.
: You are.

: Please point out the semantic word play
: here.

Your statement above is a perfect example of word play. You have just
given an example and attached arbitrary labels without defining it any way.

--
Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

DR KAMAL HASAN

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Feb 7, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/7/97
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Sounds good on paper but is it practical?

Mohan wrote:
(deleted)


> The following model in my opinion would have worked.
> 1. A true confederation of South Asian States
> 2. By south Asian States, I mean not just the states that constitute
> India today, but also what is Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan,
> Nepal and Sikim.
> 3. Each state to be an independent Nation in all respects, including
> having their own constitution, levying their own taxes, having their
> own set of laws, nad everything an independent nation has, with the
> exception of Foreign affairs and defence.

THEY ARE ALREADY INDEPENDENT.

> 4. A common "United Federation Government", whose job it is to
> co-ordinate the relationship betweeen the states, manage the foriegn
> affairs of the entire federation and enable the federation to act as a
> single trading block.

WILL THESE INDEPENDENT STATES AGREE WITH CO-ORDINATION BY MEMBERS WHO MAY
NOT BELONG TO THEIR RACE, WHOM THEY MAY SUSPECT OF BEING BIASED.

> 5. An army to be formed by the federation to which each state in the
> federation would contribute according to what it feels it can(each
> contributing state would pay for its own army and pool money to buy
> equipment in some negotiated propotion).

WILL THE RICHER NATIONS AGREE IF THEY WERE BURDENED BY THE POORER
NATIONS ? WHICH SIDE DOES THE ARMY TAKE IF THERE WERE A DISPUTE ?

> 6. The head of the united federation government would play a role not
> very different from the secretary general of the UN, and the job will
> be made available to every member state by rotation on an annual basis
> and the each state will contribute one or equal number of members to
> this governing council. No nationwide elections to this job and this
> job should carry no glamour.

THE UNITED NATIONS IS DICTATED TO BY THE US, WHO ALSO PROVIDES MOST OF
THE FUNDS. WHICH COUNTRY WILL TAKE THE LEADING ROLE IN THIS FEDERATION?

> 7. Real power will be with the states.

BACK TO SQUARE ONE. EVERY STATE WILL QUARREL OVER SOVEREIGNTY.

> 8. States can further sub divide at will, by holding plebiscites in
> specific regions based on a minimum required collected signatures.
> 9. Formation and subdivisions of states be governed by the federal
> council. The only requirements for each state to be a member of the
> federation is that they have some form of democratic government with
> approval from the federal council and uphold set standards of human
> rights.
> 10. Free movement of goods and services between states but subject to
> the laws of the induvidual states.

EXCELLENT IDEA, TRY TELLING THAT TO THE BANGLADESHI OR PAKISTANI
BUSINESS'S WHO MAY BECOME THREATENED BY COMPETITION FROM NEIGHBOURING
INDIA.

> I know everyone is going to laugh and say that it is utopia.

I'M NOT LAUGHING AS LONG AS IT WORKS

Yet
> what exists today may not be utopia, it certainly is a nightmare.

AGREED UPON

We
> cannot predict where the next conflict is going to flare. Through the
> entire cold war, the superpowers played one nation against the other to
> achieve their goals, while we like fools took sides to settle our
> tribal conflicts and what could be the worlds most potent common market
> now has very little currency for its goods and services. Last but not
> least bcos the south asian nations are eternally embroiled in some
> conflict or another(civil or external) resources that can be used to
> feed our teeming masses are being thrown away to make nuclear bombs
> that we dare not use in fear of our own anhilation.
> Mohan

--------------
DR KAMAL HASAN

Prem Thomas

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Feb 8, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/8/97
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DR KAMAL HASAN wrote:
>
> Sounds good on paper but is it practical?

It could very soon become one of the only two viable options.

> Mohan wrote:
> (deleted)


>
> > 3. Each state to be an independent Nation in all respects, including
> > having their own constitution, levying their own taxes, having their
> > own set of laws, nad everything an independent nation has, with the
> > exception of Foreign affairs and defence.
>
> THEY ARE ALREADY INDEPENDENT.

If that *is* indeed the case, then this below is not a valid point:

> WILL THESE INDEPENDENT STATES AGREE WITH CO-ORDINATION BY MEMBERS WHO MAY
> NOT BELONG TO THEIR RACE, WHOM THEY MAY SUSPECT OF BEING BIASED.

The fact is that India has the potential to develop itself, as a single
entity, but the ceaseless caterwauling on the political/religious fronts
keeps that potential in check. I agree, in principle, on Mohan's theory
that a divided India may be a way to a united India. It's working in
Europe, and for those who might disagree based on pre-WW2 history: move
with the times, what was accepted and tolerated prior to 1960 is not
anymore.

Prem

mailto:pre...@qed.net

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Feb 8, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/8/97
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Uday Reddy

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Feb 10, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/10/97
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Raghu Seshadri wrote:
>
> Here Jinnah was the active, intentional
> agent for the partition. Nehru wasn't.
>
> I don't see the source of your confusion.

I can't believe this argument is still going on!

Raghu, your point is well-taken that the roles of Jinnah and Nehru in
the partition affair were on very different levels. But, I believe you
still understimate Nehru's role.

Here is what I see. Jinnah and the majority of subcontinental Muslims
wanted partition. Why? Because they saw themselves getting lost in a
sea of Hindus and getting dominated by Hindu/Congress leadership.

(Some would even argue that partition was not the real goal of Jinnah
but rather it was about getting a reasonable amount of power for Muslims
free of Hindu domination. I won't get into that.)

If such was the case, the essential remedy was to distribute power in
some equitable fashion so that the Muslims could run their own affairs
(at least in the areas where they were in majority) and there was as
little Central domination as possible.

Cabinet Mission tried hard to achieve that and produced a plan. If
Nehru truly cared about the subcontinental unity, he should have been
ready to make the necessary compromises to address the Muslim
aspirations so that the subcontinent could stay united. He didn't.

In fact, I believe Nehru made up his mind much too early that the Muslim
League and Congress could not stay united. See in Stanley Wolpert's
biography about the letter Nehru wrote to Cripps soon after he came out
of prison (well before the Cabinet Mission, well before the elections
even). Nehru admits in that letter that it might be necessary to
partition the country, but opines that the partition should be limited
to the Muslim majority districts (as opposed to provinces). In essence,
Nehru was not willing to dilute the Central power to allay the Muslim
fears. He would rather let them go instead of working with them and
making constant compromises.

When the Cabinet Mission Plan was officially accepted by Congress, the
pro-unity camp and the pro-partition camp (with Nehru and Patel in the
latter) reached a compromise. Nehru wrecked this compromise soon after
he became the Congress President. I don't think it was just a careless
outburst. Though admittedly indiscrete, it clearly showed Nehru's true
thinking. After seeing it, the Muslim League were right to go back on
their agreement.

Nehru would have liked unity if it was on HIS terms. If he had to make
compromises, he would rather have partition. In that sense, he was also
responsible for causing the partition, though, I would agree, not at the
same level as Jinnah and the Muslim League.

Uday

Uday Reddy

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Feb 12, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/12/97
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Raghu Seshadri wrote:
>
> : If such was the case, the essential remedy was to distribute power in

> : some equitable fashion so that the Muslims could run their own affairs
> : (at least in the areas where they were in majority) and there was as
> : little Central domination as possible.
>
> To me this "remedy" is totally unacceptable.
> To paraphrase Lincoln, you cannot have
> a state half secular and half religious.
> The Congress could not espouse secularism
> and at the same time, agree to religion-based
> arrangements. For the State, the religions of
> its citizens should be of no account.
> Once special privileges are accorded according
> to religion in some areas, the stage is set
> for granting it in all areas. Nehru was right
> to oppose this poisonous idea.

That is fine if the remedy is unacceptable to you. But, the title and
the discussion of this thread seem to be to see how far Nehru was
responsible for the partition. Let us leave aside the judgements as to
whether he was right or wrong, and whether his actions appeal to you or
not.

> The crucial point, howvever, is that
> bending to the demands of a blackmailer
> does not make Nehru the cause of those
> demands.

If not "the cause", let us call him a facilitator. (Mind you, nobody is
calling him the cause of the Muslim League *demands*. Muslim League had
its own reasons for their demands. Nehru's role was in wrecking the
compromise.)

Let us also not forget the rather direct role he had in vetoing the
CMP-like plan that was produced by Mountbatten, when the latter showed
it to him in Simla. In essence, the last ditch effort at subcontinental
unity was killed by Nehru (on the grounds, remarkably, that it would
produce "balkanization"!)

> : Nehru would have liked unity if it was on HIS terms. If he had to make


> : compromises, he would rather have partition. In that sense, he was also
>

> HIS terms being a modern, secular democracy.
> You are making it sound like this was
> a selfish personal demand on his part,
> instead of the enlightened progressive
> demand it really is. Jinnah's demand
> is more deserving of this sneering tone.

Raghu, nobody is faulting Nehru for desiring a modern, secular
democracy. And, nothing stopped him from having one even if he accepted
the Cabinet Mission Plan. We would have had a federation of three
States, each running their own affairs, much like what we have now. The
CMP would have given us an additional upper layer of administration,
which would have obviated all the wars, mudslinging, and nuclear
one-upmanship that we have now. For all we know, the unity envisaged in
CMP might also have been a *positive* influence on the Northwest and the
Northeast, making them more responsible, more "modern" and more
"secular." It might have also been a positive influence on *us*,
forcing us to pay more attention to our Muslim minority. It might have
also boosted the morale of our Muslim minority, making them more
progressive, more modern and more upbeat.

Uday Reddy

Shubha Khan

unread,
Feb 13, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/13/97
to

> NEHRU RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN

It could have been created by Charlie Chapline for all I care. We
Bangladeshis don't give a shit.

Ciao.

Shamim A. Khandekar

unread,
Feb 18, 1997, 3:00:00 AM2/18/97
to

In article <5dvpbv$5...@hpindda.cup.hp.com>, sesh...@cup.hp.com (Raghu
Seshadri) wrote:

> x-no-archive: yes
> Uday writes -


>
> > : If such was the case, the essential remedy was to distribute power in
> > : some equitable fashion so that the Muslims could run their own affairs
> > : (at least in the areas where they were in majority) and there was as
> > : little Central domination as possible.
>

> I then wrote why this remedy is unacceptable to me.
>
> -That is fine if the remedy is unacceptable to you. But, the title and
> -the discussion of this thread seem to be to see how far Nehru was
> -responsible for the partition. Let us leave aside the judgements as to
> -whether he was right or wrong, and whether his actions appeal to you or
> -not.
>
> This reprimand would be well-deserved,
> Uday, but for one small point. You also deviated
> from the topic and told me why this
> remedy would have been good. So now you can
> hardly object when I explain why it is bad,
> on the grounds that it is off-topic.
> You started it.


Nehru really proved himself to be a shrewd politician when he forced
the partition of both Bengal and Punjab in exchange of creation of
Pakistan. It is also interesting to note from the history that, the then
State Govts. in both of these states were controlled by the Muslim League.
As a BDi, in the context of the present politics in the Sub-Continent,
it really worries me when I recollect his remark qouted in the, "The Sole
Spokesman " written by Ayesha Jalal as, łNehru had already told
Mountbatten that he was 'not in favour of an independent Bengal unless [it
was] closely linked to Hindustan' since 'he felt that a partition now
would anyhow bring East Bengal in to Hindustan in a few years'. 124

124 Mountbatten to Burrows, 16 May 1947, ibid., 850.

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