Hundred Years Of Muslim League
VognoDuut750
Muslim League
All Indian Muslim League was founded by Sir Salimullah of Dhaka on the 30th
December, 1906. It is a political organisation. It will arrive at hundred
years in December, 2006.
It is a well-known fact that Pakistan by name a new state was born on the
14th August, 1947. Lahore Resolution of the 23rd March, 1940, was the basis
of foundation of Pakistan separating from the rest of British India. Lahora
Resolution was based on Right of self-determination.
Now Muslim League has got no member in the parliament of Bangladesh. In
Pakistan Muslem League is also not in following .
Whatever may be the shortcom虹ngs of Muslim League but its ac負ivities were
on its peak upto 1971 in Bangladesh. The British Parliament accepted the
Lahore Resolution.
Now on the occasion of the ob貞ervation of hundred years of Mulsim League,
the historians, politicians, writers are requested to come forward with the
history of Muslem League. This should be based on the basis of political
sci苟nce and philosophy in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Abdul Wadud, Mahim, Master Road P.O. North Kattali, Chittagong-4217.
Torpedo
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> Hundred Years Of Muslim League
>
http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/commentary/jinnah.html
THE IMPACT OF JINNAH'S ANTI-BANGALEE DESIGN ON THE POLITICAL SCENE OF
BANGLADESH IN THE EARLY YEARS OF PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT
By Prof. M. Waheeduzzaman Manik
The movement for a separate homeland for the Muslims of Indian
subcontinent had reached its pinnacle with the emergence of Pakistan
as an independent nation-state on August 14, 1947. Mohammad Ali Jinnah
was the greatest exponent of Two-Nation Theory and the most articulate
champion of Pakistan movement. He was called the Quai-I-Azam (the Great
Leader) for his pivotal role in the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah's
relentless efforts for carving out a separate Muslim homeland made him
the sole spokesman of the Indian Muslims in mid-1940s. He has been
called both the "Creator" and "Founder" of Pakistan. The Muslim
League, under Jinnah's leadership, had successfully mobilized and
enlisted Bangalee Muslim masses throughout the province of Bengal in
favor of Pakistan movement. It is a verified fact that out of 100
million Muslim populations in British-India, 33 million were from
Bengal province. The leaders of Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML)
were among the vanguards that had spearheaded the Pakistan Movement.
Although the overwhelming number of Muslim population in Bengal had
supported the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan, the central
leadership of All-India Muslim League (AIML) was disproportionately
skewed in favor of non-Bengali leaders of different provinces. Jinnah
had effectively used most of the popular leaders of Bengal for the
purpose mobilizing support in favor of his "Two-Nation Theory" and the
demand for separate homeland for the Muslims of India.
Yet, Jinnah had preferred to promote and project the non-Bengali
loyalists, rightists and collaborationists in the leadership roles at
both AIML and Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML). It was by his
deliberate anti-Bengali design that most of the celebrated and popular
Muslim League leaders of Bengal were either banished or marginalized
immediately before or after the creation of Pakistan. Instead of
fostering and nurturing charismatic and independent-minded Bengali
leaders, Jinnah handpicked those leaders of Bengal to assume the
leadership roles in East Bengal (now Bangladesh) who were certified as
anti-Bangalee and spineless loyalists or collaborationists. Thus the
dice of Pakistan's anti-Bengali design was cast even before Pakistan's
independence was achieved.
The seed of colonial mode of governance in East Bengal (East Pakistan)
was planted by Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan. The genesis of the
disintegration of Pakistan and Bangalees' relentless struggle first for
maximum autonomy and later for complete independence were, to a great
extent, conditioned by Jinnah's quest for installing anti-Bangalee
collaborationist and rightist Muslim Leaguers in both the party
apparatus and Governmental structure of East Bengal (throughout this
commentary, I have used East Pakistan and East Bengal interchangeably
or synonymously with reference to the geographic area that emerged as
Bangladesh on December 16, 1971).
Lest it be thought that this writer is overstating the fact! Yet, the
following verifiable facts will lend credence to my generalizations on
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Founding Father of Pakistan.
After the passage of the Lahore Resolution (known as Pakistan
Resolution) on March 23, 1940, the moribund Bengal Provincial Muslim
League (BPML) started emerging as the mass organization for the first
time. With the popularity of Pakistan Movement, Jinnah's grip over
AIML and BPML was also getting tighter. There are some scholars who
have attributed the popularity of Pakistan movement in Bengal to
Jinnah's "personal popularity" and "organization skills." There are
observers who have asserted that "religious zeal" had prompted the
millions of people to support Pakistan Movement. There are also writers
who have singled out the alleged or perceived "Congress mis-rule" to
be the determining factor that forced the Bengali Muslims to support
the demand for Pakistan. There is no doubt that these explanations
might sound intuitively pleasing or plausible. However, such claims
might sound fantastic but not realistic at all.
Yet, these superfluous claims or assertions lack credibility. Although
there was religious fervor in Pakistan movement from the beginning to
the end, the magnitude and extent of "Islamic solidarity" of Bengali
Muslims differed substantially from the Muslims of North and
North-Western provinces of India. There is no doubt that religion had
played a clear role in the process of creating or developing a sense of
"Islamic Creed" or "Muslim Solidarity" among the Bangalee Muslims
during the movement for Pakistan. However, there is no reason to
subscribe to the idea that "Islam" was the "only" factor or
consideration that united the Muslims in Bengal behind Pakistan
movement. In fact, there were dominant factors other than "religion"
that motivated the Bangalee Muslims to lend their overwhelming support
to Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. The Muslims in Bengal were
more pragmatists or a rationalists than religionists. The truth of the
matter is that after the adoption of Lahore Resolution on March 23,
1940, the Muslim masses started to believe genuinely that they might
achieve an independent Muslim nation-state provided they vigorously
support the movement for the establishment of Pakistan. The rising
Muslim middle class found the demand for Pakistan more attractive or
prospective option for their own personal and professional growth.
Their dreams of securing jobs in both public and private sectors, and
their strong desires for succeeding in business enterprises in an
independent Muslim State, were more relevant to them than religious
consideration. The Muslim masses in Bengal had found the demand for
Pakistan to be a pragmatic way to rid themselves of the bondage of
socio-economic stagnation. For common Bengali Muslims, the
establishment of Pakistan would create limitless opportunities for
their own social mobility.
Khalid Bin Syeed, one of the most distinguished scholars on Pakistan
Movement, succinctly refuted the myth about Jinnah's organizational
capabilities and perceptions of alleged mal-administration of congress:
"It was only after the Lahore Resolution was passed and the demand for
a Muslim state came to the forefront that Muslims in their thousands
flocked to the Muslim League. Thus, neither Jinnah's organizing
ability nor the alleged Congress misrule by themselves could have
transformed the [Muslim] League into a mighty force. The demand for
Pakistan...., this stimulant which put life and vigor into the Muslim
League" Khalid Bin Syeed, Pakistan: The Formative Years, London: Oxford
University press, 1968, p. 179).
The most relevant question that needs to be raised is this: who were
the chief messengers of Muslim League's demand for Pakistan in Bengal?
The messengers of Pakistan movement to Bengali middle classes and
masses in 1940s were A.K. Fazlul Huq, Shaheed Suhrawardy and Abul
Hashim, the most celebrated and trusted Bengali leaders of that era.
Although they had championed the cause of Pakistan movement, they were
not willing to be anti-Bangalee collaborationists or die-hard Jinnah
loyalists. Doubtless, they might have sincerely believed that the
establishment of Pakistan would emancipate the Bengali Muslims from the
economic and social miseries. Yet, they were not willing to compromise
the interests of Bangalees. Jinnah had used them to popularize his
Two-Nation Theory and Demand for Pakistan. Yet, he had neutralized or
banished these doyens of Bengal politics at an appropriate time so
that no one from East Bengal (East Pakistan) could effectively
challenge his authoritarian mode of governance.
Sher-e-Bangla A.K. Fazlul Hoque, the mover of 1940 Lahore Resolution
for Muslim homeland, was expelled from the All-India Muslim League in
1941. It needs to be noted that Fazlul Huq, the most charismatic
leader of Bengal, with more popularity and name recognition throughout
India than M.A. Jinnah at least till mid-'30s, had joined the Muslim
League in 1937 after forming the Krishak Praja Party (KPP)- Muslim
League coalition Government in Bengal. He held leadership roles in both
All-India Congress and All-India Muslim League. Fazlul Huq was also
involved in the formation of Muslim League in 1906 (he was 33 years old
in 1906! Nawab Salimullah had personally commended his extraordinary
brilliance and talent). He was the chief of Krishak Praja Party, the
party that won more Muslim seats in Bengal Provincial Legislature in
1937 election than Muslim League. He was already a legendary figure in
Bengal politics before he formally joined the Muslim League in 1937.
His role as the Premier of Bengal was a catalyst in attracting the
Muslim middle class and peasantry to the Muslim League. His
accomplishments as the Premier of Bengal were beneficial and relevant
to Bengali Muslim middle class and peasantry. Doubtless, the rising
tide of Muslim nationalism and demand for Pakistan had gained an
impetus with Sher-e- Bangla A.K. Fazlul Huq's joing the Muslim League.
Although his support for Pakistan Movement was genuine, Fazlul Huq did
not tolerate Jinnah's unfair interference in Bengal politics. Instead
of taking dictates from Jinnah or Liaquat Ali Khan, Fazlul Huq had
resigned from the Muslim League for which he had to be in political
exile for more than 10 years. Aimed at the collapse of Huq's Ministry
in Bengal, Jinnah, with his ruthless brilliance, personally saw to it
that Muslim League support is withdrawn from KPP-Muslim League
coalition Government. The collapse of KPP-ML coalition Ministry had
devastating effect on the Bengali Muslims. Fazlul Huq was forced to
form a coalition Government with Shyma Prashad Mukherji (known as
Shayma-Huq Ministry). Yet, M.A. Jinnah could care less. His sole goal
was to send Fazlul Huq to political wilderness in an era when the
demand for Pakistan caught up the imagination of 33 million Bengali
Muslims. Jinnah was personally involved in spreading blatant
falsehoods and inaccuracies about Fazlul Huq throughout Bengal. He was
called "traitor." It is interesting to note that Fazlul Huq had been
vilified by both progressive faction (led by Shaheed Suhrawardy and
Abul Hashim) and rightist faction (led by Maulana Akram Khan and
Nazimuddin) of Bengal Provincial Muslim League! Aimed at demeaning and
discrediting Fazlul Huq, the leaders of Bengal Muslim League had
addressed several hundred public meetings in most of the districts in
Bengal. Nothwithstanding his enormous popularity, Sher-e-Bangla was not
invincible. Muslim League's defamatory propaganda had worked. Fazlul
Huq's Ministry had collapsed in 1943.
With Jinnah's blessing, Nazimuddim had formed the Ministry in Bengal in
1943. For all practical purposes, Jinnah, indeed, had succeeded in
dismantling Sher-e-Bangla's stronghold in Bengal politics. (I have a
plan to elaborate on Jinnah's anti-Huq crusade in a separate article.
Therefore, suffice it at this time to point out that Fazlul Huq did not
regain his popularity among the Bangalee masses till he formed the
United Front with Maulana Bhasani and Suhrawardy during the historic
election in 1954. He felt elated and to some extent vindicated when he
found out that the United Front literally routed out the ruling Muslim
League from East Pakistan).
It was Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy who had emerged as the most dynamic
leader of Bengal Muslim League. His role as the General Secretary of
BPML till 1943 was crucial in the process of recruiting dedicated and
capable party workers. He was personally instrumental in the formation
of Muslim National Guards. He was the most energetic Minister in
Fazlul Huq's cabinet in charge of Labor Ministry. He personally
cultivated support from industrial workers in favor of Pakistan
movement. He was also the most active member in Nazimuddin Cabinet
that was formed after the collapse of Shayma-Huq cabinet in 1943. His
popularity among the students had motivated many from younger
generation to be the most vocal supporters of Pakistan movement. As
the Chief Minister of Bengal in 1946, he shouldered the responsibility
of lending logistic support to Pakistan Movement. His role during
Direct Action Day in 1946 was pivotal towards hastening the achievement
of Pakistan (even though his action or inaction on that fateful day in
the history of Bengal had tarnished his image among Hindu community).
Suhrawardy had also moved the amendment to the original 1940 Lahore
Resolution in the Delhi convention of Muslim League Legislators in 1946
even though he himself was a staunch supporter of an independent United
Bengal.
Abul Hashim, another progressive leader with tremendous organizational
skills, had succeeded Suhrawardy as the General Secretary of BPML in
1943. Thousands of people had joined Muslim League in most of Bengal
districts during his tenure as the General Secretary of the party.
With the help of dedicated Muslim students, Hashim could bring Bangalee
Muslims en masse under the fold of the Muslim League. The numerical and
organizational strength of the party in Bengal was reflected in the
landslide victory of Muslim League candidates in 1945-'46 elections.
Yet, Abul Hashim's wings of power or influence in East Bengal political
scene were clipped by Jinnah and his sycophants both before and after
Pakistan was achieved.
Both Suhrawardy and Hashim tremendously contributed in the process of
transforming the Bengal Provincial Muslim League into a viable mass
organization that was capable of leading Pakistan Movement. Their
dynamic leadership had liberated BPML from the domination of the
non-Bengali Nawabs of Dacca and the upper-class leadership. For the
first time, pro-Bengali, progressive and middle class leaders dominated
the leadership of Bengal Muslim League. However, Muslim League in
Bengal was divided into two distinct factions: the progressive group
was led by Suhrawardy and Hashim whereas the rightwing conservative
faction was affiliated to Khawaja Nazimuddin and Maulana Akram Khan.
The most relevant fact is that M. A. Jinnah had decided to nurture and
sponsor the conservative elements in the party. Aimed at packing the
East Pakistan Muslim League with Jinnah loyalists, it was the
deliberate policy of Jinnah to either ignore or malign the progressive
members of the Bengal Muslim League. For example, the followers of
both Suhrawardy and Hashim were taunted or humiliated by Jinnah
loyalists and collaborationists even before the establishment of
Pakistan. Instead of recognizing Shaheed Suhrawardhy's popularity,
organizational skills and crucial contribution to Pakistan movement at
a critical juncture, the centralized All-India Muslim League leadership
had consciously lent its support to Khawaja Nazimuddin's bid to become
the leader of Muslim League legislators in Bengal on August 5, 1947
(only 9 days before Pakistan was born!). With the selection of a
reactionary, conservative and discredited leader of BPML for assuming
the role of Chief Minister of East Bengal (East Pakistan) over a
progressive and dynamic leader of Suhrawardy's caliber and stature,
M.A. Jinnah had in effect sealed off the political fate of H.S.
Suhrawardy and his followers in East Bengal (East Pakistan).
While Suhrawardy and Hashim were stalwarts in pre-partition Bengal
Muslim League, Maulana Bhasani was the legendary figure in Assam Muslim
League. As the President of Assam Provincial Muslim League, he had
spearheaded the Pakistan movement in Assam. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan
Bhasani was discredited and maligned immediately after his return to
East Bengal from Assam. Nazimuddin-Akram Khan clique quickly forgot
his crucial contribution in favor of Pakistan during referendum in
Sylhet. Maulana Bhasani had won a seat in East Bengal Provincial
Legislative Assembly (EBLA) from South Tangail constituency. However,
the Muslim League clique against Maulana Bhasani with an aim to
dislodge him from the Provincial Assembly hatched a conspiracy out. His
election to the Assembly was declared null and void on flimsy ground.
Above all, he was declared disqualified by the provincial Governor to
run for election for holding any public office!
Once the establishment of Pakistan became a reality on August 14, 1947,
the Punjabi and other non-Bengali Muslim League leaders started
consolidating their positions in the Governments of both at the Center
and provinces. Choudhury Khaliquzzaman was elected as the Chief
Organizer of the Muslim League when Jinnah had assumed the office of
Governor General of Pakistan. Jinnah also became the President of the
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The self-appointed Governor General
and President of the Constituent Assembly had handpicked Nawabzada
Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The actual
decision-making authority of Pakistan in the initial year after
independence was centralized in the offices of the Governor General and
Prime Minister. Both Jinnah ana Liaquat Ali Khan decided to employ
Muslim League under the leadership of Choudhury Khaliquzzaman as an
instrument of subjugating and controlling the East Bengal political
scene.
The ruling coterie of Pakistan had realized it quite early that the
die-hard loyalists needed to be promoted and installed in East Bengal
Muslim League establishment. Aimed at humiliating and demonizing the
most popular and celebrated Muslim League leaders of East Bengal (East
Pakistan), the ruling coterie of Pakistan adopted a deliberate policy
of filling the East Bengal (East Pakistan) Branch of Muslim League with
the collaborationist, reactionary and anti-Bangalee leaders. At the
behest of both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Choudury Khaliquzzaman, the
Chief of Organizer of the All-Pakistan Muslim League, had literally
leased the party in East Bengal to Khawaja Nazimuddin and Maulana Akram
Khan. They, in turn, sponsored those Bengali leaders who were loyal to
them. Neither Nazimuddin nor Akram Khan had any mass support or
charisma. Nor did they have any extraordinary organizational
capabilities.
As the Chief Minister of East Bengal, Khwaja Nazimuddin also saw to it
that neither Suhrwardy nor his followers have any prominent role in
East Bengal politics. He lost no time to characterize Suhrawardy as
the "Indian agent" and an "enemy of Pakistan." Nazimuddin had misused
his official position for the purpose of relieving H.S. Suhrawardy from
the membership of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. As if that was
not enough of an insult for the one of the most dynamic contributors to
Pakistan Movement in Bengal! It is a fact that the East Bengal
Government of Khawaja Nazimuddin prohibited Suhrawardy from entering or
addressing public meetings in any place of East Bengal. It was on July
13, 1948 when Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's handpicked Prime Minister of
Pakistan, informed Suhrawardy that the action of expulsion from East
Bengal taken against him was a "matter entirely for the Provincial
Government and he (Liaquat Ali Khan) can't interfere in their
administration."
One of the professed goals of Nazimuddin and Akram Khan coterie was to
keep the doors of the Muslim League closed to the most progressive and
dynamic members of Bengal Provincial Muslim League. The progressive
forces were systematically eliminated from positions of importance by
the right wing forces of the party. The followers of both Suhrawardy
and Hashim were specifically singled out to be excluded even from the
primary membership of the Muslim League. Both Maulana Bhasani and
Suhrawardy protested this exclusionary policy of the East Bengal Muslim
League. A deputation of dissatisfied East Bengal Muslim Leaguers under
the leadership of Ataur Rahman Khan had visited Choudhury
Khaliquzzaman, the Chief Organizer of the Pakistan Muslim League. The
East Bengal delegates requested that Maulana Akram Khan "be
immediately directed to make the membership of the party available to
the dissident groups." However, neither representation nor pressure
from the dissidents did open the door of the Muslim League for those
whose views were at variance with the ruling coterie.
The policy of exclusion had devastating effect on the efficacy of the
Muslim League in the changing political climate of East Bengal.
Notwithstanding the many limitations of Muslim League, over the years
since 1937 this party had become inclusive of the mainstream
linguistic, souci-economic and regional groups of people. Yet, the
rightwing grip over both the party and the Government of East Bengal
seriously eroded the mass support for Muslim League. The ruling Muslim
League regime in East Bengal had miserably failed to redress the
genuine grievances of East Bengal. The governmental policies and
procedures of suppression and persecution of the dissident groups in
East Bengal had effectively alienated the mainstream Banglee population
of East Bengal.
Both Jinnah and Liaquat totally ignored the fact that fifty six percent
of the total population of Pakistan were from East Bengal. The
discriminatory policy of the Central Government of Pakistan against
East Bengal started manifesting only after few months of independence.
To the chagrin of East Bengal, the Central Government of Pakistan had
become the exclusive domain of West Pakistanis. The representation of
Bangalees in various services including Military and Civil Service
under the Central Government was negligible. West Pakistanis deputed
from the Central Government had filled most of the crucial
administrative positions including the position of Chief Secretary in
the Government of East Bengal. The exports and imports were central
subjects to be dominated by West Pakistanis. The trade, commerce,
banking, industries and other public or private sector enterprises were
totally controlled by West Pakistanis. The allocation of annual
expenditures for development of East Bengal was negligible in
comparison with West Pakistan even though East Bengal was assessed for
greater amount of revenues. Most of the foreign earnings were generated
from East Pakistan exports. Yet, foreign exchange allocation for East
Bengal government was almost nil. Since the Federal capital was located
in Karachi, the federal expenditures had no beneficial effects on the
economy of East Bengal.
The Bengalis started resenting the discriminatory policies of the
Central Government. The progressive Bengali leaders (in some instances
even conservative Muslim Leaguers) had started protesting this kind of
blatant and unfair policies and programs of the ruling elite of
Pakistan Government. For example, one Bangalee member of Pakistan's
Constituent Assembly pointed out as early as February, 1948 that a
"feeling is growing among the East Pakistanis that Eastern Pakistan is
being neglected and treated nearly as a 'colony' of West Pakistan." It
was obvious that the Central Government was not willing to redress the
genuine grievances of Bangalees. Instead of redressing pressing
problems of East Bengal, Pakistan's ruling elite kept on sermonizing
Bangalees to be more of Pakistanis. The typical anti-Bangalee attitude
of Jinnah and Liaquat Government was manifested in Prime Minister
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan's arrogant response to a Bangalee leader's
question on Provincial autonomy for East Bengal (at the Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan on March 2, 1948): "Today in Pakistan there is no
difference between the Central Government and Provincial Government.
The central Government is composed of the provinces. .... We must kill
this provincialism for all times."
The beginning of the end of Pakistan in East Bengal had started as
early as in 1948 when the Muslim League Government at both the Center
and East Bengal were pushing for Urdu to be the "only" State Language
of Pakistan.. The language issue started mobilizing the people of East
Bengal even before the year 1947 was out. Neither Jinnah nor Liaquat
Ali Khan was willing to recognize that Urdu, an alien language to
Bangalees, could never be imposed on East Bengal. They never
recognized the fact that the then Chief Minister of East Bengal,
Khawaza Nazimuddin, was aggravating and alienating the Bangalee
population when he started aggressive campaign in favor of Urdu to be
the State language of Pakistan. Jinnah's "Urdu, and Urdu alone shall be
the State Language of Pakistan" speeches in Dacca (on March 21, 1948
at Race Course Maidan, and on March 24, 1948 at the Special Convocation
Ceremony of Dacca University) had been instantly criticized by the most
articulate segments of Bangalees.
In a Radio Address to East Pakistanis before his departure from East
Pakistan on March 28, 1948, Jinnah had harshly rebuked the critics of
his language policy. He characterized the opponents of Urdu language
as the "opponents" of Pakistan. He said that the supporters of Bengali
as a state language are nothing but the "paid agents" of foreign
countries. Aimed at castigating those who had the guts to demand
Bengali to be one of the State languages of Pakistan, an imbecile
Jinnah had labeled the champions of Bengali language as "communists,"
"enemies of Pakistan," "breakers of integrity of Pakistan," "defeated
and frustrated hate-mongers," "champions of provincialism," "
breakers of peace and tranquility," "political assassins and political
opportunists," "traitors," " inhabitants of fools' paradise," and
"self-serving, fifth columnists" etc. He commended the Chief Minister
Khawaja Nazimuddin for using various forms of repressive and aggressive
measures against the supporters of Bengali language. Jinnah had
repeatedly reminded the proponents of Bangla language that the Central
Government of Pakistan "is determined to take appropriate stern
actions" against these evil forces.
Jinnah's shameless advocacy for Urdu to be the only State language of
Pakistan clearly demonstrated his contempt for Bangalees and utter
disregard for democratic principle of majority rule. In fact, his
outlandish anti-Bengali language speeches in Dacca had sparked the
first phase of language movement in 1948. Following his footprints,
Liaquat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin made concerted efforts to
impose Urdu as the only State language of Pakistan. The historic 1952
Language Movement withstood the naked and brute aggression against
Bengali, the mother tongue of Bangalees. Instead of being silenced or
browbeaten by the renegades, reactionary, rightist and collaborationist
forces of Pakistan, Bangalees had continued their fight for
establishing Bengali as one of the State languages of Pakistan.
The ruling Muslim League coterie took it for granted that East Bengal
would forever remain subservient to the Central Government of Pakistan.
Although the Muslim League started loosing public support in East
Bengal even within the first year after independence, Jinnah's personal
charisma and his authoritarian style of leadership kept the party
together. Obviously, the Muslim League had remained relatively a viable
political party as long as Jinnah was alive. The ruling coterie also
took it for granted that public support will remain constant for the
party that "fought for and achieved Pakistan." The real crack in the
popularity of the party started manifesting after Jinnah's sudden death
on September 11, 1948. (Khawaja Nazimuddin's anti-Bangalee policies and
programs had accrued handsome dividends for him. The ruling coterie of
Pakistan under Liaquat Ali Khan's leadership had chosen him to succeed
Jinnah as the Governor General of Pakistan. Nurul Amin, another Jinnah
loyalist, had succeeded Khawaja Nazimuddin as the Chief Minister of
East Bengal).
It is obvious that the political development in East Bengal (East
Pakistan) was very much conditioned by the policies of both the Central
and provincial Governments. The main intent of the Central ruling
elite was to perpetuate their colonial policy in East Pakistan through
the use of the loyalist and collaborationist Muslim League Government.
Both Nazimuddin and Nurul Amin regimes in East Bengal had implemented
various repressive and discretionary measures. Instead of remaining
subjugated by the ruling elite of Pakistan, the dissident Muslim
Leaguers (mainly from Suhrawardy-Hashim faction of pre-independent
Bengal Muslim League) had joined hands with other progressive forces of
East Bengal (East Pakistan) to mobilize and organize themselves. Their
sole objective was to oppose the oppressive, repressive and
discriminatory policies and programs of both the Central Government of
Pakistan and the Government of East Pakistan (East Bengal). They also
felt the acute need for a political party to ventilate and articulate
the genuine grievances of East Bengal.
The emergence of East Pakistan Awami Muslim League (EPAML) on June 23,
1949 as the first opposition party in East Bengal filled such a need.
The student community and intelligentsia of East Bengal were also the
vanguards in building resistance movements in the early years of
Pakistan. The students had provided the leadership of the language
movements both in 1948 and 1952. The relentless struggle of Bangalees
for freedom and self-determination continued till they achieved
complete independence through a liberation war in 1971.
nkdat...@bigmailbox.net
> All Indian Muslim League was founded by Sir Salimullah of Dhaka on the 30th
> December, 1906.
Yes, it had to be Sir Salimullah !!
Wali Khan's book, based on now declassified documents at the India
Office in London, provides interesting reading on Jinnah's secret
liasion with the British rulers in pre-independence India. The book has
been published as:
Facts Are Sacred by Jaun Publishers (1986)
It was also available in India as:
Facts Are Facts: The Untold Story Of India's Partition by Vikash
Publishing House (1987)
This is what Wali Khan wrote about his research on the now declassified
documents, "Not that I regarded the Congress' and Bacha khan's charges
as wholly without basis. But I had not imagined that the truth was
infinitely uglier than their portrayal of it. The evidences were there
in black and white, written and signed by the guilty ones themselves,
secured for posterity in their own official library - the
communications [between] highest British dignitary in India, the
Viceroy, and the minister concerned with Indian affairs in Whitehall.
Given such authoritative sources where was the room for disbelief?
Indeed, when I was going through these documents there were moments
when my mind would get boggled. I would take out my glasses and hold my
head in my hands bewildered at what I had read. Unable to continue, I
would put away the books and go out for a cup of coffee."
As the imprerial power trying to perpetuate its hold over the colony
the British followed a policy of widening the Hindu-Muslim
communal/political divide with the aim of
a)countering/nullifying the Congress's national movement
b)promoting the division of British India into two/more states and
thereby to secure a foothold for British strategic interests in a
friendly Pakistan/European missionary-controlled NorthEast/etc.
Wali Khan was astounded to discover that Jinnah had been secretly
communicating with Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, and Lord Zetland, the
secretary of state for India, over the 1930s to come to an
understanding that would be mutually beneficial for Jinnah and the
British rulers against their common enemy.
There is no need to take Khan Abdul Wali Khan's word, anyone can verify
them on their own because these are availble in declassified official
records. Here's from Wali Khan's preface to the book:
"..In writing the account, I like other writers, have made full use of
the diaries and memories of concerned British officials, especially in
relation to their attitude and policies towards our movement. Besides
that material I have used my own knowledge of facts and political
experiences, as also the principles of induction and deduction of offer
certain conclusion. We have a saying in Pushto that if we say round,
yellow and sour, wise men immediately know that we are referring to
orange. Similar was my quest for clues.
After release from Mr. Bhutto's jail when I went to London and had some
free time from medical treatment I came to know about the classified
government document in the India Office Library which had now been
thrown open to public. They could now be read on the premises and even
photocopies of any portion could be obtained. According to British
rules all secret official documents are declassified and made available
to scholars after a lap[se] of 30 years.
I was keen on collecting all possible historical material on our
movement. Readers of this book will see that Bacha khan's politics and
the Khudai Khidmatgar movement became red rags for the colonials for
two reasons. First, the British were determined to squash any movement
that aimed at Indian independence and thus constituted a threat to
their rule. Secondly, they were resolved to crush any activity which in
their view would help a hostile outside power against them.
It is known that the independence movement within India was being
spearheaded by the Indian National Congress which was representative of
all the religious and other creeds, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian,
Parsi-no matter what the persuasion, the party was open to all. The
British strategy, as it soon developed, was to somehow weaken the
Congress and to aid and abet bodies functioning in opposition to it.
Secondly, India was geographically so placed that it had oceans on
three sides and a rampart of a mighty range of mountains on the forth.
There were also a few mountain passes in the north-west and the only
danger from a hostile foreign power could come through them. Russia was
of course considered the main source of that danger. The Khudai
Khidmatgars could not become instruments in either of the two thrusts
of British policies, so they became an object of harassment from the
very start.
In the India Office library I set about looking for documents relating
to the external aspects of the British rule in India. I wished to find
out the point of time and exact factors that saw basic changes in
British policies towards Moscow - the steps if adopted to confront the
first ideological state to emerge on the world map in 1917.
The Viceroy of India used to send a weekly report addressed to the
Secretary of State for India in London. The latter replied outlining
the government's policy issues of the moment. I decided that I only
needed to carefully study this weekly correspondence to get all the
material wanted. I began from the time immediately following Lenin's
death.
What I saw and read was beyond anything I had imagined. My object was
the British foreign policy in relation to India, but as a bonus I got a
close view of how with all[Whitehall] looked on the internal affairs of
India.
Our elders used to tell us about how Britain intrigued to get its way
in the subcontinent. Their stories, their doubts and suspicions had
seemed hard to believe. I used to think that Bacha khan had become
unduly embittered with the colonial rulers because of the agonies he
and his followers had suffered at their hands. I was particularly
skeptical about the Congress charges that the British were responsible
for fanning communal passions within the country to further their
imperialistic designs. I used to think that such accusations were
exercises in finding scapegoat. It is a common human failing to blame
others for the consequences of one's own follies.
Not that I regarded the Congress' and Bacha khan's charges as wholly
without basis. But I had not imagined that the truth was infinitely
uglier than their portrayal of it. The evidences were there in black
and white, written and signed by the guilty ones themselves, secured
for posterity in their own official library - the communications
[between] highest British dignitary in India, the Viceroy, and the
minister concerned with Indian affairs in Whitehall. Given such
authoritative sources where was the room for disbelief? Indeed, when I
was going through these documents there were moments when my mind would
get boggled. I would take out my glasses and hold my head in my hands
bewildered at what I had read. Unable to continue, I would put away the
books and go out for a cup of coffee.
It will be unfair not to give full credit to the British. They did
whatever good or bad they thought was necessary for their people- they
did not hesitate to put all that down with total candour. There was no
hypocrisy to oneself, no pulling of veils for anyone else. Everyone is
here bared to the last stitch. No friend or relative or colleague is
spared. All participants in all conspiracies are named. Even the
Indians who played the British game have been exposed with out regard
to how their compatriots would be shocked when they would come to know
of the secret doings of the idols they had worshipped.
Studying this correspondence of over 20 years, between 1922 and 1942, I
realised that all my preceding labour in collecting material from
diaries and memories had gone waste. The conclusions that I was
collecting the evidence for were all given there as explicitly as one
could wish. The government of India's policies against the Soviet Union
was down in cold details.
Those policies were of course no surprise. What did come as a
revelation was the shameful role played by certain eminent leaders of
India in Indian affairs. The worst was the conduct of certain Muslim
leaders. It was an embarrassment reading about them. The accusation of
the Congress and Bacha khan were not a fraction of what the highest
British officials had unblushingly laid down here.
What pains I had taken to prove that the thing was an orange. I went
through hundreds of papers, pursued the trail of countless books to
collect the evidence of roundness, yellowness, sourness. All that now
was rendered unnecessary. The masters themselves here say: why all this
effort; what need for proof; logic, reasoning, political sense to what
purpose; we ourselves attest that it is an orange. Once I almost
decided to abandon my book and just compile this correspondence in to a
book let to show to the nation the other side of the picture and let it
decide itself who were really its well-wishes, and who wanted to
consign it to perpetual slavery of the British.
But after much thought I decided to stay with my earlier plan.
Publishing only the documents, while it would expose Bacha khan's
critics, it would not serve my original purpose of presenting the story
of Bacha khan's political struggle and the khudai khidmatgar's great
endeavors. That would also check the course of disreputable politicking
which only aims at misleading simpleminded Muslims and distorting the
facts of history through loudmouthed falsehood and slanders. Truth
emerges one day. Diamond shines forth even in a pile of ashes..."
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Leaders like Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi were deeply religious in
personal life. But they were not the type who would use religion for
political objectives. Religous in personal life but secular in
political life is the best way to sum up their lives.
Jinnah was a stark contrast to leaders like Maulana Azad and Mahatma
Gandhi. The "Qaid-e-Azam" was not particularly religious in his
personal life. But he was was certainly not above pandering to
religious hatred to achieve his political objective. And he did that
even after he had seen the massive ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of
the partition.
West Pakistan had been cleansed of Sikhs and Hindus within months, nay
weeks, of partition. An overwhelming majority of the country's Hindus
were in East Pakistan. The rulers from West Pakistan soon realized that
they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by demonizing the
Hindus left in Pakistan. If nothing else, it was the means to
disenfranchise a significant section in East Pakistan and turn East
Pakistanis into a minority. It was this evil urge to contain the
perceived threat, from Pakistan's majority wing in any democratic
setup, that led rulers in West Pakistan to talk of "parity" and of
"separate electorates."
On March 21, 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and its
first Governor-General, while on his first and only visit to East
Bengal, declared in Dhaka University convocation that while the
language of the province can be Bengali, the "State language of
Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Any one who tries
to mislead you is really an enemy of Pakistan."
The use of the phrase "enemy of Pakistan" was deliberate. It was a
loaded phrase, particularly mischievous in view of the massive ethnic
cleansing in West Pakistan in the last seven months.
Jinnah's demagoguery was deplorable but not surprising. He was merely
repeating what Liaqat Ali Khan and his cohorts had been saying in the
Constituent Assembly for the last one month. On February 23, 1948:
Dhirendra Nath Datta, a Bengali opposition member, had moved a
resolution in the first session of Pakistan's Constituent Assembly for
recognizing Bengali as a state language along with Urdu and English.
Non-Bengali Assembly members, led by Liaqat Ali Khan, had immediately
pounded on Mr. Datta's religion to denounce the claim of Bengali as
nothing but a Hindu conspiracy. Many a snide remark was made on the
"Hindu" character of the language that was the mother tongue of the
majority of Pakistanis.
But, fortunately, most East Pakistanis were not fooled. They realized
that these non-Bengali members had deliberately chosen to forget that a
language may have grammar but it has no religion. Any competent
language is capable of expressing a gamut of religious beliefs. It is
as easy to translate the Geeta into Arabic as it is to translate the
Koran into Sanskrit. There was absolutely no basis for denouncing
Bengali as a Hindu language. If anything, it was a Muslim language
because a majority of the Bengalis were indeed Muslims.
But the ruling class in West Pakistan had its own agenda. And it
certainly did fit that agenda to denounce Bengali as a Hindu language
and to look down on East Pakistan's majority as less than "good
Muslims."
It is not surprising that, during the genocide in 1971, the Shaheed
Minar was one of the first targets of Yahya Khan's barbaric army. Nor
was it surprising what they did to Dhirendra N. Datta. He was an
octogenarian by that time. The barbaric soldiers chose to drag this old
man out of his house in Comilla and to summarily execute him in front
of his neighbors and family. It was, thus, that West Pakistan's ruling
elite punished Mr. Datta for having proposed Bengali as a national
language of Pakistan some 23 years ago.
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