1996 failed Coup :When the Constitution outshot the gun
tooladhuna
Read this latest from HOLIDAY on the Rajakar General Nasims coup attempt
in 1996 and see how you feel. Happy chodo-ing!
Tooladhuna
From HOLIDAY 31st May 2002
Nurul Kabir
The failed putsch of May 18-20, 1996 was an unprecedented event in
the history of Bangladesh. The then civilian President, Abdur Rahman
Biswas, sacked a Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Abu Saleh
Mohammad Nasim, who challenged the authority of a constitutionally
legitimate head of the State. In the past, the story was the other
way round: The military men removed three elected heads of the state
in 1975, 1981 and 1982.
Biswas removed Nasim from the post of the CAS on May 20, 1996 on
charge of insubordination to the lawful authority of the President,
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and attempting to
overthrow the erstwhile government in collusion with some Awami
League members. General Nasim, however, denied the allegations,
claiming that he was the victim of a `deep rooted conspiracy', mostly
by some of his fellow colleagues.
Six years have passed since the incident, but it is still not clear
to many as to what had actually happened in those critical days.
Besides, some questions still remain unresolved, such as, what
actually prompted General Nasim to ask the troops, stationed in
different cantonments outside Dhaka, to march towards the capital in
violation of the chain of command? Did he really secure any support
from the AL, a political party, to implement his alleged plan to
seize State power? What was the role of the erstwhile head of the Non-
party Caretaker Government, Justice Habibur Rahman, at that time?
What role did General Harun Ur Rashid, the present Chief of the Army
Staff, a close associate of General Nasim at that time, play during
those crucial days?
Some generals, allegedly involved in that incident in one way or
another, have written on this issue over the last six years. Of them,
Lieutenant General Abu Saleh Mohammad Nasim and Major General (retd)
M. A. Matin, two of the main actors involved in the episode, have
published two books in 2001. Besides, Major General (retd) Syed
Mohammad Ibrahim, the erstwhile General Officer Commanding (GOC) in
Jessore, lost his job for alleged loyalty to Nasim. But Ibrahim, who
has been consistently denying his involvement, has written a few
articles on this issue. Nasim, in his book — Ami Nasim Balchhi (I am
Nasim Speaking) — pleaded not guilty, while accusing Biswas as well
as Matin and others of conspiring against him. In his book, Amar
Dekha Barthya Sena Abhuythan,' 96 (The abortive coup of 1996: as I
have seen it), Matin, on the other hand, categorically claimed that
Nasim started planning to seize State power since February, 1996, and
with the removal of two of his loyal officers — Major General Golam
Helal Morshed Khan, the then GOC of an artillery division based in
Bogra, and Brigadier Miron Hamidur Rahman, the Deputy Director
General of the Bangladesh Rifles — on May 18, 1996, the erstwhile CAS
got desperate to oust President Biswas. General Ibrahim, in his last
write-up published in a Bangla daily on May 19, attempted to throw
light on the events, it seems, from an impersonal point of view.
Here, in the present article, an attempt has been made to find
certain clues to the answers of the questions raised above, and that
mostly on the basis of the books and articles mentioned earlier and
some personal accounts obtained in the course of probing into the
event.
The beginning of the 3-day episode
President Biswas, on 18 May, 1996 ordered early retirement of two
senior army officer — Major General Golam Helal Morshed Khan, the
then GOC of an artillery division based in Bogra, and Brigadier Miron
Hamidur Rahman, the Deputy Director General of the Bangladesh Rifles —
following a specific DGFI report that the two officers were plotting
to seize State power in collaboration with the Awami League by
overthrowing the government of the day. The DGFI, which advised the
President to sack the two officers in question, provided the
President with the audiotapes of their conspiratorial conversations
with some Awami League people, especially with the party's former MP,
Captain (retd) Tajul Islam. The conversations took place several
times between late March and mid-May, 1996.
The presidential order, which was handed over to General Nasim on his
return from Mymensingh in the afternoon, also asked him to give
effect to the order immediately. But Nasim, who did not like the
presidential action, sought an `immediate' appointment with the
President. The President's office arranged his meeting with the
President at 10 a.m. on May 19.
Nasim claims in his book that while meeting with President Biswas the
next morning, he drew the latter's attention to the tradition that
the government usually terminates senior officers, if necessary,
following prior consultation with the army chief, but in this case
the tradition was not observed and therefore he requested the
President to withdraw the order.
The President turned down the CAS's request, while informing him of
the intelligence report that the two officers were actively plotting
to dislodge the constitutionally legitimate government. In this
regard, the President asked the CAS to hear the recorded tapes of
seditious conversations the two officers had with some known AL men.
But Nasim refused to hear the taped conversations, rejected the
allegations against the officers in question and insisted on
reviewing of the order of retirements. The President, on the other
hand, asked the CAS to implement his orders first and advised him
that the two officers should write a `review petition' to the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces (President) so that he could `consider'
the CAS's request in the due process.
As regards retiring officials without prior consultation with the
CAS, General Matin admits in his book that the government usually
sends officers on early retirement, if necessary, following
consultation with the army chief, which tradition was not observed in
the present case. But Matin claimed, in the same breath, that there
is legal scope for the government to take such measures without prior
consultation with the CAS.
In this regard, Syed Mohammad Ibrahim, a Major General who lost his
job on charge of being involved with this abortive coup, said in his
last article that there were precedents in which the government sent
officers to `early retirement', on the basis of intelligence reports,
without prior discussion with the CAS, and that too happened, Ibrahim
hinted, when General Nasim was the top boss of the DGFI.
In defence of the presidential action against the two, Matin says
that Nasim had been involved with the two officers in their plot to
overthrow the government, while Matin, the erstwhile DG, DGFI, had
produced before the President some audiotapes of Nasim's
incriminating conversations with the two officers and others. So,
Matin claims, there was hardly any logical scope for the President to
have prior consultation with the CAS. Nasim virtually failed to
refute this allegation in his book.
However, Nasim then went to the Chief Adviser of the caretaker
government, Justice Habibur Rahman, to discuss the issue. The CA
reportedly gave him a patient hearing and assured him that he would
look into the matter. But the CA also told him that it was the
jurisdiction of the President, under the 13th amendment to the
Constitution, to supervise the defence affairs for the interim period.
Nasim, when he returned to the cantonment, neither took any step to
implement presidential order to retire the two officials, nor did he
advise the officers to submit review petitions. Instead, he wrote a
letter to the President, the same evening, requesting the latter to
withdraw his orders on the ground that the retirement order, if
implemented, would affect the chain of command in the armed forces.
Moreover, Nasim instructed the two officers, in clear defiance of the
presidential order, to `carry on' with their duties `as usual'.
Besides, Nasim in a counter move, also ordered the removal of four
senior officials from their erstwhile postings and issued an order of
attaching them with the army head quarters, without the legally
required prior approval by the government. The officers included
Major General M. A. Matin (DG, DGFI), Major General Subid Ali Bhuiyan
(Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division), Brigadier Abdur
Rahim (Commander, 14 Engineering Brigade) and Colonel Abdus Salam
(Director of Operations and Training, the BDR Headquarters). Nasim
also had their telephone lines disconnected.
Under the Army Rules (Instructions), 1977, the CAS does not have the
authority to attach any official working with the `parallel
organisations' like the DGFI, AFD or BDR. The CAS has the power to
attach, on his own, only those officials working directly under his
military formation/unit, and that too not beyond the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel. To attach officers belonging to the rank of
Colonels and upwards, the CAS is required to secure prior government
approval even if they work directly under his command.
Giving reasons for the attachment order, Nasim says in his book that
they were behind the `crisis' created by the May 18 presidential
action against the two officers. He hardly substantiated the
allegation.
Side by side with issuing attachment orders against the four
officials, Nasim asked, over the telephone, Major General Syed
Ibrahim, GOC of the Jessore cantonment, Major General Mohammad Ain
Uddin, GOC of the Mymensingh cantonment and Major General Helal
Morshed Khan, GOC of the Bogra cantonment and Major General
Imamuzzaman, GOC of the Ninth Division based in Savar, to prepare two
artillery brigades each to move towards Dhaka the next day (May 20).
Nasim's verbal directives to the GOCs to move troops to Dhaka was
inconsistent with the military rules, as it is the Directorate of the
Military Operations, under the command of the Chief of General Staff
(CGS), which is the appropriate authority to issue such instructions
of troops movement, and that too in black and white. But Nasim asked
the GOCs directly, without even informing the erstwhile CGS, Major
General Mahbubur Rahman. When the CGS came to know of the
instructions, he, as he claimed in a newspaper interview later,
failed to dissuade Nasim from doing so.
However, of the four GOCs who received verbal instructions from
Nasim, two — Ain Uddin and Morshed — responded positively and
eventually ordered their respective subordinates to mobilise soldiers
and make them march towards Dhaka on May 20. Imamuzzaman kept Nasim
in good humour, but made sure that that no brigade commander obeyed
the CAS's `illegal' order. Ibrahim, on the other hand, tried to
convince Nasim, unsuccessfully though, that Nasim's move against the
President would prove to be counter-productive. He claims in his
article that he eventually did not send any troops.
General Nasim admitted in his book that he had given verbal
directives to the GOCs, but claimed that his directives were a
counter move made in response to President Biswas who, in
collaboration with the four `attached officers', contacted some
military commanders directly on the night of May 19. Nasim also
claimed that he went for troops mobilisation from outside Dhaka in
the morning of May 20 to `restore the chain of command and ensure
security'. (Nasim did not point out whose security was concerned).
General Matin, on the other hand, claims that the President contacted
some GOCs on specific intelligence information that Nasim had already
asked, in the evening of May 19, some commanders to send troops to
Dhaka. Matin also claims that the President, who was the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, had no option but to instruct the GOCs
not to back the CAS who was attempting to challenge, or oust, the
constitutionally legitimate head of the State. He argues that a CAS
is not supposed to mobilise troops against the President to save
merely the jobs of two officers, unless he had a larger interest,
i.e. to take over power. And he has repeatedly been claiming that
Nasim was planning to take over power since March that year, and he
became desperate in May when he saw that two of his main co-
conspirators were already ousted from the army. In this connection,
Matin repeats the incriminating conversations, taped in March,
between Nasim, the two terminated officers and some AL leaders.
However, General Matin's DGFI men provided him with a tape of
recorded conversations between General Nasim and Capt (retd) A. B. M.
Tajul Islam of the Awami League, in which Nasim `disclosed' his
plan `to surround the Bangabhaban', `force' the President `to resign
on health ground and ask him to get out' that day. The conversation
was claimed to have been recorded by a DGFI official at 8:45 a.m. on
May 20. During the conversation, Nasim informed Taj that he
had `already attached' the four officers and he would `take them into
custody after 2:00 p.m. He also allegedly advised Taj that `Shiekh
Hasina should not go outside Dhaka at the moment. She should be
around Dhaka'. In his book, Nasim did not reject the allegation
categorically. He rather observed that `it is not impossible these
days to manipulate one's voice in the cassettes'.
Development reach climax
On receiving the tape, General Matin, along with General Bhuiyan,
rushed to the Bangabhaban in the morning of May 20. As soon as the
President reached his office at 9:45 a.m., the two Generals gave him
the tape. After hearing the taped conversation, General Matin claims,
the President requested, `over the telephone', the Chief Adviser of
the Non-Party Caretaker Government, Justice Habibur Rahman, to come
to Bangabhaban to find out ways and means to overcome the crisis.
Besides, he called the Chief of Naval Force Rear Admiral Nurul Islam,
Acting Chief of the Air Force Air Commodore Shamsher Ali, and the
Defence Secretary M. A. Hakim. The Chief Adviser, however, claimed in
his address to the nation that he went to the President to discuss
the crisis on May 20 on his own.
In the meantime, the President asked, over the telephone, the GOC of
the Ninth Division, General Imamuzzaman, not to obey Nasim's illegal
instruction to send troops to Dhaka, while assuring him that he (the
President) would take necessary steps to defuse the crisis following
a discussion with the Chief Adviser and other senior officials. The
President also asked the Commander of the Army Signal Brigade of the
Dhaka cantonment, Brigadier Mohammad Azizul Huq, who was working
directly under the command of the CAS, to assure Nasim that he (the
President) would review the cases of the two officers in a legal
manner on a review petition to be filed by them later. In this
connection, the President asked Aziz to persuade Nasim to first
comply with the presidential order with regard to the retirement of
the two officers.
However, as soon as the Chief Adviser, chiefs of the naval and air
forces and the defence secretary reached the Bangabhaban at 11: 00
a.m., President Biswas briefed them, in the presence of General
Matin, General Bhuiyan, Military Secretary Major General Ruhul Alam
Chowdhury and Secretary of the President's Secretariat Nuruddin Al
Masud, about what had happened over the last two days. Referring to
Nasim's disclosure to an AL leader the plan to surround Bangabhaban,
the President wanted to play the tape, containing those seditious
conversations, at the meeting. But, according to Matin's claim,
Justice Rahman expressed reluctance to listen to the tape, while
Barrister Ishtiaque, who came along with the CA, followed suit.
The CA advised the President to resolve the crisis on the basis of
discussion with General Nasim and, if necessary, withhold the
presidential order of retiring General Morshed and Brigadier Miron.
But the Defence Secretary reportedly found the CA's advice
unreasonable. He argued that a direct presidential attempt to
negotiate with Nasim, at the moment, would be tantamount to the
President surrendering to the army chief, especially when Nasim had
already started mobilising troops against the President instead of
complying with his orders to retire the two conspiratorial officers.
He suggested that the President could open a formal negotiation with
Nasim only after the latter sent the two officers on retirement.
Eventually, the President asked the chiefs of the Naval and Air
Forces to go to the Army Headquarters to persuade Nasim not to do
anything illegal. He also requested the Chief Adviser to talk to the
CAS, and use his good offices to help resolve the crisis through
dialogue. In reply, the CA told the President, as Matin writes in his
book, `we appreciate your concern, but we will take our time to give
a decision'. Immediately before he left Bangabhaban, the CA, however,
assured others that he would take an initiative to resolve the crisis
in a peaceful manner.
The chiefs of the Naval and Air Forces went to the CAS's office at
1:45 p.m., when the latter was busy defending his stance before the
officers of different ranks at the conference room and persuading
them to support him against the President. At the conference, some
officers made queries about the CAS's objectives behind mobilising
the army against the President. In reply, Nasim reportedly told them
that the action was necessary to make sure that there was no outside
interference in running the army. According to Matin, the CAS's reply
was unconvincing to many officers assembled at the conference room.
However, the chiefs of the two services communicated the President's
message to the CAS, but the latter refused to respond to the proposal
for a negotiation unless the President withdrew the retirement orders
of the two officers. The disappointed chiefs returned to Bangabhaban
at 2:45 p.m. The Chief Adviser also gave a similar message to the
President.
In the meantime, the Bangabhaban came to know that Nasim had again
asked, over the telephone, the GOCs and the brigade commanders,
perceived to be loyal to him, to send troops to Dhaka. Consequently,
the GOCs of Mymensing and Bogra, General Ain Uddin and General
Morshed, had already ordered their troops to prepare for marching
towards Dhaka. The Bangabhaban also came to know that Nasim had asked
Brigadier Aziz to send his soldiers to surround the BTV and radio
stations, but the latter had declined on the ground that he had no
combat force. He was earlier summoned from the bridge competition
table to snap some telephone lines including that of Begum Khaleda
Zia and General Matin.
Under these circumstances, the President, on the advice of the
Generals sitting at the Bangabhaban, asked General Imamuzzaman to
deploy forces at Joydebpur crossing and Aricha Ghat to stop soldiers
coming Mymensingh and Bogra cantonments. Imamuzzaman obeyed the
presidential order.
Beginning of the end
As soon as the President heard, at about 2:00 p.m., from the Chief
Adviser and the chiefs of the Naval and Air Forces about Nasim's
refusal to negotiate, he did not take time to decide his course of
action, which was sacking of General Nasim and replacing him with
General Mahbub. (Nasim, however, claimed in his book that the
President decided to oust him in the morning and implement the order
in the forenoon of the day. According to the sacked General, the
President was just buying time to consolidate his strength.)
At this stage of developments, the President once again instructed
General Imamuzzaman, over the telephone, to send an adequate number
of troops to Dhaka to ensure the security of the Bangabhaban, the BTV
and the radio stations. Besides, the President's military secretary
asked the commander concerned to reinforce the security of Bangbhaban
with an additional company of soldiers from the President's Guard
Regiment at the Dhaka cantonment. In addition to this, Major General
Bhuiyan requested Imamuzzaman to send soldiers and tanks to guard the
Bangabhaban and the Dhaka cantonment. Imamuzzaman acted accordingly.
An artillery brigade of the Ninth Division took position at the
Aricha ghat, under the command of Colonel Belal Uddin Mahmud, at 5:00
p.m. The commander seized all the ferries to make sure that the
troops coming from Bogra cantonment could not cross the river Jamuna.
A brigade group, under the command of Brigadier Shafi Mohammad Mahbub
from Bogra cantonment reached Nagarbari ghat, the other side of the
Jamuna, at 6:30 p.m. On information that the troops of the Ninth
division were already there at the Aricha ghat to resist them, the
soldiers from Bogra cantonment stayed back at Nagarbari.
On the other hand, the troops coming from Mymensingh cantonment,
under the command of Brigadier Zillur Rahman, started retreating when
a Detachment Commander of the DGFI officials met them near Joydebpur
and told them that a brigade group of the Ninth Division was waiting
to resist them, with tanks, at the Joydebpur crossing.
In addition to the above measures, 10 tanks from Imamuzzaman's Ninth
Division and a company of soldiers from the 48 East Bengal Regiment
took position in the Dhaka cantonment areas to prevent any possible
movement of troops in favour of Nasim.
Besides, the Bangabhaban authority sent some soldiers from the
President's Guard Regiment to guard the BTV and radio stations. In
the meantime, General Nasim, after Brigadier Aziz's refusal to send
soldiers to the BTV and radio stations, asked the chief of the BDR,
Major General Ezaj Ahmed Chowdhury, to send troops there. The BDR men
went there, but backed out when they saw that some soldiers were
already posted there to resist any possible attempt to take over the
control of the institutions by pro-Nasim soldiers. Eventually,
Imamuzzaman's soldiers reached the stations at 5:30 p.m.
All these steps strengthened President Biswas's position vis-à-vis
General Nasim's attempted putsch to oust the former. Then the
President addressed the nation over the television and radio at 5:00
p.m., giving the people his version of the events and the steps he
had taken to avert Nasim's attempt to overthrow the constitutionally
legitimate government. The President also informed the nation that he
had sacked Nasim from the post of the Chief of the Army Staff. The
Chief Adviser also went on air that day, a couple of hours after the
President, to `clarify' his position that he was not a party to the
developments taking place between the President and Nasim, and his
prime objective was to hold the election peacefully.
In the meantime, the Generals sitting inside Bangabhaban instructed
Brigadier Abdur Rahim, commander of the 14 Engineering Brigade based
in Dhaka cantonment, to surround the Army Headquarters in the
evening, from where General Nasim was conducting his operation
against the President.
Meanwhile, on behalf of General Nasim, two Major Generals including
Harun Ur Rashid, who is presently the Chief of Army Staff, met the
newly appointed CAS to negotiate a mutually acceptable modus operandi
for Nasim's exit. Nasim decided to surrender at 10:30 p.m. and asked
the GOCs loyal to him to move back their troops to their respective
garrisons immediately. At midnight of May 20, Brigadier Rahim's
forces completely surrounded the Army Headquarters. At about 2:30
a.m. (already May 21) the new CAS, Major General Mahbub, entered the
Headquarters. The three-day episode ended with the immediate arrest
of General Nasim, who was shifted to the VIP block of the Officers
Mess, adjacent to the AHQ.
Nasim was set free on June 14, 1996 — two days after the Awami League
won the national polls. But his entrance into any of the cantonments
was restricted until General Harun, who was a loyal comrade of Nasim
in the latter's move against President Biswas, became the Chief of
Army Staff and withdrew the restriction in May, 2001.
A four-man inquiry committee, headed by Major General Matiur Rahman,
was set up on May 24. The committee recorded the statements of 55
officers of various ranks on the three-day episode. It submitted its
report, with recommendations, to the Army Headquarters on June 7,
which identified 15 officers, including Nasim, as `directly involved'
in the May 20 incident. The committee recommended exemplary
punishment to the unruly officers. Eventually, the President sacked
seven officers and sent four on forced retirement.
Nasim's AL connection
There is no direct evidence of any involvement of the Awami League,
as a political party as such, in the abortive coup by General Nasim.
But if the recorded conversations of General Nasim, General Morshed
and Brigadier Miron with the known Awami League men like Captain
(retd) Taj, Major (retd) Nasir Uddin and Lieutenant (retd) Kabir
Uddin are taken into consideration, one would have reason to believe
that General Nasim had, at least, secured the tacit approval of the
party in realising his political ambition first in the months of
March and April, and later in May, 1996.
Several conversations, as quoted in Matin's book, show that the three
pro-AL retired officers were using all their guile to persuade
General Nasim and his loyal officers to take a step against the
erstwhile government of Begum Khaleda Zia throughout the month of
March. They were also keen on transferring some officers, such as
Brigadier Rahim of the Engineering Brigade, Colonel Abdus Salam of
the BDR and so on, whom they considered obstacles to implementing
their plans. Nasim and his men were also heard responding favourably
to them.
On March 16, Kabir Uddin told Nasim, "You have to take your own
decision, don't care for anybody… Everything cannot be done by
observing rules… Didn't you break rules in the Pakistan era…etc. In
response, Nasim was heard making queries as to what was `Lalmatia's
(a pir living in the Lalamatia area of the capital city) assessment
of the situation.
A taped conversation between General Morshed and Cap (retd) Taj,
after the midnight of May 19, suggests clearly that the latter had
briefed AL president Sheikh Hasina about the possible actions Nasim
was going to take against the President, which would `involve blood'.
During the conversation, Taj informed Morshed, to the latter's utter
satisfaction, that the former had persuaded Hasina that the Awami
League `should back it up'. There was no evidence in the `taped'
conversation that she had committed her support to Nasim. But Taj
told Nasim that after hearing everything from him, Hasina recalled
that she had asked them to take a move `much earlier'. Hasina
rewarded Taj by giving him the party nomination for contesting in the
June, 1996 parliamentary polls.
It is to be noted here that Nasim issued on March 30, 1996 an order
to the army to `be prepared to move in two hours'. Following the
issuance of the order, he called all the local Division and Brigade
commanders to a conference, where he reportedly told the officers
that the `army has to come forward to rescue the nation from the
crisis created by political problems', and stressed the need of the
army taking over power. His arguments were met with strong criticism
by some commanders including General Imamuzzaman and Brigadier Rahim.
Nasim eventually withdrew the NTM (Notice to Move).
However, Hasina's tacit support, if there was any, took an open form
when the President sent General Morshed and Brigadier Miron on early
retirement on May 19. She issued a statement at night, which was
carried by the national dailies the next day, condemning the
presidential action.
Hasina's sympathy for Nasim was expressed once again when her
government commuted his punishment from termination to retirement
with all facilities concerned, and sent on forced retirement five
officers who had taken the side of President Biswas. Besides, the
government of Sheikh Hasina reportedly entertained some of Nasim's
recommendations in bringing about certain changes in the army after
the AL came to power in June, 1996. All these suggest that Nasim's
dubious connection with the Awami League, or at least his prolonged
hobnobbing with some ambitious AL elements, inspired him to make an
attempt to stage the abortive coup.
Shakil Sarwar
wrote:
>Hey All you India and Awami League loving Bokachodaz out there.
>
>Read this latest from HOLIDAY on the Rajakar General Nasims coup attempt
>in 1996 and see how you feel. Happy chodo-ing!
>
>Tooladhuna
Excellent article! I am not surprised to find that Khaleda Zia,
knowing her (& BNP's) liberal stance on everything that cost her
(them) dearly during the 1996 election and that is again costing her
this time around, remains indifferent about handing down exemplary
punishment to the culprit army officers. Instead, she kept Awami man
Harun in CAS position!
I was reading the latest issue of Jai Jai Din the other day where it
mentioned how ignorant BNP Bokachodaz are regarding the power of
media. The RAW-Awami financed Bangladeshi media are enjoying their
heydays in spreading lies while the BNP bozos keep entertaining the
deviant journalists. They actually, after enjoying dinner parties and
accepting valuable gifts, embark on spreading more lies and propaganda
against BNP with renewed vigour. Now tell me who are the real
bokachodaz.