KGBstan 2.
henry alminas
For educational purposes only:
(Continuation from KGBstan 1.)
In fact - I find that I have little to
add. Perhaps one need but say:
"Amen".
Best - - Henry
Johnson's Russia List, #7234
22 June 2003
davidj...@erols.com
A CDI Project
#12
June 20, 2003
Symposium: The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
By Jamie Glazov
Mr. Bukovsky (continued)
Now, if Russia did remove nuclear material from
Iraq, it was not because the Russian authorities needed it,
and certainly not because they did not want it to be lying
around unguarded, but because they did not want it to be
found by your authorities. First, because it is quite easy to
identify where it came from in the first place; second,
because it would give US administration a perfect
justification for their military action in Iraq. Of course, we
don't know for sure whether they did it or not. But they've
had plenty of opportunities: there were numerous visits by
Russian generals, politicians and intelligence officials prior
to the outbreak of war. Some were secret, others were open.
Some, as we know, removed the most sensitive documents
from the archives, others might have removed nuclear or
bacteriological material. Logistically, it is not as difficult as
one might think. [...]
I am afraid, Western complacency has no excuse
whatsoever. Why is it deemed necessary to always suck up
to Russia, whether it is strong and dangerous (like in the
Soviet time), or weak and irrelevant as it is now? It must be
some sort of a mental disease among the Western
foreign policy establishment. Can anyone explain to me
why is Russia invited to the G7 meetings? G7 is supposed
to be consisting of the most economically developed
countries. What is Russia doing there, with the GDP smaller
than the profit of General Electrics? But, no, we must
massage their ego, mustn't we?
Mr. Heilbrunn, I hope you realize that we are talking
about nomenklatura (and KGB in particular) seizing
absolute power in the country. Please agree that it is
much more than just a "continuity".
Heilbrunn: [...] On the issue of continuity -- I'd be
curious what word you would apply to it? I can
understand why you think the nomenklatura is regaining
power, but do you really believe that industrial and
criminal bosses present no obstacles? Or do you think
they're becoming one and the same? The argument of
the optimists about Russia is that this is just a phase
the country is going through with different groups
jockeying for power.
Bukovsky: Mr. Heilbrunn, of course they are becoming
one and the same. According to recently released figures,
about 30% of top Russian bureauocrats at any level are
former KGB officers. A few months ago, I read on one
of the Russian sites about a great social event: a
well-known mafia kingpin Mikhas threw a wedding
party for his daughter. A list of the wedding guests reads
like who's who in Russia (including two FSB generals).
One can hardly be optimistic about a country where
Prime-Minister (Mikhail Kasyanov) is popularly known
as "Misha-2%" because he takes 2% from every
transaction he endorses, and where the President is
known to be involved with organized crime (see
Newsweek, August 2001). Am I supposed to believe
this is just growing pains? It took the US about 60
years to subdue Cosa Nostra which was just a
kindergarten as compared to current Russian situation. [...]
Yarim-Agaev: [...] The Lugar-Nunn program well
illustrates major deficiencies of American policy
toward Russia. The idea of this program is to subsidize
the Soviet bio-weapon industry thus keeping
its scientist from working for terrorists and rogue
states, while this industry would turn into something
peaceful. No American program toward Russia can be
value neutral, and this one clearly sends a wrong
message. I feel it personally since still in 1970s in the
Soviet Union I publicly refused to take part in any
classified research. With such an open protest I risked
more than my scientific carrier, but I felt it was important
to define a moral position on this issue. Many scientists
were sympathetic to my stand. Not daring to challenge
the system openly, they avoided participating in any
military research. Cooperation with military machines
became an important dividing issue in Russia's scientific
community. Now America rewards the side which
helped to arm its enemy. It is wrong not only from
the moral standpoint, but strategically as well, because
most pro-democratic and pro- American Russian
scientists were just on the other side. Thus,
America empowers its enemies and abandons it
friends, which is very characteristic for its Russia's
policy in general.
Even if the practical considerations justifying
Lugar-Nunn program were correct, they would have
not outweighed those negative moral and strategic
effects. Yet the main practical result of the program is
also negative -- it keeps alive the most hostile and
dangerous Soviet institutions, which otherwise would
have gone bankrupt. And our politicians do not have
control over those institutions. They do not have even
free access to them. How then can they be sure that
most of their money gets to individual scientists, rather
than sticks to the hands of the top bureaucracy? How
do they know whether those institutions stopped
developing new bioweapons? And what would happen
if they learn that those weapons are still produced and
sold to our enemies? Would they stop the program?
Hardly. Because it is necessary to subsidize the Soviet
bio-weapon industry to keep its scientist from
working for terrorists and rogue states. This is a trap,
because our subsidy is nothing but a ransom to
blackmailers. This is a palliative rather than a solution.
[...] So far our programs effectively impede
this process since we empower in Russia the institutions
which are most hostile to market reforms.
Interlocutor: Thank you Yuri. And also, let me ask you:
is it ideology or national interest that moulds Russia's
policy today?
Yarim-Agaev: Does ideology or national interest
determine Russia's policy? The answer is --neither.
Nobody, including Russian communists, believes in
communism -- and hardly anyone who truly cares about
Russia would get to power at the top. Three other
factors actually determine the behavior of top Russian
politicians: personal profit, adherence to old Soviet
institutions and the Soviet mindset. This is quite an
odd and contradictory mix, which also contains a
substantial dose of anti-Americanism. We all agree
that the communist ideology is dead, but its remnants
are still entrenched in its old institutions of the KGB,
the military-industrial complex, etc. The head is cut
but the limbs continue to move according to old reflexes.
Those old structures still remain the main milieu for
the majority of Russian politicians and greatly dominate
their behavior. Created and shaped by the most
rigid ideology, those communist institutions have
little ability to evolve. My personal encounters with
them confirm that they are still as anti-democratic and
anti-American as they were before. Ironically, we help
to prolong their existence. We believe that it is better for
us if a scientist or a spy stays within those structures.
This is our new model of containment: we subsidize
the most anti-American structures to keep people
from hurting us. Do I need to quote any fables to
that effect? Should we get surprised when this policy
backfires? [...]
Heilbrunn: In terms of these comments made by Mr.
Yarim-Agaev, now we're getting somewhere. [...]
And, yes, competitor is giving Russia too much credit
-- spoiler state is right-on.
Interlocutor: Thanks Jacob. I am happy Yuri touched
on the theme of supposed "Russian greatness." I think
the Russians' delusions about it lie at the center of a lot
of what we are talking about. [...]
What is this pathological and hilarious hatred of everyone
and everything outside of being Russian when Russia is,
aside from the beauty of the Russian soul and its literature,
a complete and utter political, social and economic basketcase?
It's Russia that fertilized the genocidal Soviet regime, not
the West. It's Russia where Russian-speaking people had
to stand in 4-hour lines just to buy bread throughout the
20th century, not America.
So: why a belief in "Russian greatness" and a hatred of
foreigners [...]
Heilbrunn: Jamie, your thunderous blast is correct, but few
countries like to look in the mirror that closely. [...] Russian
communism? Escaped largely unscathed. No Nuremberg-style
trials. An addled communist party that stumbles on.
Incompetent leadership until Putin emerged. All nations
need some uniting myth. [...]
Bukovsky: [...] We have got 73 years of communism not
because of some genetic defect in our character, and neither
did Chinese, Cubans, Estonians, Armenians, Ethiopians or
Hanty-Manci. But what we observe today is definitely some
deformities caused by those horrible 73 years. What do you
expect, if three generations were born and brought
up in the country where they were indoctrinated from
cradle to the grave in believing that their political
system and the way of life is the best in human history?
And then, suddenly, it all collapses in front of them,
leaving them destitute and virtually homeless. Of
course, they have inferiority complex at best, or
became schizophrenic at worst. But it is even more
complicated, more horrible. Thus, for the last 30-40
years of the Soviet Union's existence no one, virtually
no one believed in the ruling ideology. The huge
multi-national country was living in a constant
falsehood, constant lies, but overwhelming majority
has never admitted it to itself. And this is the whole
point: the West is doing them enormous disservice
by massaging their ego, by playing these games with
seriously sick people. [...] Instead, they constantly
create myths. Thus, many believe that the West
wants them to be weak, or even deliberately undermines
their greatness. Why? It is still better than to be
irrelevant. [...]
Yarim-Agaev: Yasha, let me try to apply my rationalism
to your impressionism. First, both Russian literature and
Russian vodka are very important contributions to our
civilization. Second, I am pretty sure that most ,,migr,,s,
whom you met, are Russian Jews. So, their social behavior
is not determined by Russian ethnicity or religion,
but by the political-economic environment in which they
were brought up, which was more Soviet than Russian.
This is important, since the "Russian greatness" which
we are talking about is actually the "Soviet greatness".
Look at its manifestations: Stalin's and KGB anniversaries,
celebration of Soviet achievements, attempts to maintain
the Soviet position in the world. Russian leaders pump
up these feelings because it helps them to legitimize
their position: if the Soviet Union was so great, so were
those who loyally served it. Also, many of those people
are skillful in propaganda, but unable do anything
constructive. So, they produce a great circus to
make up for the lack of bread. Ironically, America
helps now to prop up the same Soviet greatness, which
it fought for fifty years. Our politicians are seriously
mistaken if they think that they have to do it to show
their respect to Russian national pride. This is the
Soviet pride, not the Russian pride. Maybe the support
of those reactionary views pleases old Soviet bureaucrats
and the mob, but it really insults and turns away the
thinking part of Russian population. Actually, such
American policy undermines the position of pro-democratic
forces in Russia who must understand that it is in
their county's best interest to humbly withdraw
from the international scene and to take care of its
domestic affairs.
Interlocutor: [...] Why don't we end this symposium
on a two-fold question: (a) what do you think is the
future of Russia? (b) if the U.S. were shrewd and wise,
what policy would it pursue toward Russia?
Heilbrunn: The future of Russia is bleak unless it can
team-up with the European Union. If the EU takes off
as an economic power, a big if, Russia could benefit.
It needs to use Kaliningrad as part of its opening to the
West; at the moment, the place is a toxic dump. But
overall, it's hard to be very optimistic about Russia.
David Satter has a sober piece in the National Interest
about what he calls the low, dishonest decadence of
Russia. [...] Nor is Russia all that much of a threat
to the U.S. The cold war is over. Russia has never
been less viable as a state, no matter how many
former members of the nomenklatura pine for the
past. [...]
Pipes: (a) I think Russia will come to resemble a typical
Latin American country: in form, democratic and
capitalist, in content semi-despotic and semi-capitalist.
(b) We should be friendly but not overly so and not
reward Russia more than she deserves.
Bukovsky: In my view, the Russian crisis is far from
over. I expect a protracted period of further fragmentation
with all the consequences it entails. We still cannot be
sure whether it will ultimately survive or not, but in any
case, it will take another 30-50 years. The main
concern for the West is to contain the contamination
Russia spreads while rotting: corruption, organized
crime, weapons of mass destruction, etc. There are also
some humanitarian concerns which the West will be
forced to address, like in former Yugoslavia. Otherwise,
Russia is of no interest to the West, and will not be for
the best part of this century.
Yarim-Agaev: I do believe that Russia will eventually
become a democratic country. If democracy can prevail
in Iraq, why it cannot in Russia? [...] To me the main
question is not whether Russia will eventually get to
emocracy, but how fast and how easy. The answer to
this question also depends on American policy. The
best way to facilitate Russia's democratization is to
stop supporting reactionary forces there and to render
our support to true democrats. The sooner they will
come to power the better American-Russian relations
will be.