Thicker Than Water 2000

[Tamela]

Forthe last several months, I have been lamenting the loss of the full length surf film. It was a slow, quiet death... but the instant gratification of social media has cut the legs out from under what was once the heartbeat of surf culture.

I googled where to stream Chris Malloy and Jack Johnson's co-directed, 2000-flick Thicker Than Water, and unsurprisingly, the full film is available on YouTube. I still have the DVD in the drawer of our TV cabinet at home. Pretty sure I have the soundtrack on CD somewhere too. In the early 2000's, I bought every Malloy/Johnson/Moonshine/Brushfire film and record that came out. Listen, I get that in 2020 we're far too jaded for JJ Casual, but twenty years ago this film was like lighter fluid for my developing passion for surfing.

Skip ahead to the 19:37 mark of the film. This segment is often the first one that comes up in conversation, and many of my peers know immediately which board/scene you're talking about when you say "you know, the green board from Thicker Than Water".

Upon a rewatch all these years later, the board actually seems a little clunky and has an unusual amount of nose rocker. It's a great reminder of how far things have come in surfboard design in the last twenty years that the green singlefin was so unique and memorable at the time. Nowadays, you'd see eight boards more interesting than that just walking from your car to the waves. In the late 90's and early 00's, we were at the peak of the shortboard era, anything longer was either a "fun board" for learning or a "high-performance longboard".

Even at my most frustrated, confused, irritated and even offended, there was always something to love about this game. There was the arresting visual design, with every environment, character and effect composed of soft watercolors and bold outlines. There was the music, a spirited mix of traditional and contemporary that never wore out its welcome. There was the ever expanding list of skills, each more impressively animated than the last. There was Kochin, wriggling around in time with the music during the Frenzy periods when all the monsters in a dungeon are celebrating.

Western memory tends to be short-lived and highly selective, and Western society rarely recalls that troops from several Occidental nations and Japan once occupied China's cities, while U.S. warships patrolled China's rivers. We may have forgotten these events, but the Chinese have not; the national collective memory of the "century of shame" is never far from the surface in that country's dealings with foreign nations.

The U.S. naval presence in China dates from the earliest days of the republic: the Empress of China arrived in Canton in 1784, the first ship flying the new U.S. flag to enter the China trade. Extensive interests in China have continued to form the heart of U.S. Pacific policy to this day.

The United States was not a participant in the mid-19th century wars against China, but it was quick to take advantage of China's undoing. Indeed, during the Second Opium War, in 1858, U.S. Commodore Josiah Tattnall justified open support of his British counterpart with the statement that "blood is thicker than water," ignoring the fact that the United States was not at war with China. And U.S. warships continued to follow their Royal Navy cousins on China's waterways.

The USS Susquehanna was the first U.S. warship to steam up the mighty Yangtze River, in 1853; a motley collection of ships followed over the years, typically those fit for no other duty. One was the USS Palos, the first gunboat to bear this name. Her arrival on the Yangtze in 1871 drew the scornful opinion of her fleet commander, Rear Admiral T. A. Jenkins, that:

Early in the 20th century, U.S. interests in China continued to increase, as businessmen and missionaries expanded their solicitation efforts. This accelerated activity in a China torn by revolt and unrest led to demands for increased naval presence, which was formalized in the creation of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet (and the Yangtze River Patrol) in December 1922.2 Service on the Yangtze, a river of 1,500 navigable miles marked by frequently shifting channels, sharp bends, and currents of more than 14 knots, demanded ships with maneuverability, speed, and sturdiness. An upper Yangtze River inspector sounded the common theme in 1924: "Vessels should be of adequate dimensions, speed, and have powerful haulage equipment" to combat the river's natural and manmade hazards.3

The first "modern" U.S. warships arrived on the Yangtze only in 1903, when the USS Villalobos and USS Elcano arrived from the Philippines, where they had been captured from the Spanish in 1898. The ships were hot, dirty, and poorly ventilated. They also were underpowered, underarmed, and generally unsuitable for river duty; but they patrolled the Yangtze for a quarter-century, nonetheless.

By the turn of the century the China station was perhaps the most sought-after assignment in the U.S. Navy. Americans were above the law there, and most hedonistic pleasures were readily and cheaply available.

The Navy's General Board addressed river gunboat characteristics in almost every annual shipbuilding program from 1904 onward and frequently received design recommendations from naval officers in China. In 1910, board president Admiral George Dewey recommended a 3-foot draft, 14-knot speed, twin-screws, "several rudders for extreme handiness," combined coal- and oil-fueled boilers, bulletproof protection, and a battery of two 6-pounders, two 3-inch mounts, and six machine guns. He also suggested building these ships as double-enders-fitted with screws and rudders at both ends-since they had to operate in narrow channels.4

The Navy succeeded in funding two new river gunboats in June 1912. The USS Monocacy and USS Palos were built to plans from Yarrow Company, a Scottish firm that had built gunboats for the Royal Navy. They were constructed at the Mare Island (California) Navy Yard, then broken down for shipment to China, where they were reassembled.5

While describing the need for new river gunboats for China was easy enough, detailing their characteristics and gathering design information to get them funded was quite another matter. The Monocacy and Palos remained distinctive. The General Board noted in November 1917 that "gunboat no. 22" had been authorized by Congress but not appropriated for and requested that river gunboats be requested again in 1918.6 These craft were included in the General Board's shipbuilding programs for 1920 through 1924, but to no avail.7

The Asiatic Fleet commander at the time, Admiral W. L. Rodgers, was of course a strong advocate of new gunboats. He also extolled the virtues of Shanghai's Kiangnan shipyard as a likely contractor for new gunboats, noting that the yard had British managers and previously had built freighters for the U.S. Army.8

In a 21 February 1923 message, Rodgers said that a gunboat "speed 16 knots length 200 feet draft 5 feet can be built including all machinery except ordnance at Shanghai. Delivery 12 months cost $400,000." The admiral recommended "four replacements this year." The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert E. Coontz, also received a picture of a "Twin Screw Passenger & Cargo Steamer Specially Designed and Built for the Upper Yangtze Service Between Ichang & Chungking" by Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works of Shanghai, a supporting memorandum from the Yangtze Patrol commander, and a dispatch from the American Legation in Peking, strongly recommending increased naval presence on the Yangtze. The picture shows a steamer of the "Loong Mow" class, which, with a 206-foot length, 31 -foot beam, 8-foot draft, and 15.6 knots speed, approximated the characteristics of the river gunboats recommended by several naval officers.

The cost of this ship was 175,000 Shanghai "taels," or "about Gold $200,000, exclusive of armament and radio set." Quality was described as "perfectly satisfactory." In fact, the Japanese Navy purchased one of the ships for use as a river escort.

Late that spring, the Navy requested four gunboats but raised its bid in July to six. The Bureau of Construction and Repair then agreed that the boats could be built most economically in China, since the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works was "apparently perfectly capable of building vessels of this type complete."9

The design took detailed form during preparation of the 1924 ship-construction proposal. In October 1924, the Bureau of Construction and Repair reported to Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur that the General Board's recommended characteristics were being met, with some alterations. These included reduced bulletproof protection to meet weight limitations, diesel (instead of steam) engines capable of driving the vessel at 15 knots, and three (as opposed to four) rudders. Not only did these changes reduce the ships' maneuverability and defensive protection, but Washington officials overlooked the almost complete absence of diesel repair facilities and personnel in China.10

The bureau by this time had produced a ship's plan based on the Kiangnan design, resembling closely a typical shallow-draft Yangtze River steamer. Secretary Wilbur agreed with this recommendation, and the Navy's appropriations request for 1926 included $4.2 million to build six such ships. Congress approved this request in December 1924, and the Secretary could tell the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral E. W. Eberle, that finally he would be receiving new gunboats.11

The ships would be built in Shanghai, with the main propulsion machinery (boilers, engines, and pumps), ordnance equipment, bulletproof steel, and various other "articles of outfit" furnished by the U.S. Government. Bureau of Construction and Repair officers were concerned that material shipped to China would be subject to onerous import duties, which would increase costs significantly. Admiral Thomas Washington, the Asiatic Fleet commander who would oversee construction, was directed to "take up with the customs officials the proposal to admit, free of import duty, any materials specially ordered by the contractor for these vessels," which would amount to more than 800 tons of material, including main propelling and auxiliary machinery.12 Edwin Cunningham, U.S. consul-general in Shanghai, reached agreement with the Chinese government after three months of negotiation, when the Chinese agreed to duty-free importation of gunboat construction material.

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