Re: Ms Americana Rise Of The Council
Elliott Davis
Jim Lindsay:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is America's rise to power. With me to discuss the continuities and changes in US foreign policy over two and a half centuries is Michael Mandelbaum. Michael is the Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Michael, by my count has, written or co-written 17 books on foreign policy in world affairs. His latest, The Four Ages of American Foreign Policy: Weak Power, Great Power, Superpower, and Hyperpower is just out now. Michael, thanks for joining me and congratulations on the publication of The Four Ages of American Foreign policy.
Our Airport Infrastructure Needs Survey estimates capital development costs for the airports that comprise the United States national airport system, defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
By contrast, the appropriately named angel biscuits are incredibly flaky and light. The use of yeast plus a commercial leavening agent (baking powder, baking soda, or, in some cases, both) gives these biscuits their high rise and airy texture.
Beyond the rise in ideological consistency, another major element in polarization has been the growing contempt that many Republicans and Democrats have for the opposing party. To be sure, disliking the other party is nothing new in politics. But today, these sentiments are broader and deeper than in the recent past.
Obesity is becoming a global epidemic in both children and adults. It is associated with numerous comorbidities such as cardiovascular diseases (CVD), type 2 diabetes, hypertension, certain cancers, and sleep apnea/sleep-disordered breathing. In fact, obesity is an independent risk factor for CVD, and CVD risks have also been documented in obese children. Obesity is associated with an increased risk of morbidity and mortality as well as reduced life expectancy. Health service use and medical costs associated with obesity and related diseases have risen dramatically and are expected to continue to rise. Besides an altered metabolic profile, a variety of adaptations/alterations in cardiac structure and function occur in the individual as adipose tissue accumulates in excess amounts, even in the absence of comorbidities. Hence, obesity may affect the heart through its influence on known risk factors such as dyslipidemia, hypertension, glucose intolerance, inflammatory markers, obstructive sleep apnea/hypoventilation, and the prothrombotic state, in addition to as-yet-unrecognized mechanisms. On the whole, overweight and obesity predispose to or are associated with numerous cardiac complications such as coronary heart disease, heart failure, and sudden death because of their impact on the cardiovascular system. The pathophysiology of these entities that are linked to obesity will be discussed. However, the cardiovascular clinical evaluation of obese patients may be limited because of the morphology of the individual. In this statement, we review the available evidence of the impact of obesity on CVD with emphasis on the evaluation of cardiac structure and function in obese patients and the effect of weight loss on the cardiovascular system.
Fascism has a long history in North America, with the earliest movements appearing shortly after the rise of Fascism in Europe. Fascist movements in North America never gained power, unlike their counterparts in Europe.
According to Noam Chomsky, the rise of fascism raised concerns during the interwar period, but it was largely viewed positively by the U.S. and British governments, the corporate community, and a significant portion of the elite. This was because the fascist interpretation of extreme nationalism allowed for significant economic influence in the West while also destroying the left and the hated labor groups. Hitler, like Saddam Hussein, enjoyed strong British and U.S. support until his direct action, which severely damaged British and U.S. interests.[21]
Some scholars have argued that the political style of Donald Trump resembles the political style of fascist leaders. Such assessments began appearing during the Trump 2016 presidential campaign,[36][37] continuing over the course of the Trump presidency as he appeared to court far-right extremists,[38][39][40][41] including his attempts to overturn the 2020 United States presidential election after losing to Joe Biden,[42] and culminating in the 2021 United States Capitol attack.[43] As these events have unfolded, some commentators who had initially resisted applying the label to Trump came out in favor of it, including conservative legal scholar Steven G. Calabresi and conservative commentator Michael Gerson.[44][45] After the attack on the Capitol, one historian of fascism, Robert O. Paxton, went so far as to state that Trump is a fascist, despite his earlier objection to using the term in this way.[46] In "Trump and the Legacy of a Menacing Past", Henry Giroux wrote: "The inability to learn from the past takes on a new meaning as a growing number of authoritarian regimes emerge across the globe. This essay argues that central to understanding the rise of a fascist politics in the United States is the necessity to address the power of language and the intersection of the social media and the public spectacle as central elements in the rise of a formative culture that produces the ideologies and agents necessary for an American-style fascism."[47] Other historians of fascism such as Richard J. Evans,[48] Roger Griffin, and Stanley Payne continue to disagree that fascism is an appropriate term to describe Trump's politics.[43] Jason Stanley argued (2018) Trump uses "fascist techniques to excite his base and erode liberal democratic institutions."[49]
Note: If the 1st breath does not cause the chest to rise, retilt the head and ensure a proper seal before giving the 2nd breath If the 2nd breath does not make the chest rise, an object may be blocking the airway
But declaring this is one thing, putting it into practice quite another. The world does not look as it once did following World War II. China is on the rise, democracy is in retreat, and unprecedented climate, economic, health, and security threats abound. Meanwhile, at home, the United States faces a wide range of challenging issues, including a costly pandemic, racial injustice, economic uncertainty and inequality, and far-right extremism. Amid these challenges, the future of U.S. foreign policy and the nature and scope of its relationship with the world is again a topic of fierce debate.
Lifestyle medicine can address up to 80% of chronic diseases. A lifestyle medicine approach to population care has the potential to arrest the decades-long rise in the prevalence of chronic conditions and their burdensome costs. Patient and provider satisfaction often results from a lifestyle medicine approach, which strongly aligns the field with the Quintuple Aim of better health outcomes, lower cost, improved patient satisfaction, improved provider well-being, and advancement of health equity, in addition to its alignment with planetary health. Lifestyle medicine is the foundation for a redesigned, value-based and equitable healthcare delivery system, leading to whole person health.
The post-American world is naturally an unsettling prospect for Americans, but it should not be. This will not be a world defined by the decline of America but rather the rise of everyone else. It is the result of a series of positive trends that have been progressing over the last 20 years, trends that have created an international climate of unprecedented peace and prosperity.
As economic fortunes rise, so inevitably does nationalism. Imagine that your country has been poor and marginal for centuries. Finally, things turn around and it becomes a symbol of economic progress and success. You would be proud, and anxious that your people win recognition and respect throughout the world.
Unipolarity is arguably the most popular concept used to analyze the U.S. global position that emerged in 1991, but the concept is totally inadequate for assessing how that position has changed in the years since. A new framework that avoids unipolarity's conceptual pitfalls and provides a systematic approach to measuring how the distribution of capabilities is changing in twenty-first-century global politics demonstrates that the United States will long remain the only state with the capability to be a superpower. In addition, China is in a class by itself, one that the unipolarity concept cannot explain. To assess the speed with which China's rise might transform this into something other than a one-superpower system, analogies from past power transitions are misleading. Unlike past rising powers, China is at a much lower technological level than the leading state, and the gap separating Chinese and U.S. military capabilities is much larger than it was in the past. In addition, the very nature of power has changed: the greatly enhanced difficulty of converting economic capacity into military capacity makes the transition from a great power to a superpower much harder now than it was in the past. Still, China's rise is real and change is afoot.
In this article, we show that this approach to assessing changing power relations in today's international system is irreparably flawed, and we develop an alternative. The very qualities that make the concept of polarity helpful for capturing some key differences in how international systems work render it unhelpful for assessing changes within a given system. Use of the concept helps analysts understand why a world with one superpower is different in important ways from one with two superpowers or none, but it is too blunt an instrument to track change from one kind of system to another. On glaring display as the Cold War neared its end in the late 1980s, this pitfall of polarity is an even bigger problem today. Because China is unlike past rising powers and because the world in which it is ascending is also different in important ways from previous eras, careful thinking about how today's one-superpower world might change into something else is at a premium. Using a set of concepts and measures geared precisely to this challenge, we show that the United States will long remain the only state with the capability to be a superpower. Still, China's rise is real and change is afoot, and the arguments we develop herein will help analysts assess and classify this change without either downplaying or exaggerating its systemic significance.
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