Task Force Dagger

[Rosalia Hollingworth]

Oneof the several Joint Special Operations Task Forces established for OEF was Joint Special Operations Task Force North, also known as Task Force Dagger. TF Dagger was based at a former soviet airbase, designated 'K2', close to Karshi Kandabad, Uzbekistan and comprised: 5th Special Forces Group 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) AFSOC Special Tactics TF Dagger's aim was to link up with Northern Alliance Commanders and support their push towards several key Taliban-held cities in the North of the country. As the war progessed, more 5th Special Forces Group soldiers alos linked up with Pashtun forces in the South.

The 12-man Special Forces ODA team from the 5th Special Forces Group inserted into the Panshir Valley and joined the Jawbreaker team. The Green Berets carried the AN/PEQ-1 SOF Laser Marker (SOFLAM), a piece of kit that would, along with GPS devices, become instrumental in the campaign. Working closely with the CIA and Northern Alliance troops under warlord Fahim Khan, ODA 555 preceded to call in air strikes onto Taliban positions along the Shomali Plain.

Shomali Plain, Afghanistan (google earth kmz file)

As the Taliban forces were flushed from the plain, ODA 555 called in more air power in order to clear the last enemy from Bagram Air Base, allowing Khan's forces to take over the facility.

On the 13th of November, with assistance from ODA 595 and Jawbreaker, Kabul fell to Fahim Khan's forces.

The 2nd TF-Dagger team to insert was ODA 595, which was flown across the Hindu Kush mountains by SOAR MH-47s on the 20th of October. The team was inserted in the Dari-a-Souf Valley, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, linking up with the CIA and General Dostum, commander of the largest and most powerful Northern Alliance Faction.

ODA 595 split into two units, Alpha and Bravo. Alpha accompanied Dostrum as his force pushed towards the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, calling in strikes from US warplanes against a series of Taliban positions, whilst Bravo called in strikes against Taliban positions across the Dari-a-Souf Valley.

A further Special Forces team, ODA 534, inserted by SOAR helos on the night of November 2nd were tasked with supported General Mohammad Atta, a Northern Alliance militia leader. ODA 534, along with CIA officers, eventually linked up with ODA 595 and Gen Dostrum outside Mazar-e-Sharif.

Further north, in the Takhar province, ODA 586 were operating in support of General Daod Khan's forces which took the capital, Taloqan on the 11th of November.

Taloqan, Afghanistan (google earth kmz file)

ODA 586, called in 11 days of heavy air strikes in support of Khan's troops who eventually took Konduz, the capital of Konduz province on November 26th. A number of key Taliban and Al Qaeda personnel are believed to have been airlifted out of Konduz before it was taken by the Northern Alliance, to the frustration of the Special Forces.

ODA 574 deployed by SOAR Black Hawks near Tarin Kowt on November 14th, along with Pashtun militia leader, Hamid Karzai. As Karazai's forces pushed south towards Kandahar, an error by an attached USAF TACP resulted in a 2,000lb GPS-guided JDAM hitting friendly forces, killing and wounding several Special Forces and militiamen. Assisted by the remaining ODA 586 soldiers, with reinforcements from ODB 750 and ODA 523, Karzai was able to negotiate the surrender of Taliban forces around Kandahar.

Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan (google earth kmz file)

Kandahar, Afghanistan (google earth kmz file)

ODA 583, supporting Gul Agha Sherzai in the vicinity of the Shin Narai Valley, also pushed towards Kandahar, coming from the southeast. The ODA set up Observation Posts overlooking Kandahar airport and, over a period of several days, softened up the Taliban defences by calling down air strikes upon them. On December 7th, ODA 583 and Sherzai's forces took the airport and soon after the city of Kandaher itself. They were soon joined by Karzai's forces from the North, accompanied by his Special Forces advisors.

With the fall of Kandahar Province, the Taliban had lost the last of their major areas of control and Al Qaeda forces were either fleeing to Pakistan and the mountains of Tora Bora, with the US-led coalition in pursuit.

I'm a commander of the Special Forces Group. There are five active duty SpecialForces Groups in the United States Army, two from the reserve component. Weoccupy a portion of the Army Special Operations community. Within thatcommunity, the Special Forces Group has among its missions the conduct ofunconventional warfare operations. It was an organization founded in 1952 to dojust that, in support of U.S. effort against the Soviet Union and the Warsawpact. ...

Almost immediately. Certainly by the 12th we were in constant conversation withmy operational headquarters down in Tampa. ... By the 13th a decision had beenmade that we would stand up what's called a Joint Special Operations Task Forceheadquarters [and that] I'd be responsible for conducting unconventionalwarfare operations in the region. By that time it had become pretty clear AlQaeda was involved, and of course, [given] the sanctuary that they enjoyed fromthe Taliban in Afghanistan you didn't have to be Napoleon to figure out thatAfghanistan was going to be a likely place for us to go. ...

Colonel John Mulholland, Special Operations Commander, Afghanistan.

Mulholland, the commander of the 5th Special Forces Group, was incharge of all special operations in Afghanistan last year. As the head of TaskForce Dagger, he reported directly to General Tommy Franks, thecommander in chief of the Central Command.

The Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha, the famous A-team, is thefundamental fighting unit of Special Forces. It is a 12-man organization comprised ofa captain, the second in command, who is a Special Forces warrant officer who has comeup from the NCO ranks, and a master sergeant teamsergeant, and then nine remaining NCOs who represent a multiplicity of skill sets:weapons, demolitions, medical, communications, intelligence, engineering, allthose skill sets are contained within [each team]. There's two of each on ateam; it is designed from the very beginning to operate in two six-manelements, if necessary, to be a force multiplier in a battlefield so they canmaintain the same capabilities in smaller elements. That goes to its classicroots as an unconventional warfare element originally designed to work withresistance elements during the Cold War. ...

Isolation is a classic Special Forces technique for mission preparation, wherethe detachment is completely isolated from the outside world, put into aplanning environment, and given all their mission planning data. They conductall their mission planning and rehearsals prior to infiltration to their areaof operations. That is done by design, so that there are no distracters. ...[Then] they do a brief back to the commander ... to convince me that they areprepared to execute their mission, and upon approval of that, they are movedinto a staging area for infiltration. So we did initiate on our own, beforebeing told to do so, just because it seemed prudent, the initial isolation hereat Fort Campbell for the first teams, in anticipation of a requirement to putthem into the mission planning process, so that should the word come--"let's go"--I had at least a handful of teams ready to go at a moment's notice ...

Well, Afghanistan was new to the 5th Group as an area ofoperations. Afghanistan was not an area that the United States had focused onin a great many years, since the end of the Soviet era there after they pulledout in the end of the 80s. So, one, we did not have any experience in thecountry itself. I was concerned about our lack of precise cultural and tribalknowledge of Afghanistan because that is a hallmark of what we do. Our soldiersspend a great deal of time learning the language and culture and backgroundof the people they will work with to better understand them, and in order towork successfully with them to achieve both our objectives as well as ourcounterparts' objectives. We did not have that with Afghanistan because it wasa relatively new area. ... We did not have a great deal of precise informationof who the various factions were, so my concern at that time from a functionaloperations perspective was "Who can educate me? Who can educate my men? Wherecan we get the information to get us best informed of what the situation incountry is and who the best people to operate with would be?" I would say thoseare probably my dominant concerns, from the Afghan perspective.

Operationally it was coming to grips with the fact I was going to be [heading]a joint headquarters [which] means U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, other servicesworking together jointly, which was the first time I would have done that, [soI was] coming to grips with who those other players are going to be and how wewere going to work together and make it all come together ...

When the decision was made to place A-teams in with different leaders, howmuch information did you actually have, bearing in mind the concerns you hadbefore about these leaders and what your teams would be doing there?

I was happy to hear [the decision to send the A-teams in] because from ourassessment that seemed to be the most reasonable way to proceed in a countrylike Afghanistan. If there was one thing we learned in a very compressed courseof study of Afghanistan, it was that this was a people who ... frequently fightamongst themselves, and were somewhat springloaded to band together and fightagainst an external invader. It seemed that the unconventional warfaremethodology was a logical solution ... .

We did work to get a better grip on who the various players were on theground, and some of the prime personalities came to light very quickly, such asFahim Khan, the heir apparent to [Northern Alliance commander Ahmed ShahMassoud General who had been assassinated on September 9,] Ismail Khanoperating outside Herat, and others ... but by the time we put teams on theground there was still a great deal of uncertainty ... because we did not knowfrom first hand experience what we were dealing with.

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