The U.S. Senate Aviation Subcommittee will hold a hearing Tuesday to examine how much progress has been made by the Federal Aviation Administration and the airline industry in meeting tougher safety requirements mandated by 2010 legislation.
The new rules, which require higher standards for pilot training and dramatically raise the number of minimum flight hours for pilots applying for airline jobs, were established in the wake of the February 2009 crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 in Buffalo, N.Y. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the crash, which killed 50 people, was due to pilot error.
The mistakes that the Colgan captain committed, in response to a low-speed warning system designed to prevent the commuter jet from stalling, exposed a fatal disconnect between what the pilot expected the plane to do and what he actually experienced, officials said.
"Automation can dull the discovery of a problem if a crew relies on it too much," said Tom Peterson, manager of the advanced simulation program at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Fla.
"Our instructors teach our students that if some problem develops suddenly, don't automatically try to reprogram the system. Just go back to the day when you were 16 years old and flying a small Cessna. Hand-fly the plane and look out the window," Peterson said.
A knee-jerk decision to troubleshoot automated readings appears to have contributed to the fatal crash of Air France Flight 447, an Airbus A330 en route to Paris from Rio de Janeiro that went into a high-altitude loss of airspeed June 1, 2009 and plunged into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 people onboard. The pilots lost control in part because they responded incorrectly to an airspeed indicator failure and misinterpreted the problems that were occurring, the accident investigation determined.
"This issue of lack of awareness of what the aircraft is doing and the lack of understanding about what mode the automation is in are becoming common threads in accidents," said William Voss, president and chief executive officer of the Flight Safety Foundation.
I’ve flown both.
The potential for automation dependency is real, but there’s no real mystery about how to fix it: increase the amount and frequency of training in managing system failures. Modern simulators are really good, and allow pilots to practice things you would never want to try in a real airplane…and at a fraction of the cost.
The biggest danger here is in knee-jerk over-reaction, which unfortunately seems to be happening. The radical increase in minimum flight hours is an attempt to use a meat axe to solve a problem that needs a scalpel.
Terry C Savage
General Manager, Light Sport Training
Flying Start Aero, Reno, Nevada
http://www.flyingstartaero.com/
Science Fiction Author
Amazon book listing: http://tinyurl.com/4og9uch
Blog: (http://jacksonsuniverse.blogspot.com/)
Twitter: (@Chaosrider2808)
Facebook: (Terry Savage, Incline Village)
Training and testing definitely hasn’t kept up. I was reminded of that when studying for and then taking the written for my CFI. They are still testing an applicant’s ability to decipher those 1950s era teletype weather reports that are written in Klingon. I’ve never used them in 30 years of flying, and I don’t expect to use them during my next 30 years of flying.
Except, of course, to teach them to my students, since they’ll need to speak Klingon to pass that part of their written test!
;-)
Terry C Savage
General Manager, Light Sport Training
Flying Start Aero, Reno, Nevada
http://www.flyingstartaero.com/
Science Fiction Author
Amazon book listing: http://tinyurl.com/4og9uch
Blog: (http://jacksonsuniverse.blogspot.com/)
Twitter: (@Chaosrider2808)
Facebook: (Terry Savage, Incline Village)