"I have seen a few rash commentators playing down the danger. But it is much too early to conclude, with Marc Siegel in the Los Angeles Times, that the coronavirus “does not currently pose a threat [outside China] and may well never do so.”
We don’t know enough yet to say how bad this will be. Among the things we don’t know for sure are the virus’s reproduction number (R0) – the number of infections produced by each host – and its mortality rate, or the number of deaths per 100 cases. Early estimates by the World Health Organization suggest an R0 of between 1.4 and 2.5 – lower than the measles (12-18), but higher than SARS (0.5). According to Johns Hopkins University, by Saturday there were 12,024 confirmed cases and 259 deaths, for a mortality rate of 2.2 per cent. But these numbers are likely to be underestimates.
The volume of air travel in China has ballooned since SARS. China’s 100 busiest airports last year handled 1.2 billion passengers, up from 170 million back then. Wuhan’s Tianhe airport was almost as busy last year as Hong Kong’s was in 2002. Disastrously, this outbreak came not long before the Lunar New Year holiday – the peak travel season – and the regional and/or national authorities were slow to acknowledge how contagious the virus was.
At the time of writing, a total of 164 cases have been confirmed in 26 countries other than China, including seven in the United States, four in Canada and two in the U.K.n other words, we are now dealing with an epidemic in the world’s most populous country, which has a significant chance of becoming a global pandemic.
But how big a chance? How big a pandemic? And how lethal? The bad news, as Joseph Norman, Yaneer Bar-Yam and Nassim Nicholas Taleb argue in a new paper for the New England Complex Systems Institute, is that the answers lie in the realm of “asymmetric uncertainty” because pandemics have so-called “fat-tailed” (as opposed to normal or “bell-curve”) distributions, especially with global connectivity at an all-time high."