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Takeshi Krueger
At 11:32 a.m., the bombardier released the weapon. As the bomb fell, an enormous parachute unfurled to slow its descent, giving the pilot time to retreat to a safe distance. A minute or so later, the bomb detonated. A cameraman watching from the island recalled:
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A fire-red ball of enormous size rose and grew. It grew larger and larger, and when it reached enormous size, it went up. Behind it, like a funnel, the whole earth seemed to be drawn in. The sight was fantastic, unreal, and the fireball looked like some other planet. It was an unearthly spectacle! [1]
Designed to have a maximum explosive yield of 100 million tons (or 100 megatons) of TNT equivalent, the 60,000-pound monster bomb was detonated at only half its strength. Still, at 50 megatons, it was more than 3,300 times as powerful as the atomic bomb that killed at least 70,000 people in Hiroshima, and more than 40 times as powerful as the largest nuclear bomb in the US arsenal today. Its single test represents about one tenth of the total yield of all nuclear weapons ever tested by all nations.[2]
The Tsar Bomba is not just a subject for history; some of the same dynamics exist today. It is not just the story of a single weapon that was detonated six decades ago, but a parable about political posturing and technical enablement that applies just as acutely today. In a new era of nuclear weapons and delivery competition, the Tsar Bomba is a potent example of how nationalism, fear, and high-technology can combine in a fashion that is ultimately dangerous, wasteful, and pointless.
The Soviet Union was also, it should be noted, in a somewhat precarious strategic position. The Red Army was huge and vast, and its nuclear arsenal was rapidly growing, but its delivery vehicles did not allow it to threaten the United States homeland directly and credibly. The Soviets could threaten by proxy, to be sure. But the United States had a many-fold advantage in nuclear weapons, many of them ringed around the Soviet borders. The Soviet Union had tested its first ICBMs, but there were scarcely any deployed. These same tensions would, in a few years, lead Khrushchev to base missiles in Cuba, but prior to that they made Khrushchev desperate to appear tough.
Sakharov also made one major change to the test plan. Even though the test bomb was a 100-megaton design, it would not be a 100-megaton detonation. In most thermonuclear weapons designs, at least half the yield comes from a final stage in which non-fissile atoms of uranium 238 are induced to fission by the high-energy neutrons produced by deuterium-tritium fusion reactions. Replacing the uranium 238 with an inert substance, in this case lead, would make the weapon half as powerful (50 megatons), and it would release far less fallout in the form of fission products.
Despite this, SAC continued to push for the weapon, and expected it to be tested as part of Operation Hardtack in 1958. Eisenhower had, however, put a cap on total megatonnage for the test series (15 megatons, or 1,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), and this scuttled the test.[28] Scientists at the Livermore weapons laboratory assured SAC that they could provide them with two versions of such a weapon without testing, if desired; the first would be a 25,000-pound bomb with a 60-megaton yield, the second a 22,000-pound bomb of 45-megaton yield.[29]
Even after denouncing the Tsar Bomba as pointless terrorism, there were scientists and military planners working for the US government who were considering nuclear weapons with yields 20 times larger.
Meanwhile, the AEC Director of Military Applications had started to look at one thorny, non-nuclear part of the project: the massive ballistic case for the weapon, the same issue that had caused the Soviets so much hassle. The case for some of the newer high-yield designs, as with Tsar Bomba, might be too large to fit inside the B-52.[41]
Is the requirement for research and development in the very high-yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50-100 [megaton] device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects tests using these very high-yield devices actually be conducted since [the Department of Defense] has made no provision to fund these very expensive tests? [47]
But the Soviets never broke the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and smaller warheads became the norm. Warheads that could be mounted in multiples and independently targeted on a single missile, or put into submarines, became the core of the arsenal. Large, high-yield weapons would, eventually, be mostly phased out. The dismissal of the uselessness of the Tsar Bomba would become orthodoxy, as even the CIA (eventually) concluded that the Soviets were not going to field such a thing in numbers or try to put superbombs on missiles.
Alex Wellerstein is an Associate Professor and Director of the Science and Technology Studies program at the Stevens Institute of Technology. His first book, Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States, was published by the University of Chicago Press in April 2021.
[37] Glenn Seaborg to Robert McNamara (13 December 1962). Several differently-redacted versions of this fascinating memo exist, including two in the Nuclear Testing Archive (NV0915114 and NV0058335), and one in the GaleNet Declassified Documents Online (DDRS-262940). I am grateful to Carey Sublette for the suggestion about the spherical nature of the RIPPLE secondary and its impact on the ballistic shape of a high-yield RIPPLE warhead. Sublette's 2007 page on the Tsar Bomba, cited earlier, was also of good use in starting these investigations.
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