MS Office 2016 Pro Plus 16.0.4738.1000 March 2019
Mazie Wingeier
from where i can download the Microsoft Office 2013 Professional Plus .iso. I need to update in my company. I currently have office 2010. We do not have Office 365. Only company licenses. I found the Windows Iso Downloader program. Can I use it safely?
You bought a black market key. Pro plus is a VLK only product . You bought it off a pirate. You are not legal. Unless they gave you a VLK download link , and a invoice to add to your volume license portal.
They might have a 2013 product key from when they initially purchased Office Pro Plus. If the OP was not the original purchaser, but rather inherited the licensing, then they will need to contact Microsoft licensing to sort it out. Once sorted out, the ISO files can be downloaded from the Microsoft licensing portal.
The season packages that go on sale on Monday, March 4, include an All-Access Pass for every show as well as invitations to special events for $225; an Adult Best Buy package for the three mainstage productions for $125; a three-show package for senior citizens and Hope faculty and staff for $95; and a three-show pass for students for $60. The packages may be purchased in person at the Events and Conferences Office located downtown in the Anderson-Werkman Financial Center (100 E. Eighth St.) or by calling the office at 616-395-7890. The office is open for ticket sales on weekdays from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
When tickets for individual productions become available beginning Monday, April 1, they will also be available at the office or by calling the office, plus they will be available to purchase online at hope.edu/tickets
In addition to the productions, Hope Repertory Theatre will be offering a variety of week-long day and half-day summer camps for school-age children throughout the season, with themes and options including Fractured Fairy Tales, Improv, Theatrical Design, Musical Theatre, Creative Drama, Performing Arts, Superhero, Playwriting, 29-Hour Film-Making and Broadway Bootcamp. More information, including the camp dates, recommended grade levels, cost and how to register, is available online at hope.edu/hsrt
To inquire about accessibility or if you need accommodations to fully participate in the event, please email accommo...@hope.edu. Updates related to events are posted when available at hope.edu/calendar in the individual listings.
The latest update of our forecasts was published on 15 March 2023 in the March 2023 Economic and fiscal outlook. Read the Executive summary for the key messages of our forecast or the full report on our website.
Chapter 4 sets out our forecasts for receipts and public spending over a five-year horizon. We also explain our loans and other financial transactions forecasts. All this, together with new policy decisions, builds the outlook for borrowing and debt.
In Chapter 5, we assess the Government against its fiscal targets and assesses their likelihood of being met on current policy under our central forecast. We consider the uncertainty around our fiscal forecast and the risks to the Government meeting its targets.
Outside government we have held useful discussions with the Bank of England, the Confederation of British Industry, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Resolution Foundation, the Institute for Government, the International Monetary Fund, the Health Foundation, Alex Tuckett from the CRU group, and Tony Wilson from the Institute for Employment Studies.
We published the timetable of the key stages of the forecast on 19 January, once it had been agreed by signatories of the MoU. That timetable was adhered to at each stage for this EFO and proceeded as follows:
During the forecasting period, the BRC held nearly 40 scrutiny and challenge meetings with officials from other departments, in addition to numerous further meetings at staff level and those with external stakeholders. We have been provided with all the information and analysis that we requested and have come under no pressure from Ministers, advisers or officials to change any of our conclusions as the forecast has progressed. The BRC also met with the Chancellor four times to discuss the forecast over the course of its production (on 25 January, 7 and 20 February, and 8 March). A full log of our substantive contact with Ministers, their offices and special advisers can be found on our website. This includes the list of special advisers and officials who received the near-final draft of the EFO on 10 March.
1.2 Developments since our November forecast have been largely positive, but the economy still faces significant structural challenges. Wholesale gas prices have more than halved over the past six months and are expected to fall further over the forecast. At the time we closed our forecast, Bank Rate was expected to peak at 4 per cent later this year, rather than the 5 per cent we assumed in November. The economy narrowly avoided contracting in the final quarter of 2022 and the near-term outlook for demand has improved. But gas prices remain more than twice their pre-pandemic level which, when added to the stagnation in business investment since 2016, the recent rise in labour market inactivity, and the slowdown in productivity growth since the financial crisis, means that there remains weak underlying momentum.
1.3 CPI inflation peaked at 11.1 per cent in October and is expected to fall sharply to 2.9 per cent by the end of 2023, a more rapid decline than we expected in November. The drop in wholesale gas prices also means that household energy bills are expected to fall below the energy price guarantee limit from July and to 2,200 by the end of the year. Stronger domestically generated inflation means that inflation oscillates around zero in the middle of the decade rather than falling meaningfully into negative territory as we forecast in November. Inflation returns to target in early 2028, with the offsetting effects of lower gas prices and increased domestically generated inflation leaving the consumer price level at the end of our forecast little changed from November.
1.4 Stronger real wage growth, alongside the drop in interest rate expectations since November, results in a shorter and much shallower economic downturn this year. GDP is expected to contract by 0.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2023 to 0.6 per cent below its recent peak in the second quarter of 2022. Output then flatlines in the second quarter and starts rising again from the third quarter. This means the peak-to-trough fall in GDP is just a quarter of the 2.1 per cent fall assumed in our November forecast and output regains its pre-pandemic peak in the middle of 2024, six months earlier than expected in November. Supported by the fiscal loosening in this Budget, GDP growth gathers pace to reach 2.5 per cent in the middle of the decade. GDP growth then eases back towards its medium-term potential growth rate of 1 per cent by the end of the forecast.
1.5 That medium-term potential growth rate is unchanged from November but the level of potential output (and actual GDP) at the end of our forecast is around per cent higher. This reflects modest upward revisions due to higher migration, lower energy prices, and an increase in labour supply from Budget measures. But these are partly offset by a weaker path for the amount of capital available per worker and a lower pre-Budget-measures path for labour market participation.
1.9 The squeeze on real household incomes drags down consumption this year, despite a fall in the saving rate from its historic high during the pandemic. Consumption falls by 0.8 per cent in 2023 and then grows by 1.7 per cent on average over the rest of the forecast as real incomes recover. Cumulative business investment over the forecast period is little changed from November, but the profile is volatile due to its highly pro-cyclical nature and the impact of policy measures. Investment falls this year as output stagnates but rises strongly over the subsequent two years as firms bring forward investment to take advantage of the temporary full-expensing capital allowances announced in the Budget. Investment then falls back after the measure expires in April 2026.
1.10 The level of nominal GDP, which is the key driver of our forecast for the public finances, is 0.8 per cent higher at the forecast horizon than in our November forecast. This comprises 0.6 per cent from higher real GDP and 0.2 per cent from a higher GDP deflator, reflecting slightly stronger domestically generated inflation. This upward revision to nominal GDP has fed through to higher forecasts for wages and salaries, nominal consumer spending, and company profits (outside the oil and gas sector). These are the three largest tax bases and underpin around two-thirds of our overall revenue forecast.
1.11 The modest improvement in economic prospects has flowed through to a somewhat brighter outlook for the public finances. Public sector net borrowing in 2022-23 is expected to be 152.4 billion, or 6.1 per cent of GDP. This is down 24.7 billion (14 per cent) relative to our November forecast, which reflects a mix of largely economy-related upward revisions to receipts (14.8 billion) and largely energy-price-related downward revisions to public spending (9.9 billion). Headline public sector net debt is expected to finish the year at 100.6 per cent of GDP, 1.2 per cent of GDP lower than forecast in November.
1.12 Before accounting for new policy measures, the outlook for borrowing has improved materially since November, but remains more challenging than a year ago. On average, our pre-measures forecast has been revised down by 24.5 billion (0.9 per cent of GDP) a year from 2023-24 onwards. In 2023-24, the improvement largely reflects the better starting point this year, with energy support measures and debt interest costing less than expected, while receipts are higher across all major taxes other than those related to energy. From 2024-25 onwards, downward revisions to pre-measures borrowing are dominated by upward revisions to receipts (averaging 24.0 billion a year) as stronger outturns are largely assumed to persist, while a shallower economic downturn and modestly higher medium-term output deliver stronger growth in key tax bases. These are only partly offset by upward revisions to spending on welfare, notably another upward revision to spending on health and disability benefits.
b1e95dc632