* Tim van Dijen <
tvd...@gmail.com> [2021-04-19 15:41]:
> This is probably difficult to auto-configure, because as an IDP/SP
> we don't necessarily _want_ to support every available algorithm the
> xmlseclibs-library supports.
Hm. Currently I'm interested mostly in EncryptionMethod (since that's
where stuff breaks and where we need to move forward) and that only
has two relevant sets of algos atm: AES-CBC (which is insecure and
should be moved away from, for many years now but is mandatory to
support in the original SAML spec) and AES-GCM (which is not known to
be insecure and what we should use whenever there's library/platform
code to support it).
So with this rather specific view I'd disagree: Whenever AES-GCM
support is detected it should be listed and listed first. And AES-CBC
can always be listed (with lower priority) because listing it is the
same as not listing it. (Everyone uses and therefore supports it right
now. And not nearly enough entities support AES-GCM that anyone could
be running with AES-GCM *only* at this time, and -- sadly -- very
likely for the forseable future.)
Sorry, I'm not sure I understand your references. Did you mean to say
that the expectation would be for the admin to (1) sufficiently care
about this to (2) find out what algos are supported by xmlseclibs or
libssl or libnss or whatever deeper layers and enumerate them
manually?
If so then I think that wouldn't help at all as it's simply too
difficult for an entity operator to find out what algos are usable in
a given environment. (At least that's the case for the Shibboleth SP
software, maybe I'm missing an easy way to determine this for SSP
deployments?)
So I think this should be dealt with as much automatism as possible
and (where necessary) blocklisting known insecure algos.
-peter