Al Salam Boccaccio 98 Investigation Report

[Krysta Cirilo]

Asa result of the fire mitigation, the scuppers were blocked, and the accumulation of a large amount of water, coupled with the weather conditions, finally caused an excessive list of the vessel to starboard.

As a result of the list, sea water ingressed into the vessel. Consequently, the vessel sank approximately 57 miles from its port of destination, the Egyptian Port of Safaga, and 41 nm from her port of departure, the Saudi Arabian Port of Duba.

Fire was the immediate factor but not the root cause leading to the tragedy. A preliminary investigation report by Panama Maritime Authority says the fire apparently began in the car-deck; however, the origin of the fire could not be properly located.

Notably, water utilized during the fire-fighting efforts caused a progressive loss of stability on the vessel, leading to an excessive list of the vessel, as part of a phenomenon called free surface effect.

As a result of the fire-fighting operations, the water that was delivered onboard created a critical increase in the level of water on the cardeck, which was impossible to discharge in a timely manner by the crew, thus generating an unsafe and unstable list condition.

Additionally, as a result of the fire-fighting operation, the large volume of water delivered may have also contributed to the accumulation of debris, trash, and residue around the car-deck, and perhaps clogging the scuppers, and thus impeding the water from being freely discharged overboard.

Contributing to the capsizing were the weather conditions present at the time, with current and wind of 7 to 8 on the Beaufort Scale, while contributing to the loss of life was also the significant delay by authorities in starting search and rescue operations.

In July 2008, an Egyptian court acquitted of charges the owner of Al-Salam Boccaccio 98, his son and two others. However, in March 2009 the initial acquittal was overturned, and the owner was sentenced to seven years in prison. Two other employees of the company were sentenced to three years in prison each.

It becomes clear that this was another maritime tragedy resulted from a mix of unlucky events. It is extremely rare that a casualty of this magnitude and this death toll results from one single factor.

However, a root cause seen in many other accidents can be traced in this one too: The lack of preparedness for the unexpected and the human factor complexities during emergency situations became evident just after the fire broke out.

As emergency response procedures were not properly followed by the crew, as established in the Safety Management Manual of the vessel, this accident highlighted the importance for masters, watch standing officers, and crew members, to immediately report any emergency to the company, the authorities, and if practicable, to ships in the vicinity.

It is a matter of concern whether a great deal of the paperwork required by the ISM Code is being followed just as a matter routine compliance on many of the ships, without actually putting these procedures into practice onboard,

The importance of crew being familiar with procedures was another key point to consider. With the magnitude of rough weather the vessel experienced that day, it would only take two or three inches (5-8cm) of water on the deck to set off a Free Surface Effect.

After the accident, the Panama Maritime Authority also recommended that the stowage of luggage or cargo in opentype trailers in the car-decks of RO-RO passenger ships be avoided, and serious consideration given to the stowage of these items in enclosed areas designated for this purpose, where detection and fire-fighting measures may be implemented.

The Free Surface Effect is a phenomenon whereby a small amount of water inside the vessel starts slopping from side to side, making the ship rock. As the water moves it gathers momentum, making the ship more unstable and can shift cargo and capsize the ship quickly.

Our aim: to clarify, to reach the truth about the facts. And as relatives of the dead passengers we also want to help make navigation safer because in our opinion exposing the mistakes made on that occasion will help prevent them from happening again.

The international lawsuits for damages have begun in Italy since 2010, but they have been held for many years for procedural reasons raised by our opponents. To date, more than 15% of the families affected by the shipwreck are in the process, in addition to dozens of survivors also among the crew. It is the largest disaster and shipwreck legal case currently underway in the world.

Two of these ships will sink within a few years of each other in 2002 and 2006 while the survivors will be withdrawn from navigation and scrapped in a few months between 2006 and 2007.

Carducci Leopardi

As you can see from this official drawing that is in the litigation now, the Boccaccio was a total new ship exiting shipyard in 1991, she was top-heavy (and heavier), wider, taller, less resistant to wind pressure, totally different stability, impoverished stability.

The other transformed sisters also were bought by the same owner group. At the end of 2005 and until the sinking, the management of Al Salam Boccaccio is certainly of El Salam Maritime Transport Co. The Egyptian office of Pacific Sunlight Marine Inc. is located in the same building where both El Salam Maritime are located. Transport Co. that El Salam Shipping & Trading in 30, Yakoub Artin, Heliopolis, Cairo.

Read the transcription of the black box. You will understand how the crew was surprised and harmstrung by the behavior of the vessel that was not discharging water, the fire was detected so late, the wind was hardly pushing it on one side. And you will also see that in this complicated situation the Master wants to avoid collision with nearby traffic, creates darkness in the bridge to have clear visual, puts one responsible crew and then goes downstairs to realize what is the severity of damages.

How is it possible that two identical ships, Al Salam Petrarca 90 and Al Salam Boccaccio 98 capsize and sink after the crews attempted to put out the fires on board? How can it happen that two identical ships managed by the same company suffer such severe fires as to lead to sinking? How is it possible that after a dramatic event like the first no one has foreseen and prevented the second? With the help of our lawyers one of the family members asked for information from those who knew the fleet of ships better than any other: RINA S.p.A. and Registro Italiano Navale.

In 2007 the administrative court of Genoa (TAR) sentenced RINA to hand over part of the documentation and the technicians were able to begin studying the projects and inspections to which the ship had been subjected.

If we calculate the 5 identical sister-ships in the fleet, the inspections on that type of ship happened been dozens and dozens over the years, approximately two hundred occasions to establish the safety of the ship, crew and company, but it was not enough.

The Egyptian justice has celebrated a trial for multiple manslaughter and other crimes against judgment, Mr. Mamdouh Ismail, the main shareholder of the El Salam Group and several executives including his son Amr and others, with reference only to the phases following the sinking.

In July 2008, the commander of the Santa Catherine I ship was sentenced, that is the ferry of the same fleet that did not provide relief to the shipwrecked Al Salam Boccaccio 98 and Mr. Salah El Din Mahmoud Gomaa were convicted, while the others were acquitted.

On 11 March 2009, the Hurghada Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for Gomaa and above all sentenced the shipowner and the other defendants to imprisonment with forced labor of up to seven years for multiple manslaughter and other crimes.

For the phases following the sinking and thanks to the acquisition of phone calls between the ship and the land on the night of the tragedy, as well as between other ships in the fleet and the land and phone calls only ashore, it was found that the fleet managers were silent. The sinking of the ferry, hindered the emergence of the truth by the intervening authorities and managed the emergency in an uncoordinated and incapable manner, and confirming the absence of a safety culture in the heads of the shortcomings of the structure of the DPA (Designated Person Ashore) and top executives. The officers on board were left blind from many useful vital information from shore and those who were supposed to deliver proper calculi and warnings.

The preliminary report states that after an inspection on board the sister ship Al Salam Carducci 92, the garage floor is flooded in just 10 minutes if the water from the fixed fire prevention system is activated.

Note: as emerges from the test carried out on board one of the sister ships, under ideal conditions, it is evident that in a short period of time (10 minutes in this case), the amount of water accumulated can rapidly increase on the garage deck.

The design of the water drainage system from the garage and its level for discharging the water into the sea, prevents the water from being discharged from the garage into the sea if the ship tilts more than 6.5 , since here the system works by gravity. This was verified by the committee through calculations that it carried out on board the sister ship Assalam 92 and through the letter from RINA dated 12 April 2006 (attachment number 10).

At that point, we are in 2014, the families leave the Ligurian court and take their complaints away from Genoa and from that moment they win in the two most important places of continental justice: the Court of Justice of the European Union, in May 2020, and the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, in December 2020.

Speaking about decisions, one shall not forget those for the environmental disaster produced by the sinking of the oil tanker Erika in 1999 which sank in the Bay of Biscay, France, devastating the Breton coasts and causing one of the most serious environmental disasters of mankind.

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