Legion Spy

[Karola]

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Then where do the losses of lost battles come from?

Was the heavy infantry, encumbered by their shields and long spears, capable of pursuing defeated infantry who had thrown away theirs? Or did the losers have a safe way of disengaging without further losses in case the winners lacked sufficient cavalry to run down running infantry?

As for outright routs, I assume you had an immediate problem with having left all your stuff in the baggage train. So even if you get out, maybe you get captured the next day when you try to steal food from a nearby village or when you get lost and randomly run into the wrong people.

Ancient / medieval commanders would deny enemy armies flat ground if they could. Thermopylae was a natural choke point. The city of Tyre gave Alexander the Great enormous trouble because it was an offshore island.

One army can pressure another, slowly asphyxiate it by restricting its foraging through skirmishing and suply-line disruption and diplomatic intervention; and it can block another from taking certain routes, force it to retreat or engage or find another way. But none of that can reliably force an engagement on grounds that the opposing force finds disfavourable.

They did actively fight on more rough terrain. The myth of flat field battles is a Hollywood invention to make the spectacle of battles and delivering them to a screen an easier viewing experience. Two of the battles cited above, Pydna and Magnesia, were fought in hilly terrain and very much so to the detriment of the phalangites.

I think mainly because almost any large army (and any hoplite or horse-dependent army) also works best on open ground, both for movement and for command and control.

There certainly are holding actions in advantageous terrain (eg Ariobarzanes holds Alexander for a month with

Unfortunately the replies to you do not have reply links, so I cannot reply to them.

Most of the world isnt flat fields. It is true that flat fields are the part of the world worth fighting over; but since they make up a minority of the world, it is important whether they are continuous. They arentt. Getting from one field to another requires passing through other kinds of land.

The alternative with more total area is hills. Hills, however, may be continuous or discontinuous, various width.

Another alternative is stream valleys, and these because of basic physics of water flow, are normally continuous with a few exceptions like karst.

How common were ford battles? How did hoplites or phalangites set up their force to hold a ford? To force a ford?

In the nature of things, the defender will be trying to prevent the attacker from delivering the siege to a place of some strategic significance i.e. a place X from which you can easily access some important part of the world. That means there must be some easy way of getting to place X.

At the Granicus the Macedonian phalanx did OK. (Using the two of three reports that say the army of Alexander had to fight to cross the river, not unopposed.) They pushed back and broke the Persian infantry defending the riverbank.

Though if he lived to like eighty and kept the program going and was enough of a backer its graduates could have risen to positions of power and gotten socially enmeshed enough to hold their positions, and of course his heir would likely be a son who he might have raised to respect the integration program.

It seems to me that Alexanders system relied upon himself and his victories as being the sole source of authority. When he died there was no system left to be loyal to, and no heir to obey. If he had lived long enough to found a dynasty, then people might have been loyal to the dynast of the day, so long as the dynasty lasted.

Dynastic legitimacy was strong enough that the first half of the wars of the Successors revolved round support for/control of Alexanders heirs. A longer-lived dynasty could have cemented something more collaborative (probably Greek-Persian).

This is a somewhat unrelated question, but in the Alexander Mosaic, why is the focus on Darius and not Alexander? Darius is closer to the centre and clearly in the foreground. Alexander looks small in comparison.

Where the attritional effects start to matter is in what happens after your forty thousand man army encounters the enemy army, which will also be limited to about forty thousand men for similar reasons.

Suppose that you have two hundred thousand men back home whom you can call up to replace losses to your frontline army, and the enemy only has twenty or thirty thousand. They may win the first battle against you, by having an army of comparable size. They may win the second battle. They are less and less likely to win the third, fourth, and fifth battles.

There does not seem to be any technodeterministic advantage of loosely arraying a bunch of people in multiple lines and giving them heavy armour and javelins versus densely arraying a bunch of people in one line and giving them pikes; in fact, if you line up two such groups of equivalent size and face them against eachother, you will most likely find that the first strategy is completely impotent in the face of the second. As is logical: we are talking about humans, not robots, and humans do not push through five rows of heavy lances stabbing repeatedly at them with malicious intent. That is suicide, and all the other group have in exchange for the pikes are javelins too sparse to kill significant numbers and armour optimized for close combat that will never occur.

We just went over one. The combination of 1 and 2 caused the Phalanx to overextend in places and let the Roman infantry push through at certain places with their armor, which let them fatally crush the entire formation.

You can see the same effect at play in the Peloponnesian War. The defeat at Sphacteria sends Sparta in a panic and negotiations. In comparison Athens sustains defeats that would have crippled the Spartan army over and over again.

In the early Republic the Romans were quite willing to co-opt the ruled, but these latter were all Italians with a similar culture, so arguably the Macedonians already did something analogous in co-opting Greeks. Once the Romans began expanding outside Italy, their willingness to grant citizenship to their new subjects declined quite a bit. From the earlier post on ancient demography, it seems most scholars would put the population of ancient Greece and Macedon at quite a bit lower than that of ancient Italy, and of course the Greek and Macedonian population of the Seleucids and Ptolemies would have been lower still, so perhaps the main reason why the Roman Republic was so much more resilient was simply that the number of Romans + Italians was simply so much higher than the number of Macedonians + Greeks.

One key point here, if I recall correctly, is that one of the benefits of being an auxilia is that you became a Roman citizen after your term of service. And this status extended to your children and (under the usual inheritance rules for citizenship) their descendants.

Indeed. And the Roman citizenshipmcould be earned also via service on civilian level. If you were among local magistrates, you would become a citizen quite likely, and these magistrate held annual offices, so the upper class of any Roman ally would become citizens quite fast.

Though I must point that probably, you could also lose that citizenship if you went down on the social scale. Legally, it was impossible, but we can see the clash between de facto and de jure citizenship in the Acts: Apostle Paul is repeatedly in situations where people are a bit uncredulous about his citizenship. Paul is a charismatic, well-educated man, so he is able to convince Romans of his citizenship, but if you happened to be, say, reduced to a day-worker on the fields, your claims of citizenship would probably not have much effect, no matter how well-founded. To be a citizen in the provinces, you probably needed the education and social position to go with it. Later, this was formalised with the system of honestiores and humiliores.

That is, unless the UK and USA had signed a treaty of intermarriage. Something which I am sure all those British aristocrats who want to marry their surplus children to wealthy American heir(esse)s would push for.

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