In article <
dfl7v751r2vdrln7q...@4ax.com>,
How dumb are you ,"254? I guess we are going to find out.
<
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/US_ThirdWorld/US_PolPot.html>
Covert Action Quarterly magazine, Summer 1990
For the last eleven years the United States government, in a covert
operation born of cynicism and hypocrisy, has collaborated with the
genocidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. More specifically, Washington has
covertly aided and abetted the Pol Potists' guerrilla war to overthrow
the Vietnamese backed government of Prime Minister Hun Sen, which
replaced the Khmer Rouge regime.
The U.S. government's secret partnership with the Khmer Rouge grew out
of the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War. After the fall of Saigon in 1975,
the U.S.-worried by the shift in the Southeast Asian balance of
power-turned once again to geopolitical confrontation. It quickly
formalized an anti-Vietnamese, anti-Soviet strategic alliance with
China-an alliance whose disastrous effects have been most evident in
Cambodia. For the U.S., playing the "China card" has meant sustaining
the Khmer Rouge as a geopolitical counterweight capable of destabilizing
the Hun Sen government in Cambodia and its Vietnamese allies.
When Vietnam intervened in Cambodia and drove the Pol Potists from power
in January 1972, Washington took immediate steps to preserve the Khmer
Rouge as a guerrilla movement. International relief agencies were
pressured by the U.S. to provide humanitarian assistance to the Khmer
Rouge guerrillas who fled into Thailand. For more than a decade, the
Khmer Rouge have used the refugee camps they occupy as military bases to
wage a contra-war in Cambodia. According to Linda Mason and Roger Brown,
who studied the relief operations in Thailand for Cambodian refugees:
...relief organizations supplied the Khmer Rouge resistance movement
with food and medicines.... In the Fall of 1979 the Khmer Rouge were the
most desperate of all the refugees who came to the Thai-Kampuchean
border. Throughout l900, however, their health rapidly improved, and
relief organizations began questioning the legitimacy of feeding them.
The Khmer Rouge. . . having regained strength...had begun actively
fighting the Vietnamese. The relief organizations considered supporting
the Khmer Rouge inconsistent with their humanitarian goals.... Yet
Thailand, the country that hosted the relief operation, and the U.S.
government, which funded the bulk of the relief operations, insisted
that the Khmer Rouge be fed.
During his reign as National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski
played an important role in determining how the U.S. would support the
Pol Pot guerrillas. Elizabeth Becker, an expert on Cambodia, recently
wrote, "Brzezinski himself claims that he concocted the idea of
persuading Thailand to cooperate fully with China in efforts to rebuild
the Khmer Rouge.... Brzezinski said, " I encouraged the Chinese to
support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help the DK [Democratic
Kampuchea]. The question was how to help the Cambodian people. Pol Pot
was an abomination. We could not support him but China could."
An Unholy Alliance
The U.S. not only permitted the Khmer Rouge to use the refugee camps in
Thailand as a base for its war against the new government in Phnom Penh
but it also helped Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former Prime Minister Son
Sann to organize their own guerrilla armies from the refugee population
in the camps. These camps are an integral factor in the ability of the
Khmer Rouge, the Sihanoukist National Army (ANS) and Son Sann's Khmer
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) to wage war against the Hun
Sen government.
In 1979, Washington began "a small program" of support for Sihanouk's
and Son Sann's guerrillas by providing "travel expenses" for the
"insurgent leaders" and funds "for the up keep of resistance camps near
the Thai-Cambodian border." In addition, since 1982, the U.S. has
provided the ANS and KPNLF with covert and overt "humanitarian" and "non
lethal" military aid. By 1989, the secret non lethal aid had grown to
between $20 million and $24 million annually and the overt humanitarian
aid had reached $5 million. The Bush administration requested $7 million
more in humanitarian aid for 1990.
When Congress approved the $5 million aid package for the ANS and KPNLF
in 1985, it prohibited use of the aid "...for the purpose or with the
effect of promoting, sustaining or augmenting, directly or indirectly,
the capacity of the Khmer Rouge...to conduct military or paramilitary
operations in Cambodia or elsewhere...." From the beginning, U.S. aid
for the ANS and KPNLF has been a complimentary source of aid for the
Khmer Rouge. According to a western diplomat stationed in Southeast
Asia, ".. .two-thirds of the arms aid to the noncommunist forces appears
to come from Peking [Beijing], along with more extensive aid to the
communist fighters [the Khmer Rouge].... China is estimated to spend $60
million to $100 million yearly in aid to all factions of the
anti-Vietnamese resistance."
In 1982, under pressure from the U.S., China, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Sihanouk and Son Sann joined forces
with the Khmer Rouge to form the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea (CGDK). The ANS and KPNLF, which were more politically respect
able than the Khmer Rouge, gained military credibility from the
guerrilla alliance. However, the Khmer Rouge gained considerable
political legitimacy from the alliance and Khmer Rouge diplomats now
represent the CGDK at the United Nations.
The CGDK receives large amounts of military aid from Singapore. When
asked about the relationship between money from the U.S. and arms from
Singapore, another U.S. diplomat in Southeast Asia replied, "Let's put
it this way. If the U.S. supplies [the guerrilla coalition] with food,
then they can spend their food money on something else."
Direct U.S. Aid
But there are indications of direct U.S. Iinks to the Khmer Rouge.
Former Deputy Director of the CIA, Ray Cline, visited a Khmer Rouge camp
inside Cambodia in November 1980. When asked about the visit, the Thai
Foreign Ministry denied that Cline had illegally crossed into Cambodian
territory. However, privately, the Thai government admitted that the
trip had occurred. Cline's trip to the Pol Pot camp was originally
revealed in a press statement released by Khmer Rouge diplomats at the
United Nations.
Cline also went to Thailand as a representative of the Reagan-Bush
transition team and briefed the Thai government on the new
administration's policy toward Southeast Asia. Cline told the Thais the
Reagan administration planned to "strengthen its cooperation" with
Thailand and the other ASEAN members opposed to the Phnom Penh
government. There have been numerous other reports about direct links
between the CIA and the Khmer Rouge. According to Jack Anderson,
"through China, the CIA is even supporting the jungle forces of the
murderous Pol Pot in Cambodia." Sihanouk himself admitted that CIA
advisers were present in Khmer Rouge camps in late 1989: "Just one month
ago, I received intelligence informing me that there were U.S. advisers
in the Khmer Rouge camps in Thailand, notably in Site B camp.... The CIA
men are teaching the Khmer Rouge human rights! The CIA wants to turn
tigers into kittens!
By late 1989 the distinction between "direct or indirect" U.S. support
for the Khmer Rouge was less clear. When CGDK forces launched an
offensive in September 1989, Sihanouk's and Son Sann's armies openly
cooperated with the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, by then the Khmer Rouge had
infiltrated the military and political wings of the ANS and KPNLF.
Sihanouk confirmed ANS and KPNLF military collaboration with the Khmer
Rouge in a radio message broadcast clandestinely in Cambodia. "I would
particularly like to commend the fact that our three armies know how to
cordially cooperate with one another...We assist each other in every
circumstance and cooperate with one another on the battlefield of the
Cambodian motherland...., Sihanouk specifically mentioned military
cooperation in battles at Battambang, Siem Reap, and Oddar Meanchey.
Evidence of increased involvement of U.S. military advisers in Cambodia
has also begun to surface. A report in the London Sunday Correspondent
noted that "American advisers are reported to have been helping train
guerrillas of the non communist Khmer resistance and may have recently
gone into Cambodia with them....Reports of increased U.S. involvement
have also emerged from the northern town of Sisophon, where local
officials say four westerners accompanied guerrillas in an attack on the
town last month.''
Although the U.S. government denies supplying the ANS and KPNLF with
military hardware, a recent report claimed that KPNLF forces had
received a shipment of weapons from the U.S. including M-16s, grenade
launchers, and recoilless rifles. It has also been reported that the
U.S. is providing the KPNLF with high resolution satellite photographs
and "several KPNLF commanders claim Americans were sent to train some 40
elite guerrillas in the use of sophisticated U.S.-made Dragon anti-tank
missiles in a four-month course that ended last month." When the KPNLF
launched a major offensive on September 30, a large number of U.S.
officials were sighted in the border region, near the fighting.
Washington's link to the anti-Phnom Penh guerrilla factions was
formalized in 1989 when KPNLF diplomat Sichan Siv was appointed as a
deputy assistant to President George Bush. Siv's official assignment in
the White House is the Public Liaison Office, where he works with
different constituency groups, such as Khmer residents in the U.S. and
other minority, foreign policy, youth, and education groups. Sives
escaped from Cambodia in 1976 and immigrated to the U.S., where he
joined the KPNLF. From 1983 to 1987, Siv served as a KPNLF
representative at the United Nations as part of the CGDK delegation
which was headed by Khmer Rouge diplomats.
As part of the Bush administration, Sichan Siv is significantly involved
in the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy in Cambodia. He was a
"senior adviser" to the U.S. delegation attending an international
conference on Cambodia held last summer in Paris, where the U.S.
demanded the dismantling of the Hun Sen government and the inclusion of
the Khmer Rouge in an interim four-party government. He was also the
moderator of a White House briefing on Cambodia in October 1989 for
Khmer residents in the U.S.
Another one of Siv's assignments has been to work as a liaison with far
Right groups which provide political and material support for the KPNLF.
He attended a World Anti Communist League (WACL) conference in Dallas,
Texas in September 1985 along with other anti-communist "freedom
fighters" from around the world. At the WACL conference, the KPNLF
openly sought "outside training and support in intelligence and
demolition.''
Siv has also worked with retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Theodore
Mataxis, who heads up the North Carolina-based Committee for a Free
Cambodia (CFC). Mataxis was approached by senior KPNLF generals in 1986
to set up the CFC to organize support in the U.S. for the KPNLF.
Right Wing Support
According to the Reagan doctrine, the goal of U.S. foreign policy was to
"contain Soviet expansion" by supporting counterrevolutionary groups in
Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, etc. and, in essence, "roll back" the
"Soviet empire." Many of the right wing groups which gained prominence
after Reagan's election immediately started programs to support contras
across the globe. The World Anti-Communist League, the Heritage
Foundation, the Freedom Research Foundation, as well as many others, all
pressed hard for support of the "freedom fighters.''
In its 1984 policy report entitled, Mandate for Leadership II:
Continuing the Conservative Revolution, the Heritage Foundation called
on the Reagan administration to focus even more closely on these
counterrevolutionary struggles and to: ...employ paramilitary assets to
weaken those communist and noncommunist regimes that may already be
facing the early stages of insurgency within their borders and which
threaten U.S. interests....Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam reflect such
conditions, as do Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iran and
Libya.
In 1984, right wing activist / adventurer Jack Wheeler stated that
"[t]here are eight anti-Soviet guerrilla wars being conducted in the
third world at this moment....Sooner or later, one of these movements is
going to win....The first successful overthrow of a Soviet puppet regime
may, in fact, precipitate a 'reverse domino effect,' a toppling of
Soviet dominos, one after the other.''
Not surprisingly, Wheeler is a big supporter of the Cambodian contra
movement and has openly solicited material and political support for the
KPNLF. In August 1984 he wrote an article for the Moonie-owned
Washington Times in which he said, "After spending a week with the KPNLF
inside Cambodia...one is drawn inescapably to the conclusion that the
KPNLF does indeed represent a real third noncommunist alternative for
Cambodia....[But] the KPNLF is...running seriously low on weapons and
ammunition. The lack of ammunition for rifles, rocket launchers, machine
guns and mortars, is especially critical.''
Just how "private" the support Wheeler solicits for the KPNLF is open to
question. Listed, along with Wheeler, on the Board of Directors of
Freedom Research Foundation are Alex Alexiev and Mike Kelly. Alexiev is
"with the National Security Division of the Rand Corporation. . . [and
is] an expert on Soviet activities in the third world." Kelly was Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower Resources and Military
Personnel in the early 1980s. Kelly had earlier been a legislative
assistant to the right wing Senators Bill Armstrong (Rep.-Colo.) and
John Tower(Rep.-Tex.).
Soldier of Fortune (SOF) magazine also journeyed to Cambodia in support
of the KPNLF. In an article written after their visit to the front, SOF
authors David Mills and Dale Andrade appealed for readers to contribute
to the KPNLF and to send their donations to a Bangkok address. "Any
private citizen who wants to give more than just moral support to help
the KPNLF rebels can send "Any private citizen who wants to give more
than just moral support to help the KPNLF rebels can send money." It
doesn't take much. Forty dollars will buy two uniforms, one pair of
shoes, two pairs of socks, knapsack, plastic sheet and a scarf for one
soldier. That's not a bad deal.''
Ted Mataxis Rides Again
Retired Brigadier-General Ted Mataxis personifies the historic ties of
the U.S. to the KPNLF. In 1971-72, Mataxis worked with General Sak
Sutsakhan when he was chief of the U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team
(MEDT) in Phnom Penh. Mataxis's official role was to supervise the
delivery of U.S military aid to then-Cambodian Premier Lon Nol. However,
Mataxis's assignment also included a covert role-over seeing the
escalation of U.S. forces in Cambodia after the April 1970 U.S.
invasion. Mataxis was well suited for working on covert operations in
Cambodia, having trained at the Army's Strategic Intelligence School in
the late 1940s.
Despite a 1970 congressional ban on aid to the Lon Nol army, there
continued to be reports of MEDT personnel working as advisers to the
Cambodian military. There were also reports of U.S. helicopters
providing transport for Cambodian troops as well as supplying them with
ammunition during battles. The U.S. also opened a radio station at
Pochentong Airport, near Phnom Penh, to "help coordinate air support for
Cambodian troops."
When Mataxis retired from the U.S. Army in 1972, he began working as a
"military consultant" to the Defense Ministry of Singapore. "When I was
down in Singapore I worked with them [Sak and the other Lon Nol
generals] very closely. We used to do repairs on their ships and other
things," Mataxis explained. "When Congress cut off money to them in
1973, they came down to see what Singapore could do to help them out. I
got a team together from Singapore, and we went up to Phnom Penh. We
made arrangements to buy old brass, old weapons and other stuff [to sell
for profit] so they'd have money for supplies and other things." Under
U.S. law, old U.S. weapons and scrap metal military equipment provided
to allies is U.S. property, but there was no known official objection to
Mataxis's end run around the congressional ban on U.S. military aid to
the Lon Nol generals.
Mataxis recalled when Major General Pak Son Anh (who at the time worked
closely with General Sak, the military commander of the KPNLF) visited
him in Washington in 1986. "They [Pak and other KPNLF officers] came to
see me and asked what I could do. They came up to my office at the
Committee for a Free Afghanistan....They asked us to set up something
like that [for the KPNLF]. So I went over to see Admiral [Thomas]
Moorer. I took General Pak along and asked Admiral Moorer if he could
act as a Godfather for us. He said, 'Yes, you can use my name.' Moorer
was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Mataxis was head of the
MEDT, and Mataxis's work in Cambodia was supervised by Moorer and
Admiral John Mc Cain, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Forces, 1968-72.
Mataxis spent much of 1987 setting up the Committee for a Free Cambodia
(CFC). He visited General Sak in Thailand to determine the KPNLF's needs
and promoted the KPNLF in the U.S. "I set it up for Pak to go to one of
those American Security Council meetings [in Washington] in 1986. Then
we had another one in 1987, where guerrillas from around the world
came.... They'd get together and each guerrilla group would have a
chance to get up and give his bit. It gave them a chance to exchange
ideas and say what they were doing," Mataxis stated. Right wing support
has been an important factor in keeping the Cambodian contras supplied.
Even though Ted Mataxis lost in Vietnam, his war is not over.
Conclusion
Although most people believe that the U.S. ended its intervention in
Southeast Asia in 1975, it is evident from the information provided here
that the U.S. continues to support repressive and non-democratic forces
in the jungles of Cambodia. When asked about U.S. policy in Cambodia
during an April 26, l990 ABC News special, Rep. Chester Atkins (Dem.
Mass.) characterized it as "a policy of hatred."
The U.S. is directly responsible for millions of deaths in Southeast
Asia over the past 30 years. Now, the U.S. government provides support
to a movement condemned by the international community as genocidal. How
long must this policy of hatred continue?
<
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khmer_Rouge_rule_of_Cambodia>
The UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly for the KR to retain their
seat at the UN. The seat was occupied by Thiounn Prasith, an old cadre
of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary from their student days in Paris and one of the
21 attendees at the 1960 KPRP Second Congress. The seat was retained
under the name 'Democratic Kampuchea' until 1982 and then 'Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea' until 1993.
According to journalist Elizabeth Becker, former U.S. National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said that in 1979, "I encouraged the Chinese
to support Pol Pot. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support
him, but China could."[14] Brzezinski has denied this, writing that the
Chinese were aiding Pol Pot "without any help or encouragement from the
United States."[15]
China, the U.S., and other Western countries opposed an expansion of
Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Indochina, and refused to recognize
the People's Republic of Kampuchea as the legitimate government of
Cambodia, claiming that it was a puppet state propped up by Vietnamese
forces. China funneled military aid to the Khmer Rouge, which in the
1980s proved to be the most capable insurgent force, while the U.S.
publicly supported a non-Communist alternative to the PRK; in 1985, the
Reagan administration approved $5 million in aid to the republican
KPNLF, led by former prime minister Son Sann, and the ANS, the armed
wing of the pro-Sihanouk FUNCINPEC party.
The KPNLF, while lacking in military strength compared to the Khmer
Rouge, commanded a sizable civilian following (up to 250,000) amongst
refugees near the Thai-Cambodian border that had fled the KR regime.
Funcinpec had the benefit of traditional peasant Khmer loyalty to the
crown and Sihanouk's widespread popularity in the countryside.
In practice, the military strength of the non-KR groups within Cambodia
was minimal, though their funding and civilian support was often greater
than the KR. The Thatcher and Reagan administrations both supported the
insurgents covertly, with weapons, and military advisors in the form of
Green Berets and Special Air Service units, who taught sabotage
techniques in camps just inside Thailand.
Critics such as Human Rights Watch alleged that U.S. policy was
contradictory; while claiming to not support the Khmer Rouge, the U.S.
continually supported UN recognition of the shadow Coalition Government
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK, formed in 1982) as the legitimate
Cambodian government, despite the fact that the tripartite alliance
included the Khmer Rouge. The U.S. government stated it would bolster
the position of groups not under the control of the Vietnamese-supported
government (including the Khmer Rouge) through humanitarian and military
aid.[16][17][18]
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Apparently, your ilk had a hand in supporting Pol Pot.
Why are you such an ass?