Multilateralism Singapore

[Tina Larzelere]

Thisis aligned to the growing preference for minilateral cooperation among countries (including major powers and ASEAN members). Besides the QUAD and AUKUS, there has been an increasing number of trilateral collaborations and engagements such as the trilateral security dialogue between Australia, Japan and the US and the Australia, India and Indonesia (AII) trilateral. The Five-Power Defence Arrangement between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK is an example of minilateral consultative defence cooperation; this was signed in 1971 to safeguard the external defence of Singapore and Malaysia,[6] and its functions later evolved to include non-conventional threats such as piracy and disaster relief.[7]

However, misconceptions arise when the ASEAN-X formula is extended to decision-making process within ASEAN, as advocated by some scholars and practitioners. Often, this fails to recognise the high-degree of apprehension among several member states towards any shift away from the ASEAN fundamental principle of consultation and consensus, toward a majority-vote decision-making process.

Minilateral cooperation as suggested here is not about decision-making in a small group but rather, about an interest group being formed to focus on issues that matter more to some countries than to others. Humanitarian mine actions for example would be more relevant to ASEAN countries impacted by landmines and explosive remnants of war such as Cambodia and Laos, than to others. As such, ASEAN should not view minilateral cooperation to be an activity carried out by an exclusive group of members, but as an initiative involving an initial group of members that are ahead in certain areas of cooperation, and that will expand over time to include other interested members.

Premised upon the non-exclusive nature of such minilateral cooperation, the ASEAN-X formula can be expanded beyond economic cooperation into the security domain (such as areas like terrorism and preventive diplomacy)[11] in order to make progress on key transnational challenges, as well as future areas of cooperation such as artificial intelligence and space technologies where some members may not yet be ready.

ASEAN minilateralism can also take the form of a group of ASEAN members playing a greater leadership role in areas of cooperation that are specifically of greater relevance to them, such as in the case of the South China Sea where only four members are direct claimant states.

Similar to minilateral cooperation among major and middle powers, ASEAN countries have tried to develop various security configurations of their own in order to advance their own interests and respond to the opportunities and challenges in their geopolitical environment.[12] This takes into consideration existing gaps in ASEAN cooperation.[13]

On the security front, the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Trilateral Security Cooperation is an example of minilateral cooperation within ASEAN. It boosts cooperation in defence and humanitarian assistance between these three countries which have lingering border management and war legacy-related issues that can occasionally flare up.[14]

Apart from security initiatives, ASEAN minilateralism in the economic sector such as the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA, launched in 1994) allows the four ASEAN members to boost growth in trade, investment and tourism through intra-regional shipping routes and air links. While boosting sub-regional economic growth, the initiative also contributes to greater ASEAN economic integration.

The ASEAN Power Grid was originally envisioned in the 1990s as a region-wide initiative to encourage collaboration on energy efficiency and renewable energy innovation. However, after 20 years, not much progress has been made due to differences in energy policies and commitment, as well as economic inequality among ASEAN member states.[26]

To go beyond this difficult situation, countries that are ready for broader cooperation in the energy sector could proceed first and let others to follow when ready. In this way, cross-border cooperation on bilateral terms may be expanded to a sub-regional level, and ultimately allow for the creation of an integrated multilateral ASEAN power grid system. Similarly, the Trans ASEAN Gas Pipeline could potentially be another model of how bilateral and minilateral cooperation within ASEAN that has the potential to be scaled up to regional level.

Beyond existing minilateral cooperation in ASEAN, there is potential for ASEAN to expand such an approach in order to address more challenging issues. The South China Sea is an area of contention within ASEAN due to competing national interests and to deep differences between ASEAN countries and China. ASEAN and China have worked together for 20 years on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,[27] but with no clear end in sight.

Indonesia and Vietnam set the stage for closer coordination by coming up with an agreement to demarcate their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in December last year after 12 years of negotiation. The successful EEZ delimitation between Indonesia and Vietnam may also encourage the Philippines and Malaysia to follow suit.[31]

However, for such a minilateral caucus to work, a consensus should first be reached among all ASEAN countries to agree to leave certain issues and decision-making to a group of ASEAN members. In the case of the South China Sea, once claimant states have agreed on a common position, consensus should also be sought from non-claimant states, since the COC is to an agreement between all ten ASEAN countries and China (rather than between the claimant states alone).

Evolving geopolitical developments necessitate an exploration of new approaches to cooperation in order for ASEAN to stay relevant and uphold its centrality. The opportunity cost is high if ASEAN fails to take concrete action in dealing with important regional issues such as the South China Sea. While the preservation of ASEAN unity is important, the regional bloc must balance the usefulness of moving together against the loss of credibility if it fails to act.

Minilateral cooperation within ASEAN will allow it to make greater progress and to better serve the diverse interests of member states. Such cooperation is not meant to replace multilateralism but to supplement what is not possible in the broader setting, while facilitating its eventual expansion into greater regionalism when the time is ripe.

The agreement came as Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers' meeting and related meetings.

China is willing to further enhance high-level contacts and deepen cooperation with Singapore in important projects and fields within the framework of the China- proposed Belt and Road Initiative so as to speed up the construction of the Southern Transport Corridor and implement the third-party market cooperation, Wang said.

As responsible countries, Wang said, China and Singapore should join hands with other countries to shoulder due responsibilities, firmly promote multilateralism, maintain international rules and multilateral trade system, push for the building of an open world economy and maintain world peace and development.

For his part, Lee said Singapore upholds multilateralism, supports the Belt and Road Initiative and stands ready to work with China to push forward major projects including the Southern Transport Corridor and the third-party market cooperation.

Lee also said the world today is facing major threats and challenges. He called for enhancing global cooperation with an open mind and inclusive attitude to address uncertainty and instability arising from the evolving situation.

But despite this, countries are still able to make progress and we should continue striving. For example, this year in March, countries concluded a new agreement under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. It gives us reason for cautious optimism; that while weakened, multilateralism is yet alive.

First, we need to sustain the rules-based multilateral trading system as embodied by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO remains the best guarantor of common growth, as well as effective and resilient supply chains.

But the WTO rules need to keep pace with digital transformation and remain relevant for the modern economy. They also need to help bolster our collective food and energy security and the WTO is actively working at the Ministerial conferences.

With a standing ovation marking the conclusion of years of extensive negotiations, the Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction today adopted a historic maritime biodiversity treaty.

The text, as an international legally binding instrument under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, aims to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Alberto van Klaveren, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, similarly observed that a negotiation that took 15 years has resulted in a text that contains great advances in terms of maritime conservation. He also pointed out that his country has offered to serve as the host State of the Secretariat of the new treaty in a spirit of inclusiveness and impartiality, but also with the aim of bringing governance of the high seas closer to the Global South.

As well, 40 delegations took the floor, commending the President for her leadership, hailing the historic adoption and spotlighting national and regional concerns. Many speakers pointed out that multilateralism had prevailed, with delegations building bridges and going that extra step towards compromise. Moreso, speakers stressed, the adoption was not the finish line, but the beginning of a new era.

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