Re: Just In Mind Prototyper Serial 22
Fay Vitiello
The program creates high-fidelity prototypes, a step before the first version of a mobile app or website is coded. The prototype can be used for showreels and testing purposes. Justinmind can be used to simulate webs and mobile apps without any coding, thus allowing non-programmers to be involved in the project.
In 2011, Justinmind was awarded the second prize of the Eclipse Community Award at the EclipseCon 2011 in Santa Fe, California.[13] That same year it also won the European Red Herring Top 100 Award, recognizing them as a leading private startup company with promising and innovative technology.[14]
@Andrew_Chan wondering if there is a fix yet for the links that are automatically redirecting to the first page of the file? Not specific to a prototype, just selecting a frame and copying the link. When trying to access that link via a google doc, slack, etc. it redirects to the first screen of the file.
Justinmind Prototyping tool is an authoring tool for web and mobile app prototypes and high-fidelity website wireframes. It offers capabilities typically found in diagramming tools like drag and drop placement, re-sizing, formatting and export/import of widgets.
Low-fidelity prototyping involves the use of basic models or examples of the product being tested. For example, the model might be incomplete and use just a few of the features that will be available in the final design, or it might be constructed using materials not intended for the finished article, such as wood, paper, or metal for a plastic product. Low-fidelity prototypes can either be models that are cheaply and easily made, or simply recounts or visualizations of them.
Just start building
Design Thinking has a bias towards action: which means if you have any uncertainties about what you are trying to achieve, your best bet is to just make something. Creating a prototype will help you think about your idea in a concrete manner, and potentially allow you to gain insights into ways you can improve it.
Direct view, electroluminescent quantum dot displays. You can think of it like a traditional LED LCD or OLED display, but instead of LCD or OLED pixels, it's pixels made of just quantum dots. Note the far fewer layers, which theoretically should mean lower production costs and other benefits.
Since I first got eyeglasses, I dreamed about having a screen built in that could show me info like in a video game. AR glasses have been a thing, but they're bulky, low resolution and, to be perfectly honest, lame. A QD display could be printed on the lenses themselves, requiring less elaborate electronics in the frames. They could look just like regular eyeglasses, but show incoming message info, a video call, maps, or a movie. It's all very cyberpunk.
Pretty much any surface could work like this. I think an obvious early use, despite how annoying it could be, would be bus or subway windows. These will initially be pitched by cities as a way to show people important info, but inevitably they'll be used for advertising. That's certainly not a knock against the tech, just how things work in the world.
The history of CES is littered with advanced prototypes that never came to market, relegated to history and the minds of bald, bespectacled tech journalists. Nanosys has a solid history, and works with the biggest names in the manufacturing world. This is what they've been working towards for years. It was always at the edge of the timeline they'd share every year. When I first met with them several years ago, the first displays with quantum dots were about to hit the market. Now they're everywhere. A few years after that, they talked about adding QD to OLED. Now those are here. QD on its own, direct-view electroluminescent QD, was always their goal. And now it's here.
There are TONS of other directives around it, but the only one that appears to have any bearing just checked if it's defined: #ifndef PROTOTYPE. I found some places in HDF4 header files that do this: #define PROTOTYPE. So, none of that really clear up my question. Still seems pretty useless.
With regard to the "extra" parentheses in the code in the question, they're needed when there is more than one argument in the argument list. Without them, the macro invocation has more than one argument, so won't match a macro defined with just one argument:
The representativeness heuristic is just one type of mental shortcut that allows us to make decisions quickly in the face of uncertainty. While this can lead to quick thinking, it can also lead us to ignore factors that also shape events.
The representativeness heuristic is thought to play a role in racial bias in the criminal justice system. Studies have found that jurors in mock trials are more likely to hand down guilty verdicts to defendants who belong to ethnic minority groups commonly associated in the media with crime.
Justinmind Prototyper provides you with the best design solution to prototype feature-rich mobile apps, websites, web products and/or enterprise applications, and more. Check out our awesome collection of pre-designed widget libraries to start prototyping right away.
The first of these views maintains that concepts are psychologicalentities, taking as its starting point the representational theory ofthe mind (RTM). According to RTM, thinking occurs in an internalsystem of representation. Beliefs and desires and other propositionalattitudes enter into mental processes as internal symbols. Forexample, Sue might believe that Dave is taller than Cathy, and alsobelieve that Cathy is taller than Ben, and together these may causeSue to believe that Dave is taller than Ben. Her beliefs would beconstituted by mental representations that are about Dave, Cathy andBen and their relative heights. What makes these beliefs, as opposedto desires or other psychological states, is that the symbols have thecharacteristic causal-functional role of beliefs. (RTM is usuallypresented as taking beliefs and other propositional attitudes to berelations between an agent and a mental representation (e.g., Fodor1987). But given that the relation in question is a matter of having arepresentation with a particular type of functional role, it issimpler to say that occurrent beliefs just are mental representationswith this functional role.)
The mental representation view of concepts is the default position incognitive science (Carey 2009, Pinker 2007) and enjoys widespreadsupport in the philosophy of mind, particularly among philosophers whoview their work as being aligned with research in cognitive science(e.g., Carruthers 2006, Millikan 2000, Fodor 2003, Margolis &Laurence 2007).[1] Supporters of this view argue for it on explanatory grounds. Theymaintain that concepts and structured mental representations play acrucial role in accounting for the productivity of thought (i.e., thefact that human beings can entertain an unbounded number of thoughts),in explaining how mental processes can be both rational andimplemented in the brain, and in accommodating the need forstructure-sensitive mental processes (Fodor 1987; see also the entry language of thought hypothesis).
Not surprisingly, critics of the abilities view argue in the otherdirection. They note difficulties that the abilities view inherits byits rejection of mental representations. One is that the view isill-equipped to explain the productivity of thought; another is thatit can say little about mental processes. And if proponents of theabilities view remain neutral about the existence of mentalrepresentations, they open themselves to the criticism thatexplication of these abilities is best given in terms of underlyingmental representations and processes (see Fodor 1968 and Chomsky 1980for general discussion of the anti-intellectualist tradition in thephilosophy of mind).
One of the oldest questions about concepts concerns whether there areany innate concepts and, if so, how much of the conceptual system isinnate. Empiricists maintain that there are few if any innate conceptsand that most cognitive capacities are acquired on the basis of a fewrelatively simple general-purpose cognitive mechanisms. Nativists, onthe other hand, maintain that there may be many innate concepts andthat the mind has a great deal of innate differentiation into complexdomain-specific subsystems.
As an example, one of the earliest lines of investigation thatappeared to support traditional nativist conceptions of the mind wasthe study of language (Pinker 1994). Noam Chomsky and his followersargued that language acquisition succeeds even though children areonly exposed to severely limited evidence about the structure of theirlanguage (Chomsky 1967, 1975, 1988; see also Laurence & Margolis2001). Given the way that the final state (e.g., knowledge of English)outstrips the data that are available to children, we can onlypostulate that the human mind brings to language acquisition a complexset of language-specific dispositions. For Chomsky, these dispositionsare grounded in a set of innate principles that constrain all possiblehuman natural languages, viz., universal grammar (see Baker 2001 andRoberts 2017 on universal grammar).
One further issue concerning innate concepts that is in dispute iswhether the very idea of innateness makes sense. A common point amongthose who are skeptical of the notion is the observation that alltraits are dependent upon interactions between genes and theenvironment and that there is no way to fully untangle the two (Elmanet al. 1996, Griffiths 2002; see also Clark 1998 and Marcus 2004, andthe entry on the distinction between innate and acquired characteristics). Nonetheless, there are clear differences between models of the mindwith empiricist leanings and models of the mind with nativistleanings, and the notion of innateness may be thought to earn itsusefulness by marking these differences (Margolis & Laurence(2013). For discussion of different proposals of what innateness issee Ariew (1999), Cowie (1999), Samuels (2002), Mallon & Weinberg(2006), Mameli (2008) and Khalidi (2015).
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