Warfare in Independent Africa

[S. Kritikos]

Folks,

I came across a book that some of you may find interesting:

Warfare in Independent Africa (New Approaches to African History)
By William Reno, Associate Professor of Political Science at
Northwestern University
Pub: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 294p

From the cover:

"This book surveys the history of armed conflict in Africa in the
period since decolonization and independence. The number of
post-independence conflicts in Africa has been considerable, and this
book introduces readers to a comprehensive analysis of their causes
and character. Tracing the evolution of warfare from anti-colonial and
anti-apartheid campaigns to complex conflicts in which factionalized
armies, militias, and rebel groups fight with each other and prey on
non-combatants, it allows the readers a new perspective to understand
violence on the continent. The book is written to appeal not only to
students of history and African politics, but also to experts in the
policy community, the military, and humanitarian agencies."

You can read a review of the book at:

Africa’s Dirty Wars by Jeffrey Gettleman, March 8, 2012
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/08/africas-dirty-wars/

You can download the book at:
http://filepost.com/files/1b6522em/Warfare_in_Independent_Africa.pdf/
[low speed]

Regards
S. (Sam) Kritikos

[Alex Gakuru]

Thanks Sam,

Yesterday we marked 4 year the strange violence erupted here.
Jeffrey Gettleman's name reminded me of my below post.

Regards,

Alex
 

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Alex Gakuru <alexgaku...@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 9:14 PM
Subject: Tribalism in Kenya
To: Alex Gakuru <gak...@gmail.com>


http://africamatters.blogspot.com/2008/01/tribalism-in-kenya.html

In yesterday's New York Times, Aidan Hartley, author of The Zanzibar
Chest, writes in an op-ed of the violence unfolding in Laikipia, in
central Kenya, due north of Nairobi. The conflict there, between the
Pokot and Samburu tribes, isn't new—these groups, like other Nilotic
pastoralists throughout the region, including in Uganda and Sudan,
have a history of reciprocal cattle raiding and interclan feuds. But
today's fighting has been subsumed by the outbreak of bloodshed
throughout the country. From Kisumu in the West to Mombasa in the
East, there have been reports of rioting and ethnic violence ever
since the flawed vote that led to the contested reelection of Mwai
Kibaki. USAID reports 255,000 people have so far been displaced and
486 killed.

"Nobody wants to believe Kenya is a typical African basket case,"
Hartley writes. "Kenyans know only they themselves can prevent fresh
chaos. … The African saying that 'when elephants fight, the grass
suffers' applies tragically."

The post-election turmoil follows campaigns dominated by rhetoric that
was ethnically charged but vacuous. Hartley observes: "In the campaign
rallies I attended, I saw no debate about policies, despite the
country's immense health, education, crime, and poverty problems. The
Big Men arrived by helicopter to address the voters in slums and
forest clearings. When they spoke English for the Western news media's
benefit, they talked of human rights and democracy. But when they
switched to local languages, it was pure venom and ethnic chauvinism."

Much of the media's attention since the violence erupted has been on
its ethnic underpinnings. Comparisons to Rwanda have even been tossed
around. Kibaki, the incumbent, and Raila Odinga, his main opponent
from the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), used the election to pit
the Kikuyu, Kenya's most populous and (marginally) privileged ethnic
bloc, against other populations, such as the Luo, Odinga's tribe. The
main substantive divide was over distribution of wealth and power:
Odinga proposed decentralization—or majimbo (devolution)—and more
reallocation of wealth to underserved populations. This brought him
support from urban youth and the lower classes. But even this plan was
rooted in ethnic resentment—in calling for redistribution, Odinga
appealed to other groups' sense that the Kikuyu are favored by the
government (Kibaki, like Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, is
Kikuyu). In the run-up to the election, Africa Confidential reported,
"More than ever, this election campaign has been about ethnicity and
faith." (Africa Confidential also reported "a growing suspicion within
the Odinga camp that the President's men will play dirty should the
need arise" and that "text messages have been circulating, alleging a
detailed election-rigging plan by the government.")

The Times' coverage of the crisis has painted a particularly dire
picture of the ethnic rift. Jeffrey Gettleman, the paper's reporter in
Kenya, has repeatedly noted the historical proportions of the violence
and the damage it has done to Kenya's image abroad, drawing analogies
to Rwanda's 1994 genocide. On January 2, for instance, in explaining
the "explosion of ethnic violence that is threatening to engulf this
country," which was "last week one of the most stable in Africa," he
quoted a retired professor who said: "It reminds me of Rwanda."

On January 3 he wrote: "Within the span of a week, one of the most
developed, promising countries in Africa has turned into a starter kit
for disaster. Tribal militias are roaming the countryside with rusty
machetes, neighborhoods are pulling apart, and Kenya's economy, one of
the biggest on the continent, is unraveling—with fuel shortages
rippling across East Africa because the roads in Kenya, a regional
hub, are too dangerous to use. Roadblocks set up by armed men,
something synonymous with anarchic Somalia, have cropped up across the
country, in towns on the savannah and in the cramped slums."

On January 7 Gettleman opened his article: "Kenya's privileged tribe
is on the run."

But does Kenya really recall the specter of Rwanda?

Tavia Nyong'o, a professor at NYU, writes in The Nation (the American
magazine, not the Kenyan newspaper) that "the admittedly dire
situation unfolding in Kenya today … is not another Rwanda."

"Calls for peace to prevail cannot sidestep the present chaos, which
has its roots not in 'atavistic tribalism' but in a bold power grab by
a tight clique around the president. True, stifling of legitimate
means of protest has given vent to violent means. But the Western
penchant for 'disaster porn' coverage hasn't shed much light on the
situation, as horrifying images of mayhem and murder inevitably lead
to ill-informed speculations regarding long-suppressed hatreds boiling
to the surface. CNN, for example, described the crisis as taking shape
between a 'majority' and 'minority' tribe. In fact, Kenya is a
polyglot nation of more than thirty different ethnicities, none of
which are a demographic majority. Tribal violence is an effect of the
crisis provoked by the rigged election, not its cause."

In contrast, in Rwanda, an imbalanced ethnic dichotomy saw the Tutsi,
elevated under the colonial power, become an oppressed minority upon
independence and the sudden sea-change of Hutu rule. For decades, the
tensions continually gave way to violence, and massacres in Burundi,
Rwanda's neighbor with the reverse balance of power, would be
reciprocated in Rwanda, and vice versa. In 1990, Tutsi frustration
spawned an insurgency; after four years of war, a thorough peace
process, and finally the promise of democracy, Hutu extremists
carefully orchestrated the mass slaughter of Tutsis throughout the
country in order to preserve the power slipping from their grip.

Kenya shares few of these characteristics. It is much larger and
ethnically diverse than Rwanda, with a history of stability and
relative prosperity. While there are ethnic tensions in Kenya, as
there are throughout much of East Africa, they have rarely effected
large-scale violence; when violence has occurred, it has often been
associated with elections.

But Kenya today does mirror Rwanda 14 years ago in one important way:
violence now, as then, is the direct result of the machinations of
politicians. According to Nyong'o, "Kenyans once looked to Kibaki as
the man who could deliver [democracy, transparency, and
accountability]; their disappointment in him has now turned to
bewildered astonishment and anger that he would let Kenya burn rather
than admit electoral defeat. Ironically, Odinga helped bring Kibaki to
power five years ago by brokering a coalition of regional leaders to
unseat longtime Kenyan strongman Daniel arap Moi. Kibaki chose to
abandon the coalition that put him in the presidency, however, and to
take advantage of the very executive powers he had vowed to curtail."
And Odinga, for his part, waved the flag of majimboism; this might
seem a denunciation of centralized corruption, but, according to
Hartley, "on a local level, majimboism is interpreted another way:
without functioning national institutions, decentralization becomes
synonymous with mob rule. A few months ago a drunken power broker in a
village wagged his finger and declared that after the elections all
'outsiders'—meaning Kikuyus and whites—would be kicked out and their
farms taken."

Even Gettleman notes that, in Nairobi, "people from different tribes
live side by side and often work in the same office. They are aware of
ethnic differences and sometimes joke about them, but it usually does
not go further than that." What has changed today from a month ago is
the passage of a drawn-out and emotionally charged presidential race,
which exploited the latent ethnic prejudices of voters, followed by a
deeply flawed and patently unfair vote that added anger and
frustration to the mix. Kibaki and Odinga stirred up today's violence,
and only they can put it to rest.

Kenya's leaders' inability to hold the common good above their own
thirst for power is infuriating. It has also become a sad cliché in
Africa. One would have hoped that Kenya had risen above such reckless
egoism, but these last couple weeks have washed away the veneer of
inviolability and revealed institutions that are perhaps no stronger
than in Kenya's less exemplary neighbors.

As Hartley concludes, "We can be certain that the violence will simply
worsen the poverty that is itself the root cause of all Kenyan crises.
Already we are seeing layoffs and a potential collapse of the tourism
and agricultural industries. On the political front, perhaps the best
we can hope is that Big Men will reach a deal and the tribes will put
away their machetes and rifles. Then the Western press will trickle
home, content that democracy has been re-established, while the people
of Laikipia return to their daily struggle to survive."

I hope that Kenya's leaders will arrive at a quick settlement that
produces no further violence. In Laikipia, of course, fighting between
the Pokot and Samburu will likely persist, as it had before the
elections, and as it does between other similarly impoverished,
neglected tribes throughout the region. There, and now around the rest
of the country, people will have to return to the slow, painstaking
process of building a stable democracy with a viable economy.

(Ed. Note: We know there has been a gap in content on AM of late—our
New Year's resolution, which we hope won't go the way of most
resolutions, is to redouble our efforts to post consistently.  Sorry
for slacking, but thanks for checking in.  Happy New Year. -Aaron)

Posted by Aaron @ 9:29 AM
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Labels: Democracy, Elections, Ethnic Violence, Kenya
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