Son of Little Joe II
Pat Flannery
Rusty
Little Joe? Hell, those things could launch Hoss Cartwright!
Rusty
John Savard
in part:
>Little Joe? Hell, those things could launch Hoss Cartwright!
The reference is to a series of small rockets used for test launches of
the Mercury and Apollo capsules.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/index.html
http://www.quadibloc.com/index.html
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Rusty
> On 23 Dec 2005 16:15:31 -0800, "Rusty" <reuben...@yahoo.com> wrote,
> in part:
> >Pat Flannery wrote:
> >> The abort system tester for the CEV:
> >> http://www.usspacenews.com/
>
> >Little Joe? Hell, those things could launch Hoss Cartwright!
>
> The reference is to a series of small rockets used for test launches of
> the Mercury and Apollo capsules.
>
Do you mean these?
Flight test of a Little Joe boosted full- scale spacecraft model and
escape system for Project Mercury - May 1, 1962
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19670022650_1967022650.pdf
Program plan - NASA Project Apollo test launch vehicle, Little Joe 2 -
Jun 8, 1962
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790077213_1979077213.pdf
Facilities plan - NASA Project Apollo test launch vehicle, Little Joe 2
- Jun 8, 1962
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790076728_1979076728.pdf
Performance characteristics of the Little Joe launch vehicle - Sep 1,
1962
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19670022649_1967022649.pdf
Preliminary Little Joe 2 launch vehicle interface specification - Sep
30, 1962
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790076761_1979076761.pdf
Lunar logistic system. Volume 7: Testing aspects (Using Little Joe II
to test unmanned lunar logistic landing system on Earth) - Mar 15,
1963
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19780071273_1978071273.pdf
Little Joe II - Algol propulsion system Technical interface control
document - Jul 1, 1963
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19660017474_1966017474.pdf
Apollo spacecraft description manual high dynamic pressure abort (using
Little Joe II) - Jul 1, 1963
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19730065740_1973065740.pdf
LITTLE JOE II PROGRAM TEST DATA BOOK, REVISION C - Sep 15, 1963
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19660017471_1966017471.pdf
Launch vehicle flight report - Nasa project Apollo Little Joe 2
qualification test vehicle 12-50-1 - Sep 27, 1963
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790076764_1979076764.pdf
LITTLE JOE II MOTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FINAL REPORT - OCT 25, 1963
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19660017472_1966017472.pdf
Postlaunch report for Apollo mission A-001 - May 28, 1964
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790076675_1979076675.pdf
Little Joe II test launch vehicle - Dec 16, 1964
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19780070078_1978070078.pdf
Program apollo flight mission directive Apollo mission A-003, BP-22 -
Apr 16, 1965
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790078425_1979078425.pdf
Spacecraft 002 Little Joe 2 launch vehicle performance and interface
specification - Oct 22, 1965
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19790076767_1979076767.pdf
Postlaunch report for Apollo mission A-004 (spacecraft 002) - Apr 15,
1966
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19740073286_1974073286.pdf
Little Joe 2 test launch vehicle NASA Project Apollo. Volume 2 -
Technical summary Final report - May 1, 1966
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19690090094_1969090094.pdf
Static longitudinal aerodynamic characteristics of a hammerhead-shaped
Little Joe II - Lunar module model at Mach 0.30 to 1.20 - Oct 1, 1967
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19670029918_1967029918.pdf
Static longitudinal aerodynamic characteristics of several
configurations used in the development of the Little Joe 2-Apollo test
vehicle at Mach numbers from 0.056 to 4.65 - May 1, 1968
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19680013484_1968013484.pdf
Rusty
Herb Schaltegger
(in article <1135392805.1...@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com>):
> John Savard wrote:
>> On 23 Dec 2005 16:15:31 -0800, "Rusty" <reuben...@yahoo.com> wrote,
>> in part:
>>> Pat Flannery wrote:
>>>> The abort system tester for the CEV:
>>>> http://www.usspacenews.com/
>>
>>> Little Joe? Hell, those things could launch Hoss Cartwright!
>>
>> The reference is to a series of small rockets used for test launches of
>> the Mercury and Apollo capsules.
>>
>
> Do you mean these?
>
(snip)
Yeah, I think John Savard needs a new Usenet humor detector, Rusty. :-)
--
Herb
There ain't no such thing as a free lunch.
~ RAH
Pat Flannery
John Savard wrote:
>
>>Little Joe? Hell, those things could launch Hoss Cartwright!
>>
>>
>
>The reference is to a series of small rockets used for test launches of
>the Mercury and Apollo capsules.
>
>
>
>
I'm pretty sure Rusty knows that...in fact, I'm pretty sure Rusty knows
about 10 or so pdf's about the vehicle. :-)
Pat
Pat Flannery
Rusty wrote:
>>>Little Joe? Hell, those things could launch Hoss Cartwright!
>>>
>>>
>>The reference is to a series of small rockets used for test launches of
>>the Mercury and Apollo capsules.
>>
>>
>>
>
>Do you mean these?
>
>
Yup- saw that one coming a mile off. :-D
Pat
Rusty
I made the Hoss joke before I scrolled down to see that NASA is really
labeling the CEV test rocket "Hoss".
I wonder if China tested the Shenzhou on the "Hop Sing"?
Rusty
Rusty
The vehicle using the 2-segment RSRM probably would not have roll
control. Wouldn't they have to add the roll control package designed
for the full "Stick" or large fins?
Rusty
Pat Flannery
Rusty wrote:
>I made the Hoss joke before I scrolled down to see that NASA is really
>labeling the CEV test rocket "Hoss".
>
>
>
>
I'm keen to see if they go with a full-auto abort system, or a combo
manual/auto abort system like Apollo had.
I'd go full-auto, at least during the SRB burn, due to the speed with
which solids can catastrophically fail.
Pat
Pat Flannery
Rusty wrote:
>
>The vehicle using the 2-segment RSRM probably would not have roll
>control. Wouldn't they have to add the roll control package designed
>for the full "Stick" or large fins?
>
>
Scott Lowther will have to talk to them again. :-)
"That's right! We do need that roll control thingy, don't we?"
Still, it's better than SpaceX and their "LOX?! I thought you brought
the LOX....did anybody bring some LOX?" scenario from that static test.
I've got very serious doubts about that whole company.
Pat
John Savard
in part:
>Do you mean these?
Why, yes. So you were just joking, as I thought...
John Savard
<herb.sch...@NOSPAMgmail.com.INVALID> wrote, in part:
>Yeah, I think John Savard needs a new Usenet humor detector, Rusty. :-)
Sometimes, a literal response is the best way to go along with a joke...
Kevin Willoughby
says...
> I'd go full-auto, at least during the SRB burn, due to the speed with
> which solids can catastrophically fail.
"Uh-ho". That's the last word of astronaut Michael Smith on the final
flight of Space Shuttle Challenger.
If he had an abort button, perhaps he'd still be alive...
--
Kevin Willoughby kevinwi...@acm.org.invalid
In this country, we produce more students with university degrees
in sports management than we do in engineering. - Dean Kamen
Pat Flannery
Kevin Willoughby wrote:
>"Uh-ho". That's the last word of astronaut Michael Smith on the final
>flight of Space Shuttle Challenger.
>
>If he had an abort button, perhaps he'd still be alive...
>
>
The original Shuttle design had burn-through sensors on the SRBs and
twin solid fuel abort motors mounted on the aft of the orbiter to allow
it to blast itself free from the malfunctioning stack. These were
dropped to keep costs down.
Washington Monthly magazine had an article about the Shuttle in 1980
that correctly predicted the Challenger and Columbia accidents due to
lack of safety in its design:
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/8004.easterbrook-fulltext.html
"Here's the plan. Suppose one of the solid-fueled boosters fails. The
plan is, you die. Solid rockets can fail in two ways. They can explode;
enough said. Or they can shut down spontaneously. If a booster shuts
down, there will be 2.5 million pounds of thrust on one side battling
zero pounds on the other. Even a split second of this imbalance will
send the ship twisting into oblivion, overriding any application of
pilot skill.
Suppose one of the shuttle's three main engines fails. You have a
fighting chance. You blow the boosters off. Then, using the throttles on
the remaining engines, you try to turn the beast around. It's screaming
and trembling, a vicious wounded animal. There's that damn fuel tank
hanging there, and it has all the aerodynamic grace of the Temple of
Karnak. But it's got the fuel. Ditch it and you've got no engines.
If you get twisted back around toward the Cape, you blow the fuel tank
off and glide home. If the beast is too badly wounded to land, but you
can slow it down to a few hundred m.p.h. before you splat into the
water, you're okay. At that speed you can eject.
But you're in luck--the launch goes fine. Once you get into space, you
check to see if any tiles are damaged. If enough are, you have a choice
between Plan A and Plan B. Plan A is hope they can get a rescue shuttle
up in time. Plan B is burn up coming back."
The article also talks about the skewered Mathmatica cost estimates for
operating the Shuttle.
To anyone who really looked at it, the thing was a known lemon even
before its first flight.
Pat
Jorge R. Frank
news:11qt6h8...@corp.supernews.com:
> Kevin Willoughby wrote:
>
>>"Uh-ho". That's the last word of astronaut Michael Smith on the final
>>flight of Space Shuttle Challenger.
>>
>>If he had an abort button, perhaps he'd still be alive...
>
> The original Shuttle design had burn-through sensors on the SRBs and
> twin solid fuel abort motors mounted on the aft of the orbiter to
> allow it to blast itself free from the malfunctioning stack. These
> were dropped to keep costs down.
You're not giving the complete answer here. The abort SRMs were also
deleted because they would only provide meaningful escape capability for
about 30 seconds out of the 8.5 minute ascent profile. It was too much
money for too little increase in safety.
--
JRF
Reply-to address spam-proofed - to reply by E-mail,
check "Organization" (I am not assimilated) and
think one step ahead of IBM.
Pat Flannery
Jorge R. Frank wrote:
>You're not giving the complete answer here. The abort SRMs were also
>deleted because they would only provide meaningful escape capability for
>about 30 seconds out of the 8.5 minute ascent profile. It was too much
>money for too little increase in safety.
>
>
>
Of course you would only need them for the duration of the SRB burn-
which is two minutes three seconds (till jettison), as after that you
can shut down the SSMEs, drop the ET, and bail out via the escape pole*
as the Shuttle heads into the Atlantic or do a RTLS type abort using the
orbiter's engines to turn the vehicle around and decelerate it (I'll
believe that will work the first time they actually do it). So that the
thirty seconds does mean that you now have a 25% increase in
survivability for the part of the flight where the abort engines would
be used.
It would be interesting to know what they had in mind for those abort
engines- were they to be original designs or some sort of existing
solids off of a missile program? Assuming that you ditched them shortly
after SRB burnout they wouldn't eat that much into the overall orbital
payload.
* I'll also believe that will work the first time they do it...at the
very least the orbiter should have been equipped with ejection seats for
all of its crew.
Jorge R. Frank
@corp.supernews.com:
> Jorge R. Frank wrote:
>
>>You're not giving the complete answer here. The abort SRMs were also
>>deleted because they would only provide meaningful escape capability for
>>about 30 seconds out of the 8.5 minute ascent profile. It was too much
>>money for too little increase in safety.
>
> Of course you would only need them for the duration of the SRB burn-
> which is two minutes three seconds (till jettison), as after that you
> can shut down the SSMEs, drop the ET, and bail out via the escape pole*
> as the Shuttle heads into the Atlantic or do a RTLS type abort using the
> orbiter's engines to turn the vehicle around and decelerate it (I'll
> believe that will work the first time they actually do it). So that the
> thirty seconds does mean that you now have a 25% increase in
> survivability for the part of the flight where the abort engines would
> be used.
Still far too expensive for only a 25% increase in first-stage
survivability (actually less than that... in order for it to be 25%, you
would have to assume that the abort SRMs would be 100% effective... which
they most assuredly would not have been, not even close).
> It would be interesting to know what they had in mind for those abort
> engines- were they to be original designs or some sort of existing
> solids off of a missile program? Assuming that you ditched them shortly
> after SRB burnout they wouldn't eat that much into the overall orbital
> payload.
Actually, it was planned that they would "pay for themselves", payload-
wise, by firing them during the *nominal* second stage on every flight.
> * I'll also believe that will work the first time they do it...at the
> very least the orbiter should have been equipped with ejection seats for
> all of its crew.
Not terribly practical, given the orbiter's two-deck design. You'd either
have to reduce the crew to flight-deck-only, or you'd wind up giving up
most of the usable space on the middeck (the seats and rails would have to
be permanently installed). And in either case, you'd wind up making the aft
flight deck unusable due to the space taken up by the seats and rails.
Given the marginal increase in survivability, they're not worth it either.
Pat Flannery
Jorge R. Frank wrote:
>
>Still far too expensive for only a 25% increase in first-stage
>survivability (actually less than that... in order for it to be 25%, you
>would have to assume that the abort SRMs would be 100% effective... which
>they most assuredly would not have been, not even close).
>
>
No escape system is 100% effective, but that doesn't stop us from
putting ejection seats in our military aircraft.
Even the X-15 had an ejection seat, although its performance meant its
used would be very problematical during most of its flight profile.
>
>
>>It would be interesting to know what they had in mind for those abort
>>engines- were they to be original designs or some sort of existing
>>solids off of a missile program? Assuming that you ditched them shortly
>>after SRB burnout they wouldn't eat that much into the overall orbital
>>payload.
>>
>>
>
>Actually, it was planned that they would "pay for themselves", payload-
>wise, by firing them during the *nominal* second stage on every flight.
>
>
In that case they would have been a worthwhile addition given the
improved safety factor; the Shuttle is a classic case of "if you can't
do it right on the budget you have, then don't do it at all." and the
added abort motors and burn-through sensors wouldn't have added that
much as a fraction of its overall cost.
>
>
>>* I'll also believe that will work the first time they do it...at the
>>very least the orbiter should have been equipped with ejection seats for
>>all of its crew.
>>
>>
>
>Not terribly practical, given the orbiter's two-deck design. You'd either
>have to reduce the crew to flight-deck-only,
>
It should have been designed with all the crew on the main flight deck;
in fact it should have been designed with all the crew in something
similar to the CEV reentry capsule that had the ability to separate from
the vehicle during ascent, or on-orbit with an independent reentry
capability.
This capsule could be quite small and cramped, but use a hatch in its
heatshield ala Blue Gemini or the Soviet VA capsule to allow the crew to
enter their living and work quarters once they were on-orbit.
Incorporating such a ballistic escape/reentry capsule into a winged
reentry vehicle is possible, as the Soviet Spiral spaceplane design
shows: http://www.buran.ru/htm/str126.htm
> or you'd wind up giving up
>most of the usable space on the middeck (the seats and rails would have to
>be permanently installed). And in either case, you'd wind up making the aft
>flight deck unusable due to the space taken up by the seats and rails.
>Given the marginal increase in survivability, they're not worth it either.
>
>
This should have been designed in from the word go, not be contemplated
as a modification to the existing design.
In the case of Challenger, we know some of the crew survived the
initial vehicle break-up and were conscious for a time, as they
activated their own or some of the other crew's PEAPs (three of four
recovered PEAPs were activated):
http://www.space-shuttle.com/challenger1.htm
With full pressure suits and ejection seats some might well of survived
the loss of the Challenger.
Pat
Jorge R. Frank
> Jorge R. Frank wrote:
>
>>
>>Still far too expensive for only a 25% increase in first-stage
>>survivability (actually less than that... in order for it to be 25%,
>>you would have to assume that the abort SRMs would be 100%
>>effective... which they most assuredly would not have been, not even
>>close).
>
> No escape system is 100% effective, but that doesn't stop us from
> putting ejection seats in our military aircraft.
The ejection envelope of a military aircraft covers a much larger
percentage of its flight envelope than is the case with a spacecraft like
the shuttle, and therefore the improvement in survivability is much
higher.
A less-than-25% increase in shuttle first-stage survivability equates to
a less-than-6% increase in flight survivability, once you factor in that
first-stage risk is about half the ascent risk, which in turn is about
half the total flight risk. I can just about guarantee you that if
ejection seats improved military aircraft survivability by less than 6%,
the military wouldn't use them.
> Even the X-15 had an ejection seat, although its performance meant its
> used would be very problematical during most of its flight profile.
As is the case with military aircraft, the X-15 spent a much larger
percentage of flight time (and flight risk) within the ejection envelope
and many of the early test flights never even exceeded the ejection
envelope, so including the seats made sense, even though they were pretty
much useless (as you acknowledge) in the altitude/speed test flights. The
seats certainly did Michael Adams no good.
>>>* I'll also believe that will work the first time they do it...at the
>>>very least the orbiter should have been equipped with ejection seats
>>>for all of its crew.
>>
>>Not terribly practical, given the orbiter's two-deck design. You'd
>>either have to reduce the crew to flight-deck-only,
>
> It should have been designed with all the crew on the main flight
> deck; in fact it should have been designed with all the crew in
> something similar to the CEV reentry capsule that had the ability to
> separate from the vehicle during ascent, or on-orbit with an
> independent reentry capability.
> This capsule could be quite small and cramped, but use a hatch in its
> heatshield ala Blue Gemini or the Soviet VA capsule to allow the crew
> to enter their living and work quarters once they were on-orbit.
> Incorporating such a ballistic escape/reentry capsule into a winged
> reentry vehicle is possible, as the Soviet Spiral spaceplane design
> shows: http://www.buran.ru/htm/str126.htm
Note that this page identifies Spiral as a predecessor to Buran, and that
Buran did *not* incorporate this system. Most likely because the Russians
discovered the same thing NASA did: that incorporating a capsule escape
system inside a spacecraft is expensive to develop, adds lots of weight,
adds almost as many new failure modes as it mitigates, and in the end
doesn't add enough safety to be worth the expense and operational
drawbacks.
> In the case of Challenger, we know some of the crew survived the
> initial vehicle break-up and were conscious for a time, as they
> activated their own or some of the other crew's PEAPs (three of four
> recovered PEAPs were activated):
> http://www.space-shuttle.com/challenger1.htm
> With full pressure suits and ejection seats some might well of
> survived the loss of the Challenger.
"well of"?
Arguably, you don't need the ejection seats, just pressure suits and
parachutes (which shuttle crews since Challenger have had). The
Challenger crew cabin stabilized nose-down not long after the breakup,
according to the film evidence; the crew could have blown open the side
hatch and overhead windows and egressed that way.
Pat Flannery
Jorge R. Frank wrote:
>
>The ejection envelope of a military aircraft covers a much larger
>percentage of its flight envelope than is the case with a spacecraft like
>the shuttle, and therefore the improvement in survivability is much
>higher.
>
>A less-than-25% increase in shuttle first-stage survivability equates to
>a less-than-6% increase in flight survivability, once you factor in that
>first-stage risk is about half the ascent risk, which in turn is about
>half the total flight risk. I can just about guarantee you that if
>ejection seats improved military aircraft survivability by less than 6%,
>the military wouldn't use them.
>
>
But this presupposes that you can predict the failure modes of the
Shuttle. In the case of the Challenger, I think most engineers would
have been very surprised with how intact the crew compartment was after
the catastrophic failure of the vehicle, and the fact that at least some
of the astronauts survived the break-up and were able to activate the
PEAPs after it occurred. If they could do that, they certainly could
have activated their ejection seats, particularly if they had been
wearing full pressure suits as they did on the first flights and do now.
In the case of Columbia, the presence of ejection seats would have made
no difference to the crew's fate, but if the foam impact had occurred
aft of the wing leading edge as NASA thought it had, then one can see a
scenario in which the tiles could have been damaged enough to compromise
the vehicle's integrity during reentry but left it intact enough that
the crew could have ejected after it reached a low enough altitude and
speed for that to be survivable. Certainly it expands the survival
envelope over the one where they have to get out of their seats and head
for the side hatch if the vehicle is in a situation where it is not
fully controllable (with the side hatch option and a aerodynamically
compromised vehicle the poor pilot ends up holding everything together
as the rest of the crew leaves and then probably buys the farm himself.)
Even a aerodynamic break-up of the vehicle late enough in the descent
might leave the crew compartment fairly intact like in the case of
Challenger, and still allow a viable option for ejection.
>>Even the X-15 had an ejection seat, although its performance meant its
>>used would be very problematical during most of its flight profile.
>>
>>
>
>As is the case with military aircraft, the X-15 spent a much larger
>percentage of flight time (and flight risk) within the ejection envelope
>and many of the early test flights never even exceeded the ejection
>envelope, so including the seats made sense, even though they were pretty
>much useless (as you acknowledge) in the altitude/speed test flights. The
>seats certainly did Michael Adams no good.
>
>
Reentering the atmosphere sideways is a no-win situation; I always found
it odd that the X-15 didn't have a separable nose section like the X-2
had, given its performance and altitude capabilities. The X-2 experience
may have soured designers on the escape capsule approach, but if Mel Apt
had had regained consciousness only a few seconds sooner he might have
been able to successfully leave the capsule and parachute down to safety
(he was halfway out of the capsule as it hit the ground).
>>
>>It should have been designed with all the crew on the main flight
>>deck; in fact it should have been designed with all the crew in
>>something similar to the CEV reentry capsule that had the ability to
>>separate from the vehicle during ascent, or on-orbit with an
>>independent reentry capability.
>>This capsule could be quite small and cramped, but use a hatch in its
>>heatshield ala Blue Gemini or the Soviet VA capsule to allow the crew
>>to enter their living and work quarters once they were on-orbit.
>>Incorporating such a ballistic escape/reentry capsule into a winged
>>reentry vehicle is possible, as the Soviet Spiral spaceplane design
>>shows: http://www.buran.ru/htm/str126.htm
>>
>>
>
>Note that this page identifies Spiral as a predecessor to Buran, and that
>Buran did *not* incorporate this system. Most likely because the Russians
>discovered the same thing NASA did: that incorporating a capsule escape
>system inside a spacecraft is expensive to develop, adds lots of weight,
>adds almost as many new failure modes as it mitigates, and in the end
>doesn't add enough safety to be worth the expense and operational
>drawbacks.
>
>
They did incorporate ejection seats though, and they were usable from a
on-pad abort through the early phases of ascent and after reentry
through landing: http://www.buran.ru/htm/katapu.htm
As to what the final layout of the Buran's crew escape system would have
been is anyone's guess, but considering how blindly they were emulating
the Shuttle they might have ended up the same way it did, although
Challenger probably gave them pause in this regard.
The Energia core stage did apparently have three solid fuel rockets to
blow it away from the orbiter mounted above the orbiter itself in the
space between the LOX and LH2 tanks:
http://www.buran.ru/images/jpg/bbur71.jpg
Of course with Buran you could shut down the boosters (unlike the
Shuttle), although it also rides its core stage back down like the
Shuttle RTLS scenario: http://www.buran.ru/images/jpg/odu2.jpg
>
>
>> In the case of Challenger, we know some of the crew survived the
>>initial vehicle break-up and were conscious for a time, as they
>>activated their own or some of the other crew's PEAPs (three of four
>>recovered PEAPs were activated):
>>http://www.space-shuttle.com/challenger1.htm
>>With full pressure suits and ejection seats some might well of
>>survived the loss of the Challenger.
>>
>>
>
>"well of"?
>
>Arguably, you don't need the ejection seats, just pressure suits and
>parachutes (which shuttle crews since Challenger have had). The
>Challenger crew cabin stabilized nose-down not long after the breakup,
>according to the film evidence; the crew could have blown open the side
>hatch and overhead windows and egressed that way.
>
>
They'd be basically weightless and floating around the cabin with no
easy hand and footholds and wouldn't have had training for that
scenario; they also would have had to put their parachutes on (assuming
that they weren't attached to their pressure suits) and their bulky
pressure suits would have made movement and egress difficult.
Reaching down and pulling the ejection rings would have been far simpler
in an emergency situation. That you can do while tumbling end over end
while still strapped into your seat.
Pat
Dave Michelson
>
> But this presupposes that you can predict the failure modes of the
> Shuttle. In the case of the Challenger, I think most engineers would
> have been very surprised with how intact the crew compartment was
Had the engineers seen how the the strongly built crew compartment
pressure vessel is delicately mounted on a couple of support points
within a rather fragile aluminum frame, they shouldn't have been
surprised.
Even in the case of Columbia, I would assume that the pressure vessel
broke up some time after the rest of the vehicle disintegrated. While
aerodynamic forces destroyed the orbiter, it likely took re-entry
heating to cause the crew compartment pressure vessel to fail.
--
Dave Michelson
da...@ece.ubc.ca
hal...@aol.com
pressure vessel is delicately mounted on a couple of support points
within a rather fragile aluminum frame, they shouldn't have been
surprised.
Even in the case of Columbia, I would assume that the pressure vessel
broke up some time after the rest of the vehicle disintegrated. While
aerodynamic forces destroyed the orbiter, it likely took re-entry
heating to cause the crew compartment pressure vessel to fail.
--
Dave Michelson
The crew compartment was originally designed to be jettisonable in a
emergency, and after they decided to not support this no attempt was
made to change the strength of the crew compartment, thats why is
survived so long after both accidents
Ed Kyle
The crew compartment was never designed to be jettisonable.
NASA ruled that idea out in 1971, after Rockwell did a study
that showed a separable crew compartment would add
6.4 tonnes to the design and cost $300 million ($1.4 billion
today) to develop. That was a year before Nixon approved the
space shuttle project - well before any metal was bent.
- Ed Kyle
Michael Gallagher
wrote:
>The abort system tester for the CEV:
>http://www.usspacenews.com/
>
looks cool; thanks for the update.
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Henry Spencer
Pat Flannery <fla...@daktel.com> wrote:
>Reentering the atmosphere sideways is a no-win situation; I always found
>it odd that the X-15 didn't have a separable nose section like the X-2
Scott Crossfield, the first X-15 pilot (who expected, incorrectly as it
turned out, to be doing a lot of the envelope-expansion flights),
campaigned against it, partly because his earlier work on the Skyrocket
(aka D-558-2) had convinced him that separable noses were themselves
almost suicidally risky to use.
It's interesting to note that when ESA decided that Hermes had to have an
escape system, they too ended up specifying ejection seats... and that
ESA's astronauts were openly opposed to the whole idea.
--
spsystems.net is temporarily off the air; | Henry Spencer
mail to henry at zoo.utoronto.ca instead. | he...@spsystems.net
Pat Flannery
Henry Spencer wrote:
>
>Scott Crossfield, the first X-15 pilot (who expected, incorrectly as it
>turned out, to be doing a lot of the envelope-expansion flights),
>campaigned against it, partly because his earlier work on the Skyrocket
>(aka D-558-2) had convinced him that separable noses were themselves
>almost suicidally risky to use.
>
>
The big problem was that every different aircraft needed a different
design jettisonable nose, so you never could get any real experience
with any particular one- unlike ejection sats which could be used in
multiple types of aircraft. (although that wasn't the case in early
ejection seats which tended to be made by the same company that made the
aircraft and designed specifically for it.) I'm trying to track down the
first aircraft that was equipped with a jettisonable nose; it may have
been the German DFS 228 rocket-powered reconnaissance plane:
http://www.luft46.com/prototyp/dfs228.html
>It's interesting to note that when ESA decided that Hermes had to have an
>escape system, they too ended up specifying ejection seats... and that
>ESA's astronauts were openly opposed to the whole idea.
>
>
The ejection seats lacked the elan vitale and clashed with the cockpit
decor no doubt. :-)
Considering the weight problems that Hermes ran into, the astronauts
probably thought that they were lucky to have seats, much less ejection
seats, rather than slings to sit in. Something about an ESA spationaut
putting their ass into a sling is unappealing.
Pat
Mike Lorrey
Henry Spencer wrote:
>
> Scott Crossfield, the first X-15 pilot (who expected, incorrectly as it
> turned out, to be doing a lot of the envelope-expansion flights),
> campaigned against it, partly because his earlier work on the Skyrocket
> (aka D-558-2) had convinced him that separable noses were themselves
> almost suicidally risky to use.
>
> It's interesting to note that when ESA decided that Hermes had to have an
> escape system, they too ended up specifying ejection seats... and that
> ESA's astronauts were openly opposed to the whole idea.
Having worked on the F-111D, which had a capsule system rather than
ejection seats, and having seen one D model in my unit crash due to
hydraulic failure while flying nape of the earth (200' off the deck)
around Truth Or Consequences, NM, with a successful cabin capsule
ejection and full crew recovery, I don't think that cabin capsules are
inherently bad. They certainly are useful for vehicles spending time
above 50,000 ft if they suffer major failures that could quickly result
in fire or explosions in the air, and protect the crew against the
elements without having to work in pressure suit environments (not at
all fun). The 111's capsule was not the whole nose, though, just the
crew cabin, though it is interesting that on deployment, the cabin
deployed flaps from its trailing edges and was shaped to rougly mimic a
rather faceted airfoil shape, and so could 'fly' a little until
parachutes deployed, at least enough to maneuver away from the rest of
the aircraft at high speed.