See-Bassett accident - conflicting info?
Michael Venturino
details of Elliot See's fatal landing approach to Lambert Field in St. Louis
in February 1966.
Deke Slayton, in his book "Deke!" states (p. 167): "Elliot was flying and
must have realized he was coming in too low and slow to reach the runway."
Gene Cernan, in his book "Last Man on the Moon" says "Elliot had
miscalculated the approach and we were high, fast, and too far along the
runway..." (p. 98).
In attempting to resolve this conflicting information, one might tend to
favor Cernan's perspective since he was there. Perhaps, after so many
years, Slayton didn't remember the details accurately?
Any opinions?
OM
<vent...@rochester.rr.com> wrote:
>In attempting to resolve this conflicting information, one might tend to
>favor Cernan's perspective since he was there. Perhaps, after so many
>years, Slayton didn't remember the details accurately?
>
>Any opinions?
...Yeah, give CT a day or so, and he'll roll it into his bullshit
Armstrong Conspiracy theory.
Geo, come back. All is forgiven!
OM
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David Sander
Colin Burgess' up-and-coming book on fallen astronauts covers the crash
at St Louis in astonishing scope and detail. I would recommend reading
it when it comes out to get a clear picture on this very unfortunate incident.
David
OM
<sur...@bigpond.net.au> wrote:
>Colin Burgess' up-and-coming book on fallen astronauts covers the crash
>at St Louis in astonishing scope and detail. I would recommend reading
>it when it comes out to get a clear picture on this very unfortunate incident.
...Gee, Colin - how about a publication target date for this one? Some
of us would like to plan our budgets ahead a bit. Especially if you're
going to include Boris :-)
Stuf4
"...Yeah, give CT a day or so, and he'll roll it into
his...Armstrong...theory."
Perhaps you are remembering the time where I already discussed this
topic. I believe it was spun off some credibility issue (story about
Slayton's version of Cernan's chopper crash?) where I questioned what
the odds were that See/Bassett's T-38 would impact the very building
that they were coming to visit. I remember stating something to the
effect that I would not be surprised if it were revealed that
showboating had been a factor in the crash.
There is no doubt in my mind that accident reports do get "sanitized".
Cernan's own account of his helicopter crash in 'Last Man on the
Moon' make that clear.
(Perhaps the most striking case is the accident of Jan '82 where an
entire formation of Thunderbirds flew straight into the ground. The
original accident report is said to have cited "pilot error" but was
kicked back by Gen Bill Creech who was quoted as saying something like
"the Thunderbirds do not make errors".)
Of the two conflicting reports of See and Bassett's crash, I can only
guess which is more accurate. I would really like to hear from
someone who witnessed the incident (I don't think Cernan actually saw
the crash - the formation had split so they could fly their own
approach). But here are my thoughts on the two statements:
>> Deke Slayton, in his book "Deke!" states (p. 167): "Elliot was
flying and
must have realized he was coming in too low and slow to reach the
runway."
The T-38 has afterburners. I am certain Elliot See knew how to use
them. "Too low and slow" does not explain the crash to me at all.
>> Gene Cernan, in his book "Last Man on the Moon" says "Elliot had
miscalculated the approach and we were high, fast, and too far along
the
runway..." (p. 98).
This comment might explain a crash that happened on the runway itself,
but the jet impacted the McDonnell Douglas building where their Gemini
capsule was waiting for them. I have been to Lambert Field and have
seen how far offset the McDonnell Douglas area is from the runway. I
don't see how being high, fast or too far down the runway could have
been a causal factor for any jet that would crash into the plant.
I have not heard any explanations of their crash that have been
totally convincing for me.
*
While we are on the topic of NASA T-38 crashes, I made a comment a
while back of how this was the leading cause of death for astronauts
right up to January 1986. I am amazed how an aircraft that brand new
Air Force pilots fly around fairly well could prove to be so fatal to
the astronaut corps. The official reports of how See/Bassett, Freeman
and Williams have long puzzled me.
Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
incentive to stay with the aircraft.
And what exactly happened to CC? All military pilots are trained to
recognize symptoms of hypoxia. I would think that with all of the
altitude chamber work that an astronaut goes through, they would be
much more aware of the problem.
~ CT
John Geenty
> them. "Too low and slow" does not explain the crash to me at all.
If you read on Deke actually states that when Elliot realized he was coming
in to slow and low (since the poor weather prevented a good view until too
late) he did lit the afterburners to start moving round for another circuit
but didn't gain altitude fast enough and hit the building. The full quote
is;
"Elliot was flying and must have realized he was coming in too low and slow
to reach the runway. He hit the afterburner in order to go around and try
again, but turned right into a building near the airport."
I grant it doesn't explain why the crash happened or how a pilot like See
got into trouble like that, but Deke does make it clear in the full quote
that See did use his afterburners.
> While we are on the topic of NASA T-38 crashes, I made a comment a
> while back of how this was the leading cause of death for astronauts
> right up to January 1986. I am amazed how an aircraft that brand new
> Air Force pilots fly around fairly well could prove to be so fatal to
> the astronaut corps. The official reports of how See/Bassett, Freeman
> and Williams have long puzzled me.
How many astronauts died in T38 crashes between 1962 and 1986? Three crashes
over a period of 24 years sounds pretty good to me, and only one was due to
mechnaical failure (CC Williams). I have never read of an astronaut
critising the T38, they all seem to really like the aircraft. And
considering how many flights were flown over that 24 year period I think its
a pretty good safety record.
> Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
> The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
> incentive to stay with the aircraft.
Apparently the bird strike caused debris to enter both engines but they
continued to operate for a few seconds, possibly giving Freeman the feeling
he could land the aircraft and he made a turn to the Northwest. The engines
cut and the aircraft started to drop lower. After a few more seconds Freeman
did decide to eject, but by this time the aircraft was nose down and he
ejected sideways instead of up. The parachute did not have time to deploy
from such a position and he died on impact with the ground. I believe Deke
was one of the first to the scene and they found Ted still in his chair with
the chute unopened.
> And what exactly happened to CC? All military pilots are trained to
> recognize symptoms of hypoxia. I would think that with all of the
> altitude chamber work that an astronaut goes through, they would be
> much more aware of the problem.
From what I've read nobody actually knows what caused the crash that
involved CC Williams. But he was flying a new aircraft (less than 50 hours
on it) and the investigation resulted in the cause being named as mechanical
failure, since his controls locked up on him. He was in total control of the
situation, called a mayday and seemed calm enough. He again ejected too low.
It sounds to me a lot like very good pilots convinced that they can get
themselves out of any situation and only realizing too late they should bail
out. Take Deke Slayton putting a T38 into a flat spin during the ASTP
training, he didn't seem to consider ejecting from the aircraft and
recovered with plenty of time. But if he couldn't have recovered, he would
probably have been too low by the time he did finally decide to eject.
Overconfidence because they all think they can get themselves out of
trouble.
But I agree some more research into the crashes would be welcome, I can't
wait for the book to come out.
Richard Kaszeta
> And what exactly happened to CC? All military pilots are trained to
> recognize symptoms of hypoxia. I would think that with all of the
> altitude chamber work that an astronaut goes through, they would be
> much more aware of the problem.
I hadn't previously heard of hypoxia being an issue in that crash (my
books all mention likely mechanical failure and waiting too long to
bail out), but hypoxia, especially rapid-onset hypoxia, can *very*
hard for the person undergoing it to recognize, even if they are aware
and trained in it. Indeed, most people who've been in a hypobaric
chamber (myself included) report a surprising drop in mental
function before they realize it, unless something forces it to their
attention (like being asked to count, solve simple math problems, etc).
[1] Similarly with hyperbaric work and nitrogen narcosis---you can
have seriously impaired judgment fast enough that you don't realize
your judgment is impaired.
--
Richard W Kaszeta
ri...@kaszeta.org
http://www.kaszeta.org/rich
LooseChanj
news:y6xn164...@bofh.me.umn.edu...
> [1] Similarly with hyperbaric work and nitrogen narcosis---you can
> have seriously impaired judgment fast enough that you don't realize
> your judgment is impaired.
We've probably all seen this, but for those that haven't:
http://www.rense.com/politics6/ignorancebliss_p.htm
"The skills required for competence are the same skills necessary for
recognizing it", is the main point. So losing your facilities also means
you're not going to be able to recognize the fact.
--
Failure is not an option. It's bundled with
the software.
J. Steven York
On 16 Jul 2001 09:03:10 -0700, tdad...@yahoo.com (Stuf4) wrote:
>There is no doubt in my mind that accident reports do get "sanitized".
> Cernan's own account of his helicopter crash in 'Last Man on the
>Moon' make that clear.
J. Steven York - www.sff.net/people/j-steven-york - Writer
Generation X Novels: Crossroads, Genogoths
Bolo, Old Guard (Now in stores, from Baen Books)
Stuf4
> Okay, what's the real dirt on this one?
> >There is no doubt in my mind that accident reports do get "sanitized".
> > Cernan's own account of his helicopter crash in 'Last Man on the
> >Moon' make that clear.
Cernan tells how Slayton tried to persuade him to make up a story that
his helicopter crashed due to engine failure as opposed to pilot
error.
One head nod away from a sanitized report.
~ CT
Stuf4
> I hadn't previously heard of hypoxia being an issue in that crash (my
> books all mention likely mechanical failure and waiting too long to
> bail out)
I don't remember where I read that. But it speculated that a hose
came unplugged or something like that. Maybe they were guessing that
it was a compound problem with the mechanical failure. I don't know.
I am also eagerly awaiting to hear what Colin has to say.
~ CT
Stuf4
> > The T-38 has afterburners. I am certain Elliot See knew how to use
> > them. "Too low and slow" does not explain the crash to me at all.
>
> If you read on Deke actually states that when Elliot realized he was coming
> in to slow and low (since the poor weather prevented a good view until too
> late) he did lit the afterburners to start moving round for another circuit
> but didn't gain altitude fast enough and hit the building. The full quote
> is;
>
> "Elliot was flying and must have realized he was coming in too low and slow
> to reach the runway. He hit the afterburner in order to go around and try
> again, but turned right into a building near the airport."
>
> I grant it doesn't explain why the crash happened or how a pilot like See
> got into trouble like that, but Deke does make it clear in the full quote
> that See did use his afterburners.
We should probably also point out that we don't really know if the
front seater or back seater was flying. Most everyone seems to fault
See for the incident, but even if Bassett wasn't on the controls at
the time, there is a lot that he could have done. Maybe Bassett lit
the burners.
It will be interesting to learn Colin's analysis. I hope he covers
Lawrence's crash, too.
> > While we are on the topic of NASA T-38 crashes, I made a comment a
> > while back of how this was the leading cause of death for astronauts
> > right up to January 1986. I am amazed how an aircraft that brand new
> > Air Force pilots fly around fairly well could prove to be so fatal to
> > the astronaut corps. The official reports of how See/Bassett, Freeman
> > and Williams have long puzzled me.
>
> How many astronauts died in T38 crashes between 1962 and 1986? Three crashes
> over a period of 24 years sounds pretty good to me, and only one was due to
> mechnaical failure (CC Williams). I have never read of an astronaut
> critising the T38, they all seem to really like the aircraft. And
> considering how many flights were flown over that 24 year period I think its
> a pretty good safety record.
If you wind the clock back to the time of CC's crash, NASA's T-38
safety record was atrocious. Yes, I'm sure the astronauts are quite
fond of getting to fly a fighter-type aircraft as their private jet.
I think the safety record today can be attributed to how restrictive
NASA has gotten with their T-38 rules. I don't think astronauts are
even allowed to fly formation takeoffs. Brand new Air Force 2nd Lts
are permitted to do a lot more things with their T-38s (low levels,
basic fighter maneuvers, etc). These points were discussed a month or
so ago on a T-38 thread.
> > Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
> > The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
> > incentive to stay with the aircraft.
>
> Apparently the bird strike caused debris to enter both engines but they
> continued to operate for a few seconds, possibly giving Freeman the feeling
> he could land the aircraft and he made a turn to the Northwest. The engines
> cut and the aircraft started to drop lower. After a few more seconds Freeman
> did decide to eject, but by this time the aircraft was nose down and he
> ejected sideways instead of up. The parachute did not have time to deploy
> from such a position and he died on impact with the ground. I believe Deke
> was one of the first to the scene and they found Ted still in his chair with
> the chute unopened.
Very sad.
> > And what exactly happened to CC? All military pilots are trained to
> > recognize symptoms of hypoxia. I would think that with all of the
> > altitude chamber work that an astronaut goes through, they would be
> > much more aware of the problem.
>
> From what I've read nobody actually knows what caused the crash that
> involved CC Williams. But he was flying a new aircraft (less than 50 hours
> on it) and the investigation resulted in the cause being named as mechanical
> failure, since his controls locked up on him. He was in total control of the
> situation, called a mayday and seemed calm enough. He again ejected too low.
> It sounds to me a lot like very good pilots convinced that they can get
> themselves out of any situation and only realizing too late they should bail
> out. Take Deke Slayton putting a T38 into a flat spin during the ASTP
> training, he didn't seem to consider ejecting from the aircraft and
> recovered with plenty of time. But if he couldn't have recovered, he would
> probably have been too low by the time he did finally decide to eject.
> Overconfidence because they all think they can get themselves out of
> trouble.
I didn't know NASA got new jets. I had thought their T-38s were all
from the Air Force.
Let's wait and see what Colin writes. I'm sure it will generate some
great discussion.
~ CT
Colin Burgess
this discussion. I'll only say this (yes, I'm a damned tease!) that
although it was earlier thought that hypoxia might have led to C.C.'s crash,
it was ruled out. It was a jammed aileron, possibly caused by a foreign
object, and possibly from some kit on the rear seat. The aerodynamics
involved probably led C.C. to feel he was regaining control, but he didn't,
and bailed out too late after making a clear transmission of his intention
(not consistent with hypoxia). His T-38 was vertical, and he hit the ground
alongside it. Ted Freeman was actually heading for some houses, and he did
make a valiant attempt to swing away from them, which delayed his ejection
and cost him his life. By the time he ejected the nose of his T-38 had
dropped to the vertical and he went out horizontally, but too late. Elliot
See was flying that day in St Louis, and as you will see in Walt
Cunningham's book and others, the rear pilot was decidedly hands-off. The
afterburners were indeed engaged, and this was probably See's doing.
Bassett's tasks in this situation would have been as radio man and observer,
and it is highly unlikely he would have taken over the controls from See.
Paul Haney told me that See was actually a very good pilot, but what they
called a "fair weather pilot", which meant he did most of his flying around
California, and tended to trust more in what he saw, whereas Bassett did a
lot of his flying on the treacherous east coast, so he was more of a
trust-in-instruments pilot. This was borne out by the actions of the pilots
of the two T-38's that day - See elected to stay under the clouds and do a
visual second approach, whereas Stafford elected to go straight back up
again away from the ground. Had Bassett been flying that day, I'm confident
the accident would not have happened. As regards the witness question, I
have collected numerous accounts from factory workers who heard the accident
and witnessed the aftermath, but no one actually saw the jet hit. However
the accident report does say that the afterburner had been lit, and the
plane's tail was down as it attempted to claw its way upwards, but it had
been going too slow and it just could not recover before it hit the
building.
Peter Stickney
tdad...@yahoo.com (Stuf4) writes:
> Of the two conflicting reports of See and Bassett's crash, I can only
> guess which is more accurate. I would really like to hear from
> someone who witnessed the incident (I don't think Cernan actually saw
> the crash - the formation had split so they could fly their own
> approach). But here are my thoughts on the two statements:
>
>>> Deke Slayton, in his book "Deke!" states (p. 167): "Elliot was
> flying and
> must have realized he was coming in too low and slow to reach the
> runway."
>
> The T-38 has afterburners. I am certain Elliot See knew how to use
> them. "Too low and slow" does not explain the crash to me at all.
See the following note.
>>> Gene Cernan, in his book "Last Man on the Moon" says "Elliot had
> miscalculated the approach and we were high, fast, and too far along
> the
> runway..." (p. 98).
>
> This comment might explain a crash that happened on the runway itself,
> but the jet impacted the McDonnell Douglas building where their Gemini
> capsule was waiting for them. I have been to Lambert Field and have
> seen how far offset the McDonnell Douglas area is from the runway. I
> don't see how being high, fast or too far down the runway could have
> been a causal factor for any jet that would crash into the plant.
>
> I have not heard any explanations of their crash that have been
> totally convincing for me.
Initial overshooting, and then entering a stall/spin condition (Which
many would read as low/slow) on the go-around aren't mutually
exclusive, especially if the weather's tight, and the pilot's trying
to keep a visual on the runway. It won't be the first time such a
thing has happened, and to very experienced pilots, as well.
I ought to point out that while the T-38 does have afterburners,
they aren't Magic Bullets, instantly whisking you along. At best,
engaging the afterburners on a landing T-38 gets you an extra 0.25g of
acceleration - about an extra 5-1/2 mph/second. Depending on where
you are on the thrust-drag curve, you may not be accelerating much at
all. A good example is the "Sabre Dance" film that gets used in a lot
of movies, like the Charles Bronson "X-15" movie. In that sequence,
you've got an early F-100, well back on the power curve, unable to do
anything at Maximum Power but hang in the air, just off the runway,
with no control whatsoever, until the final crash.
> While we are on the topic of NASA T-38 crashes, I made a comment a
> while back of how this was the leading cause of death for astronauts
> right up to January 1986. I am amazed how an aircraft that brand new
> Air Force pilots fly around fairly well could prove to be so fatal to
> the astronaut corps. The official reports of how See/Bassett, Freeman
> and Williams have long puzzled me.
Well, if you go by the assumption that all reports are doctored, and
don't have a good understanding about the context, such as flying a
high performance aircraft, then I can see that. If you're looking for
secrets, it's best to be in a position where you _can_ tell wheat from
chaff.
A marvelous example is the T W A 800 (Spaced to not attract the really
lunatic fringe) investigation. Practically before the wreckage hit
the water, th FBI had decided that the loss of the aircraft had to be
a terrorist act. They, in the person of James Kallstrom, leapt in,
made many ill-advised public pronouncements, and generally bulldozed
the efforts of the professional crash investigators.
This had the deleterious effects of:
1) Trying to get the investigation to fit a predetermined result.
2) Wasting the time and efforts of the NTSB and FAA investigators.
3) Generating dissent and reducing cooperation between the
investigative agencies.
4) Adding credibility to the Conspiracy Theorist/Coverup types, both
by the very public involvment of the FBI in areas outside its
expertise, and in the delaying and dissembling of the official
reports.
Oh, and a bit of note about NASA T-38 losses. As best as I can find
out, NASA has maintained a fleet of about 30 T-38s since the early
'60s. According to the Air Force Safety Office, T-38 losses during
the period 1962 - 1975 averaged 2.7/100,000 flight hours. If the NASA
airplanes are flying 1,000 hrs a year, then 100,000 hrs will be
reached by the fleet rougly every 3 years. (Note- NASA's
certification standards require each Pilot Astronaut to be putting in
180 hrs/year of T-38 time, and 100 hrs of STA time before each
mission, in addition to whatever other flying his/her duties may
require. Back in the '60s, the Astronauts flew more, but I don't have
exact numbers.) Anyway, at that rate of utilization, between 1962 and
1975, NASA should have lost (statistically, anyway) 9 T-38s. Note
also that the NASA fleet probably didn't always have 30 T-38s, or that
utilization may heve been lower. Either way, the loss rate isn't
excessive.
Note tha
the T-38s safety record was much improved in the late '70s to the
present, with annual losses averaging less than 1/100,000 flight
hours. This, of course, has improved the integrated value tremendously.
>
> Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
> The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
> incentive to stay with the aircraft.
How about because all ejection seats have conditions that they work
well at, and many more conditions where they are marginal? Even if an
aircraft has Zero-Zero seats - (Probably able to put a pilot under a
good chute from an aircraft with zero airspeed and zero altitude -
which the T-38 doesn't have), any sort of sink rate or an attitude
that isn't level could lead to a failure to eject and survive. It's
only very recently that ejection seats with attitude sensors and
steerable motors to deal with unusual attitudes have been developed,
for instance.
> And what exactly happened to CC? All military pilots are trained to
> recognize symptoms of hypoxia. I would think that with all of the
> altitude chamber work that an astronaut goes through, they would be
> much more aware of the problem.
I don't recall anoxia being found to be the problem.
--
Pete Stickney Klein bottle for rent -- inquire within.
Stuf4
> Hi guys - been away for a few days and have just come in on the tail end of
> this discussion. I'll only say this (yes, I'm a damned tease!) that
> although it was earlier thought that hypoxia might have led to C.C.'s crash,
> it was ruled out. It was a jammed aileron, possibly caused by a foreign
Very Juicy sneak preview! Thanks, Colin.
~ CT
Stuf4
> > Of the two conflicting reports of See and Bassett's crash, I can only
> > guess which is more accurate. I would really like to hear from
> > someone who witnessed the incident (I don't think Cernan actually saw
> > the crash - the formation had split so they could fly their own
> > approach). But here are my thoughts on the two statements:
> >
> >>> Deke Slayton, in his book "Deke!" states (p. 167): "Elliot was
> > flying and
> > must have realized he was coming in too low and slow to reach the
> > runway."
> >
> > The T-38 has afterburners. I am certain Elliot See knew how to use
> > them. "Too low and slow" does not explain the crash to me at all.
> many would read as low/slow) on the go-around aren't mutually
> exclusive, especially if the weather's tight, and the pilot's trying
> to keep a visual on the runway. It won't be the first time such a
> thing has happened, and to very experienced pilots, as well.
Agreed.
> I ought to point out that while the T-38 does have afterburners,
> they aren't Magic Bullets, instantly whisking you along. At best,
> engaging the afterburners on a landing T-38 gets you an extra 0.25g of
> acceleration - about an extra 5-1/2 mph/second. Depending on where
> you are on the thrust-drag curve, you may not be accelerating much at
> all. A good example is the "Sabre Dance" film that gets used in a lot
> of movies, like the Charles Bronson "X-15" movie. In that sequence,
> you've got an early F-100, well back on the power curve, unable to do
> anything at Maximum Power but hang in the air, just off the runway,
> with no control whatsoever, until the final crash.
Yes. I've seen the footage. It's a very ugly situation to get into.
I agree with your points again. Just to be clear, I have not stated
or implied that I "go by the assumption that all reports are
doctored", as someone might mistakenly get the impression from how you
wrote that.
> Oh, and a bit of note about NASA T-38 losses. As best as I can find
> out, NASA has maintained a fleet of about 30 T-38s since the early
> '60s. According to the Air Force Safety Office, T-38 losses during
> the period 1962 - 1975 averaged 2.7/100,000 flight hours. If the NASA
> airplanes are flying 1,000 hrs a year, then 100,000 hrs will be
> reached by the fleet rougly every 3 years. (Note- NASA's
> certification standards require each Pilot Astronaut to be putting in
> 180 hrs/year of T-38 time, and 100 hrs of STA time before each
> mission, in addition to whatever other flying his/her duties may
> require. Back in the '60s, the Astronauts flew more, but I don't have
> exact numbers.) Anyway, at that rate of utilization, between 1962 and
> 1975, NASA should have lost (statistically, anyway) 9 T-38s. Note
> also that the NASA fleet probably didn't always have 30 T-38s, or that
> utilization may heve been lower. Either way, the loss rate isn't
> excessive.
You aren't saying that the loss rate at the time of Williams' crash
wasn't excessive. Are you?!
Whatever the stats on the hours are, I look at it this way...
In the middle of 1964, take a room of 26 guys (every flying
astronaut). Tell them, "4 of you aren't going to see 1968 because of
the T-38".
I imagine that at least the wive's club would consider that to be
excessive.
> Note tha
> the T-38s safety record was much improved in the late '70s to the
> present, with annual losses averaging less than 1/100,000 flight
> hours. This, of course, has improved the integrated value tremendously.
I would correlate the decreased loss rate to the fact that the T-38
Dash 1 grew an order of magnitude in thickness. Again, I point to
more conservative flight rules.
> > Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
> > The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
> > incentive to stay with the aircraft.
>
> How about because all ejection seats have conditions that they work
> well at, and many more conditions where they are marginal? Even if an
> aircraft has Zero-Zero seats - (Probably able to put a pilot under a
> good chute from an aircraft with zero airspeed and zero altitude -
> which the T-38 doesn't have), any sort of sink rate or an attitude
> that isn't level could lead to a failure to eject and survive. It's
> only very recently that ejection seats with attitude sensors and
> steerable motors to deal with unusual attitudes have been developed,
> for instance.
A good pilot would be aware of that ejection envelope and make the
decision to eject at the proper time. Ted didn't.
> > And what exactly happened to CC? All military pilots are trained to
> > recognize symptoms of hypoxia. I would think that with all of the
> > altitude chamber work that an astronaut goes through, they would be
> > much more aware of the problem.
>
> I don't recall anoxia being found to be the problem.
Judging from Colin's post, his book is going to be a 'must read' for
me.
~ CT
John Geenty
> A good pilot would be aware of that ejection envelope and make the
> decision to eject at the proper time. Ted didn't.
Very harsh CT. Your saying Freeman was a poor pilot because he didn't eject
in time?
"Ted Freeman was actually heading for some houses, and he did
make a valiant attempt to swing away from them, which delayed his ejection
and cost him his life." - Colin Burgess
Before I read that line I considered one of the principle causes of
Freeman's crash to be the strong and vital belief that many of the best
pilots have in their own ability to get themselves out of trouble. Having
read that I think its very clear why Ted Freeman didn't eject in time and it
had nothing to do with knowing about the ejection envelope of his aircraft.
And even if he did know that he couldn't eject cleanly, what do you expect
him to do? Sit in the aircraft and say "oh well". No, once he's missed the
houses he's going to eject, even if the chances of survival are practically
zero, since thats better than going down with the aircraft.
OM
<Jo...@geenty.freeserve.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> A good pilot would be aware of that ejection envelope and make the
>> decision to eject at the proper time. Ted didn't.
>
>Very harsh CT. Your saying Freeman was a poor pilot because he didn't eject
>in time?
...He's actually echoing the typical pilot's sentiments towards anyone
who "screwed the pooch". But am I defending CT in this? Hell no! Since
he's not a pilot, and not part of the "righteous bretheren", he's
simply running his mouth like a typical pudnocker.
As if we didn't already know this...
Colin Burgess
was flying over Harris County ready to line up for a landing on runway 4
when he was called off due to other traffic in the area. He poured on some
power and began climbing again, and after powering down again he began a big
sweeping turn to the right ready to line up again. He descended from 2100
feet to 1800 but then flew straight into a flock of snow geese. One hit the
left side of his Plexiglas canopy which exploded into pieces. The Plexiglas
was injested into the engines, they flamed out, then quit. Despite what
must have been terrifying conditions in his shattered cockpit Freeman still
tried to line up on the runway. He had landed once before in Okinawa with
an engine on fire, so he probably felt he could land again this time. It
would also have crossed his mind that his chances of a safe ejection would
have been compromised by the condition of his cockpit - ejecting into a
jammed canopy would ensure a very sudden death. Despite the conditions he
managed to line up and lower the wheels, trying to deadstick onto the
runway. At 1500 feet and in a silent glide he saw that he wouldn't clear a
group of military houses on the Ellington base, where in fact some astronaut
families lived. He banked away from the houses, but it was a fatal
decision. He was now dropping towards a field and with no choice left but
to get out he initiated the ejection process, which is not exactly
instantaneous. He actually ejected, according to witnesses on the nearby
Gulf Freeway, at about 100-160 metres from the ground, by which time the
T-38s nose had dropped to the vertical. Freeman went out horizontally, and
slammed into the ground a hundred metres from where his jet impacted.
Stuf4
> > A good pilot would be aware of that ejection envelope and make the
> > decision to eject at the proper time. Ted didn't.
>
> Very harsh CT. Your saying Freeman was a poor pilot because he didn't eject
> in time?
No. No.
I should have phrased that better. Let me restate...
[From Peter Stickney:
> > Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
> > The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
> > incentive to stay with the aircraft.
>
> How about because all ejection seats have conditions that they work
> well at, and many more conditions where they are marginal? Even if an
> aircraft has Zero-Zero seats - (Probably able to put a pilot under a
> good chute from an aircraft with zero airspeed and zero altitude -
> which the T-38 doesn't have), any sort of sink rate or an attitude
> that isn't level could lead to a failure to eject and survive. It's
> only very recently that ejection seats with attitude sensors and
> steerable motors to deal with unusual attitudes have been developed,
> for instance.]
What I was trying to say is that I do not accept blaming the fatality
on the limitations of the ejection seat because these limitations are
(or should be) a known quantity. A good pilot should know those
limitations. A good pilot should make the proper decision on when to
eject. But good pilots also make mistakes.
I think Ted Freeman just made a mistake on deciding to stay with the
aircraft too long. I certainly didn't mean to say he was a poor
pilot.
(I don't believe that any more than I believe that Ed Givens was a
poor driver. I wouldn't characterize their abilities based on one
mistake.)
> "Ted Freeman was actually heading for some houses, and he did
> make a valiant attempt to swing away from them, which delayed his ejection
> and cost him his life." - Colin Burgess
It could very well be that his decision was a selfless act. I would
like to see how Colin came to these conclusions. I believe that my
impressions come mostly from Jim Lovell's account in Lost Moon. If it
wasn't Lovell, then it was some other astronaut who had the decided
impression that Freeman's decision not to eject earlier was a mistake.
~ CT
Peter Stickney
>> > Of the two conflicting reports of See and Bassett's crash, I can only
>> > guess which is more accurate. I would really like to hear from
>> > someone who witnessed the incident (I don't think Cernan actually saw
>> > the crash - the formation had split so they could fly their own
>> > approach). But here are my thoughts on the two statements:
>> >
>> >>> Deke Slayton, in his book "Deke!" states (p. 167): "Elliot was
>> > flying and
>> > must have realized he was coming in too low and slow to reach the
>> > runway."
>> >
>> > The T-38 has afterburners. I am certain Elliot See knew how to use
>> > them. "Too low and slow" does not explain the crash to me at all.
>
>> Initial overshooting, and then entering a stall/spin condition (Which
>> many would read as low/slow) on the go-around aren't mutually
>> exclusive, especially if the weather's tight, and the pilot's trying
>> to keep a visual on the runway. It won't be the first time such a
>> thing has happened, and to very experienced pilots, as well.
>
> Agreed.
So, there's an explanation. Be careful of ghosted accounts, or
accounts that have been written/edited by "General Public"
storytellers. It can be easy to mistranslate, say, Pilot-Speak into
something that isn't quite accurate. (Or Physics-Speak, or Cop-Speak,
or nearly anything else that's somewhat specialized)
You've been the one mentioning "Doctoring" of reports. But if you
have enough background, doctoring is difficult to hide.
>
>> Oh, and a bit of note about NASA T-38 losses. As best as I can find
>> out, NASA has maintained a fleet of about 30 T-38s since the early
>> '60s. According to the Air Force Safety Office, T-38 losses during
>> the period 1962 - 1975 averaged 2.7/100,000 flight hours. If the NASA
>> airplanes are flying 1,000 hrs a year, then 100,000 hrs will be
>> reached by the fleet rougly every 3 years.
> You aren't saying that the loss rate at the time of Williams' crash
> wasn't excessive. Are you?!
I'm saying that NASA's loss of 3 Astronaut flown T-38s in that time
frame isn't anomalous, and may, in fact be beating the stats.
>
> Whatever the stats on the hours are, I look at it this way...
> In the middle of 1964, take a room of 26 guys (every flying
> astronaut). Tell them, "4 of you aren't going to see 1968 because of
> the T-38".
Remember, Stuffy, these guys grew up witn the F-86, the F-84, and
Naval Aviation in the 1950s. They routinely suffered loss rates that
would have the Air Force grounded today.
Here's a list of loss rates/100,000 hrs for the usual suspects,
losses are per 100,000 hrs.
F-86 47
F-100 34
F-104 29
F-105 21
F-102 13
F-101 12
F-106 11
F-111 8
F-4 8
F-5 7
These are more Air Force Safety Office numbers.
Note also that at one point, there were so many F-84s being lost in
transition training at Luke AFB, mostly on Fridays, that the Wing
Commander there ordered a stand-down 1 day a week.
>
> I imagine that at least the wive's club would consider that to be
> excessive.
Actually, better than what they were used to. Being a Fighter Jock in
the '50s and '60s wasn't a guaranteed retirement.
But look at the divorce/resignation rate among fighter types, even
today. Very high - It's bloody dangerous. It starts dangerous, and
it stays dangerous. And then, sometimes somebody shoots at you, and
it get even more dangerous. That sort of wears on people.
Go to any Air FOrce base, and look at the street names. Thay're all
named for people, and not living people.
>
>> Note tha
>> the T-38s safety record was much improved in the late '70s to the
>> present, with annual losses averaging less than 1/100,000 flight
>> hours. This, of course, has improved the integrated value tremendously.
>
> I would correlate the decreased loss rate to the fact that the T-38
> Dash 1 grew an order of magnitude in thickness. Again, I point to
> more conservative flight rules.
An order of magnitude? I don't recall FM T-38-1-1 being 10 pages
starting out, nor is it about 1,000 pages thick today. Eat Beans and Shoot
Fire, son! the F-4E -1 is only about 500 pages, including the Takeoff,
Climb and Intercept Profile charts. (Actually, that's where most of
the -1 thickness changes come from, is more and better performance
charts.
Other than some changes to recognize the possibility of the Stabilator
stalling at high load factors, diminishing pitch reponse, I haven't
seen much change in T-38 operations.
>
>> > Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
>> > The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
>> > incentive to stay with the aircraft.
>>
>> How about because all ejection seats have conditions that they work
>> well at, and many more conditions where they are marginal? Even if an
>> aircraft has Zero-Zero seats - (Probably able to put a pilot under a
>> good chute from an aircraft with zero airspeed and zero altitude -
>> which the T-38 doesn't have), any sort of sink rate or an attitude
>> that isn't level could lead to a failure to eject and survive. It's
>> only very recently that ejection seats with attitude sensors and
>> steerable motors to deal with unusual attitudes have been developed,
>> for instance.
>
> A good pilot would be aware of that ejection envelope and make the
> decision to eject at the proper time. Ted didn't.
You really don't appear to have much of an idea about what an
emergency situation in an airplane is like, and just how ragged things
like safe ejection envelopes are. You have no way of knowing when you
pull the handles if the system is going to save you or kill you. Even
under perfect conditions, they aren't 100% reliable. Imperfect
conditions contain so many variables that you won't ever know, for
certain. And if things are totally hosed with no way to make them
better, you takes your chances. It's like a street fight, you "Run
what you brung"
Stuf4
> > I agree with your points again. Just to be clear, I have not stated
> > or implied that I "go by the assumption that all reports are
> > doctored", as someone might mistakenly get the impression from how you
> > wrote that.
>
> You've been the one mentioning "Doctoring" of reports. But if you
> have enough background, doctoring is difficult to hide.
I mentioned the Creech/Thunderbirds report as an illustration to show
that official accident reports do not necessarily contain the complete
picture. I have never read the reports on Freeman, See/Bassett or
Williams. I have no idea if they are accurate or doctored. It is
quite possible that they are lacking key information. This could have
been done intentionally for whatever reason.
Have you ever looked at the Challenger report? Volumes of
information. But Joe Kerwin and co. won't tell you much about the
fate of the crew AFTER the explosion. This was done intentionally to
protect the privacy of the families and maybe for the purpose of
making it easier for the American public to get over the whole thing.
It is not inconceivable that a T-38 report will be written to make
someone look like a hero when the fact of the matter is that he
screwed up.
General Creech knew very well that an accident report that states that
"Thunderbird lead flew his entire formation of 4 perfectly good T-38s
straight into the ground" would make the Air Force look bad. Maybe
someone at NASA wanted to protect the "right stuff" image of the
astronauts.
But as I said before, good pilots make mistakes. Even GREAT pilots
screw up. Look at Neil Armstrong. The man flew his F9F Panther into
some power lines (or some such obstacle) and had to eject.
I don't don't think that there is any need for people on this forum
seem to get so bent out of shape when things like this get pointed
out. If they try to take a realistic look at the matter, they might
realize that identifying errors that historical figures have made are
an important aspect in piecing together the picture.
> >> Oh, and a bit of note about NASA T-38 losses. As best as I can find
> >> out, NASA has maintained a fleet of about 30 T-38s since the early
> >> '60s. According to the Air Force Safety Office, T-38 losses during
> >> the period 1962 - 1975 averaged 2.7/100,000 flight hours. If the NASA
> >> airplanes are flying 1,000 hrs a year, then 100,000 hrs will be
> >> reached by the fleet rougly every 3 years.
>
> > You aren't saying that the loss rate at the time of Williams' crash
> > wasn't excessive. Are you?!
>
> I'm saying that NASA's loss of 3 Astronaut flown T-38s in that time
> frame isn't anomalous, and may, in fact be beating the stats.
I TOTALLY disagree. I think that NASA's flying safety record was
horrendous even from the perspective of those early jet days.
> > Whatever the stats on the hours are, I look at it this way...
> > In the middle of 1964, take a room of 26 guys (every flying
> > astronaut). Tell them, "4 of you aren't going to see 1968 because of
> > the T-38".
>
> Remember, Stuffy, these guys grew up witn the F-86, the F-84, and
> Naval Aviation in the 1950s. They routinely suffered loss rates that
> would have the Air Force grounded today.
> Here's a list of loss rates/100,000 hrs for the usual suspects,
> losses are per 100,000 hrs.
(snip)
> F-5 7
>
> These are more Air Force Safety Office numbers.
I think that it would be more telling if you were to get the stats on
the Air Force T-38s in the same time period as the NASA crashes. You
seem to have access to very complete data. If you have the AF T-38
stats, lets compare those.
> Note also that at one point, there were so many F-84s being lost in
> transition training at Luke AFB, mostly on Fridays, that the Wing
> Commander there ordered a stand-down 1 day a week.
Mostly on Fridays!?! Do you have any idea why this would be? O-Club
fever perhaps?
> >> Note tha
> >> the T-38s safety record was much improved in the late '70s to the
> >> present, with annual losses averaging less than 1/100,000 flight
> >> hours. This, of course, has improved the integrated value tremendously.
> >
> > I would correlate the decreased loss rate to the fact that the T-38
> > Dash 1 grew an order of magnitude in thickness. Again, I point to
> > more conservative flight rules.
>
> An order of magnitude? I don't recall FM T-38-1-1 being 10 pages
> starting out, nor is it about 1,000 pages thick today. Eat Beans and Shoot
> Fire, son! the F-4E -1 is only about 500 pages, including the Takeoff,
> Climb and Intercept Profile charts. (Actually, that's where most of
> the -1 thickness changes come from, is more and better performance
> charts.
OK, maybe I exaggerated. But I hope you take my point. The
regulations are much more restrictive now then they were back then. A
key factor to lower crash rates.
> Other than some changes to recognize the possibility of the Stabilator
> stalling at high load factors, diminishing pitch reponse, I haven't
> seen much change in T-38 operations.
You didn't mean to say that, did you? Are you telling me that NASA
astronauts today fly the T-38 the same way they did in Ted Freeman's
day? Not much change in operations?!?
They might as well be flying bumpercars today, their hands are tied so
tight. Today you get kicked out of the astronaut corps even for
having lapses of judgment in the T-38...
ON THE GROUND! (ref: Bill
Gregory)
> >> > Why didn't Freeman make a clean ejection that day out at Ellington?
> >> > The area he was flying over wasn't populated so I doubt he had much
> >> > incentive to stay with the aircraft.
> >>
> >> How about because all ejection seats have conditions that they work
> >> well at, and many more conditions where they are marginal? Even if an
> >> aircraft has Zero-Zero seats - (Probably able to put a pilot under a
> >> good chute from an aircraft with zero airspeed and zero altitude -
> >> which the T-38 doesn't have), any sort of sink rate or an attitude
> >> that isn't level could lead to a failure to eject and survive. It's
> >> only very recently that ejection seats with attitude sensors and
> >> steerable motors to deal with unusual attitudes have been developed,
> >> for instance.
> >
> > A good pilot would be aware of that ejection envelope and make the
> > decision to eject at the proper time. Ted didn't.
>
> You really don't appear to have much of an idea about what an
> emergency situation in an airplane is like, and just how ragged things
> like safe ejection envelopes are. You have no way of knowing when you
> pull the handles if the system is going to save you or kill you. Even
> under perfect conditions, they aren't 100% reliable. Imperfect
> conditions contain so many variables that you won't ever know, for
> certain. And if things are totally hosed with no way to make them
> better, you takes your chances. It's like a street fight, you "Run
> what you brung"
Ejection envelopes are very specifically defined. Ted Freeman should
have had a very good idea of when he was in it and when he was out of
it. He knew the state of his aircraft when he hit the birds, and if
he was cognizant enough to valiantly avoid those houses (as we are
told) I expect that he was cognizant enough of the state of his
aircraft when he actually pulled the handles.
~ CT
Kevin Willoughby
news:2cf0acb0.01071...@posting.google.com...
> Ejection envelopes are very specifically defined. Ted Freeman should
> have had a very good idea of when he was in it and when he was out of
> it. He knew the state of his aircraft when he hit the birds, and if
> he was cognizant enough to valiantly avoid those houses (as we are
> told) I expect that he was cognizant enough of the state of his
> aircraft when he actually pulled the handles.
One of my favorite chapter titles comes from the book "Gemini", (nominally)
written by Gus Grissom: "Death or the Ejection Seat". If you know that the
alternative is certain death, then you pull the handle. A 10% chance of survival
is better than an 1% chance of survival.
--
Kevin Willoughby KevinWi...@NoSpamacm.orgXX
Limitations on the project, such as the fact that we've all been
fired, lead to certain compromises in the design. -- Rob Steele
Peter Stickney
>> > I agree with your points again. Just to be clear, I have not stated
>> > or implied that I "go by the assumption that all reports are
>> > doctored", as someone might mistakenly get the impression from how you
>> > wrote that.
>>
>> You've been the one mentioning "Doctoring" of reports. But if you
>> have enough background, doctoring is difficult to hide.
>
> I mentioned the Creech/Thunderbirds report as an illustration to show
> that official accident reports do not necessarily contain the complete
> picture. I have never read the reports on Freeman, See/Bassett or
> Williams. I have no idea if they are accurate or doctored. It is
> quite possible that they are lacking key information. This could have
> been done intentionally for whatever reason.
Then why did you bring it up, and made similar comments in the past?
As far as the See/Bassett crash, there hasn't been anyone, not one of
the eyewitnesses, nor any of the other pilots, who thought that it was
anything other than losing it while making a missed approach, in
weather, while trying to stay in visial contact with the field. (In
other words, Pilot Error). This sort of thing happens a lot, and it
happens to highly skilled, experienced pilots as well as to guys whose
wings aren't dry yet. Nothing sinister.
>
> Have you ever looked at the Challenger report? Volumes of
> information. But Joe Kerwin and co. won't tell you much about the
> fate of the crew AFTER the explosion. This was done intentionally to
> protect the privacy of the families and maybe for the purpose of
> making it easier for the American public to get over the whole thing.
Yes, I have. I gotta tell ya, sport, given that the fragment that was
the cabin section had certainly depressurized, and that at those
altitudes, you weren't going to survive without a pressure suit, and
the cabin was tumbling around, well, even if their hearts were still
beating when it hit the water, they were already dead. The certainly
were unconcious. So, what would be the point of useless speculation?
There's wasn't enough data on the specifics of the cabin's flight &
free fall to do anything other than guess, which does nobody any good.
> It is not inconceivable that a T-38 report will be written to make
> someone look like a hero when the fact of the matter is that he
> screwed up.
What _evidence_ do you have that anything like this happened?
See and Basset spun into the McDonnell plant.
You really don't have much of an understanding of that time, do you?
They weren't singing "Will You Go Boom Today" in the Officer's Open
Mess for nothing.
The thing is, if the NASA T-38 fleet is running 30,000 hrs a year
(1000 hrs/airplane) statistically, they'd expect to lost a T-38 a
year. If they're only using 500 hrs a year, you'd expect to lost one
every 2 years. (Over a long enough period of time). That's the name
of that tune, and they didn't lose that many.
> I think that it would be more telling if you were to get the stats on
> the Air Force T-38s in the same time period as the NASA crashes. You
> seem to have access to very complete data. If you have the AF T-38
> stats, lets compare those.
I already did, it was an aggregate of 2.7/100,000 hrs. The peak year
was 1962, with a rate of 7/100,000 hrs. Phase II and Phase II testing
were still going on, at that stage.
>
>> Note also that at one point, there were so many F-84s being lost in
>> transition training at Luke AFB, mostly on Fridays, that the Wing
>> Commander there ordered a stand-down 1 day a week.
>
> Mostly on Fridays!?! Do you have any idea why this would be? O-Club
> fever perhaps?
Coincidence. There were a vairiety of causes, but no linking factor.
>
>> >> Note tha
>> >> the T-38s safety record was much improved in the late '70s to the
>> >> present, with annual losses averaging less than 1/100,000 flight
>> >> hours. This, of course, has improved the integrated value tremendously.
>> Other than some changes to recognize the possibility of the Stabilator
>> stalling at high load factors, diminishing pitch reponse, I haven't
>> seen much change in T-38 operations.
>
> You didn't mean to say that, did you? Are you telling me that NASA
> astronauts today fly the T-38 the same way they did in Ted Freeman's
> day? Not much change in operations?!?
Yep, you get in the airplane, you take off into controlled airspace,
you fly somewhere, and land. All under FAA regs, and all, as with any
jet, under Positive Control. (This by the way, is the reason that jet
aircraft aren't required to carry ELTs. (This in fact, led to a Lear
Jet disappearing during an Instrument Approach in a snowstorm to
West Lebanon, NH about 4 years back. Despite very intensive searches
using every tool from Recon Satellites to Fuel Sniffers to People
Poking the Ground With Sticks, the wreckage was only discovered when a
Timber Cruiser happened to walk into the right Spruce Thicket. He'd
been past the place a half-dozen times in the previous 2 years, and
never saw a thing.)
>
> They might as well be flying bumpercars today, their hands are tied so
> tight. Today you get kicked out of the astronaut corps even for
> having lapses of judgment in the T-38...
>
> ON THE GROUND! (ref: Bill
> Gregory)
> Ejection envelopes are very specifically defined. Ted Freeman should
> have had a very good idea of when he was in it and when he was out of
> it. He knew the state of his aircraft when he hit the birds, and if
> he was cognizant enough to valiantly avoid those houses (as we are
> told) I expect that he was cognizant enough of the state of his
> aircraft when he actually pulled the handles.
Ejection envelopes are _not_ specifically defined. There are too many
factors, including the random behavior of the seat, to be able to
positvely state that you are or are not within limits. I've watched
people die ejecting with 0/0 seats while descending in the landing
pattern, wings fairly level, but descending about 300'/min at 200
kts. Maybe it would work, maybe it wouldn't. Ejection seats aren't
magic bullets, either. The seat's ability to work predictably is
among other things, dependant on the occupant's weight, sitting
height, and the location of his/her center of gravity. As a rather
big guy, I used to cheat a bit on the sitting height part of the
physicals. But you realize you can mess yourself up when you see the
canopy bow of the T-33 directly above your knees, or notice that the
canopy breaker chisel on the T-37 seat is lower than the top of your
helmet. If you're in the middle of the ejection envelope, it's
probably going to work, but the further from the middle, the more
risky it is. And nobody can say for sure what will happen.
Colin Burgess
> the eyewitnesses, nor any of the other pilots, who thought that it was
> anything other than losing it while making a missed approach, in
> weather, while trying to stay in visial contact with the field. (In
> other words, Pilot Error). This sort of thing happens a lot, and it
> happens to highly skilled, experienced pilots as well as to guys whose
> wings aren't dry yet. Nothing sinister.
You're correct in saying this; the accident report on the crash points to
the inability of the pilot, See, to recover from a too-low, too slow
situation.
scott
VFR in IFR weather.
Stuf4
> One of my favorite chapter titles comes from the book "Gemini", (nominally)
> written by Gus Grissom: "Death or the Ejection Seat". If you know that the
> alternative is certain death, then you pull the handle. A 10% chance of survival
> is better than an 1% chance of survival.
Here's one I like:
The time to eject is when your fear of the aircraft overcomes your
fear of the ejection seat.
~ CT
Stuf4
> > Have you ever looked at the Challenger report? Volumes of
> > information. But Joe Kerwin and co. won't tell you much about the
> > fate of the crew AFTER the explosion. This was done intentionally to
> > protect the privacy of the families and maybe for the purpose of
> > making it easier for the American public to get over the whole thing.
>
> Yes, I have. I gotta tell ya, sport, given that the fragment that was
> the cabin section had certainly depressurized, and that at those
> altitudes, you weren't going to survive without a pressure suit, and
> the cabin was tumbling around, well, even if their hearts were still
> beating when it hit the water, they were already dead. The certainly
> were unconcious. So, what would be the point of useless speculation?
> There's wasn't enough data on the specifics of the cabin's flight &
> free fall to do anything other than guess, which does nobody any good.
Peter, the report was very clear that crew members survived the
initial breakup of the orbiter. Joe Kerwin details how emergency
oxygen systems were activated for certain individuals. The report
even acknowledges the possibility that they were conscious and aware
when the cabin impacted the ocean.
It's been a very long time since I have read that official multivolume
report, but I distinctly remember these parts of it.
(sorry for taking so long to respond to this - I'm a bit surprised
that no one else has corrected this point by now)
> > It is not inconceivable that a T-38 report will be written to make
> > someone look like a hero when the fact of the matter is that he
> > screwed up.
>
> What _evidence_ do you have that anything like this happened?
> See and Basset spun into the McDonnell plant.
Like you, I haven't seen any account of See/Bassett that didn't cite
pilot error. My statement above was made with Ted Freeman in mind.
Some accounts make him out to be a hero by stating that he delayed his
decision to eject so that he could avoid some houses. I would be
interested in seeing a diagram of Ted's flight path in relation to
those houses. Maybe Colin will include this in his book.
> > I TOTALLY disagree. I think that NASA's flying safety record was
> > horrendous even from the perspective of those early jet days.
>
> You really don't have much of an understanding of that time, do you?
> They weren't singing "Will You Go Boom Today" in the Officer's Open
> Mess for nothing.
> The thing is, if the NASA T-38 fleet is running 30,000 hrs a year
> (1000 hrs/airplane) statistically, they'd expect to lost a T-38 a
> year. If they're only using 500 hrs a year, you'd expect to lost one
> every 2 years. (Over a long enough period of time). That's the name
> of that tune, and they didn't lose that many.
I would say that a major factor in the Air Force T-38 safety stats is
that newbie 2nd Lts were racking up a significant fraction of those
hours. I think that it is a mistake to transfer this stat and apply
it to experienced test pilots. Another consideration is that your
2.7/100,000 stat seems to lump non-fatal crashes with fatal ones. If
you were to find the *fatality* rate of AF T-38s during that period, I
think that you might find that even the AF 2nd Lts did better than the
astronauts.
> > Ejection envelopes are very specifically defined. Ted Freeman should
> > have had a very good idea of when he was in it and when he was out of
> > it. He knew the state of his aircraft when he hit the birds, and if
> > he was cognizant enough to valiantly avoid those houses (as we are
> > told) I expect that he was cognizant enough of the state of his
> > aircraft when he actually pulled the handles.
>
> Ejection envelopes are _not_ specifically defined. There are too many
> factors, including the random behavior of the seat, to be able to
(snip)
If you look in an operating manual of a military jet like the T-38,
you will find graphs that depict the state of the aircraft and when
you are in or out of the ejection envelope. This is what I mean by
"very specifically defined". Sure there are many variables like you
cite, but engineers do their best to account for all of these. I
don't think anyone claims that the graphs they come up with are
perfect, but that is the nature of engineering. You measure, then
cut.
~ CT
Chris Jones
>
> From Peter Stickney:
[...]
> > Yes, I have. I gotta tell ya, sport, given that the fragment that was
> > the cabin section had certainly
Kerwin says probably, not certainly.
> > depressurized, and that at those
> > altitudes, you weren't going to survive without a pressure suit, and
> > the cabin was tumbling around,
It didn't tumble much, and quickly stabilized pointed not quite straight down
and listing a little to one side (I believe it was the left side that was
lower).
> > well, even if their hearts were still
> > beating when it hit the water,
Which they almost certainly were, according to Kerwin.
> > they were already dead. The certainly
> > were unconcious. So, what would be the point of useless speculation?
> > There's wasn't enough data on the specifics of the cabin's flight &
> > free fall to do anything other than guess, which does nobody any good.
I agree -- the accident was unsurvivable, and the crew was doomed the moment it
happened (probably they were doomed once they lifted off, though it's possible
if they hadn't encountered wind shear aloft to reopen the SRB leak, they would
have gotten lucky.
>
> Peter, the report was very clear that crew members survived the
> initial breakup of the orbiter. Joe Kerwin details how emergency
> oxygen systems were activated for certain individuals. The report
> even acknowledges the possibility that they were conscious and aware
> when the cabin impacted the ocean.
He does say it's possible they were conscious and it's impossible to determine
for sure. He strongly hints he believes they were unconscious. I hope they
were.
Colin Burgess
> Like you, I haven't seen any account of See/Bassett that didn't cite
> pilot error. My statement above was made with Ted Freeman in mind.
> Some accounts make him out to be a hero by stating that he delayed his
> decision to eject so that he could avoid some houses. I would be
> interested in seeing a diagram of Ted's flight path in relation to
> those houses. Maybe Colin will include this in his book.
No plans to do that, although one could conceivably be drawn up based on the
available information and by plotting his course. The narrative is based on
his communications with the tower, the findings of the accident report, the
accounts of eyewitnesses on the ground as to the path of the jet, and an
aerial photo of the impact scene.
Greg D. Moore (Strider)
> initial breakup of the orbiter. Joe Kerwin details how emergency
> oxygen systems were activated for certain individuals. The report
> even acknowledges the possibility that they were conscious and aware
> when the cabin impacted the ocean.
>
Careful, they were emergency AIR systems, not pure Oxygen. Big difference.
> ~ CT
Peter Stickney
tdad...@yahoo.com (Stuf4) writes:
> From Peter Stickney:
>> > Have you ever looked at the Challenger report? Volumes of
>> > information. But Joe Kerwin and co. won't tell you much about the
>> > fate of the crew AFTER the explosion. This was done intentionally to
>> > protect the privacy of the families and maybe for the purpose of
>> > making it easier for the American public to get over the whole thing.
>>
>> Yes, I have. I gotta tell ya, sport, given that the fragment that was
>> the cabin section had certainly depressurized, and that at those
>> altitudes, you weren't going to survive without a pressure suit, and
>> the cabin was tumbling around, well, even if their hearts were still
>> beating when it hit the water, they were already dead. The certainly
>> were unconcious. So, what would be the point of useless speculation?
>> There's wasn't enough data on the specifics of the cabin's flight &
>> free fall to do anything other than guess, which does nobody any good.
>
> Peter, the report was very clear that crew members survived the
> initial breakup of the orbiter. Joe Kerwin details how emergency
> oxygen systems were activated for certain individuals. The report
> even acknowledges the possibility that they were conscious and aware
> when the cabin impacted the ocean.
Time of useful conciousness at those altitudes is very short.
Seconds, really. ANd the air packs wouldn't help. The were low-flow
"Smoke in the Cockpit" systems, not the full boat Pressure Oxygen
systems needed for even having a chance above 50,000 ft. Somebody may
have been moving for a few seconds, enough time to reach the air pack
switch, but I don't see it as more than that. It didn't fly
straight. It was tumbling and decelerating, while being further
damaged by the air loads on the wreckage. Were hearts beating?
possibly. Did it make any difference? No. Will speculation in this
case help solve any problems, or give any useful answers? No.
Will speculation in this case only stir up th epot for the Families
and Workers who are going to have to deal with this every day, to no
good end, because there are no real answers? Yes.
>> > It is not inconceivable that a T-38 report will be written to make
>> > someone look like a hero when the fact of the matter is that he
>> > screwed up.
>>
>> What _evidence_ do you have that anything like this happened?
>> See and Basset spun into the McDonnell plant.
>
> Like you, I haven't seen any account of See/Bassett that didn't cite
> pilot error. My statement above was made with Ted Freeman in mind.
> Some accounts make him out to be a hero by stating that he delayed his
> decision to eject so that he could avoid some houses. I would be
> interested in seeing a diagram of Ted's flight path in relation to
> those houses. Maybe Colin will include this in his book.
Were the houses hit? No. Did Freeman make a difference in the
airplane's flight path? Maybe, maybe not. Did he stick with the plane
until he knew it would miss? Probably. Consider teh case of teh A-7D
in the mid-'80s that crashed into a passenger terminal during an
emergency landing attempt. The pilot had the airplane aimed clear,
and ejected. The impulse of the ejection pointed the A-7 into the
terminal. (The airplane was being used as a proficiency aircraft for
the F-117 program, while the F-117 was still officially non-existant.)
Or the F-106 that the pilot ejected from in a flat spin, only to see
teh aircraft recover and fly off. (The ejection impulse pushed the
nose down far enough to recover from the spin. The airplane later
bellied into a farmer's field in New York, and sat on the ground with
the engine running for about a half hour. In fact, the airplane was
recovered, repaired and put back into service. But I digress.
>
>> > I TOTALLY disagree. I think that NASA's flying safety record was
>> > horrendous even from the perspective of those early jet days.
>>
>> You really don't have much of an understanding of that time, do you?
>> They weren't singing "Will You Go Boom Today" in the Officer's Open
>> Mess for nothing.
>> The thing is, if the NASA T-38 fleet is running 30,000 hrs a year
>> (1000 hrs/airplane) statistically, they'd expect to lost a T-38 a
>> year. If they're only using 500 hrs a year, you'd expect to lost one
>> every 2 years. (Over a long enough period of time). That's the name
>> of that tune, and they didn't lose that many.
>
> I would say that a major factor in the Air Force T-38 safety stats is
> that newbie 2nd Lts were racking up a significant fraction of those
> hours. I think that it is a mistake to transfer this stat and apply
> it to experienced test pilots. Another consideration is that your
> 2.7/100,000 stat seems to lump non-fatal crashes with fatal ones. If
> you were to find the *fatality* rate of AF T-38s during that period, I
> think that you might find that even the AF 2nd Lts did better than the
> astronauts.
My numbers are for Class A mishaps, which are damage over 1 million
dollars to repair, or where injury or death is involved (Injury or
death includes peopl on the ground, too). I'm not including Class B,
where an aircraft is damaged somewhat. Basically, somebody died,
and/or the aircraft was written off.
If the problem were newbie Butterbars, than what are the numbers for
every tactical aircraft, including the F-5, which is nearly identical
to the T-38 at least twice as great, and often much higher? In order
to get to those airplanes, you aren't a new Second John. You've gone
through UPT, FLIT, and transition training. Once you get to a
tactical unit, as a new pilot you're flying on somebody's wing for a
long time before you get the be the guy who makes the decisions.
>> Ejection envelopes are _not_ specifically defined. There are too many
>> factors, including the random behavior of the seat, to be able to
> (snip)
>
> If you look in an operating manual of a military jet like the T-38,
> you will find graphs that depict the state of the aircraft and when
> you are in or out of the ejection envelope. This is what I mean by
> "very specifically defined". Sure there are many variables like you
> cite, but engineers do their best to account for all of these. I
> don't think anyone claims that the graphs they come up with are
> perfect, but that is the nature of engineering. You measure, then
> cut.
CT/Stuff/Whatever, Not only have I read the Dash-1s, I've strapped
myself into the seats. I've watched ejections that should have been
perfectly fine according to the book go fatally bad. I've even
cheated a bit to get into those seats, knowing that it makes it more
dangerous. The engineers can't account for most of the factors. If
you were to interactively plot a safe ejection envelope, it would be a
meaningless, ever changing swirl. The lines on the chart are for one
specific set of circumstances.
Here's a small test. Give me the safe ejection envelope for a T-38's
seat with a 260 pound pilot with a sitting height of 42 inches, and an
overall height of 76 inches. Then give me the numbers for a 140 pound
pilot with a sitting height of 27 inches, and an overall height of 64
inches. (Real numbers, BTW). Just the low end will be fine. WHat
are the airspeed/Altitude limits, and the factors for bank angle and
pitch angle, and sink rate? Oh, and edition number an page numbers
would be a help.
Stuf4
> > Peter, the report was very clear that crew members survived the
> > initial breakup of the orbiter. Joe Kerwin details how emergency
> > oxygen systems were activated for certain individuals. The report
> > even acknowledges the possibility that they were conscious and aware
> > when the cabin impacted the ocean.
>
> Time of useful conciousness at those altitudes is very short.
> Seconds, really. ANd the air packs wouldn't help. The were low-flow
> "Smoke in the Cockpit" systems, not the full boat Pressure Oxygen
> systems needed for even having a chance above 50,000 ft. Somebody may
> have been moving for a few seconds, enough time to reach the air pack
> switch, but I don't see it as more than that. It didn't fly
> straight. It was tumbling and decelerating, while being further
> damaged by the air loads on the wreckage. Were hearts beating?
> possibly. Did it make any difference? No. Will speculation in this
> case help solve any problems, or give any useful answers? No.
> Will speculation in this case only stir up th epot for the Families
> and Workers who are going to have to deal with this every day, to no
> good end, because there are no real answers? Yes.
As I stated early on, maybe there are real answers and NASA just
decided not to share them with us. Your TUC comments presume cabin
depressurization. Even Joe Kerwin wouldn't state that this definitely
happened.
This conversation will not benefit the seven crewmembers nor their
families. But it does give us insight into how accident boards work,
which is why the topic was raised in the first place.
First point - butter bars DO fly the hot jets. Right after fighter
lead in, 2LTs go into the fighter. But whereas the majority of T-38
hours are racked up by inexperienced pilots, this is not the case of
the fighters. My second point is that one of the major factors in why
the accident rate of front line fighters is so high is because they
fly much more dangerous missions than what is flown at UPT. It is a
mistake to look at accident stats without considering how the planes
are flown. There is a much smaller risk factor to skyhook a T-38
cross country than to mix up a 4v4 dissimilar, or even a UPT low
level.
I do not justify NASA's lack of safety with a straight comparison to
Air Force stats.
So it appears that we are both aware of how specifically the envelope
is defined and we both seem to agree that the defined envelope is an
engineering approximation that doesn't always conform to real life.
Given all that fuzz factor, you still want to say that Ted Freeman
wasn't aware of whether he was in or out of the envelope? I suggest
we agree to disagree on this one.
(but if you really want me to take your test, please email me a copy
of the graph and I would be glad to work the numbers)
~ CT
Peter Stickney
> decided not to share them with us. Your TUC comments presume cabin
> depressurization. Even Joe Kerwin wouldn't state that this definitely
> happened.
Yep. And evidence very stronly suggests it. There were only a couple
of deliberate actions - most notably moving the airpack switches, and
that's all. Either the cabin was depressurized, or the G-forces of
the breakup were enough to inapacitate the crew. In this instance,
read "render unconcious or kill" for incapacitate. After tht point,
speculation is meaningless and unneccesary.
>> My numbers are for Class A mishaps, which are damage over 1 million
>> dollars to repair, or where injury or death is involved (Injury or
>> death includes peopl on the ground, too). I'm not including Class B,
>> where an aircraft is damaged somewhat. Basically, somebody died,
>> and/or the aircraft was written off.
>>
>> If the problem were newbie Butterbars, than what are the numbers for
>> every tactical aircraft, including the F-5, which is nearly identical
>> to the T-38 at least twice as great, and often much higher? In order
>> to get to those airplanes, you aren't a new Second John. You've gone
>> through UPT, FLIT, and transition training. Once you get to a
>> tactical unit, as a new pilot you're flying on somebody's wing for a
>> long time before you get the be the guy who makes the decisions.
>
> First point - butter bars DO fly the hot jets. Right after fighter
> lead in, 2LTs go into the fighter. But whereas the majority of T-38
> hours are racked up by inexperienced pilots, this is not the case of
> the fighters. My second point is that one of the major factors in why
> the accident rate of front line fighters is so high is because they
> fly much more dangerous missions than what is flown at UPT. It is a
> mistake to look at accident stats without considering how the planes
> are flown. There is a much smaller risk factor to skyhook a T-38
> cross country than to mix up a 4v4 dissimilar, or even a UPT low
> level.
And the majority of fighter class As aren't new 2Lts. And, as for the
three accidents we've looked at, we've got 1 stall/spin in marginal
weather, 1 birdstrike, and 1 mechanical failure. The stall/spin could
have been prevented. Birdstrikes are random. Mechanical failures can
happen despite the best mainenance on the planet. In none of the
cases, is the type of use of the aircraft germane to the mishap
itself. Oh, and while UPT is very stylized, it's also quite intense.
If you aren't on the edge of task saturation, your instructor isn't
working you hard enough. The fact that for the most part trainers fly
more "choreographed" missions is replected by the differece in the
T-38 vs. F-5 stats. They're basically the same airplane. Note that
the F-5 numbers are also training numbers. Other than one partial
squadron snet to Veitnam for a short time for evaluation in combat,
the F-5 has only been used by the Air Force as a training aircraft,
either for foreign students, or DACT.
>
> I do not justify NASA's lack of safety with a straight comparison to
> Air Force stats.
You've yet to demonstrate a lack of safety at NASA. That's the
point. If you're looking at what happens when you fly T-38s, you look
at who is flying T-38s. Given the losses over time that the Air Force
fleet incurred, NASA's losses are rather low.
>> Here's a small test. Give me the safe ejection envelope for a T-38's
>> seat with a 260 pound pilot with a sitting height of 42 inches, and an
>> overall height of 76 inches. Then give me the numbers for a 140 pound
>> pilot with a sitting height of 27 inches, and an overall height of 64
>> inches. (Real numbers, BTW). Just the low end will be fine. WHat
>> are the airspeed/Altitude limits, and the factors for bank angle and
>> pitch angle, and sink rate? Oh, and edition number an page numbers
>> would be a help.
>
> So it appears that we are both aware of how specifically the envelope
> is defined and we both seem to agree that the defined envelope is an
> engineering approximation that doesn't always conform to real life.
Correct do far.
>
> Given all that fuzz factor, you still want to say that Ted Freeman
> wasn't aware of whether he was in or out of the envelope? I suggest
> we agree to disagree on this one.
Given all that fuzz factor, you're never certain of a safe ejection.
But, yes, I do. Sometimes you pull the handles too late. Sometimes
th difference between O.K. and too late is very, very fine.
>
> (but if you really want me to take your test, please email me a copy
> of the graph and I would be glad to work the numbers)
I'll scan the pages for the Martin-Baker MK-H7 for the F-4J. It's the
most complete one you'll find. But... Not only should you give the
numbers, but how they were derived, as well.
Stuf4
> > I do not justify NASA's lack of safety with a straight comparison to
> > Air Force stats.
>
> You've yet to demonstrate a lack of safety at NASA. That's the
> point. If you're looking at what happens when you fly T-38s, you look
> at who is flying T-38s. Given the losses over time that the Air Force
> fleet incurred, NASA's losses are rather low.
I still say that 4 dead pilots out of a group of 26 over the span of
less than three years isn't a safety record to brag about.
Particularly when you claim to have the best pilots.
I don't have much more to add.
~ CT
scott
pete knew the envelope.....and still missed the party!