Why metaphysicists must know science (was: Scientific Illiteracy)
moggin
>*One of them simply being Occam's razor; to me it seems easier to
>explain my perception of a cat (barring hallucination) by the fact
>that there's a cat over there, than to invoke some kind of unknowable
>noumenal object _plus_ Categories, or a cat _plus_ a "sense-datum"
>representing a cat inside my head, etc. Once you get rid of the
>Lockean perspective, and postulate that my perception of a cat is
>caused simply by the _cat_ and not by a "sense-datum" or
>"representation" in my head, things become a good deal more
>straightforward! I say this only to make it clear where I'm coming
>from, not in the expectation of convincing you.
Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
understand the meaning of "What is reality?" Otherwise you would be
satisfied to notice that you perceive a cat, and stop there, just as
when I asked, "What is a tree?" you answered that it was a tree. By
your own standards, the cat requires no explanation, and asking for
one is meaningless. But obviously you do want to explain it -- only
instead of an explanation, you settle for saying that "there's a cat
over there," (which explains nothing), and adding that it's a "fact."
Yet his "fact" is _exactly_ what Occam's razor would eliminate -- it
contributes nothing to your understanding of the cat, or even of your
perception of the cat, and it _does_ add an unnecessary notion -- one
that's every bit as mysterious as an "unknowable noumenal object."
Note to MJ: Realism _is_ a form of mysticism (a terribly boring
one, but still).
-- moggin
moggin
I'm not too fond of sand and heat, and I don't have any affection
for the kind of person who likes to march around with an eagle-on-a-
stick; but I think there's alot to say for the peace and stillness of
a desert.
-- moggin
S. LaBonne
moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
>Steve wrote:
>
>>*One of them simply being Occam's razor; to me it seems easier to
>>explain my perception of a cat (barring hallucination) by the fact
>>that there's a cat over there, than to invoke some kind of unknowable
>>noumenal object _plus_ Categories, or a cat _plus_ a "sense-datum"
>>representing a cat inside my head, etc. Once you get rid of the
>>Lockean perspective, and postulate that my perception of a cat is
>>caused simply by the _cat_ and not by a "sense-datum" or
>>"representation" in my head, things become a good deal more
>>straightforward! I say this only to make it clear where I'm coming
>>from, not in the expectation of convincing you.
>
> Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
>things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
>understand the meaning of "What is reality?"
_Only_ in what you call the "laundry-list_ sense of the question. I
am not claiming to know "what it is to" exist, for a cat or anything
else.
--
Opinions are mine alone; I never met a university with opinions!
Steve LaBonne ********************* (labo...@cnsunix.albany.edu)
"It can never be satisfied, the mind, never." - Wallace Stevens
Gordon Fitch
| Note to MJ: Realism _is_ a form of mysticism (a terribly boring
| one, but still).
Come to think of it, mysticism is generally a form of
realism: the assertion by the mystics that they are in
direct communion with the true reality, for a great variety
of true realities depending on the mystic. What is usually
called realism completes the circuit by assigning the
mystical quality of realness to the realist's particular
objectifications of phenomena.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Michael Andrew Turton
moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
>Steve wrote:
>
>>*One of them simply being Occam's razor; to me it seems easier to
>>explain my perception of a cat (barring hallucination) by the fact
>>that there's a cat over there, than to invoke some kind of unknowable
>>noumenal object _plus_ Categories, or a cat _plus_ a "sense-datum"
>>representing a cat inside my head, etc. Once you get rid of the
>>Lockean perspective, and postulate that my perception of a cat is
>>caused simply by the _cat_ and not by a "sense-datum" or
>>"representation" in my head, things become a good deal more
>>straightforward! I say this only to make it clear where I'm coming
>>from, not in the expectation of convincing you.
Moggin Replied
> Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
>things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
>understand the meaning of "What is reality?" Otherwise you would be
>satisfied to notice that you perceive a cat, and stop there, just as
>when I asked, "What is a tree?" you answered that it was a tree. By
>your own standards, the cat requires no explanation, and asking for
>one is meaningless. But obviously you do want to explain it -- only
>instead of an explanation, you settle for saying that "there's a cat
>over there," (which explains nothing), and adding that it's a "fact."
>Yet his "fact" is _exactly_ what Occam's razor would eliminate -- it
>contributes nothing to your understanding of the cat, or even of your
>perception of the cat, and it _does_ add an unnecessary notion -- one
>that's every bit as mysterious as an "unknowable noumenal object."
Turton Added:
The presence of the cat does NOT add anything unnecessary, since
without it we have to fall back on silopsism. Rather, the addition of
the cat allows us to begin to develop explanations of why we see a cat
which account for the perception (science of cognition) and the cat
in front of us (evolutionary and behavioral sciences). Without the cat
we really do have to fall back on mysticism. Occam's Razor does not
eliminate the cat but instead demands we put it there (the alternatives are
even messier).
Mike
Andy Perry
LaBonne) wrote:
>In article <4fi0aq$b...@bessel.nando.net>,
>moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
>>Steve wrote:
>>
>>>*One of them simply being Occam's razor; to me it seems easier to
>>>explain my perception of a cat (barring hallucination) by the fact
>>>that there's a cat over there, than to invoke some kind of unknowable
>>>noumenal object _plus_ Categories, or a cat _plus_ a "sense-datum"
>>>representing a cat inside my head, etc. Once you get rid of the
>>>Lockean perspective, and postulate that my perception of a cat is
>>>caused simply by the _cat_ and not by a "sense-datum" or
>>>"representation" in my head, things become a good deal more
>>>straightforward! I say this only to make it clear where I'm coming
>>>from, not in the expectation of convincing you.
>>
>> Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
>>things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
>>understand the meaning of "What is reality?"
>
>_Only_ in what you call the "laundry-list_ sense of the question. I
>am not claiming to know "what it is to" exist, for a cat or anything
>else.
You are claiming that it is to be independent of Categories, sensory
impressions, and representation.
--
Andy Perry We search before and after,
Brown University We pine for what is not.
English Department Our sincerest laughter
Andrew...@brown.edu OR With some pain is fraught.
st00...@brownvm.bitnet -- Shelley, d'apres Horace Rumpole
Charles Palermo
: Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
: things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
: understand the meaning of "What is reality?" Otherwise you would be
: satisfied to notice that you perceive a cat, and stop there, just as
: when I asked, "What is a tree?" you answered that it was a tree. By
: your own standards, the cat requires no explanation, and asking for
: one is meaningless. But obviously you do want to explain it -- only
: instead of an explanation, you settle for saying that "there's a cat
: over there," (which explains nothing), and adding that it's a "fact."
: Yet his "fact" is _exactly_ what Occam's razor would eliminate -- it
: contributes nothing to your understanding of the cat, or even of your
: perception of the cat, and it _does_ add an unnecessary notion -- one
: that's every bit as mysterious as an "unknowable noumenal object."
: Note to MJ: Realism _is_ a form of mysticism (a terribly boring
: one, but still).
Realism is, I agree, boring (that doesn't mean it isn't true, however),
but it's not mystical. The anti-realist would have us believe that a
tree exists because we perceive it; the realist supposes that the tree
exists whether or not we perceive it. The former posits a mysterious
power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
what exists are mystical and which are not.
MJ
Charles Palermo
: In article <4fiocn$t...@rebecca.albany.edu>, labo...@csc.albany.edu (S.
: LaBonne) wrote:
: >In article <4fi0aq$b...@bessel.nando.net>,
: >moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
: >>Steve wrote:
: >>
: >>>*One of them simply being Occam's razor; to me it seems easier to
: >>>explain my perception of a cat (barring hallucination) by the fact
: >>>that there's a cat over there, than to invoke some kind of unknowable
: >>>noumenal object _plus_ Categories, or a cat _plus_ a "sense-datum"
: >>>representing a cat inside my head, etc. Once you get rid of the
: >>>Lockean perspective, and postulate that my perception of a cat is
: >>>caused simply by the _cat_ and not by a "sense-datum" or
: >>>"representation" in my head, things become a good deal more
: >>>straightforward! I say this only to make it clear where I'm coming
: >>>from, not in the expectation of convincing you.
: >>
: >> Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
: >>things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
: >>understand the meaning of "What is reality?"
: >
: >_Only_ in what you call the "laundry-list_ sense of the question. I
: >am not claiming to know "what it is to" exist, for a cat or anything
: >else.
: You are claiming that it is to be independent of Categories, sensory
: impressions, and representation.
I don't think so, because it's possible for whatever exists to exist in
some other way--i.e., dependent on categories, sensory impressions,
representation. Neither version speculates upon what existence _is_, and
it seems that the point of contention--or at least one of them--is
whether one can speculate upon what existence is without just saying that
to exist is to be.
MJ
moggin
>>>As long as there is _something_ beyond my own mind, it makes sense to
>>>try and learn whatever I can about _what_ that something might be- as
>>>far as I am concerned, the impulse behind science is not much more
>>>complicated than that.
moggin:
>> Of course it is -- that impulse could just as easily lead you
>>to become a mystic as a scientist. Science isn't merely a desire to
>>learn about the world -- it's a particular way of going about it (for
>>example, you perform experiments, rather than practicing meditation),
>>and certain ideas about what knowledge consists of (you collect data
>>and construct theories, instead of searching for divine revelation).
Steve:
>I see no philosophical presuppositions here, merely methodological
>rules-of-thumb- rules which, I repeat, build on basic aspects of human
>nature that existed long before science did; which have to a great
>extent been evolved by trial-and-error rather than philosophical
>reflection; which are commonly employed in daily life by people who
>know little of science (your car mechanic, for example.)
Are you seriously claiming that there are no suppositions in the
way a mechanic diagnoses a car, or that philosophical assumptions can
exist only as a result of self-conscious, "philosophical reflection"?
Can you really think that the idea of "basic aspects of human nature"
is free of any presuppositions, or that "rules-of-thumb" belong in a
different category than any _other_ form of supposition? It doesn't
matter how far back the presuppositions of science go, _or_ what they
evolved from, _or_ who uses them, in addition to scientists -- none of
that changes their character as suppositions. What are you trying to
peddle here? It's old, so it's not a supposition? Many people share
it, so it's not a supposition? I'll let you in on a little secret --
there are plenty of old, widely shared suppositions. (I know it must
come as a shock, but I'm sure you'll be able to absorb it eventually.)
Besides, your point was that science doesn't require _anything_
except for the impulse to learn about something beyond your own mind,
_not_ that auto mechanics share its basic assumptions. And as I just
pointed out, the impulse to learn a thing or two is shared by science
and by mysticism; so obviously science requires more to define itself.
Steve:
>(And if you're an Einstein then even "meditation" can have its place.
>Or maybe even a search for "divine revelation- on our lab wall at this
>moment is a calendar bearing the following Einstein quote [source not
>given]: "I maintain that a cosmic religiousness is the strongest and
>most noble driving force of scientific research".)
Alright, have it your way -- then creationism _is_ a science,
and St. Paul was no less a scientist than Pauli and Pauling. I'll go
along with that. I also like your idea that scientists are glorified
auto mechanics -- I didn't want to be rude, but that's exactly what I
suspected all along.
Steve:
>I continue to maintain the position stated in the first paragraph above.
Somehow I'm not surprised.
-- moggin
S. LaBonne
moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
>Steve wrote:
>
>>>>As long as there is _something_ beyond my own mind, it makes sense to
>>>>try and learn whatever I can about _what_ that something might be- as
>>>>far as I am concerned, the impulse behind science is not much more
>>>>complicated than that.
>
>moggin:
>
>>> Of course it is -- that impulse could just as easily lead you
>>>to become a mystic as a scientist. Science isn't merely a desire to
>>>learn about the world -- it's a particular way of going about it (for
>>>example, you perform experiments, rather than practicing meditation),
>>>and certain ideas about what knowledge consists of (you collect data
>>>and construct theories, instead of searching for divine revelation).
>
>Steve:
>
>>I see no philosophical presuppositions here, merely methodological
>>rules-of-thumb- rules which, I repeat, build on basic aspects of human
>>nature that existed long before science did; which have to a great
>>extent been evolved by trial-and-error rather than philosophical
>>reflection; which are commonly employed in daily life by people who
>>know little of science (your car mechanic, for example.)
>
> Are you seriously claiming that there are no suppositions in the
>way a mechanic diagnoses a car
Yes, I am. The mechanic's procedures for tracking down problems were
arrived at by a process of trial and error, quite devoid of
philosophical reflection conscous or unconscious. Philosophy
certainly has an important role _after_ the fact in explaining why
empiricism seems to be a more useful approach to fixing cars than
uttering magical incantations.
Even primitive peoples turn out to have a considerable amount of
genuine empirical knowledge about their environment; and more
"sophisticated" societies have now developed specialties like
ethnobotany whose purpose is to investigate this body of knowledge.
What one might call an empirical attitude was an inbred trait
promoting surval, eons before it became a subject for philosophical
reflection. I believe that what we call science is basically a highly
specialized outgrowth of tendencies that have been built into the
brain by natural selection- and not only into the _human_ brain.
Viz. the famous Quine tagline about how creatures that are
inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but
praiseworthy tendency not to reproduce.
moggin
>Realism is, I agree, boring (that doesn't mean it isn't true, however),
>but it's not mystical. The anti-realist would have us believe that a
>tree exists because we perceive it; the realist supposes that the tree
>exists whether or not we perceive it. The former posits a mysterious
>power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
>said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
>that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
>what exists are mystical and which are not.
The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
-- moggin
Michael Andrew Turton
S. LaBonne <labo...@csc.albany.edu> wrote:
>
>Even primitive peoples turn out to have a considerable amount of
>genuine empirical knowledge about their environment; and more
>"sophisticated" societies have now developed specialties like
>ethnobotany whose purpose is to investigate this body of knowledge.
>What one might call an empirical attitude was an inbred trait
>promoting surval, eons before it became a subject for philosophical
>reflection. I believe that what we call science is basically a highly
>specialized outgrowth of tendencies that have been built into the
>brain by natural selection- and not only into the _human_ brain.
>Viz. the famous Quine tagline about how creatures that are
>inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but
>praiseworthy tendency not to reproduce.
>--
>Opinions are mine alone; I never met a university with opinions!
>Steve LaBonne ********************* (labo...@cnsunix.albany.edu)
>"It can never be satisfied, the mind, never." - Wallace Stevens
"not only into the human brain" is entirely correct. Research
into primate cognition has shown that human cognition is closely related
to that of other primates. For example, monkeys and humans have been shown
to have similar short-term memory processes. Of course, this creates
serious problems for cultura/social determinist positions as well as the
"linguistic turn" in some recent scholarship, since any claim about human
cognition is to some extent a claim about cognition among the primates
as a whole.
Pinker has summarized findings in a new field called evolutionary
psychology in the last chapter of _The Language Instinct_. Evolutionary
psychologists see human behavior as largely the result of millenia spent
as hunter-gatherers in the pliestocene. Cognition is viewed as the
interaction of hundreds, perhaps thousands of domain-specific, content-
adapted modules in the mind. These correspond to actual problems
encountered by living organisms in the world, such as avoiding predators,
navigation and so forth. The modular view does a good job of explaining
cognitive problems -- as Fodor, one of originators, noted, there are no
general problems of brain, only specific problems. The terrifying specificity
of aphasias is difficult to explain if the view is taken that the human
mind is somehow unspecified. Moreover, an unspecialized brain could not
possible have evolved -- selectionist processes do not produce unspecialized
organs -- so that would make the human brain the only unspecialized organ
in all of creation.
Built-in modules explain human behavior in terms of heuristics
encoded to produce survival-oriented behaviors among hunter-gatherers who
live in losse, often fluid, social groups, compete for rank and status
and cooperate in food-sharing and other activities. For example, Pinker
hypothesizes a module specific to plants (can anyone say "cut flower
industry"), animals (anybody yet lost the thrill of seeing a deer in
the woods? Why do people pay millions annually to fly to Africa to
watch animals?), social relations (why do advertisers use individuals of
high status to show products rather than individuals knowledgeable about
those products? Why don't nutritionists advertise wheaties?) and other
problems a growing primate must solve.
Thus, we can answer the problem of the cat as posed in this
discussion by referring to the vast amount of research on evolution. We
suspended our inability to explain the presence of the cat until at
last we uncovered enough information to explain, at least partially,
what is going on out there.
Mike Turton
tur...@rpi.edu
For a more detailed introduction to evolutionary psychology, see
Tooby and Cosmides _The Adapted Mind_. Academic but accessible.
Gordon Fitch
| >Realism is, I agree, boring (that doesn't mean it isn't true, however),
| >but it's not mystical. The anti-realist would have us believe that a
| >tree exists because we perceive it; the realist supposes that the tree
| >exists whether or not we perceive it. The former posits a mysterious
| >power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
| >said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
| >that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
| >what exists are mystical and which are not.
mog...@bessel.nando.net (moggin):
| The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
| mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
| least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
knowing this. Some will say this is naive realism; the
more sophisticated realist retreats from these extreme,
though popular, positions. But that just means becoming
more in tune with the rest of us skeptics, and less of a
realist.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Charles Palermo
: MJ wrote:
: >Realism is, I agree, boring (that doesn't mean it isn't true, however),
: >but it's not mystical. The anti-realist would have us believe that a
: >tree exists because we perceive it; the realist supposes that the tree
: >exists whether or not we perceive it. The former posits a mysterious
: >power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
: >said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
: >that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
: >what exists are mystical and which are not.
moggin wrote:
: The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
: mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
: least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
A) if it's just as mysterious, then there's no reason to single it out as
being "mystical"--to claim that realism is mysterious suggests there are
other theories about the nature of reality that are not, but what you're
implying here is that they're all mysterious. B) If we're not going to
maintain that all theories about the nature of reality are equally
mysterious, if we're prepared to allow that some theories are less
mysterious than others, then would you say that anti-realism, as it has
been generally understood, is less mysterious than realism, as it has
been generally understood? I say no, because with realism, you're left
with the mystery of existence as such, but with anti-realism you're left
with the mystery of existence as such as well as a mysterious
power of mind upon which the existence of what exists depends. Mind you,
this is not to suggest that realism, if less mystical than anti-realism,
is therefore true, but we do have rather impressive empirical evidence to
support realism--I turn on an oven, put in something to cook, and then
leave the kitchen; when I come back thirty minutes later, lo and behold,
what I've put in the oven is cooked through, even though during that
thirty minutes I wasn't watching the oven or the food in it. Anti-realism
has alot more to account for as a theory about the nature of reality than
does realism (again, I stress, as these theories have generally been
articulated).
MJ
S. LaBonne
>
>What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
>stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
>assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
>that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
>our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
>knowing this.
Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
know of one.
Jeff Johnson
>In article <4g1uk3$3...@panix2.panix.com>, Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
>>What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
>>stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
>>assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
>>that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
>>our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
>>knowing this.
>Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
>here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
>know of one.
Aristotle?
Gordon Fitch
| >What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
| >stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
| >assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
| >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
| >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
| >knowing this.
labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
| know of one.
Professional philosophers are mostly much too cagey to get
caught out doing something like this. If you check around
the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
chair _is_ a chair. No?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
moggin
>> Are you seriously claiming that there are no suppositions in the
>>way a mechanic diagnoses a car [...] ?
Steve:
>Yes, I am. The mechanic's procedures for tracking down problems were
>arrived at by a process of trial and error, quite devoid of
>philosophical reflection conscous or unconscious.
That's completely irrevelant, as I've already pointed out. (You
might want to try replying to my comments, instead of deleting them.)
Anyone who applies the process of trial and error is already making a
host of assumptions: causality, for example, is a supposition of both
the mechanic and the scientist. The only important difference is that
mechanics can sometimes fix cars, while scientists haven't done _shit_
to repair the universe.
-- moggin
Michael Huemer
>MJ wrote:
...
>| >power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
>| >said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
>| >that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
>| >what exists are mystical and which are not.
>
>mog...@bessel.nando.net (moggin):
>| The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
>| mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
>| least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
>
>What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
>stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
>assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
>that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
>our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
>knowing this.
What's mysterious to me is what all of you guys are so mystified
about. Say there's a tree in front of me. I look at the tree. I see
it. The tree is about 7 feet tall. The tree looks to me to be about
7 feet tall. So far, I am utterly unmystified.
Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
exist. I don't see what's mysterious about a tree sitting in front of
me. If you want to test whether the tree existed before you looked at
it (which nobody ever bothers to try, because it's such a silly waste
of time), you can ask someone else who was there before you. If
you're not sure whether the other person existed, you can look at him,
while he's looking at the tree.
Of course, this is a pointless exercise. If you really think that
objects depend for their existence on being perceived, why don't you
try stepping in front of a truck on the street, and then closing your
eyes. See if it goes away.
Finally, I don't see what's mysterious about the tree 'out there'
(i.e., the tree) having the characteristics that it appears to have.
It's green and brown. It looks green and brown to me. Where's the
big problem? (N.B. I omit reference to the form in which the tree
'exists in our minds,' since trees do not exist in our minds. They
only exist in physical space.)
--
^-----^
Michael Huemer <o...@rci.rutgers.edu> / O O \
Rutgers Univ. (Philosophy Dept.) | V |
\ /
moggin
>>>> Purely in the interests of clarity, then, let me add a couple of
>>>>things. If you need to explain your perception of a cat, then you
>>>>understand the meaning of "What is reality?"
Steve:
>>>_Only_ in what you call the "laundry-list_ sense of the question. I
>>>am not claiming to know "what it is to" exist, for a cat or anything
>>>else.
moggin:
>> In that case, you don't need to explain your perception of a cat,
>>make your perception of a cat into "the fact that there's a cat over
>>there," or postulate that the cat causes your perception. Since you
>>do all three, however, you clearly want more than a laundry list can
>>provide.
Steve:
>Nope, this doesn't follow at all. I've merely stipulated that cats
>are one of the items on my laundry list.
Not true: you didn't just mark down "cats" as an item on a list.
Instead you said that you wanted to "explain" your "perception of a
cat," you claimed that "the fact that there's a cat over there" was
some kind of explanation, and you postulated that your perception of
the cat was "caused simply by _the cat_" (your emphasis). That goes
well beyond placing cats on a list, and it shows that you feel cats
need explaining.
-- moggin
cz...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
: Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
: exist. I don't see what's mysterious about a tree sitting in front of
: me. If you want to test whether the tree existed before you looked at
: it (which nobody ever bothers to try, because it's such a silly waste
: of time), you can ask someone else who was there before you. If
: you're not sure whether the other person existed, you can look at him,
: while he's looking at the tree.
Hear, hear! Maybe we can put this useless philosophical ratshit "debate"
(I use the word charitably) to rest! While metaphysics may be a
supremely entertaining mind-exercising diversion, it is ultimately as
useless (albeit just as fun) as arguing which alien race is more
advanced; Niven's Puppeteers, Pohl's Heechee, or Hogan's Ganymeans?
(Sorry to all non-SF readers for the analogy, but it's what I came up
with on the spur of the moment. You get the idea, anyway.)
cz...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
: Anyone who applies the process of trial and error is already making a
: host of assumptions: causality, for example, is a supposition of both
: the mechanic and the scientist. The only important difference is that
: mechanics can sometimes fix cars, while scientists haven't done _shit_
: to repair the universe.
Wasn't aware the universe needed repairing.
Gordon Fitch
| ...
| >| >power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
| >| >said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
| >| >that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
| >| >what exists are mystical and which are not.
mog...@bessel.nando.net (moggin):
| >| The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
| >| mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
| >| least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
| >What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
| >stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
| >assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
| >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
| >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
| >knowing this.
o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer):
| What's mysterious to me is what all of you guys are so mystified
| about. Say there's a tree in front of me. I look at the tree. I see
| it. The tree is about 7 feet tall. The tree looks to me to be about
| 7 feet tall. So far, I am utterly unmystified.
|
| Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
| exist. ...
You don't have a problem until you run into something that
looks like one thing and behaves like another: an optical
illusion, a hallucination, a dream, a deception, and so
forth. Although there are many social mechanisms for
resolving problems like these, such as locking people up
if they see things other people don't see, it's been
recognized as a significant issue for several thousand
years at least. The problem became more critical when
people in India and Greece (and probably several other
places) began to worry about matching language to
<reality> and getting it to produce <truth>, especially the
One True Truth some of them wanted everybody to believe in.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
S. LaBonne
>Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
>| >What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
>| >stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
>| >assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
>| >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
>| >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
>| >knowing this.
>
>| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
>| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
>| know of one.
>
>Professional philosophers are mostly much too cagey to get
>caught out doing something like this. If you check around
>the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
>though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
>people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
>chair _is_ a chair. No?
I like that cute sleight-of-hand switch from "assured" to "pretty
sure". There's a world of difference there, my friend.
S. LaBonne
>
>>>What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
>>>stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
>>>assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
>>>that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
>>>our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
>>>knowing this.
>
>>here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
>>know of one.
>
Did Aristotle think we have _assured_ knowledge of these things?
S. LaBonne
moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
>moggin:
>
>>> Are you seriously claiming that there are no suppositions in the
>>>way a mechanic diagnoses a car [...] ?
>
>Steve:
>
>>Yes, I am. The mechanic's procedures for tracking down problems were
>>arrived at by a process of trial and error, quite devoid of
>>philosophical reflection conscous or unconscious.
>
> That's completely irrevelant,
To your interests, no doubt, but not to the subject at hand. Not
unless you think even nonhuman animals have philosophical
presuppsitions (see Mike Turton's post).
I second, by the way, another poster's surprise at the news that the
universe is in need of repairs. Sounds like something from Star Trek.
You are droll when you get carried away.
Andy Perry
>Michael Huemer (o...@rci.rutgers.edu) wrote:
>
>: Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
>: exist. I don't see what's mysterious about a tree sitting in front of
>: me. If you want to test whether the tree existed before you looked at
>: it (which nobody ever bothers to try, because it's such a silly waste
>: of time), you can ask someone else who was there before you. If
>: you're not sure whether the other person existed, you can look at him,
>: while he's looking at the tree.
>
>Hear, hear! Maybe we can put this useless philosophical ratshit "debate"
>(I use the word charitably) to rest! While metaphysics may be a
>supremely entertaining mind-exercising diversion, it is ultimately as
>useless (albeit just as fun) as arguing which alien race is more
>advanced; Niven's Puppeteers, Pohl's Heechee, or Hogan's Ganymeans?
So you think USENET discussions are inappropriate if they are fun and not
useful? Let me guess, you're a newbie, right?
>(Sorry to all non-SF readers for the analogy, but it's what I came up
>with on the spur of the moment. You get the idea, anyway.)
The interesting thing about the analogy is that a discussion of Niven,
Pohl, and Hogan would generally not generate such a level of anxiety in
bystanders that they feel compelled to try and break it up. "Hey! Stop
talking about that! Right now!"
Gordon Fitch
| >| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
| >| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
| >| know of one.
Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
| >Professional philosophers are mostly much too cagey to get
| >caught out doing something like this. If you check around
| >the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
| >though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
| >people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
| >chair _is_ a chair. No?
labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
| I like that cute sleight-of-hand switch from "assured" to "pretty
| sure". There's a world of difference there, my friend.
Is there? And what world is that?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Michael Andrew Turton
S. LaBonne <labo...@csc.albany.edu> wrote:
>
>I second, by the way, another poster's surprise at the news that the
>universe is in need of repairs. Sounds like something from Star Trek.
>You are droll when you get carried away.
>
>--
>Opinions are mine alone; I never met a university with opinions!
>Steve LaBonne ********************* (labo...@cnsunix.albany.edu)
>"It can never be satisfied, the mind, never." - Wallace Stevens
I was out fixing the universe just last week. But the Manufacturer
is located in another dimension and you know how *hard* it is to get
imported parts.......
moggin
[Interesting comments on evolutionary psychology deleted.]
> Thus, we can answer the problem of the cat as posed in this
>discussion by referring to the vast amount of research on evolution.
>We suspended our inability to explain the presence of the cat until at
>last we uncovered enough information to explain, at least partially,
>what is going on out there.
I'm not sure that "answers the problem" -- at most it explains the
resistance to even raising the question about the cat. Thinking about
metaphysics didn't confer any advantage during the Pleistocene, so the
mind shoved it aside in favor of more practical issues. That would be
the theory, anyhow. If Pinker's right to believe our present thinking
is influenced by pre-historic concerns, then it's hardly surprising to
see all the heavy resistance to "meaningless" philosophical questions;
what's curious is that we would _ever_ ask them. We _don't_ have more
data to figure out "what's going on out there" than at any other time,
and metaphysical reflections are just as useless now, from a practical
perspective, as they probably were on the Serengeti (unless you're up
for tenure).
-- moggin
moggin
>>>> Are you seriously claiming that there are no suppositions in the
>>>>way a mechanic diagnoses a car [...] ?
Steve:
>>>Yes, I am. The mechanic's procedures for tracking down problems were
>>>arrived at by a process of trial and error, quite devoid of
>>>philosophical reflection conscous or unconscious.
moggin:
>> That's completely irrevelant,
Steve:
>To your interests, no doubt, but not to the subject at hand. Not
>unless you think even nonhuman animals have philosophical
>presuppsitions (see Mike Turton's post).
Hard to say what the subject _is_, since you have a habit of
changing it whenever you get yourself in trouble (or rather when you
notice the trouble that you're in, which isn't quite as often). But
as I said before, "anyone who applies the process of trial and error
is already making a host of assumptions: causality, for example, is a
supposition of both the mechanic and the scientist." (I also advised
replying to my comments, instead of deleting them, but I can see that
would just make things more difficult for you.)
I've read Mike's post. According to the theories he presents,
your thinking is literally pre-historic.
>I second, by the way, another poster's surprise at the news that the
>universe is in need of repairs.
Trial-and-error makes no suppositions; auto mechanics are
_naifs_; the world is perfectly designed -- got any other gems to
share?
-- moggin
Michael Huemer
>Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
. . .
>| >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
>| >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
>| >knowing this.
>labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
>| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
>| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
>| know of one.
The name "G.E. Moore" comes to mind. See his "Proof of an External
World", "Defense of Common Sense", and "Four Forms of Skepticism."
Of course, no naive realist thinks that anything exists out there in
the same form it exists in our minds. What he thinks is that we
perceive what is out there, period. We don't perceive any thing 'in
our minds'. The alleged object 'existing in your mind' is just a
philosophers' fiction.
See also Thomas Reid. And, of course, myself.
>caught out doing something like this. If you check around
>the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
>though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
>people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
>chair _is_ a chair. No?
'Pretty' sure?
And I suppose your view is that a table *isn't* a table? What is it
then, a fish perhaps?
Gordon Fitch
| >| >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
| >| >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
| >| >knowing this.
labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
| >| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
| >| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
| >| know of one.
o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer):
| The name "G.E. Moore" comes to mind. See his "Proof of an External
| World", "Defense of Common Sense", and "Four Forms of Skepticism."
| Of course, no naive realist thinks that anything exists out there in
| the same form it exists in our minds. What he thinks is that we
| perceive what is out there, period. We don't perceive any thing 'in
| our minds'. The alleged object 'existing in your mind' is just a
| philosophers' fiction.
| See also Thomas Reid. And, of course, myself.
I think we usually call realists "naive" if they don't show
any evidence of having run into serious epistemological and
ontological problems in such a way that they had to deal
with them. George Moore's reasoning doesn't appeal to me,
but it's obvious that he had come up against such problems
and had made some adjustments in his thinking to deal with
them.
gcf:
| >caught out doing something like this. If you check around
| >the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
| >though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
| >people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
| >chair _is_ a chair. No?
|
o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer):
| 'Pretty' sure?
| And I suppose your view is that a table *isn't* a table? What is it
| then, a fish perhaps?
You might want to take a look at Wittgenstein's _On_
_Certainty_.
Now, Steve -- will this exchange do as an existence proof?
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Gordon Fitch
| : Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
| : exist. I don't see what's mysterious about a tree sitting in front of
| : me. If you want to test whether the tree existed before you looked at
| : it (which nobody ever bothers to try, because it's such a silly waste
| : of time), you can ask someone else who was there before you. If
| : you're not sure whether the other person existed, you can look at him,
| : while he's looking at the tree.
cz...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca ():
| Hear, hear! Maybe we can put this useless philosophical ratshit "debate"
| (I use the word charitably) to rest! While metaphysics may be a
| supremely entertaining mind-exercising diversion, it is ultimately as
| useless (albeit just as fun) as arguing which alien race is more
| advanced; Niven's Puppeteers, Pohl's Heechee, or Hogan's Ganymeans?
I think that, now that metaphysics has been invented, one
needs to deal with it, on pain of being confused or led
astray by it. What's been laid out by Michael Huemer is
highly metaphysical, but it's strongly supported by the
culture we are embedded in, so it's called "common sense."
I gather from desultory readings in anthropology that,
before the invention of the One True Truth of monotheism,
many people would look upon a tree and also see, perhaps, a
god, a spirit, a message, possibly entities we don't have
words for. These experiences were forbidden for a long
time; you could be burned at the stake in the Middle Ages
for talking about them, and as a consequence they've been
pretty much socially repressed. Not entirely forgotten --
if you look around you'll see that there's a great deal of
anxiety about such things, usually expressed in the
impatience, derision and contradiction (entertaining /
useless) visible above.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Michael Andrew Turton
moggin <mog...@bessel.nando.net> wrote:
>
> I'm not sure that "answers the problem" -- at most it explains the
>resistance to even raising the question about the cat. Thinking about
>metaphysics didn't confer any advantage during the Pleistocene, so the
>mind shoved it aside in favor of more practical issues. That would be
>the theory, anyhow. If Pinker's right to believe our present thinking
>is influenced by pre-historic concerns, then it's hardly surprising to
>see all the heavy resistance to "meaningless" philosophical questions;
>what's curious is that we would _ever_ ask them. We _don't_ have more
>data to figure out "what's going on out there" than at any other time,
>and metaphysical reflections are just as useless now, from a practical
>perspective, as they probably were on the Serengeti (unless you're up
>for tenure).
>
>-- moggin
>
I would argue that we do have more data. We have been in a position
to refute, say, Greek assertions that vision is caused by rays emanating
from the eyes. Point by point, much of ancient Greek (and Hindu and Chinese)
"philosophy" has been shown to be empirically false. Thus, the history of
thought in the West has in some ways been the constant re-ordering of
boundaries -- whatever has been disconfirmed is tossed out, and what remains
is "philosophy." But these lines were not so clear to the ancients. Vision,
metaphysics, classification, natural history, were all of a piece to them.
Since we are finally starting to understand human/non-human perception and
cognition, we are now in a position to empirically disconfirm the remaining
metaphysical positions held by the ancient and modern "philosophers" and
known under the modern rubric of philosophy.
The alternative is to make some highly relativist/silopsist arguments
about science............
When I was young and foolish (as opposed to older but much more
articulately foolish) I used to think this meant the end of philosophy,
but seeing how vitally important philosophy has been to the cognitive sciences
in the formation of problems and the critique of data as well as in the
design of experiments, I have changed my mind on this issue.
Another point: human cognitive evolution has not been driven by the
organism-environment interaction, but by the interactions of humans, by
human sociality (according to the ev psych people). This is often described
by the metaphor of the "arms race" where everyone is evolving cognitive
mechanisms at a furious pace in order to come out ahead in social
interactions, rank and status competition, and mate competition ( I am
skeptical of the last) and so forth, much as the speed of the cheetah
is a response to the problem of catching fleet gazelles, who in turn have
developed speed and the ability to turn on a dime in order to evade cheetahs.
Thus, the mechanisms by which people examine and understand the
world are heuristics evolved primarily to deal with people. We imbue the
world with intention and meaning (hence philosophy) because we are equipped
to deal with meaning-intending primates out to cooperate and compete with
us. Thus we talk to our computers, cry when we ditch a beloved car and
can't bear to part with the teddy bear we had when we were young.
Given this outlook, I have no doubt our pliestocene forebearers regarded
the world with the same wonder and joy we do, if not the same sophistication.
Mike Turton
tur...@rpi.edu
S. LaBonne
>Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
>o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer):
>| The name "G.E. Moore" comes to mind. See his "Proof of an External
>| World", "Defense of Common Sense", and "Four Forms of Skepticism."
>| Of course, no naive realist thinks that anything exists out there in
>| the same form it exists in our minds. What he thinks is that we
>| perceive what is out there, period. We don't perceive any thing 'in
>| our minds'. The alleged object 'existing in your mind' is just a
>| philosophers' fiction.
>| See also Thomas Reid. And, of course, myself.
Excuse me for piggybacking on Gordon's post, Michael. I agree
completely with Moore's account of perception. But I don't think we
have any guarantee that our perceptions are always _accurate_, and
neither, I believe, did Moore (please correct me if I'm wrong about
that). That's why I jumped on Gordon's use of the word "assured".
Gordon seemed to be suggesting that a realist who believes in direct
perception is committed to holding that perceptions are _infallible_.
This seems to be a common misunderstanding among those who attack what
they're pleased to consider "naive" realism. (While I can understand
your adopting this label of "naive" realist as a sort of badge of
defiance, it makes me cringe; I find nothing "naive" about the realism
of a philosopher like Moore.)
S. LaBonne
>labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
>labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
>| I like that cute sleight-of-hand switch from "assured" to "pretty
>| sure". There's a world of difference there, my friend.
>
>Is there? And what world is that?
The (now widely rejected) world of foundationalism.
S. LaBonne
Michael Huemer <o...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>>caught out doing something like this. If you check around
>>the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
>>though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
>>people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
>>chair _is_ a chair. No?
>
>'Pretty' sure?
>And I suppose your view is that a table *isn't* a table? What is it
>then, a fish perhaps?
It _could_ be a hallucination or an optical illusion, so I would never
say that I am _absolutely_ sure there's a table there. And why in the
world would I _need_ such absolute certainty, which (it seems to me)
just doesn't exist outside the realm of purely deductive conclusions
within formal systems?
Charles Palermo
: MJ wrote:
: | >Realism is, I agree, boring (that doesn't mean it isn't true, however),
: | >but it's not mystical. The anti-realist would have us believe that a
: | >tree exists because we perceive it; the realist supposes that the tree
: | >exists whether or not we perceive it. The former posits a mysterious
: | >that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
: | >what exists are mystical and which are not.
: mog...@bessel.nando.net (moggin):
: | The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
: | mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
: | least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
: What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
: stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
: assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
: that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
: our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
: knowing this. Some will say this is naive realism; the
: more sophisticated realist retreats from these extreme,
: though popular, positions. But that just means becoming
: more in tune with the rest of us skeptics, and less of a
: realist.
I don't know that I know what naive realism is--what you describe above
sounds something like Lockean representationalism, which no realist need
commit herself to. So rejecting Lockean representationalism doesn't
necessarily render the realist less of a realist. That aside, if one
maintains that what exists exists independently of consciousness, then
if one retreats from that, one is one retreating to? If the answer is
anti-realism, then in retreating from the position that what exists exists
independently of consciousness, one would not become less of a realist;
rather, one would cease to be a realist. If the answer is to full-fledged
scepticism, then, again, in retreating from the above, one would not
become less of a realist; rather, one would become a skeptic. If the
answer is to a position in which one admits that one can't know with
absolute certainty that what exists exists independently of
consciousness, well, that's already a given--the realist doesn't have to
retreat from realism and thereby become less of realist by accepting that
one can't know that with absolute certainty.
MJ
Charles Palermo
: | >stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
: | >assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
: | >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
: | >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
: | >knowing this.
: labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
: | Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
: | here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
: | know of one.
: Professional philosophers are mostly much too cagey to get
: caught out doing something like this. If you check around
: the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
: though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
: people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
: chair _is_ a chair. No?
Pretty sure, yes, but absolutely sure? If you were to press someone on
the matter they would likely admit they couldn't be (unless they were
prepared to just resort ot dogmatic assertion). And, anyway, the idea
that a table is a table and not a chair is a different, albeit related,
issue to the one we're discussing here. To perceive a table as being
different from a chair--to be perceive anything as being different from
anything else--does not entail that tables, chairs, and the rest exist
independently of perceptions of them.
MJ
Charles Palermo
: In article <4g5774$h...@rebecca.albany.edu>,
: S. LaBonne <labo...@csc.albany.edu> wrote:
: >
: >I second, by the way, another poster's surprise at the news that the
: >universe is in need of repairs. Sounds like something from Star Trek.
: >You are droll when you get carried away.
: >
: >--
: >Opinions are mine alone; I never met a university with opinions!
: >Steve LaBonne ********************* (labo...@cnsunix.albany.edu)
: >"It can never be satisfied, the mind, never." - Wallace Stevens
: I was out fixing the universe just last week. But the Manufacturer
: is located in another dimension and you know how *hard* it is to get
: imported parts.......
Good one.
MJD
Charles Palermo
: tur...@cortez.its.rpi.edu (Michael Andrew Turton) wrote:
: [Interesting comments on evolutionary psychology deleted.]
: > Thus, we can answer the problem of the cat as posed in this
: >discussion by referring to the vast amount of research on evolution.
: >We suspended our inability to explain the presence of the cat until at
: >last we uncovered enough information to explain, at least partially,
: >what is going on out there.
: I'm not sure that "answers the problem" -- at most it explains the
: resistance to even raising the question about the cat. Thinking about
: metaphysics didn't confer any advantage during the Pleistocene, so the
: mind shoved it aside in favor of more practical issues. That would be
: the theory, anyhow. If Pinker's right to believe our present thinking
: is influenced by pre-historic concerns, then it's hardly surprising to
: see all the heavy resistance to "meaningless" philosophical questions;
: what's curious is that we would _ever_ ask them. We _don't_ have more
: data to figure out "what's going on out there" than at any other time,
: and metaphysical reflections are just as useless now, from a practical
: perspective, as they probably were on the Serengeti (unless you're up
: for tenure).
I've read through parts of Pinker's book, but I can't remember if, and
if, how, he accounts for the fact that we ask questions like "What is the
nature of reality?" Our asking them doesn't seem to confer any advantage,
nor does our producing poems, novels, paintings, etc. seem to.
MJ
Charles Palermo
: moggin (mog...@bessel.nando.net) wrote:
: : Anyone who applies the process of trial and error is already making a
: : host of assumptions: causality, for example, is a supposition of both
: : the mechanic and the scientist. The only important difference is that
: : mechanics can sometimes fix cars, while scientists haven't done _shit_
: : to repair the universe.
: Wasn't aware the universe needed repairing.
Perhaps it doesn't need repairing, but it might need a dose of preventive
medicine (e.g., the possibility of asteroids colliding with earth, and
the attempts to figure out how we might deflect them).
MJD
Charles Palermo
: Michael Huemer (o...@rci.rutgers.edu) wrote:
: : Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
: : exist. I don't see what's mysterious about a tree sitting in front of
: : me. If you want to test whether the tree existed before you looked at
: : it (which nobody ever bothers to try, because it's such a silly waste
: : of time), you can ask someone else who was there before you. If
: : you're not sure whether the other person existed, you can look at him,
: : while he's looking at the tree.
: Hear, hear! Maybe we can put this useless philosophical ratshit "debate"
: (I use the word charitably) to rest! While metaphysics may be a
: supremely entertaining mind-exercising diversion, it is ultimately as
: useless (albeit just as fun) as arguing which alien race is more
: advanced; Niven's Puppeteers, Pohl's Heechee, or Hogan's Ganymeans?
Useless with respect to what?
MJD
Charles Palermo
: g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
: >MJ wrote:
: ...
: >| >power of mind that has never been explained; the latter doesn't. As I
: >| >said to Gordon, _that_ anything should exist may well be mysterious, but
: >| >that is a different issue from that of which accounts of the status of
: >| >what exists are mystical and which are not.
: >
: >mog...@bessel.nando.net (moggin):
: >| The idea that a tree has an "independent existence" is just as
: >| mysterious as the idea that it exists because we perceive it -- at
: >| least, that's what I wanted to suggest.
: >
: >What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
: >stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
: >assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
: >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
: >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
: >knowing this.
: What's mysterious to me is what all of you guys are so mystified
: about. Say there's a tree in front of me. I look at the tree. I see
: it. The tree is about 7 feet tall. The tree looks to me to be about
: 7 feet tall. So far, I am utterly unmystified.
: Sounds to me like all of you are just imagining problems that don't
: exist. I don't see what's mysterious about a tree sitting in front of
: me. If you want to test whether the tree existed before you looked at
: it (which nobody ever bothers to try, because it's such a silly waste
: of time), you can ask someone else who was there before you. If
: you're not sure whether the other person existed, you can look at him,
: while he's looking at the tree.
: Of course, this is a pointless exercise. If you really think that
: objects depend for their existence on being perceived, why don't you
: try stepping in front of a truck on the street, and then closing your
: eyes. See if it goes away.
Ah, our old friend "the truck test." If only N.S. Brown were still around.
Seriously, though, "the truck test" speaks to the fact that the
mysterious power of mind anti-realists attribute to us has not been
adequately explained--it would seem that the notion that the existence of
what exists depends on our perception of it can't be understood in
terms of us _physically_ perceiving it.
: Finally, I don't see what's mysterious about the tree 'out there'
: (i.e., the tree) having the characteristics that it appears to have.
: It's green and brown. It looks green and brown to me. Where's the
: big problem? (N.B. I omit reference to the form in which the tree
: 'exists in our minds,' since trees do not exist in our minds. They
: only exist in physical space.)
Exactly my point in my post to Gordon above re: Lockean
representationalism (though it is only fair to point out that it's not
even clear Locke held with theory--see, e.g. A.D. Woozley's introduction
to his edition of the _Essay_, in which he rejects the prevailing
interpretation of what Locke meant by the term "idea.")
MJD
Van Piercy
Charles Palermo <pale...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu> wrote:
>I've read through parts of Pinker's book, but I can't remember if, and
>if, how, he accounts for the fact that we ask questions like "What is the
>nature of reality?" Our asking them doesn't seem to confer any advantage,
>nor does our producing poems, novels, paintings, etc. seem to.
Hmmm. I don't know that I'd toss the question about reality out of the
process of artistic and scientific invention. Cultural capital seems to
be important too in conferring "advantage."
Van
Gordon Fitch
| >>caught out doing something like this. If you check around
| >>the Net, the office, the bar, the dorm, wherever you are,
| >>though, I think you'll find some reasonably intelligent
| >>people who are pretty sure that a table _is_ a table and a
| >>chair _is_ a chair. No?
Michael Huemer <o...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
| >'Pretty' sure?
| >And I suppose your view is that a table *isn't* a table? What is it
| >then, a fish perhaps?
labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
| It _could_ be a hallucination or an optical illusion, so I would never
| say that I am _absolutely_ sure there's a table there. And why in the
| world would I _need_ such absolute certainty, which (it seems to me)
| just doesn't exist outside the realm of purely deductive conclusions
| within formal systems?
It depends what language game you're playing. I can see you
still haven't read _On_Certainty_ even though I recommended
it so warmly last time this issue came up.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Gordon Fitch
| ...
| Gordon seemed to be suggesting that a realist who believes in direct
| perception is committed to holding that perceptions are _infallible_.
Certainly not. Even a _very_ naive realist would understand
that some perceptions are hallucinations or illusions. What
realists believe (if I understand realism aright) is that,
out in the Out There, are entities that correspond pretty
well with human objectifications of phenomena. Thus, a
chair _is_ a chair and an electron _is_ an electron. Now, I
don't see much reason to believe this, but realists, as I
understand realism, do.
The question is somewhat different for objects which
identify themselves to us as coherent beings, for example
the cat which we discussed earlier. Even so, the cat does
not inform us much about his idea of catness, so we can't
compare it to ours except in a fairly rough way.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Michael Andrew Turton
Van Piercy <vpi...@ezinfo.ucs.indiana.edu> wrote:
>In article <4g8pl3$s...@news.jhu.edu>,
>Charles Palermo <pale...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu> wrote:
>>I've read through parts of Pinker's book, but I can't remember if, and
>>if, how, he accounts for the fact that we ask questions like "What is the
>>nature of reality?" Our asking them doesn't seem to confer any advantage,
>>nor does our producing poems, novels, paintings, etc. seem to.
>
The question isn't whether the production of plays, poems etc.
confers an advantage. The question is, what advantages do the built-in
behaviors which lead to the production of novels, etc (among other things)
have for humans? Pinker might argue along several lines......take poetry,
for example, people *love* to manipulate language. Children love to
talk and find meaningless noise quite amusing. My 19-month-old babbles
incessantly and enjoys that social interaction immensely, although he
cannot speak a word in any language spoken at home. This love of language
for its own sake is an important driver of children's acquisition of
language. It appears early (since it incurs an advantage for the language
learner and is crucial for language acqusition -- kids do not *know*
they'll grow into adults) and stays throughout one's whole life, of course.
Such a drive could easily lead to poetry.......
Pinker does not answer the "what is reality?" question directly.
But if you view human intellect as primarily something developed to
facilitate social exchang, the problem becomes solvable. People take the
heuristics which they have primarily to solve problems in the social
world and apply them to the world as a whole. The quest for meaning in
reality is really the problem-solving strategies humans
use to interact with other humans applied to the world as a whole. People
ask about the meaning of the world because they are programmed to ask
about the meaning of the primates they interact with.
Mike Turton
tur...@rpi.edu
Michael Huemer
>Excuse me for piggybacking on Gordon's post, Michael. I agree
>completely with Moore's account of perception. But I don't think we
>have any guarantee that our perceptions are always _accurate_, and
>neither, I believe, did Moore (please correct me if I'm wrong about
>that).
I don't know about the "always" part, but he did frequently insist the
he KNEW, with certainty (his words) that "this is a pencil" or things
like that.
Norman Malcolm also certainly said things like this. In one
article (forget the title) he averrs that there is no possible future
development that could cause him to question that 'this is an ink
bottle'.
>Gordon seemed to be suggesting that a realist who believes in direct
>perception is committed to holding that perceptions are _infallible_.
>This seems to be a common misunderstanding among those who attack what
>they're pleased to consider "naive" realism.
You're right about this part. NR doesn't entail that there can't be
hallucinations, for instance.
Michael Huemer
>that some perceptions are hallucinations or illusions. What
>realists believe (if I understand realism aright) is that,
>out in the Out There, are entities that correspond pretty
>well with human objectifications of phenomena.
That's REPRESENTATIONALISM. Naive realists don't talk about "human
objectifications of phenomena." Actually no one does, but I assume
that's your term for mental represtentations of external things.
NR'ists think that we just perceive external objects directly.
> Thus, a
>chair _is_ a chair and an electron _is_ an electron.
Everyone believes that, since that's a tautology.
Anthony Potts
On 17 Feb 1996 cz...@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca wrote:
> moggin (mog...@bessel.nando.net) wrote:
>
> : Anyone who applies the process of trial and error is already making a
> : host of assumptions: causality, for example, is a supposition of both
> : the mechanic and the scientist. The only important difference is that
> : mechanics can sometimes fix cars, while scientists haven't done _shit_
> : to repair the universe.
>
> Wasn't aware the universe needed repairing.
>
>
>
I am a physicist, and I can fix cars. I could also re-wire your house,
floor your loft, be a personal trainer, and probably make a halfway
decent attempt at teaching maths, physics or motor car electrics.
Now, if there are any mechanics out there who can tell me what is the
best channel for locating a higgs in the 80 to 100GeV range, and how we
can exclude the terrible backgrounds, then we are probably running even.
Anthony Potts
(I am available for parties also)
Gordon Fitch
| >>that some perceptions are hallucinations or illusions. What
| >>realists believe (if I understand realism aright) is that,
| >>out in the Out There, are entities that correspond pretty
| >>well with human objectifications of phenomena.
o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer) wrote:
| >That's REPRESENTATIONALISM. Naive realists don't talk about "human
| >objectifications of phenomena." Actually no one does, but I assume
| >that's your term for mental represtentations of external things.
| >NR'ists think that we just perceive external objects directly.
Oh, okay. I'm always overcome by having my definitions
corrected. Actually, my dictionary gives three definitions
for _realism_ which contradict one another, you, me, and the
people I've been arguing with about it for the last two or
three epochs. In _The_Dream_of_Reason_, Heinz Pagels seemed
to use the term as I have been using it, but he was only a
physicist.
I didn't invent the term _objectification_, but it fits what
I think goes on in animal minds: phenomena are associated,
grouped, and analyzed, eventually composing ideas of objects.
The objects themselves may or may not exist as such.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
cybergirl
understands and comprehends the existence of illusions, then how does he
explain them for stating that an illusion exists by definition is like
saying that that something is not real...
cybergirl
Gordon Fitch
| I am a physicist, and I can fix cars. I could also re-wire your house,
| floor your loft, be a personal trainer, and probably make a halfway
| decent attempt at teaching maths, physics or motor car electrics.
|
| Now, if there are any mechanics out there who can tell me what is the
| best channel for locating a higgs in the 80 to 100GeV range, and how we
| can exclude the terrible backgrounds, then we are probably running even.
There might be a few. I once met an auto mechanic who could
read Classical Greek easily, and had probably been through
most of the corpus at least once. Maybe not, though; the
problem with advanced physics (as opposed to advanced
classical studies, or advanced stamp-collecting) is that
it's very expensive and yet almost totally useless outside a
very specialized setting.
The tough question with working-class jobs is not whether
you can do them at all, but whether you can hold down a job
doing them. Anyone can slop paint on a wall, but if you
want to get paid for it regularly, you have to put it where
it's supposed to go, not where it isn't supposed to go, and
above all do it fast without getting in anyone's way and
often while working with unpleasant people under unpleasant
conditions. I could do it once, but thirty years of sitting
around in offices pushing bits have probably softened me up
beyond hope of rehabilitation.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Andy Perry
Huemer) wrote:
>g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>
>>that some perceptions are hallucinations or illusions. What
>>realists believe (if I understand realism aright) is that,
>>out in the Out There, are entities that correspond pretty
>>well with human objectifications of phenomena.
>
>That's REPRESENTATIONALISM. Naive realists don't talk about "human
>objectifications of phenomena." Actually no one does, but I assume
>that's your term for mental represtentations of external things.
> NR'ists think that we just perceive external objects directly.
>
>> Thus, a
>>chair _is_ a chair and an electron _is_ an electron.
>
>Everyone believes that, since that's a tautology.
"A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
"A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
--
Andy Perry We search before and after,
Brown University We pine for what is not.
English Department Our sincerest laughter
Andrew...@brown.edu OR With some pain is fraught.
st00...@brownvm.bitnet -- Shelley, d'apres Horace Rumpole
S. LaBonne
>labo...@csc.albany.edu (S. LaBonne):
>| Gordon seemed to be suggesting that a realist who believes in direct
>| perception is committed to holding that perceptions are _infallible_.
>
>Certainly not.
Thanks- I appreciate the clarification.
S. LaBonne
Michael Huemer <o...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>I don't know about the "always" part, but he did frequently insist the
>he KNEW, with certainty (his words) that "this is a pencil" or things
>like that.
> Norman Malcolm also certainly said things like this. In one
>article (forget the title) he averrs that there is no possible future
>development that could cause him to question that 'this is an ink
>bottle'.
Hmm. I wonder what he said after he wiped his specs and discovered
he'd actually been looking at a large black beetle. ;-)
To me the whole conceit that there are infallible objects of knowledge
goes ill with (and is an unnecessary hostage to argumentative fortune
for)realism; it seems much more congenial to representationalism,
since it is "sense-impressions" that have most often been supposed to
be infallible.
John Wilkins
LaBonne) wrote:
| In article <4g1uk3$3...@panix2.panix.com>, Gordon Fitch <g...@panix.com> wrote:
| >
| >What's mystical about realism is not its assertion that
| >stuff exists, which is _not_ to me a particularly mystical
| >assertion since I experience as lot of evidence for it, but
| >that it exists Out There in the same form as it exists in
| >our minds, and that the realist has an assured way of
| >knowing this.
|
| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
| know of one.
Putnam's Internal Realism?
--
John ["Chris"] Wilkins, Head of Communication Services, Walter and Eliza
Hall Institute and Assoc. Prof. of Autochtonic Aetiology, Uni of Ediacara
<http://www.wehi.edu.au/~wilkins/www.html> | <mailto:wil...@wehi.edu.au>
Errors and Omissions Exempted. "Chris" is TM Uni of Ediacara c/- talk.origins.
I do not speak for WEHI, Darwin or my wife.
Charles Palermo
: In article <4ghto7$b...@amenti.rutgers.edu>, o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael
: Huemer) wrote:
: >g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
: >
: >>that some perceptions are hallucinations or illusions. What
: >>realists believe (if I understand realism aright) is that,
: >>out in the Out There, are entities that correspond pretty
: >>well with human objectifications of phenomena.
: >
: >That's REPRESENTATIONALISM. Naive realists don't talk about "human
: >objectifications of phenomena." Actually no one does, but I assume
: >that's your term for mental represtentations of external things.
: > NR'ists think that we just perceive external objects directly.
: >
: >> Thus, a
: >>chair _is_ a chair and an electron _is_ an electron.
: >
: >Everyone believes that, since that's a tautology.
: "A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
: "A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
MJ
S. LaBonne
John Wilkins <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote:
>| Wow. Can you find a philosopher who espouses the doctrine you outline
>| here, with particular emphasis on the "assured" part? I surely don't
>| know of one.
>
>Putnam's Internal Realism?
Well, like many people I'm not at all clear oeven after reading quite
a bit of Putnam's stuff)what this contradiction in terms is really
supposed to signify; but (though Putnam certainly believes in direct
perception rather than representationalism) I _think_ it's not
particular perceptions, but only the hypothetical Ultimate Theory of
Everything, that Putnam supposes to be (by definition) infallible.
Gordon Fitch
| : >> Thus, a
| : >>chair _is_ a chair and an electron _is_ an electron.
o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer) wrote:
| : >Everyone believes that, since that's a tautology.
Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
| : "A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
|
| : "A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
pale...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Charles Palermo):
| You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
"Is" is a copula; "_is_" is not a copula. The first merely
joins two concepts; the second is meant to denote the
declaration of existence and identity, in particular the
existence in the physical world of objects corresponding
(identified) with those in the mind.
--
}"{ Gordon Fitch }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
Andy Perry
Palermo) wrote:
>Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
>: "A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
>
>: "A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
>
>You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
I don't think I have a problem, per se. I was merely pointing out that
the decision to emphasize the copula in the context of the discussion
makes it cease to be understandable simply as a copula. Rather, it has
turned into an assertion about really real-ness.
Jeff Johnson
>Charles Palermo wrote:
>>You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
>I don't think I have a problem, per se. I was merely pointing out that
>the decision to emphasize the copula in the context of the discussion
>makes it cease to be understandable simply as a copula. Rather, it has
>turned into an assertion about really real-ness.
"Somewhere between real and real real." -- Dan Quayle pinpointing
their location to reporters aboard the Quayle campaign plane (Wall
Street Journal, Michael McQueen, Oct. 21, 1988)
Charles Palermo
: g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
: | : >> Thus, a
: | : >>chair _is_ a chair and an electron _is_ an electron.
: o...@rci.rutgers.edu (Michael Huemer) wrote:
: | : >Everyone believes that, since that's a tautology.
: Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
: | : "A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
: |
: | : "A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
: pale...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Charles Palermo):
: | You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
: "Is" is a copula; "_is_" is not a copula. The first merely
: joins two concepts; the second is meant to denote the
: declaration of existence and identity, in particular the
: existence in the physical world of objects corresponding
: (identified) with those in the mind.
Hmm. I don't think I rightly see the difference.
MJ
Charles Palermo
Distribution:
Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
: In article <4gjhmr$f...@news.jhu.edu>, pale...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Charles
: Palermo) wrote:
: >Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
: >: "A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
: >
: >: "A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
: >
: >You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
: I don't think I have a problem, per se. I was merely pointing out that
: the decision to emphasize the copula in the context of the discussion
: makes it cease to be understandable simply as a copula. Rather, it has
: turned into an assertion about really real-ness.
But how is it's being an assertion about really real-ness incompatible with
it's being a tautology?
MJ
Andy Perry
Palermo) wrote:
>> <Andrew_Perry-2...@cis-ts2-slip13.cis.brown.edu>:
>Distribution:
>
>Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
>: In article <4gjhmr$f...@news.jhu.edu>, pale...@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (Charles
>: Palermo) wrote:
>
>: >Andy Perry (Andrew...@Brown.edu) wrote:
>
>: >: "A chair is a chair" is a tautology.
>: >
>: >: "A chair _is_ a chair" is not a tautology.
>: >
>: >You have a problem with the copula. What is it?
>
>: I don't think I have a problem, per se. I was merely pointing out that
>: the decision to emphasize the copula in the context of the discussion
>: makes it cease to be understandable simply as a copula. Rather, it has
>: turned into an assertion about really real-ness.
>
>But how is it's being an assertion about really real-ness incompatible with
>it's being a tautology?
Alriiiiiight, so it's a tautology...[said in a Jewish old man voice]. I
was objecting to the contextual meaning of the statement, which was
something like "this is a tautology and therefore cannot be objected to."
ie, "This is MERELY a tautology." I have no problem with saying that it's
a tautology, as long as we stipulate that this particular form of
tautology contains, in addition to its unobjectionable equation, a
controversial ontological claim.