Opinion: Morality seen as a byproduct of evolution
Jason Spaceman
-------------------------------
In The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Share, Care, and Follow
the Golden Rule (Henry Holt/Times Books, 2004) - the third volume of his trilogy on
the power of belief - science historian Michael Shermer contends that the source of
ethics is solely evolutionary. "Evolution," he writes, "generated the moral
sentiments out of a need for a system to maximize the benefits of living in small
bands and tribes. Evolution created and culture honed moral principles out of an
additional need to curb the passions of the body and mind. And culture, primarily
through organized religion, codified those principles into moral rules and
precepts."
--------------------------------
Read it at
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/opinion/article/0,1299,DRMN_38_2863104,00.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2fn3a
J. Spaceman
John Wilkins
This was, of course, Darwin's argument, but while it explains the origin
of morality, it does not justify it, nor any particular moral system. To
think so is to commit the genetic fallacy (where genesis means the
origins of something). As Darwin himself noted, if we were ants, we
should think that a mother attempting to kill her fertile daughters
would be a right thing, and nobody would intervene to stop her. But Ed
Wilson, among others, has argued that this *would* make it right, and
that it would be justified. I think this is incorrect. The justification
of some moral precept cannot be solely predicated on it maximising
genetic (in the usual sense) fitness, any more than it can be predicated
on it being socially functional. These things explain, perhaps, why we
think the moral principles we hold are right, but they only explain,
they do not justify. And this is an error into which many fall - the two
who did not being TH Huxley in the 1890s, and GE Moore in the 1910s, the
latter arguing against Spencer's evolutionism that the Good was not a
natural property (like genetic fitness).
I have a personal account of morality that is compatible with an
evolutionary etiology, but I will hold off on that for now.
--
Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
"I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
Fletch F. Fletch
But who/what is the arbiter of the right morality?
Slainte,
Fletch
James Willemin
It seems to me that an evolutionary origin for morality is very
reaonable; in fact, it seems like it should be obvious for a highly
social, not particularly abundant species. What I don't get is the
need for justificaiton of a moral system - what is inadequate about
doing the Right Thing (moral value here) because it is the right thing
to do? I am grossly naive here, but isn't morality in some sense
self-justifying? Granted, this admits of moral relativism, but I
don;t really understand why that is a Bad Thing either. Seems to me
that trying to tie morality to absolutes is really an attempt to
impose ill-fitting human constructs onto nature, in the sense that
there are precious few absolutes in the natural world (186,000 miles
per second isn''t just a good idea, it's the law).. I dunno. But I
would be very interested in Dr. Wilkins' ideas.
rich hammett
> Jason Spaceman <notr...@jspaceman.homelinux.org> wrote:
For the third time on this topic, you've lost me.
What does "justify" mean, here? I don't want to give the
Frightened Theists any help, here, but if we describe where
the moral sense comes from, then that's the moral sense.
"Justifying" seems to appeal to an external arbiter. I suspect,
in this case, that the arbiter you are referring to, if there
is one, is the collective judgement of either humanity or of
the individuals involved in any single decision (both actors
and victims).
> I have a personal account of morality that is compatible with an
> evolutionary etiology, but I will hold off on that for now.
I suspect your ideas here would answer some of my questions above,
but I'd really like to know about the "justify" thing.
rich
--
-to reply, it's hot not warm
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ Rich Hammett http://home.hiwaay.net/~rhammett
/ "Better the pride that resides in a citizen of the world;
\ than the pride that divides
/ when a colorful rag is unfurled."
Scott
"James Willemin" <jimwi...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:unkk909pv015of80t...@4ax.com...
Moral relativism has no such *thing* as moral progress.
There is no Thing (meta-ethic) that is right, or bad, to *self-justify*.
Moral systems are no better nor worst than the next.
Your society is no more morally *justified* than that of the Dark Ages or
Saddam's relative moral system; Slavery and torture are ethically
justifiable.
The morality of the political left has no *real* advantages, or
disadvantages, to that of the political right.
Because moral relativism is also non-cognitivism, believing in moral
progress is believing an illusion. Universal human rights are an illusion.
Morality, in this view, has no truth-value.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/r/relativi.htm
http://info1.nwmissouri.edu/~rfield/274guide/274overview1.html#ethical%20relativism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism
http://www.civnet.org/journal/vol3no1/ftasen.htm
Scott
VoiceOfReason
> Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
> It seems to me that an evolutionary origin for morality is very
> reaonable; in fact, it seems like it should be obvious for a highly
> social, not particularly abundant species. What I don't get is the
> need for justificaiton of a moral system - what is inadequate about
> doing the Right Thing (moral value here) because it is the right thing
> to do? I am grossly naive here, but isn't morality in some sense
> self-justifying? Granted, this admits of moral relativism, but I
> don;t really understand why that is a Bad Thing either. Seems to me
> that trying to tie morality to absolutes is really an attempt to
> impose ill-fitting human constructs onto nature, in the sense that
> there are precious few absolutes in the natural world (186,000 miles
> per second isn''t just a good idea, it's the law).. I dunno. But I
> would be very interested in Dr. Wilkins' ideas.
I remember reading of a neanderthal skeleton that had been found. It
had suffered debilitating injuries - I think it was crippled and had
lost an arm. yet it survived for many years following its injuries.
Rather than being coldly tossed aside, this member of the tribe was
kept alive by the others.
The point here is I think man *would* tend to develop morality since
it was in the tribe's best collective interests to do so. Take the
alternative - if a member of the tribe stole from others, what would
be the result on the tribe's cohesion? If instead members shared with
each other, especially when one was ill or injured, that would tend to
give the entire tribe a greater chance at survival. Deviating from
the tribe's collective (or average) interpretation of acceptable
behavior could lead to ostracism or banishment, thus lowering that
individual's chances to survive and pass on its genes.
FWIW.
John Wilkins
Your ears aren't bleeding yet, so I can't have done it right.
>
> What does "justify" mean, here? I don't want to give the
> Frightened Theists any help, here, but if we describe where
> the moral sense comes from, then that's the moral sense.
> "Justifying" seems to appeal to an external arbiter. I suspect,
> in this case, that the arbiter you are referring to, if there
> is one, is the collective judgement of either humanity or of
> the individuals involved in any single decision (both actors
> and victims).
Pretty much, although it is more complex than that plain statement.
I believe, so far as I know, uniquely, that justification is a limited
chain. You cannot justify all the way down to basic principles, because
(a) there are none, as we hold a corpus of values that is evolving and
entirely reviseable, and (b) moral justification only has a partial
transitivity. For example, "don't tell lies" to my son can engender a
series of "why?" questions that ends up with "because it's wrong, that's
why!" When asked why it is wrong, it is my opinion that there is no
final answer. It can be wrong for instrumental reasons, or for
utilitarian reasons, or for religious belief, and so on.
Most moral justification is limited in this way. We seek, almost always
after the fact, to justify or condemn an action in terms of the majority
of held beliefs. This is what moral justification is. Once we seek a
foundational account for it, we exceed moral claims and enter into the
unpleasantly sterile realms of metaethics. As Ludwig said, we have a
form of life, a Lebensform - in fact we have a series of forms of life,
our biology, our individual genetic inheritance, our developmental
trajectory and influences, our social conditions, our cultural
influences and the weather all go to form our Lebensformen from which we
draw justifications.
I am a deontologist in ethics. This is a somewhat quaint view that
treats moral actions as duties imposed by our place in society and all
those nested and inclusive Lebensformen. There is an end to it - when we
say "it is right" or "you have a duty", that is a statement of moral
fact, and like any factual claim it makes or breaks generalisations.
There are no external arbiters, just as there are no God's Eye Views of
factual claims in ontology. We make our duties, and we revise them in
terms of our highest or most core goals, and coherence with the majority
consensus of our Lebensformen.
>
> > I have a personal account of morality that is compatible with an
> > evolutionary etiology, but I will hold off on that for now.
>
> I suspect your ideas here would answer some of my questions above,
> but I'd really like to know about the "justify" thing.
>
I hope they have. You can draw a host of conclusions from this - I am
not a moral absolutist, but I will fight to establish my moral claims
and to protect them from encroachment. I do not think we engage in
actions reflectively the vast bulk of the time, but justify post hoc.
And, here is the kicker, morality is constantly in flux, just like
everything else. There is no final settled morality that is not dead.
John Wilkins
...
> But who/what is the arbiter of the right morality?
>
Why should there be one? We use the morality we have, for all kinds of
historical reasons, but I am reminded of a quip by Putnam: I should use
somebody *else's* value system?
The notion that there must be an eternal or universal morality, or some
ultimate legislator or arbiter, is unsupported except by habit and
prejudice (in the original sense of that word).
John Wilkins
> James Willemin <jimwi...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, 6 May 2004 12:31:07 +0000 (UTC), john...@wilkins.id.au (John
> > Wilkins) wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > It seems to me that an evolutionary origin for morality is very
> > reaonable; in fact, it seems like it should be obvious for a highly
> > social, not particularly abundant species. What I don't get is the
> > need for justificaiton of a moral system - what is inadequate about
> > doing the Right Thing (moral value here) because it is the right thing
> > to do? I am grossly naive here, but isn't morality in some sense
> > self-justifying? Granted, this admits of moral relativism, but I
> > don;t really understand why that is a Bad Thing either. Seems to me
> > that trying to tie morality to absolutes is really an attempt to
> > impose ill-fitting human constructs onto nature, in the sense that
> > there are precious few absolutes in the natural world (186,000 miles
> > per second isn''t just a good idea, it's the law).. I dunno. But I
> > would be very interested in Dr. Wilkins' ideas.
>
> I remember reading of a neanderthal skeleton that had been found. It
> had suffered debilitating injuries - I think it was crippled and had
> lost an arm. yet it survived for many years following its injuries.
> Rather than being coldly tossed aside, this member of the tribe was
> kept alive by the others.
A Japanese Macaque monkey survived despite being born without hands or
feet, raised several litters, and died recently to the sorrow of the
entire country. She was kept alive in extreme conditions partly by the
support of her troop. Elephants, dolphins, and various birds all do
this. It is a reason why ordinary sociality (as opposed to eusociality
such as bees or ants) evolves.
Cast in game theoretic terms, and in particular in terms of an iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma, it makes sense - if you defect to support the
progeny of another, then your own progeny will be defected against. So
long as it is not a zero sum, and hedges against freeriders are in
place, mutual support and cooperation is stable. But none of this is
moral.
>
> The point here is I think man *would* tend to develop morality since
> it was in the tribe's best collective interests to do so. Take the
> alternative - if a member of the tribe stole from others, what would
> be the result on the tribe's cohesion? If instead members shared with
> each other, especially when one was ill or injured, that would tend to
> give the entire tribe a greater chance at survival. Deviating from
> the tribe's collective (or average) interpretation of acceptable
> behavior could lead to ostracism or banishment, thus lowering that
> individual's chances to survive and pass on its genes.
>
> FWIW.
Again, I note, this is what Darwin said in _Descent of Man_ in chapters
IV and V.
LawsonE
"John Wilkins" <john...@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gdelbb.16til35gb4a17N%john...@wilkins.id.au...
> Fletch F. Fletch <notme...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> ...
> > But who/what is the arbiter of the right morality?
> >
> Why should there be one? We use the morality we have, for all kinds of
> historical reasons, but I am reminded of a quip by Putnam: I should use
> somebody *else's* value system?
>
> The notion that there must be an eternal or universal morality, or some
> ultimate legislator or arbiter, is unsupported except by habit and
> prejudice (in the original sense of that word).
>
Me old guru teaches that morality is dictated by the enlightened founders of
the various religions as a way of providing guidance appropriate for the
time and place in which the founder lives. The "goal" of any given moral
teaching is to facilitate growth towards enlightenment in the founder's
followers. The specific guidelines given are appropriate for the time and
place they are given in, but they aren't necessarily due to innate instincts
of the followers so much as an innate instinct of the enlightened person to
attempt to help his followers by giving "good" advice.
John Wilkins
True, and this is why morality evolves, as religions evolve. They have
to, or they will not be propagated (one might say that extreme
conservativism in religion is unfit, in cultural evolution).
quibbler
john...@wilkins.id.au says...
> Jason Spaceman <notr...@jspaceman.homelinux.org> wrote:
>
> > From the article:
> > -------------------------------
> > In The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Share, Care,
> > and Follow the Golden Rule (Henry Holt/Times Books, 2004) - the third
> > volume of his trilogy on the power of belief - science historian Michael
> > Shermer contends that the source of ethics is solely evolutionary.
> > "Evolution," he writes, "generated the moral sentiments out of a need for
> > a system to maximize the benefits of living in small bands and tribes.
> > Evolution created and culture honed moral principles out of an additional
> > need to curb the passions of the body and mind. And culture, primarily
> > through organized religion, codified those principles into moral rules and
> > precepts."
> > --------------------------------
> >
> > Read it at
> >
> http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/opinion/article/0,1299,DRMN_38_286
> 3104,00.html
> > or http://tinyurl.com/2fn3a
> >
> >
> >
> > J. Spaceman
>
> This was, of course, Darwin's argument, but while it explains the origin
> of morality, it does not justify it,
Yes, I think it's clear that it only explains the way in which key human
survival traits may have become hardwired into our brains and now serve
as a sort of "moral intuition". As with any product of evolution, it
may have proven useful for human survival in the past, but that's all we
can potentially say about it. We can't even be sure of its relevance
today, much less as an eternal, abstract standard of right and wrong.
We certainly need additional analysis to defend or reject our moral
intuition as well as to develop the more complicated apparatus for
dealing with complex ethical problems in the modern world.
BTW, are you the John Wilkins who wrote some FAQs for the talk.origins
archives?
--
Quibbler (quibbler247atyahoo.com)
"It is fashionable to wax apocalyptic about the
threat to humanity posed by the AIDS virus, 'mad cow'
disease, and many others, but I think a case can be
made that faith is one of the world's great evils,
comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to
eradicate." -- Richard Dawkins
John Wilkins
Exactly. As I like to quote David Hull: evolution is like the Prussian
military academy that turns out officers admirably equipped to fight the
last war.
>
> BTW, are you the John Wilkins who wrote some FAQs for the talk.origins
> archives?
I *might* be. Depends on what you have to say :-)
LawsonE
ANother part of that particular guru's teaching is that the complement of
morality teaching is "spiritual" teaching -mediation, prayer, etc. Unlike
the moral codes, this part is easily subject to distortion and is usually
lost within a few generations, leading to people attempting to hold to the
letter of the law rather than the spirit. You might be interested in reading
this study on enlightenment and its correlates when it comes out:
http://www.mum.edu/TheReview/#1
Study Describes Experience of Enlightenment
A study to be published in the June issue of the journal Consciousness and
Cognition further characterizes the state of Cosmic Consciousness, and
offers subjects' fascinating descriptions of themselves.
A main discovery of this new research by Fred Travis, Alarik Arenander, and
David DuBois is that individuals can be classified according to a continuum,
ranging from ordinary waking experience on one end to the experience of
Cosmic Consciousness on the other. The researchers term it an
Object-Referral/Self-Referral Continuum of Self-Awareness.
"Where someone stands on this continuum is related to basic attitudes and
behaviors," said Dr. Travis, first author on the study. "For example, some
people are completely overshadowed by experience while others seem to be
able to rise above it."
This continuum is based on descriptions of higher states in Maharishi Vedic
Science(SM) and descriptions of self-awareness, and on brain-wave patterns
during tasks in individuals reporting the experience of witnessing sleep for
at least one year.
Three Groups of Subjects
This research compared measures in three groups of subjects. The first group
of nonmeditating subjects described themselves predominantly in terms of
their thoughts, feelings, and behavior: "I guess I'm open to new experiences
. . . ." or "I tend to appreciate those things that are different . . . ."
or "I kind of like to forge my own way." They were "embedded" in or
identified with their thoughts, feelings, and actions.
"This could be characterized as an object-referral style," Dr. Travis says.
"One is what one does."
A second group of subjects, who had practiced the Transcendental Meditation
technique for an average of seven years, described themselves as directing
thinking and behavior -- the first stages of the self "de-embedding" or
separating from the processes of thinking and behavior. "I'm my own
capabilities; my ability to learn," said one. Another said, "I am my ability
to perceive and be aware." Yet these subjects still described themselves
primarily in terms of what they did.
Subjects Experience Enlightenment
A third group of subjects, who had practiced the Transcendental Meditation
technique for an average of 24 years, described themselves as separate from
what they were thinking or doing -- their identities, their selves were
completely "de-embedded" from the processes of thinking and behavior.
"My self is immeasurably vast . . . on a physical level -- not just
restricted to this physical environment," said one. And another said, "It's
my Being. There's just a channel underneath that's just underlying
everything. It's my essence there and it just doesn't stop where I stop."
The researchers term this style of functioning as Self-referral. "In this
state, the Self has its own status," Dr. Travis said. "It is defined in
terms of its own structure, independent of objects and processes of
knowing."
Distinct Brain-Wave Patterns
In an earlier study these subjects were found to have distinct brain-wave
patterns. With growth of higher states, the frontal lobes become more
coherent in their functioning. The frontal lobes are the seat of moral
reasoning, decision making, planning, working memory and sense of self.
Higher coherence in frontal areas supports higher levels of moral reasoning,
planning, and sense of self in these subjects.
"Though many scientifically minded people may consider enlightenment either
imaginary, impractical, or simply outside the boundaries of scientific
investigation, the implications of the data are that enlightenment can be
scientifically described," Dr. Travis said. "We've now come at this from
three different angles: responses during unstructured interviews, supported
by factor analysis of scores on psychological tests and brain-wave patterns
during tasks."
Pithecanthropus Erectus
A sociologist would tell us something similar but with a slight variation:
Morality is developed by the society and disseminated through religion.
However, the "goal" is not towards enlightenment, but to allow a
society to function. The laws are guidelines that have external
punishment and reward, morality has internal punishment and reward.
Often the laws and the more's are the same, but the more's add the
punishment of the soul.
--
"The countries the most famous and the most respected of antiquity are
those which distinguished themselves by promoting and patronizing
science, and on the contrary those which neglected or discouraged it are
universally denominated rude and barbarous. The patronage which Britain
has shown to Arts, Science and Literature has given her a better
established and lasting rank in the world than she ever acquired by her
arms."
Thomas Paine
Pithecanthropus Erectus
> not a moral absolutist, but I will fight to establish my moral claims
> and to protect them from encroachment.
This brief sentence is worth saving in my special Wilkins file; it
teaches so much and does it succinctly.
Thanks, Dr. John.
I do not think we engage in
> actions reflectively the vast bulk of the time, but justify post hoc.
> And, here is the kicker, morality is constantly in flux, just like
> everything else. There is no final settled morality that is not dead.
--
Fletch F. Fletch
> Fletch F. Fletch <notme...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> ...
>> But who/what is the arbiter of the right morality?
>>
> Why should there be one? We use the morality we have, for all kinds of
> historical reasons, but I am reminded of a quip by Putnam: I should
> use somebody *else's* value system?
>
> The notion that there must be an eternal or universal morality, or
> some ultimate legislator or arbiter, is unsupported except by habit
> and prejudice (in the original sense of that word).
Perhaps I read something into your post that wasn't there.
Slainte,
Fletch
quibbler
john...@wilkins.id.au says...
Perhaps, but I wouldn't knock evolution too much on that score.
Actually, as I'm sure you know, evolution also requires that there be a
certain amount of natural diversity in the population, so that it can
adapt in new directions if the old survival traits stop working. So
there will be a small percentage of Prussian officers, like Guderian,
with very different views on warfare and they will get quickly promoted
if a new war invalidates the conventional strategies and tactics.
> >
> > BTW, are you the John Wilkins who wrote some FAQs for the talk.origins
> > archives?
>
> I *might* be. Depends on what you have to say :-)
I meant to preface my remark by saying that this was purely idle
curiosity combined with an appreciation for the fact that there are
probably other people in the world with the same name. You certainly
don't have to divulge any private information on that basis, though I
will note that your writing style and word use does seem a tad similar
to that chap at talk.origins :). I have no complaints, as yet, about
what I've read from that person...who may or may not be you, of course.
But I'm not sure that I've read how you think that we ought to justify
moral principles. Surely naturalistic science has some role in this
process.
quibbler
tuib...@spam.earthlink.net says...
> LawsonE wrote:
>
> > "John Wilkins" <john...@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
> > news:1gdelbb.16til35gb4a17N%john...@wilkins.id.au...
> >
> >>Fletch F. Fletch <notme...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>...
> >>
> >>>But who/what is the arbiter of the right morality?
> >>>
> >>
> >>Why should there be one? We use the morality we have, for all kinds of
> >>historical reasons, but I am reminded of a quip by Putnam: I should use
> >>somebody *else's* value system?
> >>
> >>The notion that there must be an eternal or universal morality, or some
> >>ultimate legislator or arbiter, is unsupported except by habit and
> >>prejudice (in the original sense of that word).
> >>
> >
> >
> > Me old guru teaches that morality is dictated by the enlightened founders of
> > the various religions as a way of providing guidance appropriate for the
> > time and place in which the founder lives. The "goal" of any given moral
> > teaching is to facilitate growth towards enlightenment in the founder's
> > followers. The specific guidelines given are appropriate for the time and
> > place they are given in, but they aren't necessarily due to innate instincts
> > of the followers so much as an innate instinct of the enlightened person to
> > attempt to help his followers by giving "good" advice.
> >
>
> A sociologist would tell us something similar but with a slight variation:
>
> Morality is developed by the society and disseminated through religion.
> However, the "goal" is not towards enlightenment, but to allow a
> society to function.
Sure, so in this sense, one only seeks to justify the moral standards to
the extent that they serve the desired function in society. If there
are other courses of behavior which provide the same societal benefits
without incurring any greater societal costs then those routes would be
equally justified, on the functionalist view.
> The laws are guidelines that have external
> punishment and reward, morality has internal punishment and reward.
> Often the laws and the more's are the same, but the more's add the
> punishment of the soul.
I'm not sure about a soul, but moral offenses could be said to produce a
sense of guilt in those who share belief in a particular system of
mores. Since there are some people who seem to manage to not feel guilt
for transgressing mores, we have laws as well, to make sure that some
minimum level of punishment is meted out to rule breakers.
LawsonE
"Pithecanthropus Erectus" <tuib...@spam.earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:B8Jmc.10875$Hs1....@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net...
Sure, but enlightenment, in me old guru's eyes, is a function of a fully
mature, healthy nervous system. You see, you're assuming there's no such
thing as "enlightenment" nor "soul" that should enter into the equation. The
physiological evidence is mounting that there is such a "thing," at least in
the sense that there is a physiological state behind the various claims
made in the various religious and spiritual traditions (whether this is
really an immortal part of a human, and so on, isn't and can't be addressed
by any physiological study, I suspect).
quibbler
sc...@nospam.net says...
> Moral relativism has no such *thing* as moral progress.
> There is no Thing (meta-ethic) that is right, or bad, to *self-justify*.
> Moral systems are no better nor worst than the next.
Perhaps this is true in the classical theory of moral relativism. But
as has been suggested, moral relativism in the real world is somewhat
different. In actual fact there do appear to be certain evolutionary
standards encoded into the human psyche to aid survival. Like in the
studies with certain monkeys (capuchins monkeys I believe), humans have
an innate sense of fairness and most of us don't like to see it get
transgressed. Almost universally, moral systems, from the Code of Manu
to the Sermon on the Mount or animist religions there is the idea that
people should not inflict harm upon others senselessly, that people
should respect some type of social or family unit and that we should at
least occasionally help the weak or infirm. Those types of standards,
not coincidentally, are pretty much indispensable to being able to live
and survive in a large group. Sure, it might seem like certain cultures
from head hunters in the amazon to vikings and mongols have been pretty
brutal and blood thirsty at times. But any close analysis shows that
they had a code of ethics that they had a code of behavior that included
these things, at least for members of their group.
> Your society is no more morally *justified* than that of the Dark Ages or
> Saddam's relative moral system; Slavery and torture are ethically
> justifiable.
I'm not sure that this follows at all merely from the possibility of
moral relativism. Like I say, I think that an morally relative system
must be squared with individual and group instincts for survival.
Systems that violate one or both of those imperatives will be found to
be inconsistent with the values of any group larger than a size of one.
So, I think that the reality is that even within saddam's regime people
recognized that his wanton and senseless cruelty threatened to
destabilize Iraqi society. At best some people may have accepted his
dictatorship and terror tactics as a way of keeping order. But they did
not necessarily approve of the methods and probably realized that his
approach would create chaos if practiced generally.
> The morality of the political left has no *real* advantages, or
> disadvantages, to that of the political right.
Except that, at bottom, I think both groups want similar things. They
just believe that fundamentally different approaches are necessary to
get there. Sure it seems that many repugs are short-sighted, self-
absorbed conformists and that the word liberal is almost synonymous with
libertine. But those are almost certainly distortions. Really we all
want a good life. But many right-wingers have given up on the idea that
the majority of people will ever have a good life and instead seek it
primarily for themselves. Many liberals still think that the best way
to have a good life is to cooperate with those around you and look out
for each other.
> Because moral relativism is also non-cognitivism,
It's not quite. In the wikipedia link you provide it says, "Note that
non-cognitivism is not saying that whether ethical sentences are true or
false is "subjective" (compare Ethical subjectivism)"
A true moral relativist says that traditional, absolutist definitions of
morality are mistaken, especially to the extent that they propose
universal standards. However, that's not the same as saying there is no
such thing as morality or that it is an incoherent idea. In any given
group there will still be codes of conduct to which one will have to
adhere.
> believing in moral
> progress is believing an illusion.
I'm not sure I believe that either. There could certainly be progress
for individual groups, especially when compared to a previous history of
abuse. Even a moral relativist might say that people who were oppressed
against their will by a colonial power were better off when they were
free to exercise their own wills. In the same way, a slave, even from a
moral relativist, is a person who is not allowed to live his life as he
sees fit and this would mean that, from the slave perspective, the
institution of slavery could still be judged wrong. It might be seen as
moral progress, therefore, if slavery all around the world were
abolished.
> Universal human rights are an illusion.
> Morality, in this view, has no truth-value.
No, it has many values. But as I've said, I don't think that there are
a lot of 100% moral relativists anyway.
catshark
wrote:
[...]
>> >
>> > BTW, are you the John Wilkins who wrote some FAQs for the talk.origins
>> > archives?
>>
>> I *might* be. Depends on what you have to say :-)
>
>I meant to preface my remark by saying that this was purely idle
>curiosity combined with an appreciation for the fact that there are
>probably other people in the world with the same name.
Some of them are even famous . . . well, in certain circles.
>You certainly
>don't have to divulge any private information on that basis, though I
>will note that your writing style and word use does seem a tad similar
>to that chap at talk.origins :).
We occasionally let him roam around a bit . . .
<http://members.dodo.com.au/~wilkinsjandp/darwiniana.html>
>I have no complaints, as yet, about
>what I've read from that person...who may or may not be you, of course.
>But I'm not sure that I've read how you think that we ought to justify
>moral principles. Surely naturalistic science has some role in this
>process.
I hope you have a little time to spare . . .
[Helpful hint: ask him for references.]
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
Nunc Id Vides, Nunc Ne Vides
- Unseen University Motto -
Pithecanthropus Erectus
>
>
> Sure, but enlightenment, in me old guru's eyes, is a function of a fully
> mature, healthy nervous system. You see, you're assuming there's no such
> thing as "enlightenment" nor "soul" that should enter into the equation. The
> physiological evidence is mounting that there is such a "thing," at least in
> the sense that there is a physiological state behind the various claims
> made in the various religious and spiritual traditions (whether this is
> really an immortal part of a human, and so on, isn't and can't be addressed
> by any physiological study, I suspect).
>
>
And in your eyes, what? Gurus can only take you so far, and at some
point you have to think for yourself. And I am curious as to what
physiological evidence there be for a soul.
John Wilkins
> In article <1gdf4wj.17duzbm15ro7gkN%john...@wilkins.id.au>,
> john...@wilkins.id.au says...
> > quibbler <quibb...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >
...
> > > BTW, are you the John Wilkins who wrote some FAQs for the talk.origins
> > > archives?
> >
> > I *might* be. Depends on what you have to say :-)
>
> I meant to preface my remark by saying that this was purely idle
> curiosity combined with an appreciation for the fact that there are
> probably other people in the world with the same name. You certainly
> don't have to divulge any private information on that basis, though I
> will note that your writing style and word use does seem a tad similar
> to that chap at talk.origins :). I have no complaints, as yet, about
> what I've read from that person...who may or may not be you, of course.
> But I'm not sure that I've read how you think that we ought to justify
> moral principles. Surely naturalistic science has some role in this
> process.
Alright, it's a fair cop. You got me. (Besides, that quisling Pieret
already sprung the trap.)
That is just the point - I don't think we justify moral principles. I
have an arcane and probably not original account of this. Moral
justification is a "language game", as Wittgenstein referred to
linguistic procedures in a language community. Its exemplar is "Act A is
right [wrong] because it is [not] in accord with moral principle M". But
we do not have, *within* moral language and justification, the exemplar
"Moral principle M is right [wrong]... etc.". This is not a moral
argument or justification.
I argue that right is simply right. *Why* it is right is not a moral
question, but something that we can give an etiology for or an
instrumental defence of, but none of this goes to either shore up its
rightness or provide a reason to rationally revise it. Rightness is, in
the end, a matter of values.
I can give the *etiology* of moral principles, thus: "M is in force
because in the past it supported a functional system", or "M is in force
because it has the result that M-followers will persist and succeed in
social cases, while ~M-followers will do less well or badly." The former
account is what is known in the literature on functions as a Wright
function, or proper function (there is a difference between these two,
though); and the latter is what is called a Cummins function, or
homeostatic function.
I believe moral principles are a mixture of historical contingency
(recall the Toranic fundamentalist we had here not so long ago who
argues that *every injunction* in the Torah was a moral absolute,
including, at random the hanging of executed criminals on trees?) and a
broad (and changing) summary of generalisations of past experience. Tell
someone that they should not kill, and you are, in part, summarising a
rule of social order. Tell them that it is wrong to lie, and you are
summarising the fact that societies that are more honest than not will
do well in trade and cooperation - it becomes a nonzero-sum game. And so
on.
Such accidents and conventional inductive generalisations are what
*constitute* duties, but in the end, a given act is justified only in
terms of the principle. My relativism is an objective relativism - a
moral principle is only useful in the real world, and a truly perverse
moral code would result in a society that would mitigate against the
wellbeing of its members.
We must take the naturalistic fallacy seriously, but that doesn't mean
that we must have moral absolutes. Morals can evolve, but (in our
language community at least) justification is always in terms of moral
principles, and not of the moral principles themselves, which forces an
infinite regress of the Third Man variety.
Hope this helps.
LawsonE
>
> >
> >
> > Sure, but enlightenment, in me old guru's eyes, is a function of a fully
> > mature, healthy nervous system. You see, you're assuming there's no such
> > thing as "enlightenment" nor "soul" that should enter into the equation.
The
> > physiological evidence is mounting that there is such a "thing," at
least in
> > the sense that there is a physiological state behind the various claims
> > made in the various religious and spiritual traditions (whether this is
> > really an immortal part of a human, and so on, isn't and can't be
addressed
> > by any physiological study, I suspect).
> >
> >
>
> And in your eyes, what?
I find his arguments interesting, and based on the mounting evidence,
correct, insomuch as he's arguing from the perspective of internal
"experience" rather than based on external scientific measurements.
Gurus can only take you so far, and at some
> point you have to think for yourself.
I use the term "guru" loosely. He refuses to use it, nor to give explicit
advice to people on anything save meditation-related issues. He believes
that there are enough religious traditions around already that provide
behavioral guidelines.
And I am curious as to what
> physiological evidence there be for a soul.
>
>
I was talking about physical evidence that there is a physiological state
that gives rise to reports of "soul," not that there is physical evidence of
"soul" in the religious sense of an "immortal part of a human."
Matt Silberstein
(John Wilkins):
I would like to add something. ISTM that the real issue is not
justification, where I agree with you, but analysis. It is moral
to torture, for a current example, to get information. This
requires an analysis of the situation until we get to some set of
basic principles. I can't justify my principles in a rigorous
fashion, but I can argue that if you agree with principle 1 and 2
and 3, then action X is moral. I think people confuse the
analysis with justification.
--
Matt Silberstein
Donate to the C.A.N.D.L.E.S. Museum, burnt down by arsonists who wrote
"Remember Timothy McVeigh" on the wall.
C.A.N.D.L.E.S. stands for Children of Auschwitz Nazi Deadly Lab Experiments
Survivors.
www.candles-museum.com
quibbler
matts...@ix.netcom.nospamcom says...
>
> I would like to add something. ISTM that the real issue is not
> justification, where I agree with you, but analysis. It is moral
> to torture, for a current example, to get information.
Unsurprisingly, I've had this very topic come up in conversation as
well. I think the person wanted me to agree that torture was always an
immoral thing, in principle. But since I'm a consequentialist of sorts,
in order for me to say that torture is wrong, I would have to say that
there would be no possible circumstance under which I will feel it might
be acceptable. While I don't favor torture in general, I'm not
convinced that I could absolutely rule out any possible situation in
which torture would be unacceptable. Of course, this quickly lead to
the accusation that I was "no better than Saddam" and other similar
sorts of suggestions. But in response to such a statement, I think that
some circumstances may be such that they actually do "justify" actions
including torture. Of course, I realize this may not be the sense in
which we want to talk about ultimate moral justification, and perhaps
you feel that analysis of the situation for rules is a better route to
go.
But this seems to work on at least some level. On a basic view
saddam is held to be immoral because he acted without worrying about
morally justifying his behaviors. However, if we just blithely announce
that ultimately no moral principles can be justified then we encounter
the same objection that most people raise about "moral relativity" --
namely, that it seems impossible to condemn any behavior. I would say
that we can talk about moral justification, at least in terms of other
moral principles like a "greatest good". Furthermore, if I wanted to
distinguish my theoretical use of torture from saddam's, perhaps the
easiest way would merely be to explain the circumstances in which I used
torture as opposed to saddam and hope that other people agreed that my
standards, goals, etc were morally sufficient/superior, whereas saddam's
were not.
I mean, I suppose that, in an absolute sense, both saddam and I
would be willing to resort to torture, and in that sense we are the
same. However, I think that there's an important difference in the
matter of degree to which we might practice these things and the
standards which we would use. After all, some may argue that prison
itself is a form of torture and that would make most of us complicit in
abetting torture unless we felt that there was some justification for
punishment being inflicted upon criminals.
Jim07D4
>In article <msrp90d0nlqesfus3...@4ax.com>,
>matts...@ix.netcom.nospamcom says...
>
>>
>> I would like to add something. ISTM that the real issue is not
>> justification, where I agree with you, but analysis. It is moral
>> to torture, for a current example, to get information.
>
> Unsurprisingly, I've had this very topic come up in conversation as
>well. I think the person wanted me to agree that torture was always an
>immoral thing, in principle. But since I'm a consequentialist of sorts,
>in order for me to say that torture is wrong, I would have to say that
>there would be no possible circumstance under which I will feel it might
>be acceptable. While I don't favor torture in general, I'm not
>convinced that I could absolutely rule out any possible situation in
>which torture would be unacceptable. ...
...
WHen there is a clear "loser" in one or more of the alternative
decisions on what to do, a way to test a consequentialist moral
position might be: If a net good is the outcome of from torturing
someone and would be even more if that someone were me, would I
volunteer? After all, if it produces the best moral consequences,
isn't that my guiding principle?
"The moral good is optimized by a situation that produces the best net
outcome for me" might be the consequentialism of a sociopath. We are
all along the spectrum somewhere, I suspect.
Jim07D4
quibbler
Yes well Wittgenstein may be right. However, it seems like we can at
least say some things about whether a particular moral principle works
as advertised. I know that ol' Ludwig approached everything like it
needed to be rigorously proved, but it might be better to adopt a bit
more of a pragmatic standard and merely say that a moral principle is
itself justified to the extent that it consistently promotes results and
behaviors in accord with ones values. That might not be sufficient as a
justification in absolutist terms. But it seems like that could be
sufficient as justification in morally relativist systems.
> Its exemplar is "Act A is
> right [wrong] because it is [not] in accord with moral principle M". But
> we do not have, *within* moral language and justification, the exemplar
> "Moral principle M is right [wrong]... etc.". This is not a moral
> argument or justification.
This seems like an analytic (in Kantian terms) approach to finding
justification. I'm not sure that merely by analyzing the meaning of
words we can necessarily conclude that certain things are right or
wrong. We at least have to see their actual consequences.
>
> I argue that right is simply right. *Why* it is right is not a moral
> question, but something that we can give an etiology for or an
> instrumental defence of, but none of this goes to either shore up its
> rightness or provide a reason to rationally revise it. Rightness is, in
> the end, a matter of values.
I can agree there.
>
> I can give the *etiology* of moral principles, thus: "M is in force
> because in the past it supported a functional system", or "M is in force
> because it has the result that M-followers will persist and succeed in
> social cases, while ~M-followers will do less well or badly." The former
> account is what is known in the literature on functions as a Wright
> function, or proper function (there is a difference between these two,
> though); and the latter is what is called a Cummins function, or
> homeostatic function.
Yeah, I think I may have vaguely heard of those in the dim mists of
time.
>
> I believe moral principles are a mixture of historical contingency
> (recall the Toranic fundamentalist we had here not so long ago who
> argues that *every injunction* in the Torah was a moral absolute,
> including, at random the hanging of executed criminals on trees?) and a
> broad (and changing) summary of generalisations of past experience. Tell
> someone that they should not kill, and you are, in part, summarising a
> rule of social order. Tell them that it is wrong to lie, and you are
> summarising the fact that societies that are more honest than not will
> do well in trade and cooperation - it becomes a nonzero-sum game. And so
> on.
Of course, I'm not sure how many people would accept that it's never
wrong to lie merely because more honest societies have done better. It
may still seem justified under the circumstances and unlikely to impact
society as a whole. I suppose I may be overly focused on details, but
I'm doubtful that rules as rigid as "don't ever lie" would have much
survival value at all. Absolutist standards seem far more likely to die
out as exceptions are encountered over evolutionary time scales. I'd
suspect that evolutionarily based standards would tend to be somewhat
general and subjective.
>
> Such accidents and conventional inductive generalisations are what
> *constitute* duties,
That's an interesting take on duty ethics. Many people also tend to see
duties in absolutist terms.
> but in the end, a given act is justified only in
> terms of the principle. My relativism is an objective relativism - a
> moral principle is only useful in the real world, and a truly perverse
> moral code would result in a society that would mitigate against the
> wellbeing of its members.
Again, I could agree with you there. Rather than good or bad being
eternal or abstract standards they only exist with reference to actual
instances of intentional beings deciding how to act in the world.
> We must take the naturalistic fallacy seriously, but that doesn't mean
> that we must have moral absolutes. Morals can evolve, but (in our
> language community at least) justification is always in terms of moral
> principles, and not of the moral principles themselves, which forces an
> infinite regress of the Third Man variety.
>
> Hope this helps.
Oh, I'm sure it helps to some degree in straightening out the
intricacies of a naturalistic ethical system.
Jim07D4
>In article <1gdgmw8.13xzjlnpduwt3N%john...@wilkins.id.au>,
>john...@wilkins.id.au says...
...
>> That is just the point - I don't think we justify moral principles. I
>> have an arcane and probably not original account of this. Moral
>> justification is a "language game", as Wittgenstein referred to
>> linguistic procedures in a language community.
>
>Yes well Wittgenstein may be right. However, it seems like we can at
>least say some things about whether a particular moral principle works
>as advertised. I know that ol' Ludwig approached everything like it
>needed to be rigorously proved, but it might be better to adopt a bit
>more of a pragmatic standard and merely say that a moral principle is
>itself justified to the extent that it consistently promotes results and
>behaviors in accord with ones values. That might not be sufficient as a
>justification in absolutist terms. But it seems like that could be
>sufficient as justification in morally relativist systems.
...
It is as absolute as are one's values, which is not addressed here.
Is a moral principle really *justified to* the extent to which it
consistently promotes results and behaviors in accord with one's
values, or is it *useful to* ... the extent to which it consistently
promotes results and behaviors in accord with one's values? If only
useful to, then the fact that a moral principle consistently promotes
results etc. is not a justification, since it depends on the
justification for one's values. It seems to push the problem back a
step, not resolve it.
I guess you are saying that "useful to.." in this context is pragmatic
justification. THat makes sense, but it leaves the question of how
one's values are justified. Pragmatically? Or are they just givens
that need no justification?
Jim07D4
Matt Silberstein
<quibb...@yahoo.com>:
>In article <msrp90d0nlqesfus3...@4ax.com>,
>matts...@ix.netcom.nospamcom says...
>
>>
>> I would like to add something. ISTM that the real issue is not
>> justification, where I agree with you, but analysis. It is moral
>> to torture, for a current example, to get information.
That was, of course, suppose to be "Is it", not 'It is". FWIIW, I
come down on the side that torture is not moral.
> Unsurprisingly, I've had this very topic come up in conversation as
>well. I think the person wanted me to agree that torture was always an
>immoral thing, in principle. But since I'm a consequentialist of sorts,
>in order for me to say that torture is wrong, I would have to say that
>there would be no possible circumstance under which I will feel it might
>be acceptable. While I don't favor torture in general, I'm not
>convinced that I could absolutely rule out any possible situation in
>which torture would be unacceptable. Of course, this quickly lead to
>the accusation that I was "no better than Saddam" and other similar
>sorts of suggestions. But in response to such a statement, I think that
>some circumstances may be such that they actually do "justify" actions
>including torture. Of course, I realize this may not be the sense in
>which we want to talk about ultimate moral justification, and perhaps
>you feel that analysis of the situation for rules is a better route to
>go.
I think I am a conesquentialist as well, but my ethical
understanding does not come from the same academic basis as the
rest of my philosophy, so I don't have the formal words. I will
allow that torture could be more in some cases, but I can't think
of any.
As an aside, I recommend the books by Susan Matthews, starting
with (IIANM) _An Exchange of Hostages_. A SF series with the main
character an official torturer for the space navy. Very
disturbing books.
> But this seems to work on at least some level. On a basic view
>saddam is held to be immoral because he acted without worrying about
>morally justifying his behaviors. However, if we just blithely announce
>that ultimately no moral principles can be justified then we encounter
>the same objection that most people raise about "moral relativity" --
>namely, that it seems impossible to condemn any behavior.
So it would seem, but that is wrong. I can justify my morality
*to myself*. And I can state my principles and see who agrees
with them. I don't need my views to have absolute authority from
on high.
> I would say
>that we can talk about moral justification, at least in terms of other
>moral principles like a "greatest good".
I see that as analysis, not justification. If I say X is wrong
because of Y, I am not giving a justification for my moral views,
I am presenting them.
> Furthermore, if I wanted to
>distinguish my theoretical use of torture from saddam's, perhaps the
>easiest way would merely be to explain the circumstances in which I used
>torture as opposed to saddam and hope that other people agreed that my
>standards, goals, etc were morally sufficient/superior, whereas saddam's
>were not.
> I mean, I suppose that, in an absolute sense, both saddam and I
>would be willing to resort to torture, and in that sense we are the
>same.
Because I am human nothing human is beyond me.
> However, I think that there's an important difference in the
>matter of degree to which we might practice these things and the
>standards which we would use. After all, some may argue that prison
>itself is a form of torture and that would make most of us complicit in
>abetting torture unless we felt that there was some justification for
>punishment being inflicted upon criminals.
It has become quite acceptable in the U.S., at least in and
according to TV and movies, to threaten people with rape in
prison in order to get them to talk.
John Wilkins
> In article <1gdgmw8.13xzjlnpduwt3N%john...@wilkins.id.au>,
> john...@wilkins.id.au says...
> > quibbler <quibb...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >
...
> > > But I'm not sure that I've read how you think that we ought to justify
> > > moral principles. Surely naturalistic science has some role in this
> > > process.
> >
...
> > That is just the point - I don't think we justify moral principles. I
> > have an arcane and probably not original account of this. Moral
> > justification is a "language game", as Wittgenstein referred to
> > linguistic procedures in a language community.
>
> Yes well Wittgenstein may be right. However, it seems like we can at
> least say some things about whether a particular moral principle works
> as advertised. I know that ol' Ludwig approached everything like it
> needed to be rigorously proved, but it might be better to adopt a bit
> more of a pragmatic standard and merely say that a moral principle is
> itself justified to the extent that it consistently promotes results and
> behaviors in accord with ones values. That might not be sufficient as a
> justification in absolutist terms. But it seems like that could be
> sufficient as justification in morally relativist systems.
The Tractarian Wittgenstein was a rigorous prover. The latter
Wittgenstein seemed not to be except in maths. I read him more as a
pragmatist.
But this is a utilitarian standard. I don't think we even need that -
something is right if one acts according to one's moral principles.
One's moral principles may maximise one's value preferences, but that is
a matter of analysis rather than justification (nice distinction, Matt).
>
>
> > Its exemplar is "Act A is
> > right [wrong] because it is [not] in accord with moral principle M". But
> > we do not have, *within* moral language and justification, the exemplar
> > "Moral principle M is right [wrong]... etc.". This is not a moral
> > argument or justification.
>
> This seems like an analytic (in Kantian terms) approach to finding
> justification. I'm not sure that merely by analyzing the meaning of
> words we can necessarily conclude that certain things are right or
> wrong. We at least have to see their actual consequences.
And I think that by analysing terms all we know at the end is how the
terms are used. We certainly have not justified them, and I am unsure
how we ever could - as Ludwig might say, "That is just how we use them".
>
> >
> > I argue that right is simply right. *Why* it is right is not a moral
> > question, but something that we can give an etiology for or an
> > instrumental defence of, but none of this goes to either shore up its
> > rightness or provide a reason to rationally revise it. Rightness is, in
> > the end, a matter of values.
>
> I can agree there.
>
>
> >
> > I can give the *etiology* of moral principles, thus: "M is in force
> > because in the past it supported a functional system", or "M is in force
> > because it has the result that M-followers will persist and succeed in
> > social cases, while ~M-followers will do less well or badly." The former
> > account is what is known in the literature on functions as a Wright
> > function, or proper function (there is a difference between these two,
> > though); and the latter is what is called a Cummins function, or
> > homeostatic function.
>
> Yeah, I think I may have vaguely heard of those in the dim mists of
> time.
There are similar distinctions in social science philosophy and in other
disciplines. I use the biology one simply because I think it is
fundamental to any Lebensform account (unlike Wittgenstein). If a lion
could talk, we could understand him according to our best understanding
of Wright and Cummins functions; and in particular those that we, too,
share.
>
>
> >
> > I believe moral principles are a mixture of historical contingency
> > (recall the Toranic fundamentalist we had here not so long ago who
> > argues that *every injunction* in the Torah was a moral absolute,
> > including, at random the hanging of executed criminals on trees?) and a
> > broad (and changing) summary of generalisations of past experience. Tell
> > someone that they should not kill, and you are, in part, summarising a
> > rule of social order. Tell them that it is wrong to lie, and you are
> > summarising the fact that societies that are more honest than not will
> > do well in trade and cooperation - it becomes a nonzero-sum game. And so
> > on.
>
> Of course, I'm not sure how many people would accept that it's never
> wrong to lie merely because more honest societies have done better. It
Which was the point of the "more honest than not" qualifier. There may,
indeed, be a stable equilibrium in a population of cheaters. It will
lead to cheater detection devices until the costs to each variety exceed
any possible benefits of cheating.
> may still seem justified under the circumstances and unlikely to impact
> society as a whole. I suppose I may be overly focused on details, but
> I'm doubtful that rules as rigid as "don't ever lie" would have much
> survival value at all. Absolutist standards seem far more likely to die
> out as exceptions are encountered over evolutionary time scales. I'd
> suspect that evolutionarily based standards would tend to be somewhat
> general and subjective.
We arern't in dispute here.
>
>
> >
> > Such accidents and conventional inductive generalisations are what
> > *constitute* duties,
>
> That's an interesting take on duty ethics. Many people also tend to see
> duties in absolutist terms.
I'm nothing if not... interesting (for Bohrian values of that
adjective). Yes, this is my fusion of deontic ethics and language games
and moral relativity. Duties are absolute, but only within the moral
language game G of a community C. In other terms:
(In C) (in G) [Duty D is absolute]
People make a fallacious move from the fact that in G and C D is an
absolute prescription to the unwarranted claim that in all Cs and in all
Gs D is absolute. Any member of C playing G must treat D as absolute -
that is the nature of D statements. I doubt there is a necessary, and
sufficient, universal account of Ds common to all Gs in all Cs. [Or, he
added slyly, in other words, D-statements have a family resemblance...]
>
> > but in the end, a given act is justified only in
> > terms of the principle. My relativism is an objective relativism - a
> > moral principle is only useful in the real world, and a truly perverse
> > moral code would result in a society that would mitigate against the
> > wellbeing of its members.
>
> Again, I could agree with you there. Rather than good or bad being
> eternal or abstract standards they only exist with reference to actual
> instances of intentional beings deciding how to act in the world.
That I think is so true I wonder at it not being a truism. I sometimes
wonder at absolutist claims like Singer's act utilitarianism...
>
>
> > We must take the naturalistic fallacy seriously, but that doesn't mean
> > that we must have moral absolutes. Morals can evolve, but (in our
> > language community at least) justification is always in terms of moral
> > principles, and not of the moral principles themselves, which forces an
> > infinite regress of the Third Man variety.
> >
> > Hope this helps.
>
> Oh, I'm sure it helps to some degree in straightening out the
> intricacies of a naturalistic ethical system.
Is that a good thing, or a bad thing? ;-)
SMChristenson
> From the article:
> -------------------------------
> In The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Share, Care, and Follow
> the Golden Rule (Henry Holt/Times Books, 2004) - the third volume of his trilogy on
> the power of belief - science historian Michael Shermer contends that the source of
> ethics is solely evolutionary. "Evolution," he writes, "generated the moral
> sentiments out of a need for a system to maximize the benefits of living in small
> bands and tribes. Evolution created and culture honed moral principles out of an
> additional need to curb the passions of the body and mind. And culture, primarily
> through organized religion, codified those principles into moral rules and
> precepts."
> --------------------------------
>
> Read it at
> http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/opinion/article/0,1299,DRMN_38_2863104,00.html
> or http://tinyurl.com/2fn3a
>
>
>
> J. Spaceman
For me, the significant phrase is "small bands and tribes." Chimps have
tribes. If we aspire to a "civilization" we have to hope for more.
quibbler
Jim...@nospam.net says...
> quibbler <quibb...@yahoo.com> said:
>
> >In article <1gdgmw8.13xzjlnpduwt3N%john...@wilkins.id.au>,
> >john...@wilkins.id.au says...
> ...
> >> That is just the point - I don't think we justify moral principles. I
> >> have an arcane and probably not original account of this. Moral
> >> justification is a "language game", as Wittgenstein referred to
> >> linguistic procedures in a language community.
> >
> >Yes well Wittgenstein may be right. However, it seems like we can at
> >least say some things about whether a particular moral principle works
> >as advertised. I know that ol' Ludwig approached everything like it
> >needed to be rigorously proved, but it might be better to adopt a bit
> >more of a pragmatic standard and merely say that a moral principle is
> >itself justified to the extent that it consistently promotes results and
> >behaviors in accord with ones values. That might not be sufficient as a
> >justification in absolutist terms. But it seems like that could be
> >sufficient as justification in morally relativist systems.
> ...
>
> It is as absolute as are one's values
Values vary from group to group and person to person making then non-
absolute in the sense of "absolute morality". Values would be
considered relativistic as a foundation for morality.
>, which is not addressed here.
>
> Is a moral principle really *justified to* the extent to which it
> consistently promotes results and behaviors in accord with one's
> values,
I was merely proposing that it could be said to be justified in those
terms from a relativist view. I didn't say that it could be justified
in any absolute sense, but then again, I'm not sure that any moral
stance can be justified in an absolutist sense.
> or is it *useful to* ... the extent to which it consistently
> promotes results and behaviors in accord with one's values?
It's obviously useful for those holding the values if they know that the
principle is consistent with promoting their values.
> If only
> useful to, then the fact that a moral principle consistently promotes
> results etc. is not a justification, since it depends on the
> justification for one's values.
Generally speaking, I believe many axiologies regard values as
foundational and therefore don't require external justification. Of
course it's still possible to analyze value systems on other dimensions.
> It seems to push the problem back a
> step, not resolve it.
I think that there are still many problems that would still be
unresolved in any event, from a relativist perspective. However, if the
only alternative is absolutism then I guess I'm still settle for some
version of relativism, warts and all.
>
> I guess you are saying that "useful to.." in this context is pragmatic
> justification. THat makes sense, but it leaves the question of how
> one's values are justified. Pragmatically? Or are they just givens
> that need no justification?
I was assuming that, but I've been finding that not all people treat
values as foundational, so maybe that's a bad assumption.
quibbler
Jim...@nospam.net says...
> WHen there is a clear "loser" in one or more of the alternative
> decisions on what to do, a way to test a consequentialist moral
> position might be: If a net good is the outcome of from torturing
> someone and would be even more if that someone were me, would I
> volunteer? After all, if it produces the best moral consequences,
> isn't that my guiding principle?
It's not a bad maxim to experiment with. Of course, it seems like for a
variety of trivial reasons, the person whom it may be optimal to torture
would not be you, since you might not have the secret information that
was needed, etc. But I agree that if it were about the need to
arbitrarily torture someone, say as entertainment for a group of
sadists, and other things were more or less equal that some utilitarians
might feel it their duty to help promote the greatest happiness, even if
it involved one's own personal suffering.
> "The moral good is optimized by a situation that produces the best net
> outcome for me" might be the consequentialism of a sociopath. We are
> all along the spectrum somewhere, I suspect.
I think that's about right. I'm sure that folks like Ayn Rand would
vigorously disagree :) (if she weren't dead, of course)
John Wilkins
> In article <2dhq901o7v400mlo9...@4ax.com>,
> Jim...@nospam.net says...
>
> > WHen there is a clear "loser" in one or more of the alternative
> > decisions on what to do, a way to test a consequentialist moral
> > position might be: If a net good is the outcome of from torturing
> > someone and would be even more if that someone were me, would I
> > volunteer? After all, if it produces the best moral consequences,
> > isn't that my guiding principle?
>
> It's not a bad maxim to experiment with. Of course, it seems like for a
> variety of trivial reasons, the person whom it may be optimal to torture
> would not be you, since you might not have the secret information that
> was needed, etc. But I agree that if it were about the need to
> arbitrarily torture someone, say as entertainment for a group of
> sadists, and other things were more or less equal that some utilitarians
> might feel it their duty to help promote the greatest happiness, even if
> it involved one's own personal suffering.
I prefer Rawls' idea - draw a "veil of ignorance" about your own place
in society (which has an evolutionary justification in that you do not
know ahead of time what position in society your own progeny will
occupy), and draw up those rules that will maximise *any* person's
position.
>
> > "The moral good is optimized by a situation that produces the best net
> > outcome for me" might be the consequentialism of a sociopath. We are
> > all along the spectrum somewhere, I suspect.
>
> I think that's about right. I'm sure that folks like Ayn Rand would
> vigorously disagree :) (if she weren't dead, of course)
Me too (also about Rand) - the rules should produce the best outcomes
for the vast bulk of society members, and in ways that will maximise the
wellbeing of the society overall. In the end, morality is about a
well-ordered society.
Matt Silberstein
(John Wilkins):
[snip]
>But this is a utilitarian standard. I don't think we even need that -
>something is right if one acts according to one's moral principles.
>One's moral principles may maximise one's value preferences, but that is
>a matter of analysis rather than justification (nice distinction, Matt).
I suppose a POTM nomination is out of the question. I will just
keep this along with the post where Larry did not point out
several errors in my thinking.
[snip]
James Willemin
Why? Not to be picky, but what basic moral (as opposed to religious)
principle do you have, or that you can think of, that is not directly
appilicable to increasing the coherence and survivability of small
bands and tribes?
The only real difference that I can see (in moral terms, anyhow)
between small bands and modern civilization is the size of the tribe.
darth_versive
> From the article:
> -------------------------------
> In The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Share, Care, and Follow
> the Golden Rule (Henry Holt/Times Books, 2004) - the third volume of his trilogy on
> the power of belief - science historian Michael Shermer contends that the source of
> ethics is solely evolutionary. "Evolution," he writes, "generated the moral
> sentiments out of a need for a system to maximize the benefits of living in small
> bands and tribes. Evolution created and culture honed moral principles out of an
> additional need to curb the passions of the body and mind. And culture, primarily
> through organized religion, codified those principles into moral rules and
> precepts."
> --------------------------------
>
> Read it at
> http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/opinion/article/0,1299,DRMN_38_2863104,00.html
> or http://tinyurl.com/2fn3a
>
>
>
> J. Spaceman
So, from this, could it be concluded that moral values are "useful
fictions, but fictions nonetheless"?
That is, useful for reasons of evolutionary fitness, but based on
nothing universal or external to the human imagination?
If so, and if such an idea gained more widespread acceptance, that
might lead to some interesting fireworks within academic discussions
of ethical theory, as well as within practical ethical discussions
among the general public, IMO.
DV
Zachriel
"darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
It's called "shared values". Values have real consequences within the social
dynamic we share. For instance, a "liar" when found out, might lose access
to mates and material resources.
The Watcher
(darth_versive) wrote:
(snip)
>So, from this, could it be concluded that moral values are "useful
>fictions, but fictions nonetheless"?
Yes, that could(and has) been concluded for years. People have denied it for
years, but so far nobody has been able to produce any sort of objective standard
for morality.
>
>That is, useful for reasons of evolutionary fitness, but based on
>nothing universal or external to the human imagination?
>
>If so, and if such an idea gained more widespread acceptance, that
>might lead to some interesting fireworks within academic discussions
>of ethical theory, as well as within practical ethical discussions
>among the general public, IMO.
Many people find it scary, and fear to tread anywhere near that territory. There
was an interesting movie made a few years ago, called The Nemesis Game, based on
that idea.
Matthew Phillips
> On Sun, 23 May 2004 21:52:26 +0000 (UTC), darth_...@yahoo.com
> (darth_versive) wrote:
>
> (snip)
>
>>So, from this, could it be concluded that moral values are "useful
>>fictions, but fictions nonetheless"?
>
>
> Yes, that could(and has) been concluded for years. People have denied it for
> years, but so far nobody has been able to produce any sort of objective standard
> for morality.
There are numerous moral theories from confucius to kant.
John Wilkins
> On Sun, 23 May 2004 21:52:26 +0000 (UTC), darth_...@yahoo.com
> (darth_versive) wrote:
>
> (snip)
> >So, from this, could it be concluded that moral values are "useful
> >fictions, but fictions nonetheless"?
>
> Yes, that could(and has) been concluded for years. People have denied it
> for years, but so far nobody has been able to produce any sort of
> objective standard for morality.
One thing about morality, though - we are a moral animal, which means
that we do, for reasons of our being social animals which engage in
linguistic behaviours like rationalisation and justification, generate
moral codes a lot.
> >
> >That is, useful for reasons of evolutionary fitness, but based on
> >nothing universal or external to the human imagination?
> >
> >If so, and if such an idea gained more widespread acceptance, that
> >might lead to some interesting fireworks within academic discussions
> >of ethical theory, as well as within practical ethical discussions
> >among the general public, IMO.
>
> Many people find it scary, and fear to tread anywhere near that territory.
> There was an interesting movie made a few years ago, called The Nemesis
> Game, based on that idea.
To declare oneself a moral relativist is seen as something of a sin,
ironically, as if noting that moral codes are culturally and
contextually relative is to suggest that there are no moral claims that
can be made.
--
John S Wilkins PhD - www.wilkins.id.au
a little emptier, a little spent
as always by that quiver in the self,
subjugated, yes, and obedient. -- Seamus Heaney
darth_versive
Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
DV
Vince Barmann
The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
"its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
plummeting paint cans.
Vince "Like, cannabalism is a really bad idea" B.
Zachriel
Loving your children is not a fiction, though it may be considered a
peculiarity of the species (actually of the whole mammalian class).
Mark K. Bilbo
<8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com> we saw our hero
darth_...@yahoo.com (darth_versive):
I wouldn't call it "fiction." Just because morality is an aspect of *us
doesn't make it less real. Some people seem to think that morality must be
some "objective law" like gravity or such for it to be real and
meaningful. Why, I don't know. It's certainly meaningful *to *us
regardless of it's source.
Besides, it wouldn't be quite correct to say "nothing universal or
external." Morality is part of a survival strategy in a very real world.
It's not completely without connection to the reality outside us.
--
Mark K. Bilbo - a.a. #1423
EAC Department of Linguistic Subversion
"Being surprised at the fact that the universe
is fine tuned for life is akin to a puddle being
surprised at how well it fits its hole"
[Douglas Adams]
howard hershey
Mark K. Bilbo wrote:
And "useful" (even necessary) nonetheless.
>>That is, useful for reasons of evolutionary fitness, but based on nothing
>>universal or external to the human imagination?
One could also note that the societally permisible or tolerated
*exceptions* to the moral code one is supposed to follow usually involve
altered behavior toward 'outsiders' or despised 'others'. Thou shalt
not "kill", except in defense of family and/or group or country, to
defend the honor (usually attempts to control the sexuality of female
members) of your family. You shall not steal, but can expropriate
property during times of war. In some societies it is permisible to
"cheat" outsiders, but not members of your tribe. etc. etc. etc.
alexander.hudson
So perhaps better to conclude it is a constitutive process. Even the term
'morality' implies a series of assumed social conventions predicated by
culturally normative behaviours, even when driven by biological imperatives
(whatever they may be). If morality has meaning it is because we ascribe
that process ourselves, so it becomes important to recognise where those
boundaries are and the fact that 'morality' is not universal but has been
turned into a label for a set of constantly changing assumptions about
'right' and 'wrong'.
I agree though - it's not fiction as we base substantial parts of our
society around what we consider to be moral regardless of how we analyse the
context for morality itself... can't get less wishy-washy than that.
The fun part is watching certain groups trying to maintain that their
current interpretation of morality has always been in place for around 2000
years and applies to all people everywhere whether they like it or not.
Cheers
Alexander
darth_versive
> darth_versive wrote:
> > Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
> > terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
>
> The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
> as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
> "its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
> plummeting paint cans.
Yes. I agree that the codes themselves have value (they are useful),
but aren't the codes themselves also fictions? And not just the
rationalizations of the codes? Or if they do have real existence
outside of the human mind, where would that real existence be?
DV
darth_versive
> On Sun, 23 May 2004 21:52:26 +0000 (UTC), darth_...@yahoo.com
> (darth_versive) wrote:
>
> (snip)
> >So, from this, could it be concluded that moral values are "useful
> >fictions, but fictions nonetheless"?
>
> Yes, that could(and has) been concluded for years. People have denied it for
> years, but so far nobody has been able to produce any sort of objective standard
> for morality.
Yes. I agree.
> >That is, useful for reasons of evolutionary fitness, but based on
> >nothing universal or external to the human imagination?
> >
> >If so, and if such an idea gained more widespread acceptance, that
> >might lead to some interesting fireworks within academic discussions
> >of ethical theory, as well as within practical ethical discussions
> >among the general public, IMO.
>
> Many people find it scary, and fear to tread anywhere near that territory. There
> was an interesting movie made a few years ago, called The Nemesis Game, based on
> that idea.
Yes. And the fact that many people do find it scary, and fear to
tread anywhere near it, is itself quite revealing about certain
aspects of human psychology.
I'm not familiar with the Nemesis Game. Could you give me a synopsis,
from your own point of view?
DV
Zachriel
Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent real-world
experiences.
So, for instance, nearly all of us have a sense of justice. From this very
real subjective experience, we abstract that experience in order to develop
rules of interaction. Once abstracted, of course, there are then the problem
of exceptions, competing values, and "artifacts" of the abstraction process.
Nevertheless, the sense of justice is real. For those that share this
experience, we can define it by setting its limits, we can discuss "justice"
and its ramifications, and we can extend its utility to new situations. We
can even create a "theory of justice".
As another example, perhaps you adhere to an abstract ideal of "truth" well
beyond it mere utility.
darth_versive
> "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> > Vince Barmann <vbarMyFi...@earthlink.net> wrote
> > > darth_versive wrote:
>
> > > > Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
> > > > terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
> > >
> > > The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
> > > as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
> > > "its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
> > > plummeting paint cans.
> >
> > Yes. I agree that the codes themselves have value (they are useful),
> > but aren't the codes themselves also fictions? And not just the
> > rationalizations of the codes? Or if they do have real existence
> > outside of the human mind, where would that real existence be?
> >
> > DV
> >
>
> Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent real-world
> experiences.
Yes. I already do. That's why I call them "useful fictions."
> So, for instance, nearly all of us have a sense of justice. From this very
> real subjective experience, we abstract that experience in order to develop
> rules of interaction. Once abstracted, of course, there are then the problem
> of exceptions, competing values, and "artifacts" of the abstraction process.
> Nevertheless, the sense of justice is real. For those that share this
> experience, we can define it by setting its limits, we can discuss "justice"
> and its ramifications, and we can extend its utility to new situations. We
> can even create a "theory of justice".
Yes. And for those who *don't* share them, abstractions like
"justice," the way you understand it, are "useless fictions" (or
worse, even "harmful fictions"). For them, they have *another* sense
of justice that is just as real to them as ours is to us. And perhaps
another entire set of moral values to go along with it.
> As another example, perhaps you adhere to an abstract ideal of "truth" well
> beyond it mere utility.
Yes, I may adhere to it, but I see it as just another useful fiction,
and nothing beyond this.
DV
Zachriel
Actually, you seem to be using the term in a derogatory sense. Consider
love. It is a subjective experience, but it is real. We create a word,
"love", which is an abstraction, but it stands for the actual experience,
and this abstraction allows us to discuss aspects of this experience that
most of us share. Or we create another abstraction, "2" or "triangle". You
can refer to them as fictions, but the description doesn't accurately
reflect how these abstractions are actually used, or how they can lead to
new knowledge.
> > So, for instance, nearly all of us have a sense of justice. From this
very
> > real subjective experience, we abstract that experience in order to
develop
> > rules of interaction. Once abstracted, of course, there are then the
problem
> > of exceptions, competing values, and "artifacts" of the abstraction
process.
> > Nevertheless, the sense of justice is real. For those that share this
> > experience, we can define it by setting its limits, we can discuss
"justice"
> > and its ramifications, and we can extend its utility to new situations.
We
> > can even create a "theory of justice".
>
> Yes. And for those who *don't* share them, abstractions like
> "justice," the way you understand it, are "useless fictions" (or
> worse, even "harmful fictions").
I'm not sure how loving one's children is "fictional". It seems very real.
Are you confusing subjective with fictional? Once we acknowledge the
subjective experience, we can give it a name, that is, we can abstract it
and discuss its properties.
By the way, what is a "harmful fiction" if there are no values. What does it
matter if humanity sterilizes the planet with nuclear radiation?
> For them, they have *another* sense
> of justice that is just as real to them as ours is to us. And perhaps
> another entire set of moral values to go along with it.
That is quite possible. Many disputes have roots in the actual definitions
of the terms used. That does not make discussion impossible or without
value. For instance, most of us value "freedom". We may disagree on what
actually constitutes "freedom", but that doesn't mean the discussion is
irrelevant. We can marshal our arguments by finding common ground. We may
even be able to convince by weight of argument. These philosophical
discussions have value to most of us, indeed, much of human history is
defined by such discussions.
You are not required to participate or even to value these discussions.
However, any theory of humanity and human history would be rather vacuous
without an acceptance that values such as love, freedom, truth have had
significant impact. We prefer freedom to chains.
Consider it a peccadillo of humanity, if you like.
> > As another example, perhaps you adhere to an abstract ideal of "truth"
well
> > beyond it mere utility.
>
> Yes, I may adhere to it, but I see it as just another useful fiction,
> and nothing beyond this.
If it's fiction, I would think that your adherence would be at best
tentative. Is this so? Others have been more than willing to suffer to
oppose lies, if only for the hope that their children might find a better
life. Do you think the truth is something worth fighting for?
Vince Barmann
> "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
>
>>>darth_versive wrote:
>>
>>>>Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
>>>>terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
>>>
>>>The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
>>>as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
>>>"its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
>>>plummeting paint cans.
>>
>>Yes. I agree that the codes themselves have value (they are useful),
>>but aren't the codes themselves also fictions? And not just the
>>rationalizations of the codes? Or if they do have real existence
>>outside of the human mind, where would that real existence be?
In our behavior. There are some branches of mathematics that
demonstrate what look like moral codes and their efficacy. If they can
be expressed so precisely, I doubt that they are wholly subjective.
For example, someone once said that "A lie is a great testament to the
truth". Sounds like a contradiction. What was meant was that a lie
only works in an atmosphere of truth. If everybody lied, lies would not
be believed. So one can actually work out a mathematical strategy for
lying as a _minority_ behavior, and then go further to find that even
this minority behavior is contrary to the welfare of all.
> Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent real-world
> experiences.
Yeah what he said.
> So, for instance, nearly all of us have a sense of justice. From this very
> real subjective experience, we abstract that experience in order to develop
> rules of interaction. Once abstracted, of course, there are then the problem
> of exceptions, competing values, and "artifacts" of the abstraction process.
> Nevertheless, the sense of justice is real. For those that share this
> experience, we can define it by setting its limits, we can discuss "justice"
> and its ramifications, and we can extend its utility to new situations. We
> can even create a "theory of justice".
And I think we are ethically required to do so, eventually. As Ben
Franklin (sort of) said, something is not hurtful because it is a sin,
it is a sin because it is hurtful. Now, which action has more "virtue",
or is more sophisticated ethically: obeying an inherited moral code such
a "You must not steal" -- just because God or society has told you so,
or not stealing because you understand the reason why stealing is not in
the best interests of society, and indirectly, yourself?
If person A does not kill because of a moral code, perhaps because the
great God Bushwa said not to, and person B chooses not to kill becuse he
has reasoned out a personal ethic, which is superior? The effect is the
same, but the motive is different. And the purified ethic makes for
more consistently correct behavior that the rather vague and
evolutionarily-developed moral code.
The big problem with our inherited moral code is that such a code must
have excess baggage -- dependent genes, sort of. Riders on the main
bill. How wonderful would it be if we could agree on a _deductive_
tool like Ockam's razor to apply to ethical dilemmas. All we seem to
have is a rather vague admonition to obey the Golden Rule.
Locke did a fair stab at ethical "equations", but it was too temporal to
help us much. Notice there is no theoretical underpinnings for the US
Constitution; it is a purely pragmatic document, addressing many issues
of the day and providing little in terms of a blueprint for the future.
Was this wise? The founders assumed there would always be legislators
as wise as they to handle issues of future generations. I think they
were overly optimistic. I bring this up because the law is based on
either a moral code or an ethical standard.
Vince "Sorry, I think I'm rambling now" B.
Adrian
(darth_versive) wrote:
>"Zachriel" <sp...@zachriel.com> wrote in message news:<NtGdnU36JJX...@adelphia.com>...
>> "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
>> news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
>> > Vince Barmann <vbarMyFi...@earthlink.net> wrote
>> > > darth_versive wrote:
>>
>> > > > Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
>> > > > terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
>> > >
>> > > The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
>> > > as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
>> > > "its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
>> > > plummeting paint cans.
>> >
>> > Yes. I agree that the codes themselves have value (they are useful),
>> > but aren't the codes themselves also fictions? And not just the
>> > rationalizations of the codes? Or if they do have real existence
>> > outside of the human mind, where would that real existence be?
>> >
>> > DV
>> >
>>
>> Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent real-world
>> experiences.
>
>Yes. I already do. That's why I call them "useful fictions."
>
Just because they do not refer to physical objects, that doesn't mean
they are fictions. (Before you reply, you should know that I am a
"strong" atheist. I am not implying by any of this, the existence of
the supernatural or of some ethereal world of "morals". By "they do
not refer to physical objects", I mean they do not "exist".)
>> So, for instance, nearly all of us have a sense of justice. From this very
>> real subjective experience, we abstract that experience in order to develop
>> rules of interaction. Once abstracted, of course, there are then the problem
>> of exceptions, competing values, and "artifacts" of the abstraction process.
>> Nevertheless, the sense of justice is real. For those that share this
>> experience, we can define it by setting its limits, we can discuss "justice"
>> and its ramifications, and we can extend its utility to new situations. We
>> can even create a "theory of justice".
>
>Yes. And for those who *don't* share them, abstractions like
>"justice," the way you understand it, are "useless fictions" (or
>worse, even "harmful fictions"). For them, they have *another* sense
>of justice that is just as real to them as ours is to us. And perhaps
>another entire set of moral values to go along with it.
>
That is another set of moral *beliefs* not another set of *morals*.
Believing that injustice is justice is equally as reasonable,
legitimate, etc as believing that 1+1=3.
>> As another example, perhaps you adhere to an abstract ideal of "truth" well
>> beyond it mere utility.
>
>Yes, I may adhere to it, but I see it as just another useful fiction,
>and nothing beyond this.
>
>DV
Perhaps, then, you think that arithmetic is another useful fiction.
In that case, we all should wonder what you mean by "fiction".
darth_versive
> "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> > > Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent real-world
> > > experiences.
> >
> > Yes. I already do. That's why I call them "useful fictions."
>
> Actually, you seem to be using the term in a derogatory sense.
This is a mistaken conclusion on your part. I am speaking of it in
purely descriptive terms, not implying any moral approval or
disapproval.
<snip>
> > For them, they have *another* sense
> > of justice that is just as real to them as ours is to us. And perhaps
> > another entire set of moral values to go along with it.
>
> That is quite possible. Many disputes have roots in the actual definitions
> of the terms used. That does not make discussion impossible or without
> value. For instance, most of us value "freedom". We may disagree on what
> actually constitutes "freedom", but that doesn't mean the discussion is
> irrelevant.
I didn't say the discussion was irrelevant. I said the concepts of
"rights" and "moral values" are useful fictions. Therefore,
discussions about such things can also be useful. Perhaps you come to
this conclusion (that I would see such discussions as irrelvant)
because you assume that I mean the term "useful fiction" in a
derogatory sense, as you stated above.
> You are not required to participate or even to value these discussions.
> However, any theory of humanity and human history would be rather vacuous
> without an acceptance that values such as love, freedom, truth have had
> significant impact. We prefer freedom to chains.
Strawman (but most likely unintentional). Perhaps based on a
misunderstanding, that I see such discussions as being without value.
Perhaps you didn't correctly understand the importance of the word
"useful" in the term "useful fiction." This term itself is
value-laden.
> > > As another example, perhaps you adhere to an abstract ideal of "truth"
> well
> > > beyond it mere utility.
> >
> > Yes, I may adhere to it, but I see it as just another useful fiction,
> > and nothing beyond this.
>
> If it's fiction, I would think that your adherence would be at best
> tentative. Is this so? Others have been more than willing to suffer to
> oppose lies, if only for the hope that their children might find a better
> life. Do you think the truth is something worth fighting for?
You would think wrong, misunderstanding my position, as you did above.
Whether a useful fiction is worth fighting for does not change it
from a fiction into a concrete reality.
DV
darth_versive
> Zachriel wrote:
>
> > "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> >
> >>>darth_versive wrote:
>
> >>>>Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
> >>>>terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
> >>>
> >>>The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
> >>>as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
> >>>"its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
> >>>plummeting paint cans.
> >>
> >>Yes. I agree that the codes themselves have value (they are useful),
> >>but aren't the codes themselves also fictions? And not just the
> >>rationalizations of the codes? Or if they do have real existence
> >>outside of the human mind, where would that real existence be?
>
> In our behavior.
But in this context, our behavior itself is evaluated through our
subjective "lenses," which include these moral values. So we're back
to my original question: where would the real existence of these
moral values be, by which we evaluate our behavior (and that of
others)?
DV
Zachriel
We are born with certain innate properties. These include love, hate,
selfishness, and a sense of fair-play. These subjective traits are expressed
in a multitude of different forms--primarily within a social context. Our
sense of fair-play is the reality which we can abstract with words, not the
other way around.
There is ample scientific evidence that we are born with these traits and
that the process of acculturation plays a large part in the expression of
these traits in our behavior. These traits are no more fiction than gravity.
Zachriel
"darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> "Zachriel" <sp...@zachriel.com> wrote in message
news:<FNKdnaIMZYI...@adelphia.com>...
> > "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> > > "Zachriel" <sp...@zachriel.com> wrote in message
>
> > > > Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent
real-world
> > > > experiences.
> > >
> > > Yes. I already do. That's why I call them "useful fictions."
> >
> > Actually, you seem to be using the term in a derogatory sense.
>
> This is a mistaken conclusion on your part. I am speaking of it in
> purely descriptive terms, not implying any moral approval or
> disapproval.
That's fine. Why did you pick this term rather than simply "abstraction",
which is the "useful fiction" we use to stand for something else?
> <snip>
>
> > > For them, they have *another* sense
> > > of justice that is just as real to them as ours is to us. And perhaps
> > > another entire set of moral values to go along with it.
> >
> > That is quite possible. Many disputes have roots in the actual
definitions
> > of the terms used. That does not make discussion impossible or without
> > value. For instance, most of us value "freedom". We may disagree on what
> > actually constitutes "freedom", but that doesn't mean the discussion is
> > irrelevant.
>
> I didn't say the discussion was irrelevant. I said the concepts of
> "rights" and "moral values" are useful fictions. Therefore,
> discussions about such things can also be useful. Perhaps you come to
> this conclusion (that I would see such discussions as irrelvant)
> because you assume that I mean the term "useful fiction" in a
> derogatory sense, as you stated above.
Actually, I'm beginning to think you are using it in a non-standard manner
with a meaning only apparent to yourself, or only making sense after some
discussion at least.
Accordingly, arithmetic is a "useful fiction". So are scientific theories.
Even a single hydrogen atom is a fiction. We only infer its existence from
complex apparatus and through abstract consultations with others. I've never
seen one personally. However, I have seen things I thought were wrong.
> > You are not required to participate or even to value these discussions.
> > However, any theory of humanity and human history would be rather
vacuous
> > without an acceptance that values such as love, freedom, truth have had
> > significant impact. We prefer freedom to chains.
>
> Strawman (but most likely unintentional).
It was intentional and meant as a foil for you to better describe your
thoughts on the matter.
> Perhaps based on a
> misunderstanding, that I see such discussions as being without value.
> Perhaps you didn't correctly understand the importance of the word
> "useful" in the term "useful fiction." This term itself is
> value-laden.
But is it the best description available for what you mean? Again, can't we
apply this term to all abstractions? Indeed our subjective experience of
love is more "real" than scientific theories in this sense of the phrase. At
least we can directly experience love, while "Hydrogen" or the interior of
the Sun, are merely abstractions.
> > > > As another example, perhaps you adhere to an abstract ideal of
"truth"
> > well
> > > > beyond it mere utility.
> > >
> > > Yes, I may adhere to it, but I see it as just another useful fiction,
> > > and nothing beyond this.
> >
> > If it's fiction, I would think that your adherence would be at best
> > tentative. Is this so? Others have been more than willing to suffer to
> > oppose lies, if only for the hope that their children might find a
better
> > life. Do you think the truth is something worth fighting for?
>
> You would think wrong, misunderstanding my position, as you did above.
> Whether a useful fiction is worth fighting for does not change it
> from a fiction into a concrete reality.
It was a question. Do you think the truth is something worth fighting for?
You don't have to answer if you consider the question too personal.
By the way, I'm not sure that "concrete reality" is the contrary of
"fiction".
Zachriel
"Vince Barmann" <vbarMyFi...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:8tUsc.11$Yd...@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
>
> > "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> >
> >>>darth_versive wrote:
> >>
> >>>>Yes. So you would agree that these "shared values," though useful in
> >>>>terms of evolutionary fitness, are nonetheless fictions?
> >>>
> >>>The rationalizations for the moral codes are, but the codes themselves,
> >>>as you say, have value. They are evolved ideas. Superstitions like
> >>>"its bad luck to walk under a ladder" still keep us from getting hit by
> >>>plummeting paint cans.
> >>
> >>Yes. I agree that the codes themselves have value (they are useful),
> >>but aren't the codes themselves also fictions? And not just the
> >>rationalizations of the codes? Or if they do have real existence
> >>outside of the human mind, where would that real existence be?
>
> In our behavior. There are some branches of mathematics that
> demonstrate what look like moral codes and their efficacy. If they can
> be expressed so precisely, I doubt that they are wholly subjective.
>
> For example, someone once said that "A lie is a great testament to the
> truth". Sounds like a contradiction. What was meant was that a lie
> only works in an atmosphere of truth. If everybody lied, lies would not
> be believed. So one can actually work out a mathematical strategy for
> lying as a _minority_ behavior, and then go further to find that even
> this minority behavior is contrary to the welfare of all.
We are apparently talking about two different aspects of justice. One is our
subjective belief in fundamental fairness, our ability to know right from
wrong. This is innate and apparently an evolved trait.
Monkeys Show Sense Of Fairness
http://www.primates.com/monkeys/fairness.html
Not only do we have an innate sense of justice, but this innate sense is
reinforced by the nature of our complex relationships with other humans.
This reinforcement of our positive relationships is very real and can be
studied mathematically, as you correctly point out. However, many people
will do the right thing regardless of the social cost. People don't do the
right thing because they are motivated by any evolutionary benefits, any
more than they love their children for the good of the species.
Nevertheless, the benefits are there and can be described scientifically
both as a description of biological behavior and as a mathematical network.
> > Consider them to be philosophical abstractions that represent real-world
> > experiences.
>
> Yeah what he said.
>
<snip>
darth_versive
I suppose I could have used the term "abstraction" instead of
"fiction." But instead of clarifying what I meant, that would only
have obscurred my meaning.
I'm sorry if you find my use of terminology confusing. And if you
object to someone using terms that might require further discussion,
I'm also sorry about that. (I'd stay away from the field of
philosophy in this latter case, since this type of thing is quite
common there.)
By my using the term "fiction" to describe such things as rights and
moral values, I intended to convey my sense of the non-reality of the
underlying entities, in contrast to my view that the entities
underlying such abstractions as "gravity" or "hydrogen" do, in fact,
exist in the "real" world, outside of our subjective minds (that is,
unlike you, I don't believe that a single hydrogen atom is a fiction).
I may be mistaken in that belief, but that's what I believe.
So to me, the term "useful fiction" actually conveys more content
regarding my point of view than the term "useful abstraction" would.
I hope this clarifies my position somewhat. If not, I'm not sure what
else I could say on the subject.
DV
Zachriel
"darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> "Zachriel" <sp...@zachriel.com> wrote in message
<snip>
> >
> > By the way, I'm not sure that "concrete reality" is the contrary of
> > "fiction".
>
> I suppose I could have used the term "abstraction" instead of
> "fiction." But instead of clarifying what I meant, that would only
> have obscurred my meaning.
>
> I'm sorry if you find my use of terminology confusing. And if you
> object to someone using terms that might require further discussion,
> I'm also sorry about that.
There is no problem with using specialized terms. It is apparent that you
are assigning the phrase "useful fiction" with a special meaning, and not
the normal meaning. However "useful fiction" certainly conveys a facet of
self-delusion. Fiction usually applies to something "made up", or a
"deception", or perhaps in this case a "delusion".
Are we deluded when we love our children? Or is this a real reaction most
mammals have, one that can be observed objectively and experienced
subjectively?
> (I'd stay away from the field of
> philosophy in this latter case, since this type of thing is quite
> common there.)
>
> By my using the term "fiction" to describe such things as rights and
> moral values, I intended to convey my sense of the non-reality of the
> underlying entities,
But you never answered the specific objections to this "sense of
non-reality" of yours.
* There is sound scientific evidence that we do indeed have a sense of
fairplay--and that it has deep evolutionary roots, just as we have a love of
our children. You could then claim that love too is a fiction. Is the
supposition of self-delusion necessary to explain why non-human primates
insist on fair-play or why mothers nurse and care for their young?
* Aspects of moral decisions can be objectively studied in such varied
subjects as game theory and information networks. Indeed, without accepting
the reality of these specialized interactions, it is virtually impossible to
study human culture. You could then claim that all of these decisions are
based on fictions.
* But then you would then be claiming that virtually all our knowledge is an
abstraction. Everything from "triangle" to "Theory of Gravity" are
abstractions developed over millennium.
* You are left with nothing other than that all abstractions are fictions.
They are mental pictures in the mind. Sometimes they represent idealized
geometric shapes, other times they represent imaginary numbers, still other
times they represent our feelings towards one another or feelings about our
interactions. We invent names for these real feelings and these real
interactions, and then we can have discussions about them.
* Which really doesn't tell us why you have invented a special term just for
this particular type of abstraction, especially one that connotes
self-delusion, when our feelings are hardly self-delusion but important
facets of our existence.
> in contrast to my view that the entities
> underlying such abstractions as "gravity" or "hydrogen" do, in fact,
> exist in the "real" world, outside of our subjective minds (that is,
> unlike you, I don't believe that a single hydrogen atom is a fiction).
> I may be mistaken in that belief, but that's what I believe.
But you don't believe that you have feelings for others? You can't describe
these feelings, define their limits, assign them abstract labels?
What about the particular interactions you have. Can they be observed
objectively? Can we make generalizations about these interactions? How do
you explain why monkeys insist on fair treatment?
If I say "Joe is a *good* man", doesn't that convey a real meaning? That Joe
is generally honest and caring? Indeed, I would contend that it not only
conveys real meaning, but this information might allow us to make decisions
that could affect our material future. It's not fiction, but cold hard facts
about Joe that matter.
> So to me, the term "useful fiction" actually conveys more content
> regarding my point of view than the term "useful abstraction" would.
I'm still lost, then.
> I hope this clarifies my position somewhat. If not, I'm not sure what
> else I could say on the subject.
>
> DV
I'm not trying to be difficult. I think you want to say that moral codes can
be useful fictions, or that a belief in fire and brimstone might be
considered a useful fiction in some cultural circumstances. I'm not sure
that I would agree that delusions are ever a good thing. However, I do
believe that we have an innate sense of right and wrong, and that we are
happiest and most productive when we live in just societies.
Vince Barmann
Which makes it none the less "real". It seems that the concept that
valid ideas can evolve from successful behavior is being referred to as
"fiction" in any sense is really a genitive argument.*
You weren't specific about the second sense of the word "Justice".
Isn't intellectual justice just a derivation of evolved ideas of
fairness? Or intellectual confirmation of same?
Vince B.
*Clumsy sentence, I know.
Zachriel
Certainly the perception is a real aspect of human existence and any theory
of consciousness has to deal with our sense of fair-play.
> It seems that the concept that
> valid ideas can evolve from successful behavior is being referred to as
> "fiction" in any sense is really a genitive argument.*
>
> You weren't specific about the second sense of the word "Justice".
> Isn't intellectual justice just a derivation of evolved ideas of
> fairness? Or intellectual confirmation of same?
Well, they are certainly interconnected. I was referring to a possible
objective definition of morality, specifically how honest relationships
allow the creation of large cooperative networks. However, we might still
form such relationships even without a sense of honesty, and we all know
that good people do bad things when selfishness overtakes their consciences.
Back to Joe. "Joe is an honest man." This sentence tells us something real
about Joe, something important, and something we can use to take appropriate
action. Joe is someone whose words can be relied upon*. This is not a
"useful fiction" (in any sense that I have yet understood), but a very real
aspect of how Joe lives in the world.
> Vince B.
>
> *Clumsy sentence, I know.
>
I believe I was agreeing with you, but was trying to clarify two possible
(but interconnected) views of morality. One being our innate sense of right
and wrong, while the other being the objective network of relationships
formed by people living within a moral cultural framework. They are somewhat
different, though both very real in their own realms. The former is quite
difficult to study directly and often only considered within a philosophical
framework** (though the study I cited earlier with capuchin monkeys was
certainly scientific and objective); while the latter can be directly
studied quite easily and even modeled mathematically.
-----
* assuming "Joe is an honest man" is not followed by "Joe is a fool" ;-)
** People often seem confused by the invocation of philosophy, especially
when blinded by our modern bounty from scientific investigation. A
philosophical discussion of "justice" might start with certain premises,
that is, shared values. These premises are often understood implicitly, but
can be made explicit for more formal discussions. For instance, people might
note that they "sense" or "believe" killing is wrong. From this premise,
they might devise a moral code that prohibits killing, and through
experience and philosophical reflection, make for the appropriate
exceptions.
darth_versive
> "darth_versive" <darth_...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:8e0e3045.04052...@posting.google.com...
> > "Zachriel" <sp...@zachriel.com> wrote in message
> news:<bqSdnULw5t8...@adelphia.com>...
> <snip>
> > >
> > > By the way, I'm not sure that "concrete reality" is the contrary of
> > > "fiction".
> >
> > I suppose I could have used the term "abstraction" instead of
> > "fiction." But instead of clarifying what I meant, that would only
> > have obscurred my meaning.
> >
> > I'm sorry if you find my use of terminology confusing. And if you
> > object to someone using terms that might require further discussion,
> > I'm also sorry about that.
>
> There is no problem with using specialized terms. It is apparent that you
> are assigning the phrase "useful fiction" with a special meaning, and not
> the normal meaning. However "useful fiction" certainly conveys a facet of
> self-delusion. Fiction usually applies to something "made up", or a
> "deception", or perhaps in this case a "delusion".
It may be apparent to you, but it seems like the normal meaning to me.
However we are used to defining our terms seems "normal" to us, and
someone else's different use of these terms often seems like a
"special meaning" to us.
To me, "fiction" is something that is "made up," or a "deception," or
a "delusion." That's how I'm using the term. Seems like the normal
usage to me.
> Are we deluded when we love our children? Or is this a real reaction most
> mammals have, one that can be observed objectively and experienced
> subjectively?
The value we place on our children's lives is a "useful fiction," in
my view. This value is variable depending on circumstances and on
cultural influences (note the various approaches to infanticide in
various cultures, and on sending children off to war, etc.).
The actual experience of emotions, like the love of one's children, or
the hate of one's enemy in wartime, is a psychological phenomenon. As
such, it is quite real (as a subjective mental phenomenon, that is).
But then, so is the actual experience of the "love of God." The
underlying entity, whether the value of the life of one's child, or
the being of "God," is a fiction, according to my views. But they are
both "useful fictions" for those that hold to them.
So, "fictions" are quite real, but only in the sense of being
subjective mental phenomena, in my view. That is, they have no
independent existence outside of the human mind (as opposed to such
things as hydrogen atoms, etc., which do have such independent
existence, in my view).
> > (I'd stay away from the field of
> > philosophy in this latter case, since this type of thing is quite
> > common there.)
> >
> > By my using the term "fiction" to describe such things as rights and
> > moral values, I intended to convey my sense of the non-reality of the
> > underlying entities,
>
> But you never answered the specific objections to this "sense of
> non-reality" of yours.
>
> * There is sound scientific evidence that we do indeed have a sense of
> fairplay--and that it has deep evolutionary roots, just as we have a love of
> our children. You could then claim that love too is a fiction. Is the
> supposition of self-delusion necessary to explain why non-human primates
> insist on fair-play or why mothers nurse and care for their young?
The problem with this view is that the particular "sense of fairplay"
varies among different cultures. Would you say that the "sense of
fairplay" within the culture of Nazi Germany was the same as that
within modern Sweden, for example?
There's no denying that at some level, there is some psychological
phenomena going on that has something to do with some notion of
fairplay or other. But that doesn't mean that any particular value
system involving particular notions of fairplay is not made up of
useful fictions, in the same way that the fact that most all cultures
developed some type of religious thinking and behavior doesn't mean
that God isn't also a useful fiction.
These notions are subjective phenomena, manifestations of cognitive
processes shaped by the cognitive architecture of the human mind,
which is a product of biological evolution.
> * Aspects of moral decisions can be objectively studied in such varied
> subjects as game theory and information networks. Indeed, without accepting
> the reality of these specialized interactions, it is virtually impossible to
> study human culture. You could then claim that all of these decisions are
> based on fictions.
No, I disagree. One cannot "objectively" study these things. They
can only be studied subjectively. Game theory and information
networks are also conceptual frameworks, and so any analysis using any
theoretical model whatsoever is, by definition, a subjective
enterprise (at least by my definition). So therefore, all thought is
inherently subjective.
> * But then you would then be claiming that virtually all our knowledge is an
> abstraction. Everything from "triangle" to "Theory of Gravity" are
> abstractions developed over millennium.
Yes. But like I said in an earlier post, I draw a distinction between
different types of abstractions.
> * You are left with nothing other than that all abstractions are fictions.
> They are mental pictures in the mind. Sometimes they represent idealized
> geometric shapes, other times they represent imaginary numbers, still other
> times they represent our feelings towards one another or feelings about our
> interactions. We invent names for these real feelings and these real
> interactions, and then we can have discussions about them.
No, like I said in that same post, this is not what I said that I
think. If you didn't understand me, go back and re-read. If you did,
and simply refuse to take my word for it that I believe what I say I
do, I don't see what else I could say. Any more words on my part
would be pointless. You should just make up in your own mind what you
think I believe and then argue with yourself about it. Because I'm
not going to waste any more of my time on something like that.
You can disagree with me as much as you want. I have no problem with
that.
And if you demonstrate that you can follow what I'm saying, I'll
continue the discussion. But I'm not going to keep repeating myself
if you can't. And if you simply won't take me at my word that I
believe what I say I believe, and if you assume that I really don't
understand my own point of view, I'm not going to continue with this.
And if you want to try to put words in my mouth, and think you can
explain better than I can what it is that I believe, and that I don't
know what I'm saying, I respectfully disagree.
Sorry.
DV
Earle Jones
"Zachriel" <sp...@zachriel.com> wrote:
[...]
*
The man would agree:
"As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain, and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to
reality."
--Albert Einstein
earle
*
--
__
__/\_\
/\_\/_/
\/_/\_\ earle
\/_/ jones
Zachriel
That's how I originally thought you were using the term. Thank you for
clearing that up.
> > Are we deluded when we love our children? Or is this a real reaction
most
> > mammals have, one that can be observed objectively and experienced
> > subjectively?
>
> The value we place on our children's lives is a "useful fiction," in
> my view.
I believe that "fiction" is a faulty word in this context, as I will attempt
to explain at the bottom of the post. Indeed, now that you have specifically
stated that you are using fiction as something that is a "deception," or a
"delusion", I more clearly understand your meaning, and quite definitely
disagree.
First, I want to field a few of your other comments.
> This value is variable depending on circumstances and on
> cultural influences (note the various approaches to infanticide in
> various cultures, and on sending children off to war, etc.).
>
> The actual experience of emotions, like the love of one's children, or
> the hate of one's enemy in wartime, is a psychological phenomenon. As
> such, it is quite real (as a subjective mental phenomenon, that is).
And as such it can be studied objectively (to some degree at least).
> But then, so is the actual experience of the "love of God." The
> underlying entity, whether the value of the life of one's child, or
> the being of "God," is a fiction, according to my views. But they are
> both "useful fictions" for those that hold to them.
You might claim that "God" is fiction, but that doesn't necessarily make
"love of God" a fiction.
> So, "fictions" are quite real, but only in the sense of being
> subjective mental phenomena, in my view.
Arithmetic is a subjective mental phenomena, too. And the Theory of Gravity
is an abstraction.
> That is, they have no
> independent existence outside of the human mind (as opposed to such
> things as hydrogen atoms, etc., which do have such independent
> existence, in my view).
Love of children is a subjective phenomena, as such it doesn't necessarily
depend on the existence of actual children, only their perceived or imagined
or hoped-for existence.
> > > (I'd stay away from the field of
> > > philosophy in this latter case, since this type of thing is quite
> > > common there.)
> > >
> > > By my using the term "fiction" to describe such things as rights and
> > > moral values, I intended to convey my sense of the non-reality of the
> > > underlying entities,
> >
> > But you never answered the specific objections to this "sense of
> > non-reality" of yours.
> >
> > * There is sound scientific evidence that we do indeed have a sense of
> > fairplay--and that it has deep evolutionary roots, just as we have a
love of
> > our children. You could then claim that love too is a fiction. Is the
> > supposition of self-delusion necessary to explain why non-human primates
> > insist on fair-play or why mothers nurse and care for their young?
>
> The problem with this view is that the particular "sense of fairplay"
> varies among different cultures. Would you say that the "sense of
> fairplay" within the culture of Nazi Germany was the same as that
> within modern Sweden, for example?
Incredible as it might seem, people may sometimes hate one another, but that
doesn't exclude the possibility that they sometimes love one another--often
at the same time!
In any case, just because something is hard to define or understand doesn't
mean it doesn't have boundaries or a valid definition. In the case of the
Nazis, there was a very strong moral code. It included duty and loyalty, but
excluded many groups as "sub-human".
> There's no denying that at some level, there is some psychological
> phenomena going on that has something to do with some notion of
> fairplay or other. But that doesn't mean that any particular value
> system involving particular notions of fairplay is not made up of
> useful fictions, in the same way that the fact that most all cultures
> developed some type of religious thinking and behavior doesn't mean
> that God isn't also a useful fiction.
There is no doubt that some people confuse the moral code with morality. If
this the source of our confusion? For instance, going to church on Sunday
but being unchristian the rest of the week.
> These notions are subjective phenomena, manifestations of cognitive
> processes shaped by the cognitive architecture of the human mind,
> which is a product of biological evolution.
Yes. As such they can be studied objectively and scientifically.
> > * Aspects of moral decisions can be objectively studied in such varied
> > subjects as game theory and information networks. Indeed, without
accepting
> > the reality of these specialized interactions, it is virtually
impossible to
> > study human culture. You could then claim that all of these decisions
are
> > based on fictions.
>
> No, I disagree. One cannot "objectively" study these things.
Game theory and network theory, as fields within mathematics, are certainly
objective. Is this just a misstatement?
> They
> can only be studied subjectively. Game theory and information
> networks are also conceptual frameworks, and so any analysis using any
> theoretical model whatsoever is, by definition, a subjective
> enterprise (at least by my definition). So therefore, all thought is
> inherently subjective.
Is arithmetic subjective? Most commonly it is considered the inevitable and
logical result of a set of given (albeit somewhat arbitrary) premises.
> > * But then you would then be claiming that virtually all our knowledge
is an
> > abstraction. Everything from "triangle" to "Theory of Gravity" are
> > abstractions developed over millennium.
>
> Yes. But like I said in an earlier post, I draw a distinction between
> different types of abstractions.
I quite understand. I'm trying to determine which abstractions belong in
which categories.
> > * You are left with nothing other than that all abstractions are
fictions.
> > They are mental pictures in the mind. Sometimes they represent idealized
> > geometric shapes, other times they represent imaginary numbers, still
other
> > times they represent our feelings towards one another or feelings about
our
> > interactions. We invent names for these real feelings and these real
> > interactions, and then we can have discussions about them.
>
> No, like I said in that same post, this is not what I said that I
> think. If you didn't understand me, go back and re-read. If you did,
> and simply refuse to take my word for it that I believe what I say I
> do, I don't see what else I could say. Any more words on my part
> would be pointless. You should just make up in your own mind what you
> think I believe and then argue with yourself about it.
<snip>
Ok, then. Let's go to the archives:
> But in this context, our behavior itself is evaluated through our
> subjective "lenses," which include these moral values. So we're back
> to my original question: where would the real existence of these
> moral values be, by which we evaluate our behavior (and that of
> others)?
which I answered. . . .
"We are born with certain innate properties. These include love, hate,
selfishness, and a sense of fair-play. These subjective traits are expressed
in a multitude of different forms--primarily within a social context. Our
sense of fair-play is the reality which we can abstract with words, not the
other way around."
I answered your question, but you never responded directly to this or
several other points. Our moral values are intrinsic to being human. As
such, we can give names to these intrinsic properties "love", "hate",
"greed", and then extend our knowledge of these properties through
observation and discussion.
You are certainly correct to indicate that these moral values are
subjective, but that is *not* the same as a fiction. We assign value to
people and things. That doesn't make these assignments fictions. We are not
necessarily deluded (your word) about what "value" means. We can love our
children knowing full-well that the Universe doesn't care and that all our
works will crumble to dust in eternity.