Ontology of Experience
Steven Lehar
v.s. Representationalist debate. What is the ontology of experience?
First let us agree what we mean by experience. For example visual
experience is the colored three-dimensional volumetric world you see
around you when you open your eyes. This is distinct from the
objective external world in the fact that when you close your eyes,
the visual world disappears, or rather, it is transformed into a foggy
brownish space of indefinite extent, while the real world continues to
exist unaffected by the blinking of your eyes. Whether you are a
direct or indirect perception advocate, we can agree on the definition
of visual experience, even though representationalists believe it to
be located inside the brain, while direct perceptionists locate
experience out in the world beyond the retina.
In either case, visual experience takes the form of modulations of
color qualia across a volumetric space. For example a checkerboard
pattern is experienced as an alternating modulation of black and white
squares. What is the *ontology* of those alternating qualia? What is
it that flips from black to white and back again? We know that it is
an experience, and that experience is spatially extended in a
pictorial fashion, but is there anything in the external physical
world that corresponds to that experienced alternation? What is its
substance? Does it even have one?
The representationalist answer is that qualia are different states of
the physical brain, and thus they are located inside the brain. In
other words the brain must posess some continuous spatial medium
across which extends a pattern of alternating states. Whether these
states correleate with voltages, spiking frequencies, or some standing
wave representation, remains an open question at this point. But
experience has physical presence in the physical universe known to
science.
But what is the direct perceptionist's answer? What is the "stuff"
that changes color across space that you experience? And where is it
located? And is it in principle detectable by scientific means at that
location?
If my experience of a chess board is out there where the chessboard
exists, is the black and white pattern I experience the alternation of
the pigment in the paint on its surface, perceived directly? Or is it
the reflectivity of the surface experienced directly? Or is it the
intensity of reflected light experienced directly? Or is it a pattern
of activation in my retina? What is its ontology?
I think that direct perceptionists are uncertain about the ontology of
experience, they perceive it in a bistable manner, as being both an
external objective, and an internal subjective entity, and their
answers, when probed, flip back and forth between these two as if a
pattern in your brain could somehow be also outside of your head. The
whole concept of direct percption is founded on a profound
epistemological error, that we can in principle be conscious of things
which are not explicitly represented in our brain. Direct perception
states the *problem* of experience, it does not offer a *solution* to
it that can either guide the construction of a model of the concept,
or even an experiment to test the concept. The theory of direct
perception is every bit as mysterious as the property of consciousness
that it is supposed to explain.
The representationalist position is more coherent because it posits a
single ontology, that the modulations of the qualia of visual
experience are modulations of the physical state of your brain across
some spatial representational medium. And it makes the testable
prediction that that medium and its modulations will one day be
discovered and decoded in the brain. My vote is for a standing wave
representation using a Fourier code to produce moving volumetric
holographic images in the brain, and that those images correspond
directly to our experience.
Glen Sizemore will complain that there remains the problem of
experience, and why it is we have it when our brain is in certain
states. But if you accept that mind is a physical process taking place
in the physical mechanism of the brain, and you acknowledge that the
brain is conscious, then that already is an admission that a physical
process taking place in a physical system can under certain conditions
be conscious.
Besides, the mystery of experience, or why consciousness exists in the
brain, is by no means unique to representationalism. Direct perception
cannot resolve that one either. Representationalism at least offers an
account of the functional aspects of experience that can be expressed
in actual models and make testable predictions. Direct perception does
not even offer that much.
Steve
Alex Green
Glen Sizemore will complain that there remains the problem of
experience, and why it is we have it when our brain is in certain
states. But if you accept that mind is a physical process taking place
in the physical mechanism of the brain, and you acknowledge that the
brain is conscious, then that already is an admission that a physical
process taking place in a physical system can under certain conditions
be conscious.
Alex
Glen Sizemore is quite right to raise this issue because it is
the main issue in consciousness studies. He has already given
the best approach to this issue in his thread "The Dance of the
Copy Theorist":
"That is, could a photograph BE the seeing? Could it be the
experience of itself? Could the “point eye” ever “be the same as
the photograph”?"
Do we answer that this is impossible or treat self observation
as a physical possibility? After all, 'self-awareness' is often
used interchangeably with consciousness. In the Direct Realist
case, could the world be the same as the observation, in the
Indirect Realist case, could a zone of brain activity be self
observing? What are the physical constraints? Are there
physical systems where such a thing is possible? Physics
describes several phenomena that might permit self observation
without recursion for either Indirect Realism or Direct Realism.
As scientists we should select the most likely hypotheses
and test for these.
Best Wishes
Alex Green
Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
Steven Lehar
Glen Sizemore is quite right to raise [the issue of experience, and why we
have it] because it is the main issue in consciousness studies. He has
already given the best approach to this issue in his thread "The Dance of
< Alex
Sorry, I have not been following that thread. But as I have said, the
question of experience applies both to direct perception and
representationalism equally, so that issue does not select between those
two alternatives, as direct perceptionists persisistently insist.
As to my own response to the question of experience, I say that it is a
deep, primary mystery, right up there with the mystery of why anything
exists at all, instead of nothing. It is the kind of ultimate question that
can never be answered to any satisfaction. We *can* however say with some
certainty that experience does in fact exist, and it exists at least in
human brains. And for those of us who believe that mind is nothing other
than the functioning of the physical brain, (a paradigmatic assumption)
that is already proof that a physical process taking place in a physical
mechanism can under certain conditions be conscious.
Most people assume (without any evidence, another paradigmatic assumption)
that inanimate matter can't possibly have any kind of experience at all,
not even a primal kind of proto-experience very much simpler than animal
consciousness. It follows that any picture or representation in any
physical system cannot possibly be conscious. But beginning from that
assumption, human and animal consciousness is a deep dark mystery, because
brains are also physical systems.
I say that the fact that brains are conscious is proof that physical
systems can be conscious, although systems that are simpler than a human
brain will have an experience that is simpler than the human mind, by an
order of complexity commensurate with the difference in physical
complexity. This leads to the conclusion that all matter and energy must
have some primal proto-consciousness, as Chalmers proposed, although it is
something so simple that even I would hesitate to call it consciousness as
such. But whatever it is, it has the property that when matter is organized
into the complex structure of the human brain, it will automatically and
inevitably result in an experience like that of the human mind. It is the
only self-consistent physicalist explanation of the phenomena of physical
existence and of human consciousness, that does not invoke immaterial souls
or disembodied experiences, or some such nonsense.
The simplest explanation is that physical objects are aware of themselves
as spatial structures, they experience their own spatial configuration,
although with neither memory nor aspirations, nor any of the complex
cogitation that characterizes human consciousness, just this shape, right
here, right now. That is the only hypothesis that makes sense of the fact
that the pattern of activation in a human brain has a consciousness of its
own spatial structure. That may seem absurdly implausible to some, but in
my view it is nowhere near as implausible as the idea of the brain becoming
aware of objects beyond and outside of itself. Nobody has yet even
explained coherently what that could possibly even *mean*, at least not
with enough specificity as to express the concept in a simple model, or to
make testable predictions about the brain.
I hope this diversion into the "ultimate question" of experience does not
divert attention from my challenge to direct perceptionists to explain the
ontology of our experience if it is out in the world, rather than in our
brains. I see that as yet another profound failure of the concept of direct
perception.
Steve
Neil W Rickert
SL>Ok, lets try the *ontological* approach to the Direct Perception
SL>v.s. Representationalist debate. What is the ontology of experience?
SL>First let us agree what we mean by experience. For example visual
SL>experience is the colored three-dimensional volumetric world you see
SL>around you when you open your eyes. This is distinct from the
SL>objective external world in the fact that when you close your eyes,
SL>the visual world disappears, or rather, it is transformed into a foggy
SL>brownish space of indefinite extent, while the real world continues to
SL>exist unaffected by the blinking of your eyes. Whether you are a
SL>direct or indirect perception advocate, we can agree on the definition
SL>of visual experience, even though representationalists believe it to
SL>be located inside the brain, while direct perceptionists locate
SL>experience out in the world beyond the retina.
It's an ingenious argument. It seems that you could use that method
to prove that we don't eat food, we eat representations of food.
It makes you wonder how we get our nutrients.
You seems to be assuming the kind of Cartesian theater that Dennett
criticised. I don't agree with that. But even assuming a Cartesian
theater, you are misusing "experience". For example, my experience
in watching a movie includes my emotions and thought. It isn't just
what was played on the screen. Contrary to your assertion, I don't
locate experience out in the world. I don't consider it a thing. It
seems to me that treating experience as a thing is a category mistake.
The argument about blinking the eyes is interesting, because I think
that actually argues for direct perception. If there is some sort of
volumetric representation, then you would think your visual
experience would persist during a blink, perhaps slowly fading out.
May I suggest that the "foggy brownish space of indefinite extent" is
closer to what is represented.
[snip]
SL>The representationalist answer is that qualia are different states of
SL>the physical brain, and thus they are located inside the brain.
But that is an hypothesis, not an answer.
SL>But what is the direct perceptionist's answer? What is the "stuff"
SL>that changes color across space that you experience?
There is no such stuff. You have confused the issue by your misuse
of "experience".
[snip]
SL> My vote is for a standing wave
SL>representation using a Fourier code to produce moving volumetric
SL>holographic images in the brain, and that those images correspond
SL>directly to our experience.
Interesting. You had earlier asserted the need for an explicit
representation. But I would take a Fourier transform to be an
implicit representation.
I seriously doubt that there is enough DNA in the human genome to
encode the hardware specifications that would be required for the
proposed system.
In another message ("Conceptual vs. Empirical Issues"), Steven wrote:
SL>For you direct perception offers the "simplicity" of being intuitively
SL>believable, whereas for me representationalism offers the "simplicity" of
SL>being causally explanatory.
There is nothing explanatory about representationalism. Most
representationalists admit that they are unable to explain conscious
experience. The argument about an infinite regression of
homunculuses keeps coming up precisely because representationalism
explains nothing.
Whether a system uses direct perception, or is based on
representations, in an implementation issue, not an explanatory
issue. So lets stop the arguing, and wait for until there is enough
empirical evidence to answer questions about implementation details
in homo sapiens.
-NWR
Cathy Reason
Lehar, but there are a couple of questions I need to ask to try and clarify
in my own mind what is actually going on here.
Steven Lehar had said:
>First let us agree what we mean by experience. For example visual
>experience is the colored three-dimensional volumetric world you see
>around you when you open your eyes.
<snip>
Neil Rickert replied:
>It's an ingenious argument. It seems that you could use that method
>to prove that we don't eat food, we eat representations of food.
>It makes you wonder how we get our nutrients.
If we leave aside the question of direct perception for a moment (I agree,
that's an empirical question)
it seems here that you are denying that conscious experience is itself a
representation of the world. Does this mean you are endorsing naive (not
direct) realism? If not, could you possibly explain what you do mean here?
By "naive realism", I mean the view that the phenomenal properties of
consciousness are themselves a part of the external world. If you don't
like the term "phenomenal properties", then consider "qualia" an adequate
synonym for what I mean.
>Contrary to your assertion, I don't
>locate experience out in the world. I don't consider it a thing. It
>seems to me that treating experience as a thing is a category mistake.
This is clearly false if you are using the word "thing" in its natural
language sense (it's perfectly good natural language usage to say that
"experience is a thing we don't understand", for example). I take it
therefore you are using the word "thing" in some special technical sense.
Could you please explain what this is?
Cathy
[Catherine Reason]
Steven Lehar
Rickert >
It's an ingenious argument. It seems that you could use that method
to prove that we don't eat food, we eat representations of food.
It makes you wonder how we get our nutrients.
< Rickert
No, just that we experience internal representations of the
external "nouminal" food that nourishes us.
Rickert >
you are misusing "experience". ... I don't consider it a thing. It
seems to me that treating experience as a thing is a category mistake.
< Rickert
It seems there are a lot of these "category mistakes" in direct perception.
I see a spatial structure that is my experience, it is distinct from the
world itself, and yet we are not permitted to think of that spatial
structure as anything we can talk about. It seems that a lot of direct
perception involves prohibitions against certain concepts, as in
behaviorism, that fobade discussion of conscious experience. Curiously,
all of these forbidden concepts are the very things that reveal the
incoherency of direct perception.
Rickert >
The argument about blinking the eyes is interesting, because I think
that actually argues for direct perception.
< Rickert
I see. Because closing the eyelids makes the real world out there cease to
exist altogether. Hmmmm...
Rickert >
If there is some sort of volumetric representation, then you would think
your visual experience would persist during a blink, perhaps slowly fading
out.
< Rickert
No, you would expect it to blink out immediately when the input data stream
is blocked, like the image on a photodiode array when you put the lens
cover on.
Rickert >
I seriously doubt that there is enough DNA in the human genome to
encode the hardware specifications that would be required for the
proposed system.
< Rickert
There I believe you put your finger on what I believe is the principal
reason why representationalism is generally not given serious consideration.
Rickert >
There is nothing explanatory about representationalism. Most
representationalists admit that they are unable to explain conscious
experience. The argument about an infinite regression of
homunculuses keeps coming up precisely because representationalism
explains nothing.
< Rickert
Well it does explain the *functional* aspect of vision, that is, how the
information of the world gets in to the computational hardware of the
brain. Direct perception does not even explain that much. And direct
perception does not explain experience either, it merely prohibits
discussion of it.
Rickert >
So lets stop the arguing, and wait for until there is enough
empirical evidence to answer questions about implementation details
in homo sapiens.
< Rickert
I think that is wise. We are not making any further progress in
understanding each other. With this last ontological argument I have
expended my last big arrow from my quiver. I will provide a summary
overview of all the arguments we have covered in these various threads
under the Subject:
Summary: Direct Perception v.s. Representationalism
Steve
Neil W Rickert
>Neil Rickert replied:
NR>It's an ingenious argument. It seems that you could use that method
NR>to prove that we don't eat food, we eat representations of food.
NR>It makes you wonder how we get our nutrients.
CR>If we leave aside the question of direct perception for a moment (I agree,
CR>that's an empirical question)
CR>it seems here that you are denying that conscious experience is itself a
CR>representation of the world. Does this mean you are endorsing naive (not
CR>direct) realism? If not, could you possibly explain what you do mean here?
I was disagreeing with the use of the word "experience" here. But I
guess we don't really have good terminology. I don't much like the
term "qualia" either. However, I will use it for the moment, lacking
a better term.
Exactly what we should consider qualia to be is an interesting
question.
I don't have any principle objections to calling it a representation,
although I think that is not quite the right term. However, if it is
to be considered a representation, I would still doubt that it is a
brain representation. I doubt that anything in the brain has the
same qualities.
Additionally, even if our qualia are to be considered a
representation, we are not seeing that representation. Rather, that
representation exists as a result of our seeing the external world.
My current view (subject to future revision) is to consider the
qualia a construct, rather than a representation.
Maybe the term "construct" needs a little explanation here.
If we can recall some Euclidean geometry, then we remember that there
is a procedure for constructing the bisector of an angle. It is
a construction in an interesting sense. For, as mathematicians will
assure you, the angle bisector exists whether we construct it or not.
So we aren't constructing something that did not previously exist. Rather,
we are constructing something that already exists, for the purpose of
finding (or identifying) it. Moreover, we are constructing it in
exactly the location of the already existing bisector.
Maybe we use a red pencil when constructing the bisector. Thus the
constructed bisector might have some phenomenal properties that the
already existing mathematical bisector does not have.
I want to use the term "in situ construction" to describe this
process of construction, in place, of something that already exists.
With that terminology, my current view is that the qualia are an in
situ construct.
NR>Contrary to your assertion, I don't
NR>locate experience out in the world. I don't consider it a thing. It
NR>seems to me that treating experience as a thing is a category mistake.
CR>This is clearly false if you are using the word "thing" in its natural
CR>language sense (it's perfectly good natural language usage to say that
CR>"experience is a thing we don't understand", for example). I take it
CR>therefore you are using the word "thing" in some special technical sense.
CR>Could you please explain what this is?
My disagreement is over the word "experience", rather than over "thing."
Perhaps you and Steven are using "experience" in some special technical
sense that I did not recognize.
-NWR
Jeff Dalton
to be careful about the language they use.
For example, Steven Lehar gets into trouble with this:
SL> First let us agree what we mean by experience. For example visual
SL> experience is the colored three-dimensional volumetric world you see
SL> around you when you open your eyes.
So we see experience?
SL> Whether you are a
SL> direct or indirect perception advocate, we can agree on the definition
SL> of visual experience, even though representationalists believe it to
SL> be located inside the brain, while direct perceptionists locate
SL> experience out in the world beyond the retina.
So direct perceptionists believe *experience* is out "in" the world?
And representationalists believe the "world" they "see" is inside
the brain? Note how that calls out for someone to mount an
"infinite regress" / homunculuses attack. And one duely appears
in Neil W Rickert's reply:
NR:
> You seems to be assuming the kind of Cartesian theater that Dennett
> criticised. ... But even assuming a Cartesian theater, you are
> misusing "experience". For example, my experience in watching
> a movie includes my emotions and thought. It isn't just
> what was played on the screen. ...
> There is nothing explanatory about representationalism. Most
> representationalists admit that they are unable to explain conscious
> experience. The argument about an infinite regression of
> homunculuses keeps coming up precisely because representationalism
> explains nothing.
I think all of that is wrong. Representationalism explains things
that I notice every day. Sure, it doesn't explain the "hard problem"
of conscious experience, and most of the detail hasn't yet been
worked out, but that doens't mean it explains nothing.
And the infinite regress argument comes up for two reasons:
1. "Representationalists" sometimes use language and argument
that invites it. For example: talk of *seeing* representations
or (as Steven Lehar just did) of "visual experience" being what
"you see".
Another example is the argument from illusion when it says that
if a stick appears bent but isn't, there must be something else
(a sense-datum or whatever) that *is* bent. (Or similarly for
colours, etc.) This makes it sound like there's a bent, stick-
shaped, stick-coloured thing in the viewer's head (or ___?)
that still has to be seen.
2. Opponents of these theories find it convenient to treat incomplete,
partial explanations as if they did nothing; and they know a good
piece of rhetoric when they find one. ;)
"Cartesian Theatre" is another piece of rhetoric. It was invented
by Dennet in order to make certain views sound ridiculous.
Bernard Baars has done a lot to rehabilitate theatre metaphors,
and his global workspace theory has been fairly well-received.
(Of course, the workspace can, and is intended to, include
"emotions and thought" and what's seen and heard, etc, not
just visual experience.)
Nonetheless, I think that everyone, on all sides, should have
rejected "theatre" talk out of hand. Are ordinary cases of seeing
like sitting in a theatre and seeing something projected on a
screen or performed on a stage? Not very. They're much more like
looking out of a window.
A similar issue arises with the charge of "treating experience
as a thing".
NR> It seems to me that treating experience as a thing is
NR> a category mistake.
As Cathy Reason rightly points out, "thing" in English doesn't
carry the implication that is being assumed there.
However, it's at least difficult to talk of "experience",
"consciousness" etc (all nouns) without creating an opportunity
for someone to read it as involving mistaken reification.
Representationalists need to develop better ways of talking
about these things or else they will always be at a rhetorical
disadvantage in these discussions.
-- Jeff
Neil W Rickert
>Rickert >
NR>The argument about blinking the eyes is interesting, because I think
NR>that actually argues for direct perception.
NR>< Rickert
SL>I see. Because closing the eyelids makes the real world out there cease to
SL>exist altogether. Hmmmm...
No. The eyelids cutoff visual access to the world.
>Rickert >
NR>If there is some sort of volumetric representation, then you would think
NR>your visual experience would persist during a blink, perhaps slowly fading
NR>out.
>< Rickert
SL>No, you would expect it to blink out immediately when the input data stream
SL>is blocked, like the image on a photodiode array when you put the lens
SL>cover on.
Interesting example. The image on a photodiode array is not a
representation. As you said, in a different message, "Whether or not
something is a representation depends on whether somebody or
something uses it as a representation." But the image on the
photodiode array is not normally being used.
The photodiodes are transducers, converting the photon energy to
electrical signals. The image that you can see is due to reflected
photons. Those are photons that never made it to the transduction
process, so were not used.
>Rickert >
NR>There is nothing explanatory about representationalism. Most
NR>representationalists admit that they are unable to explain conscious
NR>experience. The argument about an infinite regression of
NR>homunculuses keeps coming up precisely because representationalism
NR>explains nothing.
>< Rickert
SL>Well it does explain the *functional* aspect of vision, that is, how the
SL>information of the world gets in to the computational hardware of the
SL>brain.
Representationalism is not required for that. See my comment above on
why the image on a photodiode array is not a representation. Similar
comments apply to the retina.
How the information gets into the hardware is explained by the
physiology of the eye. The claims of representationalism add
nothing.
SL> Direct perception does not even explain that much. And direct
SL>perception does not explain experience either, it merely prohibits
SL>discussion of it.
Neither direct perception nor representationalism are adequate
explanations here.
-NWR
Cathy Reason
<snip>
>Exactly what we should consider qualia to be is an interesting
>question.
>I don't have any principle objections to calling it a representation,
>although I think that is not quite the right term. However, if it is
>to be considered a representation, I would still doubt that it is a
>brain representation. I doubt that anything in the brain has the
>same qualities.
I agree, it doesn't really make much sense to regard qualia as a "brain
representation".
>Additionally, even if our qualia are to be considered a
>representation, we are not seeing that representation. Rather, that
>representation exists as a result of our seeing the external world.
Now, I always wonder what people mean when they say this. I agree that it
isn't natural language usage to say that we "see" qualia. But, seeing has
both a subjective aspect and an objective one, and as far as the subjective
aspect goes, I really don't "see" (if you'll pardon the pun) any fundamental
difference between the subjective aspect of perception, and the subjective
process whereby we become directly aware of the qualia from which the
subjective aspects of our perception are made up. So this sounds like a
purely terminological issue to me.
But, I always get the impression that when people say we don't "see"
representations, they think they are making some sort of profound
ontological point. Your second sentence above implies that qualia exist
subsequently in time to an act of seeing, which seems to make no sense as
far as the subjective aspect of perception is concerned (what is the
subjective aspect of "seeing" that doesn't involve qualia?). So I assume
that here you are talking specifically about seeing in the objective sense?
>My current view (subject to future revision) is to consider the
>qualia a construct, rather than a representation.
>Maybe the term "construct" needs a little explanation here.
>If we can recall some Euclidean geometry, then we remember that there
>is a procedure for constructing the bisector of an angle. It is
>a construction in an interesting sense. For, as mathematicians will
>assure you, the angle bisector exists whether we construct it or not.
>So we aren't constructing something that did not previously exist. Rather,
>we are constructing something that already exists, for the purpose of
>finding (or identifying) it. Moreover, we are constructing it in
>exactly the location of the already existing bisector.
>Maybe we use a red pencil when constructing the bisector. Thus the
>constructed bisector might have some phenomenal properties that the
>already existing mathematical bisector does not have.
>I want to use the term "in situ construction" to describe this
>process of construction, in place, of something that already exists.
>With that terminology, my current view is that the qualia are an in
>situ construct.
Thank you, that's a very illuminating description. It does raise at least
three questions, of course: What is the "something that already exists"
which qualia are constructed to identify? What are qualia (in this sense)
constructed from? And in what sense are they "in exactly the location" of
whatever it is they are constructed to identify? (It sounds rather odd to
me to talk about qualia existing in a "location".)
>My disagreement is over the word "experience", rather than over "thing."
>Perhaps you and Steven are using "experience" in some special technical
>sense that I did not recognize.
I can't say what Steven Lehar meant, obviously, but qualia would be an
acceptable synonym for what I mean.
Cathy
[Catherine Reason]
Alex Green
containing events occurs from 0.3 to 0.8 seconds after the event.
The most obvious evidence for this is due to pattern rivalry and
binocular rivalry, both of which have time courses in excess of
0.2 secs and occur all the time yet we are unaware of their
occurrence (just wink with alternate eyes to see the world change).
In normal life, when we are not questioning our perception, the
dominant image simply is our perception. Libet's experiments
give a similar picture of conscious experience delayed by about
0.5 secs. The auditory continuity illusion also shows that auditory
modelling is delayed by as much as 0.5 secs. Etc..
Yet reaction times are normally around 0.1 secs. We react before
we form conscious experience. Of course, we all know that this
happens, it is obvious when playing ball games where it takes a
great deal of practice to develop skilled behaviour so that our
reactions to stimuli can be <= 0.1 secs.
So, if conscious experience is not about behaviour, if Ryle's
'ghost' and Skinner's states that are unnecessary to function
exist, then what is the role of conscious experience?
My own guess is that it matches integrated brain modelling to
the world and gives a signal 'OK' or a signal 'try again'. This
would be why we need conscious experience when learning
skilled reactions. It would also explain why non-consciousness
can be accompanied by extreme mutisms or delirium where
modelling mismatches reality. Such a system should actually
be expected in a hierarchical processor based on slow
technology such as the brain. It is important to note that
this suggestion is different from the idea that conscious
experience might veto intentions. Approving behaviour after
the event is a different function from exercising a veto.
This would also suggest that conscious experience is to one
side of the normal flow of data through the brain to the
environment. The stimulus-processing-response loop would
be integrated into conscious experience after the event and
conscious experience would not normally be in the loop.
Would such a phenomenon be fatal to Direct Realism? Would
it be an argument against the idea that the specialised cortical
processors that are involved in stimulus-response loops host
conscious experience? Is it an argument against representationalism
at any level except conscious processing, most processing
being non-representational?
Arnold Trehub
>> I want to use the term "in situ construction" to describe this
>> process of construction, in place, of something that already exists.
>> With that terminology, my current view is that the qualia are an
>> in situ construct.
Cathy Reason responded:
> Thank you, that's a very illuminating description. It does raise at
> least three questions, of course: [1] What is the "something that already
> exists" which qualia are constructed to identify? [2] What are qualia (in
> this sense) constructed from? [3] And in what sense are they "in exactly
> the location" of whatever it is they are constructed to identify? (It
> sounds rather odd to me to talk about qualia existing in a "location".)
I find it remarkable that this discussion proceeds without reference to
detailed theoretical and empirical work which has addressed the very
pertinent questions Cathy asks here.
In answer to Cathy's three questions, I would say:
[1] The "something that already exists" is the real physical world.
[2] The "qualia" are constructed from living neuronal brain tissue.
[3] They (qualia) are "in exactly the location of whatever it is they are
constructed to identify" in the sense that they are located in retinotopic
and spatiotopic coordinates within a specialized brain system (I call it
the *retinoid system*) that correspond to the geometric coordinates of
their referents in the real physical world.
The details of how this can be accomplished by our brain's neuronal
mechanisms and systems are given in *The Cognitive Brain* (MIT Press, 1991).
What I have provided is a credible solution to the problem of conscious
content. What I have not provided is is a solution to the problem of the
sheer existence of consciousness.
See:
http://listserv.uh.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0110&L=psyche-d&P=R2
Arnold Trehub
Neil W Rickert
>Neil Rickert wrote:
NR>Additionally, even if our qualia are to be considered a
NR>representation, we are not seeing that representation. Rather, that
NR>representation exists as a result of our seeing the external world.
CR>Now, I always wonder what people mean when they say this. I agree that it
CR>isn't natural language usage to say that we "see" qualia. But, seeing has
CR>both a subjective aspect and an objective one, and as far as the subjective
CR>aspect goes, I really don't "see" (if you'll pardon the pun) any fundamental
CR>difference between the subjective aspect of perception, and the subjective
CR>process whereby we become directly aware of the qualia from which the
CR>subjective aspects of our perception are made up. So this sounds like a
CR>purely terminological issue to me.
Seeing is a process, not an object. To say that seeing is a
subjective process would, I think, be to commit oneself to
solipsism. In any case, and without trying to argue that point,
I was certainly using the word "seeing" to refer to a process.
Perhaps we are not agreeing on the meaning of "seeing". But then
there is rarely complete agreement on meanings.
CR>But, I always get the impression that when people say we don't "see"
CR>representations, they think they are making some sort of profound
CR>ontological point.
The only profound ontological point I would ever attempt to make,
would be to assert that there are no profound ontological points.
CR> Your second sentence above implies that qualia exist
CR>subsequently in time to an act of seeing, which seems to make no sense as
CR>far as the subjective aspect of perception is concerned (what is the
CR>subjective aspect of "seeing" that doesn't involve qualia?). So I assume
CR>that here you are talking specifically about seeing in the objective sense?
I was actually attempting to make a different point.
Here is a rough diagram of what is being discussed, at the process
level. Note that the diagram might not be correct, but it is
approximately what is often assumed.
Real world ---> information ---> representation --> analysis ---> qualia
The representationalists look at it this way:
Real world ---> information ---> representation --> analysis ---> qualia
easy simple copy difficult
To the representationalist the difficult step, and thus the most
important step, is in the analysis which comes after representation.
That's why the representationalist is prone to say that we are
literally looking at our representations.
Here is how I see it:
Real world ---> information ---> representation --> analysis ---> qualia
difficult trivial not needed
Thus I see the hard work as getting the information from the world
in the first place. Naturally, I want to apply the verb "seeing" to
that step.
The received view is that picking up information (the first step) is
easy. And why not. After all, we ourselves do it with great ease.
But we we see it as easy, because we are not aware of what is going
on in our perceptual systems. If you try to design a robotic system,
you will discover that it is not at all easy.
NR>My current view (subject to future revision) is to consider the
NR>qualia a construct, rather than a representation.
NR>[big snip]
NR>With that terminology, my current view is that the qualia are an in
NR>situ construct.
CR>Thank you, that's a very illuminating description. It does raise at least
CR>three questions, of course: What is the "something that already exists"
CR>which qualia are constructed to identify?
The world. Or, more properly, the things in our immediate environment.
CR> What are qualia (in this sense)
CR>constructed from? And in what sense are they "in exactly the location" of
CR>whatever it is they are constructed to identify? (It sounds rather odd to
CR>me to talk about qualia existing in a "location".)
I'm tempted to say that they are constructed from philosophy, and are
located in philosophy books. I really don't like the talk of qualia,
because such talk seems to lead to an inappropriate tendency to
reify. My comment about construction in situ was meant to be a
comment on the appearances or experience.
The received view (the representationalist view), is that we pick up
something like information about blotches of color. But that's an
impoverished view of perception. We are also picking up information
about objects, and we are picking up information about locations of
those objects. Our perceptual experience includes experience of that
object and location information.
NR>My disagreement is over the word "experience", rather than over "thing."
NR>Perhaps you and Steven are using "experience" in some special technical
NR>sense that I did not recognize.
CR>I can't say what Steven Lehar meant, obviously, but qualia would be an
CR>acceptable synonym for what I mean.
I think Gibson used the term "sensation", which perhaps would be
more suitable.
-NWR
Cathy Reason
>Seeing is a process, not an object.
Well indeed, the objective aspect of perception can certainly be regarded as
a process (a process of correlating an observing state with an observed
state, for example). But I think it it would be rather harder to
characterize the subjective aspect of perception as a "process".
Undoubtedly it involves "processes", but it also involves qualia, and so we
are back to the hard problem. To characterize qualia as "processes" or
aspects of a "process", you would have to characterize them adequately in
terms of structure and function, and our inability to do this is precisely
the hard problem.
>To say that seeing is a
>subjective process would, I think, be to commit oneself to
>solipsism.
I don't think anyone has said that seeing is exclusively subjective, have
they? Only that it has both subjective and objective aspects.
>In any case, and without trying to argue that point,
>I was certainly using the word "seeing" to refer to a process.
Thank you, I'll bear this in mind.
>Perhaps we are not agreeing on the meaning of "seeing". But then
>there is rarely complete agreement on meanings.
Indeed so. One of the reasons why arguments in philosophy are never
rigorous ;-)
>The only profound ontological point I would ever attempt to make,
>would be to assert that there are no profound ontological points.
And yet above you claim that "seeing is a process, not an object" -- which,
if true, would indeed be a profound onotological point.
>I was actually attempting to make a different point.
>Here is a rough diagram of what is being discussed, at the process
>level. Note that the diagram might not be correct, but it is
>approximately what is often assumed.
>Real world ---> information ---> representation --> analysis ---> qualia
>The representationalists look at it this way:
>Real world ---> information ---> representation --> analysis ---> qualia
> easy simple copy difficult
>To the representationalist the difficult step, and thus the most
>important step, is in the analysis which comes after representation.
>That's why the representationalist is prone to say that we are
> literally looking at our representations.
>Here is how I see it:
>Real world ---> information ---> representation --> analysis ---> qualia
> difficult trivial not needed
> Thus I see the hard work as getting the information from the world
> in the first place. Naturally, I want to apply the verb "seeing" to
> that step.
That's perfectly reasonable, so long as you are considering "seeing" only
in its objective sense.
>The received view is that picking up information (the first step) is
>easy. And why not. After all, we ourselves do it with great ease.
>But we we see it as easy, because we are not aware of what is going
>on in our perceptual systems. If you try to design a robotic system,
>you will discover that it is not at all easy.
Indeed so.
[Me, previously]
+What is the "something that already exists"
+which qualia are constructed to identify?
NWR:
>The world. Or, more properly, the things in our immediate environment.
Ok, that's what I thought you probably meant.
[Me previously]
+What are qualia (in this sense)
+constructed from? And in what sense are they "in exactly the location" of
+whatever it is they are constructed to identify? (It sounds rather odd to
+me to talk about qualia existing in a "location".)
NWR:
>I'm tempted to say that they are constructed from philosophy, and are
>located in philosophy books. I really don't like the talk of qualia,
>because such talk seems to lead to an inappropriate tendency to
>reify.
Ah, now here we really do have some problems.
I don't like the word "qualia" either, because I don't like Latinisms. And
the word itself is undoubtedly a construct of philosophy, as is the practice
of analyzing experience into its components.
But I'm not interested in the origins of words or the details of
philosophical analysis (not at the moment anyway). I'm interested in the
nature of seeing, and that includes both its subjective and its objective
aspects. And I'm afraid you can't address the subjective aspect of seeing
without addressing qualia.
I'm not suggesting that you should necessarily address the subjective aspect
of seeing. It's perfectly reasonable to leave the hard problem on one side
and just deal with the "easy" ones (which aren't easy at all, of course).
But I think one needs to be honest if one is doing that, rather than just
brushing the issue of qualia aside and pretending it's a non-problem.
If I look at the logical structure of the paragraph you have written above,
I get something like this: You believe that a tendency to reify (reify what
you don't say, but I'm guessing you mean experience) is inappropriate
(though you don't say why it's inappropriate). And you believe that a
consideration of qualia will challenge that assumption, so you don't want to
consider qualia.
To me, what all that boils down to is this: You can't deal with subjective
experience without violating your initial assumption, and so you want to
brush the whole question of subjective experience under the carpet.
>My comment about construction in situ was meant to be a
>comment on the appearances or experience.
Heavens, how d'you get from this to saying that qualia are "in the exact
location" of the physical properties they are constructed to identify? Or
are you now saying that the spatial relationships between qualia are the
same as the spatial relationships between the physical properties which the
qualia are supposed to represent?
The thing is, for your analogy between qualia and the bisecting of angles to
work, you need a causal story to explain the origin and nature of qualia.
If you were using a red pencil to identify the bisector, then presumably you
would make arangements to procure such a pencil in advance. You might go
down to the shop and buy one, say. And that, in combination with a lot of
stuff about manufacturing and retail in modern industrial society, would
provide us with a causal story of the origin and nature of red pencils.
But in the case of qualia, we have no such causal story. And that is why we
have the hard problem.
<snip>
[Me, previously]
>I can't say what Steven Lehar meant, obviously, but qualia would be an
>acceptable synonym for what I mean.
NWR:
>I think Gibson used the term "sensation", which perhaps would be
>more suitable.
I'm not sure that it would, because it's a verbal noun. Why do you think it
would be more suitable?
Cathy
[Catherine Reason]
Brian & Nina Earl
>So, if conscious experience is not about behaviour, if Ryle's
>'ghost' and Skinner's states that are unnecessary to function
>exist, then what is the role of conscious experience?
>
>My own guess is that it matches integrated brain modelling to
>the world and gives a signal 'OK' or a signal 'try again'. This
>would be why we need conscious experience when learning
>skilled reactions. It would also explain why non-consciousness
>can be accompanied by extreme mutisms or delirium where
>modelling mismatches reality. Such a system should actually
>be expected in a hierarchical processor based on slow
>technology such as the brain. It is important to note that
>this suggestion is different from the idea that conscious
>experience might veto intentions. Approving behaviour after
>the event is a different function from exercising a veto.
>
>This would also suggest that conscious experience is to one
>side of the normal flow of data through the brain to the
>environment. The stimulus-processing-response loop would
>be integrated into conscious experience after the event and
>conscious experience would not normally be in the loop.
>
If conscious experience were to give signals 'OK' or 'try again', it
would be 'about behaviour', wouldn't it?.
Stuart Hameroff wrote:
>The same holds for speech. We verbally respond to spoken words
>before they are consciously perceived. Yet we feel as though
>we are responding consciously.
>
>Accordingly, many say that actions which 'feel' as though they are
>conscious are actually unconscious. Therefore (according to this
>presumption) consciousness is epiphenomenal and we are (as T.H. Huxley
>bleakly said) 'merely helpless spectators'.
Do we really feel as though we are responding consciously in ordinary
conversation, or do we feel this way only when we take time to formulate
our response before voicing it? Ordinary conversation seems more like
an occasion when the stimulus and response are experienced after the event.
If actions which feel conscious are actually unconscious, does it
inevitably follow that consciousness is epiphenomenal? I wonder if
consciousness might have some other function than controlling our actions.
My own research has led to the conclusion that consciousness, that is
experience from moment to moment, is merely an array of data, and, as
such, cannot make decisions, nor can it choose, initiate or control our
actions. This is in agreement with Velmans (1991). This is why I have
referred to the stimulus and the response (in conversation) as being
experienced, but excluded the processing component of Alex Green's
'stimulus-processing-response loop'. I do not believe processes of any
kind enter consciousness, except in the trivial sense that data in our
experience (what we see, what we hear) may change sequentially.
But, again, I am not sure that this necessarily means that consciousness
does not participate in our actions in some way. I say this because I
believe the evidence that consciousness is adaptive is quite strong.
Brian Earl
Velmans, M. (1991). Is human information processing conscious?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14, 651-726.
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Alex Green
I do not believe processes of any
kind enter consciousness, except in the trivial sense that data in our
experience (what we see, what we hear) may change sequentially.
Alex
Yes, I agree with this. As I pointed out earlier, things just pop into
mind, processing is done non-consciously and conscious
experience does not create its own content. Clearly however,
whatever is in conscious experience is available for output
otherwise we could not write about it. I would suggest two ways
in which this might happen. Firstly, the whole content of conscious
experience is loaded by the non-conscious parts of the brain
so it is already 'known'. Secondly there could be some form
of matching signal such that the configuration of conscious
experience signals yes or no depending upon whether
a model supplied by the non-conscious parts of the brain
match some goal state. A binary pattern matching signal
can be generated by non-classical phenomena such as QM
and would not have the character of a classical process.
Best Wishes
Alex Green
Stuart Hameroff wrote:
Brian Earl
Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
Arnold Trehub
the ability to review and analyse aspects of the world as it exists,
and then imagine aspects of the world as they might exist in the
future if particular actions are undertaken? Can we conceive planning
and inventing outside of a content-rich (conscious/phenomenal?) state?
Arnold Trehub
Glen M. Sizemore
This is why I have
referred to the stimulus and the response (in conversation) as being
experienced, but excluded the processing component of Alex Green's
'stimulus-processing-response loop'.
Glen
You are close to saying (or you ARE saying) that consciousness (at least one meaning of the term) involves observations of our own behavior and its context. This has been said before, of course, most notably, perhaps, by Skinner. But he went much farther by pointing out 1.) its function (and, hence, origin) in culture, 2.) its function in the individual’s behavior, and 3.) how it is that we come to be aware of it, especially when what we eventually observe is private behavior.
To briefly summarize this position:
1.) Our behavior is important to others, including what we are seeing, or have seen, because it because it extends the practical actions that others may take “Og saw bison by river.” In addition, to the extent that the ability to examine our own behavior leads us to take practical action, the culture benefits.
2.) There are conspicuous ways in which responding to our own behavior leads to effective action. A person that learns, for example, to say each letter of the alphabet (maybe combined with a vowel or two in the case of consonants and vice versa with vowels) when trying to remember a name has learned to behave in a particular way in a given circumstance, and this behavior, in turn sometimes allows us to solve problems when we are controlled by that response. Following literal rules (as opposed to the metaphorical ones that we are said to follow when we, for example, speak our native language) where we ourselves repeat or invent a rule is a similar example.
3.) We come to respond discriminatively to our own behavior when our culture arranges the sorts of reinforcement contingencies that generate such stimulus control (the non-cultural world does not seem to “arrange” such contingencies). However, we also learn to respond discriminatively to events with which the verbal community has no direct access (i.e., pain, imagined scenes, private talk, etc.) and the question arises as to how the verbal community arranges the necessary contingencies. Skinner suggested that we train, for example, awareness of pain when the verbal community has access to public stimuli (they see you bump your head, or see you holding you elbow, or see the skinned knee, etc.) but the person may come under control of subtler aspects of their behavior. Another, perhaps more common way, occurs because behavior can be executed intensities that range from quite detectable publicly, to undetectable (intensity is, in fact, a differentiable property of behavior). Th!
us, we learn to describe our own behavior when we are behaving publicly, but later we are able to describe inchoate or incipient fragments of the behavior. Finally, Skinner suggested that generalization resulted in a sort of metaphorical extension. For example, a “shooting” pain is one that travels, and travels rapidly, like an arrow or other projectile.
I would also like to add something with respect to “processing.” Not only do we not see the “processing,” much of what cognitivists have suggested is going on is, quite simply, not happening at all. We do not run off in our minds or brains and retrieve stored copies of things, we are not following “unconscious rules” when we speak our native language, etc. Nothing like this is happening when physiology mediates the behavior from which we have concocted "stored representations" and "unconscious inferences," etc.
Cordially,
Glen
Neil W Rickert
>Neil Rickert wrote:
NR>Seeing is a process, not an object.
CR>Well indeed, the objective aspect of perception can certainly be regarded as
CR>a process (a process of correlating an observing state with an observed
CR>state, for example). But I think it it would be rather harder to
CR>characterize the subjective aspect of perception as a "process".
CR>Undoubtedly it involves "processes", but it also involves qualia, and so we
CR>are back to the hard problem. To characterize qualia as "processes" or
CR>aspects of a "process", you would have to characterize them adequately in
CR>terms of structure and function, and our inability to do this is precisely
CR>the hard problem.
It seems that Cathy is asking for an objective account of qualia.
I don't expect such an account to ever be possible.
We don't even have a good account of the objective world. At one
time it was thought to contain solid materials. But we since learned
that what we call solids were mostly empty space, with a sparse array
of atoms in them. But at least the atoms were solid. But, later, we
learned that the atoms, too, were mostly empty space, with orbiting
electrons going around a central solid core. But now even that solid
core is in doubt, as it seems to be composed of quarks, neutrinos and
other tiny critters. And we really haven't a clue as to what kind of
substance quarks are made out of.
Why are we supposed to take the objective world for granted while
proclaiming that we are not naive realists, yet at the same time to
expect a detailed objective account of the subjective world?
I don't expect that we shall ever have a full objective account of
the subjective. But I do expect that we shall eventually have a
credible account of the kind of architecture that is needed for
consciousness.
[big snip]
CR> [Me previously]
CR>+What are qualia (in this sense)
CR>+constructed from? And in what sense are they "in exactly the location" of
CR>+whatever it is they are constructed to identify? (It sounds rather odd to
CR>+me to talk about qualia existing in a "location".)
>NWR:
NR>I'm tempted to say that they are constructed from philosophy, and are
NR>located in philosophy books. I really don't like the talk of qualia,
NR>because such talk seems to lead to an inappropriate tendency to
NR>reify.
CR>Ah, now here we really do have some problems.
CR>I don't like the word "qualia" either, because I don't like Latinisms. And
CR>the word itself is undoubtedly a construct of philosophy, as is the practice
CR>of analyzing experience into its components.
CR>But I'm not interested in the origins of words or the details of
CR>philosophical analysis (not at the moment anyway). I'm interested in the
CR>nature of seeing, and that includes both its subjective and its objective
CR>aspects. And I'm afraid you can't address the subjective aspect of seeing
CR>without addressing qualia.
Once upon a time, the alchemists invented phlogiston, in order to
explain combustion. It later turned out that this was an entirely
unnecessary invention, that it did not contribute to the explanation
of combustion, but only introduced new problems of its own.
And some time ago, the Newtonian physicists invented the luminiferous
ether, in order to explain the propogation of light. It turned out
that this, too, was an entirely unnecessary invention that contributed
nothing to the explanation of light, but only introduced new problems.
I'm suggesting that qualia are also an entirely unnecessary invention
that contribute nothing to our accounts of consciousness, but only
introduce new mysteries.
Apparently we are supposed to believe that we live in an objectively
real world. Yet that real world is supposed to have no affect on us
at all. Our sensory systems are picking up streams of useful information
about that real world. But supposedly we are completely oblivious to
that incoming information. We are, however, enrapt by the magic qualia
picture show that is going on now in a theater in our heads.
I think this is a contemporary version of Berkeley's idealism.
I'm not denying that there is something to explain about
consciousness. But it isn't qualia that need explaining. What we
need to explain is how we have a self, while our intuitions tell us
that a computer based robot does not have a comparable self.
-NWR
Anthony Sebastian
CR: Well indeed, the objective aspect of perception can certainly be regarded as a process (a process of correlating an observing state with an observed state, for example). But I think it it would be rather harder to characterize the subjective aspect of perception as a "process". Undoubtedly it involves "processes", but it also involves qualia, and so we are back to the hard problem. To characterize qualia as "processes" or aspects of a "process", you would have to characterize them adequately in terms of structure and function, and our inability to do this is precisely the hard problem."
AS: I agree that we cannot adequately characterize qualia in terms of structure/function so long as we accept the primary premise of the formulation that generates the "hard problem". That primary premise, or starting assumption, dichotomizes the mind into separate domains, the cognitive domain and the phenomenal domain. In doing so, it requires us to bridge a gap between cognitive processing and something extra-physical I order to explain the correlative activities of a cognitive process and its accompanying conscious experiencing, directed to an object or event of reality.
AS: But one need not start with an assumption that leads to such an explanatory impasse. One can credit the assumption as reasonable/plausible, but not as the only reasonable/plausible one to begin an exploration for a satisfying explanation of conscious experiencing. One could postulate instead that the mind has no separate phenomenal domain, only a cognitive domain, and that the activity of conscious experiencing emerges through a complex of cognitive processing. That would lead us away from thinking in terms of bridging an explanatory gap to thinking in terms of building a cognitive highway.
AS: Consider a remark by David Chalmers, who put the so-called "hard problem" on the map: "Conscious experience does not arise in a vacuum. It is always tied to cognitive processing, and it is likely that in some sense it arises from that processing." (Chalmers, 1996, p. 22) Why "in some sense"? Why not just omit that qualification, and substitute "in some way"? Then start looking for a way.
CR: The thing is, for your analogy between qualia and the bisecting of angles to work, you need a causal story to explain the origin and nature of qualia....But in the case of qualia, we have no such causal story. And that is why we have the hard problem.
AS: I would not argue that we have the "hard problem" *because* we have no "causal story to explain the origin and nature of qualia". We have the "hard problem" because its authors specified assumptions that disallowed a "causal story to explain the origin and nature of qualia" without invoking extra-physical phenomena or postulating an entity referred to as "consciousness" that pervades the cosmos like the vacuum. If we did find the "causal story to explain the origin and nature of qualia", in terms of cognitive functioning, we have not solved the "hard problem", we have revealed it as a non-problem.
Anthony Sebastian
-------------------------
Anthony Sebastian, MD
Professor of Medicine
40 Crags Court
San Francisco, CA 94131
Anthony_...@msn.com<mailto:Anthony_...@msn.com>
415-648-0834 [tel]
415-648-0143 [fax]
Faculty Affiliations:
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Division of Nephrology
General Clinical Research Center,
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Faculty Webpage:
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Written in E-Prime
Reneh karamians
below)
It is difficult to conceive of a brain which can plan
ahead without, first, the ability to coevally and
projectively analyze external systems. However, we
observe such behaviors in nature regularly. The nest
building behavior exhibited by many bird species
serves as a perfect example. It is true that the human
ability to invent is based in much more complex brain
events than that of the bird’s, however, the question
is, could “planning ahead” somehow (and I would have
no idea how) simply be the unconscious big brother of
nest building? This is not as radical an idea as it
may come across, considering all thought must begin at
the unconscious atomic level.
__________________________________________________
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Glen Sizemore
GS: Are you using “cognitive” as a synonym for
“neurophysiological?” And if so, what does the
“cognitive” portion add? If not, what do you mean by
“cognitive?”
<snip the tail>
--- Anthony Sebastian <Anthony_...@MSN.COM>
wrote:
Alex Green
Best Wishes
Cordially,
Glen
Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
Cathy Reason
Neil Rickert wrote:
<snip>
>We don't even have a good account of the objective world. At one
>time it was thought to contain solid materials. But we since learned
>that what we call solids were mostly empty space, with a sparse array
>of atoms in them. But at least the atoms were solid. But, later, we
>learned that the atoms, too, were mostly empty space, with orbiting
>electrons going around a central solid core. But now even that solid
>core is in doubt, as it seems to be composed of quarks, neutrinos and
>other tiny critters. And we really haven't a clue as to what kind of
>substance quarks are made out of.
I think this is a very good point, but it goes even further than you may
imagine. It's arguable if it even makes sense to talk about quarks as being
made up of "substance" at all, since we know now that we have to regard
matter as interchangeable with energy, which is mathematical abstraction
describing a property of systems to do work.
It's not clear to me what sort of picture of the physical world this leads
to, but it doesn't seem to lend much support to the kind of
nineteenth-century "substance materialism" which appears to underly much
philosophy of mind.
<snip>
>Why are we supposed to take the objective world for granted while
>proclaiming that we are not naive realists, yet at the same time to
>expect a detailed objective account of the subjective world?
I don't think it matters whether the account is detailed or not. What
matters is whether the notion of an "objective account of the subjective
world" is a contradiction in terms, as the hard problem suggests it is.
<snip>
>I'm suggesting that qualia are also an entirely unnecessary invention
>that contribute nothing to our accounts of consciousness, but only
>introduce new mysteries.
I think this is a false analogy. The word "qualia" is not an explanatory
concept, it's just a word to refer to the phenomenal aspects of experience.
You can get rid of the word, but you can't get rid of what the word refers
to.
<snip>
>I think this is a contemporary version of Berkeley's idealism.
Why would you assume that taking account of the subjective world is
equivalent to denying the objective world?
>I'm not denying that there is something to explain about
>consciousness. But it isn't qualia that need explaining. What we
>need to explain is how we have a self, while our intuitions tell us
>that a computer based robot does not have a comparable self.
I would regard both "qualia" and "why we have a self" as aspects of a more
general problem, which is the origin and nature of subjectivity itself.
Some people have argued that qualia should not be treated in isolation from
the rest of consciousness -- that would make subjective experience
scientifically unique, in being the only area in which reductionism (the
deconstruction of entities and processes into their elements) is disallowed
a priori.
Anthony Sebastian wrote in a separate message:
I agree that we cannot adequately characterize qualia in terms of
structure/function so long as we accept the primary premise of the
formulation that generates the "hard problem". That primary premise, or
starting assumption, dichotomizes the mind into separate domains, the
cognitive domain and the phenomenal domain. In doing so, it requires us to
bridge a gap between cognitive processing and something extra-physical I
order to explain the correlative activities of a cognitive process and its
accompanying conscious experiencing, directed to an object or event of
reality
Cathy:
The mind is already dichotomized into separate domains, by virtue of the
fact that the cognitive aspect can only be studied objectively while the
phenomenal aspect is by definition subjective, so I don't believe the hard
problem requires any stronger postulate than the one which is already forced
on us by the empirical facts of life. But that aside, your prescription can
be taken as an endorsement of holism and a rejection of reductionism.
Whether that would be a good thing or not is too complicated to go into
here, though my personal feeling is that in science, holism tends to
obfuscate rather than illuminate.
In a later email, Anthony Sebastian wrote:
I would like to suggest the radical idea that we stick as close to roots as
possible. At root, we have something to explain about "conscious
experiencing", not about "consciousness"---at root. We can talk
"consciousness", but we must understand "conscious experiencing" first.
In other words, we need to explain an activity that at least some organisms
perform, viz., the activity of experiencing reality consciously. We should
have no problem conceptualizing that when an organism experiences something,
it performs an act, or activity.
Cathy:
I would caution against the assumption that we can conceptualize something
as an objective act simply by labelling it with a verb rather than a noun.
This doesn't really change the formulation of the problem, only the
assumptions we make about it. Whether we regard consciousness as a "thing"
or a process, a verb or a noun, sooner or later we are still faced with the
problem of deriving the existence of the subjective world from an objective
or physical one.
Cathy
[Catherine Reason]
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Reneh,
There is some ambiguity in your posting but on rereading it
carefully I hope that I answer you correctly.
In the literature of which I am aware, exactly how knowledge is
exchanged and conveyed in bird nesting behavior is unknown.
I have not found published experimental data that can resolve
the issue - although several experimental approaches to the
question come to mind.
It is interesting that bird communities in one valley
"invent" and build their nests differently - for example,
by building a differently shaped or located nest entrance -
that allows their eggs to survive against certain predators
while those in another valley and without the benefit of
the new design fair less well against the predator.
Whether this new knowledge is communicated between
individuals, simply asserted under the pressure of local
predation or communicated between generations by some
other mechanism appears to be unknown.
One can speculate. Firstly, is nest design innate? Is there,
perhaps, some modifiable genetic communication of innate
knowledge that is sustained by the obvious selective pressure?
An obvious experiment here is to take the eggs of an established
variety and hatch them in isolation from parents and community,
and allow them to build nests - perhaps even isolating the
genetic instructions that embody the new knowledge.
I am surprised that I have not been able to find such experiments
in the literature.
At least the Alex, Grey Parrot, study appears to show that
some birds can communicate labeled knowledge socially - but
can such knowledge effectively be sustained across generations
by "word of mouth"? To do so seems to require sophisticated
metaphysics beyond that normally associated with birds.
So, given all these questions related to the relatively simple
matter of knowledge communication, it seems very difficult at
this point to argue that nesting behavior really is the product
of what we would call intentional planning - even if it
appears to be so.
Specifically, it seems difficult to assert any form of
prediction beyond abduction, and behavioral studies
(again Alex) suggest that successful strategies might be
labeled. But while Alex demonstrated an ability to label
values, he did not show any reductive capacity (the ability
to mentally take things apart and reassemble them) nor a
commensurate capacity for induction (for example, a
comprehension of value order). So it seems all the more
unlikely that birds have deductive capacity.
However, that there is a developmental progression of
predictive capacity
(abduction -> reduction -> induction -> deduction)
based on the evolution of sophisticated biology and
characterized by physiological structure seems clear.
I will add a single caveat to this. It appears that we,
as a species, are particularly fortunate to have the
physiological capacity to develop metaphysics that allows
us to extend the capacity of word of mouth conveyance.
It seems entirely plausible that other organisms could
develop more advanced brain architectures (dolphins, for
example) but be handicapped by the inability to write
books, use rich media, produce TV and radio etc... thus
limiting their forward planning capacity.
With respect,
Steven
Reneh karamians wrote ..
Anthony Sebastian
Anthony Sebastian wrote:
I would like to suggest the radical idea that we stick as close to roots as
possible. At root, we have something to explain about "conscious
experiencing", not about "consciousness"---at root. We can talk
"consciousness", but we must understand "conscious experiencing" first.
In other words, we need to explain an activity that at least some organisms
perform, viz., the activity of experiencing reality consciously. We should
have no problem conceptualizing that when an organism experiences something,
it performs an act, or activity.
Cathy:
I would caution against the assumption that we can conceptualize something
as an objective act simply by labelling it with a verb rather than a noun.
This doesn't really change the formulation of the problem, only the
assumptions we make about it. Whether we regard consciousness as a "thing"
or a process, a verb or a noun, sooner or later we are still faced with the
problem of deriving the existence of the subjective world from an objective
or physical one.
Anthony responds:
Yes, Cathy, we need to explain "subjectivity" in the physical world. We can at least start approaching an explanation with the assumption of subjectivity as a physical phenomenon. Let's exhaust that approach before moving on to the non-physical realm.
You caution "...against the assumption that we can conceptualize something as an objective act simply by labelling it with a verb rather than a noun." In so cautioning, you seem to assume primacy of the "something", viz., "consciousness", rather than of the physiological activity of conscious experiencing. I might just as well counter with a caution against conceptualizing a physiological activity---which already presupposes physicality---as a nominalization, or reification, or abstraction.
The word "consciousness" clearly reifies a physiological activity performed by organisms---the physiological activity of experiencing objects and events of reality in that characteristic way we call "consciously". Organisms themselves perform the act of conscious experiencing; no one does it for them. Starting the thinking in those terms enables us to begin to explain conscious experiencing in terms of the "quality" of the performance of a physiological activity---just as we can speak of the quality of the performance of any physiological activity (e.g., graceful, awkward, or jazzy dancing; articulate, hesitant, stentorian, or stuttering speech).
Experiencing reality consciously subjectively describes a quality of performing the physiological activity of experiencing. Elementally, experiencing something entails receiving information about it, processing that information, and generating an adjustive response. Nothing implies that performing that physiological activity consciously subjectively requires anything but physiological functioning.
Let's keep conscious subjective experiencing in the cognitive domain until we exhaust our analytical and empirical resources.
Anthony
Cathy Reason
You caution "...against the assumption that we can conceptualize
something as an objective act simply by labelling it with a verb
rather than a noun." In so cautioning, you seem to assume
primacy of the "something", viz., "consciousness", rather than of
the physiological activity of conscious experiencing. I might
just as well counter with a caution against conceptualizing a
physiological activity---which already presupposes
physicality---as a nominalization, or reification, or
abstraction.
Cathy:
I think this all hinges on whether there is an assumption which
leads to the hard problem, and if so, whether that assumption is
dispensable. You say it is wrong to assume that the mind has
separate phenomenal and cognitive domains. The problem here, is
that I don't see how you can dispense with this assumption
without either denying that the subjective world exists, or
demanding that it should be systematically ignored. The first is
simply wrong, and the second seems to me completely contrary to
the spirit of scientific investigation -- and I'm not sure you
get all that much for it, anyway.
Quite a few people here have objective to the "reification" of
the subjective. But I think it matters a great deal whether that
reification arises from some unnecessary asumption about
consciousness, which can be dispensed with, or whether it arises
from the nature of consciousness itself.
AS:
Experiencing reality consciously subjectively describes a quality
of performing the physiological activity of experiencing.
Elementally, experiencing something entails receiving information
about it, processing that information, and generating an
adjustive response. Nothing implies that performing that
physiological activity consciously subjectively requires anything
but physiological functioning.
Cathy:
But this has no meaning unless you can define what you mean by
"subjectively". And as soon as you start doing that, you are
back with all the problems to do with qualia, phenomenal
properties, etc which you have previously admitted lead
inexorably to the hard problem.
Cathy
[Catherine Reason]
Anthony Sebastian
CR: You say it is wrong to assume that the mind has separate phenomenal and cognitive domains.
AS: Not "wrong", Cathy. The assumptions lead to an extra-physical, dualistic explanation of conscious experience. One that I find less than satisfactory. I prefer to regard them rather as not fruitful.
CR: The problem here, is that I don't see how you can dispense with this assumption without either denying that the subjective world exists, or demanding that it should be systematically ignored.
AS: I strongly believe, and have argued, that a different set of starting assumptions---different from Chalmers' assumption that the phenomenal domain of the mind exists a priori as a separate entity from the cognitive domain---can underlie a formulation (theory) that shows how subjectivity arises entirely through cognitive functioning (information receipt-processing-response). With that formulation, dispensing with the Chalmerian pre-existing separate domains assumption does not require "...denying that the subjective world exists, or demanding that it should be systematically ignored."
AS: I will argue that we must not underestimate the potential of cognitive functioning, and especially speech, to enable our highly advanced skills at discriminating cause and effect to recognize the activity of our own experiencing (as I define experiencing), and further to generate, in a sociocultural setting, a "self" that interprets its organism's conscious experiences as a subject.
CR: Quite a few people here have objective [sic] to the "reification" of the subjective. But I think it matters a great deal whether that reification arises from some unnecessary asumption about consciousness, which can be dispensed with, or whether it arises from the nature of consciousness itself."
AS: I would not characterize my objection to reification as reification of the subjective. I consider that focusing on "consciousness" leads to confusion and misguided thinking. We should focus on conscious experiencing as a physiological (perhaps neurophysiological) activity that human organisms perform. We should not forget that the performance of the physiological activity of experiencing has its counterparts in the performance of countless physiological activities: swimming, walking, vocalizing, imagining, etc.
AS: You speak of "the nature of consciousness". When we biologists speak of "the nature of life", we really mean to understand the *activity of living* as performed by organisms, and we appreciate that we can attribute qualities to the performance of the activity of living. We do not know so much what "life" consists of, but we know a lot about how organisms perform the activity of living, and what comprises the activity of living. We used to say it took an elan vital to have life, just as some say it takes psychophysical bridging principles to have consciousness.
CR: "But this has no meaning unless you can define what you mean by "subjectively". And as soon as you start doing that, you are back with all the problems to do with qualia, phenomenal properties, etc which you have previously admitted lead inexorably to the hard problem."
AS: Not if you can explain subjectivity in terms of cognitive functioning.
Anthony Sebastian
San Francisco
-------------------------
Anthony Sebastian, MD
Professor of Medicine
40 Crags Court
San Francisco, CA 94131
Anthony_...@msn.com<mailto:Anthony_...@msn.com>
415-648-0834 [tel]
415-648-0143 [fax]
Faculty Affiliations:
Department of Medicine
Division of Nephrology
General Clinical Research Center,
Associated Faculty for Special
Projects
University of California, San Francisco
seba...@gcrc.ucsf.edu<mailto:seba...@gcrc.ucsf.edu>
Faculty Webpage:
http://medicine.ucsf.edu/nephrology/faculty/anthony_sebastian.html<http://medicine.ucsf.edu/nephrology/faculty/anthony_sebastian.html>
Written in E-Prime.
Cathy Reason
You speak of "the nature of consciousness". When we biologists speak of
"the nature of life", we really mean to understand the *activity of living*
as performed by organisms, and we appreciate that we can attribute qualities
to the performance of the activity of living. We do not know so much what
"life" consists of, but we know a lot about how organisms perform the
activity of living, and what comprises the activity of living. We used to
say it took an elan vital to have life, just as some say it takes
psychophysical bridging principles to have consciousness.
Cathy:
All right Anthony, let's try another tack.
If you want to think of subjectivity in terms of a process, then let's do
that. Let's think in particular about the process by which we become aware
that we have subjective consciousness.
Let's assume that there is some set of physioloigcal states, or some set of
physiological processes, or perhaps a mixture of both, which gives rise to
subjective experience (or, if you prefer, to the process of subjective
experiencing). Let's call this set P.
Now let's assert the proposition "I am experiencing subjectively", which
we'll call X. Let us set ourselves the task of establishing whether X is
true. Presumably we will need to postulate some additional physiological
process, let's call it Q, which will examine P (or which will examine the
subjective experiences to which P gives rise) in order to establish the
truth of X. Provided that P exists, and that the process Q works properly,
then Q will prove that X is true.
The problem is, of course, how do we know that Q works properly? We could
postulate some other process R, which establishes the reliability of Q, but
that raises the question of the reliability of R, and so on. It's not hard
to see we soon end up with an infinite regress.
In other words, our knowledge that X is true depends critically on
assumptions about the reliability of our physiological processes. But in
practice, our knowledge that we are conscious is not dependent on
assumptions about the reliability of our physiological processes. Even if
we know nothing whatsoever about the physiological processes in our brains,
we can still prove that X is true.
It seems to me that we have the basis for an experiment here. It isn't an
experiment that can be performed yet, but I see no reason why it shouldn't
be performed in principle, and eventually in practice. A purely
physiological system, I predict, will be unable to establish the reliability
of Q and so conclude that it cannot ultimately prove X. The fact that the
human mind can do so indicates a clear violation of supervenience. If we
can observe the brain of a conscious subject being asked to determine if
they are in fact conscious, then I predict we will observe that brain
behaving in a way which violates physiological determinism.
What prediction would your formulation make in this case?
Cathy
[Catherine Reason]