What of representation when you don't need a cortex for consciousness?

[cha...@bigpond.net.au]

I read the representation debate, which was really interesting and useful. I'm not yet sure into which side I fit. In the process I became a little concerned that there may be a need to reconsider role of the result of the debate within the wider domain of an explanation of consciousness.

A recently documented experimental physiology outcome makes a fairly compelling case that consciousness in the form of the 'primordial' emotions is delivered by small groups of cells in the brain basal area(Denton, 2005). The book only just came out in english. (There's another paper in peer review in BBS by another author on the same issue).

In possessing this ancient and highly conserved brain region critters such as birds and reptiles all have a good case for the phenomenal consciousness of thirst, hunger, breathlessness etc - those experiences associated with basic homeostasis, reproduction behaviour and threat/damage management....the Darwinian essentials.

In the brain basal area small cohorts of cells are each held to literally generate the phenomenal consciousness of a specific primordial emotion. One small group of neurons can confer an experience of thirst and in the same activated chain can be another nearby group that has no role in phenomenal consciousness at all except insofar as it participated the chain that included the emotion's cohort. How this was empirically determined is in the book. This means that there is something unique in the emotional-cohort cells either in wiring, physical location of cells, the cells themselves or a combination.

We humans know the phenomenal fields associated with primordial emotions are homogenous and isotropic (no matter where you are, you don't feel thirst coming at you from under your feet, for example!). The entire universe is indexically 'coloured' omnidirectionally with the experience of the primordial emotion. As a representation the intentionality of the primordial emotions is implicit i.e. directed at the self through the simple act of the experience's omindirectional presentation. The resultant goal seeking behaviour ("imperious" compulsions - Denton's word) associated with these emotions is innately programmed(instinctive) in that has no reflective or reasoned component (except perhaps in the execution of the goal such as seeking to sate the experience).

The upshot? The basic implication of this work is that a neo-cortex is not necessary for a critter to have an experiential life (phenomenal consciousness).

The physiology suggests that phenomenal representation is created through the organisation of some low level physics...possibly the physics of individual cells. Organisation of cells on its own cannot be claimed to create phenomenal consciousness. The fact that we don’t know/can’t see the physics 'building block' is our real problem. The complexities of human-level cortical representations (phenomenal and non-phenomenal) are thus removed from the debate about the basic physics of generation of phenomenal consciousness.

In this light it seems that a discussion on representation will not lead to a solution to the basics of phenomenal consciousness. I know this is not claimed in the debate. It is not explicit in the debate as to any assumed causal relationship between representation and phenomenal consciousness.

Nevertheless I thought I'd bring this into the forum just to make sure any outcomes account for it and any assumptions are appropriately measured. Estimations of the role of representation may need recalibrating.

I'm interested in views on this.

On a personal note: Derek Denton is local and I have got to know him a little. I reviewed his book for a university journal. He told me of a conversation he had with Francis Crick who said of his ideas something like.... "You know, of the various ideas on consciousness around, I think I dislike yours the least". Very Popperian praise :-)

regards,

Colin Hales
Denton D. 2005. The Primordial Emotions: The dawning of consciousness: Oxford University Press. 267 p.