Perception, Behaviour and Quantum Information
Stuart Hameroff
Quoting Alex Green <drale...@YAHOO.CO.UK>:
> There is considerable evidence that conscious experience
> containing events occurs from 0.3 to 0.8 seconds after the event.
.......
> Yet reaction times are normally around 0.1 secs. We react before
> we form conscious experience. Of course, we all know that this
> happens, it is obvious when playing ball games where it takes a
> great deal of practice to develop skilled behaviour so that our
> reactions to stimuli can be <= 0.1 secs.
Stuart
The same holds for speech. We verbally respond to spoken words
before they are consciously perceived. Yet we feel as though
we are responding consciously.
Accordingly, many say that actions which 'feel' as though they are
conscious are actually unconscious. Therefore (according to this
presumption) consciousness is epiphenomenal and we are (as T.H. Huxley
bleakly said) 'merely helpless spectators'.
However Libet's experiments show that conscious experience occurs at
the time of the primary evoked potential, that conscious experience is referred
'backward in time' up to 500 milliseconds. Libet doesn't claim an actual
backward time phenomenon, just something in mental space whatever that is. But
that wouldnt explain his findings.
Roger Penrose suggested that Libet's backward time referral might
be accounted for by quantum information which does indeed go
backward in what we perceive as classical time (the question of what
time actually *is*, is rather complicated).
Another way to say this is that in the quantum realm there is no flow of time;
the quantum realm is timeless.
Quantum information going backward in classical time is
the only rational explanation for EPR quantum entanglement, and Aharonov has
suggested that quantum state reductions send quantum information backward in
classical time. Wheeler and Feynman showed that classical electromagnetics sends
information backward in time, but that a 'coherent absorber' (i.e. a quantum
system) is necessary to be influenced by the backward time.
Whether quantum information (quantum superpositions) can occur in the
warm brain is an open question, but the logic of unconscious dreams (e.g. as
detailed by Matte Blanco) is closely similar to forms of quantum logic.
Libet didnt apply his backward time to volition because in his finger moving
experiments there were no primary evoked potentials. However IF quantum
information goes backward in the brain in sensory experience it could serve to
influence actions in the time frame of our seemingly conscious responses, and
rescue consciousness from epiphenomenalism.
But quantum information is a misnomer. It cannot convey signals or classical
information. Quantum information (Penrose calls it quanglement) can only modify
classical information. One way quanglement could modify classical information is
to choose one of several possible actions (volition). Another way is to
make information conscious. Quanglement = qualia.
Another BUT. But quanglement going back in classical time is constrained by
causality violations. One cannot go back in classical time to kill one's
grandfather, preventing one's birth.
In essence, backward time effects cannot cause any possible
*observable* effects.
In the case of backward referral of unconscious quanglement in the brain
(it becomes conscious at the primary evoked potential) there is nothing possibly
observable, either to an outsider, or to the subject because it is unconscious.
So no causality violations are possible.
In Frank Jackson's version of the famous knowledge argument, Mary is a
neuroscientist who knows everything about color vision. But Mary herself is
color blind. Then one day Mary gains color vision. Has she gained new knowledge
- new information - about color? A materialist would say yes, that color qualia
are nothing more than information. Others would say, no, qualia are not the
same as classical information. Mary has gained qualia, conscious experience,
whatever that is.
If quanglement equals qualia, then Mary has not gained new knowledge, she has
modified classical information - making it conscious.
So quantum information/quanglement can rescue consciousness from
epiphenomenalism and solve the hard problem (OK, you can still ask WHY does
quanglement/qualia convey subjective phenomenal character, and then
you have to bring in pan-protopsychism. But at least quanglement gets you in
touch with the funda-mental level where irreducible proto-conscious entitites
exist).
So, either we are epiphenomenal helpless spectators, or evolution has solved the
decoherence problem and our brains use quantum information.
Before anyone asks 'what PROOF do you have????', let me say
1) what proof does anyone have that consciousness is a classical effect?
2) Libet's backward referral
cheers
Stuart
www.consciousness.arizona.edu/hameroff
>
> So, if conscious experience is not about behaviour, if Ryle's
> 'ghost' and Skinner's states that are unnecessary to function
> exist, then what is the role of conscious experience?
>
> My own guess is that it matches integrated brain modelling to
> the world and gives a signal 'OK' or a signal 'try again'. This
> would be why we need conscious experience when learning
> skilled reactions. It would also explain why non-consciousness
> can be accompanied by extreme mutisms or delirium where
> modelling mismatches reality. Such a system should actually
> be expected in a hierarchical processor based on slow
> technology such as the brain. It is important to note that
> this suggestion is different from the idea that conscious
> experience might veto intentions. Approving behaviour after
> the event is a different function from exercising a veto.
>
> This would also suggest that conscious experience is to one
> side of the normal flow of data through the brain to the
> environment. The stimulus-processing-response loop would
> be integrated into conscious experience after the event and
> conscious experience would not normally be in the loop.
>
> Would such a phenomenon be fatal to Direct Realism? Would
> it be an argument against the idea that the specialised cortical
> processors that are involved in stimulus-response loops host
> conscious experience? Is it an argument against representationalism
> at any level except conscious processing, most processing
> being non-representational?
>
> Best Wishes
>
> Alex Green
>
> Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
Alex Green
> There is considerable evidence that conscious experience
> containing events occurs from 0.3 to 0.8 seconds after the event.
.......
> Yet reaction times are normally around 0.1 secs. We react before
> we form conscious experience. Of course, we all know that this
> happens, it is obvious when playing ball games where it takes a
> great deal of practice to develop skilled behaviour so that our
> reactions to stimuli can be <= 0.1 secs.
Stuart
The same holds for speech. We verbally respond to spoken words
before they are consciously perceived. Yet we feel as though
we are responding consciously.
Accordingly, many say that actions which 'feel' as though they are
conscious are actually unconscious. Therefore (according to this
presumption) consciousness is epiphenomenal and we are (as T.H. Huxley
bleakly said) 'merely helpless spectators'.
Alex
Huxley's epiphenomenalism is often rejected simply because of
this bleakness. Huxley raised the problem when materialism was
rampant, when everything was thought to be due due to motions.
This view is still taught in schools but has not been the
representative theory in physics for a century. Things can be
epiphenomenal in the sense of 19th century materialism
but not epiphenomenal in reality.
Stuart
However Libet's experiments show that conscious experience occurs at
the time of the primary evoked potential, that conscious experience is referred
'backward in time' up to 500 milliseconds. Libet doesn't claim an actual
backward time phenomenon, just something in mental space whatever that is. But
that wouldnt explain his findings.
Alex
As far as I can see Libet showed that about 0.5 secs after
a stimulus a conscious experience containing the stimulus
occurs:
"In other words, it is the content of the subjective experience, of the
neuronally delayed awareness, that is modified by the referral to the earlier
timing signal." Libet, B. (2000). Time factors in conscious processes:
Reply to Gilberto Gomes. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 1#8211;12.
This interpretation is consistent with what we know about
the speed of the processing required to construct the content
of conscious experience. For example, the various perceptual
rivalries operate on this time base, the auditory continuity and
similar illusions have the same timings. If conscious
experience is the output of cortical modelling then c.0.5 secs
would be expected because sensory and motor data from
all modalities must be integrated.
Stuart
Roger Penrose suggested that Libet's backward time referral might
be accounted for by quantum information which does indeed go
backward in what we perceive as classical time (the question of what
time actually *is*, is rather complicated).
Another way to say this is that in the quantum realm there is no flow of time;
the quantum realm is timeless.
Quantum information going backward in classical time is
the only rational explanation for EPR quantum entanglement, and Aharonov has
suggested that quantum state reductions send quantum information backward in
classical time. Wheeler and Feynman showed that classical electromagnetics sends
information backward in time, but that a 'coherent absorber' (i.e. a quantum
system) is necessary to be influenced by the backward time.
Alex
(see: http://mist.npl.washington.edu/npl/int_rep/tiqm/TI_toc.html
for Cramer's modern interpretation of Wheeler/Feynman theory).
However, it seems to me that the only reason for introducing this
theory is the misgiving that 'conscious processes' involved in free
will are forbidden without it. As Penrose says:
"But I have to confess to a disbelief in the possibility that there
can be no role for consciousness in such rapid activities
like ordinary conversation.." (Shadows of Mind p387).
I have two principal objections to this.
Firstly, I can find no evidence for processes in conscious
experience. Things just pop into mind. If I try to construct
things consciously any building block just pops into mind,
any connection between blocks just pops up. Conscious
experience does not create it's own content.
Secondly, there is an alternative to conscious control of
behaviour: conscious training of behaviour. Instead of
processing individual behaviours conscious experience
provides intuitions of whether certain behaviours match the
world and/or the worldline of the individual. A matching
signal reinforces these behaviours. This is 'free will' after
the event. Anyone who has brought up children or
rebellious animals will know that this is part of how they
learn how to behave. Free will is self conditioning, training
of the non-conscious brain by conscious experience.This also
explains why we find it hard to keep promises with ourselves.
So there is no need for direct connection to the past,
Penrose's disbelief can be explained by pointing out that
humans endlessly train themselves by rehearsing
conversation with inner speech.
Stuart
Whether quantum information (quantum superpositions) can occur in the
warm brain is an open question, but the logic of unconscious dreams (e.g. as
detailed by Matte Blanco) is closely similar to forms of quantum logic.
Libet didnt apply his backward time to volition because in his finger moving
experiments there were no primary evoked potentials. However IF quantum
information goes backward in the brain in sensory experience it could serve to
influence actions in the time frame of our seemingly conscious responses, and
rescue consciousness from epiphenomenalism.
But quantum information is a misnomer. It cannot convey signals or classical
information. Quantum information (Penrose calls it quanglement) can only modify
classical information. One way quanglement could modify classical information is
to choose one of several possible actions (volition). Another way is to
make information conscious. Quanglement = qualia.
Another BUT. But quanglement going back in classical time is constrained by
causality violations. One cannot go back in classical time to kill one's
grandfather, preventing one's birth.
In essence, backward time effects cannot cause any possible
*observable* effects.
In the case of backward referral of unconscious quanglement in the brain
(it becomes conscious at the primary evoked potential) there is nothing possibly
observable, either to an outsider, or to the subject because it is unconscious.
So no causality violations are possible.
Alex
Whatever the origin of free will - training or direct intervention - it would
still require a non-classical explanation. As I said earlier, I can find
no conscious processes in conscious experience, whatever conscious
experience does it does it without the classical motion of things. The
training hypothesis would need some version of many minds theory
whereas the direct intervention hypothesis would require something
very similar, a sort of transtemporal many-minds. (Many minds
is a transtemporal theory but the training hypothesis proposes that
the bulk of effect is in the classical present instant rather than
0.5 secs ago).
Stuart
In Frank Jackson's version of the famous knowledge argument, Mary is a
neuroscientist who knows everything about color vision. But Mary herself is
color blind. Then one day Mary gains color vision. Has she gained new knowledge
- new information - about color? A materialist would say yes, that color qualia
are nothing more than information. Others would say, no, qualia are not the
same as classical information. Mary has gained qualia, conscious experience,
whatever that is.
If quanglement equals qualia, then Mary has not gained new knowledge, she has
modified classical information - making it conscious.
So quantum information/quanglement can rescue consciousness from
epiphenomenalism and solve the hard problem (OK, you can still ask WHY does
quanglement/qualia convey subjective phenomenal character, and then
you have to bring in pan-protopsychism. But at least quanglement gets you in
touch with the funda-mental level where irreducible proto-conscious entitites
exist).
So, either we are epiphenomenal helpless spectators, or evolution has solved the
decoherence problem and our brains use quantum information.
Before anyone asks 'what PROOF do you have????', let me say
1) what proof does anyone have that consciousness is a classical effect?
2) Libet's backward referral
Alex
I hope I demonstrated above that conscious experience need not be
epiphenomenal even if it could not intervene in the past.
There is some proof that conscious experience is classical. Prior to
decoherence theory classical structures were known to be generated by the
possibility of a classical observation by a conscious observer. Conscious
observations are classical observations. After decoherence theory Zeh
suggested that conscious observation is a mixed environment/observer state
that is again a classical observation. See:
Zeh, H. D. (1979). Quantum Theory and Time Assymetry. Foundations of Physics, Vol 9, pp 803-818 (1979). http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0307/0307013.pdf
Which brings us to the 'preferred basis problem' see Barrett's articles:
The preferred basis problem and the quantum mechanics of everything http://www.lps.uci.edu/home/fac-staff/faculty/barrett/every.pdf
Many minds and many worlds formulations of quantum mechanics. http://www.lps.uci.edu/home/fac-staff/faculty/barrett/ManyMindsManyWorlds.pdf
My own take on this is that the mind offers a preferred basis for the
brain and this basis is expressed as the geometry of conscious experience.
The qualia, as you and Brian Flanagan suggest, are certain QM fields but are
particular values of those fields superselected by the geometry.
Thank you for a most interesting post, best wishes,
Harland Harrison
hame...@U.ARIZONA.EDU wrote:
> We verbally respond to spoken words
> before they are consciously perceived. Yet we feel
as though
> we are responding consciously.
>
I hope I don't "verbally respond" without being
conscious of what was said to me! If you yell at me,
I may grunt reflexively, but I do try to think before
answering. That thinking involves selecting and
sorting the "grunts" which rise to consciousness
awareness from the unconscious. I say that I respond
consciously because some of the reflexive responses
clearly reach conscious awareness, but then are not
actually uttered (thank goodness).
In the same way, Libet's "mental space" does not
require anything non-Newtonian. The brain takes time
to do things, but in ordinary life, we simply do not
accept that. Libet found that subjects seem to report
the time at which they made the decision to move their
finger, erroneously. Detecting the readiness
potential by EEG let the experimenter know what the
subject would do, 350 milliseconds before the subject
himself seemed to know! However, Libet also found the
subject could still "veto" the action. Since the
voluntary actions actually start in the unconscious,
the conscious mind can never do anything more than
"veto" ,anyway. So the report of a "decision" time
was actually just the last instant at which the
subject could stop the motion from happening.
The brain takes time to run motor programs and it also
takes time to analyze sensory input. Again, people
commonly assume the brain takes no time at all. They
insist that they live in the present, and don't
account for the time which the brain needs for
perception. They assemble a picture of an event in
the world, fully half a second after it happened, but
claim they knew it all along. So stimuli in the brain
apply to the past, even though the subject will claim
to perceive the present as it happens.
The brain must create a four dimensional, space-time
model, to do its primary job, controlling the body,
just as a computer might control a robot. In that
"mental space" there is no data from the current time,
t(0), and incomplete data until about t(-500
milliseconds) in the past. Also, no decision can
affect t(0) but motor programs set in motion can
affect t(350) and beyond. The mental space is simply
the data model of the brain. It can account for the
"mysterious" time effects in a simple, classical ,
fashion based on Newtonian physics without resorting
to quantum theory.
Harland Harrison
http://harlandh.cnc.net
harl...@concentric.net
> Accordingly, many say that actions which 'feel' as
though they are
> conscious are actually unconscious. Therefore
(according to this
> presumption) consciousness is epiphenomenal and we
are (as T.H. Huxley
> bleakly said) 'merely helpless spectators'.
>
> However Libet's experiments show that conscious
experience occurs at
> the time of the primary evoked potential, that
conscious experience is
> referred
> 'backward in time' up to 500 milliseconds. Libet
doesn't claim an actual
> backward time phenomenon, just something in mental
space whatever that is. But
> that wouldnt explain his findings.
>
> Roger Penrose suggested that Libet's backward time
referral might
> be accounted for by quantum information which does
indeed go
> backward in what we perceive as classical time (the
question of what
> time actually *is*, is rather complicated).
> Another way to say this is that in the quantum realm
there is no flow of time;
> the quantum realm is timeless.
>
> Quantum information going backward in classical time
is
> the only rational explanation for EPR quantum
entanglement, and Aharonov has
> suggested that quantum state reductions send quantum
information backward in
> classical time. Wheeler and Feynman showed that
classical electromagnetics
> sends
> information backward in time, but that a 'coherent
absorber' (i.e. a quantum
> system) is necessary to be influenced by the
backward time.
>
> cheers
> Stuart
>
> www.consciousness.arizona.edu/hameroff
>
>
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Alex Green
RESPONSE TO HARLAND HARRISON
Harland Harrison
..
In the same way, Libet's "mental space" does not
require anything non-Newtonian. The brain takes time
to do things, but in ordinary life, we simply do not
accept that. Libet found that subjects seem to report
the time at which they made the decision to move their
finger, erroneously. Detecting the readiness
potential by EEG let the experimenter know what the
subject would do, 350 milliseconds before the subject
himself seemed to know! However, Libet also found the
subject could still "veto" the action. Since the
voluntary actions actually start in the unconscious,
the conscious mind can never do anything more than
"veto" ,anyway. So the report of a "decision" time
was actually just the last instant at which the
subject could stop the motion from happening.
Alex
The importance of these timings is that many
reactions occur before the stimulus and response
have even registered in conscious experience.
This means that for that particular stimulus and
response the conscious experience is epiphenomenal,
We cannot influence many of the behaviours
that are the content of experience because they
are already completed!
This was why I suggested that a major role
for the part of the brain that hosts conscious
experience is to train the non-conscious brain.
This would be accomplished after behaviours have
occurred by approving some behaviours and not
approving others. As a result we often correct wrong
behaviours, preventing them from being repeated
rather than simply preventing individual behaviours
from happening in the first place.
Harland
..
The mental space is simply
the data model of the brain. It can account for the
"mysterious" time effects in a simple, classical ,
fashion based on Newtonian physics without resorting
to quantum theory.
Alex
But how can we experience 'space'? The homunculus
argument and Ryle's regress are powerful arguments
against a nineteenth century materialist viewpoint.
Please explain in detail how the space and time of
'mental space' occur in experience.
RESPONSE TO GLEN SIZEMORE
AG: So, if conscious experience is not about
behaviour,[…]
GS: The sort of data you talk about suggests that
“conscious experience” IS all about behavior. First we
behave and then we observe our behavior.
Alex
No, I stressed that first there is behaviour and then
there is conscious experience containing behaviour,
after the event. This is different from your statement
which has an implication that something moves from
one part of conscious experience to another, that
there are processes in conscious experience.
Conscious experience does not involve the creation
of its own content, the content is supplied by
non-conscious parts of the brain. As a result it is not
a 'behaviour'.
AG: […]if Ryle's 'ghost' and Skinner's states that are
unnecessary to function exist, then what is the role
of conscious experience?
GS: You have Skinner’s position wrong. I suspect that
you have confused radical behaviorism’s position on
private events (subjectivity) with its position on the
role of physiology in an understanding of behavior.
Skinner argued that private behavioral events were
real, important, and could be dealt with in a science
of behavior. As to physiology, Skinner’s view was that
we might one day understand how physiology mediated
behavioral function, but that a science of behavior
qua behavior was possible, and was a necessary
precursor to understanding how physiology mediated
behavior.
Alex
Yes, perhaps I have misrepresented Skinner.
"Skinner charges that since mental activity is a form of behavior
(albeit inner), the only non-regressive, non-circular way to explain
behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral. This
non-behavioral something is environmental stimuli and an
organism's interactions with, and reinforcement from, the environment."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/
Skinner's states are directly connected to the world and do not
correspond to a 0.5 second delayed conscious experience.
Such experience seems to be inexplicable according to the
paradigms of radical behaviourism.
Best Wishes
Alex Green
Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
Harland Harrison
drale...@YAHOO.CO.UK wrote:
> But how can we experience 'space'? The homunculus
> argument and Ryle's regress are powerful arguments
> against a nineteenth century materialist viewpoint.
> Please explain in detail how the space and time of
> 'mental space' occur in experience.
According to Arnold Trehub (1), an awareness of space
is fundamental to consciousness. I would say that a
sense of time is even more basic, although most
people rarely experience time without any sense of
space. The "experience" of space and time consists
quite simply of our ability to see, remember, or
imagine movement, our mental ability to understand
motion through space over time.
The brain can build a model of space and time, and
does not need a homunculus, or "little man inside", to
watch it. Instead, the brain uses the model to plan
for motion, much as a robot uses an on-board computer.
The 21st century materialist viewpoint profits from
the understanding of computation which electronics has
given us, whereas the nineteenth century theorists,
comparing the brain to little more than clockworks and
hydraulics, extrapolated correctly, but did so mostly
on faith.
The parietal cortex creates a representation of space.
We know this because stroke patients with damage to a
parietal lobe may display "hemi-neglect", a condition
in which they act as though the world on one side of
the body does not exist. Destruction of "motor
cortex" causes the expected paralysis. Yet the
additional loss of perception, of the very
understanding of space, shows that the same regions
that control body movement, also create our awareness
of the space through which the body moves.
Accurately moving limbs, or intercepting a moving
object, requires a 4D model of space and time.
Engineers who build robots use computers to calculate
that model of three dimensions plus time. Comparing a
desired result to a current state within the model,
predicts the necessary motions and forces to achieve
them. To prepare for its constant and fundamental
motion-control tasks, the brain must also maintain a
4D model of surrounding space, continuously, during
wakefulness. That model forms the "mental space"
which we experience as the world around us.
No homunculus needs to watch the model built in
cerebral cortex. For example, V1, the primary visual
cortex connected, (through LGN), to the optic nerves,
does show an exact retinotopic pattern of the light
striking the eye. But successive stages of the
ventral visual pathway, from V1 to IT, show "feature
detection", neurons sensitive to contrast changes,
angles, colors, etc. , instead of the "bit-map"
pattern of incoming light. This observed structure
corresponds well to the hypothetical, Image Matrices,
and Detection Matrices, which extract information in
the Retinoid model (2) of Trehub's theory. But even
without such a theory, nothing about the concept of
the brain containing a model of the world of space and
objects, requires that the brain necessarily contains
any homunculus to watch it.
(1) Arnold Trehub writing in "Re: Geometric
descriptions of consciousness" on Psyche-D and "Re:
Content vs phenomenal experience, neurons vs
hyper-neurons" on Psyche-B
(2) Arnold Trehub, "The Cognitive Brain", 1991, MIT
Press.
Harland Harrison
http://harlandh.cnc.net
harl...@concentric.net
Alex Green
thread offline. Here is the thread to date:
....Harland Harrison
...
But even without such a theory, nothing about the
concept of the brain containing a model of the world of space
and objects, requires that brain necessarily contain any
homunculus to watch it.
..Alex
The homunculus argument is a reductio ad absurdum
argument. If a theory of mind requires an extra little man
inside to make it work then the theory is incorrect.
..Harland
The theory would be refuted only if the little man was
conceptually the same as a big man, or if the little man
required another, identical, little man inside of him.
....Alex
As little people, or homunculi, we can look at plans
of the brain and the world and trace the flow of data
within them. We can even confirm that the data flows
are like the content of experience. Now comes the tricky
bit. Can the plans observe the plans? If we remove
the homunculi does the theory work? Lets see:
..Harland
But I am not a little man, I am a big one. If you think the
homunculus inside must observe the plans, OK. However,
I know many people who could make no sense of such plans
or brains or machinery, and who would not comprehend this
exchange at all. Yet, I presume, they must have the same
little man inside them which I do. Nonetheless, continue:
....Alex
At one instant we have a plan of a pattern of energy on,
say, the retina; at the next instant there is a pattern on
the LGN; at the next instant there is a pattern on
V1 etc... Are any of these instantaneous patterns
a conscious observation or are they just frozen arrays
of data, like plans on paper? Of course, if we stick a
homunculus like you or I into the system the homunculus
can see that the plan contains the content of its
observation but the plan itself can never know this. At
any instant it is just a frozen array of data.
..Harland
Of course an "instantaneous" pattern is a frozen array
of data, no matter where the pattern came from. Is
one frame of a movie actually a movie? Such questions
of semantics do not matter.
On the other hand, "plans" can work on plans, and do
so today, if I understand your meaning. Computers
can create, and improve their own hardware designs.
In software, compilers compile themselves. In the life
sciences, DNA duplicates itself in vitro in PCR, and all
the chemical mechanisms that reproduce a cell and its
DNA, come from plans within that DNA itself.
....Alex
Direct Realists allege that they can solve this problem
by introducing a plan of the world. But this is also just
a frozen array of data at any instant. Radical
behaviourists try to solve the problem by introducing
whole behaviours involving the world outside the brain.
The introduction of whole durations into the argument
is useful but the radical behaviourists then spoil it
all by using ideas from school physics and demanding
that behaviours are nothing but successions of 3D forms
ie: at any instant all we have is plans, just static arrays
of data.
You say "nothing about the concept of the brain containing
a model of the world of space and objects, requires that
brain necessarily contain any homunculus to watch it."
but you have given no explanation of how this model is
like our experience other than saying that it has the same
content at an instant. But at any instant it is just a frozen set
of data that would need a homunculus to give it a Promethean
breath of life. You need a theory of time to extend the instant
if your theory is to work.
..Harland
Yes, I agree that it needs a theory of time. My message was
long enough, so I did not explore that.
The brain already has timing mechanisms for body movement.
To keep track of time, we can count "one one thousand, two.."
because we can easily speak at a known, precise, speed. The
Essene monks in ancient Jerusalem maintained an accurate
"clock" by reciting prayers as the walked in a circle. The timing
probably originates in the cerebellum, which control coordination.
My question to you now becomes, "how does our experience
differ from its content?" Simple plans explain how the brain
could model the content of consciousness. What else does
consciousness have, other than content? What fire do you
claim Prometheus brought?
.Alex
As Plato would have said: conscious experience is also a FORM.
It is content plus an arrangement of the content. To
neuroscientists this is not surprising because they are
used to topological processing but to information scientists
it is often puzzling. In information theory there is no difference
in principle between a flow of 2000 kbits in a single channel or
a flow of 2000 kbits along a 64 bit bus.
The content of conscious experience has at least a 2D layout and
the data in the brain preserves the topology of the sensory input
at the level of what things are adjacent to each other.
But the form of conscious experience goes beyond this, the
content appears 'projected', separate from some apparent
viewing point. This projection is often confused with the
geometry of the eye and world beyond the eye but it is
internal, a property of brain activity and entirely within the
brain. The form, or geometry, of the brain activity appears to
be an ordinary 4D manifold.(As we would expect).
Conscious experience also contains the 'specious present';
things have an extension in time as well as space. This
extension is also to do with 'form', for instance the sound
of a person speaking is at the mouth of the person. There seems
to be another direction for arranging things at every point in the
4D form of experience. This we would not expect from modern
physics unless we embrace 5D metrics with extensive
second time dimensions with the same signature as space.
We would however expect it from the philosophy of time, many
authors have proposed that there must be more than one sort
of time because of Ellis McTaggart's argument. See:
Physical time and intrinsic temporality
http://www.iemar.tuwien.ac.at/publications/GF_1994a.pdf
and
The unreality of time
http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html
.Harland
Having no idea what space signatures nor extensive dimensions
refer to, I may misunderstand, but I know Einstein's space-time
relates distances as
d = x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - t^2
making t distinctly expressed in units of i, the square root of -1.
Since the relative scale, known by experiment, equates t and x,y,z
by the speed of light (3^8 meters /sec), nothing occurring in the
brain at normal speed can require relativistic physics.
Alex
If we look at a spherical shell in the world there are points
such that:
0 = x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - (ct)^2
A spherical shell 1 metre in radius will have null space-time
intervals directed at the centre for all events that are
c10^ - 8 secs in the past ie: events c10 nanoseconds
in the past & future are connected to the centre by a zero
length path. As we know from QED these are possible
paths that are explored by virtual photons/particles. What is
interesting is that provided the photons do not move
down the path permanently no energy is expended.
So any volume of brain activity has a direction in space
time where all of its components are zero distance
apart whilst still being at their original locations in
3D.
See:
A modern derivation of Newtonian physics:
http://www.eftaylor.com/pub/OgbornTaylor.pdf
Also consider that kinetic energy is an entirely relativistic
effect (kinetic energy = mass increase * c^2). And this
provides the KE part of the Lagrangian. Nothing in the brain
is non-relativistic and non-QM. The Newtonian physics
dictum about the brain is curious because the
Newtonian ontology does not exist.
Harland
...
Although Newtonian physics may not "exist", it does approximate
the real world. For all we know, physics may require terms we have
not encountered yet to describe the real world accurately. Newtonian
is just as good as any other physics math, wherever it works.
The brain is a digital device, like my mechanical alarm clock, and my
computer, but not like my sliderule (if could find it) or my d'Arsonval
volt meter, which are analog devices. Digital devices work with close
approximations. Errors because of implementation or physics do not
matter. 1.001's and 0.001's amount to ones and zeroes in digital.
Even if the brain where analog, consider its accuracy. The output
is accurate to milliseconds at most. The size is less than a meter.
10 nanoseconds for relativistic effects is 10^-5 too small to even
be detectable.
Alex
Which brings us back to the apparently epiphenomenal nature
of mind. According to modern physics there is good reason to
believe that a zone of brain activity may be accompanied by
geometrical forms stretching into the past (and the future) but
only for nano-seconds in either direction. This continuous form
would be an apparently passive accompaniment for brain
activity. It would seem to have the characteristics of conscious
experience with an observation point that is just a geometrical
anomally and content that is the brain activity itself.
The big question is whether this geometrical aside from
normal brain function would actually do anything. My own
proposal is that it provides a preferred basis for observation
in a QM universe. The QM preferred basis problem is still
a mystery and must be linked to conscious experience, any
such basis would generate a classical, geometrical manifold
from an underlying QM state and this is what we find:
conscious experience is a classical, geometrical manifold.
Best Wishes
Alex Green
Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
Stuart Hameroff
Alex Green
> Huxley's epiphenomenalism [we are 'merely helpless spectators']
> is often rejected simply because of this bleakness.
Stuart
Unless one takes Libet's backward referral literally, data and prevalent
theory point to conscious perception occurring after many actions deemed
(seeming as though they are) conscious. Huxley's description of 'helpless
spectators' may be overly bleak and dramatic, but according to conventional
views consciousness remains epiphenomenal. We are merely happy, helpless
spectators.
> Alex
> As far as I can see Libet showed that about 0.5 secs after
> a stimulus a conscious experience containing the stimulus
> occurs:
>
> "In other words, it is the content of the subjective experience, of the
> neuronally delayed awareness, that is modified by the referral to the earlier
> timing signal." Libet, B. (2000). Time factors in conscious processes:
> Reply to Gilberto Gomes. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 1#8211;12.
Stuart
Libet is basically following Dennett's retrospective reconstruction (or
Orwellian revisionism). We just remember things happening in real time, rather
than a half second later. Dennett has mental time following its own meandering
course, looping backwards in real time. But then one must define mental time.
The problem is just compounded.
In his 2000 book Libet say:
'the timing of a sensation is subjectively referred...not that the conscious
sensation itself jumped backwards in time...the content of the subjective
experience...is modified by the referral to the earlier timing signal.'
But with all due respect to Ben Libet, that doesnt explain his results
(unless the direct experience associated with neuronal adequacy is delayed yet
another 500 msec in his comparisons of direct cortical stimulation, hand
stimulation and medial lemniscus stimulation).
If one suspends disbelief in actual backward time referral,
the data show that the conscious experience occurs at the time of the evoked
potential ('the timing signal'), 20 to 30 msec after stimulus and several
hundred msec before the neuronal brain activity necessary (neuronal adequacy,
as Libet put it) for conscious awareness.
Certainly evolution would favor real time conscious actions rather than delayed
nonconscious actions.
Alex
> This interpretation is consistent with what we know about
> the speed of the processing required to construct the content
> of conscious experience. For example, the various perceptual
> rivalries operate on this time base, the auditory continuity and
> similar illusions have the same timings. If conscious
> experience is the output of cortical modelling then c.0.5 secs
> would be expected because sensory and motor data from
> all modalities must be integrated.
Stuart
Agreed. But the experience and apparently conscious actions occur far earlier.
> Alex
> As Penrose says:
>
> "But I have to confess to a disbelief in the possibility that there
> can be no role for consciousness in such rapid activities
> like ordinary conversation.." (Shadows of Mind p387).
>
> I have two principal objections to this.
>
> Firstly, I can find no evidence for processes in conscious
> experience. Things just pop into mind. If I try to construct
> things consciously any building block just pops into mind,
> any connection between blocks just pops up. Conscious
> experience does not create it's own content.
Stuart
Agreed. Unconscious/preconscious processes create the content. But they create
numerous possible contents. In the quantum mind view, preconscious processes
are quantum information - superpositions of multiple possibilities - one of
which pops into mind at the moment of quantum state reduction. Quantum
mechanics allow such quantum information to travel backward in classical time.
Alex
> Secondly, there is an alternative to conscious control of
> behaviour: conscious training of behaviour. Instead of
> processing individual behaviours conscious experience
> provides intuitions of whether certain behaviours match the
> world and/or the worldline of the individual. A matching
> signal reinforces these behaviours. This is 'free will' after
> the event.
Stuart
The training argument is cogent, but lets first clarify free will.
There are two issues being conflated: one is whether we have conscious
control in real time, or after the fact (as we discussed in the context of
Libet).
But regardless of *when* and regardless of whether our actions are chosen
consciously or unconsciously, the other issue is whether our actions are
completely deterministic/algorithmic. Only Penrose non-computability gets us
out of algorithmic responses.
As for the training argument, yes, up to a point. But how do we respond in novel
situations? And what about the color phi effect, and Libet's results, and
temporal binding? One must postulate unconscious actions masquerading as
consciousness due to training, AND retrospective reconstruction.
I know you say that consciousness helps the training, like Libet's veto, or
Jeffrey Gray's idea of consciousness as a planner. But none of those functions
need to be conscious. So (teleologically) why bother with consciousness at all?
My own view is not that consciousness evolved from biology, but that biology
adapted to ubiquitous protoconsciousness.
Alex
> So there is no need for direct connection to the past,
> Penrose's disbelief can be explained by pointing out that
> humans endlessly train themselves by rehearsing
> conversation with inner speech.
Stuart
If by inner speech you mean unconscious processing, then it may be coming from
the near future. (Backward referral means from the future to the present).
> Alex
> I hope I demonstrated above that conscious experience need not be
> epiphenomenal even if it could not intervene in the past.
Stuart
The question is whether consciousness can intervene in the present.
But you havent demonstrated that is not epiphenomenal, at least not to me.
Alex
> There is some proof that conscious experience is classical. Prior to
> decoherence theory classical structures were known to be generated by the
> possibility of a classical observation by a conscious observer.
Stuart
I basically agree that conscious experience is classical.
Consciousness is the process of quantum information
reducing/collapsing to classical states.
But the conscious observer (the Copenhagen interpretation) is misleading, for it
places consciousness outide science. In my view (and that of Roger Penrose)
consciousness does not cause collapse, consciousness IS collapse (a particular
type of collapse). And decoherence theory doesnt solve the problem for several
reasons. It doesnt address the fate of isolated systems, and it doesnt really
collapse the wave function, merely bury it in noise.
Alex
> My own take on this is that the mind offers a preferred basis for the
> brain and this basis is expressed as the geometry of conscious experience.
> The qualia, as you and Brian Flanagan suggest, are certain QM fields but are
> particular values of those fields superselected by the geometry.
Stuart
I think I agree :)
cheers, and thanks for your comments
Arnold Trehub
>
> As little people, or homunculi, we can look at plans
> of the brain and the world and trace the flow of data
> within them. We can even confirm that the data flows
> are like the content of experience. Now comes the tricky
> bit. Can the plans observe the plans? If we remove
> the homunculi does the theory work? Lets see:
>
1. How did the HOMUNCULUS sneak back into this discussion. I see no need
for homunculus-talk. There are specified neuronal brain mechanisms that
have the competence to provide us with a phenomenal experience of a
3D world with temporal dynamics in the retinoid system (Alex would
prefer to call it a 4D manifold). Incidentally, notice that the painting
I chose for the cover of my book (*The Cognitive Brain*) is titled "The
Manifold of Language."
2. Plans do not *observe* plans. Plans are propositional constructions in
specialized neuronal mechanisms. We can *experience and understand* plans
as phonological expressions of strings of such propositions/instructions in
covert and overt language. We can recall old plans to compare with current
tasks and alter them as needed --- or we can can construct novel plans from
scratch and commit them to memory for future use. All without a homunculus!
What more must we be able to do?
3. For a biologically credible explanation of how our brain accomplishes
this, see *The Cognitive Brain* (1991), Chapter 8, "Composing Behavior:
Registers for Plans and Actions"; Chapter 9, "Set Point and Motive: The
Formation and Resolution of Goals."
Arnold Trehub
Alex Green
The big surprise is that both stimulus and response can be completed reflexly (non-consciously) before the 0.5 secs required to model them and hence have them in conscious experience. It is this that seems to have made Penrose shake his pen in disbelief.
Stuart:
In his 2000 book Libet says:
'the timing of a sensation is subjectively referred...not that the conscious
sensation itself jumped backwards in time...the content of the subjective
experience...is modified by the referral to the earlier timing signal.'
But with all due respect to Ben Libet, that doesnt explain his results
(unless the direct experience associated with neuronal adequacy is delayed yet
another 500 msec in his comparisons of direct cortical stimulation, hand
stimulation and medial lemniscus stimulation).
If one suspends disbelief in actual backward time referral,
the data show that the conscious experience occurs at the time of the evoked
potential ('the timing signal'), 20 to 30 msec after stimulus and several
hundred msec before the neuronal brain activity necessary (neuronal adequacy,
as Libet put it) for conscious awareness.
Alex
What I do not understand is what aspect of Libet's results show actual intervention backwards in time. In a hierarchical processor like the brain it seems natural that a set of cortical processors might receive a stimulus and another set react to it and then a third set produce this as a bound conscious experience.
.....
Alex
> Secondly, there is an alternative to conscious control of
> behaviour: conscious training of behaviour. Instead of
> processing individual behaviours conscious experience
> provides intuitions of whether certain behaviours match the
> world and/or the worldline of the individual. A matching
> signal reinforces these behaviours. This is 'free will' after
> the event.
Stuart
The training argument is cogent, but lets first clarify free will.
There are two issues being conflated: one is whether we have conscious
control in real time, or after the fact (as we discussed in the context of
Libet).
But regardless of *when* and regardless of whether our actions are chosen
consciously or unconsciously, the other issue is whether our actions are
completely deterministic/algorithmic. Only Penrose non-computability gets us
out of algorithmic responses.
As for the training argument, yes, up to a point. But how do we respond in novel
situations? And what about the color phi effect, and Libet's results, and
temporal binding? One must postulate unconscious actions masquerading as
consciousness due to training, AND retrospective reconstruction.
I know you say that consciousness helps the training, like Libet's veto, or
Jeffrey Gray's idea of consciousness as a planner. But none of those functions
need to be conscious. So (teleologically) why bother with consciousness at all?
Alex
In novel situations the algorithmic brain produces the response. Put
a person who has never driven before in a car. Let a person walk in front
of them once they have got into third. Almost every learner will run down
the pedestrian. Thank God for dual controls. When the learner driver and
instructor have wiped away the sweat they will spend a few lessons on
the skill of stopping a car.
In the phi illusion the delay is sufficient to allow the flashing bars to be modelled
as a motion.The phi illusion is evidence for a modelling delay. See:
http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~lka/handle.exe for an example of the phi
illusion showing that modelling occurs. Temporal binding also requires a
modelling delay.
I am not convinced that consciousness is necessary even for the veto. See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem
However, I think it probably does get used for vetoing because, like you, I
think it selects/collapses a reality.
The real need for consciousness seems to be the need for something to
implement Ellis McTaggart's 'A Series'. It is required for the act of
'becoming', for there to be a past and present. Such a requirement would only
occur if the universe were truly QM such as modern multiple universe/
many minds theories propose. Why else would a temporal series exist? See:
http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html
Best Wishes
Alex Green
Stuart Hameroff <hame...@U.ARIZONA.EDU> wrote:Hi everyone
Stuart
Stuart
www.consciousness.arizona.edu/hameroff
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