Relational Thinking
Charles Francis
Wolfram's Theory", but the s.p.r moderator says this has gone too far in
to philosophy, but I think it is important to have this sort of
discussion of about fundamental physical forms, so I am posting to
sci.physics.particle
In article <i3gu1o2...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Or we have a realistic theory where the electron has position x, or
>>> the process which leads to the result x is incorrectly named
>>> "measurement".
>
>> We can have a realistic theory, but one in which the electron does not
>> have a defined position.
>
>Why not with position?
This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent Cartesian
axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between an
object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
absolute space). According to Descartes, there is no 'empty space'.
There are only objects and it makes sense to say that an object A is
contiguous to object B. The 'location' of an object A is the set of the
objects to which A is contiguous. 'Motion' is change in location".
This is in strict accordance with the orthodox interpretation of quantum
mechanics. In Dirac's words "In the general case we cannot speak of an
observable having a value for a particular state, but we can.... speak
of the probability of its having a specified value for the state,
meaning the probability of this specified value being obtained when one
makes a measurement of the observable" [8]. When this statement is
applied to the position observable, it follows that precise position
only exists in measurement of position, and hence that there is no
ontological background geometrical space or space-time.
This is not positivism because Dirac does not say that values never
exist prior to measurement, only that they do not exist in all cases,
and he does not say reality does not exist, only that classical concepts
cannot always be used to describe it.
Even Newton remarks that absolute Newtonian space only exists to the
extent that it can be produces by means of mechanical actions: -
The description of right lines and circles, upon which geometry is
founded, belongs to mechanics. Geometry does not teach us to draw these
lines, but requires them to be drawn.
>> As for whether the process which leads to the result x is correctly
>> called "measurement" depends on how you define your terms, and even
>> what the correct definition of terms is. I call it measurement
>> because it is the physical process which always has been called
>> measurement.
>
>"Measurement" is appropriate for some process which allows to receive
>information about something which already exists. For processes where
>the result has nothing to do with a value of something which already
>exists, we have other words: interaction, for example.
>
>> Only the way of thinking about measurement is different.
>
>If the way you think about "measurement" is the way we usually think
>about "interaction", then naming this thing "measurement" is simply
>a cause of confusion.
When we use preconceived notions in language to describe the quantum
world that is inevitably a source of confusion. The only way I see to
remove confusion is to strip words of preconceived metaphysical meanings
and redefine language to reflect empirical reality. Fortunately language
is dynamic, not absolute, and this is part of a historical process in
which we do change the meanings of words when we see fit.
>> I say that the value x is produced in measurement, I do not
>> assume that the value x exists and is found in measurement.
>
>Yep, and you cause confusion. Why don't you say "the value x is
>produced in interaction"? There would be no need for new logic.
There is still a need for new language. Interactions do not inevitably
produce values like x. Only particular classes of very complex
combinations of interactions produce values like x, this class of
combinations of interactions includes classical measurement procedures.
The word interaction I think is better reserved for interactions between
fundamental particles of matter, which is still a concept which we
require and which also corresponds to current usage in physics.
>> In other words, in my view the assumption that measurement means
>> that a value exists and is to be discovered is false. In the quantum
>> domain we have to redefine our terms, and apply the words we have to
>> what we can actually do.
>> Otherwise our words will contain and unjustifiable hidden
>> metaphysical content which will ultimately make it impossible to
>> discuss reality.
>Certainly using "interaction" instead of "measurement" does not
>suggest any hidden variables.
Nonetheless I still feel "measurement" is the better word to import into
the quantum domain and redefine according to the actual physics we find
there. This, as it seems to me, is the nearest we can get to the way in
which language is currently used.
To the actual processes of measurement I think we need to add a new
concept, which I call "effective measurement". In this model the
existence of a value for an observable quantity depends only on the
configuration of matter. If the interactions in a configuration of
matter combine to a process describable by an eigenstate of an
observable operator then the value of the corresponding observable
quantity exists independently of observation or measurement, and is
given by the corresponding eigenvalue. However the state is our
information about the system and is an eigenstate only if we know the
value of the quantity. Schrödinger’s cat is definitely either alive
or dead because it is a classical cat and we can apply to it classical
laws. Nonetheless, the state is a superposition until the box is opened.
Here quantum mechanics does not describe the evolution in time of a
physical wave function, but describes the probability relationship
between an initial measurement result at time t1 and a final measurement
result at time t2. In classical physics there is sufficient information
to determine the motion at each instant between the initial and final
state (up to experimental accuracy). Since intermediate states are
determinate and may be calculated in principal they may effectively be
regarded as measured states. A classical motion may effectively be
described as a sequence of measured states at instances separated by
some time interval Dt which is sufficiently small that there is
negligible alteration in predictions in the limit in which Dt tends to
zero. The state at each instant may be regarded as the initial state,
and state at the next instant may be regarded as the final state, which
becomes the initial state for the next part of the motion.
>We have not yet found a device which allows to transfer information
>FTL, and our current theories do not predict the existence of such
>devices.
It goes much deeper than that, if one adopts a Cartesian position on the
meaning of position, as described above. Special relativity in
particular can be seen as the practical implications of this position,
given that in order to produce numerical values of position we
necessarily require to calculate or measure the time for information
transfer. Numerical values of position are therefore defined in terms of
the minimum time for information transfer, which implies that the
maximum speed of information transfer must be an absolute constant.
>But we are not discussing current theories, but discrete
>models which, in some large scale limit, give the current theories.
I am discussing the interpretation of current theories.
>Why do you think that these more fundamental theories should have the
>same speed limits, have the same symmetry groups? Of course, feel
>free to make this hypothesis, your choice. But do you have arguments
>in favour of this choice?
Yes, as I have said in the para before last.
>Instead, I start with classical probability theory, understood as the
>laws of logic, consistent thinking. And I think (hope), EPR realism
>may be understood in a similar way, as consistent thinking about
>reality. Then, the violation of Bell's inequality simply proves that
>something happens FTL in reality.
I don't agree. If position does not exist until the right kind of
interactions generate the value of position then it is also meaningless
to talk of speed until these interactions take place. In my view the
violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the absence of physical
background space, and shows what happens due to the circularity which is
inevitable when the measurement also creates the value which is
measured.
>There is a continuous scale of positivistic points of view. They
>share the same error, but differ in the point where they switch from
>positivism back to common sense.
> Pure positivism is solipcism, almost
>nobody goes to this extreme.
I never feel the switch between solipsism and common sense permits a
consistent view other than solipsism.
>. If I propose a theory where the electron has a position,
>I can say that the electron has a position. If the position may be
>measured via some interaction of the electron with other matter or not
>doesn't matter.
It does matter, because the empirical value of position is that which is
measured by some combination of interactions. This may be quite
different from the original notion of position, and if so there is no
meaningful way in which you can say that your original notion exists.
>
>> I don't think of Bohmian mechanics as a realistic theory.
>
>If you think otherwise, explain where it contradicts classical realism.
I would impose Newton's notion of localism on any theory which I would
regard as realistic, that "one body may (not) act upon another at a
distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by
and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to
another",
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> In article <i3gu1o2...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>> Or we have a realistic theory where the electron has position x, or
>>>> the process which leads to the result x is incorrectly named
>>>> "measurement".
>>
>>> We can have a realistic theory, but one in which the electron does not
>>> have a defined position.
>>
>> Why not with position?
>
> This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
> relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent Cartesian
> axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between an
> object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
> absolute space).
This belief of Descartes is no argument.
> This is in strict accordance with the orthodox interpretation of quantum
> mechanics.
Which is also not an argument. Note, you argue that we cannot have a
realistic theory with well-defined electron position.
BTW, I have assumed that you want to argue about problems with
position operators in relativistic field theory with interaction. In
field theory, I prefer to look at electrons as quantum effects of the
electron field, thus, not as a lot of point particles. But if you
don't consider this domain - in non-relativistic QM we already have a
realistic theory where electrons have positions - Bohmian mechanics.
> This is not positivism because Dirac does not say that values never
> exist prior to measurement, only that they do not exist in all cases,
> and he does not say reality does not exist, only that classical concepts
> cannot always be used to describe it.
In BM momentum values do not exist, but are a result of interaction.
>>> Only the way of thinking about measurement is different.
>>
>> If the way you think about "measurement" is the way we usually think
>> about "interaction", then naming this thing "measurement" is simply
>> a cause of confusion.
>
> When we use preconceived notions in language to describe the quantum
> world that is inevitably a source of confusion. The only way I see to
> remove confusion is to strip words of preconceived metaphysical meanings
> and redefine language to reflect empirical reality.
I see no reason to change anything in the meaning of "interaction" if
we use this term to replace "measurement".
>>> I say that the value x is produced in measurement, I do not
>>> assume that the value x exists and is found in measurement.
>> Yep, and you cause confusion. Why don't you say "the value x is
>> produced in interaction"? There would be no need for new logic.
> There is still a need for new language. Interactions do not inevitably
> produce values like x. Only particular classes of very complex
> combinations of interactions produce values like x, this class of
> combinations of interactions includes classical measurement procedures.
Interactions which give some results. Fine, invent some new word, if
this is too long. No problem. But no need for new logic.
> The word interaction I think is better reserved for interactions between
> fundamental particles of matter, which is still a concept which we
> require and which also corresponds to current usage in physics.
It has many other uses, but this has never been a problem. Certainly
not a problem with logic.
>>> Otherwise our words will contain and unjustifiable hidden
>>> metaphysical content which will ultimately make it impossible to
>>> discuss reality.
>> Certainly using "interaction" instead of "measurement" does not
>> suggest any hidden variables.
> Nonetheless I still feel "measurement" is the better word to import into
> the quantum domain and redefine according to the actual physics we find
> there. This, as it seems to me, is the nearest we can get to the way in
> which language is currently used.
On the other hand, "measurement" certainly suggests that something
(hidden) which really exists is measured.
> To the actual processes of measurement I think we need to add a new
> concept, which I call "effective measurement". In this model the
> existence of a value for an observable quantity depends only on the
> configuration of matter. If the interactions in a configuration of
> matter combine to a process describable by an eigenstate of an
> observable operator then the value of the corresponding observable
> quantity exists independently of observation or measurement, and is
> given by the corresponding eigenvalue.
Thus, in this particular case (state = eigenvector) the interaction
reduces to a measurement. This is also quite common for interaction
that it sometimes is only "measurement", the result does not depend on
above participants.
> However the state is our information about the system and is an
> eigenstate only if we know the value of the quantity.
"Is" seems inappropriate for this very special subjective
interpretation of the wave function.
> Schrödinger’s cat is definitely either alive
> or dead because it is a classical cat and we can apply to it classical
> laws. Nonetheless, the state is a superposition until the box is opened.
Note that in BM as well as in collapse interpretations the wave
function is objective, not subjective.
>> We have not yet found a device which allows to transfer information
>> FTL, and our current theories do not predict the existence of such
>> devices.
>
> It goes much deeper than that, if one adopts a Cartesian position on the
> meaning of position, as described above.
But I don't have, and don't plan to adopt it in future.
> Special relativity in particular can be seen as the practical
> implications of this position, given that in order to produce
> numerical values of position we necessarily require to calculate or
> measure the time for information transfer.
Special relativity is a theory with absolute background spacetime. GR
may be interpreted as a purely relational theory. You should probably
like gr-qc/9903045.
>> But we are not discussing current theories, but discrete
>> models which, in some large scale limit, give the current theories.
> I am discussing the interpretation of current theories.
Now, if the world is some discrete classical computer, then there
should be classical realistic interpretations of current theories too.
Insofar there is some connection.
But confusion is always possible, and I'm not very interested to
discuss confuse positivistic interpretations.
>> Instead, I start with classical probability theory, understood as the
>> laws of logic, consistent thinking. And I think (hope), EPR realism
>> may be understood in a similar way, as consistent thinking about
>> reality. Then, the violation of Bell's inequality simply proves that
>> something happens FTL in reality.
>
> I don't agree. If position does not exist until the right kind of
> interactions generate the value of position then it is also meaningless
> to talk of speed until these interactions take place.
Note that violations of Bell's inequality are macroscopic
observations. They are correlations between macroscopic, classical
choices of experimenters (choice of direction of spin measurements)
and macroscopic results. Quantum interpretation questions are
irrelevant on this level.
> In my view the violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the
> absence of physical background space, and shows what happens due to
> the circularity which is inevitable when the measurement also
> creates the value which is measured.
Your view is completely unjustified. We do not even have to mention
spacetime at all to formulate and prove Bell's inequalities (it is
sufficient to introduce "choice of experimenters" a,b, and "resulting
observations" A,B, and to assume not(b->A or a->B).
>> There is a continuous scale of positivistic points of view. They
>> share the same error, but differ in the point where they switch
>> from positivism back to common sense. Pure positivism is
>> solipcism, almost nobody goes to this extreme.
> I never feel the switch between solipsism and common sense permits a
> consistent view other than solipsism.
I don't understand this sentence.
>> If I propose a theory where the electron has a position, I can say
>> that the electron has a position. If the position may be measured
>> via some interaction of the electron with other matter or not
>> doesn't matter.
> It does matter, because the empirical value of position is that
> which is measured by some combination of interactions. This may be
> quite different from the original notion of position, and if so
> there is no meaningful way in which you can say that your original
> notion exists.
It is the theory which _defines_ what exists. Then, the theory defines
or derives what is observable. If something which really exists
(according to this theory) is not observable there is no logical
problem.
There may be a problem with Ockham's razor, some other theory may
be simpler. That's all.
>>> I don't think of Bohmian mechanics as a realistic theory.
>> If you think otherwise, explain where it contradicts classical realism.
> I would impose Newton's notion of localism on any theory which I would
> regard as realistic, that "one body may (not) act upon another at a
> distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by
> and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to
> another",
So, according to you Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory.
Sorry, but I certainly disagree with any notion of realism which
excludes classical mechanics from the list of realistic theories.
Ilja
--
I. Schmelzer, <il...@ilja-schmelzer.net> , http://ilja-schmelzer.net
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> In article <i3gu1o2...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>
>>>>> Or we have a realistic theory where the electron has position x, or
>>>>> the process which leads to the result x is incorrectly named
>>>>> "measurement".
>>>
>>>> We can have a realistic theory, but one in which the electron does not
>>>> have a defined position.
>>>
>>> Why not with position?
>>
>> This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
>> relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent Cartesian
>> axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between an
>> object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
>> absolute space).
>
>This belief of Descartes is no argument.
Since Descartes makes perfect sense you have to justify any other belief
about space; you have to provide physical explanation as to what the
structure of space is and how it can physically be. Without that you
have no argument, merely an irrational belief that 'space' is.
>
>> This is in strict accordance with the orthodox interpretation of quantum
>> mechanics.
>
>Which is also not an argument.
Since Descartes position leads to agreement with the empirical facts of
quantum mechanics, while belief in space leads to contradiction with
observation, you have to construct a model to reconcile your position
with observation.
>Note, you argue that we cannot have a
>realistic theory with well-defined electron position.
>
>BTW, I have assumed that you want to argue about problems with
>position operators in relativistic field theory with interaction. In
>field theory, I prefer to look at electrons as quantum effects of the
>electron field, thus, not as a lot of point particles. But if you
>don't consider this domain - in non-relativistic QM we already have a
>realistic theory where electrons have positions - Bohmian mechanics.
I certainly am only interested in relativistic theories. Please note,
Bohmian mechanics was never intended to be sensible, particularly not by
Bohm. It is merely an illustration that something could be done.
The remarks I have made apply to relativistic theories of particles. It
can be shown that the relationist view of Descartes leads to a fuzziness
when studying the positions of particles, and that the fuzziness in the
positions at which particles interact is described very well by field
operators.
>> This is not positivism because Dirac does not say that values never
>> exist prior to measurement, only that they do not exist in all cases,
>> and he does not say reality does not exist, only that classical concepts
>> cannot always be used to describe it.
>
>In BM momentum values do not exist, but are a result of interaction.
>
>>>> Only the way of thinking about measurement is different.
>>>
>>> If the way you think about "measurement" is the way we usually think
>>> about "interaction", then naming this thing "measurement" is simply
>>> a cause of confusion.
>>
>> When we use preconceived notions in language to describe the quantum
>> world that is inevitably a source of confusion. The only way I see to
>> remove confusion is to strip words of preconceived metaphysical meanings
>> and redefine language to reflect empirical reality.
>
>I see no reason to change anything in the meaning of "interaction" if
>we use this term to replace "measurement".
An interaction may just be the emission of a photon. On its own that is
not enough to return any values. If you use the word interaction to
include all measurement processes then you will corrupt it and make it
impossible to say other things which need to be said. OTOH if you use
your notion of measurement to describe the quantum world you will say
things which cannot be justified.
>>>> I say that the value x is produced in measurement, I do not
>>>> assume that the value x exists and is found in measurement.
>
>>> Yep, and you cause confusion. Why don't you say "the value x is
>>> produced in interaction"? There would be no need for new logic.
>
>> There is still a need for new language. Interactions do not inevitably
>> produce values like x. Only particular classes of very complex
>> combinations of interactions produce values like x, this class of
>> combinations of interactions includes classical measurement procedures.
>
>Interactions which give some results. Fine, invent some new word, if
>this is too long. No problem. But no need for new logic.
Even Aristotle saw the need for new logic, as he showed statements about
definite future events do not obey two valued logic. In fact they obey
probability theory. Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another
logic, namely quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you
understand the subjunctive.
>> The word interaction I think is better reserved for interactions between
>> fundamental particles of matter, which is still a concept which we
>> require and which also corresponds to current usage in physics.
>
>It has many other uses, but this has never been a problem. Certainly
>not a problem with logic.
>
>>>> Otherwise our words will contain and unjustifiable hidden
>>>> metaphysical content which will ultimately make it impossible to
>>>> discuss reality.
>
>>> Certainly using "interaction" instead of "measurement" does not
>>> suggest any hidden variables.
>
>> Nonetheless I still feel "measurement" is the better word to import into
>> the quantum domain and redefine according to the actual physics we find
>> there. This, as it seems to me, is the nearest we can get to the way in
>> which language is currently used.
>
>On the other hand, "measurement" certainly suggests that something
>(hidden) which really exists is measured.
Not to me it doesn't. It only suggests that a value will be returned,
and says nothing of the prior existence of that value. If you have a
misconception, do not complain that it is a problem with language.
>> To the actual processes of measurement I think we need to add a new
>> concept, which I call "effective measurement". In this model the
>> existence of a value for an observable quantity depends only on the
>> configuration of matter. If the interactions in a configuration of
>> matter combine to a process describable by an eigenstate of an
>> observable operator then the value of the corresponding observable
>> quantity exists independently of observation or measurement, and is
>> given by the corresponding eigenvalue.
>
>Thus, in this particular case (state = eigenvector) the interaction
>reduces to a measurement. This is also quite common for interaction
>that it sometimes is only "measurement", the result does not depend on
>above participants.
>
>> However the state is our information about the system and is an
>> eigenstate only if we know the value of the quantity.
>
>"Is" seems inappropriate for this very special subjective
>interpretation of the wave function.
Not really subjective. This is very much a part of early discussions of
the meaning of quantum mechanics, and very much a part of the orthodox,
Dirac-Von Neumann interpretation, which is the form of Copenhagen most
widely accepted.
>
>> Schrödinger’s cat is definitely either alive
>> or dead because it is a classical cat and we can apply to it classical
>> laws. Nonetheless, the state is a superposition until the box is opened.
>
>Note that in BM as well as in collapse interpretations the wave
>function is objective, not subjective.
Then you must explain its physical structure.
>>> We have not yet found a device which allows to transfer information
>>> FTL, and our current theories do not predict the existence of such
>>> devices.
>>
>> It goes much deeper than that, if one adopts a Cartesian position on the
>> meaning of position, as described above.
>
>But I don't have, and don't plan to adopt it in future.
Are you not even able to give a serious position serious consideration?
>
>> Special relativity in particular can be seen as the practical
>> implications of this position, given that in order to produce
>> numerical values of position we necessarily require to calculate or
>> measure the time for information transfer.
>
>Special relativity is a theory with absolute background spacetime.
Not in its inception. Minkowski space-time was invented about three
years after sr, and is primarily responsible for the misinterpretation
of sr. In fact it is only an absolute background if you use a purely
mathematical definition of the word background, which is itself ill
conceived for the discussion of physical theory.
>Note that violations of Bell's inequality are macroscopic
>observations. They are correlations between macroscopic, classical
>choices of experimenters (choice of direction of spin measurements)
>and macroscopic results. Quantum interpretation questions are
>irrelevant on this level.
Not so at all. The violation of the inequalities shows only what I have
already been saying, that the spins of the particles and the positions
of the particles do not exist as such until the measurement takes place,
and that the result of measurement by a remote observer does not exist
until information about the result is received locally.
>> In my view the violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the
>> absence of physical background space, and shows what happens due to
>> the circularity which is inevitable when the measurement also
>> creates the value which is measured.
>
>Your view is completely unjustified. We do not even have to mention
>spacetime at all to formulate and prove Bell's inequalities (it is
>sufficient to introduce "choice of experimenters" a,b, and "resulting
>observations" A,B, and to assume not(b->A or a->B).
There is no problem with locality if you do this.
>>> There is a continuous scale of positivistic points of view. They
>>> share the same error, but differ in the point where they switch
>>> from positivism back to common sense. Pure positivism is
>>> solipcism, almost nobody goes to this extreme.
>
>> I never feel the switch between solipsism and common sense permits a
>> consistent view other than solipsism.
>
>I don't understand this sentence.
I beg your pardon, it should have been " I never feel the switch between
positivism and common sense permits a consistent view other than
solipsism".
>>> If I propose a theory where the electron has a position, I can say
>>> that the electron has a position. If the position may be measured
>>> via some interaction of the electron with other matter or not
>>> doesn't matter.
>
>> It does matter, because the empirical value of position is that
>> which is measured by some combination of interactions. This may be
>> quite different from the original notion of position, and if so
>> there is no meaningful way in which you can say that your original
>> notion exists.
>
>It is the theory which _defines_ what exists. Then, the theory defines
>or derives what is observable.
That describes perfectly what is wrong with metaphysics. Such theories
may have nothing to do with reality or real observation.
>There may be a problem with Ockham's razor, some other theory may
>be simpler. That's all.
>
>>>> I don't think of Bohmian mechanics as a realistic theory.
>
>>> If you think otherwise, explain where it contradicts classical realism.
>
>> I would impose Newton's notion of localism on any theory which I would
>> regard as realistic, that "one body may (not) act upon another at a
>> distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by
>> and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to
>> another",
>
>So, according to you Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory.
According to Newton Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory. Indeed
a realist explanation for gravity defied all comers until gtr.
>Sorry, but I certainly disagree with any notion of realism which
>excludes classical mechanics from the list of realistic theories.
Then you simply fail to understand everything that was wrong with
classical mechanics.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:0LjQVHOj...@clef.demon.co.uk...
> In article <i3gofe5...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> In article <i3gu1o2...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >
> >>>>> Or we have a realistic theory where the electron has position x, or
> >>>>> the process which leads to the result x is incorrectly named
> >>>>> "measurement".
> >>>
> >>>> We can have a realistic theory, but one in which the electron does
not
> >>>> have a defined position.
> >>>
> >>> Why not with position?
> >>
> >> This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
> >> relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent
Cartesian
> >> axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between
an
> >> object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
> >> absolute space).
> >
> >This belief of Descartes is no argument.
>
> Since Descartes makes perfect sense you have to justify any other belief
> about space; you have to provide physical explanation as to what the
> structure of space is and how it can physically be. Without that you
> have no argument, merely an irrational belief that 'space' is.
Don't you have this sort of backwards? Didn't the greeks initiate the
western scientific trial theory by assuming that space is so fundamental
there can be no questioning about it? That which you call space is now
understood to be 100% unified field. So, granted, Descartes' trial
theory is used in arriving at this understanding, but one arrives at the
improved, more unified trial theory by falsifying Rene's assumption that
things are not unified, ie., that things are not actually splittable into
subjective and objective. To say that his notion of space makes perfect
sense sounds exceedingly irrational.
It's only "rational" in a Popperian trial theory #1 --> trial theory #2
scenario, where he says, "I am going to do something, even if it is
incorrect", and then he settles upon assuming the field is splittable
and also best represented by cubic structure. Because the structure of
the field is closer to being tetrahedral and nested tetrahedral, the cubic
approximation requires a lot of compensation to give it the appearance of
"working". That compensating stuff, we know of as the wild and
every-growing tangle of abstract mathematics that folks add willy-nilly
like adding epicycles to some ancient Ptolemic model of the solar system AND
the motions of galaxies.
Had Rene been thinking after his sauna, he should have remembered his
Platonic models and noticed that, minimally, two tetrahedra fit inside of a
cube, defining it's eight corners.
So, right there is proof that if the cube is one approximation of the
structure of the unified field, then obviously, tetrahedron is a better
approximation. _He_ should have been able to reason that out.
But did he? No.
And here we are with essentially ALL of the building blocks of the
"subjective" realm mostly in -- that is, including the root resonances
structures in all of carbon-based consciousness -- mostly in various
nested tetrahedral coordinations.
Go figure.
> >
> >> This is in strict accordance with the orthodox interpretation of
quantum
> >> mechanics.
> >
> >Which is also not an argument.
>
> Since Descartes position leads to agreement with the empirical facts of
> quantum mechanics, while belief in space leads to contradiction with
> observation, you have to construct a model to reconcile your position
> with observation.
Putting this in perspective, lest we forget, Descartes approach leads to
"agreement about quantum mechanics", only after an individual invests, say,
30 years of intensive study and living with folks who already believe
themselves to be in agreement with that delicately stack of nested
approximations. Perhaps about 0.1% of the population track on the
"agreement". Minimally, that approach is a bit tricky to navigate and the
assimilation time is long. Might there be a better one?
One portion of this learning curve involves unlearning the low-level
Cartesian cubic formatting that is impressed on students essentially since
kindergarten, and adopting some appreciation for seeing that things do fit
better when viewed via a triangulated-tetrahedral filter ....Particularly
natural things and stuff which oscillates -- intertransforms -- from unified
state to unified state to unified state.
As in, say, water and SNO.
>
> >Note, you argue that we cannot have a
> >realistic theory with well-defined electron position.
Don't the results at TRISTAN show finding electron "position" to be more
than elusive?
> >
> >BTW, I have assumed that you want to argue about problems with
> >position operators in relativistic field theory with interaction. In
> >field theory, I prefer to look at electrons as quantum effects of the
> >electron field, thus, not as a lot of point particles. But if you
> >don't consider this domain - in non-relativistic QM we already have a
> >realistic theory where electrons have positions - Bohmian mechanics.
>
> I certainly am only interested in relativistic theories. Please note,
> Bohmian mechanics was never intended to be sensible, particularly not by
> Bohm. It is merely an illustration that something could be done.
>
> The remarks I have made apply to relativistic theories of particles. It
> can be shown that the relationist view of Descartes leads to a fuzziness
> when studying the positions of particles, and that the fuzziness in the
> positions at which particles interact is described very well by field
> operators.
After how many years of learning how to believe?
...
> Even Aristotle saw the need for new logic, as he showed statements about
> definite future events do not obey two valued logic. In fact they obey
> probability theory. Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another
> logic, namely quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you
> understand the subjunctive.
Seems a bit more realistic and less furtive to accept first that we are held
in the hand of God.
....
> >Note that in BM as well as in collapse interpretations the wave
> >function is objective, not subjective.
>
> Then you must explain its physical structure.
Various tests in organic chemistry show that most of the stuff the
"subjective" realm is made of -- in the wild, at the natural level which is
obviously ONE of the solution to the overall general equation of the unified
field -- the natural patterns of structure are predominantly tetrahedral.
Unified stuff is nested and easily intertransforms. Tetrahedra nest well and
easily intertransform.
Do the math yourself.
- Ralph Frost
http://www.refrost.com
Use more robust symbols
Seek a thought worthy of speech.
Charles Francis
<ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:0LjQVHOj...@clef.demon.co.uk...
>> In article <i3gofe5...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> >> In article <i3gu1o2...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
>> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> >>
>> >> This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
>> >> relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent
>Cartesian
>> >> axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between
>an
>> >> object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
>> >> absolute space).
>> >
>> >This belief of Descartes is no argument.
>>
>> Since Descartes makes perfect sense you have to justify any other belief
>> about space; you have to provide physical explanation as to what the
>> structure of space is and how it can physically be. Without that you
>> have no argument, merely an irrational belief that 'space' is.
>
>Don't you have this sort of backwards? Didn't the greeks initiate the
>western scientific trial theory by assuming that space is so fundamental
>there can be no questioning about it?
No. This assumption originated with Newton, and Newton himself was not
as committed to it as is often held, pointing out that it was only true
to the accuracy with which lines can be drawn by mechanical means. For
the Greeks geometry was more concerned with measurement. Literally
geo-metry means "world measurement", so the Greeks were concerned with
lengths of lines and sizes of angles, not much with the structure of the
empty spaces between the lines of their diagrams. To the extent that
they did study the structure of empty space they produced Zeno's
paradoxes, and concluded that the mathematical description of a
continuum is only an approximation (Eudoxus) and that space with
properties cannot exist as such (Leucippus and Democritus).
>That which you call space is now
>understood to be 100% unified field. So, granted, Descartes' trial
>theory is used in arriving at this understanding, but one arrives at the
>improved, more unified trial theory by falsifying Rene's assumption that
>things are not unified, ie., that things are not actually splittable into
>subjective and objective.
Please try to learn what you are talking about before attacking the
intellect of one of the greatest mathematicians in history.
>Go figure.
Your nestings of geometrical figures is trivially understood. Descartes
would have understood it, and how little import it has, in his sleep.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>> We can have a realistic theory, but one in which the electron does not
>>>>> have a defined position.
>>>>
>>>> Why not with position?
>>>
>>> This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
>>> relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent Cartesian
>>> axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between an
>>> object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
>>> absolute space).
>>
>> This belief of Descartes is no argument.
>
> Since Descartes makes perfect sense you have to justify any other belief
> about space;
No. I have proven that we can have a realistic theory in which the
electron does have a defined position by presenting such a theory
(Bohmian mechanics).
> Since Descartes position leads to agreement with the empirical facts of
> quantum mechanics, while belief in space leads to contradiction with
> observation, you have to construct a model to reconcile your position
> with observation.
Nonsense. Descartes position alone, as well as belief in absolute
space alone, do not lead to falsifiable predictions. A position which
reconciles classical realism with observation exists (Bohmian
mechanics).
>> BTW, I have assumed that you want to argue about problems with
>> position operators in relativistic field theory with interaction. In
>> field theory, I prefer to look at electrons as quantum effects of the
>> electron field, thus, not as a lot of point particles. But if you
>> don't consider this domain - in non-relativistic QM we already have a
>> realistic theory where electrons have positions - Bohmian mechanics.
> I certainly am only interested in relativistic theories. Please note,
> Bohmian mechanics was never intended to be sensible, particularly not by
> Bohm. It is merely an illustration that something could be done.
(Which is what I need.) BTW, it has been considered by Bell as the
interpretation of QM which avoids the unprofessional vagueness of the
other interpretations.
> The remarks I have made apply to relativistic theories of particles.
Especially the quotes from Descartes? SCNR.
> It can be shown that the relationist view of Descartes leads to a
> fuzziness when studying the positions of particles, and that the
> fuzziness in the positions at which particles interact is described
> very well by field operators.
I don't think this has anything to do with relationalism. SR is a
theory with absolute spacetime background, not relational. Field
operators are part of SR field theory.
>> I see no reason to change anything in the meaning of "interaction" if
>> we use this term to replace "measurement".
> An interaction may just be the emission of a photon. On its own that
> is not enough to return any values.
It doesn't matter. There are a lot of interactions which give you
some values, in everyday life, in agreement with logic and common
sense, where the results are not predefined by the state of the other
side, and such interactions will not be called measurements. For
example negotiations.
> If you use the word interaction to include all measurement processes
> then you will corrupt it and make it impossible to say other things
> which need to be said.
Which other things?
> OTOH if you use your notion of measurement to describe the quantum
> world you will say things which cannot be justified.
I will not. I recommend not to use "measurement" in QM context.
>>> There is still a need for new language. Interactions do not inevitably
>>> produce values like x.
>> Interactions which give some results. Fine, invent some new word, if
>> this is too long. No problem. But no need for new logic.
> Even Aristotle saw the need for new logic, as he showed statements
> about definite future events do not obey two valued logic. In fact
> they obey probability theory.
?????? Aristotle is not really new. And that probability theory is
essentially logic is fine, but purely classical. Probability theory
is _not_ a new logic.
> Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another logic, namely
> quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you understand
> the subjunctive.
No, they follow classical logic, classical common sense. However
subjunctive a _statement_ A may be, we have, following classical logic
we have (A or ~A) and so on.
>> On the other hand, "measurement" certainly suggests that something
>> (hidden) which really exists is measured.
> Not to me it doesn't. It only suggests that a value will be
> returned, and says nothing of the prior existence of that value.
I'm not a native speaker, so I don't want to judge. However, the main
point for me is about "new logic". If already the classical meaning
of measurement does not suggest the prior existence of that value, we
also don't need any new "quantum" logic.
>>> However the state is our information about the system and is an
>>> eigenstate only if we know the value of the quantity.
>> "Is" seems inappropriate for this very special subjective
>> interpretation of the wave function.
> Not really subjective. This is very much a part of early discussions
> of the meaning of quantum mechanics, and very much a part of the
> orthodox, Dirac-Von Neumann interpretation, which is the form of
> Copenhagen most widely accepted.
Who cares about Copenhagen?
>>> Schroedinger's cat is definitely either alive or dead because it
>>> is a classical cat and we can apply to it classical
>>> laws. Nonetheless, the state is a superposition until the box is
>>> opened.
>> Note that in BM as well as in collapse interpretations the wave
>> function is objective, not subjective.
> Then you must explain its physical structure.
It is a function Psi(Q) defined on the configuration space.
>>>> We have not yet found a device which allows to transfer
>>>> information FTL, and our current theories do not predict the
>>>> existence of such devices.
>>> It goes much deeper than that, if one adopts a Cartesian position
>>> on the meaning of position, as described above.
>> But I don't have, and don't plan to adopt it in future.
> Are you not even able to give a serious position serious
> consideration?
I have already given, and, as a consequence, have rejected it.
>> Special relativity is a theory with absolute background spacetime.
> Not in its inception. Minkowski space-time was invented about three
> years after sr, and is primarily responsible for the
> misinterpretation of sr. In fact it is only an absolute background
> if you use a purely mathematical definition of the word background,
> which is itself ill conceived for the discussion of physical theory.
It looks like you have serious misconceptions about SR interpretation.
I'm not sure if I would like to discuss these issues and defend the
standard spacetime interpretation of SR, which I don't like, against
the claim of being a misconception.
>> Note that violations of Bell's inequality are macroscopic
>> observations. They are correlations between macroscopic, classical
>> choices of experimenters (choice of direction of spin measurements)
>> and macroscopic results. Quantum interpretation questions are
>> irrelevant on this level.
> Not so at all.
Not? Read Bell.
> The violation of the inequalities shows only what I have already
> been saying, that the spins of the particles and the positions of
> the particles do not exist as such until the measurement takes
> place, and that the result of measurement by a remote observer does
> not exist until information about the result is received locally.
No. It shows that one of the assumptions used in the proof of Bell's
inequality is wrong. The proof does not mention quantum theory at
all.
>>> In my view the violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the
>>> absence of physical background space, and shows what happens due to
>>> the circularity which is inevitable when the measurement also
>>> creates the value which is measured.
>> Your view is completely unjustified. We do not even have to mention
>> spacetime at all to formulate and prove Bell's inequalities (it is
>> sufficient to introduce "choice of experimenters" a,b, and "resulting
>> observations" A,B, and to assume not(b-> A or a-> B).
> There is no problem with locality if you do this.
The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
realism.
>> It is the theory which _defines_ what exists. Then, the theory defines
>> or derives what is observable.
>
> That describes perfectly what is wrong with metaphysics. Such theories
> may have nothing to do with reality or real observation.
Indeed, they _may_ have nothing to do with reality. Therefore we look
for nontrivial empirical predictions and test them. Only if the
theory survives these tests, we have reasonable hope that it has
something to do with reality.
>>>>> I don't think of Bohmian mechanics as a realistic theory.
>>
>>>> If you think otherwise, explain where it contradicts classical realism.
>>
>>> I would impose Newton's notion of localism on any theory which I would
>>> regard as realistic, that "one body may (not) act upon another at a
>>> distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by
>>> and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to
>>> another",
>>
>> So, according to you Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory.
>
> According to Newton Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory.
That means, you use another meaning of the word "realism". IMHO an
uncommon one, at least many people use the phrase "local realism" as
denoting something different than simply realism.
>> Sorry, but I certainly disagree with any notion of realism which
>> excludes classical mechanics from the list of realistic theories.
> Then you simply fail to understand everything that was wrong with
> classical mechanics.
?????????? The question how the word "realism" is defined (including
locality or not) is completely irrelevant for the question what is
wrong or not with a particular theory.
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>
>>>>>> We can have a realistic theory, but one in which the electron does not
>>>>>> have a defined position.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why not with position?
>>>>
>>>> This goes back to the thoughts of Descartes, that position is a
>>>> relationship between objects, not a coordinate in pre-existent Cartesian
>>>> axes (indeed the coordinate merely describes the relationship between an
>>>> object and the matter used to define the axes, not a position in
>>>> absolute space).
>>>
>>> This belief of Descartes is no argument.
>>
>> Since Descartes makes perfect sense you have to justify any other belief
>> about space;
>
>No. I have proven that we can have a realistic theory in which the
>electron does have a defined position by presenting such a theory
>(Bohmian mechanics).
Sorry, but no one in their right mind could think that Bohmian mechanics
is a realistic theory. And in any case Bohmian mechanics contains no
justification for belief in space, whereas
>> Since Descartes position leads to agreement with the empirical facts of
>> quantum mechanics, while belief in space leads to contradiction with
>> observation, you have to construct a model to reconcile your position
>> with observation.
>
>Nonsense. Descartes position alone, as well as belief in absolute
>space alone, do not lead to falsifiable predictions.
Actually they do taken in context, please see
http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001. Belief in absolute space leads to
the Bell inequalities which are falsified. Relational thinking leads to
qm and to special and general relativity, which are not.
>
>> The remarks I have made apply to relativistic theories of particles.
>
>Especially the quotes from Descartes?
Yes.
>SCNR.
?
>> It can be shown that the relationist view of Descartes leads to a
>> fuzziness when studying the positions of particles, and that the
>> fuzziness in the positions at which particles interact is described
>> very well by field operators.
>
>I don't think this has anything to do with relationalism. SR is a
>theory with absolute spacetime background, not relational.
That is a misconception about how the word "background" should be
defined which has been adopted by a number of mathematicians. The
mathematical definition does not represent true physics. SR is best
regarded as a purely relational theory in which Minkowski space-time is
only a local approximation, i.e. it is a part of GR, not a whole theory
of space.
> Field
>operators are part of SR field theory.
That is only how they appear in current treatments.
>
>>> I see no reason to change anything in the meaning of "interaction" if
>>> we use this term to replace "measurement".
>
>> An interaction may just be the emission of a photon. On its own that
>> is not enough to return any values.
>
>It doesn't matter. There are a lot of interactions which give you
>some values, in everyday life, in agreement with logic and common
>sense, where the results are not predefined by the state of the other
>side, and such interactions will not be called measurements. For
>example negotiations.
These are composite interactions, not elementary interactions which
should appear in fundamental theories of physics.
>
>> If you use the word interaction to include all measurement processes
>> then you will corrupt it and make it impossible to say other things
>> which need to be said.
>
>Which other things?
>
>> OTOH if you use your notion of measurement to describe the quantum
>> world you will say things which cannot be justified.
>
>I will not. I recommend not to use "measurement" in QM context.
Then you are out of sync with physicists.
>
>>>> There is still a need for new language. Interactions do not inevitably
>>>> produce values like x.
>
>>> Interactions which give some results. Fine, invent some new word, if
>>> this is too long. No problem. But no need for new logic.
>
>> Even Aristotle saw the need for new logic, as he showed statements
>> about definite future events do not obey two valued logic. In fact
>> they obey probability theory.
>
>?????? Aristotle is not really new.
He was in Aristotle's day.
> And that probability theory is
>essentially logic is fine, but purely classical. Probability theory
>is _not_ a new logic.
It is about three hundred years old, as compared with quantum logic
which is about seventy years old, I think. Not really much difference in
the great scheme of things.
>
>> Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another logic, namely
>> quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you understand
>> the subjunctive.
>
>No, they follow classical logic, classical common sense. However
>subjunctive a _statement_ A may be, we have, following classical logic
>we have (A or ~A) and so on.
No we do not. We do not even have that in the case of the future tense.
Counter example 1.
Future tense, Aristotle's sea battle argument:
A: There will be a sea battle tomorrow
Although it is true that there will or will not be a sea battle tomorrow
it is not possible to put a truth value of 0 or 1 on the statement A.
Counter example 2
Subjunctive tense, quantum measurement
f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
Now it is not true that a measurement of position will be done, and nor
is it true that the result would necessarily be x (although it might
be). Quantum logic gives truth values to families of statements f(x),
showing that the wave function f(x) is just a set of truth values.
> However, the main
>point for me is about "new logic". If already the classical meaning
>of measurement does not suggest the prior existence of that value, we
>also don't need any new "quantum" logic.
The subjunctive is not a new sentence structure. Quantum logic only
formalises it, so it is not really new at all.
>>>> However the state is our information about the system and is an
>>>> eigenstate only if we know the value of the quantity.
>
>>> "Is" seems inappropriate for this very special subjective
>>> interpretation of the wave function.
>
>> Not really subjective. This is very much a part of early discussions
>> of the meaning of quantum mechanics, and very much a part of the
>> orthodox, Dirac-Von Neumann interpretation, which is the form of
>> Copenhagen most widely accepted.
>
>Who cares about Copenhagen?
A scientist should care about truth, over and above personal whim.
>
>>>> Schroedinger's cat is definitely either alive or dead because it
>>>> is a classical cat and we can apply to it classical
>>>> laws. Nonetheless, the state is a superposition until the box is
>>>> opened.
>
>>> Note that in BM as well as in collapse interpretations the wave
>>> function is objective, not subjective.
>
>> Then you must explain its physical structure.
>
>It is a function Psi(Q) defined on the configuration space.
That is not an explanation of physical structure. What is the physical
structure of configuration space, what is the physical structure of a
function?
>>>>> We have not yet found a device which allows to transfer
>>>>> information FTL, and our current theories do not predict the
>>>>> existence of such devices.
>
>>>> It goes much deeper than that, if one adopts a Cartesian position
>>>> on the meaning of position, as described above.
>
>>> But I don't have, and don't plan to adopt it in future.
>
>> Are you not even able to give a serious position serious
>> consideration?
>
>I have already given, and, as a consequence, have rejected it.
My god, you haven't even understood the subjective tense which is taught
to schoolboys, and you call that serious consideration???
>>> Special relativity is a theory with absolute background spacetime.
>
>> Not in its inception. Minkowski space-time was invented about three
>> years after sr, and is primarily responsible for the
>> misinterpretation of sr. In fact it is only an absolute background
>> if you use a purely mathematical definition of the word background,
>> which is itself ill conceived for the discussion of physical theory.
>
>It looks like you have serious misconceptions about SR interpretation.
>I'm not sure if I would like to discuss these issues and defend the
>standard spacetime interpretation of SR, which I don't like, against
>the claim of being a misconception.
please see http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001. SR is only a local form
of gr. Global space-time background is an unwarranted and unscientific
additional metaphysical assumption.
>
>>> Note that violations of Bell's inequality are macroscopic
>>> observations. They are correlations between macroscopic, classical
>>> choices of experimenters (choice of direction of spin measurements)
>>> and macroscopic results. Quantum interpretation questions are
>>> irrelevant on this level.
>
>> Not so at all.
>
>Not? Read Bell.
I am familiar with Bell's theorem.
>
>> The violation of the inequalities shows only what I have already
>> been saying, that the spins of the particles and the positions of
>> the particles do not exist as such until the measurement takes
>> place, and that the result of measurement by a remote observer does
>> not exist until information about the result is received locally.
>
>No. It shows that one of the assumptions used in the proof of Bell's
>inequality is wrong.
Precisely. In particular one way in which an assumption is wrong is in
the definition of local, because local only makes sense in the sense of
Descartes.
>The proof does not mention quantum theory at
>all.
Of course. The inequality would hold if things could be classical. Of
course the proof that quantum theory violates the inequality does
mention quantum theory.
>>>> In my view the violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the
>>>> absence of physical background space, and shows what happens due to
>>>> the circularity which is inevitable when the measurement also
>>>> creates the value which is measured.
>
>>> Your view is completely unjustified. We do not even have to mention
>>> spacetime at all to formulate and prove Bell's inequalities (it is
>>> sufficient to introduce "choice of experimenters" a,b, and "resulting
>>> observations" A,B, and to assume not(b-> A or a-> B).
>
>> There is no problem with locality if you do this.
>
>The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>realism.
Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>>>>>> I don't think of Bohmian mechanics as a realistic theory.
>>>
>>>>> If you think otherwise, explain where it contradicts classical realism.
>>>
>>>> I would impose Newton's notion of localism on any theory which I would
>>>> regard as realistic, that "one body may (not) act upon another at a
>>>> distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by
>>>> and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to
>>>> another",
>>>
>>> So, according to you Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory.
>>
>> According to Newton Newtonian gravity is not a realistic theory.
>
>That means, you use another meaning of the word "realism". IMHO an
>uncommon one, at least many people use the phrase "local realism" as
>denoting something different than simply realism.
There is no realism other than local realism. Realism states that
something is. That which is has the property that it can be, and
therefore that it has a valid structure. Instantaneous action at a
distance has no structure, and therefore cannot be.
>>> Sorry, but I certainly disagree with any notion of realism which
>>> excludes classical mechanics from the list of realistic theories.
>
>> Then you simply fail to understand everything that was wrong with
>> classical mechanics.
>
>?????????? The question how the word "realism" is defined (including
>locality or not) is completely irrelevant for the question what is
>wrong or not with a particular theory.
It was only thought that lead to the rejection of Euclid's fifth
postulate. A genuine realistic theory must have no fault which can be
detected by thought.
Regards
--
Charles Francis MA PhD
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> No. I have proven that we can have a realistic theory in which the
>> electron does have a defined position by presenting such a theory
>> (Bohmian mechanics).
> Sorry, but no one in their right mind could think that Bohmian
> mechanics is a realistic theory.
We have already clarified that you use "realism" for what is usually
called "local realism". Of course BM is nonlocal.
> And in any case Bohmian mechanics contains no justification for
> belief in space,
It is a theory with absolute space, and that's all a theory can
provide as justification for something.
>>> Since Descartes position leads to agreement with the empirical facts of
>>> quantum mechanics, while belief in space leads to contradiction with
>>> observation, you have to construct a model to reconcile your position
>>> with observation.
>> Nonsense. Descartes position alone, as well as belief in absolute
>> space alone, do not lead to falsifiable predictions.
> Actually they do taken in context, please see
> http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001. Belief in absolute space leads
> to the Bell inequalities which are falsified.
False. Belief in absolute space with absolute causality (instead of
Einstein causality) does not lead to any inequalities which are
falsified. Especially BM is not falsified.
> SR is best
> regarded as a purely relational theory in which Minkowski space-time is
> only a local approximation, i.e. it is a part of GR, not a whole theory
> of space.
In SR Minkowski space-time is not only a local approximation, but
global. Point.
>> Field operators are part of SR field theory.
> That is only how they appear in current treatments.
We have no better one.
>> It doesn't matter. There are a lot of interactions which give you
>> some values, in everyday life, in agreement with logic and common
>> sense, where the results are not predefined by the state of the other
>> side, and such interactions will not be called measurements. For
>> example negotiations.
>
> These are composite interactions, not elementary interactions which
> should appear in fundamental theories of physics.
Composite or not, they don't require any "new logic".
>>> OTOH if you use your notion of measurement to describe the quantum
>>> world you will say things which cannot be justified.
>> I will not. I recommend not to use "measurement" in QM context.
> Then you are out of sync with physicists.
I know that physicists do not follow my recommendations today. Is
there anything wrong with making such proposals?
>> And that probability theory is essentially logic is fine, but
>> purely classical. Probability theory is _not_ a new logic.
> It is about three hundred years old, as compared with quantum logic
> which is about seventy years old, I think. Not really much
> difference in the great scheme of things.
My point is not age, but compatibility with old logic, with common
sense.
>>> Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another logic, namely
>>> quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you understand
>>> the subjunctive.
>> No, they follow classical logic, classical common sense. However
>> subjunctive a _statement_ A may be, we have, following classical logic
>> we have (A or ~A) and so on.
> No we do not. We do not even have that in the case of the future tense.
>
> Counter example 1.
> Future tense, Aristotle's sea battle argument:
>
> A: There will be a sea battle tomorrow
> Although it is true that there will or will not be a sea battle tomorrow
> it is not possible to put a truth value of 0 or 1 on the statement A.
It is impossible to establish today this truth value, that's all.
Classical logic has never claimed that it is possible for human beings
to establish all truth values, so there is no contradiction.
> Counter example 2
> Subjunctive tense, quantum measurement
> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
> Now it is not true that a measurement of position will be done, and nor
> is it true that the result would necessarily be x (although it might
> be). Quantum logic gives truth values to families of statements f(x),
> showing that the wave function f(x) is just a set of truth values.
I don't understand this. AFAIK the wave function is not a set of
truth values, but |psi(x)|^2 is a probability distribution.
> The subjunctive is not a new sentence structure. Quantum logic only
> formalises it, so it is not really new at all.
Please give examples of use of (possibly non-formalized) quantum logic
from pre-quantum time.
>>> Then you must explain its physical structure.
>> It is a function Psi(Q) defined on the configuration space.
> That is not an explanation of physical structure. What is the physical
> structure of configuration space, what is the physical structure of a
> function?
I don't understand the meaning of this question. I'm used to define
physical theories in usual mathematical terminology. If you would
like to answer similar questions for classical Newtonian mechanics, I
will try to give a similar answer for BM.
> My god, you haven't even understood the subjective tense which is
> taught to schoolboys, and you call that serious consideration???
You start with insults? No more arguments?
>> It looks like you have serious misconceptions about SR interpretation.
>> I'm not sure if I would like to discuss these issues and defend the
>> standard spacetime interpretation of SR, which I don't like, against
>> the claim of being a misconception.
> please see http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001. SR is only a local
> form of gr. Global space-time background is an unwarranted and
> unscientific additional metaphysical assumption.
It is a metaphysical assumption made by SR, and part of SR.
>> No. It shows that one of the assumptions used in the proof of Bell's
>> inequality is wrong.
> Precisely. In particular one way in which an assumption is wrong is in
> the definition of local, because local only makes sense in the sense of
> Descartes.
>
>> The proof does not mention quantum theory at
>> all.
>
> Of course. The inequality would hold if things could be classical.
BM proves that things may be "classical" (but nonlocal) without
giving the inequality.
> Of course the proof that quantum theory violates the inequality does
> mention quantum theory.
Yep.
>>>>> In my view the violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the
>>>>> absence of physical background space
>>>> Your view is completely unjustified. We do not even have to mention
>>>> spacetime at all to formulate and prove Bell's inequalities (it is
>>>> sufficient to introduce "choice of experimenters" a,b, and "resulting
>>>> observations" A,B, and to assume not(b-> A or a-> B).
>>> There is no problem with locality if you do this.
>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>> realism.
> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
>> That means, you use another meaning of the word "realism". IMHO an
>> uncommon one, at least many people use the phrase "local realism" as
>> denoting something different than simply realism.
> There is no realism other than local realism. Realism states that
> something is. That which is has the property that it can be, and
> therefore that it has a valid structure. Instantaneous action at a
> distance has no structure, and therefore cannot be.
Newtonian and Bohmian mechanics have no structure, therefore cannot
be. ROTFL.
>>> Then you simply fail to understand everything that was wrong with
>>> classical mechanics.
>> ?????????? The question how the word "realism" is defined
>> (including locality or not) is completely irrelevant for the
>> question what is wrong or not with a particular theory.
> It was only thought that lead to the rejection of Euclid's fifth
> postulate. A genuine realistic theory must have no fault which can
> be detected by thought.
Feel free to introduce a new category of theories named "genuine
realistic theories". I care only about realistic theories as defined
by EPR and Bell.
Robert J. Kolker
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>
> My point is not age, but compatibility with old logic, with common
> sense.
Common sense is a very poor guide to the way nature works. What we are
pleased to call common sense, is experience given the kind of sense
organs we have and the scale at which they work. Those parts of nature
which are very large/small and very fast with respect to our accustomed
time scale are not likely to "make sense" to us on an intuitive level.
That is why we have fancy physical theories.
Bob Kolker
tadchem
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:3D232EFC...@attbi.com...
<snip repost>
> Common sense is a very poor guide to the way nature works. What we are
> pleased to call common sense, is experience given the kind of sense
> organs we have and the scale at which they work. Those parts of nature
> which are very large/small and very fast with respect to our accustomed
> time scale are not likely to "make sense" to us on an intuitive level.
> That is why we have fancy physical theories.
That is also why we have the science of measurement.
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>> My point is not age, but compatibility with old logic, with common
>> sense.
> Common sense is a very poor guide to the way nature works.
Yes and no.
BTW, the question which interests me is the reverse one. We have
found QM, which is a scientific theory, following scientific methods
(instead of using common sense as guide). The question is if the
results of QM force us to modify or reject essential, central parts of
common sense including such fundamental things as classical logic
or realism.
But back to your point:
> What we are pleased to call common sense, is experience given the
> kind of sense organs we have and the scale at which they work. Those
> parts of nature which are very large/small and very fast with
> respect to our accustomed time scale are not likely to "make sense"
> to us on an intuitive level.
That's only a guess. BTW, a type of guess which is contrary to the
usual scientific method: usually we try to extend the domain of
application of our theories/principles beyond the scope of our
experience. We observe Lorentz invariance in some particular MM
experiment and in the EM equations, and we propose that this
invariance holds for everything. That's science as usual. If we have
to modify something, we start to modify less fundamental things (for
example matter models instead of GR if we observe G_ij != T_ij).
Thus, it is even more reasonable to do this for the most basic
principles of logic, probability theory, realism (EPR).
And there is also another point - the justification of the scientific
method itself. What is the base for this method? Classical common
sense: logic, probability theory, realism. The parts of common sense
which are used for the justification of the scientific method itself
can hardly be modified.
> That is why we have fancy physical theories.
There is also another explanation: we have not understood our theories
sufficiently well, are unable to present them in a way compatible with
common sense.
"We" means here the mainstream. The Bohmian mechanics community is
already much closer to common sense. As well I think that my GET is
an important step in this direction.
Charles Francis
tadchem <tadche...@earthlink.net> writes
The implications of common sense to the science of measurement is
actually what is under discussion here. Does "common sense" tell us (A)
that there is always a prior value, and that measurement will discover
what that value is, or does "common sense" tell us (B) that there is not
necessarily a prior value and that the process of measurement will
generate one?
In other words is "common sense" that which is commonly assumed on the
basis of prior experience, i.e. (A), or does "common sense" tell us that
(B) is also a fully rational position and that there is an unwarranted
assumption in (A).
Personally I think that (A) does contain an unwarranted assumption, and
that it only requires thought and common sense to see that it contains
an unwarranted assumption, and hence that (B) is correct.
But on another level (A) is the condition for classical mechanics,
whereas (B) is the condition for quantum mechanics. So in my view it is
quantum mechanics which actually meets the requirements of common sense,
and makes complete consistent sense on an intuitive level, while
classical mechanics only matches our general experience of the physical
world. Moreover Bob's paragraph explaining the breakdown of the laws of
general experience itself is, in my view, a good bit of common sense,
showing that we should not have expected classical mechanics to have
universal domain in the first place.
Perhaps there is nothing so uncommon as common sense.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>
>> belief in space,
>
>It is a theory with absolute space, and that's all a theory can
>provide as justification for something.
No, a fundamental theory must justify its fundamental elements.
>
>>>> Since Descartes position leads to agreement with the empirical facts of
>>>> quantum mechanics, while belief in space leads to contradiction with
>>>> observation, you have to construct a model to reconcile your position
>>>> with observation.
>
>>> Nonsense. Descartes position alone, as well as belief in absolute
>>> space alone, do not lead to falsifiable predictions.
>
>> Actually they do taken in context, please see
>> http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001. Belief in absolute space leads
>> to the Bell inequalities which are falsified.
>
>False. Belief in absolute space with absolute causality (instead of
>Einstein causality) does not lead to any inequalities which are
>falsified. Especially BM is not falsified.
That is because you have lost locality, and hence also sensibility.
>> SR is best
>> regarded as a purely relational theory in which Minkowski space-time is
>> only a local approximation, i.e. it is a part of GR, not a whole theory
>> of space.
>
>In SR Minkowski space-time is not only a local approximation, but
>global. Point.
What point?. Of course SR is globally equal to SR. But the universe is
not like that.
>>> It looks like you have serious misconceptions about SR interpretation.
>>> I'm not sure if I would like to discuss these issues and defend the
>>> standard spacetime interpretation of SR, which I don't like, against
>>> the claim of being a misconception.
>
>> please see http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001. SR is only a local
>> form of gr. Global space-time background is an unwarranted and
>> unscientific additional metaphysical assumption.
>
>It is a metaphysical assumption made by SR, and part of SR.
It is not a required assumption and should not be assumed. SR depends
only on a study of measurement and on the principle of relativity. SR
can only be established locally, and is much better thought of as a
locally true theory than as a globally false one.
>>> It doesn't matter. There are a lot of interactions which give you
>>> some values, in everyday life, in agreement with logic and common
>>> sense, where the results are not predefined by the state of the other
>>> side, and such interactions will not be called measurements. For
>>> example negotiations.
>>
>> These are composite interactions, not elementary interactions which
>> should appear in fundamental theories of physics.
>
>Composite or not, they don't require any "new logic".
They are irrelevant to the discussion of fundamental physics.
>
>>>> OTOH if you use your notion of measurement to describe the quantum
>>>> world you will say things which cannot be justified.
>
>>> I will not. I recommend not to use "measurement" in QM context.
>
>> Then you are out of sync with physicists.
>
>I know that physicists do not follow my recommendations today. Is
>there anything wrong with making such proposals?
There are already huge semantic problems in the study of fundamental
physics. One should avoid making them worse when one can help it, and
try to adapt language as consistently as possible to general usage, as
well as to real physics. It's not easy for anyone to do this,
particularly as one normally assumes that ones own prior usage is close
to general usage. In practice one's prior usage is often quite widely
different from general usage.
>>> And that probability theory is essentially logic is fine, but
>>> purely classical. Probability theory is _not_ a new logic.
>
>> It is about three hundred years old, as compared with quantum logic
>> which is about seventy years old, I think. Not really much
>> difference in the great scheme of things.
>
>My point is not age, but compatibility with old logic, with common
>sense.
My point is that, once you understand it, quantum logic is common sense
too, as applied to the subjunctive tense.
>>>> Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another logic, namely
>>>> quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you understand
>>>> the subjunctive.
>
>>> No, they follow classical logic, classical common sense. However
>>> subjunctive a _statement_ A may be, we have, following classical logic
>>> we have (A or ~A) and so on.
>
>> No we do not. We do not even have that in the case of the future tense.
>>
>> Counter example 1.
>> Future tense, Aristotle's sea battle argument:
>>
>> A: There will be a sea battle tomorrow
>> Although it is true that there will or will not be a sea battle tomorrow
>> it is not possible to put a truth value of 0 or 1 on the statement A.
>
>It is impossible to establish today this truth value, that's all.
It is possible to identify this truth value with a probability. In this
instance there may not be an objectively definable probability, but
consider the throw of a well balanced die. The truth value for the
statement "I will throw a six" can be objectively established, and it
is 1/6.
>Classical logic has never claimed that it is possible for human beings
>to establish all truth values, so there is no contradiction.
>
>> Counter example 2
>> Subjunctive tense, quantum measurement
>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>> Now it is not true that a measurement of position will be done, and nor
>> is it true that the result would necessarily be x (although it might
>> be). Quantum logic gives truth values to families of statements f(x),
>> showing that the wave function f(x) is just a set of truth values.
>
>I don't understand this. AFAIK the wave function is not a set of
>truth values, but |psi(x)|^2 is a probability distribution.
The wave function can be identified with a set of truth values, and in
my view that is the *best* way to think of it.
>> The subjunctive is not a new sentence structure. Quantum logic only
>> formalises it, so it is not really new at all.
>
>Please give examples of use of (possibly non-formalized) quantum logic
>from pre-quantum time.
"If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
field and saved his kingdom"
"If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
have won the battle of Hastings"
Any sentence in the subjunctive tense is just such an example, but it
was not known how to apply truth values to such sentences. Of course
some people respond to such sentences by saying 'there is no such thing
as "if'", and others may say that Richard had lost the support of the
nobles and would have lost his kingdom anyway, or that if Harold had
fallen on the Normans after the first retreat William would have
regrouped, stood his ground and slaughtered the Saxons earlier in the
day. But that does not prevent historians from debating such things
according to what they generally perceive as common sense, and nor does
it alter our intuitive idea that there is truth in such sentences, and
indeed there is truth in them whichever outcome one favours.
The only formal example I can give is for the sentences
f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
where x ranges over the possible measurement results. In this case we
can identify the wave function with the truth value of f(x).
>>>> Then you must explain its physical structure.
>
>>> It is a function Psi(Q) defined on the configuration space.
>
>> That is not an explanation of physical structure. What is the physical
>> structure of configuration space, what is the physical structure of a
>> function?
>
>I don't understand the meaning of this question. I'm used to define
>physical theories in usual mathematical terminology. If you would
>like to answer similar questions for classical Newtonian mechanics, I
>will try to give a similar answer for BM.
I don't think the question has a meaning. That sums up my objection.
Without physical structure the math reduces to metaphysical claptrap.
The same is true of absolute space in Newtonian mechanics. It was by
studying such questions that Gauss was able to recognise that the
parallel postulate could be dropped, before the discovery of general
relativity. But even Gauss could only touch the surface of non-Euclidean
geometry, it took Riemann using Gauss's thought as well as his own to do
anything with it, and Einstein to turn it to physics - the combined
efforts of three of the greatest minds in history. In principle by
studying such questions a clear enough minded genius could have started
with Descartes' position on space, developed by Leibniz (albeit to
lesser extent than Gauss did with non-Euclidean geometry) and influenced
by the thoughts of Kant, and other philosophers beginning to study many
valued logic in the 19th C. In principle quantum logic could have been
developed before it became empirically necessary, just as non-Euclidean
geometry was developed before it was needed. In practice it is probably
harder to understand quantum logic than to understand non-Euclidean
geometry, and it was not developed until after the empirical discovery
of qm, and even then only in a way that was as clear as mud to almost
everyone, with the possible exception of Von Neumann himself.
>> My god, you haven't even understood the subjective tense which is
>> taught to schoolboys, and you call that serious consideration???
>
>You start with insults? No more arguments?
Sorry. It was you that would not give the study of the subjunctive
serious consideration. I cannot argue something that you are not
prepared to think about.
>>>>>> In my view the violation of Bell's inequality merely reflects the
>>>>>> absence of physical background space
>
>>>>> Your view is completely unjustified. We do not even have to mention
>>>>> spacetime at all to formulate and prove Bell's inequalities (it is
>>>>> sufficient to introduce "choice of experimenters" a,b, and "resulting
>>>>> observations" A,B, and to assume not(b-> A or a-> B).
>
>>>> There is no problem with locality if you do this.
>
>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>> realism.
>
>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>
>I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
>>> That means, you use another meaning of the word "realism". IMHO an
>>> uncommon one, at least many people use the phrase "local realism" as
>>> denoting something different than simply realism.
>
>> There is no realism other than local realism. Realism states that
>> something is. That which is has the property that it can be, and
>> therefore that it has a valid structure. Instantaneous action at a
>> distance has no structure, and therefore cannot be.
>
>Newtonian and Bohmian mechanics have no structure, therefore cannot
>be.
Absolutely.
>ROTFL.
Why should you laugh at a fact which is both in complete accord with
common sense and which is also in complete accord with empirical
evidence, and with our deepest theories of physics?
>> A genuine realistic theory must have no fault which can
>> be detected by thought.
>
>Feel free to introduce a new category of theories named "genuine
>realistic theories". I care only about realistic theories as defined
>by EPR and Bell.
I only care about realistic theories as defined by nature. EPR and Bell
make definitions out of mind, not out of reality, and hence there
notions of realism is not necessarily real.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu
>In article <8aMU8.100$U4.1...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>,
>tadchem <tadche...@earthlink.net> writes
>>
>actually what is under discussion here. Does "common sense" tell us (A)
>that there is always a prior value, and that measurement will discover
>what that value is, or does "common sense" tell us (B) that there is not
>necessarily a prior value and that the process of measurement will
>generate one?
>
measurement we ddi not know what the value is. We also know that
following the measurement we do know what the value is. Thus:
1) That the measurement generated a value, this is consistent with
observation.
2) That there existed a value prior to the measurement, that's an
assumption which may or may not be true but is not supported by
observation.
I would say that Occam leans heavily on the side of (B).
>Perhaps there is nothing so uncommon as common sense.
>
Oh, common sense may be common. This does not make it correct.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
me...@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> And in any case Bohmian mechanics contains no justification for
>>> belief in space,
>> It is a theory with absolute space, and that's all a theory can
>> provide as justification for something.
> No, a fundamental theory must justify its fundamental elements.
Explain how GR and QM do this.
>>> Belief in absolute space leads
>>> to the Bell inequalities which are falsified.
>> False. Belief in absolute space with absolute causality (instead of
>> Einstein causality) does not lead to any inequalities which are
>> falsified. Especially BM is not falsified.
> That is because you have lost locality, and hence also sensibility.
Whatever, your original claim is false.
>>> SR is best regarded as a purely relational theory in which
>>> Minkowski space-time is only a local approximation, i.e. it is a
>>> part of GR, not a whole theory of space.
>> In SR Minkowski space-time is not only a local approximation, but
>> global. Point.
> What point?
The end point of this subdiscussion. I do not plan to justify this
claim about SR.
> Of course SR is globally equal to SR. But the universe is
> not like that.
You have made a claim about SR, not about the universe. This claim
remains false.
>>> Global space-time background is an unwarranted and unscientific
>>> additional metaphysical assumption.
>> It is a metaphysical assumption made by SR, and part of SR.
> It is not a required assumption and should not be assumed.
Of course it is not required to assume the assumptions of SR. We do
not live in a SR universe, as shown by any nontrivial GR effect.
> SR can only be established locally, and is much better thought of as
> a locally true theory than as a globally false one.
Even locally it is only an approximation. Curvature is local.
>>>> I recommend not to use "measurement" in QM context.
>>> Then you are out of sync with physicists.
>> I know that physicists do not follow my recommendations today. Is
>> there anything wrong with making such proposals?
> There are already huge semantic problems in the study of fundamental
> physics. One should avoid making them worse
I don't try to make them worse but to solve them, because the use of
"measurement" in QM is misleading.
>>>> And that probability theory is essentially logic is fine, but
>>>> purely classical. Probability theory is _not_ a new logic.
>>
>>> It is about three hundred years old, as compared with quantum logic
>>> which is about seventy years old, I think. Not really much
>>> difference in the great scheme of things.
>>
>> My point is not age, but compatibility with old logic, with common
>> sense.
> My point is that, once you understand it, quantum logic is common
> sense too, as applied to the subjunctive tense.
In this case, there is no need to name this "quantum logic". Instead,
it would be appropriate to use the common language constructs commonly
applied to the subjunctive tense to describe QM effects.
>>>>> Statements in the subjunctive tense obey another logic, namely
>>>>> quantum logic. There should be no issue with that if you understand
>>>>> the subjunctive.
>>
>>>> No, they follow classical logic, classical common sense. However
>>>> subjunctive a _statement_ A may be, we have, following classical logic
>>>> we have (A or ~A) and so on.
>>
>>> No we do not. We do not even have that in the case of the future tense.
>>>
>>> Counter example 1.
>>> Future tense, Aristotle's sea battle argument:
>>>
>>> A: There will be a sea battle tomorrow
>>> Although it is true that there will or will not be a sea battle tomorrow
>>> it is not possible to put a truth value of 0 or 1 on the statement A.
>> It is impossible to establish today this truth value, that's all.
> It is possible to identify this truth value with a probability. In this
> instance there may not be an objectively definable probability, but
> consider the throw of a well balanced die. The truth value for the
> statement "I will throw a six" can be objectively established, and it
> is 1/6.
So what? That's not worth to be named "new logic".
>>> Counter example 2
>>> Subjunctive tense, quantum measurement
>
>>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>
>>> Now it is not true that a measurement of position will be done, and nor
>>> is it true that the result would necessarily be x (although it might
>>> be). Quantum logic gives truth values to families of statements f(x),
>>> showing that the wave function f(x) is just a set of truth values.
>>
>> I don't understand this. AFAIK the wave function is not a set of
>> truth values, but |psi(x)|^2 is a probability distribution.
> The wave function can be identified with a set of truth values, and in
> my view that is the *best* way to think of it.
Truth values for which claims?
>>> The subjunctive is not a new sentence structure. Quantum logic only
>>> formalises it, so it is not really new at all.
>> Please give examples of use of (possibly non-formalized) quantum logic
>> from pre-quantum time.
> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
> field and saved his kingdom"
> "If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
> have won the battle of Hastings"
How these claims are related to quantum theory?
> Any sentence in the subjunctive tense is just such an example, but it
> was not known how to apply truth values to such sentences.
It was. Using the same rules of classical probabiliy theory which
we would have used before these things have happened.
> The only formal example I can give is for the sentences
>
> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>
> where x ranges over the possible measurement results. In this case we
> can identify the wave function with the truth value of f(x).
Again, I don't see any identification. The truth value (in the
meaning: the classical probability density) of f(x) is |psi(x)|^2.
>>>>> Then you must explain its physical structure.
>>
>>>> It is a function Psi(Q) defined on the configuration space.
>>
>>> That is not an explanation of physical structure. What is the physical
>>> structure of configuration space, what is the physical structure of a
>>> function?
>>
>> I don't understand the meaning of this question. I'm used to define
>> physical theories in usual mathematical terminology. If you would
>> like to answer similar questions for classical Newtonian mechanics, I
>> will try to give a similar answer for BM.
>
> I don't think the question has a meaning. That sums up my objection.
I conclude that you have the same objections against Newtonian
mechanics, QM, GR. Now, as long as you accept that BM is in the same
class, not worse, I feel quite comfortable.
>>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>>> realism.
>>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
>>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>> I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>> made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
> But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
> inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
Not at all. To decide if the inequalities are broken or not we decide
by comparison of the results later, therefore the question if the
result of B is "meaningful" for A (whatever this means) earlier is
irrelevant.
>>>> That means, you use another meaning of the word "realism". IMHO an
>>>> uncommon one, at least many people use the phrase "local realism" as
>>>> denoting something different than simply realism.
>>
>>> There is no realism other than local realism. Realism states that
>>> something is. That which is has the property that it can be, and
>>> therefore that it has a valid structure. Instantaneous action at a
>>> distance has no structure, and therefore cannot be.
>>
>> Newtonian and Bohmian mechanics have no structure, therefore cannot
>> be.
>
> Absolutely.
>
>> ROTFL.
>
> Why should you laugh at a fact which is both in complete accord with
> common sense and which is also in complete accord with empirical
> evidence, and with our deepest theories of physics?
I'm completely unable to understand you. EOD for this part.
>> Feel free to introduce a new category of theories named "genuine
>> realistic theories". I care only about realistic theories as defined
>> by EPR and Bell.
>
> I only care about realistic theories as defined by nature. EPR and Bell
> make definitions out of mind, not out of reality, and hence there
> notions of realism is not necessarily real.
Feel free to make definitions out of nature.
Unfortunately I have no idea how to obtain definitions out of Nature,
even to decide if a definition is made out of Nature or out of God's
inspiration or whatever else. I make my definitions out of mind,
following the classical scientific method used by Newton, EPR, Bell
and many others.
tadchem
<snip repost>
> The implications of common sense to the science of measurement is
> actually what is under discussion here. Does "common sense" tell us (A)
> that there is always a prior value, and that measurement will discover
> what that value is, or does "common sense" tell us (B) that there is not
> necessarily a prior value and that the process of measurement will
> generate one?
Option (C): There is not necessarily a prior value AND the process of
measurement will NOT generate a value.
> In other words is "common sense" that which is commonly assumed on the
> basis of prior experience, i.e. (A), or does "common sense" tell us that
> (B) is also a fully rational position and that there is an unwarranted
> assumption in (A).
The implicit assumptions in (A) are 1: the phenomenon under consideration is
quantifiable and 2: that quantity satisfies the conditions of measurability.
> Personally I think that (A) does contain an unwarranted assumption, and
> that it only requires thought and common sense to see that it contains
> an unwarranted assumption, and hence that (B) is correct.
IMO, "common sense" has historically been taken as that which is commonly
assumed on the basis of prior experience. The Greek genius Zeno
demonstrated with his paradoxes that common sense and logic do not always
agree, and so is not a fully rational position. His paradoxes did not
resolve the issue of which was correct, or the separate issue of why they
disagree.
The scientific method requires that theories are *always* subject to
empirical verification by objective observation and measurement. Quantities
that are not amenable to objective observation and measurement (i.e. "IQ",
which is only "measurable" in a subjective sense) are not physical
quantities.
> But on another level (A) is the condition for classical mechanics,
> whereas (B) is the condition for quantum mechanics.
The only difference between classical and quantum mechanics is that it is
important in the QM realm to recognize that angular momentum is quantized.
These quanta are so small that the difference between a discrete and a
continuous variable in the "macroscopic" realm is not measurably important.
> Perhaps there is nothing so uncommon as common sense.
"Common sense" is based on accumulated experience. My "common sense"
regarding the preparation of high-purity helium is that sub-ppm traces of
nitrogen and oxygen should appear in a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1; if the oxygen
exceeds that ratio, there is either a problem (artifact) in the analysis or
there is contamination in the tank from a source of pure oxygen (helium is
often blended with pure oxygen for breathing mixtures used in deep-sea
diving) - a rather rare example of common sense, I should say.
My point here is that because "common sense" is based on individual
experience, it is highly idiosyncratic, and in that sense decidedly NOT
"common" to many people.
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
nick
Mati,
Could you please clarify the use of 'before' and 'after' a
measurement? I think that all measurements come with at least an
implicit time coordinate (probably explicit, but I'm playing it safe.)
If you were to make measurements around an interval of time (before
and after), and the interval were to be decreased, would you not then
have confidence about the value of the 'value' which does not exist
within the unmeasured interval?
Thanks,
nick
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu
>me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote in message news:<k3UU8.61$Z4.1...@news.uchicago.edu>...
>
>Could you please clarify the use of 'before' and 'after' a
>measurement? I think that all measurements come with at least an
>implicit time coordinate (probably explicit, but I'm playing it safe.)
At least implicit, for sure. Without this the words "before" and
"after" would have no meaning.
>If you were to make measurements around an interval of time (before
>and after), and the interval were to be decreased, would you not then
>have confidence about the value of the 'value' which does not exist
>within the unmeasured interval?
>
I can only have confidence (within the limits of experimental
uncertainties, etc.) of the value obtained through the measurement
(note that it is not specified how long the measurement takes, it can
well be a time interval tending to zero) and this value is known when
the measurement is completed. Jumping from this to "this was the
value prior to the measurement as well" involves a certain leap of
faith.
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>
>>>> And in any case Bohmian mechanics contains no justification for
>>>> belief in space,
>
>>> It is a theory with absolute space, and that's all a theory can
>>> provide as justification for something.
>
>> No, a fundamental theory must justify its fundamental elements.
>
>Explain how GR and QM do this.
The fundamental elements of GR and QM are actually measurements and
measurement results, whose existence we can justify by direct
observation. But they are not normally formulated like that, which makes
them confusing. http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001
>>>> SR is best regarded as a purely relational theory in which
>>>> Minkowski space-time is only a local approximation, i.e. it is a
>>>> part of GR, not a whole theory of space.
>
>> Of course SR is globally equal to SR. But the universe is
>> not like that.
>
>You have made a claim about SR, not about the universe. This claim
>remains false.
SR is meaningless except in the manner of its application to the
universe. Any claim I make about a scientific theory is about its what
it says of the universe.
>> SR can only be established locally, and is much better thought of as
>> a locally true theory than as a globally false one.
>
>Even locally it is only an approximation. Curvature is local.
We do not have theories which we are not approximations, by locally true
one can only mean true in approximation.
>> There are already huge semantic problems in the study of fundamental
>> physics. One should avoid making them worse
>
>I don't try to make them worse but to solve them, because the use of
>"measurement" in QM is misleading.
That is a matter of personal understanding. It is possible to redefine
words; generally it is best to do so according to both general practice
and also according to what can be scientifically established. (these two
objectives are not necessarily compatible).
>> My point is that, once you understand it, quantum logic is common
>> sense too, as applied to the subjunctive tense.
>
>In this case, there is no need to name this "quantum logic". Instead,
>it would be appropriate to use the common language constructs commonly
>applied to the subjunctive tense to describe QM effects.
Quantum logic was named because its structure as a logic was discovered
before it was interpreted. All maths can be written in common language,
but it has been found far more efficient to use algebraic symbols. It is
easy to reason from simple equations, but when they are written out in
full they become intractable.
>> It is possible to identify this truth value with a probability. In this
>> instance there may not be an objectively definable probability, but
>> consider the throw of a well balanced die. The truth value for the
>> statement "I will throw a six" can be objectively established, and it
>> is 1/6.
>
>So what? That's not worth to be named "new logic".
I don't know about "new". But this is just what logic means. It is a
simple enough idea, but all maths is simple, often trivial, when you
understand it.
>>>> Counter example 2
>>>> Subjunctive tense, quantum measurement
>>
>>>>
f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>
>>>> Now it is not true that a measurement of position will be done, and nor
>>>> is it true that the result would necessarily be x (although it might
>>>> be). Quantum logic gives truth values to families of statements f(x),
>>>> showing that the wave function f(x) is just a set of truth values.
>>>
>>> I don't understand this. AFAIK the wave function is not a set of
>>> truth values, but |psi(x)|^2 is a probability distribution.
>
>> The wave function can be identified with a set of truth values, and in
>> my view that is the *best* way to think of it.
>
>Truth values for which claims?
For the family of claims:
f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
We can identify f(x) with its truth value by abuse of notation.
>>>> The subjunctive is not a new sentence structure. Quantum logic only
>>>> formalises it, so it is not really new at all.
>
>>> Please give examples of use of (possibly non-formalized) quantum logic
>>> from pre-quantum time.
>
>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>> field and saved his kingdom"
>> "If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
>> have won the battle of Hastings"
>
>How these claims are related to quantum theory?
>
>> Any sentence in the subjunctive tense is just such an example, but it
>> was not known how to apply truth values to such sentences.
>
>It was. Using the same rules of classical probabiliy theory which
>we would have used before these things have happened.
That leads to a contradiction. Classical probability theory applies to
things which definitely do or definitely do not happen. Here we are
talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't happen (which
would be probability 0) but with a sentence structure which makes us
intuitively think there is truth in the statement (which would be
probability not 0).
>> The only formal example I can give is for the sentences
>>
>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>
>> where x ranges over the possible measurement results. In this case we
>> can identify the wave function with the truth value of f(x).
>
>Again, I don't see any identification. The truth value (in the
>meaning: the classical probability density) of f(x) is |psi(x)|^2.
In the notation I am using you can write psi(x)=f(x). |f(x)|^2 is the
truth value of the statement:
"When a measurement of position is done the result will be x".
But we want to use quantum mechanics when a measurement of position is
not done.
>I conclude that you have the same objections against Newtonian
>mechanics, QM, GR. Now, as long as you accept that BM is in the same
>class, not worse, I feel quite comfortable.
My objection to Newtonian gravity is absolutely identical to my
objection to BM. GR resolves that objection in so far as gravity is
concerned. I don't see the possibility for a similar resolution of BM. I
don't have the same the same objection to the rest of Newtonian
mechanics, provided that absolute space is accepted to hold only to the
limits to which it can be measured by mechanical means (which was also
Newton's proviso), and I do not have the same objection to GR or QM,
although, especially in the case of QM I do object to standard
formulations which assume a flat space background. It is actually not
only possible, but far more correct according to the orthodox
interpretation, to formulate QM without a space background, as I have in
the paper to which I have referred you.
>>>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>>>> realism.
>
>>>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
>>>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>>>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>
>>> I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>>> made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
>
>> But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
>> inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
>
>Not at all. To decide if the inequalities are broken or not we decide
>by comparison of the results later, therefore the question if the
>result of B is "meaningful" for A (whatever this means) earlier is
>irrelevant.
In the context that this question is meaningless you cannot prove the
inequality.
>>> Feel free to introduce a new category of theories named "genuine
>>> realistic theories". I care only about realistic theories as defined
>>> by EPR and Bell.
>>
>> I only care about realistic theories as defined by nature. EPR and Bell
>> make definitions out of mind, not out of reality, and hence there
>> notions of realism is not necessarily real.
>
>Feel free to make definitions out of nature.
>
>Unfortunately I have no idea how to obtain definitions out of Nature,
>even to decide if a definition is made out of Nature or out of God's
>inspiration or whatever else. I make my definitions out of mind,
>following the classical scientific method used by Newton, EPR, Bell
>and many others.
Actually the thing which distinguishes the great mathematical
physicists, such as Newton and Einstein from the norm, such as Bell, has
been their ability to abstract from reality.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>>> And in any case Bohmian mechanics contains no justification for
>>>>> belief in space,
>>
>>>> It is a theory with absolute space, and that's all a theory can
>>>> provide as justification for something.
>>
>>> No, a fundamental theory must justify its fundamental elements.
>>
>> Explain how GR and QM do this.
>
> The fundamental elements of GR and QM are actually measurements and
> measurement results, whose existence we can justify by direct
> observation.
So you prefer theories so that all their fundamental notions have
"direct" observational justification (principle theories according to
Einstein)? That's a quite popular point of view, of course.
But I nonetheless see no base for such a preference.
>>>>> SR is best regarded as a purely relational theory in which
>>>>> Minkowski space-time is only a local approximation, i.e. it is a
>>>>> part of GR, not a whole theory of space.
>>> Of course SR is globally equal to SR. But the universe is
>>> not like that.
>> You have made a claim about SR, not about the universe. This claim
>> remains false.
> SR is meaningless except in the manner of its application to the
> universe. Any claim I make about a scientific theory is about its what
> it says of the universe.
We know that SR is false (falsified by gravity effects). Nonetheless,
it is well-defined what SR claims (about the universe) even if these
claims are false. Your claim about SR remains false.
>>> My point is that, once you understand it, quantum logic is common
>>> sense too, as applied to the subjunctive tense.
>> In this case, there is no need to name this "quantum logic". Instead,
>> it would be appropriate to use the common language constructs commonly
>> applied to the subjunctive tense to describe QM effects.
> Quantum logic was named because its structure as a logic was
> discovered before it was interpreted.
I disagree. There was found an algebraic structure which in some
sense remembers classical logic, but is not. To name this algebraic
structure nonetheless "logic" is a quite artificial and strange
choice.
Of course, names for algebraic structures are usually quite artificial
(group, field). But this choice was no accident. The suggestion
behind it was that classical logic is wrong, has to be weakened,
replaced by quantum logic. This interpretation is what I question.
>>> It is possible to identify this truth value with a probability. In this
>>> instance there may not be an objectively definable probability, but
>>> consider the throw of a well balanced die. The truth value for the
>>> statement "I will throw a six" can be objectively established, and it
>>> is 1/6.
>> So what? That's not worth to be named "new logic".
> I don't know about "new". But this is just what logic means.
Fine that we agree about this.
>>>> I don't understand this. AFAIK the wave function is not a set of
>>>> truth values, but |psi(x)|^2 is a probability distribution.
>>> The wave function can be identified with a set of truth values, and in
>>> my view that is the *best* way to think of it.
>> Truth values for which claims?
> For the family of claims:
> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
> We can identify f(x) with its truth value by abuse of notation.
Again, I miss the |.|^2 in this identification.
>>>> Please give examples of use of (possibly non-formalized) quantum logic
>>>> from pre-quantum time.
>>
>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>>> "If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
>>> have won the battle of Hastings"
>>
>> How these claims are related to quantum theory?
Seems they have no relation.
>>> Any sentence in the subjunctive tense is just such an example, but it
>>> was not known how to apply truth values to such sentences.
>> It was. Using the same rules of classical probabiliy theory which
>> we would have used before these things have happened.
> That leads to a contradiction. Classical probability theory applies to
> things which definitely do or definitely do not happen.
No. It applies to consistent reasoning, is part of logic (in the
modern Bayesian understanding).
> Here we are talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't
> happen (which would be probability 0)
This goes back to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities.
>> Again, I don't see any identification. The truth value (in the
>> meaning: the classical probability density) of f(x) is |psi(x)|^2.
>
> In the notation I am using you can write psi(x)=f(x). |f(x)|^2 is the
> truth value of the statement:
>
> "When a measurement of position is done the result will be x".
>
> But we want to use quantum mechanics when a measurement of position is
> not done.
So you want to assign to subjunctive statements like
> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
complex truth values? You also want to assign to statements like
>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>> field and saved his kingdom"
complex truth values? If yes, how these complex truth values are
related to classical common sense?
>> I conclude that you have the same objections against Newtonian
>> mechanics, QM, GR. Now, as long as you accept that BM is in the same
>> class, not worse, I feel quite comfortable.
> My objection to Newtonian gravity is absolutely identical to my
> objection to BM. GR resolves that objection in so far as gravity is
> concerned. I don't see the possibility for a similar resolution of
> BM.
I see no reason to doubt that similar localizations of BM are
possible.
> I don't have the same the same objection to the rest of Newtonian
> mechanics, provided that absolute space is accepted to hold only to
> the limits to which it can be measured by mechanical means (which
> was also Newton's proviso),
Instead, I have no problem at all to postulate absolute space.
Whatever the fundamental theory is, it has to postulate something. An
absolute space is a comparatively simple object, so I see no
reasonable objections against it.
>>>>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>>>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>>>>> realism.
>>>>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
>>>>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>>>>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>>>> I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>>>> made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
>>> But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
>>> inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
>> Not at all. To decide if the inequalities are broken or not we decide
>> by comparison of the results later, therefore the question if the
>> result of B is "meaningful" for A (whatever this means) earlier is
>> irrelevant.
> In the context that this question is meaningless you cannot prove the
> inequality.
Indeed, in the context where I prove the inequality realism is
assumed. The irrealistic context where this question is meaningless
is of no interest for me. (Except the point that even in this context
we can measure violations of Bell's inequality.)
>>>> Feel free to introduce a new category of theories named "genuine
>>>> realistic theories". I care only about realistic theories as defined
>>>> by EPR and Bell.
>>> I only care about realistic theories as defined by nature. EPR and
>>> Bell make definitions out of mind, not out of reality, and hence
>>> there notions of realism is not necessarily real.
>> Feel free to make definitions out of nature.
>> Unfortunately I have no idea how to obtain definitions out of Nature,
>> even to decide if a definition is made out of Nature or out of God's
>> inspiration or whatever else. I make my definitions out of mind,
>> following the classical scientific method used by Newton, EPR, Bell
>> and many others.
> Actually the thing which distinguishes the great mathematical
> physicists, such as Newton and Einstein from the norm, such as Bell,
> has been their ability to abstract from reality.
Actually everybody who is able to understand modern physics has the
ability to abstract. But, more important, your comment is irrelevant
to my point: "realistic theories as defined by nature" is nonsense.
nick
mati,
Thanks, I was trying to clarify my thoughts about that 'leap of faith'
exactly.
If I observe a ballistic projectile with radar, or ionizing radiation
with a cloud chamber, I have a high degree of confidence about the
value of position, and of the 'existence' of the object, in between
pulses or droplets.
If I have a long smooth track, I am confident that, for a small
interval at the beginning or end, I know the position of the object or
of an event which 'creates' or 'destroys' the object. Less so for
shorter track.
As the length of the track diminishes, my confidence about the
interstitial positions is controlled by the interval between
pulses/droplets---smaller interval, more confident.
Is there some point where I stop walking and start jumping?
nick
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu
>exactly.
>
>If I observe a ballistic projectile with radar, or ionizing radiation
>with a cloud chamber, I have a high degree of confidence about the
>value of position, and of the 'existence' of the object, in between
>pulses or droplets.
>
>If I have a long smooth track, I am confident that, for a small
>interval at the beginning or end, I know the position of the object or
>of an event which 'creates' or 'destroys' the object. Less so for
>shorter track.
Yes. That's all Bayesian confidence here. The more observations
consistent with the same model (note that observing a track amounts to
many observations) the higher the confidence in the model. Note
however, that in all the cases above you don't know what the state was
prior to beginning the measurement. You just know that from the
moment you began, the behavior was consistent, so you extrapolate
backwards.
>
>As the length of the track diminishes, my confidence about the
>interstitial positions is controlled by the interval between
>pulses/droplets---smaller interval, more confident.
>
>Is there some point where I stop walking and start jumping?
The point can only be determined empirically, i.e. through
discrepancies.
Charles Francis
>> The fundamental elements of GR and QM are actually measurements and
>> measurement results, whose existence we can justify by direct
>> observation.
>
>So you prefer theories so that all their fundamental notions have
>"direct" observational justification (principle theories according to
>Einstein)?
Not necessarily. Certainly it is useful to have mathematical theories
which abstract directly from observational processes, since any physical
theory, whatever its constituents, would have to obey such a theory. But
we also want to know what the fundamental constituents actually are, and
we cannot assume that these are open to direct observation.
>> SR is meaningless except in the manner of its application to the
>> universe. Any claim I make about a scientific theory is about its what
>> it says of the universe.
>
>We know that SR is false (falsified by gravity effects). Nonetheless,
>it is well-defined what SR claims (about the universe) even if these
>claims are false. Your claim about SR remains false.
I disagree. You have chosen a false way of interpreting physical theory,
and then you say the theory is false. But that is your interpretation,
it is not what I say, and nor is it what SR says. SR does not say the
universe has a flat space time background, only some one misinterpreting
would say that. All SR needs to say is that it is a good approximation
in a locality in which we can carry out classical measurement of time
and distance. That is not false.
>>>> My point is that, once you understand it, quantum logic is common
>>>> sense too, as applied to the subjunctive tense.
>
>>> In this case, there is no need to name this "quantum logic". Instead,
>>> it would be appropriate to use the common language constructs commonly
>>> applied to the subjunctive tense to describe QM effects.
>
>> Quantum logic was named because its structure as a logic was
>> discovered before it was interpreted.
>
>I disagree. There was found an algebraic structure which in some
>sense remembers classical logic, but is not. To name this algebraic
>structure nonetheless "logic" is a quite artificial and strange
>choice.
The algebraic structure is the structure of a many valued logic, which
was defined before quantum logic. A logic may be regarded as a set of
propositions with truth values such that a truth value of 0 corresponds
to a definitely false proposition and a truth value of 1 corresponds to
a definitely true one. There may be other structure too. Quantum logic
features both a probability interpretation, when a hypothetical "if a
measurement were done"... turned to a definite "when a measurement is
done...", and it also features a weighted logical or, seen as the
principle of superposition.
>Of course, names for algebraic structures are usually quite artificial
>(group, field). But this choice was no accident. The suggestion
>behind it was that classical logic is wrong, has to be weakened,
>replaced by quantum logic. This interpretation is what I question.
I don't think there is any weakening of logic here. Just a more
sophisticated sentence structure, which actually corresponds better to
language anyway. As for questioning the interpretation, it is certainly
healthy do that, but the more closely you study it and the more
consideration you give it, the more convincing I think you will find it.
>
>>>>> I don't understand this. AFAIK the wave function is not a set of
>>>>> truth values, but |psi(x)|^2 is a probability distribution.
>
>>>> The wave function can be identified with a set of truth values, and in
>>>> my view that is the *best* way to think of it.
>
>>> Truth values for which claims?
>
>> For the family of claims:
>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>> We can identify f(x) with its truth value by abuse of notation.
>
>Again, I miss the |.|^2 in this identification.
That appears when you change the sentence from
f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
to
p(x): When a measurement of position is done the result will be x
This corresponds precisely to what happens in qm. For example in the
Young's slits experiment the appearance of fringes is dependent on not
doing a measurement to determine which slit the electron passes through.
>
>>>>> Please give examples of use of (possibly non-formalized) quantum logic
>>>>> from pre-quantum time.
>>>
>>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>>>> "If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
>>>> have won the battle of Hastings"
>>>
>>> How these claims are related to quantum theory?
>
>Seems they have no relation.
Sorry, I forgot to answer. They are simply examples of statements of the
hypothetical to which neither two valued logic nor probability can be
applied. They are non-formalised, and I am not proposing rules for their
truth values.
>>>> Any sentence in the subjunctive tense is just such an example, but it
>>>> was not known how to apply truth values to such sentences.
>>> It was. Using the same rules of classical probabiliy theory which
>>> we would have used before these things have happened.
>
>> That leads to a contradiction. Classical probability theory applies to
>> things which definitely do or definitely do not happen.
>
>No. It applies to consistent reasoning, is part of logic (in the
>modern Bayesian understanding).
What Jaynes actually showed in the text we both like was that it applies
to consistent reasoning about things which definitely do or definitely
don't happen. He did not consider the subjunctive.
>
>> Here we are talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't
>> happen (which would be probability 0)
>
>This goes back to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities.
Not at all. We are discussing reasoning about the subjunctive tense,
which is even further removed from a frequentist interpretation.
>>> Again, I don't see any identification. The truth value (in the
>>> meaning: the classical probability density) of f(x) is |psi(x)|^2.
>>
>> In the notation I am using you can write psi(x)=f(x). |f(x)|^2 is the
>> truth value of the statement:
>>
>> "When a measurement of position is done the result will be x".
>>
>> But we want to use quantum mechanics when a measurement of position is
>> not done.
>
>So you want to assign to subjunctive statements like
>
>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>
>complex truth values?
Yes.
> You also want to assign to statements like
>
>>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>
>complex truth values?
Let's steer clear of this one. It is far too woolly an example.
>If yes, how these complex truth values are
>related to classical common sense?
When the subjunctive is replaced by actuality the complex truth value is
replaced by its squared magnitude.
>
>Instead, I have no problem at all to postulate absolute space.
>Whatever the fundamental theory is, it has to postulate something. An
>absolute space is a comparatively simple object, so I see no
>reasonable objections against it.
Absolute space is a horrendously complicated object, quite without
empirical justification, and with all sorts of bizarre properties like
being twice as big as itself. Even to define the reals you have to
define limiting procedures and equivalence classes of infinite
sequences. And the wording of all these limits has to be utterly precise
to avoid saying anything which cannot be justified, so that it does not
actually describe anything like the intuitive notion of a continuum
which we induce from the properties of a piece of paper.
>>>>>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>>>>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>>>>>> realism.
>
>>>>>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
>>>>>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>>>>>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>
>>>>> I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>>>>> made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
>
>>>> But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
>>>> inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
>
>>> Not at all. To decide if the inequalities are broken or not we decide
>>> by comparison of the results later, therefore the question if the
>>> result of B is "meaningful" for A (whatever this means) earlier is
>>> irrelevant.
>
>> In the context that this question is meaningless you cannot prove the
>> inequality.
>
>Indeed, in the context where I prove the inequality realism is
>assumed.
Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
in which entities can be described. We can have realism without a
space-time background and in which the inequalities cannot be proven.
> The irrealistic context where this question is meaningless
>is of no interest for me.
I did not mean an irrealistic context. I meant the very real context in
which a & b are outside the light cones of each other's experiments.
>>>>> Feel free to introduce a new category of theories named "genuine
>>>>> realistic theories". I care only about realistic theories as defined
>>>>> by EPR and Bell.
>
>>>> I only care about realistic theories as defined by nature. EPR and
>>>> Bell make definitions out of mind, not out of reality, and hence
>>>> there notions of realism is not necessarily real.
>
>>> Feel free to make definitions out of nature.
>>> Unfortunately I have no idea how to obtain definitions out of Nature,
>>> even to decide if a definition is made out of Nature or out of God's
>>> inspiration or whatever else. I make my definitions out of mind,
>>> following the classical scientific method used by Newton, EPR, Bell
>>> and many others.
>
>> Actually the thing which distinguishes the great mathematical
>> physicists, such as Newton and Einstein from the norm, such as Bell,
>> has been their ability to abstract from reality.
>
>Actually everybody who is able to understand modern physics has the
>ability to abstract.
Most people can only abstract when they have been shown how to do it. In
fact almost nobody is able to understand modern physics, not because
they are unable to learn the rules and do the math, but because we do
not have a genuine realist model (including local realism) from which we
know how to abstract the rules of quantum mechanics. If we all knew how
to abstract we would all be able to take the Descartes/Leibniz
relationist view and see how to abstract qm from it.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> The fundamental elements of GR and QM are actually measurements and
>>> measurement results, whose existence we can justify by direct
>>> observation.
>> So you prefer theories so that all their fundamental notions have
>> "direct" observational justification (principle theories according to
>> Einstein)?
>
> Not necessarily.
Fine.
>> We know that SR is false (falsified by gravity effects). Nonetheless,
>> it is well-defined what SR claims (about the universe) even if these
>> claims are false. Your claim about SR remains false.
> I disagree. You have chosen a false way of interpreting physical theory,
> and then you say the theory is false. But that is your interpretation,
> it is not what I say, and nor is it what SR says. SR does not say the
> universe has a flat space time background
It does. But let's simply distinguish between the original theory
SR_1905 and a microlocal version SR_local which remains meaningful
locally in GR. I have a well-defined opinion but don't want to argue
with you which of these deserves the copyright for the label SR.
>> I disagree. There was found an algebraic structure which in some
>> sense remembers classical logic, but is not. To name this algebraic
>> structure nonetheless "logic" is a quite artificial and strange
>> choice.
> The algebraic structure is the structure of a many valued logic,
> which was defined before quantum logic.
Probability (if you like, some "real-valued" logic) was of course
well-known, but I have never heard before about complex truth values.
> and it also features a weighted logical or, seen as the
> principle of superposition.
Never seen some "logic" with superpositions before quantum logic.
>> Of course, names for algebraic structures are usually quite artificial
>> (group, field). But this choice was no accident. The suggestion
>> behind it was that classical logic is wrong, has to be weakened,
>> replaced by quantum logic. This interpretation is what I question.
> I don't think there is any weakening of logic here.
There is. With all axioms of classical logic you obtain classical
logic, that's all.
>>> For the family of claims:
>>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>> We can identify f(x) with its truth value by abuse of notation.
>>
>> Again, I miss the |.|^2 in this identification.
>
> That appears when you change the sentence from
>
> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>
> to
>
> p(x): When a measurement of position is done the result will be x
In classical common sense there is nothing which assigns to f(x) a
complex number and to p(x) its |.|^2.
>>>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>>>>> "If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
>>>>> have won the battle of Hastings"
>>>>
>>>> How these claims are related to quantum theory?
>>
>> Seems they have no relation.
>
> Sorry, I forgot to answer. They are simply examples of statements of the
> hypothetical to which neither two valued logic nor probability can be
> applied.
As I have argued, classical probability theory (Bayesian version) may
be applied very well. Using simply the probabilities people would
have assigned to the claims before the ifs have happened. This is how
common sense operates with such claims.
> They are non-formalised, and I am not proposing rules for their
> truth values.
But I propose - to assign Bayesian probabilities.
>>> That leads to a contradiction. Classical probability theory applies to
>>> things which definitely do or definitely do not happen.
>>
>> No. It applies to consistent reasoning, is part of logic (in the
>> modern Bayesian understanding).
>
> What Jaynes actually showed in the text we both like was that it applies
> to consistent reasoning about things which definitely do or definitely
> don't happen. He did not consider the subjunctive.
I don't see this restriction. He did not consider the subjunctive,
but there simply is no need for this.
>>> Here we are talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't
>>> happen (which would be probability 0)
>> This goes back to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities.
> Not at all. We are discussing reasoning about the subjunctive tense,
> which is even further removed from a frequentist interpretation.
I know, my point is that your argument works only if you restrict
probability theory to a frequentist interpretation (which is far
away).
>> So you want to assign to subjunctive statements like
>>
>>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>
>> complex truth values?
>
> Yes.
>
>> You also want to assign to statements like
>>
>>>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>>
>> complex truth values?
>
> Let's steer clear of this one. It is far too woolly an example.
You argued that your quantum logic is in a certain correspondence to
common sense. I see no correspondence of complex truth values to
common sense.
I see a better correspondence of BM to common sense, a quite different
way to make common sense and QM compatible.
>> Instead, I have no problem at all to postulate absolute space.
>> Whatever the fundamental theory is, it has to postulate something. An
>> absolute space is a comparatively simple object, so I see no
>> reasonable objections against it.
> Absolute space is a horrendously complicated object
R^3 horrendously complicate? Sorry, I disagree.
> quite without empirical justification
Whatever the fundamental objects are - the empirical justification is
agreement of the whole theory with observation.
> and with all sorts of bizarre properties like being twice as big as
> itself.
Oh, if you want to replace it with some finite regular lattice, that's
not my problem. (Doing discretizations is everyday work for a
computer scientist.)
>>>>>>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>>>>>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>>>>>>> realism.
>>
>>>>>>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I think you may
>>>>>>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>>>>>>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>>
>>>>>> I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>>>>>> made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
>>
>>>>> But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
>>>>> inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
>>
>>>> Not at all. To decide if the inequalities are broken or not we decide
>>>> by comparison of the results later, therefore the question if the
>>>> result of B is "meaningful" for A (whatever this means) earlier is
>>>> irrelevant.
>>
>>> In the context that this question is meaningless you cannot prove the
>>> inequality.
>>
>> Indeed, in the context where I prove the inequality realism is
>> assumed.
>
> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
> in which entities can be described.
No.
> We can have realism without a space-time background and in which the
> inequalities cannot be proven.
They can be proven whenever we assume that some action (choice of
experimenter) a,b does not causally influence the results B,A: not
(a->B or b->A). We need a notion of causality, but not space or time.
>> The irrealistic context where this question is meaningless
>> is of no interest for me.
> I did not mean an irrealistic context. I meant the very real context
> in which a & b are outside the light cones of each other's
> experiments.
In this case, the results are not known by the other, but not
meaningless for the other.
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
> But let's simply distinguish between the original theory
>SR_1905 and a microlocal version SR_local which remains meaningful
>locally in GR.
Minkowski space-time did not appear in 1905. Instead Einstein started to
tackle the issue that the assumptions of SR could not be expected to
hold globally, and (eventually) came up with GR. Really though, it is
very confusing to have to find different names for all sorts of variants
of what is essentially the same theory. The version which best deserves
the name is the version which is most true. After all we still talk of
Darwinian evolution, even though modern evolutionary theory is a million
miles removed from Darwin.
>>> I disagree. There was found an algebraic structure which in some
>>> sense remembers classical logic, but is not. To name this algebraic
>>> structure nonetheless "logic" is a quite artificial and strange
>>> choice.
>
>> The algebraic structure is the structure of a many valued logic,
>> which was defined before quantum logic.
>
>Probability (if you like, some "real-valued" logic) was of course
>well-known, but I have never heard before about complex truth values.
It is of no matter. A truth value is just a mathematical idea which we
are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>
>> and it also features a weighted logical or, seen as the
>> principle of superposition.
>
>Never seen some "logic" with superpositions before quantum logic.
This is one of the great advantages of quantum logic. In two valued
logic you can combine propositions with Boolean OR. In quantum logic you
can apply a weighting to the propositions f & g and create propositions
like
.7f + .3g
which means, qualitatively, f or g, but more likely f.
>>>> For the family of claims:
>>>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>>> We can identify f(x) with its truth value by abuse of notation.
>>>
>>> Again, I miss the |.|^2 in this identification.
>>
>> That appears when you change the sentence from
>>
>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>
>> to
>>
>> p(x): When a measurement of position is done the result will be x
>
>In classical common sense there is nothing which assigns to f(x) a
>complex number and to p(x) its |.|^2.
This is a mathematical structure, a structure of our thought. In can be
built in any consistent way in which we choose. A truth value is what we
choose it to be according to any set of consistent definitions we wish
to use. Classical common sense allows us to take the sentence p(x) with
its truth value, and it allows us to take the square root of the truth
value. It allows us to combine propositions with a logical or, and
assign truth values to the composition. Then it shows us that since the
propositions are incompatible for different values of x it is consistent
use an inner product on the propositions defined in such a way as to
recover probability theory when an experiment is actually done.
>>>>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>>>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>>>>>> "If Harold had fallen on the Normans after the first retreat, he would
>>>>>> have won the battle of Hastings"
>>>>>
>>>>> How these claims are related to quantum theory?
>>>
>>> Seems they have no relation.
>>
>> Sorry, I forgot to answer. They are simply examples of statements of the
>> hypothetical to which neither two valued logic nor probability can be
>> applied.
>
>As I have argued, classical probability theory (Bayesian version) may
>be applied very well. Using simply the probabilities people would
>have assigned to the claims before the ifs have happened. This is how
>common sense operates with such claims.
Many people's common sense told them they could not apply probability
theory to such propositions. It would be equally correct to argue from
classical logic that since the subjunctive clause is false both
propositions are true, and that they would still be true if any other
outcome were given.
>> What Jaynes actually showed in the text we both like was that it applies
>> to consistent reasoning about things which definitely do or definitely
>> don't happen. He did not consider the subjunctive.
>
>I don't see this restriction. He did not consider the subjunctive,
>but there simply is no need for this.
There is, because in quantum theory doing the experiment changes the
situation.
>
>>>> Here we are talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't
>>>> happen (which would be probability 0)
>
>>> This goes back to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities.
>
>> Not at all. We are discussing reasoning about the subjunctive tense,
>> which is even further removed from a frequentist interpretation.
>
>I know, my point is that your argument works only if you restrict
>probability theory to a frequentist interpretation (which is far
>away).
In any logic, many valued or not, a truth value of 0 corresponds to
something which is certainly false. That does not mean there is a
frequentist interpretation of any logic.
>>> So you want to assign to subjunctive statements like
>>>
>>>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>>
>>> complex truth values?
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>> You also want to assign to statements like
>>>
>>>>>> "If Richard III had found a horse he would have escaped from Bosworth
>>>>>> field and saved his kingdom"
>>>
>>> complex truth values?
>>
>> Let's steer clear of this one. It is far too woolly an example.
>
>You argued that your quantum logic is in a certain correspondence to
>common sense. I see no correspondence of complex truth values to
>common sense.
As I say, this is a structure of the mind, and in mathematics we are
free to invent any consistent structure we please. The usefulness of
such a structure is a different matter. Mostly in physics the usefulness
of a mathematical structure is determined by how accurately it
corresponds to laws obeyed by the real world. But a truth value is not a
form which exists in the real world. A truth value only exists in the
mind. As such it can be anything we want it to be, and the only
restriction we need to apply is that it is consistent. In the case of
quantum logic we have also applied the restriction that there is a
correspondence with probability theory when experiments are actually
done.
If this were all there was to it, quantum logic would just be a
meaningless twist, a variation of probability theory in which the
probability amplitude was used instead of the density, but actually it
would be exactly the same theory (just as in statistics we can define
both variance and standard deviation, but as one is just the root of the
other there is not any real difference between them).
But realism (or at least the form of realism which I understand and
subscribe to) demands that the fundamental laws of physics are the same
for all observers. The structure given so far has the properties of
Hilbert space, which means we can do things like take Fourier
transforms. The full argument is too intricate to include here, but when
we consider the Fourier transform from the point of view of a moving
observer we find that e^ix.p which appears in the Fourier transform
acquires a time component, and hence that some form of Schrodinger
equation is obeyed. It is this which makes quantum logic useful in
physics. (By contrast no such argument can be applied to Richard III,
and even if we do apply complex probability amplitudes to such
statements, the only thing we can do with them is square the modulus and
recover an ordinary probability).
>>> Instead, I have no problem at all to postulate absolute space.
>>> Whatever the fundamental theory is, it has to postulate something. An
>>> absolute space is a comparatively simple object, so I see no
>>> reasonable objections against it.
>
>> Absolute space is a horrendously complicated object
>
>R^3 horrendously complicate? Sorry, I disagree.
Then perhaps you should work through a rigorous course in the
foundations of mathematics from the definition of the natural numbers in
set theory through to the definition of the reals. Its not exactly ten
minutes work.
>> quite without empirical justification
>
>Whatever the fundamental objects are - the empirical justification is
>agreement of the whole theory with observation.
If that were true it would still contain the error of induction. But it
is not true. The structure of the reals disagrees with observation. I
cannot observe a continuum. I cannot even do more and more refined
experiments to test the position of, say, an electron, or at least when
I attempt to do such experiments I find that it was not possible to
define the position of the electron in the first place, prior to the
measurement.
>
>> and with all sorts of bizarre properties like being twice as big as
>> itself.
>
>Oh, if you want to replace it with some finite regular lattice, that's
>not my problem. (Doing discretizations is everyday work for a
>computer scientist.)
Not one finite regular lattice, which would suggest that such a thing
really exists as a fundamental of nature, but the family of all possible
finite regular lattices which observers might, in principle, be able to
use as the set of possible results from his chosen measurement
apparatus. This merely suggests that a lattice is a fundamental of
observation, not a fundamental of nature, and, unlike R^n, it is in
complete agreement with observation that every measurement apparatus has
finite range and resolution.
>>>>>>>>> The problem is that starting with this we can derive an inequality
>>>>>>>>> which is false. Therefore, (b-> A or a-> B), following classical
>>>>>>>>> realism.
>>>
>>>>>>>> Your notations have become too skimpy to make sense, but I
>>>>>>>>think you may
>>>>>>>> be drawing a false conclusion that b's result is meaningful to a when
>>>>>>>> the two have not yet got together to compare notes.
>>>
>>>>>>> I have not talked about "meaningfulness for A" of some observation
>>>>>>> made at B. Such a notion is irrelevant for Bell's theorem.
>>>
>>>>>> But it is highly relevant for the converse, the breaking of the
>>>>>> inequalities, which is in better accord with reality.
>>>
>>>>> Not at all. To decide if the inequalities are broken or not we decide
>>>>> by comparison of the results later, therefore the question if the
>>>>> result of B is "meaningful" for A (whatever this means) earlier is
>>>>> irrelevant.
>>>
>>>> In the context that this question is meaningless you cannot prove the
>>>> inequality.
>>>
>>> Indeed, in the context where I prove the inequality realism is
>>> assumed.
>>
>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
>> in which entities can be described.
>
>No.
Then how are you defining localism?
>> We can have realism without a space-time background and in which the
>> inequalities cannot be proven.
>
>They can be proven whenever we assume that some action (choice of
>experimenter) a,b does not causally influence the results B,A: not
>(a->B or b->A). We need a notion of causality, but not space or time.
>
>>> The irrealistic context where this question is meaningless
>>> is of no interest for me.
>
>> I did not mean an irrealistic context. I meant the very real context
>> in which a & b are outside the light cones of each other's
>> experiments.
>
>In this case, the results are not known by the other, but not
>meaningless for the other.
How can they have meaning when information cannot be available even in
principle.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
nick
meti,
I apologize for trying to be clever and instead being unclear. Allow
me one more attempt (to be clear.)
I'm writing in the context of your statement that a value doesn't
'exist' before measurement.
I reviewed the initial thread and found some help, but it is overall
too complex for my understanding.
I am not trying to choose between A and B, but to decide if it matters
which you choose.
We constantly make decisions (decisions with consequences) based on
what you call extrapolation without 'knowing' a value. Choosing B
seems to imply that a dichotomous process is possible, different from
my understanding of a continuous diminution of confidence as the
number of data points approaches 1.
If I were to determine a position for my classical projectile by only
one radar pulse, I could still develop a probabilistic description of
the shortly preceding state. Taking the measured position as the
origin, I could say that it is less probable that it was 10^7 meters
from the origin than that it was 10^-20 meters. I would invoke Ockham,
and incorporate various understandings of the universe.
I understand (or think I do) about quantization and discrete states,
exclusion, uncertainty.
I don't understand how the existence or non-existence of values before
measurement affects the outcome of experiments or my choices about
experiments.
Thanks, I'm well aware that getting the question right is always the
hard part.
nick
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu
>> In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>, art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
>> >me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote in message news:<wD4V8.75$Z4.2...@news.uchicago.edu>...
>> >> In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>, art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
>> >>
>> >
>> >Thanks, I was trying to clarify my thoughts about that 'leap of faith'
>> >exactly.
>> >
>> >If I observe a ballistic projectile with radar, or ionizing radiation
>> >with a cloud chamber, I have a high degree of confidence about the
>> >value of position, and of the 'existence' of the object, in between
>> >pulses or droplets.
>> >
>> >If I have a long smooth track, I am confident that, for a small
>> >interval at the beginning or end, I know the position of the object or
>> >of an event which 'creates' or 'destroys' the object. Less so for
>> >shorter track.
>>
>> Yes. That's all Bayesian confidence here. The more observations
>> consistent with the same model (note that observing a track amounts to
>> many observations) the higher the confidence in the model. Note
>> however, that in all the cases above you don't know what the state was
>> prior to beginning the measurement. You just know that from the
>> moment you began, the behavior was consistent, so you extrapolate
>> backwards.
>> >
>> >As the length of the track diminishes, my confidence about the
>> >interstitial positions is controlled by the interval between
>> >pulses/droplets---smaller interval, more confident.
>> >
>> >Is there some point where I stop walking and start jumping?
>>
>> The point can only be determined empirically, i.e. through
>> discrepancies.
>>
>
>I apologize for trying to be clever and instead being unclear. Allow
>me one more attempt (to be clear.)
>
>I'm writing in the context of your statement that a value doesn't
>'exist' before measurement.
>I reviewed the initial thread and found some help, but it is overall
>too complex for my understanding.
>
>I am not trying to choose between A and B, but to decide if it matters
>which you choose.
Oh, I see now what is your point. That is a good question.
>
>We constantly make decisions (decisions with consequences) based on
>what you call extrapolation without 'knowing' a value. Choosing B
>seems to imply that a dichotomous process is possible, different from
>my understanding of a continuous diminution of confidence as the
>number of data points approaches 1.
>
>If I were to determine a position for my classical projectile by only
>one radar pulse, I could still develop a probabilistic description of
>the shortly preceding state. Taking the measured position as the
>origin, I could say that it is less probable that it was 10^7 meters
>from the origin than that it was 10^-20 meters. I would invoke Ockham,
>and incorporate various understandings of the universe.
Sure. Note that QM doesn't tell you something like "you just can't
know what's going on". It assigns probabilities.
>
>I understand (or think I do) about quantization and discrete states,
>exclusion, uncertainty.
>
>I don't understand how the existence or non-existence of values before
>measurement affects the outcome of experiments or my choices about
>experiments.
Well, would the whole issue have been just "does anything exist if it
is not being observed" then it would fall into the category of "if a
tree falls in a forest and nobody hears it, does it make a sound".
Cute philosophical issue, makes one feel profound, but devoid of
meaning. I agree with you on this. But there is more than this
involved.
Classical mechanics assumes that exact values always exist, even if
they're not known. Thus, if at some point of time you did determine
the value of some physical parameter, you can not only extrapolate
forward but extrapolate backward as well, know what it will be and
what it was. That's theory, of course, in practice the difficulties
may be nearly insurmountable, but in principle you've strict
determinism and knowing a system at one time you know all about its
past and future.
In QM this determinism chain breaks. Once you allow for physical
parameters not to have any well determined values until a measurement
is made, there is no strict one to one connection between the "before"
and "after". Only a probabilistic connection. And this is not an
empty philosophical argument since observations tell us that this is
how nature works (though, in the classical realm, the discrepancies
rapidly become too small to be observed).
>
>
>Thanks, I'm well aware that getting the question right is always the
>hard part.
Yes, yes, yes. The hardest part.
Ralph E. Frost
<me...@cars3.uchicago.edu> wrote in message
news:diHV8.97$Z4.3...@news.uchicago.edu...
> In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>,
art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
> >me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote in message
news:<eEhV8.88$Z4.2...@news.uchicago.edu>...
> >> In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>,
art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
> >> >me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote in message
news:<wD4V8.75$Z4.2...@news.uchicago.edu>...
> >> >> In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>,
art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
> >> >>
> ...
> >> >
> >> >Thanks, I was trying to clarify my thoughts about that 'leap of faith'
> >> >exactly.
...
> Classical mechanics assumes that exact values always exist, even if
> they're not known. Thus, if at some point of time you did determine
> the value of some physical parameter, you can not only extrapolate
> forward but extrapolate backward as well, know what it will be and
> what it was. That's theory, of course, in practice the difficulties
> may be nearly insurmountable, but in principle you've strict
> determinism and knowing a system at one time you know all about its
> past and future.
>
> In QM this determinism chain breaks. Once you allow for physical
> parameters not to have any well determined values until a measurement
> is made, there is no strict one to one connection between the "before"
> and "after". Only a probabilistic connection. And this is not an
> empty philosophical argument since observations tell us that this is
> how nature works (though, in the classical realm, the discrepancies
> rapidly become too small to be observed).
Rather then the chain breaking when moving into the classical realm, how
about if you look at it the other way around and notice that the determinism
emerges as the systems get bigger/slower/more entangled... ?
I'm aware that folks have discovered things in the order of simple
machines, then classical motions, then the QM realm, and currently moving
into the more unified, quantum gravitational models, but that is just
order of discovery -- refinement. The chain of determinism doesn't break
moving into the quantum realm; under certain conditions determinism
emerges.
Thus, one has to think completely backwards to consider that "In QM, the
determininsm chain breaks". The notion is extremely similar to "watching
the sun set or seeing the sun rise". Descriptive, filled with awesome
beauty and wonder, but scientifically flawed. A better, more rational
quest is to discern how it is that determinism forms or emerges from the
quantum gravity.
With things reframed thusly in the proper order, at least, readers may
begin to notice that "looking upscale from the quantum gravitational realm",
there are two types of big clunky things that populate and lumber though the
"classical realm": traditional inanimate artifacts like rocks and
fulcrums, planets and such, and also the more energetic and mobile,
entangled classical/quantum gravitational, organic, somewhat conscious
artifacts and organic subsystems. Notice that one of these parts, which is
by nature more quantum gravitation than its surrounding, is doing
essentially all the measuring.
With this backdrop then pose the question, "How does the determinism emerge
for these two classes of artifact?" I suspect even a non-math majors can
take a couple of new steps forward, all by themselves.
- Ralph Frost
http://www.refrost.com
Use more robust symbols
Seek a thought worthy of speech.
> >
> >
Gordon D. Pusch
> "We" means here the mainstream. The Bohmian mechanics community is
> already much closer to common sense.
Too bad for the ``Bohmian mechanics community'' that Bohmian mechanics has
recently been experimentally refuted. See ``A first experimental test of
de Broglie-Bohm theory against standard quantum mechanics,'' G. Brida,
E. Cagliero, G. Falzetta, M.Genovese, M. Gramegna, C. Novero,
<http://www.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0206196>. Experimental result: QM wins,
Bohm loses.
-- Gordon D. Pusch
perl -e '$_ = "gdpusch\@NO.xnet.SPAM.com\n"; s/NO\.//; s/SPAM\.//; print;'
sch...@gefen.cc.biu.ac.il
: Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes:
:
:> "We" means here the mainstream. The Bohmian mechanics community is
:> already much closer to common sense.
:
: Too bad for the ``Bohmian mechanics community'' that Bohmian mechanics has
: recently been experimentally refuted. See ``A first experimental test of
: de Broglie-Bohm theory against standard quantum mechanics,'' G. Brida,
: E. Cagliero, G. Falzetta, M.Genovese, M. Gramegna, C. Novero,
: <http://www.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0206196>. Experimental result: QM wins,
: Bohm loses.
Jack Sarfatti must be dreadfully disappointed.
-----
Richard Schultz sch...@mail.biu.ac.il
Department of Chemistry, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
Opinions expressed are mine alone, and not those of Bar-Ilan University
-----
"Logic is a wreath of pretty flowers which smell bad."
nick
I enjoy reading these discussions; they help my
understanding, and I appreciate the efforts
that people make to educate and enlighten. However,
I learn best by considering concrete things,
and I believe that science is about experiment.
Discussions of real, do-able experiments seem to
be very rare on the NGs.
When you say that existence vs. non-existence is
not an empty philosophical debate, I understand
that to mean that there is some physically
manifest consequence of the dichotomy.
I present my experiment of the projectile...
-I measure the position with one pulse.
-I create a probabilistic description of its state
at a very short interval before the measurement.
-I will add now, because I know about uncertainty,
and I am not trying to be tricksy, that there is a
lower limit to my pulse width imposed by the nature
of the universe.
-I say "this is exactly like 'quantum physics', and
I do not need to attribute either existence or
non-existence to the position of the object to
explain my results."
...and I hope that someone with more than my
rudimentary knowledge of the classic experiments
will say:
-No, no, you (fool and worse), here is a _real_
quantum measurement, similar to your example, but oh so
different. Go study it, and come back when you are
slightly less a fool.
(I will study, even without the insults.)
nick
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes:
> > "We" means here the mainstream. The Bohmian mechanics community is
> > already much closer to common sense.
> Too bad for the ``Bohmian mechanics community'' that Bohmian
> mechanics has recently been experimentally refuted. See ``A first
> experimental test of de Broglie-Bohm theory against standard quantum
> mechanics,'' G. Brida, E. Cagliero, G. Falzetta, M.Genovese,
> M. Gramegna, C. Novero,
> <http://www.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0206196>. Experimental result: QM
> wins, Bohm loses.
Too bad that, despite contrary claims, there is no difference in the
predictions which could be used to refute one of them without refuting
the other too.
See the discussion around <i3gu2a0...@wias-berlin.de>.
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> But let's simply distinguish between the original theory
>> SR_1905 and a microlocal version SR_local which remains meaningful
>> locally in GR.
> Minkowski space-time did not appear in 1905.
I couldn't care less.
> Really though, it is very confusing to have to find different names
> for all sorts of variants of what is essentially the same
> theory. The version which best deserves the name is the version
> which is most true.
I couldn't care less.
>>>> I disagree. There was found an algebraic structure which in some
>>>> sense remembers classical logic, but is not. To name this algebraic
>>>> structure nonetheless "logic" is a quite artificial and strange
>>>> choice.
>>> The algebraic structure is the structure of a many valued logic,
>>> which was defined before quantum logic.
>> Probability (if you like, some "real-valued" logic) was of course
>> well-known, but I have never heard before about complex truth values.
> It is of no matter. A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
Not according to common sense.
>>> and it also features a weighted logical or, seen as the
>>> principle of superposition.
>> Never seen some "logic" with superpositions before quantum logic.
> This is one of the great advantages of quantum logic. In two valued
> logic you can combine propositions with Boolean OR. In quantum logic you
> can apply a weighting to the propositions f & g and create propositions
> like
> .7f + .3g
> which means, qualitatively, f or g, but more likely f.
As far as such claims have a meaning in common sense, they can be
defined also in classical probability theory.
>> In classical common sense there is nothing which assigns to f(x) a
>> complex number and to p(x) its |.|^2.
> This is a mathematical structure, a structure of our thought. In can
> be built in any consistent way in which we choose.
Indeed we can define quite arbitrary mathematical structures and name
them "logic". For example, Galois could have used "logic" instead of
"group" in his definition of a group, and we would talk about the
"logic SU(2)" today.
If such a definition makes clear that it has nothing to do with the
common sense meaning, like in "group" or "field", fine. But this is
not the case for quantum logic.
>>> Sorry, I forgot to answer. They are simply examples of statements
>>> of the hypothetical to which neither two valued logic nor
>>> probability can be applied.
>> As I have argued, classical probability theory (Bayesian version)
>> may be applied very well. Using simply the probabilities people
>> would have assigned to the claims before the ifs have
>> happened. This is how common sense operates with such claims.
> Many people's common sense told them they could not apply
> probability theory to such propositions.
These peoples common sense has been wrong, probably mislead by the
frequentist interpretation of probability theory.
> It would be equally correct to argue from classical logic that since
> the subjunctive clause is false both propositions are true, and that
> they would still be true if any other outcome were given.
You can also argue that since the if-clause is false it doesn't matter
if we use consistent reasoning to handle the truth value of such
statements.
>>> What Jaynes actually showed in the text we both like was that it applies
>>> to consistent reasoning about things which definitely do or definitely
>>> don't happen. He did not consider the subjunctive.
>>
>> I don't see this restriction. He did not consider the subjunctive,
>> but there simply is no need for this.
>
> There is, because in quantum theory doing the experiment changes the
> situation.
This does not weaken the requirements for consistent reasoning.
>>>>> Here we are talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't
>>>>> happen (which would be probability 0)
>>>> This goes back to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities.
>>> Not at all. We are discussing reasoning about the subjunctive tense,
>>> which is even further removed from a frequentist interpretation.
>> I know, my point is that your argument works only if you restrict
>> probability theory to a frequentist interpretation (which is far
>> away).
> In any logic, many valued or not, a truth value of 0 corresponds to
> something which is certainly false. That does not mean there is a
> frequentist interpretation of any logic.
A consistent consideration of subjunctive claims is possible and
should be Bayesian, following the derivation of Bayesian probability
theory from the rules of consistent argumentation. It is not
necessary (who cares about hypotheticals?) and the claims cannot be
tested in a frequentist sense.
Of course, there is a certain freedom in the definition of consistent
thinking. Thinking which is inconsistent only for subjunctive claims
could be certainly accepted as consistent.
>> You argued that your quantum logic is in a certain correspondence to
>> common sense. I see no correspondence of complex truth values to
>> common sense.
>
> As I say, this is a structure of the mind, and in mathematics we are
> free to invent any consistent structure we please.
I don't deny your freedom to invent and consider algebraic structures,
nor the possible usefulness of such structures. I have questioned the
claim that some very special algebraic structure (quantum logic) has a
very specific correspondence to common sense logic.
>>> quite without empirical justification
>> Whatever the fundamental objects are - the empirical justification is
>> agreement of the whole theory with observation.
> If that were true it would still contain the error of induction.
Only if you mingle "empirical justification" with proof.
> But it is not true. The structure of the reals disagrees with
> observation.
Nonsense.
> I cannot observe a continuum.
You cannot distinguish "observing a continuum" and "observing a
discrete structure" if the resolution is too coarse.
>>> and with all sorts of bizarre properties like being twice as big as
>>> itself.
>>
>> Oh, if you want to replace it with some finite regular lattice, that's
>> not my problem. (Doing discretizations is everyday work for a
>> computer scientist.)
> Not one finite regular lattice, which would suggest that such a
> thing really exists as a fundamental of nature, but the family of
> all possible finite regular lattices which observers might, in
> principle, be able to use as the set of possible results from his
> chosen measurement apparatus.
Sounds like a lot of positivistic confusion. Moreover, certainly not
like a simple object. Sorry, but in this case a continuum is simpler.
> This merely suggests that a lattice is a fundamental of observation,
> not a fundamental of nature, and, unlike R^n, it is in complete
> agreement with observation that every measurement apparatus has
> finite range and resolution.
Whatever, I'm not interested in what "observation suggests", but about
what really happens. The positivistic method to derive truth from
observation has clearly failed.
>>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
>>> in which entities can be described.
>>
>> No.
>
> Then how are you defining localism?
As the part which justifies the claim "not (a-> B or b-> A)" for
space-like separated events.
I see a clear subdivision:
Einstein-causality -> "not (a-> B or b-> A)"
"not (a-> B or b-> A)" + realism -> Bell's inequality.
The second part I name "Bell's theorem", and this second part does not
even refer to spacetime at all.
>>> I did not mean an irrealistic context. I meant the very real context
>>> in which a & b are outside the light cones of each other's
>>> experiments.
>> In this case, the results are not known by the other, but not
>> meaningless for the other.
> How can they have meaning when information cannot be available even
> in principle.
You seem to subscribe to a very positivistic theory of meaning. I
don't. I'm realist. In the context of realism, claims about reality
have a meaning and a truth value even if human observers (which are
objects of realistic theories with usually restricted possibilities)
are unable to find this truth value.
Gordon D. Pusch
Too bad that your claim about the contrary claims is wrong.
The paper cited above cites several papers showing that the predictions
of ``Bohmian mechanics'' differ from QM for two-particle coincidence
experiments; in particular, ``Bohmian mechanics'' predicts that for
two-particle coincidence experiments in a two-slit apparatus, the
``no trajectory crossing theorem'' of ``Bohmian mechanics'' implies
that two particles detected in coincidence must always be on _opposite_
sides of the midplane of a two-slit apparatus, whereas standard QM
predicts that coincidences _CAN_ occur on the same side of the midplane.
The experiment shows that two-particle coincidences on the same side of the
midplane =DO= in fact occur, at the rate predicted by standard QM, and
rejects the predictions of ``Bohmian mechanics'' at the _EIGHT SIGMA LEVEL_.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes:
>> gdp...@NO.xnet.SPAM.com (Gordon D. Pusch) writes:
>>> Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes:
>>>> "We" means here the mainstream. The Bohmian mechanics community is
>>>> already much closer to common sense.
>>> Too bad for the ``Bohmian mechanics community'' that Bohmian
>>> mechanics has recently been experimentally refuted. See ``A first
>>> experimental test of de Broglie-Bohm theory against standard quantum
>>> mechanics,'' G. Brida, E. Cagliero, G. Falzetta, M.Genovese,
>>> M. Gramegna, C. Novero,
>>> <http://www.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0206196> . Experimental result: QM
>>> wins, Bohm loses.
>> Too bad that, despite contrary claims, there is no difference in the
>> predictions which could be used to refute one of them without refuting
>> the other too.
>> See the discussion around <i3gu2a0...@wias-berlin.de> .
> Too bad that your claim about the contrary claims is wrong.
> The paper cited above cites several papers showing that the predictions
> of ``Bohmian mechanics'' differ from QM for two-particle coincidence
> experiments;
I know. Moreover, I have recognized that one of them,
quant-ph/0003037, is one I have already discussed in the thread around
<i3gu2a0...@wias-berlin.de>
> in particular, ``Bohmian mechanics'' predicts that for two-particle
> coincidence experiments in a two-slit apparatus, the ``no trajectory
> crossing theorem'' of ``Bohmian mechanics'' implies that two
> particles detected in coincidence must always be on _opposite_ sides
> of the midplane of a two-slit apparatus,
which is false
> whereas standard QM
> predicts that coincidences _CAN_ occur on the same side of the
> midplane. The experiment shows that two-particle coincidences on
> the same side of the midplane =DO= in fact occur, at the rate
> predicted by standard QM, and rejects the predictions of ``Bohmian
> mechanics'' at the _EIGHT SIGMA LEVEL_.
The sigma level does not matter if the prediction claimed to be the
prediction of Bohmian mechanics is not the prediction of Bohmian
mechanics. Instead, I claim that the prediction of Bohmian mechanics
is the same as of QM, based on the standard theorem about the
agreement of these predictions.
Ilja Schmelzer
>> Too bad that, despite contrary claims, there is no difference in the
>> predictions which could be used to refute one of them without refuting
>> the other too.
>> See the discussion around <i3gu2a0...@wias-berlin.de> .
> Too bad that your claim about the contrary claims is wrong. The
> paper cited above cites several papers showing that the predictions
> of ``Bohmian mechanics'' differ from QM for two-particle coincidence
> experiments;
For a discussion of the questionable Ghose paper see
Marchildon, quant-ph/00070068 and
Ghoses reply quant-ph/0102131
A first comment:
There is agreement about the equivalence of BM and QM for one-time
space means. There is also agreement that BM is not ergodic, and the
space averages are not the time averages. This point is made in detail
in Ghoses reply, and explicitly claimed to be the basic reason for the
incompatibility.
But this non-ergodicity already shows up for the simple harmonic
oscillator in Neumaier's argument (section 2 of Marchildon). Indeed,
in a stable state (like the ground state of the harmonic oscillator)
has a real wave function, thus, the particles don't move at all, and
the true time average is simply the initial value.
Unfortunately these true time averages cannot be measured in BM. What
can be measured in BM are results of measurements made at different
times, as computed by Marchildon p.3-4, which agrees with the QM
prediction.
The important difference between true time averages and results of
measurements made at different times is not addressed in Ghoses reply,
but is certainly important if, as claimed by Ghose, non-ergodicity is
the basic reason for the incompatibility.
Charles Francis
>>r. A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>
>Not according to common sense.
According to pure sense then, whether it be common or not.
>>>> and it also features a weighted logical or, seen as the
>>>> principle of superposition.
>
>>> Never seen some "logic" with superpositions before quantum logic.
>
>> This is one of the great advantages of quantum logic. In two valued
>> logic you can combine propositions with Boolean OR. In quantum logic you
>> can apply a weighting to the propositions f & g and create propositions
>> like
>
>> .7f + .3g
>
>> which means, qualitatively, f or g, but more likely f.
>
>As far as such claims have a meaning in common sense, they can be
>defined also in classical probability theory.
But with different, and incorrect, results, owing to the fact that the
experiment to determine which alters the situation.
>>> In classical common sense there is nothing which assigns to f(x) a
>>> complex number and to p(x) its |.|^2.
>
>> This is a mathematical structure, a structure of our thought. In can
>> be built in any consistent way in which we choose.
>
>Indeed we can define quite arbitrary mathematical structures and name
>them "logic". For example, Galois could have used "logic" instead of
>"group" in his definition of a group, and we would talk about the
>"logic SU(2)" today.
>
>If such a definition makes clear that it has nothing to do with the
>common sense meaning, like in "group" or "field", fine. But this is
>not the case for quantum logic.
Logic means simply "language", from logos, the word. The subjunctive
tense is language, so quantum logic is correctly named from the Greek
root.
>>>> Sorry, I forgot to answer. They are simply examples of statements
>>>> of the hypothetical to which neither two valued logic nor
>>>> probability can be applied.
>
>>> As I have argued, classical probability theory (Bayesian version)
>>> may be applied very well. Using simply the probabilities people
>>> would have assigned to the claims before the ifs have
>>> happened. This is how common sense operates with such claims.
>
>> Many people's common sense told them they could not apply
>> probability theory to such propositions.
>
>These peoples common sense has been wrong, probably mislead by the
>frequentist interpretation of probability theory.
Common sense is not then a good indicator, without intensive study and
debate to purify it.
>
>> It would be equally correct to argue from classical logic that since
>> the subjunctive clause is false both propositions are true, and that
>> they would still be true if any other outcome were given.
>
>You can also argue that since the if-clause is false it doesn't matter
>if we use consistent reasoning to handle the truth value of such
>statements.
I said that too. But then you would be denying any truth in subjunctive
statements in common language. All this shows is that two valued logic
does not model the subjunctive well.
>>>> What Jaynes actually showed in the text we both like was that it applies
>>>> to consistent reasoning about things which definitely do or definitely
>>>> don't happen. He did not consider the subjunctive.
>>>
>>> I don't see this restriction. He did not consider the subjunctive,
>>> but there simply is no need for this.
>>
>> There is, because in quantum theory doing the experiment changes the
>> situation.
>
>This does not weaken the requirements for consistent reasoning.
Of course not. But nor does that deny the validity of quantum logic,
which is 100% rigorous and consistent.
>>>>>> Here we are talking hypothetically, of things which certainly didn't
>>>>>> happen (which would be probability 0)
>
>>>>> This goes back to the frequentist interpretation of probabilities.
>
>>>> Not at all. We are discussing reasoning about the subjunctive tense,
>>>> which is even further removed from a frequentist interpretation.
>
>>> I know, my point is that your argument works only if you restrict
>>> probability theory to a frequentist interpretation (which is far
>>> away).
>
>> In any logic, many valued or not, a truth value of 0 corresponds to
>> something which is certainly false. That does not mean there is a
>> frequentist interpretation of any logic.
>
>A consistent consideration of subjunctive claims is possible and
>should be Bayesian, following the derivation of Bayesian probability
>theory from the rules of consistent argumentation.
And following that quantum logic can be constructed on classical
probability theory. There is not any thing new here, just square roots
and complex phases. So what? Most of us have been doing that since we
were at school.
> It is not
>necessary (who cares about hypotheticals?)
Hypotheticals are essential to the interpretation of quantum logic. Of
course you can just use shut up and calculate, then the only statements
of physics made are those referring to the measurement results
themselves; then you do not have to go outside of classical probability
theory. But if you are interested in understanding the real working of
the universe between experiments, that is somewhat limiting.
>and the claims cannot be
>tested in a frequentist sense.
But the claims of quantum logic are tested in a frequentist sense in
every experiment in quantum mechanics where we repeat the experiment
many times according to good scientific practice.
>
>Of course, there is a certain freedom in the definition of consistent
>thinking. Thinking which is inconsistent only for subjunctive claims
>could be certainly accepted as consistent.
>
>>> You argued that your quantum logic is in a certain correspondence to
>>> common sense. I see no correspondence of complex truth values to
>>> common sense.
>>
>> As I say, this is a structure of the mind, and in mathematics we are
>> free to invent any consistent structure we please.
>
>I don't deny your freedom to invent and consider algebraic structures,
>nor the possible usefulness of such structures. I have questioned the
>claim that some very special algebraic structure (quantum logic) has a
>very specific correspondence to common sense logic.
Of course that depends on what you mean by common sense logic. What I
would have referred to as common sense logic does not model the
subjunctive, so in that sense I would not have made the claim that they
correspond. There is a specific correspondence between quantum logic and
probability theory when a measurement is done.
>
>>>> quite without empirical justification
>
>>> Whatever the fundamental objects are - the empirical justification is
>>> agreement of the whole theory with observation.
>
>> If that were true it would still contain the error of induction.
>
>Only if you mingle "empirical justification" with proof.
If something is not proven there may be a valid alternative, and if
there is a valid alternative the claim that it is so is not justified.
>> But it is not true. The structure of the reals disagrees with
>> observation.
>
>Nonsense.
Then show me a real physical instance of a continuum which does not
break down into some other small scale structure under sufficient
magnification.
>> I cannot observe a continuum.
>
>You cannot distinguish "observing a continuum" and "observing a
>discrete structure" if the resolution is too coarse.
Then show me a continuum which is still a continuum at all levels of
magnification.
>> Not one finite regular lattice, which would suggest that such a
>> thing really exists as a fundamental of nature, but the family of
>> all possible finite regular lattices which observers might, in
>> principle, be able to use as the set of possible results from his
>> chosen measurement apparatus.
>Sounds like a lot of positivistic confusion.
Confusion is in the mind of the beholder. This is what you get by
accurate thought.
> Moreover, certainly not
>like a simple object.
I didn't say it would be simple.
>Sorry, but in this case a continuum is simpler.
That is a moot point. As I have said the definition of the reals is far
from simple. You think it is simple because it is familiar. But in any
case if we are discussing physics simplicity is not the deciding factor.
What is required is empirical justification - and I will not accept
induction as any form of empirical justification.
>> This merely suggests that a lattice is a fundamental of observation,
>> not a fundamental of nature, and, unlike R^n, it is in complete
>> agreement with observation that every measurement apparatus has
>> finite range and resolution.
>
>Whatever, I'm not interested in what "observation suggests", but about
>what really happens. The positivistic method to derive truth from
>observation has clearly failed.
For one thing I do not regard myself as a positivist. I am most
definitely a realist. For another it has always seemed pretty clear to
me that the positivists were a load of dumbos, who would be bound to
fail in any attempt to derive truth from anything as they were not
sufficiently able to think or reason accurately. There is a world of
difference between talking of specific numerical values being a
consequence of measurement, and talking of reality being a consequence
of measurement.
>
>>>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
>>>> in which entities can be described.
>>>
>>> No.
>>
>> Then how are you defining localism?
>
>As the part which justifies the claim "not (a-> B or b-> A)" for
>space-like separated events.
>
>I see a clear subdivision:
>
>Einstein-causality -> "not (a-> B or b-> A)"
First can you express Eeinstein causality without any implicit reference
to background space-time structure.
>
>"not (a-> B or b-> A)" + realism -> Bell's inequality.
>
>The second part I name "Bell's theorem", and this second part does not
>even refer to spacetime at all.
And can you also express realism in a way that makes your precise
assumptions clear.
>>>> I did not mean an irrealistic context. I meant the very real context
>>>> in which a & b are outside the light cones of each other's
>>>> experiments.
>
>>> In this case, the results are not known by the other, but not
>>> meaningless for the other.
>
>> How can they have meaning when information cannot be available even
>> in principle.
>
>You seem to subscribe to a very positivistic theory of meaning. I
>don't. I'm realist. In the context of realism, claims about reality
>have a meaning and a truth value even if human observers (which are
>objects of realistic theories with usually restricted possibilities)
>are unable to find this truth value.
I am also a realist, but there is a huge difference between a real
structure in which background space plays a role, and a real structure
in which background space has no part. Quantum mechanics shows us (once
we can see it) that structure of space appears out of the measurements
which we do. That does not imply or suggest that the structure of
reality appears out of the measurements we do, so I deny that positivism
plays any part in this, despite a similarity in certain forms of words.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>> Not according to common sense.
> According to pure sense then, whether it be common or not.
Again, we have to distinguish the right of the mathematician to
consider a structure and to give it a quite arbitrary name,
and claims that such a name has anything to do with similar
names in common language.
In commerce we have copyright. In math, we have a similar requirement
for uniqueness of names. As "group" and "field" shows, there is no
requirement which forbids the arbitrary reuse of common language terms.
As "boolean logic" shows, the reuse is sometimes not arbitrary, boolean
logic has a connection with the common sense meaning of logic.
I have no problem with a reuse of the word "logic" or "truth value" in
math, as long as it is clarified that this reuse is arbitrary. But
"quantum logic" does not clarify this, instead it claims a connection.
>>> In quantum logic you can apply a weighting to the propositions f &
>>> g and create propositions like .7f + .3g which means,
>>> qualitatively, f or g, but more likely f.
>> As far as such claims have a meaning in common sense, they can be
>> defined also in classical probability theory.
> But with different, and incorrect, results, owing to the fact that the
> experiment to determine which alters the situation.
No. To refer to experiment you have to apply quantum logic in a
specific way (the "quantum logic" interpretation) to observational
statements. This particular specific way contradicts common sense.
If you use another, classical realistic interpretation of QM, you
cannot apply quantum logic to the observational statements.
>>>> In classical common sense there is nothing which assigns to f(x) a
>>>> complex number and to p(x) its |.|^2.
>>> This is a mathematical structure, a structure of our thought. In can
>>> be built in any consistent way in which we choose.
>> Indeed we can define quite arbitrary mathematical structures and name
>> them "logic". For example, Galois could have used "logic" instead of
>> "group" in his definition of a group, and we would talk about the
>> "logic SU(2)" today.
>> If such a definition makes clear that it has nothing to do with the
>> common sense meaning, like in "group" or "field", fine. But this is
>> not the case for quantum logic.
> Logic means simply "language", from logos, the word. The subjunctive
> tense is language, so quantum logic is correctly named from the Greek
> root.
So you make a claim of correspondence between the scientific use of
"quantum logic" and your complex "truth value" with their common sense
meanings? (If not, I would suggest to use other words to avoid
confusion. If yes, your "consistency is all we need for mathematical
structure" argument is rejected.)
>>>> As I have argued, classical probability theory (Bayesian version)
>>>> may be applied very well. Using simply the probabilities people
>>>> would have assigned to the claims before the ifs have
>>>> happened. This is how common sense operates with such claims.
>>
>>> Many people's common sense told them they could not apply
>>> probability theory to such propositions.
>>
>> These peoples common sense has been wrong, probably mislead by the
>> frequentist interpretation of probability theory.
>
> Common sense is not then a good indicator, without intensive study and
> debate to purify it.
The work on Bayesian probability theory is such an intensive study.
Classical logic and classical realism are today sufficiently purified.
The reference to common sense I make only because I make a claim of
correspondence: the scientific notions of classical logic, probability
theory and realism correspond to the common sense use of these words.
If you don't make a similar correspondence claim for quantum logic,
then "quantum logic" is only a confusing name for this algebraic
structure.
>>> It would be equally correct to argue from classical logic that since
>>> the subjunctive clause is false both propositions are true, and that
>>> they would still be true if any other outcome were given.
>>
>> You can also argue that since the if-clause is false it doesn't matter
>> if we use consistent reasoning to handle the truth value of such
>> statements.
> I said that too. But then you would be denying any truth in subjunctive
> statements in common language. All this shows is that two valued logic
> does not model the subjunctive well.
The claim was that Bayesian probability is appropriate to handle such
claims.
>>>> I don't see this restriction. He did not consider the subjunctive,
>>>> but there simply is no need for this.
>>>
>>> There is, because in quantum theory doing the experiment changes the
>>> situation.
>>
>> This does not weaken the requirements for consistent reasoning.
>
> Of course not. But nor does that deny the validity of quantum logic,
> which is 100% rigorous and consistent.
I deny that such a thing as "validity of quantum logic" is even
well-defined. Logic is something about statements, quantum logic is
some strange algebraic structure of the set of projection operators.
To identify these operators with statements which have truth values is
counterintuitive and nonsensical simply because these operators do not
follow the rules of classical logic.
>> A consistent consideration of subjunctive claims is possible and
>> should be Bayesian, following the derivation of Bayesian probability
>> theory from the rules of consistent argumentation.
>
> And following that quantum logic can be constructed on classical
> probability theory. There is not any thing new here, just square roots
> and complex phases. So what? Most of us have been doing that since we
> were at school.
You have to define their meaning.
> Hypotheticals are essential to the interpretation of quantum logic.
We don't need quantum logic at all. We need an interpretation of QM
in agreement with classical logic.
> Of course you can just use shut up and calculate, then the only
> statements of physics made are those referring to the measurement
> results themselves; then you do not have to go outside of classical
> probability theory. But if you are interested in understanding the
> real working of the universe between experiments, that is somewhat
> limiting.
Of course. But for this purpose classical logic (in combination with
classical realistic theories) is sufficient.
> But the claims of quantum logic are tested in a frequentist sense in
> every experiment in quantum mechanics where we repeat the experiment
> many times according to good scientific practice.
The claims of quantum logic are in contradiction with classical logic,
therefore nonsensical. Nonsensical theories cannot be tested. QM is,
of course, a meaningful theory. But the meaningful interpretation of
QM which can be tested is not the "quantum logic" interpretation.
>>> As I say, this is a structure of the mind, and in mathematics we are
>>> free to invent any consistent structure we please.
>>
>> I don't deny your freedom to invent and consider algebraic structures,
>> nor the possible usefulness of such structures. I have questioned the
>> claim that some very special algebraic structure (quantum logic) has a
>> very specific correspondence to common sense logic.
>
> Of course that depends on what you mean by common sense logic.
I see not much variance in the meaning of common sense logic.
> What I would have referred to as common sense logic does not model
> the subjunctive, so in that sense I would not have made the claim
> that they correspond.
What I refer to as common sense logic handles subjunctive claims like
Bayesian probabilities. The answer to "What would have happened if
not X" is the same as for "What happens if not X" asked before the
time X has happened. Above answers are predictions based on theories
and assumptions about the initial states.
>>>>> quite without empirical justification
>>
>>>> Whatever the fundamental objects are - the empirical justification is
>>>> agreement of the whole theory with observation.
>>
>>> If that were true it would still contain the error of induction.
>>
>> Only if you mingle "empirical justification" with proof.
>
> If something is not proven there may be a valid alternative, and if
> there is a valid alternative the claim that it is so is not justified.
If you identify "empirical justification" and "proof", I modify the answer:
>>>>> quite without empirical justification
I know. Science does not give, in principle, any empirical
justifications for the truth of theories. There are always possibly
valid alternatives.
>>> But it is not true. The structure of the reals disagrees with
>>> observation.
>> Nonsense.
> Then show me a real physical instance of a continuum which does not
> break down into some other small scale structure under sufficient
> magnification.
Why should I? I name spacetime. Now you have to present me an actual
_observation_ where it breaks down into another small scale structure.
>>> I cannot observe a continuum.
>> You cannot distinguish "observing a continuum" and "observing a
>> discrete structure" if the resolution is too coarse.
> Then show me a continuum which is still a continuum at all levels of
> magnification.
Why should I? We don't have "all levels of magnification" available
for observation.
>> Whatever, I'm not interested in what "observation suggests", but about
>> what really happens. The positivistic method to derive truth from
>> observation has clearly failed.
> For one thing I do not regard myself as a positivist. I am most
> definitely a realist.
Do you follow Popper? If not, where are your disagreements?
>>>>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
>>>>> in which entities can be described.
>>>>
>>>> No.
>>>
>>> Then how are you defining localism?
>>
>> As the part which justifies the claim "not (a-> B or b-> A)" for
>> space-like separated events.
>> I see a clear subdivision:
>> Einstein-causality -> "not (a-> B or b-> A)"
> First can you express Einstein causality without any implicit
> reference to background space-time structure.
I don't even want. Einstein causality defines the connection between
spacetime structure and causality. Once I have clarified that "not
(a-> B or b-> A)", I have no further need for spacetime.
>> "not (a-> B or b-> A)" + realism -> Bell's inequality.
>> The second part I name "Bell's theorem", and this second part does not
>> even refer to spacetime at all.
> And can you also express realism in a way that makes your precise
> assumptions clear.
Yep. See Bell's proof. Or, if you are interested in my
understanding of the question, the relevant section of gr-qc/0001101.
There is only some abstract space Lambda of possible states of
reality, and a classical probability distribution rho(lambda) on it.
The results of the experiments A, B, should depend on the decisions
a,b in the following general way:
<f(A,B)(a,b)> = int rho(lambda)f(A(a,b,lambda),B(a,b,lambda)) d lambda
"not (a-> B or b-> A)" means
A(a,b,lambda)=A(a,lambda), B(a,b,lambda)=B(b,lambda).
> Quantum mechanics shows us (once we can see it) that structure of
> space appears out of the measurements which we do.
A particular theory, especially in a non-realistic interpretation,
shows nothing. As a realist, I search for realistic theories able to
meet observation. Like Bohmian mechanics.
BTW, the claim is wrong also as a claim about QM, because in QM
absolute space is postulated.
> That does not imply or suggest that the structure of reality appears
> out of the measurements we do, so I deny that positivism plays any
> part in this, despite a similarity in certain forms of words.
Simple denial may be insufficient. But it is nice to hear that I can
use arguments of type "this is positivism" in this discussion, without
necessity to prove that positivism fails.
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
>>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
>>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>
>>> Not according to common sense.
>
>> According to pure sense then, whether it be common or not.
>
>Again, we have to distinguish the right of the mathematician to
>consider a structure and to give it a quite arbitrary name,
>and claims that such a name has anything to do with similar
>names in common language.
>In commerce we have copyright. In math, we have a similar requirement
>for uniqueness of names. As "group" and "field" shows, there is no
>requirement which forbids the arbitrary reuse of common language terms.
>
>As "boolean logic" shows, the reuse is sometimes not arbitrary, boolean
>logic has a connection with the common sense meaning of logic.
>
>I have no problem with a reuse of the word "logic" or "truth value" in
>math, as long as it is clarified that this reuse is arbitrary. But
>"quantum logic" does not clarify this, instead it claims a connection.
In all my arguments I have been concerned to show that quantum logic
does have to do with common language.
>>>> In quantum logic you can apply a weighting to the propositions f &
>>>> g and create propositions like .7f + .3g which means,
>>>> qualitatively, f or g, but more likely f.
>
>>> As far as such claims have a meaning in common sense, they can be
>>> defined also in classical probability theory.
>
>> But with different, and incorrect, results, owing to the fact that the
>> experiment to determine which alters the situation.
>
>No. To refer to experiment you have to apply quantum logic in a
>specific way (the "quantum logic" interpretation) to observational
>statements. This particular specific way contradicts common sense.
>
>If you use another, classical realistic interpretation of QM, you
>cannot apply quantum logic to the observational statements.
Quantum logic reduces to probability theory when applied to
observational statements. That seems to me very much in line with common
sense. The whole point of quantum logic is to be able to classify,
discuss and calculate states between observations.
>>>>> In classical common sense there is nothing which assigns to f(x) a
>>>>> complex number and to p(x) its |.|^2.
>
>> Logic means simply "language", from logos, the word. The subjunctive
>> tense is language, so quantum logic is correctly named from the Greek
>> root.
>
>So you make a claim of correspondence between the scientific use of
>"quantum logic" and your complex "truth value" with their common sense
>meanings?
Yes. I see no objection to using a complex number, as much as any other,
to place a value on the truth of a particular class of sentence -
particular a sentence with a subjunctive clause, which, of its nature,
cannot happen or it would cease to be subjunctive. The phrase "truth
value" requires two things, first a value, and a complex number is a
value like any other, and second it should be a measure of truth. Phase
has been declared meaningless and the square root is just as much a
measure as the number itself - the size of a square can be measured
either by the length of the side or by the area.
> (If not, I would suggest to use other words to avoid
>confusion. If yes, your "consistency is all we need for mathematical
>structure" argument is rejected.)
Consistency is needed for mathematical structures, but they need more
than consistency to be useful.
>>>>> As I have argued, classical probability theory (Bayesian version)
>>>>> may be applied very well. Using simply the probabilities people
>>>>> would have assigned to the claims before the ifs have
>>>>> happened. This is how common sense operates with such claims.
>>>
>>>> Many people's common sense told them they could not apply
>>>> probability theory to such propositions.
>>>
>>> These peoples common sense has been wrong, probably mislead by the
>>> frequentist interpretation of probability theory.
>>
>> Common sense is not then a good indicator, without intensive study and
>> debate to purify it.
>
>The work on Bayesian probability theory is such an intensive study.
>Classical logic and classical realism are today sufficiently purified.
But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion. Three hundred
years after Bayes we are still debating the meaning of probability
theory, and only approaching a resolution; there is still an issue
between objective and subjective Bayesianism. Quantum logic is only 70
years old, and the debate has scarcely begun.
>The reference to common sense I make only because I make a claim of
>correspondence: the scientific notions of classical logic, probability
>theory and realism correspond to the common sense use of these words.
>
>If you don't make a similar correspondence claim for quantum logic,
>then "quantum logic" is only a confusing name for this algebraic
>structure.
I understand that Von Neumann named quantum logic because he observed a
mathematical structure which was the same as that of a generalised
structure of propositions, i.e. a logic. It does not seem as though he
identified the actual propositions, or maybe he was just so bright he
thought it was clear in the maths. I don't find it clear in the maths. I
find that to make sense of it has been necessary to identify an actual
family of propositions.
>>>> It would be equally correct to argue from classical logic that since
>>>> the subjunctive clause is false both propositions are true, and that
>>>> they would still be true if any other outcome were given.
>>>
>>> You can also argue that since the if-clause is false it doesn't matter
>>> if we use consistent reasoning to handle the truth value of such
>>> statements.
>
>> I said that too. But then you would be denying any truth in subjunctive
>> statements in common language. All this shows is that two valued logic
>> does not model the subjunctive well.
>
>The claim was that Bayesian probability is appropriate to handle such
>claims.
According to Bayesian probability there would be no difference in
predictions whether you know which slit an electron passes through or
not. There is a fundamental difference in the sentence structures
"when a measurement is done....
"if a measurement were to be done...
>>
>> Of course not. But nor does that deny the validity of quantum logic,
>> which is 100% rigorous and consistent.
>
>I deny that such a thing as "validity of quantum logic" is even
>well-defined. Logic is something about statements, quantum logic is
>some strange algebraic structure of the set of projection operators.
I agree that every account I have seen of quantum logic is couched in
these terms, and extremely unhelpful I find it too. That is why I have
been anxious to exhibit the family of sentences
f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
which is a basis for the Hilbert space which Von Neumann identifies with
quantum logic. The projection operators take the subjunctive statements
f(x) over to future tense statements
p(x): When a measurement of position is done the result will be x
>To identify these operators with statements which have truth values is
>counterintuitive and nonsensical simply because these operators do not
>follow the rules of classical logic.
>
>>> A consistent consideration of subjunctive claims is possible and
>>> should be Bayesian, following the derivation of Bayesian probability
>>> theory from the rules of consistent argumentation.
>>
>> And following that quantum logic can be constructed on classical
>> probability theory. There is not any thing new here, just square roots
>> and complex phases. So what? Most of us have been doing that since we
>> were at school.
>
>You have to define their meaning.
The model is (locally as well as globally) invariant under phase shift
(known as U(1).. This is just a meaningless value which has no effect on
the theory and can be fixed at will. The square root is defined because
its square is the classical probability.
>
>> Hypotheticals are essential to the interpretation of quantum logic.
>
>We don't need quantum logic at all. We need an interpretation of QM
>in agreement with classical logic.
Quantum logic is in agreement with classical logic, or at least with
classical probability theory whenever an experiment is done.
>> Of course you can just use shut up and calculate, then the only
>> statements of physics made are those referring to the measurement
>> results themselves; then you do not have to go outside of classical
>> probability theory. But if you are interested in understanding the
>> real working of the universe between experiments, that is somewhat
>> limiting.
>
>Of course. But for this purpose classical logic (in combination with
>classical realistic theories) is sufficient.
But it isn't enough and frankly to cite BM as a classical realist theory
is ludicrous. Incidentally classical logic is normally regarded as two
valued, Aristotelian logic. I shall take it that you mean classical
probability theory.
>> But the claims of quantum logic are tested in a frequentist sense in
>> every experiment in quantum mechanics where we repeat the experiment
>> many times according to good scientific practice.
>
>The claims of quantum logic are in contradiction with classical logic,
>therefore nonsensical.
In my paper I build quantum logic on classical probability theory, and
hence it is merely an extension of it, certainly not in contradiction.
>>>>>> quite without empirical justification
>>>
>>>>> Whatever the fundamental objects are - the empirical justification is
>>>>> agreement of the whole theory with observation.
>>>
>>>> If that were true it would still contain the error of induction.
>>>
>>> Only if you mingle "empirical justification" with proof.
>>
>> If something is not proven there may be a valid alternative, and if
>> there is a valid alternative the claim that it is so is not justified.
>
>If you identify "empirical justification" and "proof", I modify the answer:
>
>>>>>> quite without empirical justification
>
>I know. Science does not give, in principle, any empirical
>justifications for the truth of theories. There are always possibly
>valid alternatives.
Not always. For example special relativity follows from the defining
processes of measurement of time and space coordinates in a locality.
>
>> Then show me a real physical instance of a continuum which does not
>> break down into some other small scale structure under sufficient
>> magnification.
>
>Why should I? I name spacetime. Now you have to present me an actual
>_observation_ where it breaks down into another small scale structure.
First present an observation of space time. Any actual observation is an
observation of matter, and all matter has a different small scale
structure.
>>>> I cannot observe a continuum.
>
>>> You cannot distinguish "observing a continuum" and "observing a
>>> discrete structure" if the resolution is too coarse.
>
>> Then show me a continuum which is still a continuum at all levels of
>> magnification.
>
>Why should I? We don't have "all levels of magnification" available
>for observation.
Why? Because if you don't you are open to the charge of talking
metaphysical claptrap.
>
>>> Whatever, I'm not interested in what "observation suggests", but about
>>> what really happens. The positivistic method to derive truth from
>>> observation has clearly failed.
>
>> For one thing I do not regard myself as a positivist. I am most
>> definitely a realist.
>
>Do you follow Popper? If not, where are your disagreements?
I consider Popper as simplistic as he is wrong. (As illustrated by my
disagreement with you over the meaning and truth of special relativity).
For a theory to be scientific it must come with a rider, explicit or
implicit, describing the circumstances and a range of experimental
accuracy under which it holds. It would be tedious in the extreme to
make the rider explicit every time the theory is stated, but if it is a
scientific theory it should be taken that the rider exists, whether it
is stated or not. Incidentally it should also be noted that Newton
included just such a rider in the Principia, and that Newtonian
mechanics was only deemed, by Newton, to hold to the mechanical accuracy
of the drawing of lines and circles, no matter what metaphysical claims
for absolute space were made subsequently by lesser scientists.
When a scientific theory is fully and properly expressed in this manner
it is perfectly possible to say that it is true, and indeed it is
possible to say that special relativity is true in local regions
whenever the internationally agreed definitions of time and space
coordinates can be made, (namely when quantum effects need not be
considered). Indeed, since special relativity can be proven from the
definitions under such circumstances it can be taken as absolutely and
definitely mathematically true.
The interpretation you gave of universal background Minkowski space is
not then a part of special relativity, but is a wholly unscientific and
false metaphysic.
>>>>>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
>>>>>> in which entities can be described.
>>>>>
>>>>> No.
>>>>
>>>> Then how are you defining localism?
>>>
>>> As the part which justifies the claim "not (a-> B or b-> A)" for
>>> space-like separated events.
>
>>> I see a clear subdivision:
>>> Einstein-causality -> "not (a-> B or b-> A)"
>
>> First can you express Einstein causality without any implicit
>> reference to background space-time structure.
>
>I don't even want. Einstein causality defines the connection between
>spacetime structure and causality. Once I have clarified that "not
>(a-> B or b-> A)", I have no further need for spacetime.
Once you have included space-time you have no further need for
space-time? Come on. I thought you wanted to stick to classical logic.
None of the argument follows from here on in.
>BTW, the claim is wrong also as a claim about QM, because in QM
>absolute space is postulated.
That is true only of general accounts of quantum mechanics. It is not
necessary to postulate absolute space in order to express the axioms of
quantum mechanics.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
> In article <i3g8z4l...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >
> >>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
> >>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
Doesn't the truth value of all the various ways to label truth value have
more to do with resonance than with anything else?
...
> >The work on Bayesian probability theory is such an intensive study.
> >Classical logic and classical realism are today sufficiently purified.
>
> But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion. Three hundred
> years after Bayes we are still debating the meaning of probability
> theory, and only approaching a resolution; there is still an issue
> between objective and subjective Bayesianism. Quantum logic is only 70
> years old, and the debate has scarcely begun.
Is the Baynesian imagery basically approaching the quantum realm, coming
from the school of thought that classical stuff is sacred and that
determinism *breaks* upon crossing the classical/quantum boundary?
Is this quantum logic business that you refer to perhaps in the school of
thought where one begins within the quantum realm and notices that
determinism *emerges* as the entanglements and nesting get more complex,
leading to highly repeatable "classical" constraints?
...Thereby allowing for different set of rules for the different classes of
energetic artfacts that emerge and persist from the quantum realm?
Curious, in Indiana
Charles Francis
<ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:xW2BCuOFq$K9E...@clef.demon.co.uk...
>> In article <i3g8z4l...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> >>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> >
>> >>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
>> >>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>
>Doesn't the truth value of all the various ways to label truth value have
>more to do with resonance than with anything else?
I don't you know what you mean by resonance in this context, but it is
reasonable to demand, as does Ilja, that a truth value is a measure of
truth. I seek also to show that complex truth values are a measure of
truth.
>> >The work on Bayesian probability theory is such an intensive study.
>> >Classical logic and classical realism are today sufficiently purified.
>>
>> But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion. Three hundred
>> years after Bayes we are still debating the meaning of probability
>> theory, and only approaching a resolution; there is still an issue
>> between objective and subjective Bayesianism. Quantum logic is only 70
>> years old, and the debate has scarcely begun.
>
>Is the Baynesian imagery basically approaching the quantum realm, coming
>from the school of thought that classical stuff is sacred and that
>determinism *breaks* upon crossing the classical/quantum boundary?
>
>Is this quantum logic business that you refer to perhaps in the school of
>thought where one begins within the quantum realm and notices that
>determinism *emerges* as the entanglements and nesting get more complex,
>leading to highly repeatable "classical" constraints?
No, determinism is a different issue. Bayesianism basically means that
we think of probability as a measure of plausibility or truth. I have
been saying that in quantum logic we also think of the probability
amplitude as a measure of likelihood or truth. Ilja has been concerned
that there is a clash between those points of view, whereas I have been
seeking to show that they can be reconciled.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
>>>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>>>> Not according to common sense.
>> I have no problem with a reuse of the word "logic" or "truth value" in
>> math, as long as it is clarified that this reuse is arbitrary. But
>> "quantum logic" does not clarify this, instead it claims a connection.
> In all my arguments I have been concerned to show that quantum logic
> does have to do with common language.
So show this for complex truth values. They have nothing to do with
common language. Your reference to "just a mathematical idea" is
insufficient.
>> No. To refer to experiment you have to apply quantum logic in a
>> specific way (the "quantum logic" interpretation) to observational
>> statements. This particular specific way contradicts common sense.
>> If you use another, classical realistic interpretation of QM, you
>> cannot apply quantum logic to the observational statements.
> Quantum logic reduces to probability theory when applied to
> observational statements. That seems to me very much in line with common
> sense. The whole point of quantum logic is to be able to classify,
> discuss and calculate states between observations.
Which, according to common sense, may be discussed using classical
logic and probability theory.
>>> Logic means simply "language", from logos, the word. The subjunctive
>>> tense is language, so quantum logic is correctly named from the Greek
>>> root.
>> So you make a claim of correspondence between the scientific use of
>> "quantum logic" and your complex "truth value" with their common sense
>> meanings?
> Yes. I see no objection to using a complex number, as much as any other,
> to place a value on the truth of a particular class of sentence -
It is meaningless in common language. Truth is "yes/no" or "more or
less probable" in common language.
> The phrase "truth value" requires two things, first a value, and a
> complex number is a value like any other,
I disagree - truth values are not "values like any other".
> and second it should be a measure of truth. Phase has been declared
> meaningless and the square root is just as much a measure as the
> number itself - the size of a square can be measured either by the
> length of the side or by the area.
>>> Common sense is not then a good indicator, without intensive study and
>>> debate to purify it.
>> The work on Bayesian probability theory is such an intensive study.
>> Classical logic and classical realism are today sufficiently purified.
> But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion.
Quantum logic is, IMHO, an interesting algebraic structure with an
unfortunate name. It has nothing to do with common sense, therefore
needs no purification (is already pure math).
> I understand that Von Neumann named quantum logic because he observed a
> mathematical structure which was the same as that of a generalised
> structure of propositions, i.e. a logic.
The problem is that it is not the same, but weaker.
> It does not seem as though he identified the actual propositions, or
> maybe he was just so bright he thought it was clear in the maths.
In what I have learned as "quantum logic" there are well-defined
propositions. Statements like "S has coordinate x", "S has momentum
x" where S is some state. There is no classical realistic model where
all these claims may be true together (if "measurement" is understood
as measurement of something already existing). The classical common
sense concludes there is something wrong with these claims, in Bohmian
mechanics only some of them ("S has coordinate x") are true, while
momentum "measurement" is not measurement but a result of interaction.
The "quantum logic" way is to claim that all these claims are correct,
but logic is false, and to remove some classical logical rules which
allow to derive a contradiction from all these claims.
> I don't find it clear in the maths.
The math is clear.
> According to Bayesian probability there would be no difference in
> predictions whether you know which slit an electron passes through
> or not.
In the world of common sense there are similar differences if
"measurement" is the result of interaction. If a police officer knows
that a suspect is near X because of an interaction between them (and,
therefore, the suspect also knows that he has been seen) the suspect
may behave differently.
BTW, in Bohmian mechanics Bayesian probability is sufficient.
>> Logic is something about statements, quantum logic is
>> some strange algebraic structure of the set of projection operators.
> I agree that every account I have seen of quantum logic is couched in
> these terms, and extremely unhelpful I find it too. That is why I have
> been anxious to exhibit the family of sentences
>
> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>
> which is a basis for the Hilbert space which Von Neumann identifies with
> quantum logic. The projection operators take the subjunctive statements
> f(x) over to future tense statements
>
> p(x): When a measurement of position is done the result will be x
The distinction you want to do is irrelevant. As in the classical
case (where I argue that you have to apply in above cases Bayesian
consistent reasoning) as in the quantum logic case.
The important difference in "quantum logic" is the following:
p(x) - the projection operator - may be interpreted in a direct form:
"The particle _is_, with probability |psi(x)|^2, in x".
This interpretation is in contradiction with classical logic(*), IOW
nonsense. The quantum logic proposal is to weaken classical logic
so that a contradiction no longer follows.
There is another interpretation:
"A certain interaction with the particle named for historical reasons
'measurement of position of the particle' _gives_, with probability
|psi(x)|^2, the result x."
This interpretation has already no contradiction with classical logic.
Therefore there is no reason to modify classical logic and to define
some "quantum logic" or to question common sense.
(*) if combined with other claims, like "if the particle is in x_0 at
time t, then its evolution is defined by the Schroedinger equation
with initial value delta(x-x_0)"
>>> [complex truth values]
>> You have to define their meaning.
> The model is (locally as well as globally) invariant under phase shift
> (known as U(1).. This is just a meaningless value ...
Thus, complex truth value is real (Bayesian) truth value + something
meaningless. LOL. We apply Occam's razor.
>>> Hypotheticals are essential to the interpretation of quantum logic.
>> We don't need quantum logic at all. We need an interpretation of QM
>> in agreement with classical logic.
> Quantum logic is in agreement with classical logic, or at least with
> classical probability theory whenever an experiment is done.
I hope I have clearified my understanding of the "quantum logic"
concept.
>>> But if you are interested in understanding the real working of the
>>> universe between experiments, that is somewhat limiting.
>> Of course. But for this purpose classical logic (in combination with
>> classical realistic theories) is sufficient.
> But it isn't enough and frankly to cite BM as a classical realist
> theory is ludicrous. Incidentally classical logic is normally
> regarded as two valued, Aristotelian logic. I shall take it that you
> mean classical probability theory.
I identify classical logic with the science about consistent
reasoning. Therefore, after having learned that Bayesian probability
theory is simply consistent reasoning, it is, for me, part of
classical logic.
>> The claims of quantum logic are in contradiction with classical logic,
>> therefore nonsensical.
> In my paper I build quantum logic on classical probability theory,
> and hence it is merely an extension of it, certainly not in
> contradiction.
Then your "quantum logic" is not what I know as "quantum logic".
>> If you identify "empirical justification" and "proof", I modify the answer:
>>
>>>>>>> quite without empirical justification
>>
>> I know. Science does not give, in principle, any empirical
>> justifications for the truth of theories. There are always possibly
>> valid alternatives.
>
> Not always. For example special relativity follows from the defining
> processes of measurement of time and space coordinates in a locality.
It follows from axioms which may be easily questioned and replaced
with alternatives. For example, the classical Lorentz ether is an
alternative to SR.
>>> Then show me a real physical instance of a continuum which does not
>>> break down into some other small scale structure under sufficient
>>> magnification.
>> Why should I? I name spacetime. Now you have to present me an actual
>> _observation_ where it breaks down into another small scale structure.
> First present an observation of space time.
No. You have made a claim about contradiction with observation. You
have to present observations.
> Any actual observation is an observation of matter, and all matter
> has a different small scale structure.
So what?
>>>>> I cannot observe a continuum.
>>
>>>> You cannot distinguish "observing a continuum" and "observing a
>>>> discrete structure" if the resolution is too coarse.
>>
>>> Then show me a continuum which is still a continuum at all levels of
>>> magnification.
>> Why should I? We don't have "all levels of magnification" available
>> for observation.
> Why?
Such is life. Why not?
> Because if you don't you are open to the charge of talking
> metaphysical claptrap.
I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
>>> For one thing I do not regard myself as a positivist. I am most
>>> definitely a realist.
>> Do you follow Popper? If not, where are your disagreements?
> I consider Popper as simplistic as he is wrong. (As illustrated by my
> disagreement with you over the meaning and truth of special relativity).
> For a theory to be scientific it must come with a rider, explicit or
> implicit, describing the circumstances and a range of experimental
> accuracy under which it holds. It would be tedious in the extreme to
> make the rider explicit every time the theory is stated, but if it is a
> scientific theory it should be taken that the rider exists,
Einstein, at time of creation of GR, could not have guessed what is
the correct rider. That it works, for example, for binary pulsars.
We don't know today if it works for the global universe (but our
matter models are invalid) or if the "dark energy" problem is a
disagreement between GR and observation. And to find this out, we
have to apply GR in the questionable domain, to derive predictions,
and to see if they fail. Thus, even if there is a "rider", scientists
do not care about such riders but apply the theory beyond this rider,
simply because there is no other way to establish the correct rider.
Of course, there are some parts of SR which follow from SR axioms and
in this sense may be proven. These parts are accepted as mathematical
theorems also in Popper's concept.
> When a scientific theory is fully and properly expressed in this manner
> it is perfectly possible to say that it is true, and indeed it is
> possible to say that special relativity is true in local regions
> whenever the internationally agreed definitions of time and space
> coordinates can be made,
Nonsense. "Internationally agreed definitions of time and space
coordinates" can be made with high accuracy in our global universe,
using the CMBR frame. SR is clearly false in this domain, as well as
in many comparably local subdomains.
>>>>>>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space background
>>>>>>> in which entities can be described.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then how are you defining localism?
>>>>
>>>> As the part which justifies the claim "not (a-> B or b-> A)" for
>>>> space-like separated events.
>>
>>>> I see a clear subdivision:
>>>> Einstein-causality -> "not (a-> B or b-> A)"
>>
>>> First can you express Einstein causality without any implicit
>>> reference to background space-time structure.
>>
>> I don't even want. Einstein causality defines the connection between
>> spacetime structure and causality. Once I have clarified that "not
>> (a-> B or b-> A)", I have no further need for spacetime.
>
> Once you have included space-time you have no further need for
> space-time? Come on.
I have used it in the first part. Let's name it the "spacetime part"
if you like. This first part is completely classical, extremely
simple, has never been questioned.
In the second part, the "realistic part", I have to care only about
realism, logic, "not(a -> B or b -> A)". Bell's inequality follows.
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
>>>>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
>
>>>>> Not according to common sense.
>
>>> I have no problem with a reuse of the word "logic" or "truth value" in
>>> math, as long as it is clarified that this reuse is arbitrary. But
>>> "quantum logic" does not clarify this, instead it claims a connection.
>
>> In all my arguments I have been concerned to show that quantum logic
>> does have to do with common language.
>
>So show this for complex truth values. They have nothing to do with
>common language. Your reference to "just a mathematical idea" is
>insufficient.
Then read the rest of the post.
>>> No. To refer to experiment you have to apply quantum logic in a
>>> specific way (the "quantum logic" interpretation) to observational
>>> statements. This particular specific way contradicts common sense.
>>> If you use another, classical realistic interpretation of QM, you
>>> cannot apply quantum logic to the observational statements.
>
>> Quantum logic reduces to probability theory when applied to
>> observational statements. That seems to me very much in line with common
>> sense. The whole point of quantum logic is to be able to classify,
>> discuss and calculate states between observations.
>
>Which, according to common sense, may be discussed using classical
>logic and probability theory.
That is an absolute denial of common sense, since you are basically
saying that measurement results can be discussed when there is no
measurement.
>>>> Logic means simply "language", from logos, the word. The subjunctive
>>>> tense is language, so quantum logic is correctly named from the Greek
>>>> root.
>
>>> So you make a claim of correspondence between the scientific use of
>>> "quantum logic" and your complex "truth value" with their common sense
>>> meanings?
>
>> Yes. I see no objection to using a complex number, as much as any other,
>> to place a value on the truth of a particular class of sentence -
>
>It is meaningless in common language. Truth is "yes/no" or "more or
>less probable" in common language.
And the amplitude of a probability amplitude is a measure of more or
less probable.
>> The phrase "truth value" requires two things, first a value, and a
>> complex number is a value like any other,
>
>I disagree - truth values are not "values like any other".
That is again a denial of common sense. How can a value not be a value.
>> and second it should be a measure of truth. Phase has been declared
>> meaningless and the square root is just as much a measure as the
>> number itself - the size of a square can be measured either by the
>> length of the side or by the area.
>
>>>> Common sense is not then a good indicator, without intensive study and
>>>> debate to purify it.
>
>>> The work on Bayesian probability theory is such an intensive study.
>>> Classical logic and classical realism are today sufficiently purified.
>
>> But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion.
>
>Quantum logic is, IMHO, an interesting algebraic structure with an
>unfortunate name. It has nothing to do with common sense,
It is just a subtlety to see that it is common sense, and it needs to be
shown by discussion that it is common sense when properly thought
through.
>> I understand that Von Neumann named quantum logic because he observed a
>> mathematical structure which was the same as that of a generalised
>> structure of propositions, i.e. a logic.
>
>The problem is that it is not the same, but weaker.
You say weaker, I say generalised. But informal language is much more
general than formal language, and I say a formal structure is stronger
for formalising more than was formalised before.
>> It does not seem as though he identified the actual propositions, or
>> maybe he was just so bright he thought it was clear in the maths.
>
>In what I have learned as "quantum logic" there are well-defined
>propositions. Statements like "S has coordinate x", "S has momentum
>x" where S is some state. There is no classical realistic model where
>all these claims may be true together (if "measurement" is understood
>as measurement of something already existing).
Then the propositions are wrong, which is why I have been at pains to
point to the fact of the subjunctive clause which must be used to make
sense of these propositions.
>The classical common
>sense concludes there is something wrong with these claims,
Precisely. The subjunctive is missing.
>The "quantum logic" way is to claim that all these claims are correct,
>but logic is false, and to remove some classical logical rules which
>allow to derive a contradiction from all these claims.
As appropriate to the subjunctive
>
>> I don't find it clear in the maths.
>
>The math is clear.
Then you already see the subjunctive is expressed in them? Why then are
you arguing?
>> According to Bayesian probability there would be no difference in
>> predictions whether you know which slit an electron passes through
>> or not.
>
>In the world of common sense there are similar differences if
>"measurement" is the result of interaction. If a police officer knows
>that a suspect is near X because of an interaction between them (and,
>therefore, the suspect also knows that he has been seen) the suspect
>may behave differently.
>
>BTW, in Bohmian mechanics Bayesian probability is sufficient.
But the metaphysics is garbage, and clashes with what we know of
relativity.
>>> Logic is something about statements, quantum logic is
>>> some strange algebraic structure of the set of projection operators.
>
>> I agree that every account I have seen of quantum logic is couched in
>> these terms, and extremely unhelpful I find it too. That is why I have
>> been anxious to exhibit the family of sentences
>>
>> f(x): If a measurement of position were to be done the result would be x
>>
>> which is a basis for the Hilbert space which Von Neumann identifies with
>> quantum logic. The projection operators take the subjunctive statements
>> f(x) over to future tense statements
>>
>> p(x): When a measurement of position is done the result will be x
>
>The distinction you want to do is irrelevant.
Think about it.
> As in the classical
>case (where I argue that you have to apply in above cases Bayesian
>consistent reasoning) as in the quantum logic case.
>
>The important difference in "quantum logic" is the following:
>
>p(x) - the projection operator - may be interpreted in a direct form:
>
>"The particle _is_, with probability |psi(x)|^2, in x".
>
>This interpretation is in contradiction with classical logic(*), IOW
>nonsense.
If that is so, then this interpretation is clearly wrong. Do not put it
forward.
>There is another interpretation:
>
>"A certain interaction with the particle named for historical reasons
>'measurement of position of the particle' _gives_, with probability
>|psi(x)|^2, the result x."
>
>This interpretation has already no contradiction with classical logic.
But it only matches when the measurement was actually done, so is
inadequate.
>Therefore there is no reason to modify classical logic and to define
>some "quantum logic" or to question common sense.
We have to describe situations when no measurement was done.
>
>>> You have to define their meaning.
>
>> The model is (locally as well as globally) invariant under phase shift
>> (known as U(1).. This is just a meaningless value ...
>
>Thus, complex truth value is real (Bayesian) truth value + something
>meaningless. LOL. We apply Occam's razor.
Then you have a great deal of trouble describing time evolution. I think
it can be done, but it is much more difficult. Occam's razor says leave
things as they are.
>>>> Hypotheticals are essential to the interpretation of quantum logic.
>
>>> We don't need quantum logic at all. We need an interpretation of QM
>>> in agreement with classical logic.
>
>> Quantum logic is in agreement with classical logic, or at least with
>> classical probability theory whenever an experiment is done.
>
>I hope I have clearified my understanding of the "quantum logic"
>concept.
It is clear, but inadequate. I might have hope to have extended your
understanding of it, but at the moment your mind seems enclosed.
>>>> But if you are interested in understanding the real working of the
>>>> universe between experiments, that is somewhat limiting.
>
>>> Of course. But for this purpose classical logic (in combination with
>>> classical realistic theories) is sufficient.
>
>> But it isn't enough and frankly to cite BM as a classical realist
>> theory is ludicrous. Incidentally classical logic is normally
>> regarded as two valued, Aristotelian logic. I shall take it that you
>> mean classical probability theory.
>
>I identify classical logic with the science about consistent
>reasoning. Therefore, after having learned that Bayesian probability
>theory is simply consistent reasoning, it is, for me, part of
>classical logic.
By that definition, so is quantum logic.
>>> The claims of quantum logic are in contradiction with classical logic,
>>> therefore nonsensical.
>
>> In my paper I build quantum logic on classical probability theory,
>> and hence it is merely an extension of it, certainly not in
>> contradiction.
>
>Then your "quantum logic" is not what I know as "quantum logic".
That is clearly true, since you have not seen the effect of the
subjunctive.
>>> If you identify "empirical justification" and "proof", I modify the answer:
>>>
>>>>>>>> quite without empirical justification
>>>
>>> I know. Science does not give, in principle, any empirical
>>> justifications for the truth of theories. There are always possibly
>>> valid alternatives.
>>
>> Not always. For example special relativity follows from the defining
>> processes of measurement of time and space coordinates in a locality.
>
>It follows from axioms which may be easily questioned and replaced
>with alternatives. For example, the classical Lorentz ether is an
>alternative to SR.
Not really. It is just a wacky metaphysical idea which gives the same
formulae as special relativity under a narrow range of circumstances
which do not hold generally.
>>>> Then show me a real physical instance of a continuum which does not
>>>> break down into some other small scale structure under sufficient
>>>> magnification.
>
>>> Why should I? I name spacetime. Now you have to present me an actual
>>> _observation_ where it breaks down into another small scale structure.
>
>> First present an observation of space time.
>
>No. You have made a claim about contradiction with observation. You
>have to present observations.
No. I believe I said space-time could not be justified from observation,
and hence is unscientific. You tried to deny my claim, you have to
present observations.
>> Any actual observation is an observation of matter, and all matter
>> has a different small scale structure.
>
>So what?
So there is no observation of space-time.
>
>>>>>> I cannot observe a continuum.
>>>
>>>>> You cannot distinguish "observing a continuum" and "observing a
>>>>> discrete structure" if the resolution is too coarse.
>>>
>>>> Then show me a continuum which is still a continuum at all levels of
>>>> magnification.
>
>>> Why should I? We don't have "all levels of magnification" available
>>> for observation.
>
>> Why?
>
>Such is life. Why not?
>
>> Because if you don't you are open to the charge of talking
>> metaphysical claptrap.
>
>I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
Then following Popper you are not a scientist. Popper describes
metaphysics as science because it can be proved wrong. That is garbage,
and makes nonsense of the very meaning of the word science, which is
knowledge.
>
>>>> For one thing I do not regard myself as a positivist. I am most
>>>> definitely a realist.
>
>>> Do you follow Popper? If not, where are your disagreements?
>
>> I consider Popper as simplistic as he is wrong. (As illustrated by my
>> disagreement with you over the meaning and truth of special relativity).
>> For a theory to be scientific it must come with a rider, explicit or
>> implicit, describing the circumstances and a range of experimental
>> accuracy under which it holds. It would be tedious in the extreme to
>> make the rider explicit every time the theory is stated, but if it is a
>> scientific theory it should be taken that the rider exists,
>
>Einstein, at time of creation of GR, could not have guessed what is
>the correct rider.
That is irrelevant. All that is needed is the knowledge that a rider can
be produced. The fact that gtr agreed with Newtonian gravity gives a
sufficient rider for theory to be scientific, although it is better that
a much broader rider could also be produced.
> That it works, for example, for binary pulsars.
>We don't know today if it works for the global universe (but our
>matter models are invalid) or if the "dark energy" problem is a
>disagreement between GR and observation. And to find this out, we
>have to apply GR in the questionable domain, to derive predictions,
>and to see if they fail. Thus, even if there is a "rider", scientists
>do not care about such riders but apply the theory beyond this rider,
>simply because there is no other way to establish the correct rider.
You are now talking of research issues. Examining the limitations of a
theory is a matter of research. The rider does not have to describe the
absolute limitations of the theory, merely a set of circumstances under
which it is true.
>Of course, there are some parts of SR which follow from SR axioms and
>in this sense may be proven. These parts are accepted as mathematical
>theorems also in Popper's concept.
>
>> When a scientific theory is fully and properly expressed in this manner
>> it is perfectly possible to say that it is true, and indeed it is
>> possible to say that special relativity is true in local regions
>> whenever the internationally agreed definitions of time and space
>> coordinates can be made,
>
>Nonsense. "Internationally agreed definitions of time and space
>coordinates" can be made with high accuracy in our global universe,
>using the CMBR frame. SR is clearly false in this domain, as well as
>in many comparably local subdomains.
That is irrelevant to the truth of SR, which is specified to apply
locally.
>>>>>>>> Actually a bit more is assumed, namely the reality of a space
>>>>>>>>background
>>>>>>>> in which entities can be described.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then how are you defining localism?
>>>>>
>>>>> As the part which justifies the claim "not (a-> B or b-> A)" for
>>>>> space-like separated events.
>>>
>>>>> I see a clear subdivision:
>>>>> Einstein-causality -> "not (a-> B or b-> A)"
>>>
>>>> First can you express Einstein causality without any implicit
>>>> reference to background space-time structure.
>>>
>>> I don't even want. Einstein causality defines the connection between
>>> spacetime structure and causality. Once I have clarified that "not
>>> (a-> B or b-> A)", I have no further need for spacetime.
>>
>> Once you have included space-time you have no further need for
>> space-time? Come on.
>
>I have used it in the first part. Let's name it the "spacetime part"
>if you like. This first part is completely classical, extremely
>simple, has never been questioned.
Then it is about bloody time it was questioned, since failure to
question it is the same as the complete failure to understand quantum
Ilja Schmelzer
No. This is the basic argument that the use of "measurement" is
inappropriate.
According to common sense, everything what happens in reality can be
discussed using classical logic and probability theory. If something
"cannot be discussed" in this context, it is simply nonsense. If QM
in its "measurement"-formulation is in contradiction to classical
logic, this formulation is simply false. Point.
We have to use another formulation, which is quite simple. The minimal
interpretation, which talks only about probability distributions,
combined with a replacement of "measurement" by "interaction", does
this job.
>>> But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion.
>> Quantum logic is, IMHO, an interesting algebraic structure with an
>> unfortunate name. It has nothing to do with common sense,
> It is just a subtlety to see that it is common sense, and it needs to be
> shown by discussion that it is common sense when properly thought
> through.
(Almost) every algebraic structure is in some sense in agreement with
common sense: according to common sense you have the right to define
it and derive various properties from its axioms. This type of
agreement is not interesting.
The interesting part is the identification of the algebraic structure
with structures of reasoning. The claim that certain laws of
classical consistent reasoning do not hold in a quantum world.
A claim which is false.
>>> I understand that Von Neumann named quantum logic because he observed a
>>> mathematical structure which was the same as that of a generalised
>>> structure of propositions, i.e. a logic.
>> The problem is that it is not the same, but weaker.
> You say weaker, I say generalised.
The point is that some axiom of classical logic does not hold
according to quantum logic. "Weaker" and "generalized" are only
different words.
> But informal language is much more general than formal language,
Indeed. Therefore we prefer a "less general" logic in science.
>>> It does not seem as though he identified the actual propositions, or
>>> maybe he was just so bright he thought it was clear in the maths.
>> In what I have learned as "quantum logic" there are well-defined
>> propositions. Statements like "S has coordinate x", "S has momentum
>> x" where S is some state. There is no classical realistic model where
>> all these claims may be true together (if "measurement" is understood
>> as measurement of something already existing).
> Then the propositions are wrong, which is why I have been at pains to
> point to the fact of the subjunctive clause which must be used to make
> sense of these propositions.
These statements are, indeed, wrong. Which we can prove by
application of classical logic. But not in quantum logic, which is
"more general".
>> The classical common sense concludes there is something wrong with
>> these claims,
> Precisely. The subjunctive is missing.
>> The "quantum logic" way is to claim that all these claims are correct,
>> but logic is false, and to remove some classical logical rules which
>> allow to derive a contradiction from all these claims.
> As appropriate to the subjunctive
But once we have modified the claims so that there no longer is any
problem with classical logic, we have no need to modify classical
logic.
>>> I don't find it clear in the maths.
>> The math is clear.
> Then you already see the subjunctive is expressed in them?
No. I see clear algebraic relations between the elements.
These elements are projection operators, not statements.
>> In the world of common sense there are similar differences if
>> "measurement" is the result of interaction. If a police officer knows
>> that a suspect is near X because of an interaction between them (and,
>> therefore, the suspect also knows that he has been seen) the suspect
>> may behave differently.
>> BTW, in Bohmian mechanics Bayesian probability is sufficient.
> But the metaphysics is garbage, and clashes with what we know of
> relativity.
I disagree, but that's another discussion.
The "metaphysics is garbage" is positivistic nonsense, the "clash with
relativity" is the necessity of a hidden preferred frame. Its a
really strange argument against a hidden variable theory that it
contains a special hidden variable: a preferred frame.
>> The important difference in "quantum logic" is the following:
>>
>> p(x) - the projection operator - may be interpreted in a direct form:
>>
>> "The particle _is_, with probability |psi(x)|^2, in x".
>>
>> This interpretation is in contradiction with classical logic(*), IOW
>> nonsense.
>
> If that is so, then this interpretation is clearly wrong. Do not put it
> forward.
I have to put it forward to explain the meaning of "quantum logic".
According to "quantum logic" it is not wrong, because some of the laws
of consistent thinking which are used to derive the contradiction
are not accepted in "quantum logic".
>> There is another interpretation:
>> "A certain interaction with the particle named for historical reasons
>> 'measurement of position of the particle' _gives_, with probability
>> |psi(x)|^2, the result x."
>> This interpretation has already no contradiction with classical logic.
> But it only matches when the measurement was actually done, so is
> inadequate.
Add whatever you want to tell about other cases. As long as you
accept that _all_ laws of classical logic may be applied to your
claims, and, if a contradiction appears, some of your claims should be
wrong, that's fine. In this case you accept classical logic.
That's the BM way. We add a lot of statements about reality,
trajectories and so on. All together are consistent, give no
contradiction, tell us about everything we would like to know. The BM
statements about trajectories are AFAIU something close to your
"subjunctive" claims.
>> Thus, complex truth value is real (Bayesian) truth value + something
>> meaningless. LOL. We apply Occam's razor.
>
> Then you have a great deal of trouble describing time evolution.
No. It is well-defined in BM which is in agreement with my philosophy.
>>> Quantum logic is in agreement with classical logic, or at least with
>>> classical probability theory whenever an experiment is done.
>> I hope I have clearified my understanding of the "quantum logic"
>> concept.
> It is clear, but inadequate. I might have hope to have extended your
> understanding of it, but at the moment your mind seems enclosed.
I see a similar problem with your SR understanding. I tend to accept
the copyright for SR as defined by Einstein/Minkowski, "quantum logic"
by their creators, AFAIU them. You develop something different, in
better agreement with observation (SR as local limit of GR, quantum
logic as not in contradictio with classical logic) but want to use the
same name.
This leads to a clash. An unnecessary clash of notions, names.
>>>>>>>>> quite without empirical justification
>>>> I know. Science does not give, in principle, any empirical
>>>> justifications for the truth of theories. There are always
>>>> possibly valid alternatives.
>>> Not always. For example special relativity follows from the
>>> defining processes of measurement of time and space coordinates in
>>> a locality.
>> It follows from axioms which may be easily questioned and replaced
>> with alternatives. For example, the classical Lorentz ether is an
>> alternative to SR.
> Not really. It is just a wacky metaphysical idea which gives the same
> formulae as special relativity under a narrow range of circumstances
> which do not hold generally.
Whatever, it is an alternative. I have not claimed you should like
the alternative.
>
>>>>> Then show me a real physical instance of a continuum which does not
>>>>> break down into some other small scale structure under sufficient
>>>>> magnification.
>>
>>>> Why should I? I name spacetime. Now you have to present me an actual
>>>> _observation_ where it breaks down into another small scale structure.
>>
>>> First present an observation of space time.
>>
>> No. You have made a claim about contradiction with observation. You
>> have to present observations.
>
> No. I believe I said space-time could not be justified from observation,
> and hence is unscientific. You tried to deny my claim, you have to
> present observations.
So let's iterate. I have answered that nothing can be really
justified from observation, all we can do to "justify" using
observation is to present theories which have the property in question
(for example a continuous spacetime) which make predictions and that
these predictions are not yet falsified by observation.
> So there is no observation of space-time.
There is no theory-independent observation at all.
>> I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>> recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
> Then following Popper you are not a scientist. Popper describes
> metaphysics as science because it can be proved wrong. That is garbage,
> and makes nonsense of the very meaning of the word science, which is
> knowledge.
Then we have a fundamental disagreement about the scientific method.
You seem to follow a classical ideal of knowledge which has been shown
to be unrealizable and has nothing to do with real science.
>>> It would be tedious in the extreme to make the rider explicit
>>> every time the theory is stated, but if it is a scientific theory
>>> it should be taken that the rider exists,
>> Einstein, at time of creation of GR, could not have guessed what is
>> the correct rider.
> That is irrelevant.
No. Because there is no way Einstein could have used to produce your rider.
> All that is needed is the knowledge that a rider can be produced.
Knowledge which was not available for Einstein.
> The fact that gtr agreed with Newtonian gravity gives a sufficient
> rider for theory to be scientific, although it is better that a much
> broader rider could also be produced.
Your rider-requirement does not improve anything in the scientific
method. A theory with rider has the same problem as a theory without:
Or you restrict your rider to past measurements, or you cannot prove
the correctness of the rider because of the induction problem.
Your rider is a reasonable way to modify a theory without rider of
with greater rider after falsification.
> You are now talking of research issues. Examining the limitations of
> a theory is a matter of research. The rider does not have to
> describe the absolute limitations of the theory, merely a set of
> circumstances under which it is true.
There is no such set in any strong sense (proven truth).
>> I have used it in the first part. Let's name it the "spacetime part"
>> if you like. This first part is completely classical, extremely
>> simple, has never been questioned.
> Then it is about bloody time it was questioned, since failure to
> question it is the same as the complete failure to understand quantum
> mechanics.
Feel free to question whatever you like.
To question that from Einstein causality follows that for space-like
separated events as used in EPR-Bell experiments follows
"not( a -> B or b -> A)" seems IMHO quite unreasonable.
Ralph E. Frost
> In message <uiof9i2...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
> >
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> >news:xW2BCuOFq$K9E...@clef.demon.co.uk...
> >> In article <i3g8z4l...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >> >>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> >
> >> >>>> A truth value is just a mathematical idea which
> >> >>>> we are free to invent in any consistent way in which we choose.
> >
> >Doesn't the truth value of all the various ways to label truth value have
> >more to do with resonance than with anything else?
>
> I don't you know what you mean by resonance in this context, but it is
> reasonable to demand, as does Ilja, that a truth value is a measure of
> truth. I seek also to show that complex truth values are a measure of
> truth.
What I mean my resonance in this context is -- resonance, agreement,
symmetry -- that who ever is to gaze upon such expressions necessarily
needs to *feel* when gazing on such expressions and having the imagery "fit"
into place.
...
> >Is the Baynesian imagery basically approaching the quantum realm, coming
> >from the school of thought that classical stuff is sacred and that
> >determinism *breaks* upon crossing the classical/quantum boundary?
> >
> >Is this quantum logic business that you refer to perhaps in the school
of
> >thought where one begins within the quantum realm and notices that
> >determinism *emerges* as the entanglements and nesting get more
complex,
> >leading to highly repeatable "classical" constraints?
>
>
> No, determinism is a different issue. Bayesianism basically means that
> we think of probability as a measure of plausibility or truth. I have
> been saying that in quantum logic we also think of the probability
> amplitude as a measure of likelihood or truth. Ilja has been concerned
> that there is a clash between those points of view, whereas I have been
> seeking to show that they can be reconciled.
You lost me on determinism being unrelated and on the
probability/plausibility mumbo. Sorry.
It appears to me that you are still beginning your walk in the classical
realm, assuming determinism breaks when you move into the quantum realm,
whereby then you try to map the breakage via either of the types of
probablility notions.
I think the more fruitful path starts out in the deep recesses of quantum
gravity, not excluding gravity, and then noticing that as the entanglements
nest and grow, someplace along a fairly complex surface, various amounts of
determinism *emerge* in various amounts, mostly dependent upon the
"openness" and amounts and types of energy that flow through the different
classes of emergent artifacts. Rocks and such follow certain rules of
emergence. Biospheric stuff and so-called conscious or semi-conscious
widgets glide along in acoord with entirely different sets of rules.
If physics is about approximating or discerning what these rules are so we
can beterr order our affairs and educational systems, then it seems to me
the objective functions and rules that will also emerge will differ based on
how one views and approaches this boundary issue.
If the natural situation is the quantum gravitational realm supports the
classical realm and deteminism *emerges*, then working on a model that
views this in reverse is likely to be pretty danged complicated until the
fever breaks.
Maybe that is what you and Ilja are bandying back and forth, but if so,
pardon me for being so insensitive but it sure doesn't sound like it.
- Ralph Frost
http://www.refrost.com
Use more robust symbols
Seek a thought worthy of speech.
"...Love one another..." John 15:12
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>According to common sense, everything what happens in reality can be
>discussed using classical logic and probability theory. If something
>"cannot be discussed" in this context, it is simply nonsense. If QM
>in its "measurement"-formulation is in contradiction to classical
>logic, this formulation is simply false.
To repeat, in its measurement formulation there is absolutely no
contradiction between qm and classical logic. You only appear to get a
clash by trying to assume that the world between measurements is
described by definite measurement results. Of course there still exists
the possibility that there is a description of the world between
measurements, but that description is not qm.
>We have to use another formulation, which is quite simple. The minimal
>interpretation, which talks only about probability distributions,
>combined with a replacement of "measurement" by "interaction", does
>this job.
I do not see how altering the meanings of fairly straightforward words
like measurement and interaction does any job other than create
confusion. We do have to ensure that our understanding of measurement
does not contain unwarranted assumptions, like the prior existence of
the measured value, but that is all.
>>>> But quantum logic has not been purified by discussion.
>
>>> Quantum logic is, IMHO, an interesting algebraic structure with an
>>> unfortunate name. It has nothing to do with common sense,
>
>> It is just a subtlety to see that it is common sense, and it needs to be
>> shown by discussion that it is common sense when properly thought
>> through.
>
>(Almost) every algebraic structure is in some sense in agreement with
>common sense: according to common sense you have the right to define
>it and derive various properties from its axioms. This type of
>agreement is not interesting.
I agree, but quantum logic has real correspondence with ordinary
language using the subjunctive, so your objection does not apply.
>
>The interesting part is the identification of the algebraic structure
>with structures of reasoning. The claim that certain laws of
>classical consistent reasoning do not hold in a quantum world.
No such claim is made. Reasoning is the same as always.
>The point is that some axiom of classical logic does not hold
>according to quantum logic.
No axiom of classical logic does not apply. Only a metaphysical
construct, in this instance space-time does not apply. Space-time is
metaphysics, not logic.
> "Weaker" and "generalized" are only
>different words.
A language, in this case quantum logic, which can describe everything
which classical probability theory describes, and which is in absolute
agreement with probability theory when it applies, and can also describe
a whole lot more besides is clearly a more powerful language, not a
weaker one.
>
>> But informal language is much more general than formal language,
>
>Indeed. Therefore we prefer a "less general" logic in science.
It is not common sense to restrict yourself to a language which is not
adequate to discuss reality, when informal language is actually up to
the job.
>>>> It does not seem as though he identified the actual propositions, or
>>>> maybe he was just so bright he thought it was clear in the maths.
>
>>> In what I have learned as "quantum logic" there are well-defined
>>> propositions. Statements like "S has coordinate x", "S has momentum
>>> x" where S is some state. There is no classical realistic model where
>>> all these claims may be true together (if "measurement" is understood
>>> as measurement of something already existing).
>
>> Then the propositions are wrong, which is why I have been at pains to
>> point to the fact of the subjunctive clause which must be used to make
>> sense of these propositions.
>
>These statements are, indeed, wrong. Which we can prove by
>application of classical logic. But not in quantum logic, which is
>"more general".
Well of course if you start with the misapplication of quantum logic by
using definite statements all you can show is that you are talking
garbage. Quantum logic replaces those sentences by introducing the
subjunctive, and so the objection does not apply.
>
>>> The classical common sense concludes there is something wrong with
>>> these claims,
>
>> Precisely. The subjunctive is missing.
>
>>> The "quantum logic" way is to claim that all these claims are correct,
>>> but logic is false, and to remove some classical logical rules which
>>> allow to derive a contradiction from all these claims.
>
>> As appropriate to the subjunctive
>
>But once we have modified the claims so that there no longer is any
>problem with classical logic, we have no need to modify classical
>logic.
>
>>>> I don't find it clear in the maths.
>
>>> The math is clear.
>
>> Then you already see the subjunctive is expressed in them?
>
>No.
Then you do not find it clear.
>I see clear algebraic relations between the elements.
>These elements are projection operators, not statements.
That is just the mechanical manipulation of mathematical formulae, which
is always clear if one can be bothered to pay attention. Understanding
what the formulae say is a different issue.
>> But the metaphysics is garbage, and clashes with what we know of
>> relativity.
>
>I disagree, but that's another discussion.
>
>The "metaphysics is garbage" is positivistic nonsense, the "clash with
>relativity" is the necessity of a hidden preferred frame. Its a
>really strange argument against a hidden variable theory that it
>contains a special hidden variable: a preferred frame.
No, it is a direct conflict with any common sensual notion that position
is only meaningful when it means position relative to other matter. This
Cartesian/Leibnizian view was absolute common sense before absolute
space, which was a patently absurd notion to many, became habitual
thinking.
This metaphysics is garbage not because it is simply "beyond nature",
i.e. supernatural, but because we already know that it is proven wrong,
falsified by general relativity. Of course only a Popperist could say a
theory is right and scientific because it is falsified, but that is
itself a denial of logic and common sense.
There is nothing positivist in this stance. Quite clearly to a realist
there is a reality beyond measurement results. If you claim to be a
realist you should appreciate a language, vis quantum logic, which can
talk of reality beyond measurement results. Instead you deny that such a
thing exists.
>
>I have to put it forward to explain the meaning of "quantum logic".
But you do not show any understanding of quantum logic, which is why you
do not accept it. It would be more sensible if you paid attention to the
explanation I have given.
>According to "quantum logic" it is not wrong, because some of the laws
>of consistent thinking which are used to derive the contradiction
>are not accepted in "quantum logic".
This is simply not true.
>
>>> There is another interpretation:
>>> "A certain interaction with the particle named for historical reasons
>>> 'measurement of position of the particle' _gives_, with probability
>>> |psi(x)|^2, the result x."
>>> This interpretation has already no contradiction with classical logic.
>
>> But it only matches when the measurement was actually done, so is
>> inadequate.
>
>Add whatever you want to tell about other cases.
That can be done with quantum logic.
>
>That's the BM way. We add a lot of statements about reality,
>trajectories and so on.
These are just words, not a possible description of reality.
>>> Thus, complex truth value is real (Bayesian) truth value + something
>>> meaningless. LOL. We apply Occam's razor.
>>
I should have pointed out that this is done as a fundamental principle
in qft, U(1) gauge symmetry. You can always apply a gauge transformation
and remove the meaningless phase at all points. But it is easier to
calculate with the phase in place.
>>>> Quantum logic is in agreement with classical logic, or at least with
>>>> classical probability theory whenever an experiment is done.
>
>>> I hope I have clearified my understanding of the "quantum logic"
>>> concept.
>
>> It is clear, but inadequate. I might have hope to have extended your
>> understanding of it, but at the moment your mind seems enclosed.
>
>I see a similar problem with your SR understanding. I tend to accept
>the copyright for SR as defined by Einstein/Minkowski,
Minkowski has no copyright is SR. As originally proposed by Einstein SR
is a relationist theory of the sort advocated, but not developed, by
Leibniz and Descartes. In fact it is only a partially relationist theory
since it only has motion as relative, whereas position is also relative.
The discovery of a mathematical invariant form by Minkowski in no way
implies that this form has physical meaning. The attempt to identify
Minkowski space-time with a metaphysic seriously debases SR as
scientific theory and clashes with both GR and qm.
>"quantum logic"
>by their creators, AFAIU them. You develop something different, in
>better agreement with observation (SR as local limit of GR, quantum
>logic as not in contradictio with classical logic) but want to use the
>same name.
I just give a different interpretation of the same thing. It is still
the same thing. No one changed the name of probability theory when
Bayesianism became more fashionable than Frequentism.
>
>>> It follows from axioms which may be easily questioned and replaced
>>> with alternatives. For example, the classical Lorentz ether is an
>>> alternative to SR.
>> Not really. It is just a wacky metaphysical idea which gives the same
>> formulae as special relativity under a narrow range of circumstances
>> which do not hold generally.
>
>Whatever, it is an alternative.
Only if you do not think properly about the definition of time and space
coordinates. The axioms of special relativity describe how we actually
go about measuring things. If you replace them you no longer have a
definition of time and space coordinates which corresponds to what we
actually do. Hence any such replacement is nonsense.
>> I believe I said space-time could not be justified from observation,
>> and hence is unscientific. You tried to deny my claim, you have to
>> present observations.
>
>So let's iterate. I have answered that nothing can be really
>justified from observation, all we can do to "justify" using
>observation is to present theories which have the property in question
>(for example a continuous spacetime) which make predictions and that
>these predictions are not yet falsified by observation.
Then I disagree. I justify special relativity by observing the manner in
which time and space coordinates are defined, and then making deductions
from them. I do much the same with qm.
>There is no theory-independent observation at all.
On a trivial level if I observe two apples I need no theory because that
is what I mean by apples and that is what I mean by two. The trick is to
reduce scientific theory to the level of such trivial observation. The
only theories I need is one which says reality exists, and one which
says the underlying structure of reality is always the same, since
without this scientific observation would be nonsense.
>>> I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>>> recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
But where Popper made a complete klutz of himself was to suggest that
these parts are scientifically established. It is precisely because they
are not scientific that they are open to rejection by future theories.
>
>> Then following Popper you are not a scientist. Popper describes
>> metaphysics as science because it can be proved wrong. That is garbage,
>> and makes nonsense of the very meaning of the word science, which is
>> knowledge.
>
>Then we have a fundamental disagreement about the scientific method.
>You seem to follow a classical ideal of knowledge which has been shown
>to be unrealizable and has nothing to do with real science.
That is only what Popper thought, but Popper's thought itself had
nothing to do with real science. The only thing which is discredited is
argument from induction, and that was always discredited. Popper gets no
credit for that.
>>>> It would be tedious in the extreme to make the rider explicit
>>>> every time the theory is stated, but if it is a scientific theory
>>>> it should be taken that the rider exists,
>
>>> Einstein, at time of creation of GR, could not have guessed what is
>>> the correct rider.
>
>> That is irrelevant.
>
>No. Because there is no way Einstein could have used to produce your rider.
Actually Einstein could have produced any number of correct riders. It
is not needed to produce a rider at the extremum of what is true, only
one within which the theory is true, such as Newton's rider to the
effect that geometrical constructs like circles and lines only exist to
the accuracy of mechanics.
>
>> All that is needed is the knowledge that a rider can be produced.
>
>Knowledge which was not available for Einstein.
Of course it was. In fact he found gtr by looking at the manner in which
the assumptions of sr could be expected to break down when it ceases to
be a local theory.
>> The fact that gtr agreed with Newtonian gravity gives a sufficient
>> rider for theory to be scientific, although it is better that a much
>> broader rider could also be produced.
>
>Your rider-requirement does not improve anything in the scientific
>method. A theory with rider has the same problem as a theory without:
>Or you restrict your rider to past measurements, or you cannot prove
>the correctness of the rider because of the induction problem.
I do not even allow induction. If the measurement processes described in
SR can be applied SR holds. If not, it doesn't. There is no induction
here.
>> You are now talking of research issues. Examining the limitations of
>> a theory is a matter of research. The rider does not have to
>> describe the absolute limitations of the theory, merely a set of
>> circumstances under which it is true.
>
>There is no such set in any strong sense (proven truth).
There is proven truth in the form of the sentence just given "If the
measurement processes described in SR can be applied SR holds." That
statement only requires deductive logic, and so is proven.
>To question that from Einstein causality follows that for space-like
>separated events as used in EPR-Bell experiments follows
>"not( a -> B or b -> A)" seems IMHO quite unreasonable.
>
I didn't question that. But I do question the statement of Einstein
causality, and also I question any description of space-like separation
which requires space to exist as a prior form. To postulate the
existence of an absolute space which consists solely of number sounds
more like Pythagorean number worship than science.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> According to common sense, everything what happens in reality can be
>> discussed using classical logic and probability theory. If something
>> "cannot be discussed" in this context, it is simply nonsense. If QM
>> in its "measurement"-formulation is in contradiction to classical
>> logic, this formulation is simply false.
> To repeat, in its measurement formulation there is absolutely no
> contradiction between qm and classical logic.
To repeat, if "measurement" is understood as some interaction which
gives a result, as you seem to do. If "measurement" is understood as
detecting the value of something which already has a well-defined
value, not.
>> We have to use another formulation, which is quite simple. The minimal
>> interpretation, which talks only about probability distributions,
>> combined with a replacement of "measurement" by "interaction", does
>> this job.
> I do not see how altering the meanings of fairly straightforward
> words like measurement and interaction does any job other than
> create confusion.
I do not plan to alter the meaning of words. Instead, I propose not
to use the word "measurement" in QM because it has a meaning
(detection of an already existing value) which is in contradiction to
its use in QM.
If you disagree that "measurement" has such a meaning, this
replacement will be, indeed, unjustified IYO. I may err about
meanings of English words, because I'm not a native speaker.
Nonetheless, at the current moment I continue to believe that
"measurement" has such a meaning.
> We do have to ensure that our understanding of measurement does not
> contain unwarranted assumptions, like the prior existence of the
> measured value, but that is all.
This would be another way. BTW, saying that "measurement is a bad
choice, interaction would have been a better choice" is also a way to
ensure this understanding.
> I agree, but quantum logic has real correspondence with ordinary
> language using the subjunctive, so your objection does not apply.
I don't see this connection.
>> The interesting part is the identification of the algebraic structure
>> with structures of reasoning. The claim that certain laws of
>> classical consistent reasoning do not hold in a quantum world.
> No such claim is made. Reasoning is the same as always.
We disagree about the meaning of "quantum logic".
>> "Weaker" and "generalized" are only
>> different words.
> A language, in this case quantum logic, which can describe everything
> which classical probability theory describes, and which is in absolute
> agreement with probability theory when it applies, and can also describe
> a whole lot more besides is clearly a more powerful language, not a
> weaker one.
This remembers another fundamental discussion: intuitionism in math.
The proposal was to remove the axiom "exists A == not forall not A".
Another interpretation of it was the following: dear intuitionists,
please use another word for your understanding of "exists", especially
"exists_constructively". After this, we _define_ a new word "exists"
with "'exists A' =_def 'not forall not A'". After this, we have
classical math, together with some interesting (or, possibly, not so
interesting) new object of research, the quantor
"exists_constructively".
For quantum logic we have similarly these two possibilities. The
first one means weakening classical logic, the second means classical
logic holds, and we consider some new algebraic structures in this
classical context.
What I criticize and reject are interpretations of the first type. I
have no problem with interpretations of the second type. I guess you
want to present "quantum logic" as something of the second type.
Correct?
>>> But the metaphysics is garbage, and clashes with what we know of
>>> relativity.
>> I disagree, but that's another discussion.
>> The "metaphysics is garbage" is positivistic nonsense, the "clash with
>> relativity" is the necessity of a hidden preferred frame. Its a
>> really strange argument against a hidden variable theory that it
>> contains a special hidden variable: a preferred frame.
> No, it is a direct conflict with any common sensual notion that position
> is only meaningful when it means position relative to other matter. This
> Cartesian/Leibnizian view was absolute common sense before absolute
> space, which was a patently absurd notion to many, became habitual
> thinking.
I disagree, but, more important, I see no connection to Bohmian
mechanics. Except that you obviously don't like theories with
absolute space for metaphysical reasons.
> This metaphysics is garbage not because it is simply "beyond
> nature", i.e. supernatural, but because we already know that it is
> proven wrong, falsified by general relativity.
Again, there is no "proven wrong" in science. All we need is a viable
theory of gravity with absolute space. Such a theory of gravity
exists. See gr-qc/0205035.
> Of course only a Popperist could say a theory is right and
> scientific because it is falsified, but that is itself a denial of
> logic and common sense.
Nonsense.
> There is nothing positivist in this stance. Quite clearly to a
> realist there is a reality beyond measurement results. If you claim
> to be a realist you should appreciate a language, vis quantum logic,
> which can talk of reality beyond measurement results. Instead you
> deny that such a thing exists.
I have never had any problem to talk about reality beyond measurement
results in common language. What I certainly don't need for such a
purpose is some "quantum logic".
>> I have to put it forward to explain the meaning of "quantum logic".
> But you do not show any understanding of quantum logic, which is why you
> do not accept it. It would be more sensible if you paid attention to the
> explanation I have given.
I simply disagree that your description of the "quantum logic" concept
is the standard one. But I don't want to argue about copyright
questions for "quantum logic", therefore let's agree that there was a
misunderstanding about the meaning of "quantum logic".
>> That's the BM way. We add a lot of statements about reality,
>> trajectories and so on.
> These are just words, not a possible description of reality.
I disagree. First, they are not "just words" but formulas and
theorems.
>>>> Thus, complex truth value is real (Bayesian) truth value + something
>>>> meaningless. LOL. We apply Occam's razor.
> I should have pointed out that this is done as a fundamental
> principle in qft, U(1) gauge symmetry. You can always apply a gauge
> transformation and remove the meaningless phase at all points. But
> it is easier to calculate with the phase in place.
QFT is quite irrelevant here. You mingle the U(1) gauge symmetry with
the phase of the wave function. These are quite different things.
U(1) gauge symmetry is a symmetry of _classical_ electromagnetism.
>> I see a similar problem with your SR understanding. I tend to accept
>> the copyright for SR as defined by Einstein/Minkowski,
> Minkowski has no copyright is SR.
I don't want to argue about copyright claims. Feel free to believe
that in the copyright fight between Einstein/Minkowski and Francis the
winner is Francis.
> As originally proposed by Einstein SR is a relationist theory of the
> sort advocated, but not developed, by Leibniz and Descartes. In fact
> it is only a partially relationist theory
Indeed.
>> You develop something different, in better agreement with
>> observation (SR as local limit of GR, quantum logic as not in
>> contradictio with classical logic) but want to use the same name.
> I just give a different interpretation of the same thing. It is still
> the same thing.
Certainly not.
> No one changed the name of probability theory when Bayesianism
> became more fashionable than Frequentism.
When discussing these issues, people use different names for these
different things: Bayesianism and frequentism. When these differences
are unimportant, they use "probability theory".
>>>> For example, the classical Lorentz ether is an
>>>> alternative to SR.
>>> Not really. It is just a wacky metaphysical idea
>> Whatever, it is an alternative.
> Only if you do not think properly about the definition of time and space
> coordinates.
IOW if I do not follow your preferred metaphysical argumentation about
space and time.
>> So let's iterate. I have answered that nothing can be really
>> justified from observation, all we can do to "justify" using
>> observation is to present theories which have the property in
>> question (for example a continuous spacetime) which make
>> predictions and that these predictions are not yet falsified by
>> observation.
> Then I disagree. I justify special relativity by observing the
> manner in which time and space coordinates are defined, and then
> making deductions from them. I do much the same with qm.
Nonsense. Time and space coordinates are not even defined in SR, I
can define them as I like. For example, I'm free to use spherical
coordinates in SR.
>> There is no theory-independent observation at all.
> On a trivial level if I observe two apples I need no theory because
> that is what I mean by apples and that is what I mean by two. The
> trick is to reduce scientific theory to the level of such trivial
> observation.
You are naive. This was the hope of the positivists, they have
failed.
>>>> I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>>>> recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
> But where Popper made a complete klutz of himself was to suggest
> that these parts are scientifically established.
Please quote him. Popper talks about "corrobated", I don't remember
any "scientifically established".
> It is precisely because they are not scientific that they are open
> to rejection by future theories.
LOL. That means, IOW, scientific theories are not open for rejection.
They are, IOW, positive knowledge. The existence of positive
knowledge about nature is, BTW, the philosophy named positivism.
>> Then we have a fundamental disagreement about the scientific method.
>> You seem to follow a classical ideal of knowledge which has been shown
>> to be unrealizable and has nothing to do with real science.
> That is only what Popper thought, but Popper's thought itself had
> nothing to do with real science.
Fine, we agree to disagree about scientific methodology. Which
methodology of science do you follow?
> The only thing which is discredited is argument from induction, and
> that was always discredited. Popper gets no credit for that.
He has never claimed credit for discrediting induction, this was done
by Hume.
So, you follow quite naive positivistic claims, but don't know Popper,
and don't know positivism and the reasons for its failure. I would
recommend you to read Popper.
>>>> Einstein, at time of creation of GR, could not have guessed what is
>>>> the correct rider.
>>> That is irrelevant.
>> No. Because there is no way Einstein could have used to produce your rider.
> Actually Einstein could have produced any number of correct riders.
No. GR could have been simply wrong.
> It is not needed to produce a rider at the extremum of what is true
Of course, because it is not needed to produce a rider at all.
>>> All that is needed is the knowledge that a rider can be produced.
>> Knowledge which was not available for Einstein.
> Of course it was. In fact he found gtr by looking at the manner in which
> the assumptions of sr could be expected to break down when it ceases to
> be a local theory.
And he could have been completely wrong.
>> Your rider-requirement does not improve anything in the scientific
>> method. A theory with rider has the same problem as a theory without:
>> Or you restrict your rider to past measurements, or you cannot prove
>> the correctness of the rider because of the induction problem.
> I do not even allow induction. If the measurement processes described in
> SR can be applied SR holds. If not, it doesn't. There is no induction
> here.
That's a triviality, here we also don't need any riders. If the
assumptions of a physical theory hold, the theory holds. Else not.
A really deep insight.
>> To question that from Einstein causality follows that for space-like
>> separated events as used in EPR-Bell experiments follows
>> "not( a -> B or b -> A)" seems IMHO quite unreasonable.
> I didn't question that.
(You did. But let's count it as a misunderstanding.)
> But I do question the statement of Einstein causality
Me too. Fine. (In BM we have no Einstein causality on the level of
hidden variables.)
> and also I question any description of space-like separation which
> requires space to exist as a prior form. To postulate the existence
> of an absolute space which consists solely of number sounds more
> like Pythagorean number worship than science.
Numbers are names. Any realistic theory has to describe reality, and
to give the objects of reality names.
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>
>>> According to common sense, everything what happens in reality can be
>>> discussed using classical logic and probability theory. If something
>>> "cannot be discussed" in this context, it is simply nonsense. If QM
>>> in its "measurement"-formulation is in contradiction to classical
>>> logic, this formulation is simply false.
>
>> To repeat, in its measurement formulation there is absolutely no
>> contradiction between qm and classical logic.
>
>To repeat, if "measurement" is understood as some interaction which
>gives a result, as you seem to do. If "measurement" is understood as
>detecting the value of something which already has a well-defined
>value, not.
The latter is a clash between an assumed metaphysic and quantum
mechanics, not between qm and classical logic. I am not prepared to
reject classical logic, but I have little trouble rejecting an assumed
metaphysic when I find it in conflict with experiment and perceive it
unnecessary to both to physics and thought.
>>> We have to use another formulation, which is quite simple. The minimal
>>> interpretation, which talks only about probability distributions,
>>> combined with a replacement of "measurement" by "interaction", does
>>> this job.
>
>> I do not see how altering the meanings of fairly straightforward
>> words like measurement and interaction does any job other than
>> create confusion.
>
>I do not plan to alter the meaning of words. Instead, I propose not
>to use the word "measurement" in QM because it has a meaning
>(detection of an already existing value) which is in contradiction to
>its use in QM.
>
>If you disagree that "measurement" has such a meaning, this
>replacement will be, indeed, unjustified IYO. I may err about
>meanings of English words, because I'm not a native speaker.
>Nonetheless, at the current moment I continue to believe that
>"measurement" has such a meaning.
English words rarely have unique meanings. So many languages have
contributed to English that it is often claimed that English is uniquely
flexible. In the case of 'measurement' I would have said it is an
important philosophical issue as to whether in measurement there is a
prior value which is to be determined, or whether the value is produced
in the measurement. Although the former is often assumed there is
nothing in the word itself to imply that this must be the case.
Measurement is best defined as meaning that which is done in
measurement, a definition which does not prejudge whether a value exists
as prior or not.
I do not know how other languages are affected. I understand that
Descartes, Leibniz and Riemann who were not English speakers all gave
the matter thought and considered measurement as a comparison between
matter and matter, and that it was not in general possible to assume the
prior existence of the value.
>> We do have to ensure that our understanding of measurement does not
>> contain unwarranted assumptions, like the prior existence of the
>> measured value, but that is all.
>
>This would be another way. BTW, saying that "measurement is a bad
>choice, interaction would have been a better choice" is also a way to
>ensure this understanding.
The trouble is that the word interaction really does not apply very well
here at all. Interaction does not imply that a value is returned. Also
one wants the word interaction to apply to fundamental physical
processes "an electron emits/absorbs a photon" is an interaction.
If we had another word to distinguish measurement of a prior value from
measurement of a value produced by the measurement, that might be
helpful, but as, prior to qm, this has merely been an obscure
philosophical principle considered only by the great mathematical
philosophers of science I do not think there is another word. So it
seems better to distinguish by adding an adjective and to talk of
classical measurement when there is a prior value and quantum
measurement when there is not.
>> I agree, but quantum logic has real correspondence with ordinary
>> language using the subjunctive, so your objection does not apply.
>
>I don't see this connection.
I don't understand why not. QM describes a Hilbert space. If we take as
a basis the states |x> for which there is a definite position then every
state is expressible as a superposition of position eigenstates. Then ql
is defined in such a way as to agree with probability theory whenever a
measurement is done which will return a definite position. Then the
state
0.6|x> + 0.8|y>
is defined simply to mean that in a measurement of position the result
would be x with probability 0.35 and y with probability 0.64.
0.6|x> + 0.8|y> means no more and no less than that, and which is
perfectly expressible in ordinary language.
>>> The interesting part is the identification of the algebraic structure
>>> with structures of reasoning. The claim that certain laws of
>>> classical consistent reasoning do not hold in a quantum world.
>
>> No such claim is made. Reasoning is the same as always.
>
>We disagree about the meaning of "quantum logic".
I generally try to mean that which it is possible to mean if the words
makes sense. I agree that many accounts describe quantum logic in terms
of definite statements and funny rules of truth, and I agree that this
view is nonsense and should be rejected. But by introducing the
subjunctive I am able to use strict rules of truth consistent with
classical probability theory. In doing so I am describing the same
mathematical structure of Hilbert space, and I am also describing a
structure of propositions, so the name quantum logic applies quite
correctly. In fact Von-Neumann and Dirac and even in Copenhagen there is
discussion of the subjunctive, that qm gives rules for what would happen
if a measurement were to be done. I was suggesting that Von Neumann may
well have thought in terms of a subjunctive clause encompassing the
whole of quantum logic, whereas I have made the subjunctive clauses
explicit in the sentences of the logic. If so what I am doing is really
very little different from the expansion of a bracket by the
distributive law, but I find it clearer.
>>> "Weaker" and "generalized" are only
>>> different words.
>
>> A language, in this case quantum logic, which can describe everything
>> which classical probability theory describes, and which is in absolute
>> agreement with probability theory when it applies, and can also describe
>> a whole lot more besides is clearly a more powerful language, not a
>> weaker one.
>
>This remembers another fundamental discussion: intuitionism in math.
>
>The proposal was to remove the axiom "exists A == not forall not A".
>
>Another interpretation of it was the following: dear intuitionists,
>please use another word for your understanding of "exists", especially
>"exists_constructively". After this, we _define_ a new word "exists"
>with "'exists A' =_def 'not forall not A'". After this, we have
>classical math, together with some interesting (or, possibly, not so
>interesting) new object of research, the quantor
>"exists_constructively".
>
>For quantum logic we have similarly these two possibilities. The
>first one means weakening classical logic, the second means classical
>logic holds, and we consider some new algebraic structures in this
>classical context.
>
>What I criticize and reject are interpretations of the first type. I
>have no problem with interpretations of the second type. I guess you
>want to present "quantum logic" as something of the second type.
>Correct?
Yes, I think so.
>>>> But the metaphysics is garbage, and clashes with what we know of
>>>> relativity.
>
>>> I disagree, but that's another discussion.
>>> The "metaphysics is garbage" is positivistic nonsense, the "clash with
>>> relativity" is the necessity of a hidden preferred frame. Its a
>>> really strange argument against a hidden variable theory that it
>>> contains a special hidden variable: a preferred frame.
>
>> No, it is a direct conflict with any common sensual notion that position
>> is only meaningful when it means position relative to other matter. This
>> Cartesian/Leibnizian view was absolute common sense before absolute
>> space, which was a patently absurd notion to many, became habitual
>> thinking.
>
>I disagree, but, more important, I see no connection to Bohmian
>mechanics. Except that you obviously don't like theories with
>absolute space for metaphysical reasons.
I don't like any unnecessary metaphysical assumption, and most certainly
I reject non-local theories. All that is necessary is to describe a
model of particles in which there is no background space, in which
position only makes sense as the position of matter relative to matter,
and in which contact is necessary for interaction. This is a local
realist model, and I can demonstrate using only classical mathematical
reasoning that measurements in this model necessarily obey quantum
mechanics, and I can further demonstrate gtr within this model
http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001
Discrete Quantum Mechanics I: Quantum Covariance
>> This metaphysics is garbage not because it is simply "beyond
>> nature", i.e. supernatural, but because we already know that it is
>> proven wrong, falsified by general relativity.
>
>Again, there is no "proven wrong" in science. All we need is a viable
>theory of gravity with absolute space. Such a theory of gravity
>exists. See gr-qc/0205035.
We may have different ideas of what is "viable", but I'll read your
paper if you'll read mine
>> Of course only a Popperist could say a theory is right and
>> scientific because it is falsified, but that is itself a denial of
>> logic and common sense.
>
>Nonsense.
I should have added a smiley -;)
>> There is nothing positivist in this stance. Quite clearly to a
>> realist there is a reality beyond measurement results. If you claim
>> to be a realist you should appreciate a language, vis quantum logic,
>> which can talk of reality beyond measurement results. Instead you
>> deny that such a thing exists.
>
>I have never had any problem to talk about reality beyond measurement
>results in common language. What I certainly don't need for such a
>purpose is some "quantum logic".
As I have put it quantum logic is only a mathematical formalisation of
ordinary language. We need mathematical formalisations in order to
calculate and to assist rigorous thought.
>>> I have to put it forward to explain the meaning of "quantum logic".
>
>> But you do not show any understanding of quantum logic, which is why you
>> do not accept it. It would be more sensible if you paid attention to the
>> explanation I have given.
>
>I simply disagree that your description of the "quantum logic" concept
>is the standard one.
I do not claim it is the standard one, as I have never seen anyone make
the subjunctive clause explicit. I do claim it is the correct one, and
that the inclusion of a subjunctive clause is necessary if it is to make
sense and have a legitimate interpretation in ordinary language.
>>> That's the BM way. We add a lot of statements about reality,
>>> trajectories and so on.
>
>> These are just words, not a possible description of reality.
>
>I disagree. First, they are not "just words" but formulas and
>theorems.
formulae and theorems are just phrases and sentences expressed in
mathematical language, which is itself just a formal extension of
ordinary language and consists of words. E.g. x = 5 is a simple
sentence, subject x, verb =, object 5. x, = and 5 are just the words of
this sentence.
>>>>> Thus, complex truth value is real (Bayesian) truth value + something
>>>>> meaningless. LOL. We apply Occam's razor.
>
>> I should have pointed out that this is done as a fundamental
>> principle in qft, U(1) gauge symmetry. You can always apply a gauge
>> transformation and remove the meaningless phase at all points. But
>> it is easier to calculate with the phase in place.
>
>QFT is quite irrelevant here.
Actually it is highly relevant since in order to introduce interactions
into the model described in my paper it is necessary to construct
"field" operators. (I do this in part II, not on lanl). I use the term
"field" operator because, to all intents and purposes, these are
mathematically and formally the same as the field operators. However the
model is a particle theoretic qed, in the original tradition of Dirac's
hole theoretic qed and following Feynman, it is not a field theoretic
qed in the sense that of the second quantisation of "classical" fields
following Jordan and other such metaphysical tripe.
>You mingle the U(1) gauge symmetry with
>the phase of the wave function. These are quite different things.
>U(1) gauge symmetry is a symmetry of _classical_ electromagnetism.
The phase of the wave function is also a U(1) gauge symmetry, and plays
a vital role in qed.
I must admit I hate the way physicists, particularly field theorists,
bandy symmetries about by describing their group theoretic
classifications, U(1), SU(2) etc instead of studying the underlying
meaning of the symmetry. it is often the case that they thoroughly
confuse quite different underlying symmetries because they have the same
group structure. By my count there are four, quite distinct symmetries
in qed, all of which physicists call gauge symmetry, apparently not even
realising that they are distinct symmetries.
>>> I see a similar problem with your SR understanding. I tend to accept
>>> the copyright for SR as defined by Einstein/Minkowski,
>
>> Minkowski has no copyright is SR.
>
>I don't want to argue about copyright claims. Feel free to believe
>that in the copyright fight between Einstein/Minkowski and Francis the
>winner is Francis.
That would be an appalling claim.
>> As originally proposed by Einstein SR is a relationist theory of the
>> sort advocated, but not developed, by Leibniz and Descartes. In fact
>> it is only a partially relationist theory
>
>Indeed.
>
>>> You develop something different, in better agreement with
>>> observation (SR as local limit of GR, quantum logic as not in
>>> contradictio with classical logic) but want to use the same name.
>
>> I just give a different interpretation of the same thing. It is still
>> the same thing.
>
>Certainly not.
It is the same thing. Language cannot be taken to be so rigid.
>> No one changed the name of probability theory when Bayesianism
>> became more fashionable than Frequentism.
>
>When discussing these issues, people use different names for these
>different things: Bayesianism and frequentism. When these differences
>are unimportant, they use "probability theory".
Names sometimes have to be invented to distinguish valid positions.
Bayesianism can mean objective or subjective Bayesianism, and there is a
world of difference between them. Like probability theory, quantum logic
is the name of the mathematical structure, not the interpretation.
Bayesianism and Frequentism are names for interpretations. I do not have
an established name for my interpretation of quantum logic, but it is
still quantum logic, and I do not think there is another valid
interpretation of it.
>>>>> For example, the classical Lorentz ether is an
>>>>> alternative to SR.
>
>>>> Not really. It is just a wacky metaphysical idea
>
>>> Whatever, it is an alternative.
>
>> Only if you do not think properly about the definition of time and space
>> coordinates.
>
>IOW if I do not follow your preferred metaphysical argumentation about
>space and time.
My argument for SR is empirical, not metaphysical. Time and space
coordinates are defined by the processes used to measure them. Provided
that the situation is such that these processes directly or indirectly
apply, and provided that the fundamental behaviour of matter is
everywhere the same, the formulae of SR follow by deductive reason
alone.
>>> So let's iterate. I have answered that nothing can be really
>>> justified from observation, all we can do to "justify" using
>>> observation is to present theories which have the property in
>>> question (for example a continuous spacetime) which make
>>> predictions and that these predictions are not yet falsified by
>>> observation.
>
>> Then I disagree. I justify special relativity by observing the
>> manner in which time and space coordinates are defined, and then
>> making deductions from them. I do much the same with qm.
>
>Nonsense. Time and space coordinates are not even defined in SR, I
>can define them as I like. For example, I'm free to use spherical
>coordinates in SR.
That is just a coordinate transformation, a reinterpretation of the same
mathematical formulae and of no matter. SR is most simply based on the
definition of time and space coordinates according to the radar method
(in which spherical coords are actually the most natural). If you have
not seen SR approached this way, as I approach it in my paper, as Bondi
dealt with it in Relativity and Common Sense and in Assumption and Myth
in Physical Theory, then it is essential to study it, as there are some
very misleading books. As I understand Einstein's original approach was
very similar, though he used rods and clocks and synchronisation
processes to define time and space coordinates. The radar method is
easily shown to be equivalent, but has advantages of simplicity.
>>> There is no theory-independent observation at all.
>
>> On a trivial level if I observe two apples I need no theory because
>> that is what I mean by apples and that is what I mean by two. The
>> trick is to reduce scientific theory to the level of such trivial
>> observation.
>
>You are naive. This was the hope of the positivists, they have
>failed.
The positivists were really not very bright by the standards of the
mathematical physicists. Moreover it is not possible to start from a
positivist view and carry out a meaningful scientific investigation
without making additional realist assumptions, in particular that the
behaviour of matter is everywhere the same. Without such an assumption
no scientific measurement could be meaningful, and yet in the
descriptions of positivism I have seen no such fundamental position on
the nature of reality is taken, so that it becomes impossible to avoid
solipsism.
>>>>> I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>>>>> recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
>
>> But where Popper made a complete klutz of himself was to suggest
>> that these parts are scientifically established.
>
>Please quote him. Popper talks about "corrobated", I don't remember
>any "scientifically established".
Scientifically established was a poor choice of phrase on my part. I
withdraw it. I meant that metaphysical notions, such as the existence of
space-time should not be considered scientific even if they appear in
scientific theory.
>> It is precisely because they are not scientific that they are open
>> to rejection by future theories.
>
>LOL. That means, IOW, scientific theories are not open for rejection.
>They are, IOW, positive knowledge.
If they are genuinely and rigorously scientifically established then
they are not open for rejection. The statement "two apples and two
apples make four apples" is not open for rejection. But up until special
relativity I am not certain that there ever was a non-trivial scientific
theory which could be developed simply by mathematical reason from the
empirical definition of physical quantities, and any discussion by
philosophers which does not understand this is uninformed, meaningless
and irrelevant, which I think includes the early development of
positivism. The situation now is very different, since it is now
possible to develop qm and gtr and even qed in the same manner. But
there will still not be much in the way of meaningful discussion while
no one understands that.
>The existence of positive
>knowledge about nature is, BTW, the philosophy named positivism.
That is an interesting definition, one which I have not heard, but one
which makes far more sense than the extremely negative descriptions of
positivism which I have seen.
>>> Then we have a fundamental disagreement about the scientific method.
>>> You seem to follow a classical ideal of knowledge which has been shown
>>> to be unrealizable and has nothing to do with real science.
>
>> That is only what Popper thought, but Popper's thought itself had
>> nothing to do with real science.
>
>Fine, we agree to disagree about scientific methodology. Which
>methodology of science do you follow?
I am a theorist, and count myself a mathematical physicist. I allow only
deductive reason from definition. The accuracy of the theory depends
entirely on the accuracy of the definition in abstracting from
observation.
>> The only thing which is discredited is argument from induction, and
>> that was always discredited. Popper gets no credit for that.
>
>He has never claimed credit for discrediting induction, this was done
>by Hume.
>
>So, you follow quite naive positivistic claims, but don't know Popper,
>and don't know positivism and the reasons for its failure. I would
>recommend you to read Popper.
I have read some Popper, though more précis of Popper. It made some
sense when I first read it, but the more I have thought about the less
sensible I think it. I have also read something of positivism, and not
approved of any of it. I would rather describe myself an English
Empiricist in the long standing tradition, but it is important to
realise that it is the methodology of measurement which leads to
theories like sr, gr and qm, not the results of measurement. And, as I
say, it is difficult to see that there could have been a meaningful
discussion of these theories by positivists at the time when positivism
came to the fore. Likewise it is not useful to discuss whether my claims
are naive without first understanding how sr gr and qm can be produced
from them using only definition and deduction.
>>>>> Einstein, at time of creation of GR, could not have guessed what is
>>>>> the correct rider.
>
>>>> That is irrelevant.
>
>>> No. Because there is no way Einstein could have used to produce your rider.
>
>> Actually Einstein could have produced any number of correct riders.
>
>No. GR could have been simply wrong.
>
>> It is not needed to produce a rider at the extremum of what is true
>
>Of course, because it is not needed to produce a rider at all.
Without such a rider no theory can expect to be true, and if it is not
true it cannot be knowledge, hence it cannot be science which means
knowledge. In practice every experimentalist includes ranges of accuracy
for every result of every scientific experiment. If you ignore such
riders you are not talking about scientific practice at all.
>>>> All that is needed is the knowledge that a rider can be produced.
>
>>> Knowledge which was not available for Einstein.
>
>> Of course it was. In fact he found gtr by looking at the manner in which
>> the assumptions of sr could be expected to break down when it ceases to
>> be a local theory.
>
>And he could have been completely wrong.
Actually not. At least not unless he had made a mistake in deductive
reason. GR is a mathematical structure and proceeds in almost the only
way possible. Other possible theories are little more than unmotivated
complications of the same.
>>> Your rider-requirement does not improve anything in the scientific
>>> method. A theory with rider has the same problem as a theory without:
>>> Or you restrict your rider to past measurements, or you cannot prove
>>> the correctness of the rider because of the induction problem.
>
>> I do not even allow induction. If the measurement processes described in
>> SR can be applied SR holds. If not, it doesn't. There is no induction
>> here.
>
>That's a triviality, here we also don't need any riders. If the
>assumptions of a physical theory hold, the theory holds. Else not.
>A really deep insight.
All mathematical thought reduces to the trivial, that is its power. In
this case the rider is not unnecessary, but has been made explicit: "If
the measurement processes described in SR can be applied..."
>>> To question that from Einstein causality follows that for space-like
>>> separated events as used in EPR-Bell experiments follows
>>> "not( a -> B or b -> A)" seems IMHO quite unreasonable.
>
>> I didn't question that.
>
>(You did. But let's count it as a misunderstanding.)
I disputed whether the word space-like is valid in this context, that is
slightly different.
>> But I do question the statement of Einstein causality
>
>Me too. Fine. (In BM we have no Einstein causality on the level of
>hidden variables.)
>
>> and also I question any description of space-like separation which
>> requires space to exist as a prior form. To postulate the existence
>> of an absolute space which consists solely of number sounds more
>> like Pythagorean number worship than science.
>
>Numbers are names. Any realistic theory has to describe reality, and
>to give the objects of reality names.
numbers are more than names. They have structure, and there exist
relationships between them. My criticism stands.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
...
> English words rarely have unique meanings. So many languages have
> contributed to English that it is often claimed that English is uniquely
> flexible. In the case of 'measurement' I would have said it is an
> important philosophical issue as to whether in measurement there is a
> prior value which is to be determined, or whether the value is produced
> in the measurement. Although the former is often assumed there is
> nothing in the word itself to imply that this must be the case.
> Measurement is best defined as meaning that which is done in
> measurement, a definition which does not prejudge whether a value exists
> as prior or not.
>
> I do not know how other languages are affected. I understand that
> Descartes, Leibniz and Riemann who were not English speakers all gave
> the matter thought and considered measurement as a comparison between
> matter and matter, and that it was not in general possible to assume the
> prior existence of the value.
Doesn't part of this ambiguity arise from one's perspective on the
transition between classical and quantum realms?
If one views the classical realm as emerging from the quantum realm then
ALL results are consistently produced during measurement.
>
> >> We do have to ensure that our understanding of measurement does not
> >> contain unwarranted assumptions, like the prior existence of the
> >> measured value, but that is all.
> >
> >This would be another way. BTW, saying that "measurement is a bad
> >choice, interaction would have been a better choice" is also a way to
> >ensure this understanding.
>
> The trouble is that the word interaction really does not apply very well
> here at all. Interaction does not imply that a value is returned. Also
> one wants the word interaction to apply to fundamental physical
> processes "an electron emits/absorbs a photon" is an interaction.
>
> If we had another word to distinguish measurement of a prior value from
> measurement of a value produced by the measurement, that might be
> helpful, but as, prior to qm, this has merely been an obscure
> philosophical principle considered only by the great mathematical
> philosophers of science I do not think there is another word. So it
> seems better to distinguish by adding an adjective and to talk of
> classical measurement when there is a prior value and quantum
> measurement when there is not.
Prior value, or a consistently repeatable measurement? I think you can
clear up a lot of confusion and reduce the bandwidth consumed by this sort
of thread by deciding on whether determinism breaks on entry to the
quantum realm, or if determinism merely emerges, gently and consistently
supported by the quantum mechanical and quantum gravitational oscillations.
As shown above, the confusion goes away when the classical realm emerges
from the quantum realm. One "definition" of measurement suffices.
...
> I don't like any unnecessary metaphysical assumption, and most certainly
> I reject non-local theories. All that is necessary is to describe a
> model of particles in which there is no background space, in which
> position only makes sense as the position of matter relative to matter,
> and in which contact is necessary for interaction. This is a local
> realist model, and I can demonstrate using only classical mathematical
> reasoning that measurements in this model necessarily obey quantum
> mechanics, and I can further demonstrate gtr within this model
By "contact" do you include various field-field interactions and not just
"hard-marble-like" interactions?
If so, what happens when a combination of field-field occur to give
different results but you are unaware of all of the fields and all of their
interactions?
...
> I do not claim it is the standard one, as I have never seen anyone make
> the subjunctive clause explicit. I do claim it is the correct one, and
> that the inclusion of a subjunctive clause is necessary if it is to make
> sense and have a legitimate interpretation in ordinary language.
SUBJUNCTIVE: designating or of the mood of a verb that is used to express
supposition, desire, hypothesis, possibility, etc., rather than to state an
actual fact (Ex, the mood of *were* as in, 'If I *were* you' 1. the
subjuntive mood, 2 a verb in this mood. -- Webster's New World Dictionary
3rd College Edition 1988.
Is what you are saying ... 'If a measurement/interaction *were* to occur
or be done' ?
If you and Ilja haven't already, I'd prefer you first define what your
position is on the determinism breaking/emerging question. If you are
climbing the ladder downward from classical realm, having to break
determinism, if I were you, I'd want to impose subjunctive clauses all over
the place, too. One the other hand, the way looks clear to just say you
are being with the trial theory that determinism EMERGES from the quantum
realm which gives you one defintion for "measurement" and a fairly long list
of features and rules and interactions to puzzle through and try to discove
and articulate. If a couple of classes of studnets in that school of
thought carreen steadfastly ahead and defintions continue to resolve to
reason and simple expressions, then it seems to me the trial theory would
be working -- not smeared out in a hopeless maze of 'what if' statements.
...
> I am a theorist, and count myself a mathematical physicist. I allow only
> deductive reason from definition. The accuracy of the theory depends
> entirely on the accuracy of the definition in abstracting from
> observation.
Where are you on the "breaks/emerges" question?
jmfb...@aol.com
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>,
art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
>>Thanks, I'm well aware that getting the question right is always the
>>hard part.
>
>Yes, yes, yes. The hardest part.
Isn't that the job of an experimentalist, Mati? Getting
the question right in computer biz was key in debugging anything
we hoped to fix.
/BAH
Subtract a hundred and four for e-mail.
Charles Francis
<ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:$JfyVMF7...@clef.demon.co.uk...
>
>...
>> English words rarely have unique meanings. So many languages have
>> contributed to English that it is often claimed that English is uniquely
>> flexible. In the case of 'measurement' I would have said it is an
>> important philosophical issue as to whether in measurement there is a
>> prior value which is to be determined, or whether the value is produced
>> in the measurement. Although the former is often assumed there is
>> nothing in the word itself to imply that this must be the case.
>> Measurement is best defined as meaning that which is done in
>> measurement, a definition which does not prejudge whether a value exists
>> as prior or not.
>>
>> I do not know how other languages are affected. I understand that
>> Descartes, Leibniz and Riemann who were not English speakers all gave
>> the matter thought and considered measurement as a comparison between
>> matter and matter, and that it was not in general possible to assume the
>> prior existence of the value.
>
>Doesn't part of this ambiguity arise from one's perspective on the
>transition between classical and quantum realms?
>
>If one views the classical realm as emerging from the quantum realm then
>ALL results are consistently produced during measurement.
Yes, this is true. The difference is that in instances where classical
measurement applies the value which will be produced is determined by
the configuration of matter without the measuring apparatus, and is not
affected by the introduction of a measuring apparatus.
>> If we had another word to distinguish measurement of a prior value from
>> measurement of a value produced by the measurement, that might be
>> helpful, but as, prior to qm, this has merely been an obscure
>> philosophical principle considered only by the great mathematical
>> philosophers of science I do not think there is another word. So it
>> seems better to distinguish by adding an adjective and to talk of
>> classical measurement when there is a prior value and quantum
>> measurement when there is not.
>
>Prior value, or a consistently repeatable measurement?
Strictly the latter.
> I think you can
>clear up a lot of confusion and reduce the bandwidth consumed by this sort
>of thread by deciding on whether determinism breaks on entry to the
>quantum realm, or if determinism merely emerges, gently and consistently
>supported by the quantum mechanical and quantum gravitational oscillations.
Since it is not possible to determine every aspect of a configuration of
matter it is not actually possible to test for determinism in the
quantum realm.
>
>
>As shown above, the confusion goes away when the classical realm emerges
>from the quantum realm. One "definition" of measurement suffices.
I prefer that, but I doubt whether Ilja will be comfortable.
>> I don't like any unnecessary metaphysical assumption, and most certainly
>> I reject non-local theories. All that is necessary is to describe a
>> model of particles in which there is no background space, in which
>> position only makes sense as the position of matter relative to matter,
>> and in which contact is necessary for interaction. This is a local
>> realist model, and I can demonstrate using only classical mathematical
>> reasoning that measurements in this model necessarily obey quantum
>> mechanics, and I can further demonstrate gtr within this model
>
>By "contact" do you include various field-field interactions and not just
>"hard-marble-like" interactions?
I only allow the latter.
>
>If so, what happens when a combination of field-field occur to give
>different results but you are unaware of all of the fields and all of their
>interactions?
does not apply
>> I do not claim it is the standard one, as I have never seen anyone make
>> the subjunctive clause explicit. I do claim it is the correct one, and
>> that the inclusion of a subjunctive clause is necessary if it is to make
>> sense and have a legitimate interpretation in ordinary language.
>
>SUBJUNCTIVE: designating or of the mood of a verb that is used to express
>supposition, desire, hypothesis, possibility, etc., rather than to state an
>actual fact (Ex, the mood of *were* as in, 'If I *were* you' 1. the
>subjuntive mood, 2 a verb in this mood. -- Webster's New World Dictionary
>3rd College Edition 1988.
>Is what you are saying ... 'If a measurement/interaction *were* to occur
>or be done' ?
precisely
>If you and Ilja haven't already, I'd prefer you first define what your
>position is on the determinism breaking/emerging question.
I don't think it is possible for us to know at the present time. If, as
a matter of principle, we cannot determine everything in the initial
state then we cannot determine the outcome, even if the universe evolved
according to its own ultimately determinist law. I don't like the idea
of a determinist universe, and would prefer to believe in the
possibility that we may influence the future.
> If you are
>climbing the ladder downward from classical realm, having to break
>determinism, if I were you, I'd want to impose subjunctive clauses all over
>the place, too.
yes.
>One the other hand, the way looks clear to just say you
>are being with the trial theory that determinism EMERGES from the quantum
>realm which gives you one defintion for "measurement" and a fairly long list
>of features and rules and interactions to puzzle through and try to discove
>and articulate.
Yes, it is possible to show that determinism emerges statistically.
>
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
<cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes
>>Numbers are names. Any realistic theory has to describe reality, and
>>to give the objects of reality names.
>
>numbers are more than names. They have structure, and there exist
>relationships between them.
Of course we quite legitimately use numbers to name the results of
measurement, thus a ket |x> is the name of the result of a measurement
of position. It is another thing entirely to hope to use raw numbers to
name fundamental properties of matter when there is no measurement.
Similarly we can say .8|x> + .6|y> is a name for any state where the
result of measurement would be x with probability .64 and y with
probability .36, and if it is just a name there is nothing strange about
it. Where it becomes strange is when one thinks that these names
actually describe reality.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu
experimentalist.
Ralph E. Frost
> In article <uj0he42...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
> >
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> >news:$JfyVMF7...@clef.demon.co.uk...
> >
> >...
> >> English words rarely have unique meanings.
> >Doesn't part of this ambiguity arise from one's perspective on the
> >transition between classical and quantum realms?
> >
> >If one views the classical realm as emerging from the quantum realm then
> >ALL results are consistently produced during measurement.
>
> Yes, this is true. The difference is that in instances where classical
> measurement applies the value which will be produced is determined by
> the configuration of matter without the measuring apparatus, and is not
> affected by the introduction of a measuring apparatus.
Do you mean, for example, given a rock of a certain height and crowbar of
certain length and my total weight to be applied to the lever, even _I_
might be able to calculate the outcome(s) and don't have to do the
experience to find out?
You can't be meaning that, can you? Or, are you meaning that the fall
for drops from a water clock continue regardless of observers and
cross-checkers?
In either of those instances -- in all the classical stuff, I'm thinking
all the classical "prediction" was previously established for our
forbearers. THEY measured, over and over again. They we adopted or
inherited the consistency, whole hog.
Maybe you mean something else.
>
> >> If we had another word to distinguish measurement of a prior value from
> >> measurement of a value produced by the measurement, that might be
> >> helpful, but as, prior to qm, this has merely been an obscure
> >> philosophical principle considered only by the great mathematical
> >> philosophers of science I do not think there is another word. So it
> >> seems better to distinguish by adding an adjective and to talk of
> >> classical measurement when there is a prior value and quantum
> >> measurement when there is not.
> >
> >Prior value, or a consistently repeatable measurement?
>
> Strictly the latter.
So there never is a "prior value", right?
>
> > I think you can
> >clear up a lot of confusion and reduce the bandwidth consumed by this
sort
> >of thread by deciding on whether determinism breaks on entry to the
> >quantum realm, or if determinism merely emerges, gently and consistently
> >supported by the quantum mechanical and quantum gravitational
oscillations.
>
> Since it is not possible to determine every aspect of a configuration of
> matter it is not actually possible to test for determinism in the
> quantum realm.
It sounds to me like you are still missing the point -- still
starting out from the prior deterministic basis and then making statements
from that prior perspective.
> >
> >
> >As shown above, the confusion goes away when the classical realm emerges
> >from the quantum realm. One "definition" of measurement suffices.
>
> I prefer that, but I doubt whether Ilja will be comfortable.
Sure he will. He's a reasonable person. It's just a different trial
theory. You put your chips down on the entire shebang rather than smearing
them out on all the many different ways the determinism "must" break.
If it's a terribly flawed trial theory that should become apparent very
rapidly. Conversely, if there is a bit of merit in the approach, some
fruit should drop out of the tree fairly soon.
Ilja's not a Devil's Advocate, is he?
>
> >> I don't like any unnecessary metaphysical assumption, and most
certainly
> >> I reject non-local theories. All that is necessary is to describe a
> >> model of particles in which there is no background space, in which
> >> position only makes sense as the position of matter relative to matter,
> >> and in which contact is necessary for interaction. This is a local
> >> realist model, and I can demonstrate using only classical mathematical
> >> reasoning that measurements in this model necessarily obey quantum
> >> mechanics, and I can further demonstrate gtr within this model
> >
> >By "contact" do you include various field-field interactions and not
just
> >"hard-marble-like" interactions?
>
> I only allow the latter.
You're kidding me, right? Don't kid me. I'm naive enough as I am.
Point-like, huh? Ugh.
> >
> >If so, what happens when a combination of field-field occur to give
> >different results but you are unaware of all of the fields and all of
their
> >interactions?
>
> does not apply
Does the HEP, LEP, Kaon, SNO, or TRISTAN data all back that notion up?
>
> >> I do not claim it is the standard one, as I have never seen anyone make
> >> the subjunctive clause explicit. I do claim it is the correct one, and
> >> that the inclusion of a subjunctive clause is necessary if it is to
make
> >> sense and have a legitimate interpretation in ordinary language.
> >
> >SUBJUNCTIVE: designating or of the mood of a verb that is used to
express
> >supposition, desire, hypothesis, possibility, etc., rather than to state
an
> >actual fact (Ex, the mood of *were* as in, 'If I *were* you' 1. the
> >subjunctive mood, 2 a verb in this mood. -- Webster's New World
Dictionary
> >3rd College Edition 1988.
>
>
> >Is what you are saying ... 'If a measurement/interaction *were* to
occur
> >or be done' ?
>
> precisely
So I can report that as the word-for-the-day I learned to my wife and kids
and say I sort of know of someone who uses it. Good.
>
> >If you and Ilja haven't already, I'd prefer you first define what your
> >position is on the determinism breaking/emerging question.
>
> I don't think it is possible for us to know at the present time. If, as
> a matter of principle, we cannot determine everything in the initial
> state then we cannot determine the outcome, even if the universe evolved
> according to its own ultimately determinist law. I don't like the idea
> of a determinist universe, and would prefer to believe in the
> possibility that we may influence the future.
Denial is quite an influencer. Head-in-the-sand is another. Settling
in on a strong new trial theory is another. Remaining confused is another.
Look, all I am saying is if one views the system from the perspective that
determinism is the sacred cat's meow, and that the quantum stuff is
secondary, acquired by determinism breaking, then that leads to a certain
view and certain rules of the local region. OTOH, if one jumps feet
first all the way to quantum gravity and nails the landing, the alternative
POV is the jittery stuff in the quantum realm entangles to yield various
types of artifacts roaming about in the classical realm. And, like fits
with our experience, there is a range of more or less deterministic
artifacts, some of which has large influences upon our future. Rocks;
life forms; biospheres, dice, etc. Classical, sort of, but not all to the
same degree.
There is a value in the alternative POV.
>
> > If you are
> >climbing the ladder downward from classical realm, having to break
> >determinism, if I were you, I'd want to impose subjunctive clauses all
over
> >the place, too.
>
> yes.
>
> >One the other hand, the way looks clear to just say you
> >are being with the trial theory that determinism EMERGES from the
quantum
> >realm which gives you one definition for "measurement" and a fairly long
list
> >of features and rules and interactions to puzzle through and try to
discover
> >and articulate.
>
> Yes, it is possible to show that determinism emerges statistically.
So what's the rub?
- Ralph Frost
http://www.refrost.com
Use more robust symbols
Seek a thought worthy of speech.
"...Love one another..." John 15:12
"No great success to show, no glory on my own,
Yet in my weakness He is there to let me know."
-Stephan Curtis Chapman
Charles Francis
<ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
>>
>> Yes, this is true. The difference is that in instances where classical
>> measurement applies the value which will be produced is determined by
>> the configuration of matter without the measuring apparatus, and is not
>> affected by the introduction of a measuring apparatus.
>
>Do you mean, for example, given a rock of a certain height and crowbar of
>certain length and my total weight to be applied to the lever, even _I_
>might be able to calculate the outcome(s) and don't have to do the
>experience to find out?
>You can't be meaning that, can you? Or, are you meaning that the fall
>for drops from a water clock continue regardless of observers and
>cross-checkers?
>
>In either of those instances -- in all the classical stuff, I'm thinking
>all the classical "prediction" was previously established for our
>forbearers. THEY measured, over and over again. They we adopted or
>inherited the consistency, whole hog.
There is no reason to think that classical laws which have been true in
the classical domain for hundreds of years will suddenly cease to be
true in the classical domain. One of the requirements on quantum theory
is that it predicts the correct classical limit.
>> >> If we had another word to distinguish measurement of a prior value from
>> >> measurement of a value produced by the measurement, that might be
>> >> helpful, but as, prior to qm, this has merely been an obscure
>> >> philosophical principle considered only by the great mathematical
>> >> philosophers of science I do not think there is another word. So it
>> >> seems better to distinguish by adding an adjective and to talk of
>> >> classical measurement when there is a prior value and quantum
>> >> measurement when there is not.
>> >
>> >Prior value, or a consistently repeatable measurement?
>>
>> Strictly the latter.
>
>So there never is a "prior value", right?
That is a moot point. It is possible to say that since the value is
determinate, it exists. It is also possible to say the value does not
exist until the dial is read.
>>
>> Since it is not possible to determine every aspect of a configuration of
>> matter it is not actually possible to test for determinism in the
>> quantum realm.
>
>It sounds to me like you are still missing the point -- still
>starting out from the prior deterministic basis and then making statements
>from that prior perspective.
I don't believe in determinism, and what we do know of the fundamental
structure of the universe does not appear to be determinate.
>>
>> >> I don't like any unnecessary metaphysical assumption, and most
>certainly
>> >> I reject non-local theories. All that is necessary is to describe a
>> >> model of particles in which there is no background space, in which
>> >> position only makes sense as the position of matter relative to matter,
>> >> and in which contact is necessary for interaction. This is a local
>> >> realist model, and I can demonstrate using only classical mathematical
>> >> reasoning that measurements in this model necessarily obey quantum
>> >> mechanics, and I can further demonstrate gtr within this model
>> >
>> >By "contact" do you include various field-field interactions and not
>just
>> >"hard-marble-like" interactions?
>>
>> I only allow the latter.
>
>You're kidding me, right? Don't kid me. I'm naive enough as I am.
>
>Point-like, huh? Ugh.
I kid you not. My claim, which I feel is now well supported with
mathematics, is that a model of point-like electrons and photons, and
one can throw in quarks and other things for good measure, will give
rise to a universe with exactly the properties we observe. All of the
field stuff does not indicate the existence of fields but merely
describes the lack of certainty with which it is possible to say where
each point-like entity is, because we cannot describe points in a
background as in Cartesian geometry, but can only describe the position
of a point relative to other points which themselves also only have
relative position.
>> >If so, what happens when a combination of field-field occur to give
>> >different results but you are unaware of all of the fields and all of
>their
>> >interactions?
>>
>> does not apply
>
>Does the HEP, LEP, Kaon, SNO, or TRISTAN data all back that notion up?
Yes. But the matter of interpretation is quite subtle, and physicists
generally do not know how to think in terms of a universe in which there
is no background space-time.
>> >If you and Ilja haven't already, I'd prefer you first define what your
>> >position is on the determinism breaking/emerging question.
>>
>> I don't think it is possible for us to know at the present time. If, as
>> a matter of principle, we cannot determine everything in the initial
>> state then we cannot determine the outcome, even if the universe evolved
>> according to its own ultimately determinist law. I don't like the idea
>> of a determinist universe, and would prefer to believe in the
>> possibility that we may influence the future.
>
>Denial is quite an influencer. Head-in-the-sand is another. Settling
>in on a strong new trial theory is another. Remaining confused is another.
>
>Look, all I am saying is if one views the system from the perspective that
>determinism is the sacred cat's meow, and that the quantum stuff is
>secondary, acquired by determinism breaking, then that leads to a certain
>view and certain rules of the local region.
Perhaps, but it doesn't really make sense as the classical realm is an
emergent property of the quantum realm, not vice versa, so you
alternative makes more sense.
>OTOH, if one jumps feet
>first all the way to quantum gravity and nails the landing, the alternative
>POV is the jittery stuff in the quantum realm entangles to yield various
>types of artifacts roaming about in the classical realm. And, like fits
>with our experience, there is a range of more or less deterministic
>artifacts, some of which has large influences upon our future. Rocks;
>life forms; biospheres, dice, etc. Classical, sort of, but not all to the
>same degree.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> contradiction between qm and classical logic.
>> To repeat, if "measurement" is understood as some interaction which
>> gives a result, as you seem to do. If "measurement" is understood as
>> detecting the value of something which already has a well-defined
>> value, not.
> The latter is a clash between an assumed metaphysic and quantum
> mechanics, not between qm and classical logic.
Agreement.
>> I do not plan to alter the meaning of words. Instead, I propose not
>> to use the word "measurement" in QM because it has a meaning
>> (detection of an already existing value) which is in contradiction to
>> its use in QM.
>> If you disagree that "measurement" has such a meaning, this
>> replacement will be, indeed, unjustified IYO. I may err about
>> meanings of English words, because I'm not a native speaker.
>> Nonetheless, at the current moment I continue to believe that
>> "measurement" has such a meaning.
> English words rarely have unique meanings. So many languages have
> contributed to English that it is often claimed that English is
> uniquely flexible. In the case of 'measurement' I would have said it
> is an important philosophical issue as to whether in measurement
> there is a prior value which is to be determined, or whether the
> value is produced in the measurement. Although the former is often
> assumed there is nothing in the word itself to imply that this must
> be the case.
Differences in meaning of a word are not important philosophical issues.
Once the former meaning "is often assumed", the use of "measurement"
causes misunderstandings.
>> This would be another way. BTW, saying that "measurement is a bad
>> choice, interaction would have been a better choice" is also a way to
>> ensure this understanding.
> The trouble is that the word interaction really does not apply very
> well here at all. Interaction does not imply that a value is
> returned. Also one wants the word interaction to apply to
> fundamental physical processes "an electron emits/absorbs a photon"
> is an interaction.
Nothing forbids to apply it to these processes too.
It is clear that as the result of an interaction a device changes it
own state. This chance is the value produces by the interaction.
>> We disagree about the meaning of "quantum logic".
> I generally try to mean that which it is possible to mean if the
> words makes sense. I agree that many accounts describe quantum logic
> in terms of definite statements and funny rules of truth, and I
> agree that this view is nonsense and should be rejected.
Fine. These funny rules of truth are what I reject as "quantum logic".
Other interpretations of QM, which do not question classical logic, do
not use that funny label (which in itself suggests that classical
logic should be replaced by something different.)
> But by introducing the subjunctive I am able to use strict rules of
> truth consistent with classical probability theory. In doing so I am
> describing the same mathematical structure of Hilbert space, and I
> am also describing a structure of propositions, so the name quantum
> logic applies quite correctly.
IMHO it is more reasonable to leave the label "quantum logic" to
nonsensical attempts to interpret QM as a modification of classical
logic. Other interpretations, as your interpretation, are more
reasonable described as interpretations in the context of classical
logic.
> In fact Von-Neumann and Dirac and even in Copenhagen there is
> discussion of the subjunctive,
Copenhagen is not quantum logic. It is a combination of a realistic
collapse interpretation with positivistic misunderstandings.
>>> This metaphysics is garbage not because it is simply "beyond
>>> nature", i.e. supernatural, but because we already know that it is
>>> proven wrong, falsified by general relativity.
>>
>> Again, there is no "proven wrong" in science. All we need is a viable
>> theory of gravity with absolute space. Such a theory of gravity
>> exists. See gr-qc/0205035.
> We may have different ideas of what is "viable", but I'll read your
> paper if you'll read mine
> http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205001
I will see.
>>> There is nothing positivist in this stance. Quite clearly to a
>>> realist there is a reality beyond measurement results. If you claim
>>> to be a realist you should appreciate a language, vis quantum logic,
>>> which can talk of reality beyond measurement results. Instead you
>>> deny that such a thing exists.
>> I have never had any problem to talk about reality beyond measurement
>> results in common language. What I certainly don't need for such a
>> purpose is some "quantum logic".
> As I have put it quantum logic is only a mathematical formalisation of
> ordinary language.
Once in ordinary language we have nothing remembering complex truth
values it is not. You interpretation of quantum logic may be in no
contradiction with classical logic, but to be a formalization of
something which already exists in ordinary language is much more.
>>> But you do not show any understanding of quantum logic, which is why you
>>> do not accept it.
>> I simply disagree that your description of the "quantum logic" concept
>> is the standard one.
> I do not claim it is the standard one,
What I don't accept is standard quantum logic. And that it is
reasonable to name a modified concept which does not contradict
classical logic "quantum logic".
>>> No one changed the name of probability theory when Bayesianism
>>> became more fashionable than Frequentism.
>>
>> When discussing these issues, people use different names for these
>> different things: Bayesianism and frequentism. When these differences
>> are unimportant, they use "probability theory".
>
> Names sometimes have to be invented to distinguish valid positions.
Invalid positions as well. At least as long as there are people who
defend them. "Quantum logic" as the idea that experiment (QM) may show
that classical logic is wrong is certainly an interesting enough concept
to deserve an own name, even if it is invalid.
> My argument for SR is empirical, not metaphysical. Time and space
> coordinates are defined by the processes used to measure them. Provided
> that the situation is such that these processes directly or indirectly
> apply, and provided that the fundamental behaviour of matter is
> everywhere the same, the formulae of SR follow by deductive reason
> alone.
LOL. Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows
by deductive reason alone.
>>> Then I disagree. I justify special relativity by observing the
>>> manner in which time and space coordinates are defined, and then
>>> making deductions from them. I do much the same with qm.
>>
>> Nonsense. Time and space coordinates are not even defined in SR, I
>> can define them as I like. For example, I'm free to use spherical
>> coordinates in SR.
> That is just a coordinate transformation
No, spherical coordinates are coordinates, not a coordinate
transformation.
> a reinterpretation of the same
> mathematical formulae and of no matter. SR is most simply based on the
> definition of time and space coordinates according to the radar method
> (in which spherical coords are actually the most natural). If you have
> not seen SR approached this way,
AFAIU thats the standard way.
> As I understand Einstein's original approach was
> very similar, though he used rods and clocks and synchronisation
> processes to define time and space coordinates. The radar method is
> easily shown to be equivalent, but has advantages of simplicity.
Einstein used light signals. Radar is light.
>>>> There is no theory-independent observation at all.
>>> On a trivial level if I observe two apples I need no theory
>>> because that is what I mean by apples and that is what I mean by
>>> two. The trick is to reduce scientific theory to the level of such
>>> trivial observation.
>> You are naive. This was the hope of the positivists, they have
>> failed.
> The positivists were really not very bright by the standards of the
> mathematical physicists.
Nonsense. They have had enormous influence. Their ideas have far too
much influence even today.
>>>>>> I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>>>>>> recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
> ... metaphysical notions, such as the existence of space-time should
> not be considered scientific even if they appear in scientific
> theory.
Since there is no way to subdivide notions into metaphysical and
non-metaphysical notions, this suggestion is meaningless. The
subdivision between empirical science and metaphysics which exists -
falsifiability - is defined only for _whole_theories_. In a more
rigorous sense only for groups of theories, because the interpretation
of a single experiment always includes lots of different theories.
>>> It is precisely because they are not scientific that they are open
>>> to rejection by future theories.
>> LOL. That means, IOW, scientific theories are not open for rejection.
>> They are, IOW, positive knowledge.
> If they are genuinely and rigorously scientifically established then
> they are not open for rejection. The statement "two apples and two
> apples make four apples" is not open for rejection.
These are mathematical truths in a physical formulation. As long as
physics is involved, they are open for rejection: two drops of water
and two drops of water possibly make one big drop of water.
>>> That is only what Popper thought, but Popper's thought itself had
>>> nothing to do with real science.
>>
>> Fine, we agree to disagree about scientific methodology. Which
>> methodology of science do you follow?
> I am a theorist, and count myself a mathematical physicist. I allow only
> deductive reason from definition. The accuracy of the theory depends
> entirely on the accuracy of the definition in abstracting from
> observation.
I see no way to derive nontrivial physical theories in such a way.
> Likewise it is not useful to discuss whether my claims are naive
> without first understanding how sr gr and qm can be produced from
> them using only definition and deduction.
GR and QM are in contradiction with each other. If they could be
produced using only definition and deduction this would mean a
contradiction in math. I prefer to hope there is none.
>>> It is not needed to produce a rider at the extremum of what is true
>> Of course, because it is not needed to produce a rider at all.
> Without such a rider no theory can expect to be true, and if it is not
> true it cannot be knowledge, hence it cannot be science which means
> knowledge.
That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
Their application is quite obvious: if we have falsified a theory, we
construct a rider to obtain a more restricted theory which is not
falsified.
> In practice every experimentalist includes ranges of accuracy
> for every result of every scientific experiment.
Of course - but that's experiment, not theory. According to my
understanding of science theory is not derived from experiment,
therefore there are no riders which follow from experimental
ranges of accuracy.
>>> Of course it was. In fact he found gtr by looking at the manner in which
>>> the assumptions of sr could be expected to break down when it ceases to
>>> be a local theory.
>> And he could have been completely wrong.
> Actually not. At least not unless he had made a mistake in deductive
> reason. GR is a mathematical structure and proceeds in almost the only
> way possible. Other possible theories are little more than unmotivated
> complications of the same.
Not at all.
>>> To postulate the existence of an absolute space which consists
>>> solely of number sounds more like Pythagorean number worship than
>>> science.
>> Numbers are names. Any realistic theory has to describe reality, and
>> to give the objects of reality names.
> numbers are more than names. They have structure, and there exist
> relationships between them.
Fine. To understand such structures is what we want.
> My criticism stands.
If something "sounds like number worship" is not really important
criticism.
Ralph E. Frost
...
> >Look, all I am saying is if one views the system from the perspective
that
> >determinism is the sacred cat's meow, and that the quantum stuff is
> >secondary, acquired by determinism breaking, then that leads to a certain
> >view and certain rules of the local region.
>
> Perhaps, but it doesn't really make sense as the classical realm is an
> emergent property of the quantum realm, not vice versa, so you
> alternative makes more sense.
I'm not going to argue with that.
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>
>>> to use the word "measurement" in QM because it has a meaning
>>> (detection of an already existing value) which is in contradiction to
>>> its use in QM.
>>> If you disagree that "measurement" has such a meaning, this
>>> replacement will be, indeed, unjustified IYO. I may err about
>>> meanings of English words, because I'm not a native speaker.
>>> Nonetheless, at the current moment I continue to believe that
>>> "measurement" has such a meaning.
>
>> English words rarely have unique meanings. So many languages have
>> contributed to English that it is often claimed that English is
>> uniquely flexible. In the case of 'measurement' I would have said it
>> is an important philosophical issue as to whether in measurement
>> there is a prior value which is to be determined, or whether the
>> value is produced in the measurement. Although the former is often
>> assumed there is nothing in the word itself to imply that this must
>> be the case.
>
>Differences in meaning of a word are not important philosophical issues.
>Once the former meaning "is often assumed", the use of "measurement"
>causes misunderstandings.
Huge numbers of philosophical arguments reduce to semantics. It is
philosophically very important to allow ones own understanding of the
meanings of words to be as flexible as language itself. Very often
assumed meanings of words are wrong, or do not make sense. This is
certainly confusing and causes misunderstanding, but the cure for it is
to redefine words to mean that which does make sense, and to forget
other meanings which don't make sense. Otherwise we would not have the
words at all, and would have to define language from scratch - something
scientist have a tendency to be very bad at BTW. As it happens there
have been a couple of other posters here who have seen the sense in my
definition of measurement, and are happy with this use of words.
Language is agreed convention, and changes as convention changes, I feel
my use is justified and also that, as people start to understand the
underlying philosophical issue better, and recognise that qm is only in
conflict with the prior existence of numerical values, not in conflict
with the prior existence of reality as I have heard claimed, this is the
usage that will become the norm.
>>> This would be another way. BTW, saying that "measurement is a bad
>>> choice, interaction would have been a better choice" is also a way to
>>> ensure this understanding.
>
>> The trouble is that the word interaction really does not apply very
>> well here at all. Interaction does not imply that a value is
>> returned. Also one wants the word interaction to apply to
>> fundamental physical processes "an electron emits/absorbs a photon"
>> is an interaction.
>
>Nothing forbids to apply it to these processes too.
No, but it is even more confusing to do so. There is nothing in the word
interactions to suggest is should return a values, measurement can be
described as interaction between a particle and an apparatus, but this
is a complex interaction.
>It is clear that as the result of an interaction a device changes it
>own state. This chance is the value produces by the interaction.
Simply define measurement as interaction between subject matter and an
apparatus.
>> But by introducing the subjunctive I am able to use strict rules of
>> truth consistent with classical probability theory. In doing so I am
>> describing the same mathematical structure of Hilbert space, and I
>> am also describing a structure of propositions, so the name quantum
>> logic applies quite correctly.
>
>IMHO it is more reasonable to leave the label "quantum logic" to
>nonsensical attempts to interpret QM as a modification of classical
>logic.
Nevertheless a quantum logic is a formal mathematical structure, not the
interpretation of that structure.
>Other interpretations, as your interpretation, are more
>reasonable described as interpretations in the context of classical
>logic.
It is interesting you should describe it like that. Certainly I see no
conflict.
>
>> In fact Von-Neumann and Dirac and even in Copenhagen there is
>> discussion of the subjunctive,
>
>Copenhagen is not quantum logic. It is a combination of a realistic
>collapse interpretation with positivistic misunderstandings.
I agree, and the Dirac-Von Neumann interpretation is not Copenhagen, but
is a distillation of the most sensible parts of it, given a context
which does not imply realistic collapse. All I was saying is that I am
not prepared to second guess Von Neumann understanding of quantum logic.
>> As I have put it quantum logic is only a mathematical formalisation of
>> ordinary language.
>
>Once in ordinary language we have nothing remembering complex truth
>values it is not. You interpretation of quantum logic may be in no
>contradiction with classical logic, but to be a formalization of
>something which already exists in ordinary language is much more.
>
>>>> But you do not show any understanding of quantum logic, which is why you
>>>> do not accept it.
>
>>> I simply disagree that your description of the "quantum logic" concept
>>> is the standard one.
>
>> I do not claim it is the standard one,
>
>What I don't accept is standard quantum logic. And that it is
>reasonable to name a modified concept which does not contradict
>classical logic "quantum logic".
My perspective is different. I would say it is quite unreasonable to
call either "logic" or "mathematics" any kind of structure which is in
conflict with classical logic. But quantum logic has always been a valid
and consistent mathematical structure. It is a manner of interpretation
which is in contradiction with logic, and that we both reject.
>
>>>> No one changed the name of probability theory when Bayesianism
>>>> became more fashionable than Frequentism.
>>>
>>> When discussing these issues, people use different names for these
>>> different things: Bayesianism and frequentism. When these differences
>>> are unimportant, they use "probability theory".
>>
>> Names sometimes have to be invented to distinguish valid positions.
>
>Invalid positions as well. At least as long as there are people who
>defend them. "Quantum logic" as the idea that experiment (QM) may show
>that classical logic is wrong is certainly an interesting enough concept
>to deserve an own name, even if it is invalid.
Then we are running short of names.
>> My argument for SR is empirical, not metaphysical. Time and space
>> coordinates are defined by the processes used to measure them. Provided
>> that the situation is such that these processes directly or indirectly
>> apply, and provided that the fundamental behaviour of matter is
>> everywhere the same, the formulae of SR follow by deductive reason
>> alone.
>
>LOL. Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows
>by deductive reason alone.
Yes, but you really do not need very many assumptions at all, and in
fact the assumptions are not assumptions but definitions. The only
assumption you need is that the definition be valid, and that is
difficult to avoid as part of any reasonable realist position.
>>>> Then I disagree. I justify special relativity by observing the
>>>> manner in which time and space coordinates are defined, and then
>>>> making deductions from them. I do much the same with qm.
>>>
>>> Nonsense. Time and space coordinates are not even defined in SR, I
>>> can define them as I like. For example, I'm free to use spherical
>>> coordinates in SR.
>
>> That is just a coordinate transformation
>
>No, spherical coordinates are coordinates, not a coordinate
>transformation.
Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
coordinates, and then all coordinate transformations to all other
coordinates may also be defined. Your freedom to use any coordinates
comes from the fact that coordinates, and coordinate transformations,
are defined.
>> a reinterpretation of the same
>> mathematical formulae and of no matter. SR is most simply based on the
>> definition of time and space coordinates according to the radar method
>> (in which spherical coords are actually the most natural). If you have
>> not seen SR approached this way,
>
>AFAIU thats the standard way.
It should be, but it was not done like this when I was an undergraduate,
and does not seem to be done like this in the training of many
mathematical physicists, hence I believe many physicists can manipulate
the formulae without understanding where the definitions come from.
>>>>> There is no theory-independent observation at all.
>
>>>> On a trivial level if I observe two apples I need no theory
>>>> because that is what I mean by apples and that is what I mean by
>>>> two. The trick is to reduce scientific theory to the level of such
>>>> trivial observation.
>
>>> You are naive. This was the hope of the positivists, they have
>>> failed.
>
>> The positivists were really not very bright by the standards of the
>> mathematical physicists.
>
>Nonsense. They have had enormous influence.
So had the flat Earthers in their day.
>Their ideas have far too
>much influence even today.
So do creationists. I am not about to describe them as very bright
either.
>>>>>>> I'm not much afraid of such charges. Following Popper I have
>>>>>>> recognized that we have metaphysical parts in all physical theories.
>
>> ... metaphysical notions, such as the existence of space-time should
>> not be considered scientific even if they appear in scientific
>> theory.
>
>Since there is no way to subdivide notions into metaphysical and
>non-metaphysical notions, this suggestion is meaningless. The
>subdivision between empirical science and metaphysics which exists -
>falsifiability - is defined only for _whole_theories_. In a more
>rigorous sense only for groups of theories, because the interpretation
>of a single experiment always includes lots of different theories.
>
>>>> It is precisely because they are not scientific that they are open
>>>> to rejection by future theories.
>
>>> LOL. That means, IOW, scientific theories are not open for rejection.
>>> They are, IOW, positive knowledge.
>
>> If they are genuinely and rigorously scientifically established then
>> they are not open for rejection. The statement "two apples and two
>> apples make four apples" is not open for rejection.
>
>These are mathematical truths in a physical formulation.
No, the mathematical truth is 2+2=4. The application to apples is
physics, and it is still not open to rejection.
>As long as
>physics is involved, they are open for rejection: two drops of water
>and two drops of water possibly make one big drop of water.
Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but since it
is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement that 2+2=4.
>
>>>> That is only what Popper thought, but Popper's thought itself had
>>>> nothing to do with real science.
>>>
>>> Fine, we agree to disagree about scientific methodology. Which
>>> methodology of science do you follow?
>
>> I am a theorist, and count myself a mathematical physicist. I allow only
>> deductive reason from definition. The accuracy of the theory depends
>> entirely on the accuracy of the definition in abstracting from
>> observation.
>
>I see no way to derive nontrivial physical theories in such a way.
The simplest theory to derive is sr, and that, in my view, is far from
trivial. It is also possible to derive qm and gr as in my paper, though
since there is a tweaking of qm, and gr only applies in the classical
limit you may not like calling them that.
>> Likewise it is not useful to discuss whether my claims are naive
>> without first understanding how sr gr and qm can be produced from
>> them using only definition and deduction.
>
>GR and QM are in contradiction with each other. If they could be
>produced using only definition and deduction this would mean a
>contradiction in math. I prefer to hope there is none.
No, there is no contradiction. There is a minor tweaking, not so much of
the axioms of qm, but of the interpretation. Certain assumption, notably
the time evolution assumption which requires a prior definition of
differentiation, have to be omitted, but what emerges is close enough to
quantum mechanics that I would call it quantum mechanics. Since you like
to stick rather rigidly to prior definitions of names, whether they are
good or bad, you may want to coin a new name, but I would still rather
call it quantum mechanics, since in essence, that is what it is.
>>>> It is not needed to produce a rider at the extremum of what is true
>
>>> Of course, because it is not needed to produce a rider at all.
>
>> Without such a rider no theory can expect to be true, and if it is not
>> true it cannot be knowledge, hence it cannot be science which means
>> knowledge.
>
>That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
>is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
>knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
That is merely defeatism in science and contains the error of induction.
The fact no such theory had been produced it does not imply that no such
theory can be produced. In any case you are not being consistent. On the
one thing you find it trivial that
>Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows
>by deductive reason alone.
and on the other you are claiming that this statement is not positivist
knowledge.
>
>Their application is quite obvious: if we have falsified a theory, we
>construct a rider to obtain a more restricted theory which is not
>falsified.
But then you may produce a theory which is correctly restricted to its
area of validity. I call that good science, but according to a
falsificationist, since this theory cannot be falsified it is
unscientific.
>
>> In practice every experimentalist includes ranges of accuracy
>> for every result of every scientific experiment.
>
>Of course - but that's experiment, not theory. According to my
>understanding of science theory is not derived from experiment,
>therefore there are no riders which follow from experimental
>ranges of accuracy.
Any empiricist believes in developing science theory from experiment.
The vital thing is to recognise that theory can be deductively developed
from the way of doing experiment, not inductively developed from the
results of experiment.
Actually I find the charge that theory has nothing to do with scientific
practice somewhat offensive, and I charge in return that Popper's major
contribution has to debase science and bring it into disrepute. I can
think of no other individual whose influence has done so much damage to
the scientific quest. It is all very we3l teaching some idiot
philosopher to school children who do not know any better, but since the
philosophical world now does not take Popper that seriously, since
scientists have never had much time for philosophers, one should
recognise that Popper's characature of science was no more than that, a
characature.
>>>> Of course it was. In fact he found gtr by looking at the manner in which
>>>> the assumptions of sr could be expected to break down when it ceases to
>>>> be a local theory.
>
>>> And he could have been completely wrong.
>
>> Actually not. At least not unless he had made a mistake in deductive
>> reason. GR is a mathematical structure and proceeds in almost the only
>> way possible. Other possible theories are little more than unmotivated
>> complications of the same.
>
>Not at all.
Then you have to study it.
>>>> To postulate the existence of an absolute space which consists
>>>> solely of number sounds more like Pythagorean number worship than
>>>> science.
>
>>> Numbers are names. Any realistic theory has to describe reality, and
>>> to give the objects of reality names.
>
>> numbers are more than names. They have structure, and there exist
>> relationships between them.
>
>Fine. To understand such structures is what we want.
>
>> My criticism stands.
>
>If something "sounds like number worship" is not really important
>criticism.
A failure to justify metaphysics is an important criticism, since
without such a justification the notion is not science. We have two
options, first that the use of numbers in physics applies to measurement
results. This option is not open to question, and is therefore positive
knowledge, and moreover it forms part of the assumptions from which we
can develop a unified form of qm and gtr. The other is that the numbers
are part of an assumed metaphysic, absolute space. This option is not
directly testable but leads to numerous conflicts both between theory
and experiment and between one part of scientific theory and another. To
assume it is quite unscientific.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
> In message <i3g3cul...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >
> >It is clear that as the result of an interaction a device changes it
> >own state. This chance is the value produces by the interaction.
>
> Simply define measurement as interaction between subject matter and an
> apparatus.
Pardonne moi, but in the quantum realm there is no hard and fast boundary
between subject and object. You can say there is, but that does not make it
so.
You seem to still be coming at the issue from the direction of
Classical-to-Quantum despite voicing the notion that the classical realm
emerges from the quantum. You need to take those words to heart. Otherwise
you will need to re-normalize your description at some point and, that is
just another word for saying you started out with a flawed trial theory.
The determinism, the perfect repeatability or some things AND the notion of
separate subject-object all emerge FROM the jitterings in the quantum realm.
...
> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
> coordinates, and then all coordinate transformations to all other
> coordinates may also be defined. Your freedom to use any coordinates
> comes from the fact that coordinates, and coordinate transformations,
> are defined.
And doesn't that situation arise because folks assume the Ancient Grecian
Notion that space is fundamental?
Re-partition awareness to start with _FIELD_ as fundamental (space being an
observable). The statement about the equivalent coordinate transforms still
holds but it holds only for a certain initial assumption -- for the class
of expressions that assume space, not field, as primary.
Charles Francis
<ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:alD7eDKK...@clef.demon.co.uk...
>> In message <i3g3cul...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> >
>...
>> >It is clear that as the result of an interaction a device changes it
>> >own state. This chance is the value produces by the interaction.
>>
>> Simply define measurement as interaction between subject matter and an
>> apparatus.
>
>Pardonne moi, but in the quantum realm there is no hard and fast boundary
>between subject and object. You can say there is, but that does not make it
>so.
In quantum mechanics, as described by the mathematical structure of
Hilbert space there is indeed a hard and fast boundary between subject
an object. That may not be an optimum description, but it is the
description we have. Recall that in quantum mechanics we describe the
information we have from reading an apparatus, we do not directly
describe quantum particles.
>You seem to still be coming at the issue from the direction of
>Classical-to-Quantum despite voicing the notion that the classical realm
>emerges from the quantum. You need to take those words to heart. Otherwise
>you will need to re-normalize your description at some point and, that is
>just another word for saying you started out with a flawed trial theory.
It is necessary to "re-normalise" the description. This is the point at
which I claim qed reduces to a theory of point-like particles, whereas
qm makes it look like a theory of fields.
>> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
>> coordinates, and then all coordinate transformations to all other
>> coordinates may also be defined. Your freedom to use any coordinates
>> comes from the fact that coordinates, and coordinate transformations,
>> are defined.
>
>And doesn't that situation arise because folks assume the Ancient Grecian
>Notion that space is fundamental?
It is not clear that the Ancient Greeks were that highly committed to
the notion of fundamental space. Absolute space only came in in a big
way with Newton, and the form in which it came in, R^3, was invented by
Descartes not by a Greek. Descartes himself thought the idea of absolute
space made no sense and that R^3 only described relative positions of an
object relative to other matter.
In fact it appears that the main line of Greek thought following
Leucippus and Democritus was that Zeno's paradoxes showed the
non-existence of absolute space.
>Re-partition awareness to start with _FIELD_ as fundamental (space being an
>observable).
For a start you have a problem because a field is defined to be a
mapping on space, so you must have a space as fundamental before you
define field.
For a second you have all the difficulties of interpretation which we
have been discussing in this thread. If you start with particle as
fundamental then space arises naturally as describing the relationships
between particle and reference matter, which also consists of particles.
Confusion here has arisen because we talk of the classical and quantum
realms, as though there were only two realms. The quantum realm suggests
the realm of elementary particles, but the laws of quantum mechanics
actually apply to relationships between elementary particles and
classical apparatus. We should talk of the particle realm and the
classical realm emerging from that, and of quantum mechanics being the
laws of observation emerging from the two..
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
> In article <uj8121b...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
> >
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> >news:alD7eDKK...@clef.demon.co.uk...
> >> In message <i3g3cul...@wias-berlin.de>, Ilja Schmelzer
> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> >> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
> >> >
> >...
> >> >It is clear that as the result of an interaction a device changes it
> >> >own state. This chance is the value produces by the interaction.
> >>
> >> Simply define measurement as interaction between subject matter and an
> >> apparatus.
> >
> >Pardonne moi, but in the quantum realm there is no hard and fast
boundary
> >between subject and object. You can say there is, but that does not make
it
> >so.
>
> In quantum mechanics, as described by the mathematical structure of
> Hilbert space there is indeed a hard and fast boundary between subject
> an object. That may not be an optimum description, but it is the
> description we have. Recall that in quantum mechanics we describe the
> information we have from reading an apparatus, we do not directly
> describe quantum particles.
You mean, you try to describe the primary objects and morphisms using the
secondary abstract math symbols and imagery? Is that waht you refer to
when you write "quantum logic", or are you suggesting packingthe U-haul and
moving away from the older notion?
>
> >You seem to still be coming at the issue from the direction of
> >Classical-to-Quantum despite voicing the notion that the classical realm
> >emerges from the quantum. You need to take those words to heart.
Otherwise
> >you will need to re-normalize your description at some point and, that is
> >just another word for saying you started out with a flawed trial theory.
>
> It is necessary to "re-normalise" the description. This is the point at
> which I claim qed reduces to a theory of point-like particles, whereas
> qm makes it look like a theory of fields.
I realize my notions are pretty vague and not clearly communicated, but I
think you folks are violating a major part of your own knowledge when you
beginning from the Classical realm and trying to break determinism AND use
the secondary abstract math symbols as you climb "down into" the quantum
realm. Hey, at least the re-normalization approach reveals something
about the confusion and differences. It paints a cloudy picture.
However, it seems to me that since initial conditions are important that
sitting with the uncomfortable feelings of BEGINNING in the quantum realm
and waiting for different, more robust, more synchronous symbols to emerge
is a wiser choice rather than actively approaching the problem from the
known-to-be-wrong direction. Minimally, it looks as though the
conceptual confusion clears up and a totally different sort of problems,
criteria and approaches and questions emerge. Beginning from the quantum
gravitational realm there are apparently rules that couple with instances in
the classical, semi-classical and non-classical emerging. Find out
these, more integrated, less bifurcated rules looks to me to give a
different slant on things.
Is that what you meant a few months ago in using the phrase, "quantum
logic"?
>
> >> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
> >> coordinates, and then all coordinate transformations to all other
> >> coordinates may also be defined. Your freedom to use any coordinates
> >> comes from the fact that coordinates, and coordinate transformations,
> >> are defined.
> >
> >And doesn't that situation arise because folks assume the Ancient Grecian
> >Notion that space is fundamental?
>
> It is not clear that the Ancient Greeks were that highly committed to
> the notion of fundamental space. Absolute space only came in in a big
> way with Newton, and the form in which it came in, R^3, was invented by
> Descartes not by a Greek. Descartes himself thought the idea of absolute
> space made no sense and that R^3 only described relative positions of an
> object relative to other matter.
I won't argue you with you about it more than to say that Descartes took
issue with the what he was taught from the Greek schools of thought and,
after a fashion met with some success in shifting things around so that
folks mapped things to cube -- one of several available choices of
polyhedra which can be used to map/represent volumes and relationships --
and he couple that with the idea that things are not unified -- that they
can be split into subject and object.
Notice he made those procedural choices rather than choosing, say, the more
fundamental tetrahedron for structure, and, say, magnetic field polarities
as a way of intimating a binary system that is also highly unified.
To do the latter, though, he would have had to had some notion that _field_
was fundamental and space was more like an observable or an emergent protery
of _field_.
If you have every picked up an organic chemistry or bichemistry book,
perhaps even a geology book, too, you might notice that picking some
tetrahedral representation would FIT nicely with a lot of significant stuff
in the natural world.
Given that forever is a long time, or, at least a couple millenia are fairly
long times, it makes sense to consider what kind of science goes along
with, say, a binary tetrahedral mathematical framework, in constract to the
science that emerges within a cube/subject-object approach.
Strange as it sounds, I propose we actively shift over from the Cartesian
imagery to the more natural binary tetrahedral mathematical basis. The
notion appears to fit pretty well with Bohr's idea of waiting around for a
"complementary language" to emerge. Plus the proposed binary tetrahedral
math basis nested well and seems to me like it resonates well a lot of
more unified models, including spin networks and foam models for the
quantum gravity.
>
> In fact it appears that the main line of Greek thought following
> Leucippus and Democritus was that Zeno's paradoxes showed the
> non-existence of absolute space.
>
> >Re-partition awareness to start with _FIELD_ as fundamental (space being
an
> >observable).
>
> For a start you have a problem because a field is defined to be a
> mapping on space, so you must have a space as fundamental before you
> define field.
Sure you do having started out with the Grecian notion that space is so
fundamental it can't be broken down or questioned. And, in the grander
scheme of things, it makes sense to have an initial phase of the scientific
method where essentially everything is bifurcated and dissected and reduced
and classified. But, in a subsequent phase of the scientific method, that
activity can become secondary compared to increasingly more integrative
efforts and discoveries -- as in the emergence of more unified models.
And what better way to initiate a second phase in math than by embarking on
a different mapping wherein one begins with tetrahedral fields. It
doesn't means THAT notion is right either, but it's different and it will
therefore spawn different discoveries and relationships.
Re-framing space into an observable of _field_ is a reasonavble
jutaposition. It seems to fit a bit better that some of the confused and
cloudy abstract math approximationspeople bandy about in sci.*whatever*.
>
> For a second you have all the difficulties of interpretation which we
> have been discussing in this thread. If you start with particle as
> fundamental then space arises naturally as describing the relationships
> between particle and reference matter, which also consists of particles.
I am not a fan of particles. It seems to me that when one starts from a
deeply nested stacked tetrahedral-octahedral lattice you get regions that
are nice little spin networks down in quantum gravity, and then you get the
binary tetrahedra in water, silicates and the carbon-based stuf. And right
there you alos get the same sorts of resonance patterns in the carbon-based
consciousness, which, incidently, provides a more rational basis for why
the abstract math imagery that tries to compensate for the weaknesses of the
cubic choice work AT ALL and why the "uncanny symmetry between abstract
math and physical reality. [Shift over to the binary tetrahedral math and
you can sort of *see* the connection immediately. most likely there is a
bunch of math that goes along with that important connection. (And, yeah,
don't ask me to say what those math relationships are explicitly because I
don't know. I bet they exist, though.)]
Moreover, given all that stuff, I am still partial to the notion that
"particles" have a binary tetrahedral sub-structure, and/or it is handy and
efficient to view things that way.
Working "backwards" like you folks have down, I suppose particle makes
"sense". Just remember, you're working backward from a less natural
mathematical basis.
>
> Confusion here has arisen because we talk of the classical and quantum
> realms, as though there were only two realms. The quantum realm suggests
> the realm of elementary particles, but the laws of quantum mechanics
> actually apply to relationships between elementary particles and
> classical apparatus. We should talk of the particle realm and the
> classical realm emerging from that, and of quantum mechanics being the
> laws of observation emerging from the two..
As outlined above, I favor a different arrangement. What Ithink is
cool and agree with what you say is to integrate oneself within the low
level synchronous quantum gravity and notice that there are rules and
partial rules that spawn highly repeatable artifacts in the classical
realm, and some different but similar sets of rules that couple with the
emergence of semi-classical arifacts like the biospheric rigs, lifeforms an
d people, etc.
What are the integrative rules? (1) They are different from the
bifurcating/dis-integrative rules and (2) the integrative rules have
considerable value in discerning how to order large segments of our
mass-transport and mass-transfer activities.
-- A little structured duality goes a long way.
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Once the former meaning "is often assumed", the use of "measurement"
>> causes misunderstandings.
> Huge numbers of philosophical arguments reduce to semantics.
In this case, they are no longer philosophical arguments.
> It is philosophically very important to allow ones own understanding
> of the meanings of words to be as flexible as language itself.
I disagree. One has to be aware of the uncertainty of common language.
>> What I don't accept is standard quantum logic. And that it is
>> reasonable to name a modified concept which does not contradict
>> classical logic "quantum logic".
>
> My perspective is different. I would say it is quite unreasonable to
> call either "logic" or "mathematics" any kind of structure which is in
> conflict with classical logic.
I would not call anything "logic" except classical logic. Exceptions are
sarcastic phrases like "the logic of Mr. X", which BTW also indicates
that "logic with a prefix" is something in contradiction with usual logic.
> But quantum logic has always been a valid and consistent
> mathematical structure.
Wasn't there also another name for this structure (something like
"lattice")?
>>> Names sometimes have to be invented to distinguish valid positions.
>> Invalid positions as well. At least as long as there are people who
>> defend them. "Quantum logic" as the idea that experiment (QM) may show
>> that classical logic is wrong is certainly an interesting enough concept
>> to deserve an own name, even if it is invalid.
> Then we are running short of names.
I'm not afraid.
>>> My argument for SR is empirical, not metaphysical. Time and space
>>> coordinates are defined by the processes used to measure them. Provided
>>> that the situation is such that these processes directly or indirectly
>>> apply, and provided that the fundamental behaviour of matter is
>>> everywhere the same, the formulae of SR follow by deductive reason
>>> alone.
>> LOL. Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows
>> by deductive reason alone.
> Yes, but you really do not need very many assumptions at all, and in
> fact the assumptions are not assumptions but definitions.
No.
> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
> coordinates,
In my version it starts from the Minkowski metric.
>>> The statement "two apples and two
>>> apples make four apples" is not open for rejection.
>> These are mathematical truths in a physical formulation.
> No, the mathematical truth is 2+2=4. The application to apples is
> physics, and it is still not open to rejection.
>> As long as physics is involved, they are open for rejection: two
>> drops of water and two drops of water possibly make one big drop of
>> water.
> Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but
> since it is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement that
> 2+2=4.
Once you name the "water drops" application a misapplication, the
"apple" application is open to such criticism as well.
>> GR and QM are in contradiction with each other. If they could be
>> produced using only definition and deduction this would mean a
>> contradiction in math. I prefer to hope there is none.
> No, there is no contradiction. There is a minor tweaking, not so much of
> the axioms of qm, but of the interpretation. Certain assumption, notably
> the time evolution assumption which requires a prior definition of
> differentiation, have to be omitted, but what emerges is close enough to
> quantum mechanics that I would call it quantum mechanics. Since you like
> to stick rather rigidly to prior definitions of names, whether they are
> good or bad, you may want to coin a new name, but I would still rather
> call it quantum mechanics, since in essence, that is what it is.
So you also change quantum mechanics. Thanks for telling me about this.
>> That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
>> is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
>> knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
> That is merely defeatism in science and contains the error of induction.
> The fact no such theory had been produced it does not imply that no such
> theory can be produced.
I have said "hopeless", not "impossible", so I have not made such an
error.
> In any case you are not being consistent. On the one thing you find
> it trivial that
>> Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows by
>> deductive reason alone.
> and on the other you are claiming that this statement is not
> positivist knowledge.
This is mathematical knowledge. IOW, knowledge about the language.
Not about nature.
>> Their application is quite obvious: if we have falsified a theory, we
>> construct a rider to obtain a more restricted theory which is not
>> falsified.
> But then you may produce a theory which is correctly restricted to
> its area of validity.
Which may be correctly restricted. But I cannot be sure it is.
> I call that good science, but according to a falsificationist, since
> this theory cannot be falsified it is unscientific.
Of course it is falsifiable, once it makes claims inside the rider.
(If your "rider" means something like empirical restrictions like
v<<c for Newtonian mechanics. Not if "rider" means the construction
"if <complete list of axioms> then prediction".
>>> In practice every experimentalist includes ranges of accuracy
>>> for every result of every scientific experiment.
>> Of course - but that's experiment, not theory. According to my
>> understanding of science theory is not derived from experiment,
>> therefore there are no riders which follow from experimental
>> ranges of accuracy.
> Any empiricist believes in developing science theory from experiment.
So every empiricist is wrong. Who cares?
> Actually I find the charge that theory has nothing to do with scientific
> practice somewhat offensive,
Nobody has made it, so nobody cares.
> and I charge in return that Popper's major contribution has to
> debase science and bring it into disrepute. I can think of no other
> individual whose influence has done so much damage to the scientific
> quest.
Evidence please.
>>> My criticism stands.
>> If something "sounds like number worship" is not really important
>> criticism.
> A failure to justify metaphysics is an important criticism, since
> without such a justification the notion is not science.
The scientific theories I uses are corrobated. That's all science can
give as justification according to Popper.
If something "is not science" in the wrong, positivistic understanding
of science, I don't care.
> We have two options, first that the use of numbers in physics
> applies to measurement results. This option is not open to question,
> and is therefore positive knowledge,
It is a meaningless phrase, because you have not defined "numbers",
thus, not knowledge at all.
jmfb...@aol.com
In article <04iY8.107$Z4.4...@news.uchicago.edu>,
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>In article <agrrtf$sev$4...@bob.news.rcn.net>, jmfb...@aol.com writes:
>>In article <diHV8.97$Z4.3...@news.uchicago.edu>,
>> me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>>>In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>,
>>art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
>><snip wonderful discussion>
>>
>>>>Thanks, I'm well aware that getting the question right is always the
>>>>hard part.
>>>
>>>Yes, yes, yes. The hardest part.
>>
>>Isn't that the job of an experimentalist, Mati? Getting
>>the question right in computer biz was key in debugging anything
>>we hoped to fix.
>>
>Of course. But it applies to the theorist just as much as to the
>experimentalist.
Isn't the "right question" a theorist's output; whereas the "right
question" is the exerimentalist's input (or the beginning of the
process).
I kept meaning to backup to last week's unread data base so that
I could retrieve your measurement writeup and comment. With the
advent of the lastest crank blizzard, I kept putting it off.
Thank you for the writeup. It has been very carefully saved on
my disk. I had not thought that congruency was precedent for
equality. Once you said it, the words "Of course!" popped right
into my head. The obvious is never clear.
Robert J. Kolker
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> I would not call anything "logic" except classical logic.
Not so. Any formal system of inference is logic, whether or not it is
classical (i.e. Aristotelean). Intuitionaist logic is logic but is not
classical. Model logics are logic but are not classical.
Bob Kolker
me...@cars3.uchicago.edu
>[spit]
>
>In article <04iY8.107$Z4.4...@news.uchicago.edu>,
> me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>>In article <agrrtf$sev$4...@bob.news.rcn.net>, jmfb...@aol.com writes:
>>>In article <diHV8.97$Z4.3...@news.uchicago.edu>,
>>> me...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>>>>In article <a95259d3.02070...@posting.google.com>,
>>>art_i...@yahoo.com (nick) writes:
>>><snip wonderful discussion>
>>>
>>>>>Thanks, I'm well aware that getting the question right is always the
>>>>>hard part.
>>>>
>>>>Yes, yes, yes. The hardest part.
>>>
>>>Isn't that the job of an experimentalist, Mati? Getting
>>>the question right in computer biz was key in debugging anything
>>>we hoped to fix.
>>>
>>Of course. But it applies to the theorist just as much as to the
>>experimentalist.
>
>question" is the exerimentalist's input (or the beginning of the
>process).
>
>I kept meaning to backup to last week's unread data base so that
>I could retrieve your measurement writeup and comment. With the
>advent of the lastest crank blizzard, I kept putting it off.
>
>Thank you for the writeup. It has been very carefully saved on
>my disk. I had not thought that congruency was precedent for
>equality. Once you said it, the words "Of course!" popped right
>into my head. The obvious is never clear.
Yes, since once something is obvious, it becomes nearly invisible. It
is just not being noticed.
Charles Francis
Yes. Actually mostly all physicists try to describe is experimental
results.
>I realize my notions are pretty vague and not clearly communicated, but I
>think you folks are violating a major part of your own knowledge when you
>beginning from the Classical realm and trying to break determinism AND use
>the secondary abstract math symbols as you climb "down into" the quantum
>realm.
"quantisation" as it is called. Hey, don't call me "you folks", I have
always been a severe critic of quantisation.
> Hey, at least the re-normalization approach reveals something
>about the confusion and differences. It paints a cloudy picture.
Yes.
>Is that what you meant a few months ago in using the phrase, "quantum
>logic"?
I just mean a formal language for describing what would happen if a
measurement were done
>Strange as it sounds, I propose we actively shift over from the Cartesian
>imagery to the more natural binary tetrahedral mathematical basis.
But then you're not planning to do the maths. I suggest leaving the
suggestions to those who are.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Differences in meaning of a word are not important philosophical issues.
>>> Once the former meaning "is often assumed", the use of "measurement"
>>> causes misunderstandings.
>
>> Huge numbers of philosophical arguments reduce to semantics.
>
>In this case, they are no longer philosophical arguments.
Nonetheless semantics constitutes the nitty gritty of resolving them,
and that is philosophy. Also it is necessary to develop language to
describe reality, and that is philosophy too.
>
>> It is philosophically very important to allow ones own understanding
>> of the meanings of words to be as flexible as language itself.
>
>I disagree. One has to be aware of the uncertainty of common language.
Had you been aware of the uncertainty of common language you would also
be aware that your meaning of the word measurement is not cast in stone.
As we learn language we learn to use words in whatever random contexts
we find, and we also jump to conclusions about the meanings of words.
When we jump to a conclusion we have invented the meaning for ourself,
not acquired it from others. And when we think carefully about meanings
we may often find that the meaning we supposed does not in fact make
sense. I have been aware of a philosophical issue regarding the nature
of measurement since I was at school, and this was not out of my own
thought, but out of discussions which echoed back to the discussions of
Descartes and Leibniz. Any number of people who have not thought about
it may make assumptions, and to these people applies the clause "is
often assumed", and yes their assumption may cause them confusion
because there are circumstances in which their assumption is wrong.
However we cannot go far by adapting language to false assumptions. What
we have to do is adapt language to reality.
>
>>> What I don't accept is standard quantum logic. And that it is
>>> reasonable to name a modified concept which does not contradict
>>> classical logic "quantum logic".
>>
>> My perspective is different. I would say it is quite unreasonable to
>> call either "logic" or "mathematics" any kind of structure which is in
>> conflict with classical logic.
>
>I would not call anything "logic" except classical logic.
Then you will be using language in a way that is not correct by general
usage.
>Wasn't there also another name for this structure (something like
>"lattice")?
Yes. I try to ignore this name because it has nothing to do with
lattices that physicists use in e.g. lattice field theory. It is just a
name for an algebraic structure, like group or field.
>>>> My argument for SR is empirical, not metaphysical. Time and space
>>>> coordinates are defined by the processes used to measure them. Provided
>>>> that the situation is such that these processes directly or indirectly
>>>> apply, and provided that the fundamental behaviour of matter is
>>>> everywhere the same, the formulae of SR follow by deductive reason
>>>> alone.
>
>>> LOL. Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows
>>> by deductive reason alone.
>
>> Yes, but you really do not need very many assumptions at all, and in
>> fact the assumptions are not assumptions but definitions.
>
>No.
>
>> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
>> coordinates,
>
>In my version it starts from the Minkowski metric.
Then it starts from something which is known to be physically wrong, and
even in the flat space approximation it starts from something which is
unscientific, having no logical justification, since:-
You can produce the formulae SR from the empirical definition of time
and space coordinates, together with the assumption that the underlying
structure of matter is everywhere the same. That is a matter of logical,
deductive proof, and not open to dispute. It follows that any further
assumption about the existence of flat space with Minkowski metric leads
to no alteration in measurement results whatsoever, and hence that it is
an untestable, and unscientific assumption.
>>>> The statement "two apples and two
>>>> apples make four apples" is not open for rejection.
>
>>> These are mathematical truths in a physical formulation.
>
>> No, the mathematical truth is 2+2=4. The application to apples is
>> physics, and it is still not open to rejection.
>
>>> As long as physics is involved, they are open for rejection: two
>>> drops of water and two drops of water possibly make one big drop of
>>> water.
>
>> Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but
>> since it is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement that
>> 2+2=4.
>
>Once you name the "water drops" application a misapplication, the
>"apple" application is open to such criticism as well.
Not so long as the apples are apples. The countability of apples is part
of their appleness.
>>> That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
>>> is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
>>> knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
>
>> That is merely defeatism in science and contains the error of induction.
>> The fact no such theory had been produced it does not imply that no such
>> theory can be produced.
>
>I have said "hopeless", not "impossible", so I have not made such an
>error.
Then it really is defeatism, not reasoned argument. It is really quite
out of order and thoroughly offensive to charge that anyone disagreeing
is naive, and merely highlights the preposterously pompous position
adopted by Popperists.
>> In any case you are not being consistent. On the one thing you find
>> it trivial that
>
>>> Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows by
>>> deductive reason alone.
>
>> and on the other you are claiming that this statement is not
>> positivist knowledge.
>
>This is mathematical knowledge. IOW, knowledge about the language.
>Not about nature.
This was language to describe nature, and hence it is knowledge about
nature. mathematical knowledge only describes mathematics, and may be
applied to nature under circumstances such that nature's laws follow
those of mathematics. In any scientific application of mathematics it
should be clear what circumstances are being claimed. This is done in
the rider, it is the very thing which makes the theory a theory of
nature, which makes it scientific and which tells us that the theory
applies.
Apple is a word to describe an attribute of nature. Part of what we have
to do in science is produce language to describe nature. The fact that
we can do so is part of the fundamental assumption of a realist that
reality exists, that it is consistent, and that it's behaviour is
somehow reflected in our perceptions. I do not see much in the way of
positivist knowledge without this assumption, and since positivists are
not clear about making it I don't go along with positivism. However,
because scientific investigation is not sensible without realism, and
because we choose not to be solipsists, we can make a realist assumption
and claim that it is an absolute assumption without which nothing else
makes sense.
>>> Their application is quite obvious: if we have falsified a theory, we
>>> construct a rider to obtain a more restricted theory which is not
>>> falsified.
>
>> But then you may produce a theory which is correctly restricted to
>> its area of validity.
>
>Which may be correctly restricted. But I cannot be sure it is.
It is always possible to restrict scientific theory, even if it means
over restricting it. As you said earlier
>>>Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows by
>>> deductive reason alone.
>> I call that good science, but according to a falsificationist, since
>> this theory cannot be falsified it is unscientific.
>
>Of course it is falsifiable, once it makes claims inside the rider.
The claims inside the rider may be directly empirical or deductive, so
not falsifiable. They are, however, demonstrably and deductively
testable and true.
>>>> In practice every experimentalist includes ranges of accuracy
>>>> for every result of every scientific experiment.
>
>>> Of course - but that's experiment, not theory. According to my
>>> understanding of science theory is not derived from experiment,
>>> therefore there are no riders which follow from experimental
>>> ranges of accuracy.
>
>> Any empiricist believes in developing science theory from experiment.
>
>So every empiricist is wrong. Who cares?
It might be more reasonable to call a commentator on scientific theory,
notably Popper, who does not appear to have understood or observed the
first thing about scientific practice, a complete bloody pompous
imbecile. Or better yet to say who cares what Popper thought? A load of
half educated schoolteachers and their pupils who are in no position to
know better.
>
>> Actually I find the charge that theory has nothing to do with scientific
>> practice somewhat offensive,
>
>Nobody has made it, so nobody cares.
You make it every time you try to ignore the rider and claim that SR is
a theory of universal Minkowski space time.
>> and I charge in return that Popper's major contribution has to
>> debase science and bring it into disrepute. I can think of no other
>> individual whose influence has done so much damage to the scientific
>> quest.
>
>Evidence please.
Your claim that my belief in the possibility of the truth of a
scientific theory is naive is sufficient evidence in itself. I call such
a claim slanderous, especially when compared to the real achievements of
mathematicians in science over the centuries.
In the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a
steady stream of mathematical genii. In the twentieth century this dried
up. One reason is that the scientific search for truth was no longer
respectable, potential genii could seek greater reward elsewhere. And
indeed have sought greater reward elsewhere. Stephen Wolfram might be
one example of such a genius, but when studying to be a physicist he
found so little of merit in physics as it was taught, and found so
little credibility in his teachers, that he has missed the point
entirely and published a load of nonsense. All of this is indication
that the basic health of the scientific quest is in poor shape, as it
was also btw during the decline of Greece.
>
>>> If something "sounds like number worship" is not really important
>>> criticism.
>
>> A failure to justify metaphysics is an important criticism, since
>> without such a justification the notion is not science.
>
>The scientific theories I uses are corrobated. That's all science can
>give as justification according to Popper.
And who cares what Popper says any more. He is no longer highly regarded
by philosopher's generally, and never should have been in my view.
>
>If something "is not science" in the wrong, positivistic understanding
>of science, I don't care.
Likewise who cares for a positivist approach which does not appreciate
the fundamentals of scientific investigation.
>
>> We have two options, first that the use of numbers in physics
>> applies to measurement results. This option is not open to question,
>> and is therefore positive knowledge,
>
>It is a meaningless phrase, because you have not defined "numbers",
>thus, not knowledge at all.
Numbers are perfectly defined, starting from Von Neumann's definition of
the counting numbers, and working on from there.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> I disagree. One has to be aware of the uncertainty of common language.
> Had you been aware of the uncertainty of common language you would also
> be aware that your meaning of the word measurement is not cast in stone.
I have never claimed it is cast in stone.
> However we cannot go far by adapting language to false
> assumptions. What we have to do is adapt language to reality.
In this case, two things may be modified: "measurement" may no longer
be applied in QM, or the meaning of "measurement" which assumes
predefined values (which is fine in many other contexts) should be
removed. But we need this meaning in these other contexts, so I would
not propose to remove this meaning.
>> Wasn't there also another name for this structure (something like
>> "lattice")?
> Yes. I try to ignore this name because it has nothing to do with
> lattices that physicists use in e.g. lattice field theory. It is just a
> name for an algebraic structure, like group or field.
And, because it makes clear that it has nothing to do with lattices,
does not cause misunderstandings (similar to groups and fields).
>>> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
>>> coordinates,
>> In my version it starts from the Minkowski metric.
> Then it starts from something which is known to be physically wrong,
but often a good approximation, so that's fine. And exactly my
understanding of SR.
> and even in the flat space approximation it starts from something
> which is unscientific, having no logical justification, since:
Again, scientific theories are hypotheses, they don't need logical
justifications.
> You can produce the formulae SR from the empirical definition of time
> and space coordinates, together with the assumption that the underlying
> structure of matter is everywhere the same.
Nonsense. Claims about the "underlying structure of matter" are not
part of SR.
>>> Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but
>>> since it is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement that
>>> 2+2=4.
>> Once you name the "water drops" application a misapplication, the
>> "apple" application is open to such criticism as well.
> Not so long as the apples are apples. The countability of apples is part
> of their appleness.
I have made an high energy scattering experiment, with the result 2
apples + 2 apples = apple sauce ;-).
>>>> That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
>>>> is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
>>>> knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
>>> That is merely defeatism in science and contains the error of induction.
>> I have said "hopeless", not "impossible", so I have not made such an
>> error.
> Then it really is defeatism, not reasoned argument. It is really quite
> out of order and thoroughly offensive to charge that anyone disagreeing
> is naive, and merely highlights the preposterously pompous position
> adopted by Popperists.
Blabla. Feel free to prove us wrong. Whatever you like is open to
criticism. Feel free to criticize energy conservation and to
construct a Perpetuum Mobile.
>>> and on the other you are claiming that this statement is not
>>> positivist knowledge.
>> This is mathematical knowledge. IOW, knowledge about the language.
>> Not about nature.
> This was language to describe nature, and hence it is knowledge about
> nature.
LOL. This does not follow.
>>> But then you may produce a theory which is correctly restricted to
>>> its area of validity.
>>
>> Which may be correctly restricted. But I cannot be sure it is.
>
> It is always possible to restrict scientific theory, even if it means
> over restricting it.
Yep, but if you restrict it to a level where is is proven truth, what
remains is only pure math, no longer empirical science.
> As you said earlier
>>>> Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows by
>>>> deductive reason alone.
That's what I name "pure math".
>>> I call that good science, but according to a falsificationist, since
>>> this theory cannot be falsified it is unscientific.
>> Of course it is falsifiable, once it makes claims inside the rider.
> The claims inside the rider may be directly empirical or deductive,
> so not falsifiable. They are, however, demonstrably and deductively
> testable and true.
Ok, if you use a "strong" rider so that what remains is pure math.
I have assumed you mean reasonable claims like "NM holds for v<<c"
or variants with error ranges.
>>> Any empiricist believes in developing science theory from experiment.
>> So every empiricist is wrong. Who cares?
> It might be more reasonable to call a commentator on scientific theory,
> notably Popper, who does not appear to have understood or observed the
> first thing about scientific practice, a complete bloody pompous
> imbecile.
It is even more reasonable to ignore people who start calling names.
>> The scientific theories I uses are corrobated. That's all science can
>> give as justification according to Popper.
> And who cares what Popper says any more.
I care, as long as somebody with better arguments appears. (BTW, this
has happened in the Bayesian vs. frequentist issue.)
> He is no longer highly regarded by philosopher's generally,
I couldn't care less. See Sokal's hoax to understand why.
Ralph E. Frost
Yes, the reading of dials and counts of impacts ~*feelings*~ made by the
interactions within the physical model.
Hmmm. okay, so let me try to recap. We're in agreement that folks measure
things and then try to fit the data onto their map(s), or when those maps
are found to not be accurate, to create better maps. In the current
discussion, which I guess is a philosophical one, the mainstream notion
is, "Keep going with the massively bifurcated program and don't question
ANYof the low lying stuff. Shut-up and calculate. It doesn't matter what
coordinate frame is used. ...Er, and don't bring in discussions about other
aspect of physical reality like consciousness or other uncanny situations
relating to math and science... that older practioners don't want to
discuss."
What I propose, though, outlandish as it may first sound, is 350 years of
scientific development is actually a very infintesimal number of solar
maximum cycles or earth orbits -- in the grander scheme of things. Really,
it's a very short time. And, for a lot of surprising good reasons,
considering _I_ have knit some of them together and then expressed them,
what I am saying, re-iterating and extending slightly what Buckminster
Fuller expressed last century, is that even though the Cartesian
procedural choices result in a large conflagration of pretty good
approximations somewhat fitting several islandic regions of the local
region, it is just ONE of the possible choices. Descartes started the
ball rolling mapping things to the polyhedron we call a cube. It comes
with compensatory expressions in the form of the abstract mathematical
symbols and expressions. The entire thing works pretty good except for
when it comes to tying things together, er, or learning a basic
understanding of natural philosophy in under, say, 45 to 60 years of
essentially full time effort.
For some strange reason, no doubt related to a broken boundary or some
troublesome unresolved childhood authority issue, I fail to see what is
wrong with taking a logical approach to building a solid scientific
foundation. For 350 orbits -- about 10 generations, people have worked
the Cartesian cube/subject object approach. There are troubles with that
approach. Here at the close of the 20th century, we've sort of hit the
proverbial wildly bifurcating, asymptotic wall, so to speak.
Something like 0.5% of the population presume or act as though they
understand all the epicycles of the traditonal scientific model. The
99.5% population group is left out. Those who do know something are all
engaged in trying to find the emerging, more unified model. Something is
wrong with that overall picture. How can ~everyone~ be troubled? Hmmm.
Must be a fundamental defugality someplace. Where? Well, it sort of has
to be in the conceptual model/coordinate system that everyone trucks with.
How does one test for that kind of situation? Shift over to a different
coordination system and see if any of the prior difficulties go away or if
there are some advantages to the new approach.
>
> >I realize my notions are pretty vague and not clearly communicated, but I
> >think you folks are violating a major part of your own knowledge when you
> >beginning from the Classical realm and trying to break determinism AND
use
> >the secondary abstract math symbols as you climb "down into" the quantum
> >realm.
>
> "quantisation" as it is called. Hey, don't call me "you folks", I have
> always been a severe critic of quantisation.
Pardon me and my prejudicial labeling. I'm aware you are fostering some
competing theory but to me it sounds like yours is still down in the same
deep ruts mostly on the quantum side.
The flaw in thinking is at the deeper, Cartesian cube/subject-object level
as far as I can tell, which induces complicated, nearly intractable flaws in
both the QM and SR/GR strands. That's not to say the detailed imagery you
have a grasp on and have been developing is not an improvement over of,
(heh heh) their -- the Cubic-Cartesianists' "quantisation" model.
[Traditionalist or conventional science model might be a better label.]
>
> > Hey, at least the re-normalization approach reveals something
> >about the confusion and differences. It paints a cloudy picture.
>
> Yes.
>
> >Is that what you meant a few months ago in using the phrase, "quantum
> >logic"?
>
> I just mean a formal language for describing what would happen if a
> measurement were done
Er, we'd likely need Bill Clinton to spearhead the foray into that dark,
damp linguistic cul-de-sac.
I wish you luck with that more fine grained approach. I'm not much for
formal language, I guess because I'm saying a different "What if"
statement. What kind of scientific description, serendipitous discovery,
mass-transport/engineering and sociological systems are naturally coupled
with math-science systems built up solely from the other polyehdral/duality
coordination schemes beside the Cartesian-cubic option?
Since initial conditions influence outcomes, logic tells us that other good
and useful things would naturally come from exploring such an alternative
approach. To a very limited extent, my own success arranging bits in
Usenet and elsewhere over the last few years shows the approach has some
merit.
Unbeknownst to Monseuir Descartes, while the honeycomb is hexagonal,
the dominant resonance pattern throughout the biosphere and at the base
resonance level of carbon-based consciousness is tetrahedral. And
while he would have known that two tetrahedra can fit inside a cube and
define its eight corners [since he had a pretty good education in the solid
figures] , no doubt he couldn't have gotten away, then, with changing the
stone masons tools or their thinking. Plus, ANY of the polyhedra can
serve as a rational basis. He could not lose no matter which polyhedron he
decided to focus attention upon.
However, technically, mathematically, since two equal tetrahedra DO fit
inside a cube, logically the appropriate choice of coordinate frame is not
the cube, but the tetrahedron.
It only stands to reason..... again, recursively, for a lot of good reas
ons way down in the guts of carbon-based consciousness.
>
> >Strange as it sounds, I propose we actively shift over from the
Cartesian
> >imagery to the more natural binary tetrahedral mathematical basis.
>
> But then you're not planning to do the maths. I suggest leaving the
> suggestions to those who are.
Math? What math? Didn't I just do the math? You need more?
I reject your illogical suggestion for the obvious reasons.
The people who are "going to do the maths" may be the children of the next
generation, depending upon how much blind ignorance and resistance
continues to stand in the way. Plus, "teaching binary tetrahedral maths" is
markedly different than reformatting carbon-based consciousness to appear
to map to the cube/subject-object edicts.
You show a kid the five ways to align four rod magnets along the radii of a
tetrahedron and let him or her play around to get a *feel* for doing
one-half spins, variable mass-density and anharmonics. You point to the
five Debye electronegativity diagrams for tetravalent molecules in organic
chemistry books. You draw a picture of the silicate mantle of
terrestrial-type planets and then say a couple things about computers and
water. Sketch some pictures of amino acids; maybe add a few pictures from
biochemistry. You ask the kid what percentage of the local region fits with
the binary tetrahedral pattern he or she has in hand. Continue by
pointing out the prior notion of the "uncanny relationship" between
cubic-based math and physical phenomena. Explain that Descartes didn't
have much choice -- that he made a good initial approximation. Throw in a
couple sentences about unification, the general principle of structured
duality, and how Descartes' choice covertly assumed things aren't unified
and thus is, as we find out some 3.5 centuries into the program,
fundamentally flawed. Then you, like I admit that unless illogic,
ignorance and denial wins out that we're all involved in a wonderfully
unique process of creation and discovery. Exciting times. Transitions in
science. Things are not perfect. And, yes, we are faced with living with
both views and points of view, but we can't just exclude powerfully
rational possibilities just on an egoic whim, prejudice or due to some
irrational fear of change.
Pardon my ire.
Ralph E. Frost
Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> wrote in message
news:i3gofd5...@wias-berlin.de...
...
> Blabla. Feel free to prove us wrong. Whatever you like is open to
> criticism. Feel free to criticize energy conservation and to
> construct a Perpetuum Mobile.
Aren't you just referring to damping in entangled, unified systems?
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
>> However we cannot go far by adapting language to false
>> assumptions. What we have to do is adapt language to reality.
>
>In this case, two things may be modified: "measurement" may no longer
>be applied in QM, or the meaning of "measurement" which assumes
>predefined values (which is fine in many other contexts) should be
>removed. But we need this meaning in these other contexts, so I would
>not propose to remove this meaning.
There is no loss in removing the second meaning. In fact it would be
more correct to say that even in classical measurement the value does
not exist until it is read from the dials, all that exists prior to that
is the prediction of that a repeatable value will be generated by
measurement.
>
>>>> Don't be obtuse. SR proceeds from the definition of time and space
>>>> coordinates,
>
>>> In my version it starts from the Minkowski metric.
>
>> Then it starts from something which is known to be physically wrong,
>
>but often a good approximation, so that's fine. And exactly my
>understanding of SR.
Then you have no understanding of SR. You would do well to study it
properly and see what Einstein's assumptions actually were.
>> and even in the flat space approximation it starts from something
>> which is unscientific, having no logical justification, since:
>
>Again, scientific theories are hypotheses, they don't need logical
>justifications.
SR is no hypothesis. Nor is GR, or QL. These are simply models of
measurement in a universe in which we define quantities from the
relationships of matter to matter.
>> You can produce the formulae SR from the empirical definition of time
>> and space coordinates, together with the assumption that the underlying
>> structure of matter is everywhere the same.
>
>Nonsense. Claims about the "underlying structure of matter" are not
>part of SR.
Isotropy of measurement of time and distance is essential to SR. Your
claim of the existence of a background space is also a claim about an
underlying structure, and it is false.
>>>> Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but
>>>> since it is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement that
>>>> 2+2=4.
>
>>> Once you name the "water drops" application a misapplication, the
>>> "apple" application is open to such criticism as well.
>
>> Not so long as the apples are apples. The countability of apples is part
>> of their appleness.
>
>I have made an high energy scattering experiment, with the result 2
>apples + 2 apples = apple sauce ;-).
Of course, and apple sauce is not apples, so that describes a situation
in which 2+2=4 would be a misapplication. Had the apples remained apples
then you might correctly apply the equation.
>>>>> That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
>>>>> is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
>>>>> knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
>
>>>> That is merely defeatism in science and contains the error of induction.
>
>>> I have said "hopeless", not "impossible", so I have not made such an
>>> error.
>
>> Then it really is defeatism, not reasoned argument. It is really quite
>> out of order and thoroughly offensive to charge that anyone disagreeing
>> is naive, and merely highlights the preposterously pompous position
>> adopted by Popperists.
>
>Blabla. Feel free to prove us wrong. Whatever you like is open to
>criticism. Feel free to criticize energy conservation and to
>construct a Perpetuum Mobile.
One is not free to contradict mathematical argument, such as that which
proves energy conservation or the second law. Once again these are
demonstrable science facts, not simply hypotheses, and they may be cited
as counter instances to Popper, who has never shown understanding of a
mathematical argument.
>
>>>> and on the other you are claiming that this statement is not
>>>> positivist knowledge.
>
>>> This is mathematical knowledge. IOW, knowledge about the language.
>>> Not about nature.
>
>> This was language to describe nature, and hence it is knowledge about
>> nature.
>
>LOL. This does not follow.
It did not have to follow. "2apples+2apples = 4 apples" is already
knowledge about nature, under the rider that the apples remain apples.
>>>> But then you may produce a theory which is correctly restricted to
>>>> its area of validity.
>>>
>>> Which may be correctly restricted. But I cannot be sure it is.
>>
>> It is always possible to restrict scientific theory, even if it means
>> over restricting it.
>
>Yep, but if you restrict it to a level where is is proven truth, what
>remains is only pure math, no longer empirical science.
You have to study it. In SR we only need to restrict to a region of
space-time in which an approximation is valid, and we need to restrict
to circumstances such that classical measurement makes sense. That
covers the whole validity of SR, and it remains a theory of science.
>> As you said earlier
>>>>> Provided (all other assumptions I need) whatever I claim follows by
>>>>> deductive reason alone.
>
>That's what I name "pure math".
>
>>>> I call that good science, but according to a falsificationist, since
>>>> this theory cannot be falsified it is unscientific.
>
>>> Of course it is falsifiable, once it makes claims inside the rider.
>
>> The claims inside the rider may be directly empirical or deductive,
>> so not falsifiable. They are, however, demonstrably and deductively
>> testable and true.
>
>Ok, if you use a "strong" rider so that what remains is pure math.
It is not pure math, since in pure math we work only with symbols and
the symbols have no intrinsic meaning outside of their relationships in
the mathematical structure under study. The instant we talk of apples or
of seconds and metres we are talking of the application of math to
physics. The rider merely states when the application is correct, and is
part of the postulates of the theory. You may, if you like, describe the
rider and the empirical definitions as the whole of the theory, since
the rest follows by pure math.
>I have assumed you mean reasonable claims like "NM holds for v<<c"
>or variants with error ranges.
That is the kind of thing which is necessary in the rider. You also need
to specify that the empirical definitions hold. An instance of an
experiment where assumptions of SR do not hold is found in Young's
slits, since you could not, even in principle, do a measurement to test
which slit the particle goes through without altering the particle's
motion.
>> It might be more reasonable to call a commentator on scientific theory,
>> notably Popper, who does not appear to have understood or observed the
>> first thing about scientific practice, a complete bloody pompous
>> imbecile.
>
>It is even more reasonable to ignore people who start calling names.
You are the one who calls naive anyone who finds Popper's ideas
inadequate as philosophy of science.
>> And who cares what Popper says any more.
>
>I care, as long as somebody with better arguments appears.
To know that you must study both the science and the arguments. It is no
good distorting SR to become something which fits Popper, you actually
have to analyse SR objectively and mathematically to see what its real
mathematical structure is.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
>
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:scjmQzDM...@clef.demon.co.uk...
>> In article <ujadvir...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
>> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>For some strange reason, no doubt related to a broken boundary or some
>troublesome unresolved childhood authority issue, I fail to see what is
>wrong with taking a logical approach to building a solid scientific
>foundation. For 350 orbits -- about 10 generations, people have worked
>the Cartesian cube/subject object approach. T speak.
>
>
>How does one test for that kind of situation? Shift over to a different
>coordination system and see if any of the prior difficulties go away or if
>there are some advantages to the new approach.
The mathematicians have already done this. It is built most
comprehensively into the symbolism of GR, though coordinate shifts are
bread and butter to mathematicians generally. Don't teach your
grandmother to suck eggs, it doesn't go down too well.
>>Hey, don't call me "you folks", I have
>> always been a severe critic of quantisation.
>
>Pardon me and my prejudicial labeling. I'm aware you are fostering some
>competing theory but to me it sounds like yours is still down in the same
>deep ruts mostly on the quantum side.
It is not a competing theory, it is a justification and unification of
existing theory.
>> >Strange as it sounds, I propose we actively shift over from the
>Cartesian
>> >imagery to the more natural binary tetrahedral mathematical basis.
>>
>> But then you're not planning to do the maths. I suggest leaving the
>> suggestions to those who are.
>
>Math? What math? Didn't I just do the math? You need more?
You hardly scratch the surface. It takes years of training to learn
enough math to tackle this stuff.
>Pardon my ire.
pardon mine.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
> In article <ujdmiqs...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
> >
> >Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> >news:scjmQzDM...@clef.demon.co.uk...
> >> In article <ujadvir...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
> >> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
> >For some strange reason, no doubt related to a broken boundary or some
> >troublesome unresolved childhood authority issue, I fail to see what
is
> >wrong with taking a logical approach to building a solid scientific
> >foundation. For 350 orbits -- about 10 generations, people have
worked
> >the Cartesian cube/subject object approach.
> >
> >
different
> >coordination system and see if any of the prior difficulties go away or
if
> >there are some advantages to the new approach.
>
> The mathematicians have already done this. It is built most
> comprehensively into the symbolism of GR, though coordinate shifts are
> bread and butter to mathematicians generally. Don't teach your
> grandmother to suck eggs, it doesn't go down too well.
I don't think you understand what I am proposing. I'm not saying the old
folks need to learn the new math, necessarily. They can if they want. My
point is focused toward the early grades, pre-school through the lower
grades. Instead of doing the low level formatting to the cubic
specification, re-tool and burn in a simple binary tetrahedral pattern
_first_. Then everyone would have a moderately good shot at acquiring a
general *feel* for A LOT of the natural patterns via the readily accessible
analog math symbols and tactile learning pathway.
After that, when the teacher puts two tetrahedra together to define
the eight corners of a cube, then the student could see how that particular
coordinate transformation is made. Then folks can get into the fancy cubic
XYZ math approximations, and from there, to the others you say mathematician
eat for breakfast. After 10 to15 years of that education, the kids could
learn the equations of anharmonic motions and/or field equations --
something they *felt* with the analog binary tetrahedral models and had
physical intuition and discussions about since pre-school.
I know it must be difficult but please try to imagine a long term
educational project that opens more doors than it closes. Try also to
remember that initial conditions have substantial influence on outcomes.
For very little cost -- infintesimal cost, really -- kids can acquire a good
*feel* for a naturally occurring frame of reference. The proposed change
is a bit like asking the 'right' question or having the "spark of insight"
at just the right moment. ...imo.
As for the small horde of mathematicians who perhaps can fluidly shift
coordinate frames and can climb down into the GR cul-de-sac and then claim
that ALL coordinate systems are equal, notice that (1) those folks are in
one cul-de-sac and the there is another group of folks in separate QM/QFT
cul-de-sac; that is, apparently GR as formulated is not the unified cat's
meow, and (2) what better way for SR/GR to fold into falsification than for
there to be a preferred frame of reference. The preferred reference does
not show itself when the analysis is worked in the secondary abstract math
symbols, however, clearly the physical (analog) thing itself IS unified and
does all its unified math to perfection in the analog symbols.
That is, mathematicians are working with secondary, virtual, imaginary bread
and butter.
>
> >>Hey, don't call me "you folks", I have
> >> always been a severe critic of quantisation.
> >
> >Pardon me and my prejudicial labeling. I'm aware you are fostering some
> >competing theory but to me it sounds like yours is still down in the
same
> >deep ruts mostly on the quantum side.
>
> It is not a competing theory, it is a justification and unification of
> existing theory.
If it is not the official party line, it is a competing theory. Don't kid
yourself. Plus, your approach is down in the ruts, so to speak, heavily
dependent upon considerable mastery in the abstract math symbols and
expression, isn't it?
Mind you I'm not saying that your approach is bad for _trying_ to
communicate with the abstract math expressionists. All you folks are a
lot smarter than I am at playing those games. The distinction I am making
though, is what do you do if you have to present an effective unified field
model that kids, blind kids and kids in the bush country in the Dark
Continent, Rain Forest, and Outback can get a common *feel* for without
get
a Post Doc in Cartesian Brand Abstract Math?
There are two different problems. Your approach _may_ work fine for the
0.5% population group. Yours or someone elses. However, I don't think so.
You said yourself that "coordinate shifts are bread and butter to
mathematicians generally", so ultimately your abstract expression gets
folded around into the same morass. The wonderfully creative and efficient
thing I am proposing is a shift from abstract to analog _symbols_. That's
not a simple coordinate tranformation,
although it can start as one in shifting from the cube to the tetrahedral
shift. Shifting symbolic representations invokes a different sort of
adaptive response. It's not a simple coordinate tranformation. One is
faced with re-partitioning awareness at a deeper level. Perform that
"coordinate transformation" -- pre-re-normalize -- and then develop a
large group of people who think along the complementary way. That's the
path to the more unified models.
Otherwise, you and your brilliant abstract mathematician buddies would be
done by now, not trying to figure out how to shut me up.
>
> >> >Strange as it sounds, I propose we actively shift over from the
> >Cartesian
> >> >imagery to the more natural binary tetrahedral mathematical basis.
> >>
> >> But then you're not planning to do the maths. I suggest leaving the
> >> suggestions to those who are.
> >
> >Math? What math? Didn't I just do the math? You need more?
>
> You hardly scratch the surface. It takes years of training to learn
> enough math to tackle this stuff.
I know that. Don't you think I know that?
The math I am referring to is simply the ~proof~ that binary tetrahedral
math basis is more fundamental than the cubic stuff. The fact that two
tetrahedra arrange to define the eight corners of the cube ~proves~
that a single tetrahedron is more fundamental than the cube. You might be
able to clutter that proof up with more verbiage but the outcome is the
same. I don't think you can refute it.
That's not to say there are not yet some more sections that make those
solids up, but
when comparing the two, the logic I'm using works. Since tetrahedron is
more fundamental than cube, how come kids don't begin their math education
with at least that small fact? Plus, a lot of nature is cast in the same
tetrahedral mould. How come it's not widely taught as the initial frame of
reference?
Why not actively teach such stuff in school? Are you saying mathematicians
are against educational reform and making simple changes that induce global
improvements in math comprehension?
Surely you are saying that, are you?
Charles Francis
<ref...@dcwi.com> writes
>
>
>I don't think you understand what I am proposing. I'm not saying the old
>folks need to learn the new math, necessarily.
Then how would they teach it?
> They can if they want. My
>point is focused toward the early grades, pre-school through the lower
>grades. Instead of doing the low level formatting to the cubic
>specification, re-tool and burn in a simple binary tetrahedral pattern
>_first_.
We don't do much in the way of solid geometry in early grades anyway. In
fact geometry is not much studied at all these days, mores the pity. I
still think the geometry I studied after the manner of Euclid was a
great training, and in many ways much better than using Cartesian
coordinates to reduce everything to algebra, but teaching Euclid has all
but died out in the schools, so you are very much against the trend.
>After that, when the teacher puts two tetrahedra together to define
>the eight corners of a cube, then the student could see how that particular
>coordinate transformation is made.
There really isn't any advantage in solving any problem I can think of.
>As for the small horde of mathematicians who perhaps can fluidly shift
>coordinate frames and can climb down into the GR cul-de-sac and then claim
>that ALL coordinate systems are equal, notice that (1) those folks are in
>one cul-de-sac and the there is another group of folks in separate QM/QFT
>cul-de-sac; that is, apparently GR as formulated is not the unified cat's
>meow, and (2) what better way for SR/GR to fold into falsification than for
>there to be a preferred frame of reference.
That is not a good way. In fact it is a way we know is wrong. The trick
is to formulate a model when the very notion of a frame of reference
starts to break down. Unfortunately physicists are not good at thinking
about that, and that is the sole reason there is apparent
incompatibility between QM and GR.
>> >>Hey, don't call me "you folks", I have
>> >> always been a severe critic of quantisation.
>> >
>> >Pardon me and my prejudicial labeling. I'm aware you are fostering some
>> >competing theory but to me it sounds like yours is still down in the
>same
>> >deep ruts mostly on the quantum side.
>>
>> It is not a competing theory, it is a justification and unification of
>> existing theory.
>
>If it is not the official party line, it is a competing theory.
That is a moot point. It is actually the most official party line,
simply reformulating qm as it should be formulated if Dirac's and Von
Neumann's interpretation of it is essentially correct, and if Einstein's
thoughts on measurement are essentially correct. The fact that it
disagrees with many physicists is due to the fact that physicists do not
study the field of interpretation properly, generally avoiding it
because they say it engenders too many arguments, and failing to
recognise that if you make mistakes in interpretation then everything
based on it may be wrong.
>Don't kid
>yourself. Plus, your approach is down in the ruts, so to speak, heavily
>dependent upon considerable mastery in the abstract math symbols and
>expression, isn't it?
I use mathematics as an extension of ordinary language. I also express
myself as much as possible in ordinary language, especially when
discussing in on the NG.
>There are two different problems. Your approach _may_ work fine for the
>0.5% population group.
I don't think it works fine for anyone. If it is not done in mathematics
then no one has the confidence and authority to understand it and say it
is right, and if it is done in mathematics no one studies it well enough
to understand it and say it is right. In addition the manner of thinking
of physicists is not rigorous according to the laws of mathematics and
logic, and so they can only see that what I say is not what they learned
from books, and cannot make any personal judgement on whether it is
right by the rules of mathematics and logic.
>Otherwise, you and your brilliant abstract mathematician buddies would be
>done by now, not trying to figure out how to shut me up.
I am done. But one thing which we can all see is that there is no way
forward for this tetrahedron stuff.
>The math I am referring to is simply the ~proof~ that binary tetrahedral
>math basis is more fundamental than the cubic stuff. The fact that two
>tetrahedra arrange to define the eight corners of the cube ~proves~
>that a single tetrahedron is more fundamental than the cube.
Surely by that reason lines and points are more fundamental than either,
just as they always were. But I think you mistake something. Coordinate
systems are not built like this out of cubes. A coordinate system is
based on only one corner of a cube, which by your argument makes it more
fundamental than either a cube or a tetrahedron.
>Why not actively teach such stuff in school?
Look up tessellation in a school level math text. We have studied enough
of what you are saying to see that it is a non-starter for studying the
fundamental structure of space-time/
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ralph E. Frost
> In article <uk5n93o...@corp.supernews.com>, Ralph E. Frost
> <ref...@dcwi.com> writes
> >
> >
> >I don't think you understand what I am proposing. I'm not saying the
old
> >folks need to learn the new math, necessarily.
>
> Then how would they teach it?
Oops, I meant not all the old folks need to learn the new approach,
particularly those who are staunchly resistant to making a transition into
the more unified models.
>
> > They can if they want. My
> >point is focused toward the early grades, pre-school through the lower
> >grades. Instead of doing the low level formatting to the cubic
> >specification, re-tool and burn in a simple binary tetrahedral pattern
> >_first_.
>
> We don't do much in the way of solid geometry in early grades anyway. In
> fact geometry is not much studied at all these days, mores the pity. I
> still think the geometry I studied after the manner of Euclid was a
> great training, and in many ways much better than using Cartesian
> coordinates to reduce everything to algebra, but teaching Euclid has all
> but died out in the schools, so you are very much against the trend.
>
> >After that, when the teacher puts two tetrahedra together to define
> >the eight corners of a cube, then the student could see how that
particular
> >coordinate transformation is made.
>
> There really isn't any advantage in solving any problem I can think of.
You're still not seeing it. The next generation or two face this exquisite
transition from the islandic approach to physics and physical models, into
themore unified model. It's a huge transition. Big. Significant,
comprehensive. A foundational shift.
It's brought about by re-partitioning awareness. Shifting over to a more
synchronous symbol set. Adopting a different initial math basis -- a more
natural POV.
The entire package leads to new approaches while disrupting the stagnant
misperception.
>
> >As for the small horde of mathematicians who perhaps can fluidly shift
> >coordinate frames and can climb down into the GR cul-de-sac and then
claim
> >that ALL coordinate systems are equal, notice that (1) those folks are
in
> >one cul-de-sac and the there is another group of folks in separate QM/QFT
> >cul-de-sac; that is, apparently GR as formulated is not the unified
cat's
> >meow, and (2) what better way for SR/GR to fold into falsification than
for
> >there to be a preferred frame of reference.
>
> That is not a good way. In fact it is a way we know is wrong. The trick
> is to formulate a model when the very notion of a frame of reference
> starts to break down. Unfortunately physicists are not good at thinking
> about that, and that is the sole reason there is apparent
> incompatibility between QM and GR.
Sure it's a good way. After the fact, one goes from Newton, to the GR/QM
trial theory, through the "re-formation", where experience exists but time
does not. GR doesn't get completely falsified, only a central part of it,
which relegates it to the same status as Newtonian approximation. It's
all useful.
As for bringing up the notion of breaking down the notion of a frame of
reference, what better way to introduce that option than to step from the
Cartesian stepping stone, over to the more natural binary tetrahedral
system -- noticing that stuff is already "written" in the analog math
symbols of carbon-based consciousness.
That's what my approach ~formalizes~ That is, folks can at least see a
portion of what the pathway is and notice that there is something
significant in attempting, _attempting_ to switch from the abstract math
symbols to the more robust and more unified analog math symbols.
That is, carbon-based consciousness -- or the sequencing and combinations
of binary tetrahedral pattens is the proverbial "preferred frame of
reference", of the frame of reference-less framework.
Surely you can see that.
>
> >> >>Hey, don't call me "you folks", I have
> >> >> always been a severe critic of quantisation.
> >> >
> >> >Pardon me and my prejudicial labeling. I'm aware you are fostering
some
> >> >competing theory but to me it sounds like yours is still down in the
> >same
> >> >deep ruts mostly on the quantum side.
> >>
> >> It is not a competing theory, it is a justification and unification of
> >> existing theory.
> >
> >If it is not the official party line, it is a competing theory.
>
> That is a moot point. It is actually the most official party line,
> simply reformulating qm as it should be formulated if Dirac's and Von
> Neumann's interpretation of it is essentially correct, and if Einstein's
> thoughts on measurement are essentially correct. The fact that it
> disagrees with many physicists is due to the fact that physicists do not
> study the field of interpretation properly, generally avoiding it
> because they say it engenders too many arguments, and failing to
> recognise that if you make mistakes in interpretation then everything
> based on it may be wrong.
Pardon me for saying so, but I think your own comments apply to you, too.
Over on the abstract math side, we've got a large number of similar,
essentially equal abstract math approximations. Where do they come from?
Minimally, all that secondary stuff arises from the energetic geometry in
carbon-based consciousness. Call it what you will. It's a bunch of analog
math symbols.
Making a detailed model of that is difficult. Making a simplified unified
model of it is easy. One can get the conceptual model and a fairly large
chunk of the physical inituition down in very short order just by playing
around with one simple mass-energetic model and one-half spin.
Traditional physicists apparently believe that "time exists". Or that is
one part of their confused interpretation.
>
> >Don't kid
> >yourself. Plus, your approach is down in the ruts, so to speak,
heavily
> >dependent upon considerable mastery in the abstract math symbols and
> >expression, isn't it?
>
> I use mathematics as an extension of ordinary language. I also express
> myself as much as possible in ordinary language, especially when
> discussing in on the NG.
What is different with my approach? Sure, I had to create more robust
analog math symbols, but the approach still is the same thing. Of course
you may say the primary analog math symbols aren't math at all, or you can
claim that simplified unified models that anyone can understand and gain a
benefit from ought not be allowed as math becasue they were not thought up
by someone trained in mathematics.
>
> >There are two different problems. Your approach _may_ work fine for
the
> >0.5% population group.
>
> I don't think it works fine for anyone. If it is not done in mathematics
> then no one has the confidence and authority to understand it and say it
> is right, and if it is done in mathematics no one studies it well enough
> to understand it and say it is right. In addition the manner of thinking
> of physicists is not rigorous according to the laws of mathematics and
> logic, and so they can only see that what I say is not what they learned
> from books, and cannot make any personal judgement on whether it is
> right by the rules of mathematics and logic.
That's like that math proof that hundreds of people worked on and no one
understood completely?
You see, right there is where you ought to be saying, "Hmmmm, I've never
thought about ANALOG math symbols. I wonder......."
When you dare to shift over and consider using only simple analog math
symbols a new world opens up. It's substantially different than dealing
with the secondary abstract math echoes. It's a cut above fiddling just
with the "pure" Platonic solids. You acquire a different focus.
Real mathematicians, and even real physicists are always looking for
acquiring a different focus.
>
> >Otherwise, you and your brilliant abstract mathematician buddies would be
> >done by now, not trying to figure out how to shut me up.
>
> I am done. But one thing which we can all see is that there is no way
> forward for this tetrahedron stuff.
Not all of us. All of you folks, perhaps. Geez, if I were one of you, I'd
make the same frivolous, unfounded claim, too. Look at how completely
terrible it looks for your side -- for those working the secondary abstract
math symbols.
The neat part of the tetrahedron stuff, particularly the magnetic
tetrahedral stuff, is it's so small and quick. But small and quick does
not mean insiginficant or inconsequential.
Not when you have the quantum gravity models being formulated with binary
tetrahedra and quantum tetrahedra. Or, essentially ~all~ of organic
chemistry.
There are plenty of ways forward with the tetrahedron stuff.
>
> >The math I am referring to is simply the ~proof~ that binary tetrahedral
> >math basis is more fundamental than the cubic stuff. The fact that two
> >tetrahedra arrange to define the eight corners of the cube ~proves~
> >that a single tetrahedron is more fundamental than the cube.
>
> Surely by that reason lines and points are more fundamental than either,
> just as they always were. But I think you mistake something. Coordinate
> systems are not built like this out of cubes. A coordinate system is
> based on only one corner of a cube, which by your argument makes it more
> fundamental than either a cube or a tetrahedron.
Oh, please. Go look in an organic chemistry book, for Christ's sake.
Lines and points are part of the abstract crap that end up fooling you.
And, or the corner of the cube, that's also just an arbitary center of a
particular tetrahedron -- or octahedron.
Look at the pictures in an organic chemistry and biochemistry book. Does
these books write themselves?
>
>
> >Why not actively teach such stuff in school?
>
> Look up tessellation in a school level math text. We have studied enough
> of what you are saying to see that it is a non-starter for studying the
> fundamental structure of space-time/
That must be why it is popular in quantum gravity.
That argument merely uses the criteria of the flawed way of partitioning
awareness to rule out or exclude the development a completely different,
more unified approach.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to notice that the tetrahedral
structure -- sinces it's ubiquitous throughout the local region, is a
better approximation of the structure of the thing itself than all the
non-finishers you folks have put out. Be brave, Charles.
The thing itself is unified at the analog level.
Go figure.
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> However we cannot go far by adapting language to false
>>> assumptions. What we have to do is adapt language to reality.
>> In this case, two things may be modified: "measurement" may no longer
>> be applied in QM, or the meaning of "measurement" which assumes
>> predefined values (which is fine in many other contexts) should be
>> removed. But we need this meaning in these other contexts, so I would
>> not propose to remove this meaning.
> There is no loss in removing the second meaning. In fact it would be
> more correct to say that even in classical measurement the value does
> not exist until it is read from the dials, all that exists prior to that
> is the prediction of that a repeatable value will be generated by
> measurement.
I disagree. This position is not "more correct" but, in usual
classical applications of "measurement" purely positivistic, in
disagreement with common sense realism.
>>> Then it starts from something which is known to be physically wrong,
>> but often a good approximation, so that's fine. And exactly my
>> understanding of SR.
> Then you have no understanding of SR. You would do well to study it
> properly and see what Einstein's assumptions actually were.
The thing I name "SR" is a reasonable theory with a reasonable domain
of application as an approximation. My use of "SR" seems to be shared
by the physics community.
>> Again, scientific theories are hypotheses, they don't need logical
>> justifications.
> SR is no hypothesis. Nor is GR, or QL. These are simply models of
> measurement in a universe in which we define quantities from the
> relationships of matter to matter.
I disagree.
>>>>> Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but
>>>>> since it is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement
>>>>> that 2+2=4.
>>>> Once you name the "water drops" application a misapplication, the
>>>> "apple" application is open to such criticism as well.
>>> Not so long as the apples are apples. The countability of apples
>>> is part of their appleness.
>> I have made an high energy scattering experiment, with the result 2
>> apples + 2 apples = apple sauce ;-).
> Of course, and apple sauce is not apples, so that describes a
> situation in which 2+2=4 would be a misapplication. Had the apples
> remained apples then you might correctly apply the equation.
Thus, a "correct application" is restricted to situations where apples
remain apples forever. But in reality apples do not remain apples for
sufficiently large periods of time, say 50 years.
>>>>>> That's following the classical positive definition of knowledge, which
>>>>>> is an ideal which cannot be reached. To hope for certain, provable
>>>>>> knowledge with such riders is hopeless.
>>
>>>>> That is merely defeatism in science and contains the error of induction.
>>
>>>> I have said "hopeless", not "impossible", so I have not made such an
>>>> error.
>>> Then it really is defeatism, not reasoned argument. It is really quite
>>> out of order and thoroughly offensive to charge that anyone disagreeing
>>> is naive, and merely highlights the preposterously pompous position
>>> adopted by Popperists.
>> Blabla. Feel free to prove us wrong. Whatever you like is open to
>> criticism. Feel free to criticize energy conservation and to
>> construct a Perpetuum Mobile.
> One is not free to contradict mathematical argument, such as that which
> proves energy conservation or the second law.
Energy conservation is certainly not a mathematical argument. It is a
physical hypothesis corrobated by observation, not more.
Instead, the original statement that provable knowledge is impossible
has much more mathematical character. See Goedel.
> Once again these are demonstrable science facts, not simply
> hypotheses, and they may be cited as counter instances to Popper,
> who has never shown understanding of a mathematical argument.
Energy conservation as a counter instance to Popper? ROTFL. Your
personal remarks about Popper are uninteresting. He has not claimed
to have made serious contributions to math.
> It did not have to follow. "2apples+2apples = 4 apples" is already
> knowledge about nature, under the rider that the apples remain
> apples.
This makes it knowledge about language. We use a language where 2
(something) + 2 (something) = 4 (something), and under the rider that
this language may be applied to reality this becomes a statement about
reality.
>>> It is always possible to restrict scientific theory, even if it means
>>> over restricting it.
>>
>> Yep, but if you restrict it to a level where is is proven truth, what
>> remains is only pure math, no longer empirical science.
>
> You have to study it.
No, the disagreement is obviously a more fundamental, philosophical
one. What appears already for "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples", will
show up in a similar way in SR too. No need to study SR-specific
issues.
>> Ok, if you use a "strong" rider so that what remains is pure math.
> It is not pure math, since in pure math we work only with symbols
> and the symbols have no intrinsic meaning outside of their
> relationships in the mathematical structure under study. The instant
> we talk of apples or of seconds and metres we are talking of the
> application of math to physics. The rider merely states when the
> application is correct, and is part of the postulates of the
> theory. You may, if you like, describe the rider and the empirical
> definitions as the whole of the theory, since the rest follows by
> pure math.
Ok, so what you name "rider" means the whole theory minus the "empirical"
definitions (whatever this means) minus what follows from pure math.
So I suggest to identify the rider with the axioms of the theory.
>> I have assumed you mean reasonable claims like "NM holds for v<<c"
>> or variants with error ranges.
> That is the kind of thing which is necessary in the rider. You also need
> to specify that the empirical definitions hold.
Definitions are definitions, they may be meaningful or not. They are
theoretical decisions, not empirical. The combination "definitions
... hold" is meaningless.
>>> It might be more reasonable to call a commentator on scientific theory,
>>> notably Popper, who does not appear to have understood or observed the
>>> first thing about scientific practice, a complete bloody pompous
>>> imbecile.
>> It is even more reasonable to ignore people who start calling names.
> You are the one who calls naive anyone who finds Popper's ideas
> inadequate as philosophy of science.
I call somebody naive if he repeats age-old positivistic positions
without giving evidence that he knows the arguments against these
positions presented by Popper and others.
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> However we cannot go far by adapting language to false
>>>> assumptions. What we have to do is adapt language to reality.
>
>>> In this case, two things may be modified: "measurement" may no longer
>>> be applied in QM, or the meaning of "measurement" which assumes
>>> predefined values (which is fine in many other contexts) should be
>>> removed. But we need this meaning in these other contexts, so I would
>>> not propose to remove this meaning.
>
>> There is no loss in removing the second meaning. In fact it would be
>> more correct to say that even in classical measurement the value does
>> not exist until it is read from the dials, all that exists prior to that
>> is the prediction of that a repeatable value will be generated by
>> measurement.
>
>I disagree. This position is not "more correct" but, in usual
>classical applications of "measurement" purely positivistic, in
>disagreement with common sense realism.
But I find absolutely no common sense reason to think that the world is
composed of number, only reason to think that number can be used to
quantify aspects of the behaviour of reality.
I don't think it right to call this viewpoint positivistic, since the
fundamental assumption of the existence of material reality cannot be
made from a positivistic viewpoint. Nor am I saying that only positivist
knowledge of reality exists (a view which I find self defeating) only
that the numbers which we use to quantify certain properties of reality
are simply values read from scales on the equipment and do not exist
without these scales or this equipment. Depending on the configuration
of matter this numbers may or may not have definite (albeit unknown)
values prior to measurement, and we know from the laws of quantum
mechanics that that there are situations in which we do know that the
numbers do not have a definite existence or definite values.
It is quite wrong, however, to go from a statement of the non-existence
of certain values to a statement of the non-existence of reality between
measurement. Incorporated in the assumption of the existence of a
consistent reality is that electrons, protons, etc exist with exactly
the same properties between measurement as in measurement. Only the
relationship of an electron to the rest of reality is altered in the
measurement. In itself this is not a strange idea, but a natural
intuitive one, and so it is also natural and intuitive that numbers
(e.g. position) describing the relationship of an electron to the rest
of reality only exist when the physical interactions of the electron
with the rest of reality are such that those numbers make sense.
>The thing I name "SR" is a reasonable theory with a reasonable domain
>of application as an approximation. My use of "SR" seems to be shared
>by the physics community.
What is shared is the correctness of predictions, since that is all that
the physics community seems to use to validate theory. My use of SR
shares precisely the same predictions.
I do not dispute the existence of a model using Minkowski space-time
treated as a reasonable approximation within a reasonable domain of
approximation, but I do dispute that it is scientific or correct to
induce the physical existence of Minkowski space-time from that.
BTW SR as taught at by the mathematical sector of the scientific
community at Cambridge only meant the mathematical form of the Lorentz
transformation, and no more. That I might think positivistic, but you
should acknowledge before claiming to share your interpretation with the
physics community that much of the physics community is influenced by
positivism, and indeed it is a large community with disparate views and
training.
>>> Again, scientific theories are hypotheses, they don't need logical
>>> justifications.
>
>> SR is no hypothesis. Nor is GR, or QL. These are simply models of
>> measurement in a universe in which we define quantities from the
>> relationships of matter to matter.
>
>I disagree.
Then you should study the way to draw these "theories" from the
properties of measurement. There is no induction, no hypothesis, just
observation, definition and strictly deductive reason, and hence also
there is no room for rational disagreement. Possibly the use of the word
"theory" to describe something which is proven true is mistaken, but it
is so heavily ingrained that we have to accept that science theory can
also be science fact, not just hypothesis.
>>>>>> Likewise the misapplication to water drops is also physics, but
>>>>>> since it is a misapplication it does not falsify the statement
>>>>>> that 2+2=4.
>
>>>>> Once you name the "water drops" application a misapplication, the
>>>>> "apple" application is open to such criticism as well.
>
>>>> Not so long as the apples are apples. The countability of apples
>>>> is part of their appleness.
>
>>> I have made an high energy scattering experiment, with the result 2
>>> apples + 2 apples = apple sauce ;-).
>
>> Of course, and apple sauce is not apples, so that describes a
>> situation in which 2+2=4 would be a misapplication. Had the apples
>> remained apples then you might correctly apply the equation.
>
>Thus, a "correct application" is restricted to situations where apples
>remain apples forever. But in reality apples do not remain apples for
>sufficiently large periods of time, say 50 years.
I never heard of an apple that lasted that long! A correct application
is restricted to the period of time when the apples are apples, whatever
that may be. There is no reason to suppose that that should be forever!
>> One is not free to contradict mathematical argument, such as that which
>> proves energy conservation or the second law.
>
>Energy conservation is certainly not a mathematical argument. It is a
>physical hypothesis corrobated by observation, not more.
This is no longer true. Energy conservation is a derivable consequence
of quantum field theory, and follows by combining the assumptions of
relativity and quantum mechanics (see Noether's theorem, although I much
prefer a more direct proof which does not depend on the Lagrangian
formulation).
>Instead, the original statement that provable knowledge is impossible
>has much more mathematical character. See Goedel.
No one has said anything deeper since Pythagoras pointed out that proof
must proceed from assumptions. Proof cannot proceed only from
observation, since there is no way to prove that the world is consistent
between observations. However the fundamental assumption of science is
that we are investigating the properties of a material reality, which
exists, which is consistent, and whose behaviour is reflected in our
perceptions. By putting this fundamental assumption together with
observation we can, as it has turned out during the C20th century, prove
actual properties of material reality. It is not meaningful to discuss
scientific law or the nature of reality without making this fundamental
assumption, and so it is legitimate to talk of scientific proof, and
scientific knowledge, meaning that it is implicit that the fundamental
assumption of science has been taken.
>> Once again these are demonstrable science facts, not simply
>> hypotheses, and they may be cited as counter instances to Popper,
>> who has never shown understanding of a mathematical argument.
>
>Energy conservation as a counter instance to Popper? ROTFL.
You really ought to understand the actual status of energy conservation
in modern scientific theory before you start rolling of the floor
laughing, especially as you make an exhibition of yourself, and moreover
you object when I respond with similar derogatory remarks.
> Your
>personal remarks about Popper are uninteresting. He has not claimed
>to have made serious contributions to math.
He has attempted to comment on mathematical argument, just as he has
attempted to comment on physical argument. Before he did either he
really should have understood a bit more about mathematics and its
relation to physics. Of course to do that he would have had to have
trained as a mathematician. I merely find it pompous that he comments
while he has not proper training.
>>>> It is always possible to restrict scientific theory, even if it means
>>>> over restricting it.
>>>
>>> Yep, but if you restrict it to a level where is is proven truth, what
>>> remains is only pure math, no longer empirical science.
>>
>> You have to study it.
>
>No, the disagreement is obviously a more fundamental, philosophical
>one. What appears already for "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples", will
>show up in a similar way in SR too. No need to study SR-specific
>issues.
In principle that may be true,. What appears trivial for apples is
obscure for SR and is beyond the ken of most scientists for both QM and
GTR. In the case of "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" we should be able
to agree that this describes physics so long as the apples remain
apples, whereas 2+2=4 is pure maths.
>>> Ok, if you use a "strong" rider so that what remains is pure math.
>
>> It is not pure math, since in pure math we work only with symbols
>> and the symbols have no intrinsic meaning outside of their
>> relationships in the mathematical structure under study. The instant
>> we talk of apples or of seconds and metres we are talking of the
>> application of math to physics. The rider merely states when the
>> application is correct, and is part of the postulates of the
>> theory. You may, if you like, describe the rider and the empirical
>> definitions as the whole of the theory, since the rest follows by
>> pure math.
>
>Ok, so what you name "rider" means the whole theory minus the "empirical"
>definitions (whatever this means) minus what follows from pure math.
>So I suggest to identify the rider with the axioms of the theory.
In broad terms, when fully expressed, the rider should be at least
included with the axioms of the theory and exists on a level with them.
It may be useful to think of it as an axiom.
I regard the concept of an empirical definition as absolutely
fundamental to the study of science, just as the concept of definitional
tautology is absolutely fundamental to a pure mathematical structure. By
an empirical definition I mean that we are defining an observed property
of matter, and not simply defining a word in terms of the other words of
the sentence (definitional truism). Specifically when we define time and
space coordinates we mean the numbers which would be produced from the
specified measurement process (which may be idealised) for time and
space coordinates.
>>> I have assumed you mean reasonable claims like "NM holds for v<<c"
>>> or variants with error ranges.
>
>> That is the kind of thing which is necessary in the rider. You also need
>> to specify that the empirical definitions hold.
>
>Definitions are definitions, they may be meaningful or not. They are
>theoretical decisions, not empirical. The combination "definitions
>... hold" is meaningless.
Not at all. The idea that an apple is an apple is an empirical
definition. You take your definition of the word apple from your
experience of apples, not from some theory of apples which you could
just as well have read in a book. Does a book's description of an apple
taste like an apple? Then the book's description is not a complete
definition.
>I call somebody naive if he repeats age-old positivistic positions
>without giving evidence that he knows the arguments against these
>positions presented by Popper and others.
But the fact is that I did not do that. Simply because I disagreed with
Popper you accused me of taking a positivist stance, which I also
disagree with; yet that is what you based your accusation on. Moreover
your accusation was based on a complete misconstruction of what I am
saying. Before you take such a position you should be sure that you have
understood what I am saying.
On a historical note positivism is not usually taken to be age old, but
dates from the early C20th. It actually flies in the face of some
genuinely age old philosophy of the nature of reality, indicating that
positivists had not even grasped much of Plato, let alone equipped
themselves to tackle the issues raised by Hume. I fear I have less time
for positivism even than Popper.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> There is no loss in removing the second meaning. In fact it would be
>>> more correct to say that even in classical measurement the value does
>>> not exist until it is read from the dials, all that exists prior to that
>>> is the prediction of that a repeatable value will be generated by
>>> measurement.
>> I disagree. This position is not "more correct" but, in usual
>> classical applications of "measurement" purely positivistic, in
>> disagreement with common sense realism.
> But I find absolutely no common sense reason to think that the world
> is composed of number,
Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
irrelevant.
>> The thing I name "SR" is a reasonable theory with a reasonable domain
>> of application as an approximation. My use of "SR" seems to be shared
>> by the physics community.
> What is shared is the correctness of predictions, since that is all
> that the physics community seems to use to validate theory.
Naming conventions accepted by the community and criteria for
validation used by this community are quite different things.
>>> SR is no hypothesis. Nor is GR, or QL.
>> I disagree.
> Then you should study the way to draw these "theories" from the
> properties of measurement. There is no induction, no hypothesis, just
> observation, definition and strictly deductive reason, and hence also
> there is no room for rational disagreement.
LOL.
>> Thus, a "correct application" is restricted to situations where apples
>> remain apples forever. But in reality apples do not remain apples for
>> sufficiently large periods of time, say 50 years.
> I never heard of an apple that lasted that long! A correct application
> is restricted to the period of time when the apples are apples, whatever
> that may be. There is no reason to suppose that that should be forever!
IOW, the "correct application" is restricted to the period (and
whatever else) where it is correct. A tautology.
>>> One is not free to contradict mathematical argument, such as that which
>>> proves energy conservation or the second law.
>> Energy conservation is certainly not a mathematical argument. It is a
>> physical hypothesis corrobated by observation, not more.
> This is no longer true. Energy conservation is a derivable consequence
> of quantum field theory, and follows by combining the assumptions of
> relativity and quantum mechanics
So what? These assumptions are questionable.
>> Instead, the original statement that provable knowledge is impossible
>> has much more mathematical character. See Goedel.
> No one has said anything deeper since Pythagoras pointed out that proof
> must proceed from assumptions. Proof cannot proceed only from
> observation, since there is no way to prove that the world is consistent
> between observations. However the fundamental assumption of science is
> that we are investigating the properties of a material reality, which
> exists, which is consistent, and whose behaviour is reflected in our
> perceptions. By putting this fundamental assumption together with
> observation we can, as it has turned out during the C20th century, prove
> actual properties of material reality.
No, it doesn't.
>> No, the disagreement is obviously a more fundamental, philosophical
>> one. What appears already for "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples", will
>> show up in a similar way in SR too. No need to study SR-specific
>> issues.
> In principle that may be true,. What appears trivial for apples is
> obscure for SR and is beyond the ken of most scientists for both QM and
> GTR. In the case of "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" we should be able
> to agree that this describes physics so long as the apples remain
> apples, whereas 2+2=4 is pure maths.
And physical theories remain correct as long as they remain correct.
A deep insight, LOL.
>> Ok, so what you name "rider" means the whole theory minus the "empirical"
>> definitions (whatever this means) minus what follows from pure math.
>> So I suggest to identify the rider with the axioms of the theory.
> In broad terms, when fully expressed, the rider should be at least
> included with the axioms of the theory and exists on a level with
> them. It may be useful to think of it as an axiom.
Thus, your claim reduces to "a theory is true if its axioms are true".
Deep insight.
> I regard the concept of an empirical definition as absolutely
> fundamental to the study of science, just as the concept of
> definitional tautology is absolutely fundamental to a pure
> mathematical structure. By an empirical definition I mean that we
> are defining an observed property of matter, and not simply defining
> a word in terms of the other words of the sentence (definitional
> truism). Specifically when we define time and space coordinates we
> mean the numbers which would be produced from the specified
> measurement process (which may be idealised) for time and space
> coordinates.
Whatever you use, you use an idealization - like idealized time
measurement - which may appear to be invalid.
>>> That is the kind of thing which is necessary in the rider. You also need
>>> to specify that the empirical definitions hold.
>> Definitions are definitions, they may be meaningful or not. They are
>> theoretical decisions, not empirical. The combination "definitions
>> ... hold" is meaningless.
> Not at all. The idea that an apple is an apple is an empirical
> definition. You take your definition of the word apple from your
> experience of apples, not from some theory of apples which you could
> just as well have read in a book. Does a book's description of an
> apple taste like an apple? Then the book's description is not a
> complete definition.
Your experience suggests you a theory: something which looks like
(your prototypical image of an apple) and feels like (your prototype
of feelings if you hold an apple in your hand) smecks like (your
prototype of taste of an apple). This theory will be corrobated and
corrected by a long series of experiences during your childhood.
The theory is your personal theory, not formulated in words. But it
fits into the general concept of falsifiable theories. Your
understanding of the meaning of words is such a complex theory, named
"common sense".
Definitions are something different. The meaning of "apple" appears
in another way.
>> I call somebody naive if he repeats age-old positivistic positions
>> without giving evidence that he knows the arguments against these
>> positions presented by Popper and others.
> But the fact is that I did not do that.
Fact is that I have not seen other evidence, and therefore called you
naive.
> On a historical note positivism is not usually taken to be age old, but
> dates from the early C20th.
Now we have the early C21th, means, one age old.
Charles Francis
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>> <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>>>> There is no loss in removing the second meaning. In fact it would be
>>>> more correct to say that even in classical measurement the value does
>>>> not exist until it is read from the dials, all that exists prior to that
>>>> is the prediction of that a repeatable value will be generated by
>>>> measurement.
>
>>> I disagree. This position is not "more correct" but, in usual
>>> classical applications of "measurement" purely positivistic, in
>>> disagreement with common sense realism.
>
>> But I find absolutely no common sense reason to think that the world
>> is composed of number,
>
>Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
>irrelevant.
Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
Common sense realism merely says that reality continues to exist, and
with the same properties, between measurements. You are trying to say
that those properties include the numbers produced by measurement, and
hence that the world is, in fact, composed of number. I find your claims
quite spurious.
>>> The thing I name "SR" is a reasonable theory with a reasonable domain
>>> of application as an approximation. My use of "SR" seems to be shared
>>> by the physics community.
>
>> What is shared is the correctness of predictions, since that is all
>> that the physics community seems to use to validate theory.
>
>Naming conventions accepted by the community and criteria for
>validation used by this community are quite different things.
Naming conventions are quite regularly not shared and so long as their
is agreement on predictions no one either notices or cares. However I
have put it to you that a more correct naming convention, both
philosophically and mathematically, is that SR is contained in Lorentz
transformation, and that there is no mathematical, philosophical or
physical justification to claim a physical existence for absolute
Minkowski space-time, so it is not scientifically correct to include
such a metaphysic within the name of a scientific theory.
>>>> SR is no hypothesis. Nor is GR, or QL.
>
>>> I disagree.
>
>> Then you should study the way to draw these "theories" from the
>> properties of measurement. There is no induction, no hypothesis, just
>> observation, definition and strictly deductive reason, and hence also
>> there is no room for rational disagreement.
>
>LOL.
This is a measure of your lack of mathematical skill. You make an idiot
of yourself.
>>> Thus, a "correct application" is restricted to situations where apples
>>> remain apples forever. But in reality apples do not remain apples for
>>> sufficiently large periods of time, say 50 years.
>
>> I never heard of an apple that lasted that long! A correct application
>> is restricted to the period of time when the apples are apples, whatever
>> that may be. There is no reason to suppose that that should be forever!
>
>IOW, the "correct application" is restricted to the period (and
>whatever else) where it is correct. A tautology.
And hence an absolute truth. However it is not a mathematical tautology
but a piece of physics, falsifying Popper. Likewise SR, GR, QM are
essentially tautologies. But the interesting thing is that the only
physics allowing the tautologies of SR & QM to be true at all requires
the Dirac equation for fundamental particles. So from these tautologies
we also have real statements of the properties of matter.
>>>> One is not free to contradict mathematical argument, such as that which
>>>> proves energy conservation or the second law.
>
>>> Energy conservation is certainly not a mathematical argument. It is a
>>> physical hypothesis corrobated by observation, not more.
>
>> This is no longer true. Energy conservation is a derivable consequence
>> of quantum field theory, and follows by combining the assumptions of
>> relativity and quantum mechanics
>
>So what? These assumptions are questionable.
The assumptions of relativity and quantum mechanics, properly formulated
(which is admittedly rare), are not questionable, but come directly from
a Leibnizian relationist view of matter, whose truth is demonstrated
conclusively by the correctness its predictions (since all other
positions are conclusively falsified by the same, if you must)
>
>>> Instead, the original statement that provable knowledge is impossible
>>> has much more mathematical character. See Goedel.
>
>> No one has said anything deeper since Pythagoras pointed out that proof
>> must proceed from assumptions. Proof cannot proceed only from
>> observation, since there is no way to prove that the world is consistent
>> between observations. However the fundamental assumption of science is
>> that we are investigating the properties of a material reality, which
>> exists, which is consistent, and whose behaviour is reflected in our
>> perceptions. By putting this fundamental assumption together with
>> observation we can, as it has turned out during the C20th century, prove
>> actual properties of material reality.
>
>No, it doesn't.
If you wish to claim that 2+2=5 then go elsewhere.
>>> No, the disagreement is obviously a more fundamental, philosophical
>>> one. What appears already for "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples", will
>>> show up in a similar way in SR too. No need to study SR-specific
>>> issues.
>
>> In principle that may be true,. What appears trivial for apples is
>> obscure for SR and is beyond the ken of most scientists for both QM and
>> GTR. In the case of "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" we should be able
>> to agree that this describes physics so long as the apples remain
>> apples, whereas 2+2=4 is pure maths.
>
>And physical theories remain correct as long as they remain correct.
>A deep insight, LOL.
Clearly too deep for Popper, whose whole position is built on the
failure to recognise it. Hence I think he was an idiot. Oh, perhaps not
an idiot relative to the intellect of an ordinary man, but certainly an
idiot relative to the intellect of the few mathematical physicists of
history who have shaped scientific thought.
>>> Ok, so what you name "rider" means the whole theory minus the "empirical"
>>> definitions (whatever this means) minus what follows from pure math.
>>> So I suggest to identify the rider with the axioms of the theory.
>
>> In broad terms, when fully expressed, the rider should be at least
>> included with the axioms of the theory and exists on a level with
>> them. It may be useful to think of it as an axiom.
>
>Thus, your claim reduces to "a theory is true if its axioms are true".
>Deep insight.
I am not in the business of producing deep insights, merely correct ones
which seem to have been overlooked. You have regularly been laughing out
loud at the idea that it is possible to make such universally true
statements about physics, calling it naive. But it is simple enough to
demonstrate that such statements do apply to physics. Since it is so
simple, then one should not call it deep, but merely call a philosopher
such as Popper who fails to grasp it an idiot.
>> I regard the concept of an empirical definition as absolutely
>> fundamental to the study of science, just as the concept of
>> definitional tautology is absolutely fundamental to a pure
>> mathematical structure. By an empirical definition I mean that we
>> are defining an observed property of matter, and not simply defining
>> a word in terms of the other words of the sentence (definitional
>> truism). Specifically when we define time and space coordinates we
>> mean the numbers which would be produced from the specified
>> measurement process (which may be idealised) for time and space
>> coordinates.
>
>Whatever you use, you use an idealization - like idealized time
>measurement - which may appear to be invalid.
Not invalid, but valid in a limit, i.e. a well defined approximation.
This is merely a statement that empirical facts are given with a range
of accuracy.
>>>> That is the kind of thing which is necessary in the rider. You also need
>>>> to specify that the empirical definitions hold.
>
>>> Definitions are definitions, they may be meaningful or not. They are
>>> theoretical decisions, not empirical.
The definition of a metre is most definitely empirical, as is the
definition of a kilogram or a second. Such definitions are meaningful
only if they describe observable physical processes.
>> Not at all. The idea that an apple is an apple is an empirical
>> definition. You take your definition of the word apple from your
>> experience of apples, not from some theory of apples which you could
>> just as well have read in a book. Does a book's description of an
>> apple taste like an apple? Then the book's description is not a
>> complete definition.
>
>Your experience suggests you a theory: something which looks like
>(your prototypical image of an apple) and feels like (your prototype
>of feelings if you hold an apple in your hand) smecks like (your
>prototype of taste of an apple). This theory will be corrobated and
>corrected by a long series of experiences during your childhood.
>
>The theory is your personal theory, not formulated in words. But it
>fits into the general concept of falsifiable theories. Your
>understanding of the meaning of words is such a complex theory, named
>"common sense".
>
>Definitions are something different. The meaning of "apple" appears
>in another way.
The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>>> I call somebody naive if he repeats age-old positivistic positions
>>> without giving evidence that he knows the arguments against these
>>> positions presented by Popper and others.
>
>> But the fact is that I did not do that.
>
>Fact is that I have not seen other evidence, and therefore called you
>naive.
These seems to be a measure of your lack of understanding.
>
>> On a historical note positivism is not usually taken to be age old, but
>> dates from the early C20th.
>
>Now we have the early C21th, means, one age old.
Although the definition is fuzzy, in normal English usage an age is
substantially more than one century.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
>> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
>> irrelevant.
>
> Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
> positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
> produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
LOL. There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
According to common sense realism?
> Common sense realism merely says that reality continues to exist,
> and with the same properties, between measurements. You are trying
> to say that those properties include the numbers produced by
> measurement, and hence that the world is, in fact, composed of
> number. I find your claims quite spurious.
Please don't play games with words around "do numbers exist". The
question is if, if we don't count them, we have nonetheless 2000
trees in the forest. Or if this number is uncertain, undefined.
>>> What is shared is the correctness of predictions, since that is all
>>> that the physics community seems to use to validate theory.
>> Naming conventions accepted by the community and criteria for
>> validation used by this community are quite different things.
> Naming conventions are quite regularly not shared and so long as their
> is agreement on predictions no one either notices or cares. However I
> have put it to you that a more correct naming convention, both
> philosophically and mathematically, is that SR is contained in Lorentz
> transformation, and that there is no mathematical, philosophical or
> physical justification to claim a physical existence for absolute
> Minkowski space-time, so it is not scientifically correct to include
> such a metaphysic within the name of a scientific theory.
>> LOL.
>
> This is a measure of your lack of mathematical skill. You make an idiot
> of yourself.
>> IOW, the "correct application" is restricted to the period (and
>> whatever else) where it is correct. A tautology.
> And hence an absolute truth. However it is not a mathematical
> tautology but a piece of physics, falsifying Popper.
If you like to count mathematical tautologies as "pieces of physics"
simply because words like "apples" are involved, nobody
cares.
> Likewise SR, GR, QM are essentially tautologies.
Not at all.
> The assumptions of relativity and quantum mechanics, properly formulated
> (which is admittedly rare), are not questionable, but come directly from
> a Leibnizian relationist view of matter, whose truth is demonstrated
> conclusively by the correctness its predictions (since all other
> positions are conclusively falsified by the same, if you must)
"Its predictions" includes non-trivial predictions about future.
Predictions which obviously have not yet been tested. Therefore,
their truth is not demonstrated.
>> And physical theories remain correct as long as they remain correct.
>> A deep insight, LOL.
> Clearly too deep for Popper, whose whole position is built on the
> failure to recognise it. Hence I think he was an idiot. Oh, perhaps not
> an idiot relative to the intellect of an ordinary man, but certainly an
> idiot relative to the intellect of the few mathematical physicists of
> history who have shaped scientific thought.
LOL. Hence I think you are an idiot. Oh, perhaps not an idiot
relative to the intellect of an ordinary man, but certainly an idiot
relative to the intellect of Popper.
>> Thus, your claim reduces to "a theory is true if its axioms are true".
>> Deep insight.
> I am not in the business of producing deep insights, merely correct ones
> which seem to have been overlooked. You have regularly been laughing out
> loud at the idea that it is possible to make such universally true
> statements about physics, calling it naive. But it is simple enough to
> demonstrate that such statements do apply to physics.
Of course mathematical tautologies may be _applied_ to physics.
Nobody has questioned this. I'm interested only in nontrivial
theories. That means, theories which make nontrivial predictions.
>> Whatever you use, you use an idealization - like idealized time
>> measurement - which may appear to be invalid.
> Not invalid, but valid in a limit, i.e. a well defined approximation.
> This is merely a statement that empirical facts are given with a range
> of accuracy.
For any well-defined range of applications, if this range includes the
possibility to make nontrivial predictions for tomorrow, it may appear
to be invalid.
>>>> Definitions are definitions, they may be meaningful or not. They are
>>>> theoretical decisions, not empirical.
>
> The definition of a metre is most definitely empirical, as is the
> definition of a kilogram or a second. Such definitions are meaningful
> only if they describe observable physical processes.
LOL.
> The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
> with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
"apple". You don't understand it.
Ralph E. Frost
> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
> >> irrelevant.
> >
> > Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
> > positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
> > produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
>
> LOL. There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
> According to common sense realism?
No. If you don't count them, there are "about 2000 trees", or whatever
would be a resonable estimate for the km^2 involved and conditions of the
forest.
In addition, if you count the trees month after month, the specifc number
changes for lots of different reasons.
D.A.Kopf
>
> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
> >> irrelevant.
> >
> > Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
> > positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
> > produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
>
> LOL. There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
> According to common sense realism?
I'd say not, since countable trees aren't defined until you count them. Do you
count dead or fallen trees? How many trees in a dense coppice from a single
stump? Trees whose trunks have merged? Trees whose roots have merged? Are
seedlings trees? How about the ones that haven't broken through the ground
yet? Unsprouted seeds? Embryo seeds in the unsprouted seeds?
Clearly there is no number in objective reality for something as complicated
as trees. Whether simple things like elementary particles contain objective
numbers is more speculative. This might have some application in the theory of
quantum computing. The quantum order-finding algorithm, for example, assumes
the interacting qubits sample all possible mixed states when projecting an
answer onto the measurement basis. If number is not inherent to quantum
systems, but rather produced only when they interact, I don't think quantum
algorithms will realize the expected exponential speedups.
[snip]
>
> > The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
> > with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
> > observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>
> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
> "apple". You don't understand it.
It doesn't make sense to me either.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>> LOL. There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
>> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
>> According to common sense realism?
> I'd say not, since countable trees aren't defined until you count them. Do you
> count dead or fallen trees? How many trees in a dense coppice from a single
> stump? Trees whose trunks have merged? Trees whose roots have merged? Are
> seedlings trees? How about the ones that haven't broken through the ground
> yet? Unsprouted seeds? Embryo seeds in the unsprouted seeds?
>
> Clearly there is no number in objective reality for something as complicated
> as trees.
But these problems with tree counting appear if we count. Once a
well-defined counting procedure is defined, the result of counting is
_defined_ by the state of reality. If we count or not.
In my statement I have _assumed_ that counting them gives a unique
answer: 2000.
>>> The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
>>> with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
>>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>> "apple". You don't understand it.
> It doesn't make sense to me either.
"Apple" is a net of associations. With this net, we can associate a
lot of theories about reality:
"If (n-1) of the associations hold, then there is a large probability
that association n holds too. ("Large" in comparison with the default
probability.)"
Indeed, in this case we have an apple, and with the apple we associate
association n.
All these theories are theories in a Popperian sense, falsifiable (in
a statistical sense).
We "learn" the meaning of "apple" by creating and testing these
theories: We observe that "apple" is used by others in various
circumstances, and we make theories about the meaning of the word.
These theories do not follow in any automatic way from observation.
From seeing 30 apples and 20 pears and being told what they are you
cannot _derive_ a theory which allows you to decide if something is an
apple or a pear. The only way we can develop such a theory is the
Popperian way - making hypothesis (like apples are green) which may be
falsified (by red apples).
If we already know language, we can ask others for their theories.
But on the fundamental level this is where we have to start.
Moreover, asking somebody else is also not infallible: can you trust
him?
In this sense, learning a language is theory building in a Popperian
sense, not following "empirical definitions".
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> wrote in message
>>>> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
>>>> irrelevant.
>>> Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
>>> positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
>>> produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
>> LOL. There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
>> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
>> According to common sense realism?
> No. If you don't count them, there are "about 2000 trees", or
> whatever would be a resonable estimate for the km^2 involved and
> conditions of the forest.
You mingle "there are" with "I estimate". Or you like to play with
words, or you have internalized positivism so much that you already
mingle it with common sense.
> In addition, if you count the trees month after month, the specifc
> number changes for lots of different reasons.
Irrelevant. I could have chosen another example. Like the number of
money in my pocket at a given time.
D.A.Kopf
[snip]
> "If (n-1) of the associations hold, then there is a large probability
> that association n holds too. ("Large" in comparison with the default
> probability.)"
Possibly this is the key issue. If tossing of an historically well-documented
fair coin produces n heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for
the n+first toss?
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writesCharles Francis wrote:
>>>> The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
>>>> with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
>>>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>
>>> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>>> "apple". You don't understand it.
>
>> It doesn't make sense to me either.
There is a good reason for that. It was wrong.
>"Apple" is a net of associations. With this net, we can associate a
>lot of theories about reality:
Ah, you have discarded your original explanation, and adopted mine. It
would be more honest to admit it.
>"If (n-1) of the associations hold, then there is a large probability
>that association n holds too. ("Large" in comparison with the default
>probability.)"
It is not clear you can even define probability like this, and certainly
not that the number of associations is describable by an integer.
>All these theories are theories in a Popperian sense, falsifiable (in
>a statistical sense).
>
>We "learn" the meaning of "apple" by creating and testing these
>theories: We observe that "apple" is used by others in various
>circumstances, and we make theories about the meaning of the word.
>These theories do not follow in any automatic way from observation.
>From seeing 30 apples and 20 pears and being told what they are you
>cannot _derive_ a theory which allows you to decide if something is an
>apple or a pear. The only way we can develop such a theory is the
>Popperian way - making hypothesis (like apples are green) which may be
>falsified (by red apples).
Do learn some educational psychology. It is all very well constructing
these speculations about learning, declaring "The only way we can
develop such a theory is the Popperian way", because that means you
simply do not have to study any thing else, most especially you do not
have to follow the work of Piaget and subsequent researchers, and nor do
you have to follow the work of Chomsky and others in understanding the
nature and structure of language, or the work of numerous researchers in
understanding the structure and mechanisms of the brain. You already
know the answer according to Popper, and according to you everything is
falsified by disagreement with Popper.
Well I will tell you one thing. Even Popper was not that stupid. When he
met Adler, Adler was asked to comment on the behaviour of a child who he
had not met. Adler gave a diagnosis on the spot, and Popper asked how it
was achieved. Adler said "from my thousand fold experience", to which
Popper replied "and I suppose it is now one thousand and one fold". I
expect Adler felt pretty dumb, and so should you. Perhaps it is not
Popper who is stupid, just his followers, especially as Popper has lost
credibility in educated philosophical circles for thirty years or more.
>In this sense, learning a language is theory building in a Popperian
>sense, not following "empirical definitions".
And how will you build a theory if you do not already have a language to
build it in? And how will you define your language if not from the net
of your experience?
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
>>> irrelevant.
>>
>> Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
>> positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
>> produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
>
>don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
>According to common sense realism?
Don't change the subject. Apply your argument to the number of points in
R^3, as we were discussing.
>> Common sense realism merely says that reality continues to exist,
>> and with the same properties, between measurements. You are trying
>> to say that those properties include the numbers produced by
>> measurement, and hence that the world is, in fact, composed of
>> number. I find your claims quite spurious.
>
>Please don't play games with words around "do numbers exist". The
>question is if, if we don't count them, we have nonetheless 2000
>trees in the forest. Or if this number is uncertain, undefined.
Are you talking of numbers, or are you talking of trees? Perhaps you do
not even know the difference. Show me where I can find the set of the
null set in nature. Then we will be talking of numbers. Numbers are
merely ideas, and in pure maths they are divorced from application.
>>>> What is shared is the correctness of predictions, since that is all
>>>> that the physics community seems to use to validate theory.
>
>>> Naming conventions accepted by the community and criteria for
>>> validation used by this community are quite different things.
>
>> Naming conventions are quite regularly not shared and so long as their
>> is agreement on predictions no one either notices or cares. However I
>> have put it to you that a more correct naming convention, both
>> philosophically and mathematically, is that SR is contained in Lorentz
>> transformation, and that there is no mathematical, philosophical or
>> physical justification to claim a physical existence for absolute
>> Minkowski space-time, so it is not scientifically correct to include
>> such a metaphysic within the name of a scientific theory.
>
>> This is a measure of your lack of mathematical skill. You make an idiot
>> of yourself.
>
>>> IOW, the "correct application" is restricted to the period (and
>>> whatever else) where it is correct. A tautology.
>
>> And hence an absolute truth. However it is not a mathematical
>> tautology but a piece of physics, falsifying Popper.
>
>If you like to count mathematical tautologies as "pieces of physics"
>simply because words like "apples" are involved, nobody
>cares.
And if you do not know the distinction between mathematics and physics
then no one cares either. But you might.
>> Likewise SR, GR, QM are essentially tautologies.
>
>Not at all.
You have to understand them. What is true, and trivial, for apples is
equally true of SR, GR and QM, but it is by no means trivial. "Two
apples plus two apples is four apples, so long as the apples remain
apples" is a trivial, tautologous truth. But it is not a useless one,
since without it, and without similar knowledge regarding money, you
would have trouble with your grocery shopping.
>> The assumptions of relativity and quantum mechanics, properly formulated
>> (which is admittedly rare), are not questionable, but come directly from
>> a Leibnizian relationist view of matter, whose truth is demonstrated
>> conclusively by the correctness its predictions (since all other
>> positions are conclusively falsified by the same, if you must)
>
>"Its predictions" includes non-trivial predictions about future.
>Predictions which obviously have not yet been tested. Therefore,
>their truth is not demonstrated.
Now that really is a naive positivist argument. By that token if you
count 2000 trees in the forest you will not be able to predict, even a
second later, that there are still 2000 trees in the forest unless you
count them again. And after that you will still not be able to say how
many trees there are in the forest without counting them again.
>>> And physical theories remain correct as long as they remain correct.
>>> A deep insight, LOL.
>
>> Clearly too deep for Popper, whose whole position is built on the
>> failure to recognise it. Hence I think he was an idiot. Oh, perhaps not
>> an idiot relative to the intellect of an ordinary man, but certainly an
>> idiot relative to the intellect of the few mathematical physicists of
>> history who have shaped scientific thought.
>
>LOL. Hence I think you are an idiot. Oh, perhaps not an idiot
>relative to the intellect of an ordinary man, but certainly an idiot
>relative to the intellect of Popper.
Do read some modern philosophy to discover why Popper is discredited in
all educated circles. You might like to start with AF Chalmers, What is
this Thing call Science.
>>> Thus, your claim reduces to "a theory is true if its axioms are true".
>>> Deep insight.
>
>> I am not in the business of producing deep insights, merely correct ones
>> which seem to have been overlooked. You have regularly been laughing out
>> loud at the idea that it is possible to make such universally true
>> statements about physics, calling it naive. But it is simple enough to
>> demonstrate that such statements do apply to physics.
>
>Of course mathematical tautologies may be _applied_ to physics.
>Nobody has questioned this. I'm interested only in nontrivial
>theories. That means, theories which make nontrivial predictions.
As we have discussed, it is extremely non-trivial to apply a
mathematical tautology such as 2+2=4 to physics. For a start 2+2=4 is a
universal truth, whereas two apples plus two apples is four apples is
only true when qualified.
Leaving GR & QM aside, because the interpretation of them is still
controversial, you should at least be able to follow the demonstration
that SR is essentially tautology. If you don't want to read my account,
try "Relativity and Common Sense" by Hermann Bondi. I have tightened up
the arguments in my papers, because in fact there is no dependency in SR
on the physical behaviour of light, merely on the theoretical maximum
speed of information (SR would still be true even if the photon were
massive).
>>> Whatever you use, you use an idealization - like idealized time
>>> measurement - which may appear to be invalid.
>
>> Not invalid, but valid in a limit, i.e. a well defined approximation.
>> This is merely a statement that empirical facts are given with a range
>> of accuracy.
>
>For any well-defined range of applications, if this range includes the
>possibility to make nontrivial predictions for tomorrow, it may appear
>to be invalid.
Again you fall back on the positivist position which you claim to
despise. Apply this argument to counting the money in your wallet. Is it
trivial that you will have the same amount tomorrow if you do not spend
or lose any? If you cannot predict how much you have, how will you cope
with shopping for groceries?
>>>>> Definitions are definitions, they may be meaningful or not. They are
>>>>> theoretical decisions, not empirical.
>>
>> The definition of a metre is most definitely empirical, as is the
>> definition of a kilogram or a second. Such definitions are meaningful
>> only if they describe observable physical processes.
>
>LOL.
Learn some basic physics, or shut up.
>> The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
>> with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>
>I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>"apple". You don't understand it.
You came up with a spurious, untested hypothesis which is logically
unsound and which was deflated on the instant you were not able to say
what the meaning of "apple" actually is. You cannot build a personal
theory in the way in which you describe, since you have nothing on which
to build a theory, and you can function perfectly well in the world
without ever developing such a theory. do develop a personal meaning out
of the net of all your experiences of "apple", and this defines for you
what an apple is.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> If tossing of an historically well-documented fair coin produces n
> heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for the n+first
> toss?
If the theory that the coin is fair is true, 1/6. But for large
enough n I would reject this theory, and prefer the theory that the
coin is unfair.
Ralph E. Frost
> "Ralph E. Frost" <ref...@dcwi.com> writes:
> > Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> wrote in message
> >> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
> >>>> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
> >>>> irrelevant.
>
> >>> Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
> >>> positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
> >>> produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of
measurement.
>
> >> LOL. There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
> >> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
> >> According to common sense realism?
>
> > No. If you don't count them, there are "about 2000 trees", or
> > whatever would be a resonable estimate for the km^2 involved and
> > conditions of the forest.
>
> You mingle "there are" with "I estimate". Or you like to play with
> words, or you have internalized positivism so much that you already
> mingle it with common sense.
>
I think the feedback you are getting is related to the "tree" instance
being a bit cumbersome and too different from electrons through a slit or
some other particle/QFT notion.
I see your quibble as something related to uncertainty. Let's say you
have a magnet on the table and a compass in you hand with which you can
determine which end of the magnet is a certain polarity. You measure once
and find the left end point north. You turn your back and when you look at
it again, you can't tell by looking whether your assistance moved it or not.
You're uncertain. The "number" is one or the other but you can't tell
(can't collapse the wave function) until you measure again with your
compass. Then you know..... until you turn your attention to something
else. Then you don't know for certain.
I don't see what the point is about the _number_ existing or not. The
number seems to me to be just another property of the object -- an
observable that is determined by the type of measurent you choose to make.
What are you really saying? What is your point?
Gordon D. Pusch
> "D.A.Kopf" <d...@dakx.com> writes:
>> If tossing of an historically well-documented fair coin produces n
>> heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for the n+first
>> toss?
>
> If the theory that the coin is fair is true, 1/6. But for large
> enough n I would reject this theory, and prefer the theory that the
> coin is unfair.
Bayesian Hypothesis Testing provides a rational procedure for deciding
whether or not the coin is ``fair,'' as well as for estimating and revising
the predictive probability for the outcome of the next toss. Cox's Theorem
shows that Bayesian probability is the only self-consistent extension of
Aristotelean logic to cover uncertain hypotheses.
-- Gordon D. Pusch
perl -e '$_ = "gdpusch\@NO.xnet.SPAM.com\n"; s/NO\.//; s/SPAM\.//; print;'
D.A.Kopf
>
> "D.A.Kopf" <d...@dakx.com> writes:
> > If tossing of an historically well-documented fair coin produces n
> > heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for the n+first
> > toss?
>
> If the theory that the coin is fair is true, 1/6. But for large
> enough n I would reject this theory, and prefer the theory that the
> coin is unfair.
>
But for which n do you switch theories? Isn't it more logical to use a single
theory, that fair coins are an abstraction and the division of coins into fair
and unfair for counting purposes creates a number that has no objective
existence? Similarly for the coins themselves; counting the number of them in
your pocket is still a matter of definition. Do foreign coins count? Keys?
Keys that a foreign country accepts as money?
Charles Francis
<gdp...@NO.xnet.SPAM.com> writes
>Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes:
>
>> "D.A.Kopf" <d...@dakx.com> writes:
>>> If tossing of an historically well-documented fair coin produces n
>>> heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for the n+first
>>> toss?
>>
>> If the theory that the coin is fair is true, 1/6. But for large
>> enough n I would reject this theory, and prefer the theory that the
>> coin is unfair.
>
>Bayesian Hypothesis Testing provides a rational procedure for deciding
>whether or not the coin is ``fair,'' as well as for estimating and revising
>the predictive probability for the outcome of the next toss. Cox's Theorem
>shows that Bayesian probability is the only self-consistent extension of
>Aristotelean logic to cover uncertain hypotheses.
Strictly one should qualify this to say that Cox's Theorem
shows that Bayesian probability is the only self-consistent extension of
Aristotelian logic to cover uncertain hypotheses about events which
definitely either happen or not happen. As was discussed earlier in the
thread quantum logic is a self consistent extension of probability
theory and covers events which might happen contingent on the action of
an experimenter - if a measurement were done a definite result would be
obtained, and ql reduces to probability theory, but if no measurement
were done the observable quantity does not exist with a definite value,
and ql is required.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> wrote in message
>>>> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
>>>> According to common sense realism?
>>
>>> No. If you don't count them, there are "about 2000 trees", or
>>> whatever would be a resonable estimate for the km^2 involved and
>>> conditions of the forest.
>>
>> You mingle "there are" with "I estimate". Or you like to play with
>> words, or you have internalized positivism so much that you already
>> mingle it with common sense.
> No doubt about some sort of mingling. I'm not too sure it's
> positivism. I think the feedback you are getting is related to the
> "tree" instance being a bit cumbersome and too different from
> electrons through a slit or some other particle/QFT notion.
The discussion was about the common sense realism. Therefore I have
used something everybody is able to count.
In this everyday realism the number of trees in a forest depends on
the definition of the tree (what you count as a tree) but not on the
question if you have applied it or not.
In common sense realism, there are also things which depend on this.
Like the price for something: Ask the seller. The answer may not have
existed before your question (if you look like a rich fool, it will be
higher).
Everybody with common sense understands this difference between the
price (which may have not existed before the question) and the number
of trees (which we don't know before counting too, and which depends
on the counting rules, but not on the particular counter as long as he
applies these rules correctly).
The common sense theory named "realism" explaines this independence in
a simple way: the number is a well-defined function of the state of
reality. The function value is well-defined even if nobody counts.
> I don't see what the point is about the _number_ existing or not.
> The number seems to me to be just another property of the object --
> an observable that is determined by the type of measurent you choose
> to make.
The question is if it is determined by the state of reality and the
type of measurement which may be applied even if it is not applied
actually or not.
> What are you really saying? What is your point?
I want to clarify the meaning of a theory named "common sense
realism". I have thought that this meaning is simple and obvious, but
it seems it is not, and some people name claims which I classify as
positivistic to be part of "common sense".
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer <schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes:
>> "D.A.Kopf" <d...@dakx.com> writes:
>>> If tossing of an historically well-documented fair coin produces n
>>> heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for the n+first
>>> toss?
>> If the theory that the coin is fair is true, 1/6. But for large
>> enough n I would reject this theory, and prefer the theory that the
>> coin is unfair.
> Bayesian Hypothesis Testing provides a rational procedure for deciding
> whether or not the coin is ``fair,'' as well as for estimating and revising
> the predictive probability for the outcome of the next toss.
No. Bayesian probability, AFAIU, tells me that every self-consistent
extension follows the classical rules of standard probability theory.
But this does not define all probabilities.
> Cox's Theorem shows that Bayesian probability is the only
> self-consistent extension of Aristotelean logic to cover uncertain
> hypotheses.
Yep, but above theories in my example are consistent, don't violate
any rule of classical logic.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>> "D.A.Kopf" <d...@dakx.com> writes:
>>> If tossing of an historically well-documented fair coin produces n
>>> heads in a row, what is the conditional probability for the n+first
>>> toss?
>> If the theory that the coin is fair is true, 1/6. But for large
>> enough n I would reject this theory, and prefer the theory that the
>> coin is unfair.
> (1/2, you mean)
Indeed.
> But for which n do you switch theories?
There is no fixed n. It depends on the evidence for the theory that
the coin is fair.
> Isn't it more logical to use a single theory, that fair coins are an
> abstraction and the division of coins into fair and unfair for
> counting purposes creates a number that has no objective existence?
No. All the theories we have considered do not have internal
contradictions, thus, you cannot name one of them "more logical" than
another.
Of course, I use abstractions in every physical theory. Being a "fair
coin" is, of course, an abstraction, or an approximation. But IMHO a
very good one.
> Similarly for the coins themselves; counting the number of them in
> your pocket is still a matter of definition. Do foreign coins count?
> Keys? Keys that a foreign country accepts as money?
Of course, whatever I claim, depends on the meaning of the words used
in this claim.
But in my particular case the number of coins does not depend on the
questions you have mentioned: Simply because there are no foreign
coints or keys in my pocket.
Ilja Schmelzer
> In article <i3gadno...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
>>>>> with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
>>>>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>>
>>>> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>>>> "apple". You don't understand it.
>>
>>> It doesn't make sense to me either.
>
> There is a good reason for that. It was wrong.
>
>> "Apple" is a net of associations. With this net, we can associate a
>> lot of theories about reality:
>
> Ah, you have discarded your original explanation, and adopted mine. It
> would be more honest to admit it.
My key objection against your theory is your claim "come from
observation". I have not changed my position in this point.
On the other hand, I have tried to explain you my theory in a language
more close to your choice of words.
>> "If (n-1) of the associations hold, then there is a large probability
>> that association n holds too. ("Large" in comparison with the default
>> probability.)"
> It is not clear you can even define probability like this, and certainly
> not that the number of associations is describable by an integer.
Indeed, but this description is itself a theory, a highly simplified
model of the complex thing named "meaning". And this model is IMHO
less problematic than "meaning is defined by a definition" or
"comes from observation".
>> All these theories are theories in a Popperian sense, falsifiable (in
>> a statistical sense).
>> We "learn" the meaning of "apple" by creating and testing these
>> theories: We observe that "apple" is used by others in various
>> circumstances, and we make theories about the meaning of the word.
>> These theories do not follow in any automatic way from observation.
>> From seeing 30 apples and 20 pears and being told what they are you
>> cannot _derive_ a theory which allows you to decide if something is an
>> apple or a pear. The only way we can develop such a theory is the
>> Popperian way - making hypothesis (like apples are green) which may be
>> falsified (by red apples).
> Do learn some educational psychology. It is all very well constructing
> these speculations about learning, declaring "The only way we can
> develop such a theory is the Popperian way", because that means you
> simply do not have to study any thing else, most especially you do not
> have to follow the work of Piaget and subsequent researchers, and nor do
> you have to follow the work of Chomsky and others in understanding the
> nature and structure of language, or the work of numerous researchers in
> understanding the structure and mechanisms of the brain. You already
> know the answer according to Popper, and according to you everything is
> falsified by disagreement with Popper.
You miss the point. Popper is about the logic of the whole thing.
The logic is the same. A lot of other things are quite different.
Nothing in the work of Piaget or Chomsky, AFAIU, contradicts Popperian
logic of science.
> Well I will tell you one thing. Even Popper was not that stupid. When he
> met Adler, Adler was asked to comment on the behaviour of a child who he
> had not met. Adler gave a diagnosis on the spot, and Popper asked how it
> was achieved. Adler said "from my thousand fold experience", to which
> Popper replied "and I suppose it is now one thousand and one fold". I
> expect Adler felt pretty dumb, and so should you.
Why should I? It was a good point against Adlers "from my thousand
fold experience", as well as against your:
>>>>> The associations come from
>>>>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
> Perhaps it is not Popper who is stupid, just his followers,
> especially as Popper has lost credibility in educated philosophical
> circles for thirty years or more.
I don't care about credibility in "educated philosophical circles"
which have, in my eyes, no credibility themself. Read Sokal's hoax to
understand why.
>> In this sense, learning a language is theory building in a Popperian
>> sense, not following "empirical definitions".
> And how will you build a theory if you do not already have a language to
> build it in?
I need a language to describe you my theories. For myself, I don't
need a language to have falsifiable theories.
My visual unit identifies something which looks like fire. I don't
need a word for it as long as I don't want to tell you about it. My
sense of touch is able to identify something which is very hot. I
don't need a word for it as long as I don't want to tell you about it.
I can develop and test a theory which, formulated in words, would be
"Stuff which looks like fire is very hot". I don't need a word for it
as long as I don't want to tell you about it.
> And how will you define your language if not from the net
> of your experience?
From the net of non-verbal personal theories which have been developed
and tested by a child before it learns language, and during this
process.
Ilja Schmelzer
> In article <i3gfzxg...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
>>>> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
>>>> irrelevant.
>>>
>>> Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
>>> positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
>>> produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
>>
>> There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
>> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
>> According to common sense realism?
> Don't change the subject. Apply your argument to the number of
> points in R^3, as we were discussing.
Sorry, I have never made a claim about the number of points in R^3.
>> Please don't play games with words around "do numbers exist". The
>> question is if, if we don't count them, we have nonetheless 2000
>> trees in the forest. Or if this number is uncertain, undefined.
> Are you talking of numbers, or are you talking of trees? Perhaps you do
> not even know the difference. Show me where I can find the set of the
> null set in nature. Then we will be talking of numbers. Numbers are
> merely ideas, and in pure maths they are divorced from application.
The word "tree" is also an idea only.
>>> Likewise SR, GR, QM are essentially tautologies.
>> Not at all.
> You have to understand them. What is true, and trivial, for apples is
> equally true of SR, GR and QM, but it is by no means trivial. "Two
> apples plus two apples is four apples, so long as the apples remain
> apples" is a trivial, tautologous truth. But it is not a useless one,
> since without it, and without similar knowledge regarding money, you
> would have trouble with your grocery shopping.
The nontrivial part is the domain of application. That apples remain
apples during the shopping time and usually during the time I take
them home to eat them. Without such nontrivial knowledge you would
have trouble with your grossery shopping.
A full, open bottle remains full only if in vertical position. Without
such nontrivial knowledge you would have trouble with your grossery
shopping.
Note that these theories are not only nontrivial but even false, only
very rough approximations.
>> "Its predictions" includes non-trivial predictions about future.
>> Predictions which obviously have not yet been tested. Therefore,
>> their truth is not demonstrated.
> Now that really is a naive positivist argument.
No. It is a simple and known, but anti-positivistic argument.
> By that token if you count 2000 trees in the forest you will not be
> able to predict, even a second later, that there are still 2000
> trees in the forest unless you count them again.
I'm unable to predict with certainty. But I'm able to make a good
prediction (the number is unchanged). So what? I'm not much
interested in certain, proven, positive knowledge, demonstrated truth.
You make claims about demonstrated truth.
> Do read some modern philosophy to discover why Popper is discredited in
> all educated circles. You might like to start with AF Chalmers, What is
> this Thing call Science.
Thanks for the recommendation. Can you describe the main line of
argumentation? I have read already too much nonsense which claims to
reject Popper, but usually rejects only some highly trivialized
strawman.
>> Of course mathematical tautologies may be _applied_ to physics.
>> Nobody has questioned this. I'm interested only in nontrivial
>> theories. That means, theories which make nontrivial predictions.
> As we have discussed, it is extremely non-trivial to apply a
> mathematical tautology such as 2+2=4 to physics. For a start 2+2=4
> is a universal truth, whereas two apples plus two apples is four
> apples is only true when qualified.
Fine that we have found agreement here.
> Leaving GR & QM aside, because the interpretation of them is still
> controversial, you should at least be able to follow the
> demonstration that SR is essentially tautology.
The mathematical part from Einstein's axioms (or maybe some others) to
full theory is essentially tautology. The nontrivial part is the
domain where the axioms are meaningful and true.
> Try "Relativity and Common Sense" by Hermann Bondi. I have tightened up
> the arguments in my papers, because in fact there is no dependency in SR
> on the physical behaviour of light, merely on the theoretical maximum
> speed of information (SR would still be true even if the photon were
> massive).
LOL. SR is false because it doesn't describe gravity. But who has
proposed that massive photons would falsify SR?
>> For any well-defined range of applications, if this range includes the
>> possibility to make nontrivial predictions for tomorrow, it may appear
>> to be invalid.
> Again you fall back on the positivist position which you claim to
> despise. Apply this argument to counting the money in your wallet. Is it
> trivial that you will have the same amount tomorrow if you do not spend
> or lose any?
Nontrivial and false, at least in my understanding of the meaning of
"lose" (which may be false). I may be robbed. But, of course, you
can define "lose" in a way that this becomes a tautology.
> If you cannot predict how much you have, how will you cope
> with shopping for groceries?
I can predict how much I have, but without complete certainty. Which
is not a problem for everyday shopping. It leads to some problems if
the prediction fails. In this case, I solve them by saying "sorry, it
seems I have lost my money, so I cannot buy these things now."
You cannot predict with certainty. Because you can never know for
certain that you have not lost your money during the time. Your
trivial but true theory tells you nothing interesting.
>>> The definition of a metre is most definitely empirical, as is the
>>> definition of a kilogram or a second. Such definitions are meaningful
>>> only if they describe observable physical processes.
>>
>> LOL.
>
> Learn some basic physics, or shut up.
... yourself.
>> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>> "apple". You don't understand it.
> You came up with a spurious, untested hypothesis which is logically
> unsound
blabla
> and which was deflated on the instant you were not able to say what
> the meaning of "apple" actually is.
Not at all. A theory which claims that the meaning of a given word is
not something well-defined for everybody but a complex theory which
is different for different persons cannot be deflated in this way.
> You cannot build a personal theory in the way in which you describe,
> since you have nothing on which to build a theory,
I have - already existing theories, problems in these theories, and a
brain to search for solutions of these problems. The child starts
with some inborn theories.
> and you can function perfectly well in the world without ever
> developing such a theory.
If you think that you can function perfectly well without language,
feel free to believe this. It seems, you have preferred to learn a
language for yourself.
> do develop a personal meaning out of the net of all your experiences
> of "apple", and this defines for you what an apple is.
You have to do something nontrivial - IYW "develop a personal
meaning". I have classified the result as a theory in the Popperian
sense.
Is it possible, in principle, that your future experiences with
"apple", if different from your experiences with "apple" in the past,
lead to a modification of your "personal meaning"? In this case, I
name the experiences which have lead you to this conclusion a
"falsification of your personal meaning". If not, you are a dogmatic.
But even in this case, explain when you have "developed your personal
meaning". After 1, 2, 100 or 10000 experiences with the word "apple"?
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>I want to clarify the meaning of a theory named "common sense
>realism".
On this much we have the same objective.
> I have thought that this meaning is simple and obvious, but
>it seems it is not, and some people name claims which I classify as
>positivistic to be part of "common sense".
The issue is to do with how much of common sense is actually just common
misconception. In particular whether it is common sense to think of a
structure consisting only of number, namely the space-time manifold, as
being an entity of ontology. In particular is it possible to describe
position as a 3-number at all times, or is position only a relationship
of a body to other bodies, and only exists due to the elementary
particles interactions taking place between the different bodies. This
latter notion is essentially that asserted by Descartes & Leibniz, based
only on common sense reason, and the elimination of unjustified
assumption and is supported by the empirically determined structure of
quantum mechanics.
The number of trees in a forest has no bearing on the issue. Each tree
has its own reality and a property that it does not spontaneously appear
or vanish, unless it is a new tree grown from seed or is destroyed
leaving determinable remains, and it follows trivially that in the
absence of new seedlings and destruction that the number of trees is not
subject to change, and nor is it dependent on whether a count of trees
is made.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> In article <i3gadno...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
>>>>>> The meaning of "apple" is the net of the associations made in your mind
>>>>>> with the word, as you describe above. The associations come from
>>>>>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>>>
>>>>> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>>>>> "apple". You don't understand it.
>>>
>>>> It doesn't make sense to me either.
>>
>> There is a good reason for that. It was wrong.
>>
>>> "Apple" is a net of associations. With this net, we can associate a
>>> lot of theories about reality:
>>
>> Ah, you have discarded your original explanation, and adopted mine. It
>> would be more honest to admit it.
>
>My key objection against your theory is your claim "come from
>observation". I have not changed my position in this point.
This is very likely due to a fundamental difference in the way of
understanding our experience, the meanings of words and the relationship
of language to reality. I do not need to have any theory about reality
to know my experience of "apple", and hence the word refers to my
personal experience, not to any personal theory. The relationship of
language to ontology is clearly a different thing, but one should
understand Plato, that we cannot have experience of ontology. We may
theorise about it, but not have experience of it. We experience sights,
colours, sounds, sensations, not electrons and photons. Hence "apple"
consists principally of the sight, touch taste etc of an apple, not of
the apple's structure of electrons and photons which is only something I
know about but do not experience.
>On the other hand, I have tried to explain you my theory in a language
>more close to your choice of words.
>
>>> "If (n-1) of the associations hold, then there is a large probability
>>> that association n holds too. ("Large" in comparison with the default
>>> probability.)"
>
>> It is not clear you can even define probability like this, and certainly
>> not that the number of associations is describable by an integer.
>
>Indeed, but this description is itself a theory, a highly simplified
>model of the complex thing named "meaning". And this model is IMHO
>less problematic than "meaning is defined by a definition" or
>"comes from observation".
You seem to confuse meaning with something else, perhaps truth or
ontology but I cannot see what you are saying behind the words. Meaning
clearly can and often is defined by a definition, particularly in
mathematics and science, but is more normally defined by the net of ones
experience of a word.
I don't think I did miss the point. You put forward a theory of theory
making as giving rise to meaning. It all sounds very logical and
consistent and seems to make sense in its own terms. And it is always
possible to make a gestalt, build a picture out of the bits you see and
fail to see the bits which do not fit the picture. I merely point out
that the account you gave is just a speculation and is contradicted by
other studies.
>> Well I will tell you one thing. Even Popper was not that stupid. When he
>> met Adler, Adler was asked to comment on the behaviour of a child who he
>> had not met. Adler gave a diagnosis on the spot, and Popper asked how it
>> was achieved. Adler said "from my thousand fold experience", to which
>> Popper replied "and I suppose it is now one thousand and one fold". I
>> expect Adler felt pretty dumb, and so should you.
>
>Why should I? It was a good point against Adlers "from my thousand
>fold experience", as well as against your:
It was a good point against constructing these speculations, such as
your theory making which was apparently well advanced when you were a
toddler learning the meanings of words for the first times, and
supporting your argument with what you see from the perspective of your
argument rather than from practical study.
>>>>>> The associations come from
>>>>>> observation, and hence this is an empirical definition.
>
>> Perhaps it is not Popper who is stupid, just his followers,
>> especially as Popper has lost credibility in educated philosophical
>> circles for thirty years or more.
>
>I don't care about credibility in "educated philosophical circles"
>which have, in my eyes, no credibility themself.
Then Popper, as a member of such a circle, should also have no
credibility. But I agree, I see little prospect for the advance of
philosophy of science if it is not done by someone who is actually
capable of scientific theory making, and that means a mathematical
physicist, and I see little prospect of advance in the understanding of
language if not by a logician. Popper was neither.
>>> In this sense, learning a language is theory building in a Popperian
>>> sense, not following "empirical definitions".
>
>> And how will you build a theory if you do not already have a language to
>> build it in?
>
>I need a language to describe you my theories.
Precisely you must have language before you have a theory.
>For myself, I don't
>need a language to have falsifiable theories.
I'm sorry but this sentence strikes me as so dumb that I can only
construe that it is either a mistake or that your personal meaning of
the word theory is so different from what I take to be normal usage that
I cannot conceive of any meaning for it.
>
>My visual unit identifies something which looks like fire. I don't
>need a word for it as long as I don't want to tell you about it.
>My
>sense of touch is able to identify something which is very hot. I
>don't need a word for it as long as I don't want to tell you about it.
>I can develop and test a theory which, formulated in words, would be
>"Stuff which looks like fire is very hot". I don't need a word for it
>as long as I don't want to tell you about it.
This is quite irrelevant. We are discussing the meanings of words, not
what can be done without them.
>> And how will you define your language if not from the net
>> of your experience?
>
>From the net of non-verbal personal theories which have been developed
>and tested by a child before it learns language, and during this
>process.
This really is a silly speculation, and quite at odds with research in
the field.
Regards
--
Charles Francis
Charles Francis
<schm...@wias-berlin.de> writes
>Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>> In article <i3gfzxg...@wias-berlin.de> , Ilja Schmelzer
>>> Charles Francis <cha...@clef.demon.co.uk> writes:
>>>>> Nobody claims the world is "composed of number", so this remark is
>>>>> irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>> Then you have no justification in your claim that my position is
>>>> positivistic. It is not common sense realism to say that numbers
>>>> produced in measurement continue to exist in the absence of measurement.
>>>
>>> There are 2000 trees in the forest if we count them, but if we
>>> don't count them, their number is not defined in objective reality?
>>> According to common sense realism?
>
>> Don't change the subject. Apply your argument to the number of
>> points in R^3, as we were discussing.
>
>Sorry, I have never made a claim about the number of points in R^3.
We were discussing whether it is reasonable to assert that an electron
has a position describable in R^3 at all times simply because it has a
position describable in R^3, to the accuracy of measurement, when we
measure it, not whether it is reasonable to think that a count of trees
is constant or varies in a determinable way.
>> Are you talking of numbers, or are you talking of trees? Perhaps you do
>> not even know the difference. Show me where I can find the set of the
>> null set in nature. Then we will be talking of numbers. Numbers are
>> merely ideas, and in pure maths they are divorced from application.
>
>The word "tree" is also an idea only.
Yes, but according to common sense realism there is a direct
correspondence between tree and an element of reality. I think we agree
on that much. I also think we agree that trees can be counted, and that
there number is independent of whether we count them. In the instance of
a forest we can therefore also draw a correspondence between the set of
trees and number, since counting merely means drawing a correspondence.
This is quite different from making such claims about the position of
objects.
>>>> Likewise SR, GR, QM are essentially tautologies.
>
>>> Not at all.
>
>> You have to understand them. What is true, and trivial, for apples is
>> equally true of SR, GR and QM, but it is by no means trivial. "Two
>> apples plus two apples is four apples, so long as the apples remain
>> apples" is a trivial, tautologous truth. But it is not a useless one,
>> since without it, and without similar knowledge regarding money, you
>> would have trouble with your grocery shopping.
>
>The nontrivial part is the domain of application. That apples remain
>apples during the shopping time and usually during the time I take
>them home to eat them.
Quite so. And the non-trivial part of sr is also the domain of
application. This is why the part required for a theory to be scientific
is the statement of the domain of application, or as I have called it,
the rider. We can demonstrate sr by tautology from the definitions of
the second and of the meter, provided that we are working in a region of
space in which we can apply those definitions. It is much harder to
specify exactly in what region that is.
>Without such nontrivial knowledge you would
>have trouble with your grossery shopping.
>
>A full, open bottle remains full only if in vertical position. Without
>such nontrivial knowledge you would have trouble with your grossery
>shopping.
>
>Note that these theories are not only nontrivial but even false, only
>very rough approximations.
No, they are true in the sense in which I understand them, which is that
they refer to normal circumstances, shorts time scales (up to a few
days) and an absence of disasters.
>>> "Its predictions" includes non-trivial predictions about future.
>>> Predictions which obviously have not yet been tested. Therefore,
>>> their truth is not demonstrated.
>
>> Now that really is a naive positivist argument.
>
>No. It is a simple and known, but anti-positivistic argument.
When sr, properly applied within its domain of application, makes a
prediction, it is already tested because it is a logical deduction.
Anything else is a denial of common sense realism.
>> By that token if you count 2000 trees in the forest you will not be
>> able to predict, even a second later, that there are still 2000
>> trees in the forest unless you count them again.
>
>I'm unable to predict with certainty. But I'm able to make a good
>prediction (the number is unchanged). So what? I'm not much
>interested in certain, proven, positive knowledge, demonstrated truth.
Nor am I. I am interested in scientific knowledge, demonstrated true
within the context that science makes sense.
>You make claims about demonstrated truth.
Demonstrated truth within a scientific context. That means I start from
a fundamental assumption of common sense realism, that there exists some
form of material reality which is free from self contradiction and which
is reflected in our perceptions. Obviously we know we cannot prove
common sense realism because we also know that solipsism is consistent.
But once we make an assumption we can prove whatever follows from the
assumptions. In this case the fundamental assumption allows us also to
draw on observation, and from the two together we can demonstrate truth
about reality.
>>You might like to start with AF Chalmers, What is
>> this Thing call Science.
>
>Thanks for the recommendation. Can you describe the main line of
>argumentation? I have read already too much nonsense which claims to
>reject Popper, but usually rejects only some highly trivialized
>strawman.
He doesn't set out to discredit Popper, but to report on the general
state of philosophy of science. I read it and liked it about 20 years
ago, when it was in its first edition. I have recently seen it in large
numbers in a local bookshop, indicating that it is used as a course
book, (I would guess at undergraduate level). Chalmers says he
originally followed Popper, and thought the philosophical world did too,
but since moving around the academic world he found that not true.
>> Leaving GR & QM aside, because the interpretation of them is still
>> controversial, you should at least be able to follow the
>> demonstration that SR is essentially tautology.
>
>The mathematical part from Einstein's axioms (or maybe some others) to
>full theory is essentially tautology. The nontrivial part is the
>domain where the axioms are meaningful and true.
Agreed, but then you accept that there is a part where the axioms are
meaningful and true, which has been the thrust of my argument.
>
>> Try "Relativity and Common Sense" by Hermann Bondi. I have tightened up
>> the arguments in my papers, because in fact there is no dependency in SR
>> on the physical behaviour of light, merely on the theoretical maximum
>> speed of information (SR would still be true even if the photon were
>> massive).
>
>LOL. SR is false because it doesn't describe gravity.
No. The important part, or as you say the nontrivial part is the domain
where the axioms are meaningful and true. In the domain where SR doesn't
work it is non-scientific and not interesting.
>But who has
>proposed that massive photons would falsify SR?
If photons had mass light would not move at the speed of light, which
would be a self contradiction. To my knowledge no one has actually
suggested that this would falsify SR, but it would falsify the treatment
of SR by Bondi, and Einstein which depend on the speed of light. Anyone
properly analysing it would simply redefine c as the theoretical maximum
speed of information, and would find SR as before, but with light moving
at less than c.
>>> For any well-defined range of applications, if this range includes the
>>> possibility to make nontrivial predictions for tomorrow, it may appear
>>> to be invalid.
>
>> Again you fall back on the positivist position which you claim to
>> despise. Apply this argument to counting the money in your wallet. Is it
>> trivial that you will have the same amount tomorrow if you do not spend
>> or lose any?
>
>Nontrivial and false, at least in my understanding of the meaning of
>"lose" (which may be false). I may be robbed.
I include being robbed under "lose".
> But, of course, you
>can define "lose" in a way that this becomes a tautology.
>> If you cannot predict how much you have, how will you cope
>> with shopping for groceries?
>
>I can predict how much I have, but without complete certainty. Which
>is not a problem for everyday shopping. It leads to some problems if
>the prediction fails. In this case, I solve them by saying "sorry, it
>seems I have lost my money, so I cannot buy these things now."
>
>You cannot predict with certainty. Because you can never know for
>certain that you have not lost your money during the time. Your
>trivial but true theory tells you nothing interesting.
>
>>>> The definition of a metre is most definitely empirical, as is the
>>>> definition of a kilogram or a second. Such definitions are meaningful
>>>> only if they describe observable physical processes.
>>>
>>> LOL.
>>
>> Learn some basic physics, or shut up.
>
>... yourself.
Then learn the definitions of a meter kilogram or second, at least
adequately to say why you think these are not defined by experimental
processes.
>>> I have explained you the role of theory building in the meaning of
>>> "apple". You don't understand it.
>
>> You came up with a spurious, untested hypothesis which is logically
>> unsound
>
>blabla
and that even more so. There is not a shred of evidence for your
speculation about theory building.
>
>> and which was deflated on the instant you were not able to say what
>> the meaning of "apple" actually is.
>
>Not at all. A theory which claims that the meaning of a given word is
>not something well-defined for everybody but a complex theory which
>is different for different persons cannot be deflated in this way.
The question is whether you need a theory of what an apple is to have a
meaning for the word, not whether the meaning is personal.
>
>> You cannot build a personal theory in the way in which you describe,
>> since you have nothing on which to build a theory,
>
>I have - already existing theories, problems in these theories, and a
>brain to search for solutions of these problems. The child starts
>with some inborn theories.
And turtles stand upon more turtles to support the corners of the world.
It is always possible to extend a speculation by using more speculation.
>
>> and you can function perfectly well in the world without ever
>> developing such a theory.
>
>If you think that you can function perfectly well without language,
>feel free to believe this.
That is not what I said. I deny that your theories are necessary to have
language. Theories I may have about apples may become part of my
experience of apples, and hence part of the meaning of apple to me. But
to use language I only need the words and my experience of the words.
>> do develop a personal meaning out of the net of all your experiences
>> of "apple", and this defines for you what an apple is.
>
>You have to do something nontrivial - IYW "develop a personal
>meaning". I have classified the result as a theory in the Popperian
>sense.
Then I was right, you are using the word theory in a sense which takes
it apart from its use in ordinary language. I do not understand it,
since I can describe the net of my experience without needing any
theory.
>Is it possible, in principle, that your future experiences with
>"apple", if different from your experiences with "apple" in the past,
>lead to a modification of your "personal meaning"?
Obviously.
>In this case, I
>name the experiences which have lead you to this conclusion a
>"falsification of your personal meaning".
Ha. By the same token a tree is falsified as a tree because it grows a
new leaf.
> If not, you are a dogmatic.
Dogmatist? How does changing my meanings according to my experience make
me a dogmatist? The opposite I should have said.
>But even in this case, explain when you have "developed your personal
>meaning". After 1, 2, 100 or 10000 experiences with the word "apple"?
I have a personal meaning for the word apple after only one experience
of it. Do you recall what Alice said of Jabberwocky
Twas brillig and the slithy toves
did gyre and gymble in the wabe
All mimsey were the borogroves
and the mome raphs outgrabe
Something to the effect of it filling her head with meanings, but which
she could not put her finger on. (remember Dodgson, or Carroll, was the
best logician of his era, and thought about language truth and reality
quite substantially).
Regards
--
Charles Francis