On realism in physics
Patrick Reany
realists on these two NGs. Neither camp friendly to each other and
both unfriendly toward me. I am going to attempt to characterize the
philosophical nature underlying most of the arguments we find on these
NGs. I will indentify some of the "ring" leaders of the two camps. (Of
course, I'm the "ring" leader of the instrumentalist "camp." ;-) )
They are free to inform me if I have unfairly characterized their
personal philosophic beliefs.
The "conventional" realists, whose views are championed by Bilge and
Hobba, maintain that conventional physical theories do indeed deal
with "reality" because they reify every mathematical structure in
conventional theories. So, to them spacetime and spacetime traces are
real things, and so are phase space and virtual photons. No question
about it. Apparently their underlying dogma is this: Only theories
with real things in them can "work." So, if a theory "works" (by
conventional approbation, i.e., the Establishment declares it so) then
the theory's models MUST have immediate connection to TRUTH. 1-1, or
something close to it in some "approximation" (whatever that means).
The traditional realists disagree completely. They see these "models"
as cheats, as mere mathemagic, first derived on the basis of
mathematical principles (such as simplicity, concinnity, symmetry, or
minimality -- the things which are good only as heuristics for getting
the math right), and then reified afterwards. To them, "correct"
physical theories begin with an obvious, intuitive mechanical model
and build from there. The chief proponents of this view are
Greywolf42, Paul Stowe, and O'Barr.
So if it was mysterious to the reader why the ether concept is so
controversial here, now it's revealed. It is because of these two
radically contrary philosophical views on how one should "model" in
physics.
I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
sotospeak. It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
nothing but hostility.
Surely there are instrumentalist physicists and amateurs on these NGs.
Where are they hiding? Steven Hawking is an instrumentalist. So,
reveal yourselves.
Patrick
Androcles
"Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
news:844a1b64.04040...@posting.google.com...
All too often we miss what is right under our very noses.
Androcles
Gregory L. Hansen
Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
>
>I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
>because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
>beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
>sotospeak. It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
>metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
>nothing but hostility.
>
>Surely there are instrumentalist physicists and amateurs on these NGs.
>Where are they hiding? Steven Hawking is an instrumentalist. So,
>reveal yourselves.
I must be somewhat instrumentalist, then. I see good reasons to prefer
some theories over other theories, but the history of science shows us
what happens to The Truth. E.g. whatever happened to Newton's clockwork
universe? Either we're at the end of science and are finally discovering
what The Truth really is, or one day it will be found that it was just
nice to think, for a while, that those virtual photons and curved
spacetimes were real.
But I don't feel compelled to argue much about those things. "That may
not be the only explanation" is a really wimpy argument, and seems
inevitably recast as "Einstein was right!" or somesuch.
--
"The polhode rolls without slipping on the herpolhode lying in the
invariable plane." -- Goldstein, Classical Mechanics 2nd. ed., p207.
greywolf42
> realists on these two NGs. Neither camp friendly to each other and
> both unfriendly toward me. I am going to attempt to characterize the
> philosophical nature underlying most of the arguments we find on these
> NGs. I will indentify some of the "ring" leaders of the two camps. (Of
> course, I'm the "ring" leader of the instrumentalist "camp." ;-) )
> They are free to inform me if I have unfairly characterized their
> personal philosophic beliefs.
>
> The "conventional" realists, whose views are championed by Bilge and
> Hobba, maintain that conventional physical theories do indeed deal
> with "reality" because they reify every mathematical structure in
> conventional theories. So, to them spacetime and spacetime traces are
> real things, and so are phase space and virtual photons. No question
> about it. Apparently their underlying dogma is this: Only theories
> with real things in them can "work." So, if a theory "works" (by
> conventional approbation, i.e., the Establishment declares it so) then
> the theory's models MUST have immediate connection to TRUTH. 1-1, or
> something close to it in some "approximation" (whatever that means).
I concur in your detail about the 'Establishment' view, and some of the
adherents. However, I would quibble that this view is not 'conventional'
(as related to the scientific method) -- although you have distinguished
between 'conventional' and 'traditional'. And the view is not 'realist' in
any sense of the word (equations are not reality).
> The traditional realists disagree completely. They see these "models"
> as cheats, as mere mathemagic, first derived on the basis of
> mathematical principles (such as simplicity, concinnity, symmetry, or
> minimality -- the things which are good only as heuristics for getting
> the math right), and then reified afterwards. To them, "correct"
> physical theories begin with an obvious, intuitive mechanical model
> and build from there. The chief proponents of this view are
> Greywolf42, Paul Stowe, and O'Barr.
Not a bad summary. However, I would say that we differentiate between
physical 'models', and mere 'equations' or 'correlations.'
> So if it was mysterious to the reader why the ether concept is so
> controversial here, now it's revealed. It is because of these two
> radically contrary philosophical views on how one should "model" in
> physics.
Not physics. The scientific method.
> I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
> because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
> beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
> sotospeak.
But this is pure Kantian wandervogel. It's not 'instrumental' at all.
Reality as pure perception.
> It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
> metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
> nothing but hostility.
That depends on what you want to do. If one follows the scientific method,
one is constrained by the metaphysical boundaries of said scientific method.
If you want to worship equations or believe that the senses reveal Truth
without thought ... then you simpy aren't participating in the scientific
endeavor. Regardless of the letters after your name, or the label you
attach to your metaphysics.
> Surely there are instrumentalist physicists and amateurs on these NGs.
> Where are they hiding? Steven Hawking is an instrumentalist. So,
> reveal yourselves.
Perhaps you need to spend more time in the philosophy newsgroups. I'm sure
you'll find many more positivists and Kantians. And you can discuss the
distinctions between these two philosophies and what you call
'instrumentalism.'
--
greywolf42
ubi dubium ibi libertas
{remove planet for return e-mail}
Uncle Al
>
> I seem to be a lone instrumentalist among two hostile camps of
> realists on these two NGs.
You troll, you spam, you plagiarize, you volumnously dump... and you
are empirically demonstrated of your own hand to be incapable of
coherent, self-consistent, educated, or even entertaining thought.
You harbor bold delusions of competence.
> The "conventional" realists, whose views are championed by Bilge and
> Hobba, maintain that conventional physical theories do indeed deal
> with "reality"
Idiot. You are entirely clueless to the difference between physics
and metaphysics. Go design a "realistic" toilet adn tell us how it
worked.
[snip]
> I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
> because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
> beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
> sotospeak.
Jump off a roof. Go argue POV subjectivity of "(m)(g)(h)" and
"(a)(t)" and "impulse" with the ground thereafter.
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/eotvos.htm
(Do something naughty to physics)
Bilge
>realists on these two NGs.
Mainly, because you feel compelled to classify a broad range of
arguments into a few, very narrow labels with your views defining
one of those labels. Are you really surprised that you are the only
person that holds your views to the extent required to satisfy your
narrowly defined criteria for having views similar to yours?
>Neither camp friendly to each other and both unfriendly toward me.
Maybe people dislike arguments which begin by interpreting the content
of the argument in terms of a philosophical position and then proceeding
to argue against the label rather than the argument itself.
>I am going to attempt to characterize the philosophical nature underlying
>most of the arguments we find on these NGs.
Why am I not surprised.
>I will indentify some of the "ring" leaders of the two camps. (Of
>course, I'm the "ring" leader of the instrumentalist "camp." ;-) )
>They are free to inform me if I have unfairly characterized their
>personal philosophic beliefs.
Consider yourself informed.
>The "conventional" realists, whose views are championed by Bilge and
>Hobba, maintain that conventional physical theories do indeed deal
>with "reality" because they reify every mathematical structure in
>conventional theories. So, to them spacetime and spacetime traces are
>real things, and so are phase space and virtual photons. No question
>about it.
That is a very superficial analysis. Your attempt to label me with that
sort of conventional definition is like trying to force quantum mechanical
concepts to fit the classical definitions of those concepts. You've done
the latter as well when you talked about bohr orbits. If you'll recall, my
suggestion was to adopt a definition orbit that reflects the quantum
mechanical reality and gives the classical definition as a limit rather
than dismissing the quantum reality because it doesn't contain the same
classical reality you accept as reality. That example demonstrates both
the flaw in categorizing me as ``realist'' in the conventional sense and
my claim that your position regarding the purpose of a physical theory
stems from you holding a classical picture of reality that you can't
reconcile with ``theories that work''. You apparently didn't like that
idea and apparently do not want to change what you consider reality to be
such that it reflects what physics says it is.
>Apparently their underlying dogma is this: Only theories with real things
>in them can "work."
And your tendency to put the cart before the horse prevents you from
accepting the other possibility: theories that work, do so because
the theories contain real things. You've dismissed the idea that
your concept of what constitutes a ``thing'' might be flawed.
>So, if a theory "works" (by
>conventional approbation, i.e., the Establishment declares it so) then
>the theory's models MUST have immediate connection to TRUTH. 1-1, or
>something close to it in some "approximation" (whatever that means).
yeah - whatever that means.
>
>The traditional realists disagree completely. They see these "models"
>as cheats, as mere mathemagic, first derived on the basis of
>mathematical principles (such as simplicity, concinnity, symmetry, or
>minimality -- the things which are good only as heuristics for getting
>the math right), and then reified afterwards.
There are no physical theories which began as mathematical principles,
with the possible exception of quantum mechanics and even quantum
mechanics didn't spring to existence from mathematics alone. I can
think of no physical theory which did not begin as a belief in
principles by which nature works. The mathematical statements follow
as a means of giving precision to the meanings of the words. Scientists
employ common sense about what they consider ``physical'' just like
everyone else. The difference is that scientists accept a lot more
things as physical than non-scientists.
>To them, "correct" physical theories begin with an obvious, intuitive
>mechanical model and build from there. The chief proponents of this
>view are Greywolf42, Paul Stowe, and O'Barr.
Even that characterization is inaccurate. See above regarding
the physical theories most physicists accept as physics. What
differs about the people you've mentioned is that, to them,
``correct'' physical theories begin with a very narrow, classical
idea of what is intuitively obvious due to a lack of ability to
adapt to a new way of thinking about the way nature might really
work.
>So if it was mysterious to the reader why the ether concept is so
>controversial here, now it's revealed. It is because of these two
>radically contrary philosophical views on how one should "model" in
>physics.
>
>I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
>because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
>beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
>sotospeak. It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
>metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
>nothing but hostility.
I equate your point of view with that of the phony intellectual who
wants to judge science based on something other than the actual science.
You avoid the very thing a scientist has to do when faced with a
conjecture or theory that has no evidence for or against it - make a
judgement based upon physical intuition (assuming of course, that the
formalism itself isn't mathematically flawed). Scientists get to
experience being wrong - some of them in a big way. You simply wait
for the numbers to roll in and pontificate about the scientific merits
from a viewpoint which is as unassailable as it is useless.
Your idea of a physical theory dispenses with the idea that
physical theories when taken as a whole should have some logical
coherence that transcends merely getting the right numbers in
a very limited set of circumstances. If you really believe that
only numbers matter, then why do physicists spend so much effort
attempting to reconcile different descriptions into a single
description that explains the disparity?
>Surely there are instrumentalist physicists and amateurs on these NGs.
>Where are they hiding? Steven Hawking is an instrumentalist. So,
>reveal yourselves.
My guess is that you credit hawking with being an instrumentalist,
either because he said so or because you haven't had the opportunity
to get a complete enough picture to argue with from him personally.
Franz Heymann
camps of
> realists on these two NGs. Neither camp friendly to each
other and
> both unfriendly toward me. I am going to attempt to
characterize the
> philosophical nature underlying most of the arguments we
find on these
> NGs.
Phuck philosophising about physics.
[snip]
Franz
Androcles
Androcles
"Uncle Al" <Uncl...@hate.spam.net> wrote in message
news:406DAF21...@hate.spam.net...
ueb
> I seem to be a lone instrumentalist among two hostile camps of
> realists on these two NGs. Neither camp friendly to each other and
> both unfriendly toward me.
That is really sad.
[snip philosophical crap]
Categorizing people does always fail. -
Realism means to take notice of the facts. I know not a single
living realistic physicist. Einstein was the last realistic physicist,
until he did not more know what he should do with the mysterious
matter. Due to the influence from his colleagues, he lost the
consequence applied to the ether.
Since you always talk of theories that work:
Only a theory that consists of exclusively (really !) observable
quantities can really work. That is the geometric theory of
gravitation and electromagnetism, formally expressed by the
Einstein-Maxwell equations. Do you know that even this theory
predicts particle numbers ?
Ulrich
Paul Stowe
> I seem to be a lone instrumentalist among two hostile camps of
> realists on these two NGs.
Hmmm,
"instrumentalism: - a doctrine that ideas are instruments
of action and that their usefulness
determines their truth
or,
In the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the view
that concepts and theories are merely useful instruments
whose worth is measured not by whether the concepts and
theories are true or false (or correctly depict reality),
but how effective they are in explaining and predicting
phenomena."
In other words, a person that doesn't give a rat's ass about the
nature of nature. OK, a pure positivist...
> Neither camp friendly to each other and both unfriendly toward me.
> I am going to attempt to characterize the philosophical nature
> underlying most of the arguments we find on these NGs. I will
> indentify some of the "ring" leaders of the two camps. (Of course,
> I'm the "ring" leader of the instrumentalist "camp." ;-) ) They are
> free to inform me if I have unfairly characterized their personal
> philosophic beliefs.
>
> The "conventional" realists, whose views are championed by Bilge
> and Hobba, maintain that conventional physical theories do indeed
> deal with "reality" because they reify every mathematical structure
> in conventional theories. So, to them spacetime and spacetime traces
> are real things, and so are phase space and virtual photons. No
> question about it. Apparently their underlying dogma is this: Only
> theories with real things in them can "work." So, if a theory "works"
> (by conventional approbation, i.e., the Establishment declares it
> so)
Yes, this particular aspect is of primary important to them. It is the
clergy as a whole that must ordain ideas as acceptable and, for the most
part, many that are in this group will refuse to even seriously consider
concepts that their clergy has ordained as heresy...
> then the theory's models MUST have immediate connection to TRUTH. 1-1,
> or something close to it in some "approximation" (whatever that means).
I would say that these worship the abstract concepts of symmetry, abstract
space, and covariance above any possible reasons for their appearence in
theories that contain them.
I'd say this is centered around positivism as applied to realism...
See,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positivism
> The traditional realists disagree completely. They see these "models"
> as cheats, as mere mathemagic, first derived on the basis of
> mathematical principles (such as simplicity, concinnity, symmetry, or
> minimality -- the things which are good only as heuristics for getting
> the math right), and then reified afterwards. To them, "correct"
> physical theories begin with an obvious, intuitive mechanical model
> and build from there. The chief proponents of this view are
> Greywolf42, Paul Stowe, and O'Barr.
I'd say that the philosophical term mechanism as applied to realism see,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_(philosophy)
Best describes this group. I would not us the word intuitive since
much of mechanistic science is quite counter intuitive.
> So if it was mysterious to the reader why the aether concept is so
> controversial here, now it's revealed. It is because of these two
> radically contrary philosophical views on how one should "model" in
> physics.
Yeah, metaphorically just like JMS's Vorlon & Shadow philosopical wars
in B5...
> I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
> because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
> beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
> so-to-speak. It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
> metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
> nothing but hostility.
Thus my oft commented statement that even those that proclaim they
have no metaphyical/philosophical beliefs do. Even the stouch
positivists...
> Surely there are instrumentalist physicists and amateurs on these NGs.
> Where are they hiding? Steven Hawking is an instrumentalist. So,
> reveal yourselves.
I doubt that there are many who don't give a rat's ass about the nature
of nature bother to frequent here.
Paul Stowe
Mike Helland
Can you provide a couple cites that mention the word "realism" in the
context that you've used it? I think you've made some assumptions
about its use in science.
When realism is discussed in science, it as *nothing* to do with how
science relates to reality. It has to do with the methods one uses to
pursue truth in science.
There are some approaches like the following:
a. Science must involve math
b. Science must involve observation
c. Science is only the discipline of verifying quantifiable
predictions
These are rather idealistic approaches to science. The alternative is
a far simpler method:
1. Make a conjecture
2. Criticize it
3. Repeat
In this method, the method of the critical rationalist, potentional
discoveries are not eliminated by the dogmatic application of the
idealist approaches I explained above.
Realism in science has absolutely nothing of significance in the issue
of how science and reality coexist. See Karl Popper's postscripts to
the _Logic of Scientific Discovery_.
Patrick Reany
I used here "conventional" similar to how Poincare used it: Generally
accepted as "true" or sacrosanct. I should also point out that when I
referred to "realist" in this post I meant to refer to scientific
realist. The scientific realist belives that the models used in
successful theories are literally true of the world. They are not
thoery or definition dependent.
>
> > The traditional realists disagree completely. They see these "models"
> > as cheats, as mere mathemagic, first derived on the basis of
> > mathematical principles (such as simplicity, concinnity, symmetry, or
> > minimality -- the things which are good only as heuristics for getting
> > the math right), and then reified afterwards. To them, "correct"
> > physical theories begin with an obvious, intuitive mechanical model
> > and build from there. The chief proponents of this view are
> > Greywolf42, Paul Stowe, and O'Barr.
>
> Not a bad summary. However, I would say that we differentiate between
> physical 'models', and mere 'equations' or 'correlations.'
I define a model as a representation of a thing, concept, or
relationship. By that definition, equations and correlations and even
theories can be considered as models.
>
> > So if it was mysterious to the reader why the ether concept is so
> > controversial here, now it's revealed. It is because of these two
> > radically contrary philosophical views on how one should "model" in
> > physics.
>
> Not physics. The scientific method.
>
> > I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
> > because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
> > beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
> > sotospeak.
>
> But this is pure Kantian wandervogel. It's not 'instrumental' at all.
> Reality as pure perception.
I'm not a positivist. I have no problem with speculative or
hypothetical models. I'm not of the opinion that science should ONLY
deal with perceptions. But there is one virtue of preceptions -- at
least we can be sure of them as truthful even if we don't know for
sure what they imply as "Real."
>
> > It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
> > metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
> > nothing but hostility.
>
> That depends on what you want to do. If one follows the scientific method,
> one is constrained by the metaphysical boundaries of said scientific method.
> If you want to worship equations or believe that the senses reveal Truth
> without thought ... then you simpy aren't participating in the scientific
> endeavor. Regardless of the letters after your name, or the label you
> attach to your metaphysics.
Present for us this authorized version of the scientific method. Don't
bother to tell me that I "once agreed with you about this." You
certainly do NOT treat me as an authority. So, what class or book and
dream did you get this authotized version of the true "scientific
method"? Where is it written.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany wrote:
> > I seem to be a lone instrumentalist among two hostile camps of
> > realists on these two NGs. Neither camp friendly to each other and
> > both unfriendly toward me.
>
> That is really sad.
>
> [snip philosophical crap]
Mine or yours?
> Categorizing people does always fail. -
Can you prove that claim?
> Realism means to take notice of the facts.
That's the silliest definition I've ever heard of for realism. What do
you mean by "take notice" and "fact"? What scholarly reference did you
get that definition from?
> I know not a single
> living realistic physicist. Einstein was the last realistic physicist,
> until he did not more know what he should do with the mysterious
> matter. Due to the influence from his colleagues, he lost the
> consequence applied to the ether.
Einstein said many times such things to this effect: "Physical
concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it
may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. (Evolution of
Physics)
>
> Since you always talk of theories that work:
> Only a theory that consists of exclusively (really !) observable
> quantities can really work.
If the issue was only about the "reality" of measurement, there'd be
no controversy at all. The issue is not there. The issue is whether or
not the models used in successful theories are "true" of reality
(scientific realism).
The only requirement needed for a theory to work is that it have good
agreement between its predictions and its experimental measurements
made on the theory's domain of applicability. Good theories do NOT
imply true models. The only justification that one has that a
theoretical model is true is pure faith.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
>
> > Surely there are instrumentalist physicists and amateurs on these NGs.
> > Where are they hiding? Steven Hawking is an instrumentalist. So,
> > reveal yourselves.
>
> I doubt that there are many who don't give a rat's ass about the nature
> of nature bother to frequent here.
>
> Paul Stowe
I have two contrary desires: I want to know absolute deep reality, and
I want to not delude myself that I have found it. What do you suppose
would be the personality of someone who held to the former desire but
not the latter one?
Patrick
Patrick Reany
> re...@asu.edu (Patrick Reany) wrote in message news:<844a1b64.04040...@posting.google.com>...
>
> Can you provide a couple cites that mention the word "realism" in the
> context that you've used it? I think you've made some assumptions
> about its use in science.
>
> When realism is discussed in science, it as *nothing* to do with how
> science relates to reality. It has to do with the methods one uses to
> pursue truth in science.
>
You think that I just make this stuff up? You could have done a simple
google search yourself.
http://www.routledge-ny.com/rep/q094sam.html
From the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND ANTIREALISM
Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of
scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of
scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective
(mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the
dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a
metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the
independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an
epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals
exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that
govern them.
Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just 'realism') are a variety
of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two
others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special
challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of
knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so
takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as
scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the
existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards
them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism
maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that
'facts' are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of
knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent
existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the
truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied
to constructivism.
___________________________________
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Patrick Reany wrote:
> I have two contrary desires: I want to know absolute deep reality,
Give that up. We can not see into the Belly of the Beast and we have not
the wits to understand it all. We have to be satisfied with more
superficial knowledge and the kind of good guesses our brains are
capable of.
The Best is the Enemy of the Good Enough.
Bob Kolker
xxein
xxein: They are fleeing the leaning tower of Babel.
Everyone is happy doing what they are doing. Why do you want to rock the boat?
The universe operates on its own. What category does that fall into?
ueb
> ueb wrote in message news:<107m4c...@Muse2.private.de>...
>> Patrick Reany wrote:
>> > I seem to be a lone instrumentalist among two hostile camps of
>> > realists on these two NGs. Neither camp friendly to each other and
>> > both unfriendly toward me.
>>
>> That is really sad.
>>
>> [snip philosophical crap]
> Mine or yours?
>> Categorizing people does always fail. -
> Can you prove that claim?
I can _support_ that claim. I have often experienced it.
The result of such was always shit.
>> Realism means to take notice of the facts.
> That's the silliest definition I've ever heard of for realism. What do
> you mean by "take notice" and "fact"? What scholarly reference did you
> get that definition from?
Ah, the philosopher must define the simplest terms with other terms
as complicatedly as possible. And he needs of course a reference,
because he cannot do it alone.
>> I know not a single
>> living realistic physicist. Einstein was the last realistic physicist,
>> until he did not more know what he should do with the mysterious
>> matter. Due to the influence from his colleagues, he lost the
>> consequence applied to the ether.
> Einstein said many times such things to this effect: "Physical
> concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it
> may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. (Evolution of
> Physics)
Hmm. Einstein succeeded as long he did listen to his own mind.
>>
>> Since you always talk of theories that work:
>> Only a theory that consists of exclusively (really !) observable
>> quantities can really work.
> If the issue was only about the "reality" of measurement, there'd be
> no controversy at all. The issue is not there. The issue is whether or
> not the models used in successful theories are "true" of reality
> (scientific realism).
> The only requirement needed for a theory to work is that it have good
> agreement between its predictions and its experimental measurements
> made on the theory's domain of applicability. Good theories do NOT
> imply true models. The only justification that one has that a
> theoretical model is true is pure faith.
You forget to rate a theory according to the width of its domain
of applicability. I challenge that a theory works if one tells me
that it is limited to certain dimensions. For that reason, I prefer
a theory that makes both the predictions of small dimensions
(e.g. particle numbers) and those of great dimensions together.
That is the geometric theory of gravitation and electromagnetism.
Ulrich
Mike Helland
> You think that I just make this stuff up? You could have done a simple
> google search yourself.
Of course not, I just wanted a pointer to the best sources of your
information. Thanks for that.
greywolf42
That is why I noted that my dislike was a quibble, and that you had
differentiated your terms.
> I should also point out that when I
> referred to "realist" in this post I meant to refer to scientific
> realist. The scientific realist belives that the models used in
> successful theories are literally true of the world. They are not
> thoery or definition dependent.
I believe that you are a bit confused. A scientific theory includes a
physical model. A model is *part* of a theory. Equations are never
'literally true.' For all equations are definition-dependent. They are
mere language.
Thus sayeth the 'traditional realist.' ;)
> > > The traditional realists disagree completely. They see these "models"
> > > as cheats, as mere mathemagic, first derived on the basis of
> > > mathematical principles (such as simplicity, concinnity, symmetry, or
> > > minimality -- the things which are good only as heuristics for getting
> > > the math right), and then reified afterwards. To them, "correct"
> > > physical theories begin with an obvious, intuitive mechanical model
> > > and build from there. The chief proponents of this view are
> > > Greywolf42, Paul Stowe, and O'Barr.
> >
> > Not a bad summary. However, I would say that we differentiate between
> > physical 'models', and mere 'equations' or 'correlations.'
>
> I define a model as a representation of a thing, concept, or
> relationship. By that definition, equations and correlations and even
> theories can be considered as models.
And if I define a rose as a pencil, then the rose can be considered a
pencil. But you still can't write with it. A scientific model is a
physical view of how things work. Physical cause and effect. An equation
*is* a correlation. But it does not itself contain the model.
> > > So if it was mysterious to the reader why the ether concept is so
> > > controversial here, now it's revealed. It is because of these two
> > > radically contrary philosophical views on how one should "model" in
> > > physics.
> >
> > Not physics. The scientific method.
> >
> > > I claim that the question of "reality" in physics is meaningless
> > > because there is no indisputable way to prove any "reality" claim
> > > beyond what we can see with our own eyes and vetted by majority vote,
> > > sotospeak.
> >
> > But this is pure Kantian wandervogel. It's not 'instrumental' at all.
> > Reality as pure perception.
>
> I'm not a positivist.
I attempted to distinguish the difference between positivism and Kantian
perception. The difference is small.
> I have no problem with speculative or hypothetical models.
Neither do I ... so long as they are admitted as such. And where a 'model'
is an attempt to represent physical cause and effect. (Not merely
equations.)
> I'm not of the opinion that science should ONLY
> deal with perceptions. But there is one virtue of preceptions -- at
> least we can be sure of them as truthful even if we don't know for
> sure what they imply as "Real."
I believe that Dr. Leary might have a few words to say about whether
perception is "Truth" or perception is "Real."
The keystone of the scientific method is repeatbility. Thus, 'perception'
is barred from the scientific method.
> > > It's all faith on the part of the faithful. Extreme
> > > metaphysics in the halls of physics is divisive and accomplishes
> > > nothing but hostility.
> >
> > That depends on what you want to do. If one follows the scientific
> > method, one is constrained by the metaphysical boundaries of said
> > scientific method. If you want to worship equations or believe that
> > the senses reveal Truth without thought ... then you simpy aren't
> > participating in the scientific endeavor. Regardless of the letters
> > after your name, or the label you attach to your metaphysics.
>
> Present for us this authorized version of the scientific method. Don't
> bother to tell me that I "once agreed with you about this." You
> certainly do NOT treat me as an authority.
Authority has no value in the scientific method. Or in scientific
discourse.
> So, what class or book and
> dream did you get this authotized version of the true "scientific
> method"? Where is it written.
I feel no need to repeat an argument that was successfully concluded by an
agreement between two parties. You have agreed in the past that I provided
you a succinct, and adequate description of the scientific method. Although
you termed it 'naive.' I will continue to distinguish between the objective
scientific method and the actions performed by academics calling themselves
'scientists.'
Now, if you wish to change your mind about what the 'naive' scientific
method entails, we can reopen the discussion by you identifying the
differences leading to your change of mind.
Patrick Reany
The reference I gave about scientific realism may be excellent; I
don't really know. I can say that the explanation of the term it gave
was good and about the same as every other characterization I've seen
of it from many other philosophic sources.
FYI, the one thing you shouldn't do with philosophical terms is to put
too much faith in how standard dictionaries define them.
Patrick