What is a physical law (was: Alfred Schild gives SR-GR distinction)
Patrick Reany
> "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
[snip]
> >
> > model -- a representation of a thing, concept, or relationship
> > law -- an invariable relationship on values and/or events
> > theory -- an explanation in the form of a deductive system
> > hypothesis -- a simple speculation
> >
> > These definitions aren't meant to be complete. I could write a
> > monograph expanding the meaning of each of them! But for standard
> > education, that's not what's needed! They are meant to be 1) short, 2)
> > easy to remember, and 3) consistent with how the top physicists of the
> > last 300 years used them. I believe that all those criteria have been
> > met.
>
> And you have definitely shown that? You have definitely shown it is
> consistent with the way 'the top physicists of the last 300 years used
> them'? Would you mind naming these top physicist? Surveyed physicists gave
> these names http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/541840.stm. Now I do not
> claim to be an expert on all these physicists but I do know the writing of
> some - in particular Feynman. Now examination of his classic 'The Character
> of Physical Law' page 13 gives a different definition of law - 'There is a
> rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena of nature which is not apparent
> to the eye but only to the eye of analysis; and it is these rhythms and
> patterns which we called physical laws'. Your exact reasoning of how your
> definition is consistent (by which I mean captures its important aspects)
> with Feynmans should be another very enlightening sojourn into highly
> valuable semantics.
So, this is Feynman's definition of a "physical law":
physical law -- a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena
of nature which is not apparent to the eye but only to
the eye of analysis
That's a horrible definition of a physical law. First, the use of the
word "between" is all wrong. It is used to compare two things at a
time. A better word choice would have been "among." Second, what is
meant by the "phenomena of nature"? Are we looking for relationships
"between" electromagentic phenomena and fluid phenomena, say? Even
worse is "phenomena of nature which is not apparent to the eye but
only to the eye of analysis." Feynman's use of the restrictive case of
the "which" phrase is troubling, for it implies that there may be
"laws" which are apparent to the eye but not apparent to the eye of
analysis. He should have used the nonrestrictive case by placing a
comma between the words "nature" and "which."(Even that is bad -- too
complicated, contentious, and basically superfluous for a definition)
The Ideal Gas Law PV = nRT is a relationship on multiple variables at
once. Now, how do we divide these variables up into "phenomena" and
why bother to? Are we talking about the pressure, volume, temperature,
and nR "phenomenas"? Lastly, there is no clear and explicit mention
that these rythms and patterns are relationships that continue
consistently through time, and are not just one off relationships,
being ephemeral? If I walk outside during a storm and see ball
lightning boucing periodically across the lawn, that is an example of
a "rythm and pattern," but not necessarily a pattern that will repeat
every time I walk outside during a storm. This issue of "phenomena"
has another troubling aspect. If we were forced to deal with laws as
exact descriptions of what really is happening in phenomena, then we
would disallow for "laws" as idealizations, such as the Ideal Gas Law
or the Law of Galilean Inertia.
No wonder that science students complain that either they don't get
definitions of the Big Four in science classes, or the definitions
given are vague and confusing. Feynman's so-called definition sure is.
In my definition of law, "invariable" means "temporally repeating,
persisting, or continuing." So, my definition of law (as an invariable
relationship on values and/or events) becomes, as a physical law:
physical law -- a temporally persisting relationship on physical
values and/or physical events.
I point out, as I have pointed out many times, that this definition is
an adaptation of a definition I got from N. Campbell in his book, What
is Science. Physical laws tend to imply a certain extensions in space
-- a domain of applicability, which physical theories are supposed to
make explicit. The confidence to make the claim that the relationship
is persiting through time comes from experience and is justified in
particular cases by induction as a probability argument -- the past is
a probable indicator of the future.
Now, let's look at the physical law "What goes up must come down"
(which is understood as a crude description of projectile motion).
This is certainly a temporally persisting relationship between events
of going up and coming down of physical objects projected up from the
surface of the earth. Yet, it is commonly quite visible to the naked
eye (in my opinion, inasmuch as the relationship is immediately
apparent to the average human being upon seeing it happen over and
over), contrary to Feynman's "definition." Naturally, the law has a
domain of applicability. We're not exceeding escape velocity here.
Now, is there a "rythm and pattern" involved in this projectile
example? I leave that to you, Bill. It's a question of semantics. I
can't understand why Feynman chose to claim "rythm and pattern" rather
than "rythm or pattern." In any case, one has to strain to identify
the "rythms and patterns" in all relationships "between" phenomena.
The term "phenomena" used in Feynman's "definition" is just really
imprecise and vague.
My definition easily deals with PV = nRT. It claims a relationship
among various physical values, and that relationship persist through
time. No problem. Likewise, the Uncertainty Principle is a physical
law by my definition, but is there a "rythm and pattern" to it? Again,
I leave that to you to decide. The question is prefectly irrelevant to
my definition.
If Feynman wanted to draw a distinction between what the eye can see
at any moment and what is the psychological connection between visible
events, sense impressions, and the invention of laws, then he should
have read what Einstein had to say about them:
What are the general conclusions which can
be drawn from the development of physics
indicated here in the broad outline representing
only the most fundamental ideas?
Science is not just a collection of laws, a
catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of
the human mind, with its freely invented ideas
and concepts. Physical theories try to form a
picture of reality and to establish its connection
with the wide world of sense impressions. Thus
the only justification for our mental structures is
whether and in what way our theories form such
a link.
We have seen new realities created by the
advance of physics. But this chain of creation
can be traced back far beyond the starting point
of physics. One of the most primitive concepts
is that of an object. The concepts of a tree, a
horse, any material body, are creations gained
on the basis of experience, though the impressions
from which they arise are primitive in comparison
with the world of physical phenomena. A cat
teasing a mouse also creates, by thought, its
own primitive reality. The fact that the cat reacts
in a similar way toward any mouse it meets shows
that it forms concepts and theories which are its
guide through its own world of sense impressions.
"Three trees" is something different from "two
trees." Again "two trees" is different from "two
stones." The concept of the pure numbers 2, 3,
4, ... freed from the objects from which they
arose, are creations of the thinking mind which
describe the reality of our world.
The psychological subjective feeling of time
enables us to order our impressions, to state that
one event precedes another. But to connect every
instant of time with a number, by the use of a clock,
to regard time as a one-dimensional continuum, is
already an invention. So also are the concepts of
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry, and our
space understood as a three-dimensional continuum.
Physics really began with the invention of mass,
force, and an inertial system. These concepts are
all free inventions. They lead to the formulation of
the mechanical point of view. For the physicist of
the early nineteenth century, the reality of our outer
world consisted of particles with simple forces acting
between them and depending only on the distance.
He tried to retain as long as possible his belief that
he would succeed in explaining all events in nature
by these fundamental concepts of reality. The
difficulties connected with the deflection of the
magnetic needle, the difficulties connected with the
structure of the ether, induced us to create a more
subtle reality. The important invention of the
electromagnetic field appears. A courageous
scientific imagination was needed to realize fully
that not the behavior of bodies, but the behavior of
something between them, that is, the field, may be
essential for ordering and understanding events.
Later developments both destroyed old concepts
and created new ones. Absolute time and the inertial
co-ordinate system were abandoned by the relativity
theory. The background for all events was no longer
the one-dimensional time and the three-dimensional
space continuum, but the four-dimensional time-space
continuum, another free invention, with new
transformation properties. The inertial co-ordinate
system was no longer needed. Every co-ordinate
system is equally suited for the description of events
in nature.
The quantum theory again created new and
essential features of our reality. Discontinuity
replaced continuity. Instead of laws governing
individuals, probability laws appeared.
The reality created by modern physics is, indeed,
far removed from the reality of the early days. But
the aim of every physical theory still remains the same.
With the help of physical theories we try to find
our way through the maze of observed facts, to
order and understand the world of our sense
impressions. We want the observed facts to follow
logically from our concept of reality. Without the
belief that it is possible to grasp the reality with our
theoretical constructions, without the belief in the
inner harmony of our world, there could be no
science. This belief is and always will remain the
fundamental motive for all scientific creations.
Throughout all our efforts, in every dramatic struggle
between old and new views, we recognize the
eternal longing for understanding, the ever-firm
belief in the harmony of our world, continually
strengthen by the increasing obstacles to comprehension.
[Found in: The Evolution of Physics,
(Quanta, Physics and Reality),
Einstein and Infeld, 1938, pp. 294-6.]
--------------------------
In Einstein's essay, PHYSICS AND REALITY, Ideas and Opinions, p 293,
we find this paragraph:
We shall call "primary concepts" such concepts as are directly and
intuitively connected with typical complexes of sense experiences. All
other notions are---from the physical point of view---possessed of
meaning, only in so far as they are connected, by theorems, with the
primary notions. These theorems are partially definitions of the
concepts (and of the statements derived logically from them) and
partially theorems not derivable from the definitions, which express
at least indirect relations between the "primary concepts," and in
this way between sense experiences. Theorems of the latter kind are
"statements about reality" or laws of nature, i.e. theorems which have
to show their usefulness when applied to sense experiences
comprehended by primary concepts. The question as to which of the
theorems shall be considered as definitions and which as natural laws
will depend largely upon the chosen representation. It really becomes
absolutely necessary to make this differentiation only when one
examines the degree to which the whole system of concepts considered
is not empty from the physical point of view.
---------------------------
I wouldn't want to use either Feynman's or Einstein's "definitions"
given above of physical law in a physics textbook. Yet they are both
consistent with my definition, if you remove the contentious phrase in
Feynman's about being not "apparent to the eye" and add in a lot of
definitions of the undefined terms he used. But both of those
"definitions" need a lot of revising to become functionally useful,
however. Certainly, physical laws can begin as hypotheses being
intially derived as theorems of a postulate set (in a theory), but it
requires repeated testing before the hypothesis gains the reliability
needed to call it a "law."
Now, my definition of physical law is consistent with: the Exclusion
Principle, Charles Law, Kepler's laws, Newton's laws, the Law of
Action (interpreting action as a "physical" quantity), and the Light
Principle, etc. Let's look closer at the Light Principle: The measured
speed of light in a vacuum in an inertial frame of reference is the
fixed number c. I find it strained to claim that that is an example of
"rythm and pattern." The main importance of a law is not just that it
makes a claim about relationships, but that it also makes the claim
that that relationship exists consistently over time. Thus, laws are
rules that can be counted on to make predictions in the future.
If you can find a "law of physics" that defies my definition, please
let me know. I'll be thankful to you, Bill. Truly!! Getting feedback
is one reason I have made these post about the Big Four. But so far
not one poster has presented an example that contradicts my
definitions, except for your one example from Feynman. Obviously,
based on my analysis of his "definition," I'm not going to drop mine
in favor of his.
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Your nitpicking and sniggling shows just how irrelevent your concerns
are. While you wring your hands over the philosophical impurity of
Feynman's ideas about physical law, Feynman did the physics.
Bob Kolker
ZZBunker
But, it's no different than laws scientists having been
making up for 400 years. Einstein's definition
was even stupider.
Bill Hobba
As in the difference between and three and one is two?
> A better word choice would have been "among."
It looks like your claim to have definitions 'consistent with how the top
physicists of the last 300 years used them.' may require a bit more work.
> Second, what is meant by the "phenomena of nature"?
Your definition is 'law -- an invariable relationship on values and/or
events'. What is meant by value? What is its relationship to the objects
of physics? Indeed assuming you can give precise meaning to the terms you
used what makes one 'invariable relationship on values and/or events' better
than another so they have the status of law? Or does it not matter? Then
your rejecting Feynmans claim they are only apparent to the eye of analysis.
On what grounds?
> Are we looking for relationships
> "between" electromagentic phenomena and fluid phenomena, say?
That is one of things was could look at. Why not? The fact is of course it
was dead end but we would not know that unless we looked.
> Even worse is "phenomena of nature which is not apparent to the eye but
> only to the eye of analysis." Feynman's use of the restrictive case of
> the "which" phrase is troubling, for it implies that there may be
> "laws" which are apparent to the eye but not apparent to the eye of
> analysis.
And they do not exist? The fact that all objects fall at the same rate is
not apparent to the eye (in fact the opposite is true to the eye - a feather
does not fall at the same rate as a cannonball) but only to the eye of
analysis where we exclude the effect of air resistance. In fact one could
formulate a complete physics of bodies consistent with 'law -- an
invariable relationship on values and/or events' by listing all objects,
their weight and how fast they fell and still get no closer to the real
law - which is only apparent when you make the crucial step of excluding air
resistance.
> He should have used the nonrestrictive case by placing a
> comma between the words "nature" and "which."(Even that is bad -- too
> complicated, contentious, and basically superfluous for a definition)
So it looks as though rather than coming up with a definition 'consistent
with how the top physicists of the last 300 years used them' your putting
you own spin on things.
> The Ideal Gas Law PV = nRT is a relationship on multiple variables at
> once. Now, how do we divide these variables up into "phenomena" and
> why bother to? Are we talking about the pressure, volume, temperature,
> and nR "phenomenas"?
Notice that Feynman talks about the relationship between phenomena apparent
only 'to the eye of analysis' - not that all the objects of that analysis
are phenomena.
> Lastly, there is no clear and explicit mention
> that these rythms and patterns are relationships that continue
> consistently through time, and are not just one off relationships,
> being ephemeral?
What exactly do you think 'to the eye of analysis means'? Just because you
can not see that means something fundamental does not mean everyone can not.
> If I walk outside during a storm and see ball
> lightning boucing periodically across the lawn, that is an example of
> a "rythm and pattern," but not necessarily a pattern that will repeat
> every time I walk outside during a storm.
Which you will find out when you subject it 'to the eye of analysis'
> This issue of "phenomena"
> has another troubling aspect.
No more troubling than your use of value.
> If we were forced to deal with laws as
> exact descriptions of what really is happening in phenomena, then we
> would disallow for "laws" as idealizations, such as the Ideal Gas Law
> or the Law of Galilean Inertia.
Again exactly what do you think 'to the eye of analysis' means - that we
reject considerations like you gave above?
>
> No wonder that science students complain that either they don't get
> definitions of the Big Four in science classes, or the definitions
> given are vague and confusing. Feynman's so-called definition sure is.
And the documented evidence of these complaints are located at? If you can
not find such then I humbly suggest such resides purely in the mind of
Patrick Reany and has the objective validity of such - which is to say none
at all.
>
> In my definition of law, "invariable" means "temporally repeating,
> persisting, or continuing." So, my definition of law (as an invariable
> relationship on values and/or events) becomes, as a physical law:
>
> physical law -- a temporally persisting relationship on physical
> values and/or physical events.
In Feynmans definition 'to the eye of analysis' means that is one
consideration but there may be others eg Ohms law is not a persisting
relationship - the fact it skips in an out of existence in electronic
devices is very important to their design - in regions where it holds
(linear regions) everything is ok - outside stability and distortion
problems occur.
>
> I point out, as I have pointed out many times, that this definition is
> an adaptation of a definition I got from N. Campbell in his book, What
> is Science.
So your statement 'consistent with how the top physicists of the last 300
years used them' would be based on some comment N. Campbell made rather than
a studious analyses you made of the writings of the 'top physicists of the
last 300 years'? If so it would be appreciated if you made such clear.
> Physical laws tend to imply a certain extensions in space
> -- a domain of applicability, which physical theories are supposed to
> make explicit. The confidence to make the claim that the relationship
> is persiting through time comes from experience and is justified in
> particular cases by induction as a probability argument -- the past is
> a probable indicator of the future.
And exactly how would such considerations not be apparent 'to the eye of
analysis'?
>
> Now, let's look at the physical law "What goes up must come down"
> (which is understood as a crude description of projectile motion).
> This is certainly a temporally persisting relationship between events
> of going up and coming down of physical objects projected up from the
> surface of the earth. Yet, it is commonly quite visible to the naked
> eye (in my opinion, inasmuch as the relationship is immediately
> apparent to the average human being upon seeing it happen over and
> over), contrary to Feynman's "definition." Naturally, the law has a
> domain of applicability. We're not exceeding escape velocity here.
Looks like your subjecting it 'to the eye of analysis' to me rather than
accepting a statement that is 'an invariable relationship on values and/or
events'
>
> Now, is there a "rythm and pattern" involved in this projectile
> example? I leave that to you, Bill. It's a question of semantics. I
> can't understand why Feynman chose to claim "rythm and pattern" rather
> than "rythm or pattern." In any case, one has to strain to identify
> the "rythms and patterns" in all relationships "between" phenomena.
> The term "phenomena" used in Feynman's "definition" is just really
> imprecise and vague.
No more vague than your use of value, relationship and events.
>
> My definition easily deals with PV = nRT. It claims a relationship
> among various physical values, and that relationship persist through
> time. No problem. Likewise, the Uncertainty Principle is a physical
> law by my definition, but is there a "rythm and pattern" to it? Again,
> I leave that to you to decide. The question is prefectly irrelevant to
> my definition.
How does your definition deal with ohms law? It fits Feynmans definition
marvelously - but yours would seem another matter. After all it is not 'an
invariable relationship on values and/or events' it is a statement that is
sometimes true and sometime false - certainly not invariable (eg it works
great for transistors when they are biased correctly - outside such a region
watch out) - all it is really saying is when it is true then it is a useful
thing to know.
Still quoting Einstein again. Apart from Einstein exactly what other 'top
physicists of the last 300 years' have you distilled your views from? Come
now surely you can name them.
Thanks
Bill
Patrick Reany
zzbunker, give us your definition of a "physical law."
Patrick
ZZBunker
Anything that satisifies the criteria
a) it is has four and only four local dimensions.
b) one and only one of the dimensions has energy.
c) that which exised before quotes existed.
d) that which will which still exist
after Lunar exploration is completely robotized.
e) that which has both waves and particles,
and no non-existent shit like virtual-ons.
> Patrick
Patrick Reany
> "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
> news:844a1b64.0405...@posting.google.com...
> > "Bill Hobba" <bho...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:<2hZmc.26481$TT.2...@news-server.bigpond.net.au>...
> > > "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
> >
> > [snip]
> > > >
> > > > model -- a representation of a thing, concept, or relationship
> > > > law -- an invariable relationship on values and/or events
> > > > theory -- an explanation in the form of a deductive system
> > > > hypothesis -- a simple speculation
> > > >
> > > > These definitions aren't meant to be complete. I could write a
> > > > monograph expanding the meaning of each of them! But for standard
> > > > education, that's not what's needed! They are meant to be 1) short, 2)
> > > > easy to remember, and 3) consistent with how the top physicists of the
> > > > last 300 years used them. I believe that all those criteria have been
> > > > met.
> > >
> >
> >
> > So, this is Feynman's definition of a "physical law":
> >
> > physical law -- a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena
> > of nature which is not apparent to the eye but only to
> > the eye of analysis
> >
> >
> > That's a horrible definition of a physical law. First, the use of the
> > word "between" is all wrong. It is used to compare two things at a
> > time.
>
> As in the difference between and three and one is two?
>
> > A better word choice would have been "among."
>
> It looks like your claim to have definitions 'consistent with how the top
> physicists of the last 300 years used them.' may require a bit more work.
I said how the best physicists USED the terms law, hypothesis, theory,
and model, not how they tried to "define" or characterize the terms.
Ordinarily, defining would be a form of using, but not with physicists
when it comes to defining philosophical terms. Feynman did not use the
term "law" the way he "defined" the term. Definitions are often very
difficult.
>
> > Second, what is meant by the "phenomena of nature"?
>
> Your definition is 'law -- an invariable relationship on values and/or
> events'. What is meant by value?
Give us YOUR definition of "physical law."
> What is its relationship to the objects
> of physics? Indeed assuming you can give precise meaning to the terms you
> used what makes one 'invariable relationship on values and/or events' better
> than another so they have the status of law? Or does it not matter? Then
> your rejecting Feynmans claim they are only apparent to the eye of analysis.
> On what grounds?
>
> > Are we looking for relationships
> > "between" electromagentic phenomena and fluid phenomena, say?
>
> That is one of things was could look at. Why not? The fact is of course it
> was dead end but we would not know that unless we looked.
You missed the whole point I made. This notion of classification into
various "phenomena" is vague and contentious.
>
> > Even worse is "phenomena of nature which is not apparent to the eye but
> > only to the eye of analysis." Feynman's use of the restrictive case of
> > the "which" phrase is troubling, for it implies that there may be
> > "laws" which are apparent to the eye but not apparent to the eye of
> > analysis.
>
> And they do not exist? The fact that all objects fall at the same rate is
> not apparent to the eye (in fact the opposite is true to the eye - a feather
> does not fall at the same rate as a cannonball) but only to the eye of
> analysis where we exclude the effect of air resistance. In fact one could
> formulate a complete physics of bodies consistent with 'law -- an
> invariable relationship on values and/or events' by listing all objects,
> their weight and how fast they fell and still get no closer to the real
> law - which is only apparent when you make the crucial step of excluding air
> resistance.
The point is that Feynman's "definition" is imprecise and vague, and
thus is useless as a definition at all.
>
> > He should have used the nonrestrictive case by placing a
> > comma between the words "nature" and "which."(Even that is bad -- too
> > complicated, contentious, and basically superfluous for a definition)
>
> So it looks as though rather than coming up with a definition 'consistent
> with how the top physicists of the last 300 years used them' your putting
> you own spin on things.
>
> > The Ideal Gas Law PV = nRT is a relationship on multiple variables at
> > once. Now, how do we divide these variables up into "phenomena" and
> > why bother to? Are we talking about the pressure, volume, temperature,
> > and nR "phenomenas"?
>
> Notice that Feynman talks about the relationship between phenomena apparent
> only 'to the eye of analysis' - not that all the objects of that analysis
> are phenomena.
Defending Feynman's "definition" is a total waste of time, except as a
philosophic exercise.
>
> > Lastly, there is no clear and explicit mention
> > that these rythms and patterns are relationships that continue
> > consistently through time, and are not just one off relationships,
> > being ephemeral?
>
> What exactly do you think 'to the eye of analysis means'? Just because you
> can not see that means something fundamental does not mean everyone can not.
Then tell us *exactly* what it means to you, since you seem to KNOW.
>
> > If I walk outside during a storm and see ball
> > lightning boucing periodically across the lawn, that is an example of
> > a "rythm and pattern," but not necessarily a pattern that will repeat
> > every time I walk outside during a storm.
>
> Which you will find out when you subject it 'to the eye of analysis'
>
> > This issue of "phenomena"
> > has another troubling aspect.
>
> No more troubling than your use of value.
Nonsense!
>
> > If we were forced to deal with laws as
> > exact descriptions of what really is happening in phenomena, then we
> > would disallow for "laws" as idealizations, such as the Ideal Gas Law
> > or the Law of Galilean Inertia.
>
> Again exactly what do you think 'to the eye of analysis' means - that we
> reject considerations like you gave above?
I chose to adapt N. Campbell's definition of a law because it forsakes
dealing with vague concepts of phenomena or patterns, and deals only
with values (to which I included events), which in the case of a
physical law is an invariable (i.e., temporally persisting)
relationship on physical values and/or physical events. In PV = nRT,
P, V, n, R, and T are physical values. (In practice these are only the
obvious ones. To apply the equation you need a rarified gas, IIRC, as
well, and this is associated with other physical values, such as those
associated with density. The implicit values are just as important as
the explicit values.) What's so hard to grasp about that? And because
I'm not dealing with "phenomena" per se in my definition, I can posit
idealizations on relationships among physical values and/or physical
events. As far as we know, the Ideal Gas Law is never true of any real
"phenomena."
[snip]
> >
> > In my definition of law, "invariable" means "temporally repeating,
> > persisting, or continuing." So, my definition of law (as an invariable
> > relationship on values and/or events) becomes, as a physical law:
> >
> > physical law -- a temporally persisting relationship on physical
> > values and/or physical events.
>
> In Feynmans definition 'to the eye of analysis' means that is one
> consideration but there may be others eg Ohms law is not a persisting
> relationship - the fact it skips in an out of existence in electronic
> devices is very important to their design - in regions where it holds
> (linear regions) everything is ok - outside stability and distortion
> problems occur.
How would YOU know? You're inventing here.
>
> >
> > I point out, as I have pointed out many times, that this definition is
> > an adaptation of a definition I got from N. Campbell in his book, What
> > is Science.
>
> So your statement 'consistent with how the top physicists of the last 300
> years used them' would be based on some comment N. Campbell made rather than
> a studious analyses you made of the writings of the 'top physicists of the
> last 300 years'? If so it would be appreciated if you made such clear.
Illogical, as usual. It's been about 20 years since I first
encountered Campbell's definition. I adopted and adapted it right away
and I have used it to compare how he used the term "law" compared to
how it was used by writings of physicists. Over those 20 years, I
found the usages quite consistent with Campbell's definition most of
the time. I have given other reasons why his definition is a good
definition, at least as a point of departure. Quite simply, I
appreciate its operationalist, rather than metaphysical, nature.
Dealing with physical values (corresponding to physical measurements
or assignments, such as physical constants) and/or physical events
brings the term closer to an objective and operationalist definition.
>
> > Physical laws tend to imply a certain extensions in space
> > -- a domain of applicability, which physical theories are supposed to
> > make explicit. The confidence to make the claim that the relationship
> > is persiting through time comes from experience and is justified in
> > particular cases by induction as a probability argument -- the past is
> > a probable indicator of the future.
>
> And exactly how would such considerations not be apparent 'to the eye of
> analysis'?
Why don't you just cut to the chase and give us all a clarification of
what Feynman meant by his "definition" of physical law.
[snip]
> How does your definition deal with ohms law? It fits Feynmans definition
> marvelously - but yours would seem another matter. After all it is not 'an
> invariable relationship on values and/or events' it is a statement that is
> sometimes true and sometime false - certainly not invariable (eg it works
> great for transistors when they are biased correctly - outside such a region
> watch out) - all it is really saying is when it is true then it is a useful
> thing to know.
Where do you get this stuff. The domain of applicability is defined by
a certain set of physical values and/or events. The only question is
whether the relationship V = IR applies consistently over time under a
given set of circumstances defined by physical values, such as those
values which tell you precisely how to setup an experiment that can
test the relationship.
Patrick
Ken S. Tucker
> Patrick Reany wrote:
>> So, this is Feynman's definition of a "physical law":
>>
>> physical law -- a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena
>> of nature which is not apparent to the eye but only to
>> the eye of analysis
>>
>> That's a horrible definition of a physical law. >
Agreed
[...]
>Your nitpicking and sniggling shows just how irrelevent your concerns
>are. While you wring your hands over the philosophical impurity of
>Feynman's ideas about physical law, Feynman did the physics.
>Bob Kolker
Agreed.
From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute truth".
"Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
The mathematical embodiment of that agreement is
know as covariance in GR. Consider how the covariant
tensor A_u in K transforms to another CS K',
A'_v = &x^u/&x'^v A^u (& =partial diff sign).
Then it's easy to see,
A'_v dx'^v = A_u dx^u .
See that's invariant, and is true in all CS's, hence
it's a "physical law".
I'm not entirely clear on this, but I think this
is why covaraint expressions are the basis of
physical law in GR.
Regards
Ken S. Tucker
Sam Wormley
>
> From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute truth".
>
> "Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
>
Feynman did a good job of talking about "The Character of Physical
Law" in his book. There is no "absolute truth". There are the
empirical results of observation and experiment... humans have
a few theories (tools) that are extremely useful in understanding
the world around us... and that make new fruitful predictions.
Paul Stowe
>"Robert J. Kolker" <robert...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1G6nc.52320$kh4.2975273@attbi_s52>...
>> Patrick Reany wrote:
>
>>> So, this is Feynman's definition of a "physical law":
>>>
>>> physical law -- a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena
>>> of nature which is not apparent to the eye but
>>> only to the eye of analysis
>>>
>>> That's a horrible definition of a physical law. Reany
>
> Agreed
Ditto...!
> [...]
>
>> Your nitpicking and sniggling shows just how irrelevent your
>> concerns are. While you wring your hands over the philosophical
>> impurity of Feynman's ideas about physical law, Feynman did the
>> physics.
>>
>> Bob Kolker
>
> Agreed. From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute
> truth".
>
> "Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
Hmmm, the very word 'absolute' raises the hackles of many around
here. :)
I'd say a 'physical law' is an observation about (or a result of)
the behavior of the physical universe. If that universe (system)
has an independent existence the such behavior is also independent
and predictable. It is this independence and predictability that
makes physical laws, 'laws'.
Such behavior (nature) is eminently amenable to mathematical
quantification. But all mathematica CAN EVER DO is quantify such
behaviors, NOT explain them.
> The mathematical embodiment of that agreement is know as covariance
> in GR. Consider how the covariant tensor A_u in K transforms to
> another CS K',
>
> A'_v = &x^u/&x'^v A^u (& =partial diff sign).
>
> Then it's easy to see,
>
> A'_v dx'^v = A_u dx^u .
>
> See that's invariant, and is true in all CS's, hence it's a "physical
> law".
Is this not a result of independent existence???
> I'm not entirely clear on this, but I think this is why covaraint
> expressions are the basis of physical law in GR.
Paul Stowe
Bill Hobba
"Ken S. Tucker" <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> wrote in message
news:2202379a.04050...@posting.google.com...
> "Robert J. Kolker" <robert...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<1G6nc.52320$kh4.2975273@attbi_s52>...
> > Patrick Reany wrote:
>
> >> So, this is Feynman's definition of a "physical law":
> >>
> >> physical law -- a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena
> >> of nature which is not apparent to the eye but only to
> >> the eye of analysis
> >>
> >> That's a horrible definition of a physical law. >
> >>Reany
>
> Agreed
> [...]
>
> >Your nitpicking and sniggling shows just how irrelevent your concerns
> >are. While you wring your hands over the philosophical impurity of
> >Feynman's ideas about physical law, Feynman did the physics.
> >Bob Kolker
>
> Agreed.
> From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute truth".
>
> "Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
So Ohms law has absoute truth. Does it apply to a diode?
>
> The mathematical embodiment of that agreement is
> know as covariance in GR.
Ken a guy called Kretchamnn proved that such is not the case and challenged
Einstein on this very point and Einstein admitted he was wrong. The
principle of general covarience is just that - a heuristic principle without
any physical content whatever. You need to add other things to get the
physical content. See http://modeling.la.asu.edu/R&E/SecretsGenius.pdf and
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0402/teaching/handout4.pdf.
Consider how the covariant
> tensor A_u in K transforms to another CS K',
>
> A'_v = &x^u/&x'^v A^u (& =partial diff sign).
>
> Then it's easy to see,
>
> A'_v dx'^v = A_u dx^u .
>
> See that's invariant, and is true in all CS's, hence
> it's a "physical law".
>
> I'm not entirely clear on this, but I think this
> is why covaraint expressions are the basis of
> physical law in GR.
The reason we have covarience is a practical one. The POR applied generally
says laws, when transformed to inertial frames, are always the same. This
is obviously not an easy thing to always do but becomes trivial for laws
expressed covariantly. See the links I gave above for further discussion.
Basically the idea of GR is no prior geometry or geometry itself is
dynamical. To quite one of the links I gave above, technically we say:
'General relativity is distinguished from other dynamical field theories by
its invariance under active diffeomorphisms. Any theory can be made
invariant under passive diffeomorphisms. Passive diffeomorphism invariance
is a property of the formulation of a dynamical theory, while active
diffeomorphism invariance is a property of the dynamical theory itself'
Thanks
Bill
Bill Hobba
"Sam Wormley" <swor...@mchsi.com> wrote in message
news:409E734B...@mchsi.com...
Correct. Laws are simply labels we put on useful things that help us in
solving problems. Maxwell's equations for example breakdown in GR and need
to be recast. The laws of QM have found no exception, but Newton's laws
have. As Feynman says they are things that appear 'to the eye of analysis'
and from that viewpoint are important things to consider when solving
problems. Immutable and god given - not always - obeying underlying
symmetries considered important to the problem at hand - yes.
Thanks
Bill
Patrick Reany
> "Robert J. Kolker" <robert...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<1G6nc.52320$kh4.2975273@attbi_s52>...
> > Patrick Reany wrote:
>
> >> So, this is Feynman's definition of a "physical law":
> >>
> >> physical law -- a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena
> >> of nature which is not apparent to the eye but only to
> >> the eye of analysis
> >>
> >> That's a horrible definition of a physical law. >
> >>Reany
>
> Agreed
> [...]
>
> >Your nitpicking and sniggling shows just how irrelevent your concerns
> >are. While you wring your hands over the philosophical impurity of
> >Feynman's ideas about physical law, Feynman did the physics.
> >Bob Kolker
>
> Agreed.
> From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute truth".
>
> "Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
You like Feynman's definition of "physical law"? Why? And you see it
as embodying "absolute truth"?
Patrick
Patrick Reany
So, theories are tools for understanding and laws are labels? I think
that there are quite a lot of things that can be regarded as "tools
for understanding," such as diagrams. And "laws are labels" is
hopelessly vague.
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Patrick Reany wrote:
>>
> You like Feynman's definition of "physical law"? Why? And you see it
> as embodying "absolute truth"?
What difference does it make what Feynman called a physical law? He did
the physics. And that is what counts.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
Patrick Reany wrote:
> So, theories are tools for understanding and laws are labels? I think
> that there are quite a lot of things that can be regarded as "tools
> for understanding," such as diagrams. And "laws are labels" is
> hopelessly vague.
So what? Feynman's papers on -physics- were not hopeless vague. Read
them somtime.
Bob Kolker
>
Bill Hobba
Are you suggesting Feynman used the term differently to how he defined it?
An example would be nice.
>
> >
> > > Second, what is meant by the "phenomena of nature"?
> >
> > Your definition is 'law -- an invariable relationship on values and/or
> > events'. What is meant by value?
>
> Give us YOUR definition of "physical law."
Like 'reality' it is too basic a term to play the definition game with.
Beyond what is found in a dictionary and elaborated in writings by people
like Feynman doing so is of little value. It is you that believe it is a
crucial issue. Not me - I know that pinning such concepts down is a
chimera, of little value in doing actual physics. As yet you have produced
no evidence its concrete definition is of any value whatsoever. Your claim
that physics students are crying out for it is valueless speculation; pure
and simple.
>
>
> > What is its relationship to the objects
> > of physics? Indeed assuming you can give precise meaning to the terms
you
> > used what makes one 'invariable relationship on values and/or events'
better
> > than another so they have the status of law? Or does it not matter?
Then
> > your rejecting Feynmans claim they are only apparent to the eye of
analysis.
> > On what grounds?
> >
> > > Are we looking for relationships
> > > "between" electromagentic phenomena and fluid phenomena, say?
> >
> > That is one of things was could look at. Why not? The fact is of
course it
> > was dead end but we would not know that unless we looked.
>
>
> You missed the whole point I made. This notion of classification into
> various "phenomena" is vague and contentious.
And you have missed the point I have made - your definition contains at
least as many problems as what Feynman says. However he realizes firm
definitions in this area is a chimera and did not even attempt such.
Because of that he was able to capture some of its true essence, but leaving
the reader in little doubt it was not the final word, indeed a final word in
this is not possible. After giving this admittedly imprecise definition he
does not attempt to elaborate on it. Instead he says he will not do that
but rather give an example of a law - Newton's law of Gravitation. I
suspect he knows that examination beyond such simple definitions if
worthless - much better to examine specific examples and build up your
knowledge that way. I agree.
> >
> > > Even worse is "phenomena of nature which is not apparent to the eye
but
> > > only to the eye of analysis." Feynman's use of the restrictive case of
> > > the "which" phrase is troubling, for it implies that there may be
> > > "laws" which are apparent to the eye but not apparent to the eye of
> > > analysis.
> >
> > And they do not exist? The fact that all objects fall at the same rate
is
> > not apparent to the eye (in fact the opposite is true to the eye - a
feather
> > does not fall at the same rate as a cannonball) but only to the eye of
> > analysis where we exclude the effect of air resistance. In fact one
could
> > formulate a complete physics of bodies consistent with 'law -- an
> > invariable relationship on values and/or events' by listing all objects,
> > their weight and how fast they fell and still get no closer to the real
> > law - which is only apparent when you make the crucial step of excluding
air
> > resistance.
>
> The point is that Feynman's "definition" is imprecise and vague, and
> thus is useless as a definition at all.
The point is that precision and definiteness is not possible in this area
and making that clear from the outset is of greater value than attempting
something than is not possible.
>
> >
> > > He should have used the nonrestrictive case by placing a
> > > comma between the words "nature" and "which."(Even that is bad -- too
> > > complicated, contentious, and basically superfluous for a definition)
> >
> > So it looks as though rather than coming up with a definition
'consistent
> > with how the top physicists of the last 300 years used them' your
putting
> > you own spin on things.
> >
> > > The Ideal Gas Law PV = nRT is a relationship on multiple variables at
> > > once. Now, how do we divide these variables up into "phenomena" and
> > > why bother to? Are we talking about the pressure, volume, temperature,
> > > and nR "phenomenas"?
> >
> > Notice that Feynman talks about the relationship between phenomena
apparent
> > only 'to the eye of analysis' - not that all the objects of that
analysis
> > are phenomena.
>
> Defending Feynman's "definition" is a total waste of time, except as a
> philosophic exercise.
We can each bandy words about on that issue and get precisely nowhere. Have
you considered why the knowledgeable people around here (I am not one) have
not reacted positively to what you say? It is not because they are ignorant
of philosophical issues. Hell I do not care much about philosophy but I am
not ignorant of it. Feynman did not like philosophy, in fact he was anti
philosophy, but that does not mean he was ignorant of it. It is an
indication that they know what you want to achieve is essentially
unachievable. However that is not a problem because it is not required for
doing physics.
>
> >
> > > Lastly, there is no clear and explicit mention
> > > that these rythms and patterns are relationships that continue
> > > consistently through time, and are not just one off relationships,
> > > being ephemeral?
> >
> > What exactly do you think 'to the eye of analysis means'? Just because
you
> > can not see that means something fundamental does not mean everyone can
not.
>
> Then tell us *exactly* what it means to you, since you seem to KNOW.
I did not claim to know exactly what he means but it is obvious to any
reasonable person that one of the factors in analyzing something is sorting
out what is fundamental. I am not a physicist but I am an
analyst/programmer and can assure you one of the key parts of analysis, if
not the key part, is sorting out what is fundamental to the problem. I did
4 subjects at university on analysis. Did anyone ever define what the term
actually meant? No. You figured out what was required by doing it. Since
then I have had nearly 25 years experience at it, did even more advanced
courses on it, and still failed to get that definition. Do you want to know
something - it simply is not necessary. And there is zippo evidence if
someone tries to define it exactly it would have made the slightest
difference. Did you hear students complain about it - not a whisper. What
they complained about was the amount of assignment work they had to do. It
was that assignment work that gave them the experience to know what a term
like analysis actually means, the type of experiential knowledge that can
never be obtained by a futile discussion of definitional semantics.
>
> >
> > > If I walk outside during a storm and see ball
> > > lightning boucing periodically across the lawn, that is an example of
> > > a "rythm and pattern," but not necessarily a pattern that will repeat
> > > every time I walk outside during a storm.
> >
> > Which you will find out when you subject it 'to the eye of analysis'
> >
> > > This issue of "phenomena"
> > > has another troubling aspect.
> >
> > No more troubling than your use of value.
>
> Nonsense!
Oh - mind explaining why?
>
> >
> > > If we were forced to deal with laws as
> > > exact descriptions of what really is happening in phenomena, then we
> > > would disallow for "laws" as idealizations, such as the Ideal Gas Law
> > > or the Law of Galilean Inertia.
> >
> > Again exactly what do you think 'to the eye of analysis' means - that we
> > reject considerations like you gave above?
>
> I chose to adapt N. Campbell's definition of a law because it forsakes
> dealing with vague concepts of phenomena or patterns, and deals only
> with values (to which I included events), which in the case of a
> physical law is an invariable (i.e., temporally persisting)
> relationship on physical values and/or physical events. In PV = nRT,
> P, V, n, R, and T are physical values. (In practice these are only the
> obvious ones. To apply the equation you need a rarified gas, IIRC, as
> well, and this is associated with other physical values, such as those
> associated with density. The implicit values are just as important as
> the explicit values.) What's so hard to grasp about that? And because
> I'm not dealing with "phenomena" per se in my definition, I can posit
> idealizations on relationships among physical values and/or physical
> events. As far as we know, the Ideal Gas Law is never true of any real
> "phenomena."
Notice the words 'I chose'. Why do you think others choose not to? I doubt
it is because the issue is as clear cut as you want to present it. Just
like you believe you had a good definition of algorithm. And when I pointed
you to a paper that showed that no clear cut definition exists even toady
what did you do - ignore the issue. You simply dismissed it without even a
comment except to say I was wrong. No discussion of the Church/Turing
thesis or other issues central to what an algorithm is - you simply ignored
it. But that will not make the facts go away. There is no clear cut
definition of what algorithm is, just like there is no clear cut definition
of what law is, just like there is no clear cut definition of what reality
is, just like there is no clear cut definition of a myriad of other
fundamental issues. Your answer is 'I chose'. My answer is I accept. You
believe students require clear cut definitions of these things. My answer
is I will not accept such without evidence.
>
> [snip]
> > >
> > > In my definition of law, "invariable" means "temporally repeating,
> > > persisting, or continuing." So, my definition of law (as an invariable
> > > relationship on values and/or events) becomes, as a physical law:
> > >
> > > physical law -- a temporally persisting relationship on physical
> > > values and/or physical events.
> >
> > In Feynmans definition 'to the eye of analysis' means that is one
> > consideration but there may be others eg Ohms law is not a persisting
> > relationship - the fact it skips in an out of existence in electronic
> > devices is very important to their design - in regions where it holds
> > (linear regions) everything is ok - outside stability and distortion
> > problems occur.
>
> How would YOU know? You're inventing here.
Patrick I have formally studied electronics. I have done a research project
on circuit analysis. I suggest it is you that does not know of such things.
A BJT (and if you do not know what a BJT is then I suggest finding out) will
only obey ohms law if biased correctly. What do you think causes non
linearity in amplifiers? It is not that it continues to obey ohms law -
that is for sure. I suggest you do not know enough about the issue to know
if I am inventing or not - I am not BTW. Have a look at the voltage vs
current of a diode. You will see it can be roughly divided into two
regions - one where it is linear with very high resistance and other where
it is linear with very low resistance and is not linear as it switches
between the two regions - in those regions it obeys ohms law. When it is in
the region where can be considered a high resistance it is biased off, when
it is the region where it has a low resistance it is biased on, if it is in
the in-between region it does not obey ohms law. Such non linearity causes
problems in analogue devices. That is what is meant by 'it skips in an out
of existence in electronic devices'. Ohms law is not an immutable law. It
is simply something that is very useful when we can apply it - which is only
sometimes. In fact I studied the behavior of a diode in grade 12 physics -
the above is a favorite point examiners likes to ask questions about -
precisely to bring home the point ohms law has a provisional existence. now
if we rammed you definitions down students throats. Anyone can see your
semantic quibling of saying 'invariable' means 'temporally repeating,
persisting, or continuing' is simply a semantic cop out.
>
> >
> > >
> > > I point out, as I have pointed out many times, that this definition is
> > > an adaptation of a definition I got from N. Campbell in his book, What
> > > is Science.
> >
> > So your statement 'consistent with how the top physicists of the last
300
> > years used them' would be based on some comment N. Campbell made rather
than
> > a studious analyses you made of the writings of the 'top physicists of
the
> > last 300 years'? If so it would be appreciated if you made such clear.
>
> Illogical, as usual.
> ]It's been about 20 years since I first
> encountered Campbell's definition. I adopted and adapted it right away
> and I have used it to compare how he used the term "law" compared to
> how it was used by writings of physicists. Over those 20 years, I
> found the usages quite consistent with Campbell's definition most of
> the time. I have given other reasons why his definition is a good
> definition, at least as a point of departure. Quite simply, I
> appreciate its operationalist, rather than metaphysical, nature.
> Dealing with physical values (corresponding to physical measurements
> or assignments, such as physical constants) and/or physical events
> brings the term closer to an objective and operationalist definition.
So your saying you appreciate its operational nature. What makes you think
your 'appreciation' is an adequate objective measure to decide these things?
What your really saying is that you have adopted the operational viewpoint.
Now Patrick what makes you think all 'the top physicists of the last 300
years' were operationalist in their views? Eddington for example was a
well known realist. Or does he not count in one of those top scientists?
This is his view:
'Eddington had a firm belief in an external world, which was not simply the
belief on which most scientists operate. Our senses, for the most part, give
us an accurate perception of the world in which we live, in all matters
concerning our immediate existence and safety. Do they tell us about the
whole of reality? Most of us, most of the time, assume that they do, but
Eddington denied that the world of the senses was the whole of the external
world. He did not question the reality of matter and the material world, but
he did claim that ultimate reality was spiritual in nature. "Spirit" and
"mind" were near synonyms in his thinking and composed an unseen world'
Now Patrick are you claiming your operational views extend to Eddington? I
think he would claim that laws extend to this unseen world and that students
should be made aware of this. In fact I would suggest Edenton believes that
in that unseen world laws are immutable and not temporary as your new
definition would have us believe. Indeed how does it apply to the laws of
QM which have no known exceptions? And if a scientist of Eddington's
stature
may not agree why do you assume that you are in a better position to decide
what should be taught to students?
> >
> > > Physical laws tend to imply a certain extensions in space
> > > -- a domain of applicability, which physical theories are supposed to
> > > make explicit. The confidence to make the claim that the relationship
> > > is persiting through time comes from experience and is justified in
> > > particular cases by induction as a probability argument -- the past is
> > > a probable indicator of the future.
> >
> > And exactly how would such considerations not be apparent 'to the eye of
> > analysis'?
>
> Why don't you just cut to the chase and give us all a clarification of
> what Feynman meant by his "definition" of physical law.
I can not and I believe Feynman can not either. This is my whole point. It
is not possible to give clear definitions on such things nor is it required
to do so. It is an unwarranted assumption on your part that such is
necessary, an assumption you can produce no evidence for.
>
> [snip]
>
> > How does your definition deal with ohms law? It fits Feynmans definition
> > marvelously - but yours would seem another matter. After all it is not
'an
> > invariable relationship on values and/or events' it is a statement that
is
> > sometimes true and sometime false - certainly not invariable (eg it
works
> > great for transistors when they are biased correctly - outside such a
region
> > watch out) - all it is really saying is when it is true then it is a
useful
> > thing to know.
>
> Where do you get this stuff. The domain of applicability is defined by
> a certain set of physical values and/or events. The only question is
> whether the relationship V = IR applies consistently over time under a
> given set of circumstances defined by physical values, such as those
> values which tell you precisely how to setup an experiment that can
> test the relationship.
What your saying is that Ohms law is not valid outside of it domain of
applicability which is basically in regions where it does hold. Thus you
have hit upon the essential meaningless of ohms law. That would not seem to
lie too comfortably 'with an INVARIABLE relationship on values and/or
events'. Does that mean it is not a law? Not at all. What it means is it
is an essential component of 'the eye of analysis' to be used when analyzing
electrical circuits. All it means is that there is more dreamt of in what
is meant by law that in what you have thought of. And your attempt to
define you way out by redefining invariable is easily seen for what it is -
a
cop out. Your new definition - physical law -- a temporally persisting
relationship on physical values and/or physical events now faces other
issues such as exactly how long they can temporarily exist before they are
counted as law. When will you realize this is not the central issue you
make it out to be - it is simply semantic quibbling of little intrinsic
value.
Thanks
Bill
Bill Hobba
Who ever said what Feynman wrote embodies 'absolute truth'? In fact he,
like me, would probably argue such does not exist. In fact for Feynman it
was simply a starting point to discussions of actual physical laws that
allowed people to understand it from example. Patrick, do you actually
believe absolute truth exists? Hell I don't even know in general what
'truth' is little alone 'absolute truth'. Is that you motivation for these
definitions of yours? It is a chimera if you think so, such does not exist,
or rather no one has ever been able to satisfactorly demonstrate such.
Thanks
Bill
Ken S. Tucker
This posts acknowledges Sam Wormley and Paul Stowe too.
Normally I try to stay clear of arguments that stink of
semantics, but a philosopher friend of mine insisted we
try to define "absolute truth". By definition a physical law
is always true.
>"Ken S. Tucker" <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> wrote in message
>news:2202379a.04050...@posting.google.com...
[...]
>> From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute truth".
>> "Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
>
>So Ohms law has absoute truth. Does it apply to a diode?
I presume that's a joke. Is having to wear a seat-belt a Law?
((Incidentally, I frequently use an OHM meter to test
and establish diode polarity)).
>> The mathematical embodiment of that agreement is
>> know as covariance in GR.
>
>Ken a guy called Kretchamnn proved that such is not the case and challenged
>Einstein on this very point and Einstein admitted he was wrong. The
>principle of general covarience is just that - a heuristic principle without
>any physical content whatever. You need to add other things to get the
>physical content. See http://modeling.la.asu.edu/R&E/SecretsGenius.pdf and
Thanks, the article has an interesting PoV.
>Consider how the covariant
>> tensor A_u in K transforms to another CS K',
>> A'_v = &x^u/&x'^v A^u (& =partial diff sign).
>> Then it's easy to see,
>> A'_v dx'^v = A_u dx^u .
>> See that's invariant, and is true in all CS's, hence
>> it's a "physical law".
>> I'm not entirely clear on this, but I think this
>> is why covaraint expressions are the basis of
>> physical law in GR.
>
>The reason we have covarience is a practical one. The POR applied generally
>says laws, when transformed to inertial frames, are always the same.
The condition "inertial frames" is unnecessary.
>This
>is obviously not an easy thing to always do but becomes trivial for laws
>expressed covariantly.
Right, that's the whole point.
>See the links I gave above for further discussion.
>Basically the idea of GR is no prior geometry or geometry itself is
>dynamical. To quite one of the links I gave above, technically we say:
>
>'General relativity is distinguished from other dynamical field theories by
>its invariance under active diffeomorphisms. Any theory can be made
>invariant under passive diffeomorphisms. Passive diffeomorphism invariance
>is a property of the formulation of a dynamical theory, while active
>diffeomorphism invariance is a property of the dynamical theory itself'
That's neat! One of the best definitions of GR and
diffeomorphism I've ever seen.
>Thanks Bill
Thank you too,
Ken S. Tucker
Y.Porat
and another point to consider:
most physics laws are *limited to some scope of validity*-
as far as the experimental support
ie
the *physics scope of a formula*
is in too many cases not as wide as
*the mathematical scope*
*of the same formula*
people who dont realise it do too often
a fale snd harmful *jump to conclusions*
---------------
all th ebest
Y.Porat
-----------------
V.K.Tamhane
True! But this is covered by the word "pattern".
>
> Such behavior (nature) is eminently amenable to mathematical
> quantification. But all mathematica CAN EVER DO is quantify such
> behaviors, NOT explain them.
Well! Sometimes mathematics can also lead. But what you say is true
beyond doubt. Mathematics is a compressed, general logic, which can be
applied not only for quantifying but also for precision and
prediction. Mathematics is a tool in physics, and a wonderful tool at
that but never a physics itself. An idea or a concept describing a
physical phenomenon are the basic foundation blocks of physics. A
simple observation and the concept behind the gravitation led Newton
to formulate a law, which is immortal. It comprises only one sentence
that two objects attract each other at a distance. All the rest is
wonderful mathematics, but then as you said equations by themselves
can never explain a physical law.
Therefore, the word analysis is very important. This could acquire
two forms. One mathematical and the other logically conceptual. Former
is meaningless unless the later is expounded.
>
> > The mathematical embodiment of that agreement is know as covariance
> > in GR. Consider how the covariant tensor A_u in K transforms to
> > another CS K',
> >
> > A'_v = &x^u/&x'^v A^u (& =partial diff sign).
> >
> > Then it's easy to see,
> >
> > A'_v dx'^v = A_u dx^u .
> >
> > See that's invariant, and is true in all CS's, hence it's a "physical
> > law".
>
> Is this not a result of independent existence???
Of course! it is. But tensor transformations help us in deciding the
properties of laws. However once again they are only the tools.
Patrick Reany
> "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
> news:844a1b64.0405...@posting.google.com...
> > "Bill Hobba" <bho...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:<Qefnc.28176$TT.2...@news-server.bigpond.net.au>...
> > > "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
> > > news:844a1b64.0405...@posting.google.com...
> > >
> > > It looks like your claim to have definitions 'consistent with how the
> top
> > > physicists of the last 300 years used them.' may require a bit more
> work.
> >
> > I said how the best physicists USED the terms law, hypothesis, theory,
> > and model, not how they tried to "define" or characterize the terms.
> > Ordinarily, defining would be a form of using, but not with physicists
> > when it comes to defining philosophical terms. Feynman did not use the
> > term "law" the way he "defined" the term. Definitions are often very
> > difficult.
>
> Are you suggesting Feynman used the term differently to how he defined it?
> An example would be nice.
Take PV = nRT. As I said before, no one, including Feynman, treated
the law as a description of P phenomena, V phenomena, n phenomena, R
phenomena, T phenomena. I have already given other weaknesses of
Feynman's "definition" that he would not have adhered to. But in my
definition, these physical values are either directly measured,
calculutated, or assigned by convention. Now, what's so hard to grasp
about that?
> > Give us YOUR definition of "physical law."
>
> Like 'reality' it is too basic a term to play the definition game with.
It is TOTALLY unlike the term "reality" in physics. Physics can go on
quite happily without ever using the vague term "reality." Not so for
"physical law"! The term is indispensable in physics, and thus
requires a good definition. Or, maybe you think that the term
"physical law" is indeed dispensable in physics.
When you find yourself arriving at an absurd conclusion, you should
wonder if maybe that's because you started with an absurd assumption
among your starting assumptions.
[snip]
> >
> > The point is that Feynman's "definition" is imprecise and vague, and
> > thus is useless as a definition at all.
>
> The point is that precision and definiteness is not possible in this area
> and making that clear from the outset is of greater value than attempting
> something than is not possible.
I have proved otherwise by the example of the Ideal Gas Law for one.
> >
> > Defending Feynman's "definition" is a total waste of time, except as a
> > philosophic exercise.
>
> We can each bandy words about on that issue and get precisely nowhere. Have
> you considered why the knowledgeable people around here (I am not one) have
> not reacted positively to what you say?
Thank God that the "knowledgeable" people around here are not the only
representatives of knowledgeable people in the world. Keep an open
mind -- that's the secret.
There are plenty of knowledgeable posters around here that have said
nothing about my definition. I can't draw any sure conclusion about
the reasons for their silence, and neither can you. There are many
possible reasons. On the hand, we have not seen them rallying around
your dispensibility argument, either.
> It is not because they are ignorant
> of philosophical issues. Hell I do not care much about philosophy but I am
> not ignorant of it. Feynman did not like philosophy, in fact he was anti
> philosophy, but that does not mean he was ignorant of it. It is an
> indication that they know what you want to achieve is essentially
> unachievable. However that is not a problem because it is not required for
> doing physics.
Maybe Feynman was "antiphilosophy." Maybe that shows up in his
abortive attempt to define a "physical law" in a book about physical
laws! Maybe he should have paid more attention to Wittgenstein, who
argued that philosophy is about the clarification of thoughts. Maybe
this is just one more good reason why physicists should NOT be
"antiphilosophy."
Just the same, Feynman's attempt to define "physical law" indicates to
me that he thought that some attempt at defining it in his book was
necessary.
How many times do I have to tell you people: Doing physics is NOT my
only concern! (See my example given at the bottom of this post.)
[snip]
> >
> > I chose to adapt N. Campbell's definition of a law because it forsakes
> > dealing with vague concepts of phenomena or patterns, and deals only
> > with values (to which I included events), which in the case of a
> > physical law is an invariable (i.e., temporally persisting)
> > relationship on physical values and/or physical events. In PV = nRT,
> > P, V, n, R, and T are physical values. (In practice these are only the
> > obvious ones. To apply the equation you need a rarified gas, IIRC, as
> > well, and this is associated with other physical values, such as those
> > associated with density. The implicit values are just as important as
> > the explicit values.) What's so hard to grasp about that? And because
> > I'm not dealing with "phenomena" per se in my definition, I can posit
> > idealizations on relationships among physical values and/or physical
> > events. As far as we know, the Ideal Gas Law is never true of any real
> > "phenomena."
>
> Notice the words 'I chose'. Why do you think others choose not to?
More to the point is why you didn't bother to meet my challenge that
the Ideal Gas Law is not valid in any know phenomena, which
contradicts Feynman's so-called definition of a "physical law." One
actual use of ideal laws is to give us approximations of measurable
physical values.
> > [snip]
> > > >
> > > > In my definition of law, "invariable" means "temporally repeating,
> > > > persisting, or continuing." So, my definition of law (as an invariable
> > > > relationship on values and/or events) becomes, as a physical law:
> > > >
> > > > physical law -- a temporally persisting relationship on physical
> > > > values and/or physical events.
[snip]
> > ]It's been about 20 years since I first
> > encountered Campbell's definition. I adopted and adapted it right away
> > and I have used it to compare how he used the term "law" compared to
> > how it was used by writings of physicists. Over those 20 years, I
> > found the usages quite consistent with Campbell's definition most of
> > the time. I have given other reasons why his definition is a good
> > definition, at least as a point of departure. Quite simply, I
> > appreciate its operationalist, rather than metaphysical, nature.
> > Dealing with physical values (corresponding to physical measurements
> > or assignments, such as physical constants) and/or physical events
> > brings the term closer to an objective and operationalist definition.
>
> So your saying you appreciate its operational nature. What makes you think
> your 'appreciation' is an adequate objective measure to decide these things?
> What your really saying is that you have adopted the operational viewpoint.
> Now Patrick what makes you think all 'the top physicists of the last 300
> years' were operationalist in their views? Eddington for example was a
> well known realist. Or does he not count in one of those top scientists?
It is impossible to satisfy EVERY physicist with any particular
definition of a "physical law." Nevertheless, there is no antipathy
per se between operationalism and instrumentalism, positivism, or
realism. Operationalism is not a stand on metaphysical issues. It is
semantical in nature, not metaphysical. Operationalism is the great
equalizer in theoretical physics.
[snip]
> >
> > Why don't you just cut to the chase and give us all a clarification of
> > what Feynman meant by his "definition" of physical law.
>
> I can not and I believe Feynman can not either. This is my whole point.
Then why have you been talking constantly about the obvious meaning of
Feynman's "eye of analysis"?
> It
> is not possible to give clear definitions on such things nor is it required
> to do so.
Your personal "dispensibility" argument. Then you admit that Feynman's
"definition" of a "physical law" is NOT clear.
> It is an unwarranted assumption on your part that such is
> necessary, an assumption you can produce no evidence for.
A while back we had a poster tell us that the special theory
relativity can be dispensed with on the basis that it is "only" a
theory and not a law. It is a brilliant rhetorical argument that can
easily sway the ignorant. But it is faulty; it is based on a sincere
misconception of the difference between what a theory and a law is.
One thing I want to accomplish is to change that so that the
demagogues in this world cannot so easily deceive people by their
slick but incorrect arguments. Science education in the West has
failed, because it doesn't teach the basics right.
Patrick
ZZBunker
But in math has ever objected to that observation
from physics.
The only question from anybody in the math
side of things has ever been:
Is physics succifiently non-religous to call
a science, or is it just Newton and
a thumb, that can be computerized?
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu
[...]
> Physics can go on
> quite happily without ever using the vague term "reality." Not so for
> "physical law"! The term is indispensable in physics, and thus
> requires a good definition. Or, maybe you think that the term
> "physical law" is indeed dispensable in physics.
I certainly think the term ``physical law'' is dispensible. It's use
is wildly inconsistent -- ``Ohm's law'' has a vastly different standing
than ``Newton's second law,'' for instance -- and is mainly of historical
significance. Physics could get along quite nicely without the term.
Steve Carlip
Gregory L. Hansen
Wouldn't we still need some term to express the patterns discovered in
nature? Newton's postulate? Ohm's relationship? The ideal gas inkling?
--
"When the fool walks through the street, in his lack of understanding he
calls everything foolish." -- Ecclesiastes 10:3, New American Bible
Patrick Reany
> "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
[snip]
> > Where do you get this stuff. The domain of applicability is defined by
> > a certain set of physical values and/or events. The only question is
> > whether the relationship V = IR applies consistently over time under a
> > given set of circumstances defined by physical values, such as those
> > values which tell you precisely how to setup an experiment that can
> > test the relationship.
>
> What your saying is that Ohms law is not valid outside of it domain of
> applicability which is basically in regions where it does hold. Thus you
> have hit upon the essential meaningless of ohms law.
You call that critical thinking? You haven't merely attacked the
"domain of applicability" argument of Ohm's Law, but of ALL physical
laws! Your basic argument is that the "domain of applicability"
argument is circular and therefore meaningless. Nonsense. Ohm's law
has real content. Where it applies (at least approximately), it
applies in the definite form of V = IR, which contains all measurable
values.
Galileo's law of inertia states that a free particle is either at
"rest" or moves in a straight line at a constant speed as seen from an
inertial frame of reference. It is not so from a noninertial frame of
reference. The Galilean law of inertia has a domain of applicability.
Everybody KNOWS this -- or should.
> That would not seem to
> lie too comfortably 'with an INVARIABLE relationship on values and/or
> events'. Does that mean it is not a law? Not at all. What it means is it
> is an essential component of 'the eye of analysis' to be used when analyzing
> electrical circuits. All it means is that there is more dreamt of in what
> is meant by law that in what you have thought of. And your attempt to
> define you way out by redefining invariable is easily seen for what it is -
> a
> cop out.
invariable -- Not changing or subject to change; constant
> Your new definition - physical law -- a temporally persisting
> relationship on physical values and/or physical events now faces other
> issues such as exactly how long they can temporarily exist before they are
> counted as law. When will you realize this is not the central issue you
> make it out to be - it is simply semantic quibbling of little intrinsic
> value.
>
> Thanks
> Bill
It takes two to quibble. I'm much less interested in how long it takes
a hypothesis-of-empirical-content to become a law, if ever. I'm much
more interested in precisely what the Establishment means when it
declares a law of physics.
Patrick
Bill Hobba
<car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu> wrote in message
news:c7okmn$o2u$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu...
I never thought of it that way, but now you mention it, I agree entirely.
However it has become ingrained in our language so the practicalities of
doing that do not look promising. Perhaps the best thing to do is simply
leave it undefined and let it gain its meaning through context. I certainly
believe that anyone the reads Feynmans Character of Physical Law can proceed
quite a long way in physics without being troubled by use of the term. If
Patrick was saying that as supplemental reading people were encouraged
(encouraged - not forced - there is a difference) to read a book like that
then I would agree - but forcing rote learning of mindless questionable
definitions strikes me as counter productive.
Thanks
Bill
Bill Hobba
"Gregory L. Hansen" <glha...@steel.ucs.indiana.edu> wrote in message
news:c7onpv$9rc$2...@hood.uits.indiana.edu...
> In article <c7okmn$o2u$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>,
> <car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu> wrote:
> >In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
> >
> >[...]
> >> Physics can go on
> >> quite happily without ever using the vague term "reality." Not so for
> >> "physical law"! The term is indispensable in physics, and thus
> >> requires a good definition. Or, maybe you think that the term
> >> "physical law" is indeed dispensable in physics.
> >
> >I certainly think the term ``physical law'' is dispensible. It's use
> >is wildly inconsistent -- ``Ohm's law'' has a vastly different standing
> >than ``Newton's second law,'' for instance -- and is mainly of historical
> >significance. Physics could get along quite nicely without the term.
>
> Wouldn't we still need some term to express the patterns discovered in
> nature? Newton's postulate? Ohm's relationship? The ideal gas inkling?
>
I think you have answered you own question; all those terms, (except of
course 'inkling' - and point taken in your use of it), could be used. The
ideal gas postulate sounds ok. But I do agree the practicalities of
carrying out such a program do not look promising.
Thanks
Bill
Bill Hobba
> "Bill Hobba" <bho...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<_iBnc.30102$TT.2...@news-server.bigpond.net.au>...
> > "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
>
> [snip]
>
> > > Where do you get this stuff. The domain of applicability is defined by
> > > a certain set of physical values and/or events. The only question is
> > > whether the relationship V = IR applies consistently over time under a
> > > given set of circumstances defined by physical values, such as those
> > > values which tell you precisely how to setup an experiment that can
> > > test the relationship.
> >
> > What your saying is that Ohms law is not valid outside of it domain of
> > applicability which is basically in regions where it does hold. Thus
you
> > have hit upon the essential meaningless of ohms law.
>
> You call that critical thinking? You haven't merely attacked the
> "domain of applicability" argument of Ohm's Law, but of ALL physical
> laws! Your basic argument is that the "domain of applicability"
> argument is circular and therefore meaningless. Nonsense. Ohm's law
> has real content. Where it applies (at least approximately), it
> applies in the definite form of V = IR, which contains all measurable
> values.
Patrick you have hit upon one of the problems with the idea of a law of
nature and why it is not possible to give an exact definition. I have
pointed you to the following link before
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0207047. Laws of physics are often:
1. Mere tautological statements about definitions eg Ohms law
2. Tautological statements about underlining symmetries eg conservation
laws. Even Maxwell's equations and the EFE's can be subsumed into this
view.
The only example I can think of that is not are the laws of quantum
mechanics. But basically they seem to represent the thing that the
underlying symmetries are a symmetry of. To quote from the link:
'Most laypeople think of the laws of physics as something like the Ten
Commandments-rules governing the behavior of matter imposed by some great
lawgiver in the sky. However, no stone tablet has ever been found upon which
such laws were either naturally or supernaturally inscribed. On the
contrary, the laws of physics are human inventions-mathematical formulas
that quantitatively describe the results of observations and measurements.
These formulas are first inferred from and
then tested against observations. If they hold up, they are eventually
reformulated as part of general and universal theories that are derived from
a minimum number of assumed fundamental principles. Very often, a "law" will
turn out to be nothing more than a circular definition, such as Ohm's law
which says that the voltage is proportional to the current in a resistor,
where a resistor is defined as a device that obeys Ohm's law. Since the time
of Copernicus and Galileo it has been realized that the laws of physics
should not single out any particular space-time reference frame, although a
distinction between inertial and noninertial frames was maintained in
Newtonian physics. That distinction was removed in 1916 by Einstein who
formulated his general theory of relativity in a covariant way. That is, the
form of Einstein's equations is the same in all reference frames, inertial
or noninertial. As this experience showed, physicists are highly constrained
in the way they may formulate the laws of physics. Not only must they agree
with the data, the equations that are used to describe that data should not
be written in such a way as to
specify a privileged coordinate system or reference frame. This principle of
covariance generalizes other notions such as the Copernican and cosmological
principles and the principle of Galilean relativity. The application of this
principle is not a matter of choice; centuries of observations have shown
that to do otherwise produces calculations that disagree with the data in
some reference frames. In 1918, Noether showed that coordinate independence
was more than just a constraint on the mathematical form of physical laws.
She proved that some of the most important physics principles are, in fact,
nothing more than tautologies that follow from space-time coordinate
independence: energy conservation arises from time translation invariance,
linear momentum conservation comes from space translation
invariance, and angular momentum conservation is a consequence of space
rotation invariance. These conserved quantities were simply the mathematical
generators of the corresponding symmetry transformation. As the twentieth
century progressed, invariance or symmetry principles became an increasingly
dominant idea in physics. Not only were space-time coordinate symmetries
built into theories, the notion of coordinate independence was extended to
the abstract spaces physicists use to represent the other degrees of freedom
of systems. Rotational symmetry was also applied to the space of quantum
state vectors, resulting in derived properties of spin, isospin, charge,
baryon number, and other observables that agreed with measurements. Charge
conservation, for example, was found to follow from the invariance of the
Schrödinger equation to changes in the phase of the complex wave function.
And then, a remarkable discovery was made. It was found that the Schrödinger
equation could be made invariant to a local phase change in the wave
function, that is, a change in phase that varies from point to point in
space-time, provided that vector and scalar potentials were added. The
potentials turned out to be exactly those that give the classical electric
and magnetic fields. This local quantum phase symmetry was precisely related
to the local classical gauge symmetry of electrodynamics. Maxwell's
equations were derived from a single principle-local phase invariance. If we
think of the Schrödinger wave function as a "vector" in 2-dimensional
complex space, then changing phase is equivalent to a rotation in that space
and phase invariance, or gauge invariance, is equivalent to rotational
invariance. Indeed, the generator of that transformation is the electric
charge whose conservation follows from global gauge invariance. In the
standard model, the fields associated with the weak and strong nuclear
forces are obtained by extending the idea of gauge symmetry to higher
dimensions of abstract space. There the situation is complicated by the fact
that all the symmetries are not exact at the "low temperatures" of current
experimentation. Good thing. The diversity and complexity of the universe is
a result of broken symmetries, without which we would not be here to do the
experiments. Twentieth century physics was also marked by the discovery that
symmetries are often broken. In the 1950s, it was found that weak
interactions maximally violated space reflection symmetry; that is, they
were not invariant under the parity operation P that changes the handedness
or chirality of a system. In the 1960s certain rare decays were found to be
noninvariant under the combined operation CP, where C changes a particle to
its antiparticle. The study of the origin of CP violation remains a subject
of considerable experimental and theoretical effort to this date. In this
paper, it will be shown that much of familiar physics can be derived from
the generalized notion of coordinate invariance applied not only in
space-time but in the spaces of other observables and the spaces of the
functions that are used to mathematically describe physical phenomena. In
order to make this result accessible to the greatest number of people, the
mathematical level will be limited to that of an advanced undergraduate
student in physics or mathematics. The equations will appear very
familiar-just those found in physics textbooks, and it may appear that the
author is using hindsight to make things come out the way they already are.
However, the
reader is asked to look carefully at how those equations are obtained.
Certain familiar principles normally taken as axioms, such as the
quantization of angular momentum and the invariance of the speed of light
will be derived from the hypothesized symmetry principles without additional
assumptions.'
>
> Galileo's law of inertia states that a free particle is either at
> "rest" or moves in a straight line at a constant speed as seen from an
> inertial frame of reference. It is not so from a noninertial frame of
> reference. The Galilean law of inertia has a domain of applicability.
> Everybody KNOWS this -- or should.
The law of inertia is nothing more than a statement about the symmetry of an
inertial frame which by definition has that symmetry; it has exactly the
same status as ohms law. You should know that Patrick - if you do not check
out page 4 Landau - Mechanics.
I hope what I wrote and quoted above helps. The answer is - basically -
tautological statements about symmetry. The reason they have physical
content is the symmetries they are talking about in practice often occur,
with good accuracy; just like the existence of objects, with good accuracy,
that obeys ohms law under certain circumstances often occurs in practice.
That is one meaning of Feynmans reference to the eye of analysis.
Thanks
Bill
Gregory L. Hansen
But the ideal gas law is not a postulate, it's an empirical relationship
that's known not to be universally true. And in stat mech, it's a
conclusion.
But if we call it the ideal gas relationship, it's just a substitution
law->relationship, with no change in meaning or intent, and the cost of
two extra syllables.
--
"Beer is living proof that God loves us and wants us to be happy."
-- Benjamin Franklin
Bilge
>> What your saying is that Ohms law is not valid outside of it domain of
>> applicability which is basically in regions where it does hold. Thus you
>> have hit upon the essential meaningless of ohms law.
>
>You call that critical thinking? You haven't merely attacked the
>"domain of applicability" argument of Ohm's Law, but of ALL physical
>laws! Your basic argument is that the "domain of applicability"
>argument is circular and therefore meaningless. Nonsense. Ohm's law
>has real content.
Oh, really? Pray tell what is it? A linear fit to data points?
If you bother to check, ohm's law was derived empirically. It
wasn't until much later that anyone justified it from any physics.
>Where it applies (at least approximately), it applies in the definite
>form of V = IR, which contains all measurable values.
Say what?
>Galileo's law of inertia states that a free particle is either at
>"rest" or moves in a straight line at a constant speed as seen from an
>inertial frame of reference. It is not so from a noninertial frame of
>reference. The Galilean law of inertia has a domain of applicability.
>Everybody KNOWS this -- or should.
What everyone who deems themselves competent to discuss this should
also know is that argument is entirely circular. An inertial frame
is defined via the motion of a free particle in a straight line and
a straight line is defined as the inertial motion of a free particle.
>> That would not seem to
>> lie too comfortably 'with an INVARIABLE relationship on values and/or
>> events'. Does that mean it is not a law? Not at all. What it means
>> is it is an essential component of 'the eye of analysis' to be used
>> when analyzing electrical circuits. All it means is that there is
>> more dreamt of in what is meant by law that in what you have thought
>> of. And your attempt to define you way out by redefining invariable
>> is easily seen for what it is - a cop out.
>
>invariable -- Not changing or subject to change; constant
``Unobservable'' is more physically meaningul.
>
>> Your new definition - physical law -- a temporally persisting
>> relationship on physical values and/or physical events now faces other
>> issues such as exactly how long they can temporarily exist before they are
>> counted as law. When will you realize this is not the central issue you
>> make it out to be - it is simply semantic quibbling of little intrinsic
>> value.
>>
>> Thanks
>> Bill
>
>It takes two to quibble. I'm much less interested in how long it takes
>a hypothesis-of-empirical-content to become a law, if ever. I'm much
>more interested in precisely what the Establishment means when it
>declares a law of physics.
I already told you partick. It's a ``rule of thumb'' applied to anything
no one knows how to derive, but assumes is true - It still gets called
a ``law'' after someone derives it and shows that isn't always true.
Patrick Reany
Nothing has changed! I can think of no better way to end up with an
invariable relationship than by invoking a definition to do so.
If I want to know the resistance of an array of resistors in series
and or parallel contained in a circuit, I can measure the voltage drop
of the current across the array and then measure the current through
the circuit, yielding R = V / I. On the other hand, if I want to know
the current through the array by calculation, I can measure the
voltage drop across the array and use the formulas for determining the
net resistance of the array from the resistance values marked on the
resistors themselves, yielding I = V / R. Alternatively, if I want to
know the voltage across the array with using a voltmeter, I can
measure the current through the array and calculate the net resistance
of the array, yielding V = IR.
[snip]
>
> >
> > Galileo's law of inertia states that a free particle is either at
> > "rest" or moves in a straight line at a constant speed as seen from an
> > inertial frame of reference. It is not so from a noninertial frame of
> > reference. The Galilean law of inertia has a domain of applicability.
> > Everybody KNOWS this -- or should.
>
> The law of inertia is nothing more than a statement about the symmetry of an
> inertial frame which by definition has that symmetry; it has exactly the
> same status as ohms law. You should know that Patrick - if you do not check
> out page 4 Landau - Mechanics.
There is no such thing as ONLY a statement about symmetry. Nature
invented the symmetries; we merely report them in laws.
[snip]
>
> I hope what I wrote and quoted above helps. The answer is - basically -
> tautological statements about symmetry. The reason they have physical
> content is the symmetries they are talking about in practice often occur,
> with good accuracy; just like the existence of objects, with good accuracy,
> that obeys ohms law under certain circumstances often occurs in practice.
> That is one meaning of Feynmans reference to the eye of analysis.
>
> Thanks
> Bill
You've said nothing new to me at all:
The axioms define the objects of which geometry
treats. Schlick in his book on epistemology
has therefore characterized axioms very aptly
as "implicit definitions."
--- Found in: Geometry and Experience, A. Einstein,
Albert Einstein's Theory of General Relativity,
G. Tauber, Crown Press, p159--160.
According to the special relativity principle the
laws of Nature must be covariant relative to
Lorentz transformations; the theory thus
provides a criterion for general laws of Nature.
Found in : Fundamental Ideas and Problems
of the Theory of Relativity, Albert Einstein's
Theory of General Relativity, Gerald Tauber,
Crown Press, p. 54.
Meaning a criterion for the definition of the general laws of Nature.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany:
> >"Bill Hobba" <bho...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:
>
> >> What your saying is that Ohms law is not valid outside of it domain of
> >> applicability which is basically in regions where it does hold. Thus you
> >> have hit upon the essential meaningless of ohms law.
> >
> >You call that critical thinking? You haven't merely attacked the
> >"domain of applicability" argument of Ohm's Law, but of ALL physical
> >laws! Your basic argument is that the "domain of applicability"
> >argument is circular and therefore meaningless. Nonsense. Ohm's law
> >has real content.
>
> Oh, really? Pray tell what is it? A linear fit to data points?
> If you bother to check, ohm's law was derived empirically. It
> wasn't until much later that anyone justified it from any physics.
>
I didn't invent or declare Ohm's law into being; the physics
establishment declared it a law. And it matters not a bit how Ohm's
law orginated. Either it says something about measurables on a domain
of applicability or it doesn't. Bilge, are you saying it doesn't
****whatsoever****? If it doesn't, we ought to rewrite those
University Physics textbooks that claim that it does.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
In exactly what regard is Ohm's law "wildly" or "vastly" different
than Newton's second law? In your vocabluary "Newton's second law"
becomes what?
I hereby request Steve Carlip to write a new university physics
textbook that completely avoids using the term "physical law" or any
term equivalent to it.
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Patrick Reany wrote:
>
> I didn't invent or declare Ohm's law into being; the physics
> establishment declared it a law. And it matters not a bit how Ohm's
> law orginated.
Some law. It is a numerical correlation that holds under restricted
circumstances, like Boyle's Law. It is not a fundemental hypothesis
about how the world works
Bob Kolker
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu
> In exactly what regard is Ohm's law "wildly" or "vastly" different
> than Newton's second law?
Newton's second law is, as far as we now know, a deep statement
about the way fundamental physical systems work. It is a universal
characteristic of classical physical systems and, in a slightly
modified form, of quantum systems as well. The discovery of a
genuine violation of Newton's second law would lead to a major
upheaval in physics.
Ohm's law is an approximate, empirical relation that holds for a
narrow set of physical systems under a narrow set of conditions.
It arises essentially by coincidence from fundamental underlying
physical processes. The discovery of a violation of Ohm's law
would lead to shrugs -- there are plenty of violations already --
or perhaps, if it occured in an unexpected place, to a more careful
investigation of the microscopic properties of some particular
material.
The fact that you ask this question is an excellent illustration
of the reason I don't like the term ``physical law'' -- it has
apparently led you to confuse two things that have a very different
status in physics.
Steve Carlip
xxein
xxein: Good work.
I know we don't see eye to eye, but I'll ask - what does it take to
identify a physical law that nature must always obey? Are we fooled
by combinatorial effects that we think may be a basic property and/or
action? In particular, just because all inertial frames measure the
speed of light as constant c (TWLS) does that mean that sol is OWLS
"c" in that particular frame of reference?
I'll slant it a different way. If a light emitting source and a
reciever are both in the same frame, does it follow that if the
reciever moves - that OWLS c for that reciever is still c or whatever
they shared while both in the same frame? I just want to get your
response one step at a time. I just ask.
thanx
Patrick Reany
> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
>
> > In exactly what regard is Ohm's law "wildly" or "vastly" different
> > than Newton's second law?
>
> Newton's second law is, as far as we now know, a deep statement
> about the way fundamental physical systems work. It is a universal
> characteristic of classical physical systems and, in a slightly
> modified form, of quantum systems as well. The discovery of a
> genuine violation of Newton's second law would lead to a major
> upheaval in physics.
True, but irrelevant to my definition of physical law. But classical
mechanics is only an approximate description of the behavior of
physical systems too.
>
> Ohm's law is an approximate, empirical relation that holds for a
> narrow set of physical systems under a narrow set of conditions.
> It arises essentially by coincidence from fundamental underlying
> physical processes. The discovery of a violation of Ohm's law
> would lead to shrugs -- there are plenty of violations already --
> or perhaps, if it occured in an unexpected place, to a more careful
> investigation of the microscopic properties of some particular
> material.
My definition of physical law does not attempt to rank invariable
relationships according to some arbitrary and subjective standard of
"importance" or "fundamentalness." What's next, to defrock Charles's
Law of its "lawness"? And then what's next?
>
> The fact that you ask this question is an excellent illustration
> of the reason I don't like the term ``physical law'' -- it has
> apparently led you to confuse two things that have a very different
> status in physics.
>
> Steve Carlip
Now let's look at what the two laws have in common. Both have physical
content. Both make claims to specific invariable relationships on
physical values on their respective domains of applicability. (F = ma
is NOT true in noninertial frames. Most certainly, the Galilean
covariance of F = ma is only true among inertial frames of reference.)
Just as we can provide a more complicated form for Newton's second law
if it is generalized to include noninertial frames of reference, so
too I suppose that Ohm's law could take on a more complicated form
were it to be generalized to a larger domain of applicability.
None of your arguments here goes to support your claim against the
entire concept of "physical law" in physics.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
Well Newton's second law, once a specific force is given, is also just
a numerical correlation that holds under restricted circumstances, and
it also doesn't claim unlimited domain of applicability. Between the
two cases, it's just a matter of degree.
What is "fundamental" is subjective and arbitrary. You argue to make
the concept of "lawness" dependent on that?
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Patrick Reany wrote:
> What is "fundamental" is subjective and arbitrary. You argue to make
> the concept of "lawness" dependent on that?
If proposition A implies proposition B but not vica versa A is more
fundimental than B. Look at implication as a partial order of
propositions and seek minimal propositions to ground your theories.
There is nothing subjective about that at all, if you consider the laws
of logic objective.
Bob Kolker
Patrick Reany
What if there are ten nodes in a branch of this partially ordered set
of yours? Where's the Rule that cuts off the fundamental from the
nonfundamental? Will you demand that only the first node be
"fundamental"? And give a specific example for us to ponder. What
about Ohm's law? I see one problem right away. What's a postulate in
one theory could be a theorem in another theory, which means that we
have a theory-based notion of "fundamental." I don't like this at all.
The subjectivity is still there.
I want you to tell us all exactly what the Rule is you propose that is
to separate those invariable relationships on physical values/events
that justify labeling only those relationships as "fundamental" from
those that are not to be so labeled.
Then tell us why this distinction makes any difference in the first
place.
Patrick
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu
> car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:<c7rhnu$g0q$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
> > about the way fundamental physical systems work. It is a universal
> > characteristic of classical physical systems and, in a slightly
> > modified form, of quantum systems as well. The discovery of a
> > genuine violation of Newton's second law would lead to a major
> > upheaval in physics.
> True, but irrelevant to my definition of physical law. But classical
> mechanics is only an approximate description of the behavior of
> physical systems too.
> > Ohm's law is an approximate, empirical relation that holds for a
> > narrow set of physical systems under a narrow set of conditions.
> > It arises essentially by coincidence from fundamental underlying
> > physical processes. The discovery of a violation of Ohm's law
> > would lead to shrugs -- there are plenty of violations already --
> > or perhaps, if it occured in an unexpected place, to a more careful
> > investigation of the microscopic properties of some particular
> > material.
> My definition of physical law does not attempt to rank invariable
> relationships according to some arbitrary and subjective standard of
> "importance" or "fundamentalness."
Right. That's exactly the problem. Any definition that places Newton's
second law and Ohm's law on the same plane creates far more confusion
than clarity. Any definition that ignores the *fundamental* difference
between fundamental physics and its approximate consequences in particular
complex systems fails to reflect the basic nature of physics.
And the fact that you would say that the difference between Ohm's law
and Newton's second law is ``arbitrary and subjective'' suggests that
you are the victim of this confusion.
> What's next, to defrock Charles's Law of its "lawness"?
Certainly. The ideal gas laws are not fundamental; they're consequences
of statistical mechanics, given certain rather strong assumptions, e.g.,
that intermolecular interactions can be neglected. Here, as in Ohm's
law, the ``law'' is an approximate result of the dynamics of smaller,
more fundamental subsystems.
(I assume you accept that atoms are more fundamental than molecular gases,
and that this is not just an ``arbitrary and subjective'' choice.)
Steve Carlip
Patrick Reany
> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
> > car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:<c7rhnu$g0q$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>
> > > Newton's second law is, as far as we now know, a deep statement
> > > about the way fundamental physical systems work. It is a universal
> > > characteristic of classical physical systems and, in a slightly
> > > modified form, of quantum systems as well. The discovery of a
> > > genuine violation of Newton's second law would lead to a major
> > > upheaval in physics.
>
> > True, but irrelevant to my definition of physical law. But classical
> > mechanics is only an approximate description of the behavior of
> > physical systems too.
You didn't reply to this. Why? QM, SR, and GR are more fundamental
than Newtonian mechanics. Are we to defrock the laws of Newton of
their "law" status? This has already gone too far. It's gone to the
absurd.
>
> > > Ohm's law is an approximate, empirical relation that holds for a
> > > narrow set of physical systems under a narrow set of conditions.
> > > It arises essentially by coincidence from fundamental underlying
> > > physical processes. The discovery of a violation of Ohm's law
> > > would lead to shrugs -- there are plenty of violations already --
> > > or perhaps, if it occured in an unexpected place, to a more careful
> > > investigation of the microscopic properties of some particular
> > > material.
>
> > My definition of physical law does not attempt to rank invariable
> > relationships according to some arbitrary and subjective standard of
> > "importance" or "fundamentalness."
>
> Right. That's exactly the problem. Any definition that places Newton's
> second law and Ohm's law on the same plane creates far more confusion
> than clarity. Any definition that ignores the *fundamental* difference
> between fundamental physics and its approximate consequences in particular
> complex systems fails to reflect the basic nature of physics.
I didn't call Charles Law or Ohm's Law "laws"; the physics
establishment named them so. You keep saying that I have a problem in
doing so. You keep saying that I am confused. You keep saying that
don't get the "basic nature of physics."
It's time for you to do more than spout off platitudes and write an
essay explaining CLEARLY to everyone what this "basic nature of
physics" is and how the physics establishment doesn't "get it" any
more than I do. Explain to us why lawness DEMANDS "fundamentalness."
Lawness has NOTHING to do with "fundamentalness." And if we would
choose to make it so, we'd have the problem that what is fundamental
and what is derived (i.e., non-fundamental) is generally theory
dependent.
Patrick
Bilge
>I know we don't see eye to eye, but I'll ask - what does it take to
>identify a physical law that nature must always obey?
Nobody really knows what ``physical law(s)'' nature must obey.
Physicists seek general principles which lead to consequences that have
been referred to in the past as ``laws''. For example, conservation of
energy was condidered a ``law'' to classical physicists. It's fairly
hard to imagine that nature would have the wherewithall to create such
a law, since nature isn't a concious entity. Now days, physicists
recognize that conservation of energy is merely a consequence of
invariance under time translations. It's fairly easy to believe that
experiments are repeatable without nature conciously intervening to
make it so.
>Are we fooled by combinatorial effects that we think may be a basic
>property and/or action?
I don't see how. The ``properties'' that physicists consider
to be fundamental are pretty fundamental.
>In particular, just because all inertial frames measure the
>speed of light as constant c (TWLS) does that mean that sol is OWLS
>"c" in that particular frame of reference?
Quite honestly, I don't see the point of the entire OWLS/TWLS
nonsense. I can't even see that it amounts to anything but metaphysical
navel contemplating, if that.
>I'll slant it a different way. If a light emitting source and a
>reciever are both in the same frame, does it follow that if the
>reciever moves - that OWLS c for that reciever is still c or whatever
>they shared while both in the same frame? I just want to get your
>response one step at a time. I just ask.
I don't think I understand the question. If I assume that the
value for `c' in the lorentz transforms is the speed of light,
then the speed of light is a constant. Period. There is no,
``appears constant'', or any mumbo jumbo about frames. It's
a constant, just like pi is a constant. If that doesn't answer
the question, then I'm not sure what you asked.
mme...@cars3.uchicago.edu
> xxein:
> >I know we don't see eye to eye, but I'll ask - what does it take to
> >identify a physical law that nature must always obey?
>
>Physicists seek general principles which lead to consequences that have
>been referred to in the past as ``laws''. For example, conservation of
>energy was condidered a ``law'' to classical physicists. It's fairly
>hard to imagine that nature would have the wherewithall to create such
>a law, since nature isn't a concious entity. Now days, physicists
>recognize that conservation of energy is merely a consequence of
>invariance under time translations. It's fairly easy to believe that
>experiments are repeatable without nature conciously intervening to
>make it so.
>
existance of some conscious entity "legislating" it, with whether it
is "fundamental" or derived, etc. All it means is "here is some
regularity or relationship which we found valuable enough to give it a
separate name. The usage is not limited to physics. In mathematics
you have the "Law of sines" and "Law of cosines" where the fact that
they're derived is clear. In fact "Pythagoras' theorem" was referred
to, in the past, as "Pythagoras' law". No big deal.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
me...@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Bilge
>dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) writes:
>> xxein:
>>
>> >I know we don't see eye to eye, but I'll ask - what does it take to
>> >identify a physical law that nature must always obey?
>>
>> Nobody really knows what ``physical law(s)'' nature must obey.
>>Physicists seek general principles which lead to consequences that have
>>been referred to in the past as ``laws''. For example, conservation of
>>energy was condidered a ``law'' to classical physicists. It's fairly
>>hard to imagine that nature would have the wherewithall to create such
>>a law, since nature isn't a concious entity. Now days, physicists
>>recognize that conservation of energy is merely a consequence of
>>invariance under time translations. It's fairly easy to believe that
>>experiments are repeatable without nature conciously intervening to
>>make it so.
>>
>The term "law" as used in science has ***nothing*** to do with the
>existance of some conscious entity "legislating" it, with whether it
>is "fundamental" or derived, etc.
I don't believe that I said it had to do with some concious entity.
>All it means is "here is some regularity or relationship which we found
>valuable enough to give it a separate name.
No, the usage is highly context dependent. When one states that ``the
laws of physics are invariant under a lorentz transform'', one is talking
about something entirely different than when one refers to ohm's law (even
if that might apply to ohm's law). In the former case, one is referring to
fundamental principles. In the latter, ``law'' means some rule of thumb
which has very little to do with fundamental principles. What xxein asked
was about the former case.
Bill Hobba
It has changed. Ohms law is simply the definition of resistance, nothing
more. Newton's second law, for example, while a statement about underlying
symmetries, is spiking about real properties of a lagrangian (if you use the
lagrangian formulation) or the gauge symmetries quantum states (if you use
that formulation). That was the key point of the paper I referenced.
Purely from the gauge symmetry of quantum states it derived Newton's second
law of motion (equation 4.45 - actually a stronger form). These symmetries
are key features of nature ohms law is not. What I am saying is the logical
status of 1 and 2 above is different - one is a mere definition the other is
a fundamental property of nature.
That is the law of inertia. Other laws (eg the force is derivable from a
potential) have the properties your talking about except it is a fundamental
statement of properties of a lagrangian or of underlying gauge symmetries.
These symmetries are not definitional like an inertial frame - they seem to
be actual fundamental properties of nature. The point I was trying to make
is that there is a difference between the two and law in the usual sense of
the term is not realty appropriate in both cases. I think this is the point
Steve Carlip was making as well.
Thanks
Bill
Y.Porat
> "Bill Hobba" <bho...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<_iBnc.30102$TT.2...@news-server.bigpond.net.au>...
> > "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
>
> [snip]
>
> > > Where do you get this stuff. The domain of applicability is defined by
> > > a certain set of physical values and/or events. The only question is
> > > whether the relationship V = IR applies consistently over time under a
> > > given set of circumstances defined by physical values, such as those
> > > values which tell you precisely how to setup an experiment that can
> > > test the relationship.
> >
> > What your saying is that Ohms law is not valid outside of it domain of
> > applicability which is basically in regions where it does hold. Thus you
> > have hit upon the essential meaningless of ohms law.
>
> You call that critical thinking? You haven't merely attacked the
> "domain of applicability" argument of Ohm's Law, but of ALL physical
> laws! Your basic argument is that the "domain of applicability"
> argument is circular and therefore meaningless. Nonsense. Ohm's law
> has real content. Where it applies (at least approximately), it
> applies in the definite form of V = IR, which contains all measurable
> values.
>
> Galileo's law of inertia states that a free particle is either at
> "rest" or moves in a straight line at a constant speed as seen from an
> inertial frame of reference. It is not so from a noninertial frame of
> reference. The Galilean law of inertia has a domain of applicability.
> Everybody KNOWS this -- or should.
the point that some people here whant to assert is
that a ohysics law has it 'domain of aplicability'
i called it 'its valid phycical scope'
and we know why we assert it here
we assert it because
tooo many scintists *too often forget it*!
and as a result 'stretch the law ' *beyond its verified experimental scopoe*
and the harmfull result of it is :
*wrong jumping to conclusions*!
if you whant an intreaguing just one of many example:
the jump to conclusion that for any proton in the nuc-
there is a 'electrically balancing electrons'around the nuc'.
that is based on the false assumption that any proton in the nuc
has the same properties as an isolated proton.
unfortunately that is right for the light elements and then .....
came the *jump to conclusions* that it applies for all heavy elemnts
while thwere is no experimental verification for that false assumption.
and it crated the rediculous models of shells
and sub shells' of dozens of electrons etc.in which the theory manipulate them
once in a shell ans once out ie forcing it here and there
without a blink of an eye and shamelessly.
---------------
all the best
Y.porat
------------------------
>
Patrick Reany
> "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
[snip]
> >
> > There is no such thing as ONLY a statement about symmetry. Nature
> > invented the symmetries; we merely report them in laws.
>
> That is the law of inertia. Other laws (eg the force is derivable from a
> potential) have the properties your talking about except it is a fundamental
> statement of properties of a lagrangian or of underlying gauge symmetries.
> These symmetries are not definitional like an inertial frame - they seem to
> be actual fundamental properties of nature. The point I was trying to make
> is that there is a difference between the two and law in the usual sense of
> the term is not realty appropriate in both cases. I think this is the point
> Steve Carlip was making as well.
>
> Thanks
> Bill
In your subjective obsession for the ghost of "fundamentalness," you
have to reject Newton's laws because they are not really "laws." They
are less fundamental than QM and SR. Then again, SR has no laws
because it is less fundamental than GR and Schrodinger's theory has no
laws because that theory is less "fundamental" than QED and other
theories. Etc.
I'd like to see the reaction to a university physics book written by
you, Carlip, and Bilge. No laws in it but one impenetrable Ulitmate
"law" that no student can ever get. If you refuse to call the
approbated physical laws "laws," what will you call them?
Patrick
Bilge
>I'd like to see the reaction to a university physics book written by
>you, Carlip, and Bilge. No laws in it but one impenetrable Ulitmate
>"law" that no student can ever get. If you refuse to call the
>approbated physical laws "laws," what will you call them?
How does, ``The rule of thumb of conservation of energy'' sound?
Or, how about, ``Ohm's ordinance''?
mme...@cars3.uchicago.edu
> mme...@cars3.uchicago.edu:
> >dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) writes:
> >> xxein:
> >>
> >> >I know we don't see eye to eye, but I'll ask - what does it take to
> >> >identify a physical law that nature must always obey?
> >>
> >> Nobody really knows what ``physical law(s)'' nature must obey.
> >>Physicists seek general principles which lead to consequences that have
> >>been referred to in the past as ``laws''. For example, conservation of
> >>energy was condidered a ``law'' to classical physicists. It's fairly
> >>hard to imagine that nature would have the wherewithall to create such
> >>a law, since nature isn't a concious entity. Now days, physicists
> >>recognize that conservation of energy is merely a consequence of
> >>invariance under time translations. It's fairly easy to believe that
> >>experiments are repeatable without nature conciously intervening to
> >>make it so.
> >>
> >The term "law" as used in science has ***nothing*** to do with the
> >existance of some conscious entity "legislating" it, with whether it
> >is "fundamental" or derived, etc.
>
If not, so much the better:-)
>
> >All it means is "here is some regularity or relationship which we found
> >valuable enough to give it a separate name.
>
> No, the usage is highly context dependent.
That much is certainly true.
> When one states that ``the
>laws of physics are invariant under a lorentz transform'', one is talking
>about something entirely different than when one refers to ohm's law (even
>if that might apply to ohm's law). In the former case, one is referring to
>fundamental principles. In the latter, ``law'' means some rule of thumb
>which has very little to do with fundamental principles. What xxein asked
>was about the former case.
>
Ahh, xxein. Well, I wouldn't know what he asked.
Ken S. Tucker
There is no domain of applicabilty. A physical law is
true everywhere in the universe, always. For fun, let's
paraphrase, *what's a car?*. Well I think a Chevy
Corvette String-Ray Wagon with wooden panels is
my idea of a REAL car.
The idea of importing the notion of time into the
computation of physical law is actually a specializtion
of a CS, that applies only to an imaginary reference
known as memory. As proof, give me one invariant
that needs memory!
Take Planck's "h" = 6.625*10^-27 ERGS*SECONDS,
does the universe give a shit about ERGS and SECONDS?
Of course not.
The rule I follow is that the inclusion of time, and
the specialization to 3D space is a specialized CS,
because the universal laws of nature don't give a
poop about our conscious preception, aka pre-
conceived notions.
Remember you cannot do tensor analysis in a
specialized CS, so I don't even consider the idea
of the summation indices themselves to be integers,
or set to a particular number of dimensions.
Ken S. Tucker
Robert J. Kolker
Sort of like the Three Horsemen of the Apocolypse. It just doesn't have
that ring.
Bob Kolker
>
Bill Hobba
"Ken S. Tucker" <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> wrote in message
news:2202379a.04050...@posting.google.com...news:<n6ync.29895$TT....@news-server.bigpond.net.au>...
> This posts acknowledges Sam Wormley and Paul Stowe too.
> Normally I try to stay clear of arguments that stink of
> semantics, but a philosopher friend of mine insisted we
> try to define "absolute truth". By definition a physical law
> is always true.
>
> >"Ken S. Tucker" <dyna...@vianet.on.ca> wrote in message
> >news:2202379a.04050...@posting.google.com...
> [...]
> >> From what I understand, a "physical law" is "absolute truth".
> >> "Absolute truth" is what we will "all always agree on".
> >
> >So Ohms law has absoute truth. Does it apply to a diode?
>
> I presume that's a joke. Is having to wear a seat-belt a Law?
> ((Incidentally, I frequently use an OHM meter to test
> and establish diode polarity)).
>
> >> The mathematical embodiment of that agreement is
> >> know as covariance in GR.
> >
> >Ken a guy called Kretchamnn proved that such is not the case and
challenged
> >Einstein on this very point and Einstein admitted he was wrong. The
> >principle of general covarience is just that - a heuristic principle
without
> >any physical content whatever. You need to add other things to get the
> >physical content. See http://modeling.la.asu.edu/R&E/SecretsGenius.pdf
and
>
> Thanks, the article has an interesting PoV.
>
> >Consider how the covariant
> >> tensor A_u in K transforms to another CS K',
> >> A'_v = &x^u/&x'^v A^u (& =partial diff sign).
> >> Then it's easy to see,
> >> A'_v dx'^v = A_u dx^u .
> >> See that's invariant, and is true in all CS's, hence
> >> it's a "physical law".
> >> I'm not entirely clear on this, but I think this
> >> is why covaraint expressions are the basis of
> >> physical law in GR.
> >
> >The reason we have covarience is a practical one. The POR applied
generally
> >says laws, when transformed to inertial frames, are always the same.
>
> The condition "inertial frames" is unnecessary.
I think you will find it is. The law of inertia in its usual form does not
apply in non inertial frames - by the definition of an inertial frame. The
fact that it is possible to tell inertial frames from non inertial ones
shows immediately it does not mean the same as it does in SR where it is not
possible to tell inertial frame from each other by experiments conducted in
the frame - accelerated ones give themselves away immediately by use of an
accelerometer. About the only out I know of is that used by Machians who
say your still in an inertial frame but now the outside universe is rotating
and/or accelerating about you and that is creating a special type of
gravitational field. The trouble with that view is as I have posted
previously it leads to the idea of influences traveling into the future and
the past - not quite the thing everyone would accept.
The real content of GR lies in the principle of general covariance not the
principle of general relativity. See
http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~suchii/Einstein/generalcovar.html
Thanks
Bill
>
> >This
> >is obviously not an easy thing to always do but becomes trivial for laws
> >expressed covariantly.
>
> Right, that's the whole point.
>
> >See the links I gave above for further discussion.
> >Basically the idea of GR is no prior geometry or geometry itself is
> >dynamical. To quite one of the links I gave above, technically we say:
> >
> >'General relativity is distinguished from other dynamical field theories
by
> >its invariance under active diffeomorphisms. Any theory can be made
> >invariant under passive diffeomorphisms. Passive diffeomorphism
invariance
> >is a property of the formulation of a dynamical theory, while active
> >diffeomorphism invariance is a property of the dynamical theory itself'
>
> That's neat! One of the best definitions of GR and
> diffeomorphism I've ever seen.
>
> >Thanks Bill
>
> Thank you too,
> Ken S. Tucker
tj Frazir
IF its not then its not law.
ALL physical laws MUST be identical to the conservation of energy.
A physical law obeys in evry way the conservation of energy.
Gravity is a push to less energy.
tj Frazir
energy "
Im shure is printed on the first page of evry book .
Anything that is not identical to conservation is in violation of the
laws of physics and wrong.
ALL things are identical to conservation.
we are still inside the big bang in an expanding universe under energy
presure that has no shape or sise and energy reacts with energy at C.
Patrick Reany
I think part of the problem that you, Hobba, and Kolker have is your
lack of distinction making on "physical law." You conflate "physical
law," "general physical law," and "conservation law."
physical law -- an invariable relationship on physical values
and/or events. It has a domain of applicability.
It is an induction on time-tested experimental
relationships, whether tested directly or
indirectly.
general physical law -- a physical law satifying a covariance
relationship
conservation law -- a physical law corresponding to a Noetherian
invariance
Technically, Noether's theorem relative to a given Lagrangian gives us
a hypothesis, not necessarly a vetted physical law, unless the
Noetherian hypothesis is already know to be a vetted physical law. In
other words, Noether's theorem is not a substitute for empirical
testing to declare a hypothesis a "law."
As I said before, but was apprarently not understood, the phrase
"relationship on physical values and/or events" requires one to
account for all possible influences on an experiment (defined by
physical values) that might be setup to test the relationship. And
that is our domain of applicability defined by the "entire
experimental setup."
Patrick
Bilge
>dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote in message:
>> Patrick Reany:
>>
>> >I'd like to see the reaction to a university physics book written by
>> >you, Carlip, and Bilge. No laws in it but one impenetrable Ulitmate
>> >"law" that no student can ever get. If you refuse to call the
>> >approbated physical laws "laws," what will you call them?
>>
>> How does, ``The rule of thumb of conservation of energy'' sound?
>> Or, how about, ``Ohm's ordinance''?
>
>I think part of the problem that you, Hobba, and Kolker have is your
>lack of distinction making on "physical law." You conflate "physical
>law," "general physical law," and "conservation law."
case, it's irrelevant whether or not I conflate those things.
I beleve that steve carlip's point was that the term ``law''
is used to mean all of those things (and more) in textbooks
and in common usage. Actually, the word ``law'' is less descriptive
than it is a part of the common name for something which has simply
become part of the language. You also seem to missing the point
(or else you got the point and are now reconnoitering to introduce
fine divisions as if you'd realized this all along).
>physical law -- an invariable relationship on physical values
> and/or events. It has a domain of applicability.
> It is an induction on time-tested experimental
> relationships, whether tested directly or
> indirectly.
>
>general physical law -- a physical law satifying a covariance
> relationship
>
>conservation law -- a physical law corresponding to a Noetherian
> invariance
That is really tortured, patrick. Can't you just accept the
fact that physicists can know what something is without having
to put an official label on it so that it can be filed in
the proper drawer? You seem to be a real slave to categorizing
everything. Does it bother you to see a piece of furniture that
isn't quite a chair but isn't quite a couch either if there is
no special name for it?
>Technically, Noether's theorem relative to a given Lagrangian gives us
>a hypothesis, not necessarly a vetted physical law, unless the
>Noetherian hypothesis is already know to be a vetted physical law.
Say what? I have news for you. If you have a lagrangian which
describes a physical system _and_ the lagrangian posseses a
continuous symmetry, then there is a conserved current which
corresponds to that symmetry.
>In other words, Noether's theorem is not a substitute for empirical
>testing to declare a hypothesis a "law."
Wrong. Noether's theorem _defines_ a conservation law. If that
doesn't agree with what has been historically measured, then what
is measured gets redefined. I'm not sure I can think of case where
this has happened, but for example, had the relativistic mass-energy
relation not been ``discovered'' so that newton's expression for
the energy was already altered, noether's theorem would have
redefined it correctly for us.
Here, you confuse two terms you've been so eager to define -
hypothesis and theory (i.e., theorem in this case). Noether's
theorem is a theorem - a mathematical fact. If you're going
to call that a hypothesis, you might as well say that taking
the derivative of a velocity with respect to time is only
a hypothesis of acceleration.
>As I said before, but was apprarently not understood, the phrase
>"relationship on physical values and/or events" requires one to
>account for all possible influences on an experiment (defined by
>physical values) that might be setup to test the relationship. And
>that is our domain of applicability defined by the "entire
>experimental setup."
I'm afraid I have no idea what this addresses.
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany:
> >dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote in message:
> >> Patrick Reany:
> >>
> >> >I'd like to see the reaction to a university physics book written by
> >> >you, Carlip, and Bilge. No laws in it but one impenetrable Ulitmate
> >> >"law" that no student can ever get. If you refuse to call the
> >> >approbated physical laws "laws," what will you call them?
> >>
> >> How does, ``The rule of thumb of conservation of energy'' sound?
> >> Or, how about, ``Ohm's ordinance''?
> >
> >I think part of the problem that you, Hobba, and Kolker have is your
> >lack of distinction making on "physical law." You conflate "physical
> >law," "general physical law," and "conservation law."
>
> You didn't seem to object when I wrote examples before. In any
> case, it's irrelevant whether or not I conflate those things.
> I beleve that steve carlip's point was that the term ``law''
> is used to mean all of those things (and more) in textbooks
> and in common usage. Actually, the word ``law'' is less descriptive
> than it is a part of the common name for something which has simply
> become part of the language.
More to the point, is for you to produce examples of the standard use
of "physical law" which violates my definition.
> You also seem to missing the point
> (or else you got the point and are now reconnoitering to introduce
> fine divisions as if you'd realized this all along).
>
> >physical law -- an invariable relationship on physical values
> > and/or events. It has a domain of applicability.
> > It is an induction on time-tested experimental
> > relationships, whether tested directly or
> > indirectly.
> >
> >general physical law -- a physical law satifying a covariance
> > relationship
> >
> >conservation law -- a physical law corresponding to a Noetherian
> > invariance
>
> That is really tortured, patrick.
What's "tortured" about it?
> Can't you just accept the
> fact that physicists can know what something is without having
> to put an official label on it so that it can be filed in
> the proper drawer?
How would they know if that were really the case without precise
definitions to vet the meaning of these "labels." BTW, I'm not
labeling; I'm providing definitions for "labels." I did not invent any
of these three terms (labels): "physical law," "general (physical)
law," and "conservation law."
[snip]
>
> >Technically, Noether's theorem relative to a given Lagrangian gives us
> >a hypothesis, not necessarly a vetted physical law, unless the
> >Noetherian hypothesis is already know to be a vetted physical law.
>
> Say what? I have news for you. If you have a lagrangian which
> describes a physical system _and_ the lagrangian posseses a
> continuous symmetry, then there is a conserved current which
> corresponds to that symmetry.
Some news flash. That theorem of a conserved current is a physical
hypothesis until vetted empirically, which it probably already has
been.
On his webpage
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html
Baez states that
Noether's theorem is an amazing result which lets
physicists get conserved quantities from symmetries
of the laws of nature. Time translation symmetry gives
conservation of energy; space translation symmetry
gives conservation of momentum; rotation symmetry gives
conservation of angular momentum, and so on.
Baez goes on to tell us that there is an invariable relationship
(i.e., a "law") between theories describable by a Lagrangian and
conserved quantities.
Mario Bunge, in his article "Laws of Physical Laws," found in AJP,
1961, pp 518--529, tells us that (p 518)
Scientiifc texts contain both object statements
(e.g., "2+3=5," "Water expands when freezing") and
metastatements (e.g., "The equality '2+3=5' is a theorem
in ordinary arithmetics," "The law 'Water expands when
freezing' is well known to plumbers"). While object
statements refer to the objects (whether material or
not) dealt with in the corresponding piece of language,
metastatements say something about further statements:
they are not signs of primary objects but signs of signs;
metastatements belong consequently in the metalanguage.
An important subclass of metastatements is
constituted by those dealing with law statements, or
scientific laws. Statments about law statements may be
called metalaw statements.
He went on to say that (p 519)
Attention will be focused in the following on a
particularly interesting and neglected kind of metalaw
statements: namely, the class of lawlike (or nomomorphous)
statements about scientific laws; that is, the set of
well justified (or at any rate accepted) assertions that
are general in some respect and to some extent, and
which refer to scientific laws. "The law of conservation
of parity does not hold for weak interactions," and
"The laws of heredity are rooted to the laws of chemistry,"
are members of this set. Lawlike statements like these
differ from causal metalaw utterances in that the former
do not specify particular situations involving the use of
law statements (as, e.g., in "Electricians employ Kirchoff's
laws"), but describe or prescribe basic traits of law
statements. The name metanomological statement has been
suggested for this subclass of metalaw statements; it is
less ambiguous that the name "law of law" because scientific
laws too can be considered as laws of laws if, in its second
occurence, is taken to denote objective pattern or nomic
structure.
OK, my turn:
1) Obviously, Bunge has no problem calling Kirchoff's laws as
"laws" and conservation laws as "laws."
2) Bunge appears to use the term "law" consistent with how I
defined it: an invariable relationship on values or events.
3) The statement "there is an invariable relationship between
theories describable by a Lagrangian and a conserved quantity"
is metanomological because it is a statement about a relation
connecting one or more laws which is descriptive or
prescriptive of the basic traits of that/those law/s.
4) In the same sense, the claim "Every physical law has a
'domain of applicability' is also metanomological.
5) If science is to remain empirically based, we cannot allow the
declaration of physical laws solely on the basis of Noether's
theorem. All such metanomological existence theorems of some
conserved quantity are physically hypothetical and the hypothesis
only takes on actual "physical law" status after being tested
empirically and, of course, operationally.
>
> >In other words, Noether's theorem is not a substitute for empirical
> >testing to declare a hypothesis a "law."
>
> Wrong. Noether's theorem _defines_ a conservation law.
Would that include the "law of energy conservation"? But then again,
your last post you said this: "The rule of thumb of conservation of
energy," apparently to NOT call energy conservation a "law." Changing
your story already?
In physics, physical laws are empirically vetted, no matter what
formalism or theory produces them as theorems. Until a theorem with
physical content has been vetted empirically it is a physical
hypothesis.
> If that
> doesn't agree with what has been historically measured, then what
> is measured gets redefined. I'm not sure I can think of case where
> this has happened, but for example, had the relativistic mass-energy
> relation not been ``discovered'' so that newton's expression for
> the energy was already altered, noether's theorem would have
> redefined it correctly for us.
>
> Here, you confuse two terms you've been so eager to define -
> hypothesis and theory (i.e., theorem in this case).
I didn't confuse them at all. You confused theorem, law, and
hypothesis.
> Noether's
> theorem is a theorem - a mathematical fact. If you're going
> to call that a hypothesis, you might as well say that taking
> the derivative of a velocity with respect to time is only
> a hypothesis of acceleration.
There is a huge difference though. Newtonian kinematics is well
established empiricially on the Newtonian domain of applicability.
Besides that, Newtonian kinematics deals directly with object-language
variables. Not so Noether's theorem. Is this an implicit retreat back
to rationalism?
Mathematics alone does not produce physical laws. Mathematics can
provide a suggested invariable relationship on physical variables (a
physical hypothesis), but it takes empirical testing to vet the
physical hypothesis, in which case, the hypothesis may be accepted as
a physical law or else rejected. At which point, it's time to take a
deeper look at that Lagrangian.
Patrick
tj Frazir
How about " identical to conservation AND the sum of all its qualities
"
Bilge
>dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote:
[...]
>> You didn't seem to object when I wrote examples before. In any
>> case, it's irrelevant whether or not I conflate those things.
>> I beleve that steve carlip's point was that the term ``law''
>> is used to mean all of those things (and more) in textbooks
>> and in common usage. Actually, the word ``law'' is less descriptive
>> than it is a part of the common name for something which has simply
>> become part of the language.
>
>More to the point, is for you to produce examples of the standard use
>of "physical law" which violates my definition.
contain ``physical law'', and the third of which could easily
be ``physical conservation law''.
[...]
>> That is really tortured, patrick.
>
>What's "tortured" about it?
Resorting to further subdividing the term ``law'' in order to try
and skate by steve carlip's remark regarding your own confusion over
the term.
>> Can't you just accept the fact that physicists can know what
>> something is without having to put an official label on it so
>> that it can be filed in the proper drawer?
>
>How would they know if that were really the case without precise
>definitions to vet the meaning of these "labels."
How does an infant learn to speak without knowing precise definitions
for the words? Using your logic, no one could ever learn to communicate
(and perhaps for you, that is true).
>BTW, I'm not labeling; I'm providing definitions for "labels."
yada yada yada...
>I did not invent any of these three terms (labels): "physical law,"
>"general (physical) law," and "conservation law."
I didn't say you invented them. I only said you were acting in an
obsessive-compulsive fashion exhibited by your need to provide
precise definitions for a lot of terms containing the word `law',
which have no reason to be grouped together in the first place.
You can't turn the historical reasons from which the word ``law''
was used into a scientific one.
>> Say what? I have news for you. If you have a lagrangian which
>> describes a physical system _and_ the lagrangian posseses a
>> continuous symmetry, then there is a conserved current which
>> corresponds to that symmetry.
>
>Some news flash. That theorem of a conserved current is a physical
>hypothesis until vetted empirically, which it probably already has
>been.
Talking to you about physics is like trying to explain snow to the
indigenous population of a rain forest.
>Baez goes on to tell us that there is an invariable relationship
>(i.e., a "law") between theories describable by a Lagrangian and
>conserved quantities.
What's your point? Not only do I know what noether's theorem is, I said
the same thing in the paragraph to which you are responding with this
quote. Instead of quote mining, why don't you just speak from your
knowledge of the subject? If you don't know enough to do that, then you
don't know enough to express a legitimate opinion.
[*snip pointless quoted text*]
>
>OK, my turn:
>
>1) Obviously, Bunge has no problem calling Kirchoff's laws as
> "laws" and conservation laws as "laws."
So what? Lots of things are called ``laws'' - mainly because they
have become part of the vernacular for historical reasons. Read steve
carlip's post again (assuming you read it the first time). See if you
can understand his point regarding newton's second law and ohm's law.
>2) Bunge appears to use the term "law" consistent with how I
> defined it: an invariable relationship on values or events.
That is meaningless. In what sense does ohm's law define an
``invariable relationship on values or events''?
>3) The statement "there is an invariable relationship between
> theories describable by a Lagrangian and a conserved quantity"
> is metanomological because it is a statement about a relation
> connecting one or more laws which is descriptive or
> prescriptive of the basic traits of that/those law/s.
>4) In the same sense, the claim "Every physical law has a
> 'domain of applicability' is also metanomological.
>5) If science is to remain empirically based, we cannot allow the
> declaration of physical laws solely on the basis of Noether's
> theorem. All such metanomological existence theorems of some
> conserved quantity are physically hypothetical and the hypothesis
> only takes on actual "physical law" status after being tested
> empirically and, of course, operationally.
Don't be an idiot. Noether's theorem defines the conserved quantities
which follow from a given lagrangian. If noether's theorem requires
that some quantity be conserved for a given lagrangian and experiments
indicate otherwise, then your options are (1) the lagrangian is wrong,
(2) your lagrangian doesn't have the symmetry you think it did, or
(3) you aren't measuring the quantity you think you are measuring.
>>
>> >In other words, Noether's theorem is not a substitute for empirical
>> >testing to declare a hypothesis a "law."
>>
>> Wrong. Noether's theorem _defines_ a conservation law.
>Would that include the "law of energy conservation"?
Yep, since it defines conservation of energy only when the lagrangian
is invariant under time displacements. In other words, conservation
of energy is not a ``fundamental law of physics''.
>But then again, your last post you said this: "The rule of thumb of
>conservation of energy," apparently to NOT call energy conservation
a "law."
Is energy conserved in general relativity? If not, then it's obvious
that conservation of energy is a law only when the lagrangian which
describes a system is invariant under time displacements.
>Changing your story already?
Not hardley and if you weren't confused by the inconsistency with which
``law'' is used, you'd know that.
>In physics, physical laws are empirically vetted, no matter what
>formalism or theory produces them as theorems. Until a theorem with
>physical content has been vetted empirically it is a physical
>hypothesis.
I suggest that you don't have the slightest idea what is going on.
[...]
>> Noether's
>> theorem is a theorem - a mathematical fact. If you're going
>> to call that a hypothesis, you might as well say that taking
>> the derivative of a velocity with respect to time is only
>> a hypothesis of acceleration.
>
>There is a huge difference though. Newtonian kinematics is well
>established empiricially on the Newtonian domain of applicability.
>Besides that, Newtonian kinematics deals directly with object-language
>variables. Not so Noether's theorem. Is this an implicit retreat back
>to rationalism?
No, it's a fact that has nothing to do with ``object-language
variables''.
>Mathematics alone does not produce physical laws.
You are no less of a kook than the people who claim relativity is
inadequate based upon the non-sequiter that there exists no mechanism
which makes `c' a constant.
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany:
> >dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote:
> [...]
> >> You didn't seem to object when I wrote examples before. In any
> >> case, it's irrelevant whether or not I conflate those things.
> >> I beleve that steve carlip's point was that the term ``law''
> >> is used to mean all of those things (and more) in textbooks
> >> and in common usage. Actually, the word ``law'' is less descriptive
> >> than it is a part of the common name for something which has simply
> >> become part of the language.
> >
> >More to the point, is for you to produce examples of the standard use
> >of "physical law" which violates my definition.
>
> Which one? You list three subdivisions of ``law'', two of which
> contain ``physical law'', and the third of which could easily
> be ``physical conservation law''.
Fine, I'll give it for YOU again:
physical law -- an invariable relationship on physical values
and/or events
That's the short version for easy memorization. The long version
includes mention of a domain of applicability. The really long version
is a monograph!
>
> [...]
> >> That is really tortured, patrick.
> >
> >What's "tortured" about it?
>
> Resorting to further subdividing the term ``law'' in order to try
> and skate by steve carlip's remark regarding your own confusion over
> the term.
The subdivisions are there already. I didn't invent them
opportunistically.
>
> >> Can't you just accept the fact that physicists can know what
> >> something is without having to put an official label on it so
> >> that it can be filed in the proper drawer?
> >
> >How would they know if that were really the case without precise
> >definitions to vet the meaning of these "labels."
>
> How does an infant learn to speak without knowing precise definitions
> for the words? Using your logic, no one could ever learn to communicate
> (and perhaps for you, that is true).
Hopefully we can learn to discuss things at a higher level than a
babbling infant or a babbling Bilge.
>
> >BTW, I'm not labeling; I'm providing definitions for "labels."
>
> yada yada yada...
Obviously, some of DO babble when words and intelligence fail them.
>
> >I did not invent any of these three terms (labels): "physical law,"
> >"general (physical) law," and "conservation law."
>
> I didn't say you invented them. I only said you were acting in an
> obsessive-compulsive fashion exhibited by your need to provide
> precise definitions for a lot of terms containing the word `law',
> which have no reason to be grouped together in the first place.
> You can't turn the historical reasons from which the word ``law''
> was used into a scientific one.
You're acting in an obsessive-compulsive fashion exhibited by your
need to eliminate "law" status to many, or even to most, accepted laws
in the physics books right now.
Bilge, if you could eliminate all the mathematical relationships in
the physics books which are called "laws" but you don't want them to
be call as such in the future, what "physical laws" would be left and
why? You would seem to want to get rid of Newton's law of gravity for
a start, contradicting Feynman's views regarding its law status
(Character of Physical Laws, p 14). According to you, Feynman just got
it all wrong.
>
> >> Say what? I have news for you. If you have a lagrangian which
> >> describes a physical system _and_ the lagrangian posseses a
> >> continuous symmetry, then there is a conserved current which
> >> corresponds to that symmetry.
> >
> >Some news flash. That theorem of a conserved current is a physical
> >hypothesis until vetted empirically, which it probably already has
> >been.
>
> Talking to you about physics is like trying to explain snow to the
> indigenous population of a rain forest.
Talking to you about philosophy is like trying to tell an idiot to
become intelligent over night.
>
>
> >Baez goes on to tell us that there is an invariable relationship
> >(i.e., a "law") between theories describable by a Lagrangian and
> >conserved quantities.
>
> What's your point? Not only do I know what noether's theorem is, I said
> the same thing in the paragraph to which you are responding with this
> quote. Instead of quote mining, why don't you just speak from your
> knowledge of the subject? If you don't know enough to do that, then you
> don't know enough to express a legitimate opinion.
>
[snip Bilge's polemic and pointless explanation about snipping]
>
> >
> >OK, my turn:
> >
> >1) Obviously, Bunge has no problem calling Kirchoff's laws as
> > "laws" and conservation laws as "laws."
>
> So what? Lots of things are called ``laws'' - mainly because they
> have become part of the vernacular for historical reasons. Read steve
> carlip's post again (assuming you read it the first time). See if you
> can understand his point regarding newton's second law and ohm's law.
Read my posts again. See if you can understand even the most simple
statements in them.
>
> >2) Bunge appears to use the term "law" consistent with how I
> > defined it: an invariable relationship on values or events.
>
> That is meaningless. In what sense does ohm's law define an
> ``invariable relationship on values or events''?
V = IR is a relationship on three physical values V, I, R: its
invariable status is justified by induction on past usage, and thus is
believed to be a correct relationship in the future.
>
> >3) The statement "there is an invariable relationship between
> > theories describable by a Lagrangian and a conserved quantity"
> > is metanomological because it is a statement about a relation
> > connecting one or more laws which is descriptive or
> > prescriptive of the basic traits of that/those law/s.
> >4) In the same sense, the claim "Every physical law has a
> > 'domain of applicability' is also metanomological.
> >5) If science is to remain empirically based, we cannot allow the
> > declaration of physical laws solely on the basis of Noether's
> > theorem. All such metanomological existence theorems of some
> > conserved quantity are physically hypothetical and the hypothesis
> > only takes on actual "physical law" status after being tested
> > empirically and, of course, operationally.
>
> Don't be an idiot. Noether's theorem defines the conserved quantities
> which follow from a given lagrangian. If noether's theorem requires
> that some quantity be conserved for a given lagrangian and experiments
> indicate otherwise, then your options are (1) the lagrangian is wrong,
> (2) your lagrangian doesn't have the symmetry you think it did, or
> (3) you aren't measuring the quantity you think you are measuring.
Don't be an idiot.
>
> >>
> >> >In other words, Noether's theorem is not a substitute for empirical
> >> >testing to declare a hypothesis a "law."
> >>
> >> Wrong. Noether's theorem _defines_ a conservation law.
Don't be an idiot. That's a retreat back to rationalism: the
"rational" mind taking precedence over experimentation. Law status of
physical content must always first go through experimental vetting,
regardless of the source of the hypothesis. Physical theories deal
directly with the object language of physics. Noether's theorem deals
with metatheories and is part of the metalanguage of physics because
it deals with the class of theories expressible by a Lagrangian. It's
a theory of theories.
>
> >Would that include the "law of energy conservation"?
>
> Yep, since it defines conservation of energy only when the lagrangian
> is invariant under time displacements. In other words, conservation
> of energy is not a ``fundamental law of physics''.
>
> >But then again, your last post you said this: "The rule of thumb of
> >conservation of energy," apparently to NOT call energy conservation
> a "law."
>
> Is energy conserved in general relativity? If not, then it's obvious
> that conservation of energy is a law only when the lagrangian which
> describes a system is invariant under time displacements.
Don't be an idiot, Bilge. You just contradicted yourself! If you want
to define a "law" of conservation of some quantity based on a
lagrangian alone, and drop the time-honored empiricism of actually
testing relationships on values of the object language first, then you
reject the empiricist notion of laws in favor of a rationalist notion
of "a priori law." I remind you of how bad that practice went for
those who by similar reasoning merely assumed that parity is always
conserved. Yang-Lee showed that the conservation of parity is not so
universal as the naive rational mind would believe.
Are you allowing for only conservation laws, Bilge?
>
> >Changing your story already?
>
> Not hardley and if you weren't confused by the inconsistency with which
> ``law'' is used, you'd know that.
Don't be an idiot.
>
> >In physics, physical laws are empirically vetted, no matter what
> >formalism or theory produces them as theorems. Until a theorem with
> >physical content has been vetted empirically it is a physical
> >hypothesis.
>
> I suggest that you don't have the slightest idea what is going on.
I suggest that YOU don't have the slightest idea what is going on.
Laws do NOT demand a domain of unlimited applicability. If YOU choose
to demand that they do, that's just your personal anti-establishment
philosophical viewpoint, and you are out of step with Feynman and with
most physicists who wrote physics books and articles to date.
> [...]
> >> Noether's
> >> theorem is a theorem - a mathematical fact. If you're going
> >> to call that a hypothesis, you might as well say that taking
> >> the derivative of a velocity with respect to time is only
> >> a hypothesis of acceleration.
> >
> >There is a huge difference though. Newtonian kinematics is well
> >established empiricially on the Newtonian domain of applicability.
> >Besides that, Newtonian kinematics deals directly with object-language
> >variables. Not so Noether's theorem. Is this an implicit retreat back
> >to rationalism?
>
> No, it's a fact that has nothing to do with ``object-language
> variables''.
>
> >Mathematics alone does not produce physical laws.
>
> You are no less of a kook than the people who claim relativity is
> inadequate based upon the non-sequiter that there exists no mechanism
> which makes `c' a constant.
Don't be a kook, Bilge.
Patrick
Bilge
>Fine, I'll give it for YOU again:
>
>physical law -- an invariable relationship on physical values
> and/or events
to explain how physics should be structured understanding the physics,
is no more logical than the notions of the nutcases who are dead
certain that physics will advance by ressurecting the physics of the
19th century which was discarded for failing to do just that. Get a
clue.
Patrick Reany
So, you're willing to allow intro physics books that declare to their
readers that it has no "laws of physics" in it because the subject
matter of the text is too old and the "new" way to look at physics has
defrocked all the "old" laws of "law" status?
Patrick
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu
> You didn't reply to this. Why? QM, SR, and GR are more fundamental
> than Newtonian mechanics. Are we to defrock the laws of Newton of
> their "law" status? This has already gone too far. It's gone to the
> absurd.
Excuse me for being a bit blunt. But if you don't understand
the fundamental difference between the status of Newton's second
law and that of Ohm's law, then you need to learn a lot more
physics.
In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
> I didn't call Charles Law or Ohm's Law "laws"; the physics
> establishment named them so.
Nearly two centuries ago, when their status was poorly understood.
The term is a historical accident. The ``physics establishment''
has better things to do than trying to rework historically
established terms. That's all.
[...]
> Lawness has NOTHING to do with "fundamentalness."
That's true of the historical usage. And that's exactly what makes
it so confusing. It's like treating ``blue things'' as a category,
including robin's eggs together with the sky and my notebook, and
then trying to establish that as an essential definition. You can
do it, but it doesn't do much good.
Steve Carlip
Patrick Reany
> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
> > car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:<c7tt5e$5f1$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>
> > You didn't reply to this. Why? QM, SR, and GR are more fundamental
> > than Newtonian mechanics. Are we to defrock the laws of Newton of
> > their "law" status? This has already gone too far. It's gone to the
> > absurd.
>
> Excuse me for being a bit blunt. But if you don't understand
> the fundamental difference between the status of Newton's second
> law and that of Ohm's law, then you need to learn a lot more
> physics.
Nonresponsive.
>
> In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
> SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
Newton's law rephrased is no longer Newton's law. You could say the
same for Ohm's law as well. Rephrase it.
>
> > I didn't call Charles Law or Ohm's Law "laws"; the physics
> > establishment named them so.
>
> Nearly two centuries ago, when their status was poorly understood.
> The term is a historical accident. The ``physics establishment''
> has better things to do than trying to rework historically
> established terms. That's all.
>
> [...]
> > Lawness has NOTHING to do with "fundamentalness."
If you claim it should now, then define "fundamental" and prove your
view.
>
> That's true of the historical usage. And that's exactly what makes
> it so confusing. It's like treating ``blue things'' as a category,
> including robin's eggs together with the sky and my notebook, and
> then trying to establish that as an essential definition. You can
> do it, but it doesn't do much good.
>
> Steve Carlip
A typical hand waving reply. If you want to make your point rationally
then define "physical law" and sell the definition to us.
Patrick
Bilge
>>
>> In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
>> SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
>
>Newton's law rephrased is no longer Newton's law. You could say the
>same for Ohm's law as well. Rephrase it.
Maybe _you_ should try to rephrase it. In attempting to ``rephrase''
ohm's law, perhaps you'll appreciate the difference. By the way,
did you actually look up eherenfest's theorem? From your comment,
my guess is no. If you had, you would have noticed the only difference
between the ``quantum version'' of newton's second law and the classical
version is a few <>'s.
[...]
>> That's true of the historical usage. And that's exactly what makes
>> it so confusing. It's like treating ``blue things'' as a category,
>> including robin's eggs together with the sky and my notebook, and
>> then trying to establish that as an essential definition. You can
>> do it, but it doesn't do much good.
>A typical hand waving reply. If you want to make your point rationally
>then define "physical law" and sell the definition to us.
Earth to patrick. Hello? Did you actually read that to which you are
responding?
jmfb...@aol.com
re...@asu.edu (Patrick Reany) wrote:
>car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message
news:<c8ead9$8c9$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
>> > car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message
news:<c7tt5e$5f1$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>>
>> > You didn't reply to this. Why? QM, SR, and GR are more fundamental
>> > than Newtonian mechanics. Are we to defrock the laws of Newton of
>> > their "law" status? This has already gone too far. It's gone to the
>> > absurd.
>>
>> Excuse me for being a bit blunt. But if you don't understand
>> the fundamental difference between the status of Newton's second
>> law and that of Ohm's law, then you need to learn a lot more
>> physics.
>
>Nonresponsive.
You have no achieved complete crank status.
>
>>
>> In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
>> SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
>
>Newton's law rephrased is no longer Newton's law. You could say the
>same for Ohm's law as well. Rephrase it.
>
>>
>> > I didn't call Charles Law or Ohm's Law "laws"; the physics
>> > establishment named them so.
>>
>> Nearly two centuries ago, when their status was poorly understood.
>> The term is a historical accident. The ``physics establishment''
>> has better things to do than trying to rework historically
>> established terms. That's all.
>>
>> [...]
>> > Lawness has NOTHING to do with "fundamentalness."
>
>If you claim it should now, then define "fundamental" and prove your
>view.
He is not going to do your writing for you.
>
>>
>> That's true of the historical usage. And that's exactly what makes
>> it so confusing. It's like treating ``blue things'' as a category,
>> including robin's eggs together with the sky and my notebook, and
>> then trying to establish that as an essential definition. You can
>> do it, but it doesn't do much good.
>>
>> Steve Carlip
>
>A typical hand waving reply.
I have yet to see Mr. Carlip ever do a hand wave in a post.
> .. If you want to make your point rationally
>then define "physical law" and sell the definition to us.
He's not going to do your writing for you. It is not him
who needs to do the work to learn more; it is you who
has to do that work. Steve's already done that work.
/BAH
Subtract a hundred and four for e-mail.
jmfb...@aol.com
dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote:
> Patrick Reany:
> >car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:
>
> >>
> >> In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
> >> SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
> >
> >Newton's law rephrased is no longer Newton's law. You could say the
> >same for Ohm's law as well. Rephrase it.
>
> Maybe _you_ should try to rephrase it. In attempting to ``rephrase''
>ohm's law, perhaps you'll appreciate the difference. By the way,
>did you actually look up eherenfest's theorem?
Of course he hasn't. He hasn't done any of the work we've told
him.
> .From your comment,
>my guess is no. If you had, you would have noticed the only difference
>between the ``quantum version'' of newton's second law and the classical
>version is a few <>'s.
>
>[...]
>
> >> That's true of the historical usage. And that's exactly what makes
> >> it so confusing. It's like treating ``blue things'' as a category,
> >> including robin's eggs together with the sky and my notebook, and
> >> then trying to establish that as an essential definition. You can
> >> do it, but it doesn't do much good.
>
> >A typical hand waving reply. If you want to make your point rationally
> >then define "physical law" and sell the definition to us.
>
> Earth to patrick. Hello? Did you actually read that to which you are
>responding?
I'm about to offer a copy of my pointy stick to Mr. Carlip; being
blunt with apologies isn't going to do it with this one.
Patrick Reany
Earth to Bilge. Define "physical law" and sell the definition to us.
Patrick
Bilge
reading and comprehending the responses he's received,
>Earth to Bilge. Define "physical law" and sell the definition to us.
Physical Law: A phrase in the english language which exaccerbates
the obsessive/compulsive disorder in patrick reany,
who doesn't appear to compensate with the increased
dose of anafranil, resulting in panic attacks which
he fails to mitigate with proper amounts of xanax.
Bilge
>jmfb...@aol.com wrote in message news:
>> Of course he hasn't. He hasn't done any of the work we've told
>> him.
>
>Has Bilge ever done any of the homework I've given him.
This is a physics newsgroup. If I want some advice on choosing
philosophy to read, I'll ask someone in a philosophy newsgroup.
>This is not Bilge's personal classroom.
You have an uncanny ability to state the obvious as if it were
a revelation. If this happened to be my personal classroom, I
would have made use of the most obvious solution to your insane
ankle-biting and removed you from the roll.
>Bilge is here voluntarily on a public, unmoderated newsgroup and
>he's no better than anyone else here.
And I'm volunteering my conclusion regarding what you need to
do in order to learn some physics.
>Bilge randomly throwing examples of what "should" and "shouldn't" be
>considered "physical laws" in his own mind is completely irrelevant
>until Bilge provides us with his definition of "physical law."
There was nothing random about it.
>That's the ONLY way to test his examples against his definition. If Bilge
>already gave it, I missed it, so would he pretty please give it to us
>again.
Take your anafranil.
Uncle Al
[snip]
Reany - your are an abusive boring ineducable fool. If this bothers
you, go e-mail yourself.
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" The Net!
jmfb...@aol.com
>> In article <slrncaomhn....@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net>,
>> dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote:
>> > Patrick Reany:
>> > >car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:
>>
>> > >>
>> > >> In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
>> > >> SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
>> > >
>> > >Newton's law rephrased is no longer Newton's law. You could say the
>> > >same for Ohm's law as well. Rephrase it.
>> >
>> > Maybe _you_ should try to rephrase it. In attempting to ``rephrase''
>> >ohm's law, perhaps you'll appreciate the difference. By the way,
>> >did you actually look up eherenfest's theorem?
>>
>> Of course he hasn't. He hasn't done any of the work we've told
>> him.
>
I don't care about Bilge. I addressed the fact that you don't
do your own homework but expect physicists to do it for you.
<snip passing the buck to Bilge>
People who are experienced in the subject have corrected you over and
over and over and over and over again. A few of them and me spent
serious brain power and wallclock time discussing these aspects
with you because you seemed to be willing to learn. Early on,
I decided that you were not. Mati had the opinion that I was mistaken
so I put my conclusion on hold and watched.
Now, if you really want to learn, I suggest that you do precisely
what Mr. Carlip suggested. He is an expert on figuring out how
and where each person needs to get started.
No discipline, including dictionary publishers, get hung up on
vocabulary, insisting that the meaning of one word hold true
for centuries.
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany, the philosopher stoned:
>
> >Bilge randomly throwing examples of what "should" and "shouldn't" be
> >considered "physical laws" in his own mind is completely irrelevant
> >until Bilge provides us with his definition of "physical law."
>
> There was nothing random about it.
Prove it.
>
> >That's the ONLY way to test his examples against his definition. If Bilge
> >already gave it, I missed it, so would he pretty please give it to us
> >again.
>
> Take your anafranil.
You failed the test.
Patrick
mme...@cars3.uchicago.edu
>In article <844a1b64.04052...@posting.google.com>,
> re...@asu.edu (Patrick Reany) wrote:
>>jmfb...@aol.com wrote in message
>news:<40aca8fc$0$3163$61fe...@news.rcn.com>...
>>> dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) wrote:
>>> > Patrick Reany:
>>> > >car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:
>>>
>>> > >>
>>> > >> In fact, Newton's second law, slightly rephrased, holds in GR and
>>> > >> SR, and in quantum mechanics as well (look up Ehrenfest's theorem).
>>> > >
>>> > >Newton's law rephrased is no longer Newton's law. You could say the
>>> > >same for Ohm's law as well. Rephrase it.
>>> >
>>> > Maybe _you_ should try to rephrase it. In attempting to ``rephrase''
>>> >ohm's law, perhaps you'll appreciate the difference. By the way,
>>> >did you actually look up eherenfest's theorem?
>>>
>>> Of course he hasn't. He hasn't done any of the work we've told
>>> him.
>>
>
>I don't care about Bilge. I addressed the fact that you don't
>do your own homework but expect physicists to do it for you.
>
><snip passing the buck to Bilge>
>
>People who are experienced in the subject have corrected you over and
>over and over and over and over again. A few of them and me spent
>serious brain power and wallclock time discussing these aspects
>with you because you seemed to be willing to learn. Early on,
>I decided that you were not. Mati had the opinion that I was mistaken
>so I put my conclusion on hold and watched.
>
this. Sorry.
Patrick Reany
Define "physical theory" for us.
Patrick
mitch perkins
>
> Define "physical
Oh. Sorry. I'm looking for Bilge's classroom. Is this it?
>theory" for us.
>
> Patrick
jmfb...@aol.com
mme...@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>In article <40ade3ac$0$3108$61fe...@news.rcn.com>, jmfb...@aol.com
writes:
>Well, by now I fully recognized that it was I who was mistaken on
>this. Sorry.
No need to apologize. We both had hopes of thinking ability in the
beginning.
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu
[...]
> If you want to make your point rationally
> then define "physical law"
"Physical law": a historical term referring to certain empirical
relationships among physical quantities that were deemed to be
particularly important at the time of their discovery. The term
originated from a religious view of regularities in nature being
``God's laws.''
Almost all named ``physical laws'' date from the 19th century or
earlier. Since the decision about whether to call an observed
correlation a ``law'' was typically made before the relevant
phenomena were well understood, the patterns now called ``laws''
vary tremendously in significance, from fundamental statements
about the universal behavior of physical systems (Newton's laws)
to accidental consequences of the complicated dynamics of a
particular small set of physical systems (Ohm's law), to patterns
that are now generally believed to be almost purely accidental
(the Titius-Bode law).
The term is used by physicists today to refer to historically
established labels. It reflects the history the relevant ideas,
and sometimes a homage to great physicists of the past, rather
than anything more intrinsic. Thus, for instance, we speak of
``Newton's law of gravity,'' but we call the more accurate modern
description ``the Einstein field equations,'' not ``Einstein's
law of gravity.'' We speak of the ``ideal gas laws,'' but do
not use the term ``law'' for our now much better description of
the corresponding behavior of real gases. In the rare instances
that the term ``law'' has been applied since the 19th century,
it has usually been a sort of literary device; the ``laws of
black hole mechanics,'' for instance, were named and numbered
in order to encourage a direct comparison with the 19th century
``laws of thermodynamics.''
> and sell the definition to us.
I have no wish to sell you anything.
Steve Carlip
Patrick Reany
> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
>
> [...]
> > If you want to make your point rationally
> > then define "physical law"
>
> "Physical law": a historical term referring to certain empirical
> relationships among physical quantities that were deemed to be
> particularly important at the time of their discovery. The term
> originated from a religious view of regularities in nature being
> ``God's laws.''
I don't see the relevancy of the origin issue.
>
> Almost all named ``physical laws'' date from the 19th century or
> earlier. Since the decision about whether to call an observed
> correlation a ``law'' was typically made before the relevant
> phenomena were well understood, the patterns now called ``laws''
> vary tremendously in significance, from fundamental statements
> about the universal behavior of physical systems (Newton's laws)
> to accidental consequences of the complicated dynamics of a
> particular small set of physical systems (Ohm's law), to patterns
> that are now generally believed to be almost purely accidental
> (the Titius-Bode law).
You failed to state the definition of "physical law" these
quaint-minded, theist physicists of old employed. Are you implying
that they had no standard to classify "physical law" in the olden
days? Your notions of the "significance" of or "fundamental"ness of a
"law" are vague. Maybe they should be clarified before you use them to
make your rational presentation to us.
I don't know of any physics textbook that has adopted your post-theist
insight of what is and what is not a "physical law." I suppose you'll
tell us that Feynman was not included in this post-theist revolution
about the meaning of "physical law" because in his lecture series on
physics he talked about Newton's laws, Kelper's laws, Kirchoff's laws,
Boyle's law, Boltzman's law, and Ohm's law. Not much help for you
there. And if you aren't going to call those relationships "laws" any
more, what do you call them?
In his "This Week's Finds in Mathematical Physics (Week 206)" John
Baez refers to Newton's laws. It seems that physicists are not so
committed to following this post-theist insight as you indicate they
are. On the one hand you degrade the theist origin of "laws," yet
Newton was a theist. Then you say that his "laws" are "fundamental."
Yet they are not true under all conditions, according to modern
belief. So are his "laws" laws or not?
>
> The term is used by physicists today to refer to historically
> established labels. It reflects the history the relevant ideas,
> and sometimes a homage to great physicists of the past, rather
> than anything more intrinsic. Thus, for instance, we speak of
> ``Newton's law of gravity,'' but we call the more accurate modern
> description ``the Einstein field equations,'' not ``Einstein's
> law of gravity.''
So, you claim that physicists don't use the phrase "Einstein's law of
gravity." I don't know how you could prove that ascertion. The
question for you to answer for us is WHY they shouldn't use that
phrase. I suppose you probably consider John C. Taylor as a very minor
physicist by your reckonning, but he used the phrase "Einstein's law
of gravitation" in his book Hidden Unity in Nature's Laws, p. 204. I
would surmise that Taylor considers the notion of physical law to be
still very relevant in the conceptual foundation to physics, wouldn't
you?
Einstein said this: "...the general laws on which the structure of
theoretical physics is based claim to be valid for any natural
phenomena whatsoever" (What is the theory of relativity, Ideas and
Opinions, p. 226). On page 255 Einstein referred to the "law of
inertia" and to "Newton's law of motion."
Einstein also said in Physics and Reality, Ideas and Opinions, p.
309-310:
Only such equations as are covariant in relation
to arbitrary tranformations in this sense have
meaning as expressions of general laws of nature
(postulate of general covariance).....Newton's law
of interaction by gravitation is replaced by the
system of the simplest generally covariant
differential equations [i.e., GENERAL LAWS] which
can be set up for the g_{\mu\nu} tensor.
In his essay, "The fundaments of theoretical physics," p. 329, he
refer to the "law of propagation of light" in describing Maxwell's
equations.
The fact that laws may have a restrictive domain of applicability did
not bother Einstein:
Special relativity has this in common with
Newtonian mechanics: The laws of both theories
are supposed to hold only with respect to certain
coordinate systems: those known as inertial systems.
--- On the generalized theory of gravitation,
Ideas and Opinions, p. 346.
And on page 351 he taked about a "generally covariant field law."
He also said:
The general principle of relativity requires that all these
[reference] molluscs can be used as reference bodies
with equal right and equal success in the FORMULATION
OF THE GENERAL LAWS OF NATURE [again, what is
really an implicit definition of a law of nature];
the laws themselves must be quite independent of the
choice of the mollusc.
The GREAT power possessed by the general principle
of relativity lies in the comprehensive limitation which
is imposed on the laws of nature in consequence of
what we have seen.
[Found in: Albert Einstein's Theory of General Relativity,
reprinted Albert Einstein, Relativity, p. 91-92,
emphasis mine.]
> We speak of the ``ideal gas laws,'' but do
> not use the term ``law'' for our now much better description of
> the corresponding behavior of real gases.
Poor Feynman -- he called it the "ideal gas law." Poor fellow, he name
an entire physics book "The Character of Physical Law."
> In the rare instances
> that the term ``law'' has been applied since the 19th century,
> it has usually been a sort of literary device; the ``laws of
> black hole mechanics,'' for instance, were named and numbered
> in order to encourage a direct comparison with the 19th century
> ``laws of thermodynamics.''
>
> > and sell the definition to us.
>
> I have no wish to sell you anything.
>
> Steve Carlip
I didn't say to sell me alone; I said to sell it to all of us. You
seem to have trouble reading.
You failed to state the definition of "physical law" now employed by
you advanced-minded physicists of the modern era. Are we to take from
this that you refuse to use the term "physical law" at all?
You have claimed that the modern, enlightened physicsts no longer
thinks of "physical law" in the 19th century way. What evidence do you
have to back up this claim?
The Principle of Relativity is typically stated in terms of the laws
of physics. What's to become of it? Galilean relativity of about the
covariance of Newton's laws.
What is your opinion of the relationship of physical laws to Noether's
theorem?
Patrick
Jeff Krimmel
>
>>car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message
>>news:<c904ei$dml$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
[...]
> And if you aren't going to call those relationships "laws" any
> more, what do you call them?
You are _completely_ confused about Dr. Carlip's participation in this
discussion. He is not rabid like you, and as such, he is not spear-heading
a complete redefinition and reclassification of all science vocabulary as
we know it. He has told you, now more than once, how the word "law" is
currently being (and has in the past been) used by physicists. He's not
arguing for any change from the current semantics.
[...]
> So, you claim that physicists don't use the phrase "Einstein's law of
> gravity." I don't know how you could prove that ascertion. The
> question for you to answer for us is WHY they shouldn't use that
> phrase.
Again, you are confused. Dr. Carlip is telling you _how_ these words are
used now, not _why_ they are used the way they are (though he did lend
some insight into the historical development of some common uses).
[...]
>> We speak of the ``ideal gas laws,'' but do
>> not use the term ``law'' for our now much better description of
>> the corresponding behavior of real gases.
>
> Poor Feynman -- he called it the "ideal gas law." Poor fellow, he name
> an entire physics book "The Character of Physical Law."
Again, you are confused. Dr. Carlip's point was that physicists use labels
today that are quite inconsistent but manage, somehow, to continue to make
pretty good progress. The example above was the label of "law" applied to
the "ideal gas laws" when we have much more accurate descriptions that are
not labeled "law".
So, take it easy, and take Dr. Carlip's response for what it is. He
explained quite clearly how physicists use these terms today, and it's
also clear that if you _know_ what you are talking about, then no
confusion exists.
Jeff
--
Add an underscore between 'd' and 's' and remove the first three
letters of the alphabet for email.
jmfb...@aol.com
news:<c904ei$dml$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>> > If you want to make your point rationally
>> > then define "physical law"
>>
>> "Physical law": a historical term referring to certain empirical
>> relationships among physical quantities that were deemed to be
>> particularly important at the time of their discovery. The term
>> originated from a religious view of regularities in nature being
>> ``God's laws.''
>
>I don't see the relevancy of the origin issue.
[emoticon hands poster 3'x3' piece of coarse grit sandpaper
to be rubbed on head]
Now reread what Mr. Carlip wrote. He told you how that
three-lettered word was used and how it is used today
in the context of the physics biz.
Why are you asking scientists (who actually do the work)
for input when you rudely dismiss anything they write for
you?
jmfb...@aol.com
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote:
[I can't snip it.]
Would it be useful for your writeup to go into the FAQ?
/BAH
Subtract a hundred and four for e-mail.
Patrick Reany
> On Tue, 25 May 2004 19:34:25 -0700, Patrick Reany wrote:
>
> >
> >>car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message
> >>news:<c904ei$dml$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>
> [...]
>
> > And if you aren't going to call those relationships "laws" any
> > more, what do you call them?
>
> You are _completely_ confused about Dr. Carlip's participation in this
> discussion. He is not rabid like you, and as such, he is not spear-heading
> a complete redefinition and reclassification of all science vocabulary as
> we know it. He has told you, now more than once, how the word "law" is
> currently being (and has in the past been) used by physicists. He's not
> arguing for any change from the current semantics.
But he is!
Carlip:
> The term is used by physicists today to refer to historically
> established labels. It reflects the history the relevant ideas,
> and sometimes a homage to great physicists of the past, rather
> than anything more intrinsic. Thus, for instance, we speak of
> ``Newton's law of gravity,'' but we call the more accurate modern
> description ``the Einstein field equations,'' not ``Einstein's
> law of gravity.''
Yet John C. Taylor used the phrase "Einstein's law of gravitation" in
his book Hidden Unity in Nature's Laws, p. 204.
Question: Was Carlip correct in his assertion or not?
Patrick
Jeff Krimmel
> Jeff Krimmel <madscien...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:<pan.2004.05.26...@hotmail.com>...
>>
>> On Tue, 25 May 2004 19:34:25 -0700, Patrick Reany wrote:
>>
>>
>> >>car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message
>> >>news:<c904ei$dml$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
>>
>> [...]
>>
>> > And if you aren't going to call those relationships "laws" any more,
>> > what do you call them?
>>
>> You are _completely_ confused about Dr. Carlip's participation in this
>> discussion. He is not rabid like you, and as such, he is not
>> spear-heading a complete redefinition and reclassification of all
>> science vocabulary as we know it. He has told you, now more than once,
>> how the word "law" is currently being (and has in the past been) used
>> by physicists. He's not arguing for any change from the current
>> semantics.
>
> But he is!
No, he's not. Reread his post and try again.
car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu
> car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message
> news:<c904ei$dml$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>...
> > The term is used by physicists today to refer to historically
> > established labels. It reflects the history the relevant ideas,
> > and sometimes a homage to great physicists of the past, rather
> > than anything more intrinsic. Thus, for instance, we speak of
> > ``Newton's law of gravity,'' but we call the more accurate modern
> > description ``the Einstein field equations,'' not ``Einstein's
> > law of gravity.''
> So, you claim that physicists don't use the phrase "Einstein's law of
> gravity." I don't know how you could prove that ascertion.
Well, I've been doing research in general relativity for about
20 years. I go to four or five conferences a year; I read between
500 and 1000 papers in the field a year. I'm on the editorial board
of the leading journal in the field. I expect I've talked to at
least a quarter of the people currently doing research in the field.
So I think I have a pretty good idea of how words are actually used.
> The question for you to answer for us is WHY they shouldn't use that
> phrase.
When it comes to language, I'm not a prescriptivist. If someone wants
to talk about ``Einstein's law of gravity,'' fine. The fact is that
most physicists don't, because the word ``law'' carries too much
historical baggage, and, because of that history, lumps together things
that don't belong together. It's as if someone invented a word for
``green things less than two centimeters high,'' to refer to grass
(when it's short enough), green books, and very shallow algae-filled
streams. Such a concept exists, but it's not very useful.
[...]
> > We speak of the ``ideal gas laws,'' but do
> > not use the term ``law'' for our now much better description
> > of the corresponding behavior of real gases.
> Poor Feynman -- he called it the "ideal gas law."
Read what you're responding to. As I said, we *do* speak of
the ``ideal gas laws.'' That term is historically established.
We don't call the better descriptions of real gases that now
exist ``laws.''
[...]
> You failed to state the definition of "physical law" now employed by
> you advanced-minded physicists of the modern era. Are we to take from
> this that you refuse to use the term "physical law" at all?
I did, in fact, describe the modern use of the term ``physical
law.'' In fact, you quoted the paragraph in which I did -- see
the beginning of this post. I will happily use the term ``law''
when it is the historically established name of something.
[...]
> > I have no wish to sell you anything.
> >
> > Steve Carlip
> I didn't say to sell me alone; I said to sell it to all of us.
OK. If someone else besides you posts a response in this thread
saying that they're not ``sold,'' I'll respond. If it's just you
who complains, feel free to use words any way you'd like.
Steve Carlip
greywolf42
news:c934pl$kk3$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu...
>
> OK. If someone else besides you posts a response in this thread
> saying that they're not ``sold,'' I'll respond. If it's just you
> who complains, feel free to use words any way you'd like.
Steve, your descriptions of the use of the word "law", as it arose in common
scientific literature is straightforward and accurate. I see nothing here
that you are trying to 'sell', unless it's historical information. Great
job.
And although I sometimes feel you try to 'sell' an idea, this is not one of
those times. Patrick's tenacity to the 'definition' of 'law' in science is
unmatched in the newsgroup. I don't believe there's a single poster he's
not demanded to 'define law' at least once. No matter how often he's given
an answer similar to what you have provided.
--
greywolf42
ubi dubium ibi libertas
{remove planet for return e-mail}
Jeff Krimmel
[...]
> Patrick's tenacity to the 'definition' of 'law' in science is
> unmatched in the newsgroup. I don't believe there's a single poster he's
> not demanded to 'define law' at least once.
Haha...quite true. :)
Patrick Reany
Laws are invariable relationships on values and/or events. They can be
ideal or not (empirical, phenomenological -- although no law is
required to be absolutely perfect). What I am saying is that there
exists more than mere historical habit to call the "ideal gas law" a
"law." Some laws are designed to describe an ideal model or situation,
such as the Law of Inertia.
> >
> > [...]
> > > You failed to state the definition of "physical law" now employed by
> > > you advanced-minded physicists of the modern era. Are we to take from
> > > this that you refuse to use the term "physical law" at all?
> >
> > I did, in fact, describe the modern use of the term ``physical
> > law.'' In fact, you quoted the paragraph in which I did -- see
> > the beginning of this post. I will happily use the term ``law''
> > when it is the historically established name of something.
> >
> > [...]
> > > > I have no wish to sell you anything.
>
> > > I didn't say to sell me alone; I said to sell it to all of us.
> >
> > OK. If someone else besides you posts a response in this thread
> > saying that they're not ``sold,'' I'll respond. If it's just you
> > who complains, feel free to use words any way you'd like.
>
> Steve, your descriptions of the use of the word "law", as it arose in common
> scientific literature is straightforward and accurate. I see nothing here
> that you are trying to 'sell', unless it's historical information. Great
> job.
>
> And although I sometimes feel you try to 'sell' an idea, this is not one of
> those times. Patrick's tenacity to the 'definition' of 'law' in science is
> unmatched in the newsgroup. I don't believe there's a single poster he's
> not demanded to 'define law' at least once.
And how many "definitions" have I received in reply? And this a
science newgroup. It has been very revealing. From both physicists
(though not all of them) and non-physicists alike we have seen just
how bad is science education in the West. Most of you people haven't
the slightest idea of the centrality of physical laws in the
epistemology of science.
What is a science if not a search for all the laws which describe the
behavior of the phenomena under its domain? The scientific laws are
the principal means of justifying scientific knowledge claims. We
trust the relativistic corrections to GPS on the basis of our
relativistic laws of space, time, and motion. We count on these
relativistic corrections to give us correct results day after day,
year ofter year, precisely because they are derived from relativistic
laws --- those invariable metrical relationships of relativity.
Carlip is trying to sell us the belief that to continue to claim that
the label "physical law" is more important in the naming conventions
of science beyond mere historical usage is naive or deluded; that it
is out of touch with modern usage and any good sense. That is
nonsense. I don't give a damn what modern usage is if it is
rationalized on the basis a number of misconceptions.
On what basis does Carlip KNOW where the Schwarzschild Radius, R, is
for an arbitrary black hole anywhere in the known universe? That
knowledge claim is justified on the basis of the law
R = 2MG/c^2
a relationship first introduced by the Rev John Michell in 1783, and
is a relationship which by now is justified by induction (confidence
gained by its repeated correct use over the decades, according to the
Duhem-Quine Thesis). The point is that the relationship is either
empirically correct or not correct, regardless of which theories or
traditions claim it.
> No matter how often he's given
> an answer similar to what you have provided.
What "answers" have I been given? A bunch of muddle-headed nonsense so
far.
Let me get this right. You're saying that there is nothing in physics
which is actually called a "law" that deserves today to be called a
"law," except in begrudged deference to its historical usage? I ask
because that is exactly the position taken by Carlip.
It is obvious that Ohm's law does not have the "generality" of
Newton's Laws, but Newton's Law doesn't have the "generality" of
Einstein's Law of Gravitation. So what? It's also obvious that a
dollar is not as "general" as a hundred-dollar bills, which itself is
not as "general" as a thousand-dollar bill, yet each is a form of
money. Generality is a completely irrelevant notion from the
epistemological viewpoint. An invariable relationship on physical
values is an invariable relationship, regardless of how "general" that
relationship is compared to some other invariable relationship. Which
invariable relationships "deserved" to be named by convention is a
matter of practicality.
Even Bode's Law is a legitimate invariable relationship on the orbits
of the planets in some sense. It was even used to make an important
astronomical prediction, as described on the webpage:
Bode's Law
The Titius-Bode Law is rough rule that predicts
the spacing of the planets in the Solar System.
The relationship was first pointed out by Johann
Titius in 1766 and was formulated as a mathematical
expression by J.E. Bode in 1778. It lead Bode to
predict the existence of another planet between
Mars and Jupiter in what we now recognize as the
asteroid belt.
http://astrosun2.astro.cornell.edu/academics/courses/astro201/bodes_law.htm
----------------------------------
I can see all kinds of objections brought against Bode's Law (P_n =
P_0 A^n):
1) It's not derivable by any known theory.
So what? That is in itself only good to declare the invariable
relationship as "accidental." But even that is a guess, and somewhat
arrogantly proffered.
2) It's not meaningfully applied to the entire solar system, unless we
regard the asteriod belt as the remains of a former planet.
Yet it has been used profitably as a base of prediction. Laws can come
with exceptional cases defined.
3) It's not eternally invariable because the solar system evolves
slowly.
Indeed, someday the configuration of the planets may force us to drop
it as a law. But for the foreseeable future, it is a law.
4) Finally, there's not much use for the law in any case.
Irrelevant from the epistemological viewpoint. Science is supposed to
provide us with a reasonable basis for belief. Bode's Law should be
around for a hundred, a thousand, or a million years. I think that we
can continue to believe in it for some time to come, but whether or
not Bode's Law will ever again find a new practical use is too early
to say.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
You people are amazing. I have PROVED that Carlip was in ERROR when he
set himself up as spokesman for all physicists, even in his own field.
I showed that one of his own, John C. Taylor, mathematical physicist
from Cambridge, used the phrase "Einstein's law of gravitation" on
page 204 of his book Hidden Unity in Nature's Laws. Yet you want to
ignore this disproof that Carlip knows what he is talking about and
reward his misconceptions and poor scholarship by putting this
nonsense of his in the FAQs for this NG? This NG is rife with denial
and dishonesty and a plethora of misconceptions about the nature of
science.
Yet, Carlip is not a bad guy. He's obviously quite sincere in his
beliefs. But he's wrong just the same. Carlip got his education about
science in the same place that the rest of us did: from an educational
system that has systematically removed the philosophy of science from
science education. We reap the misconceptions which it has sown.
Science turned against itself. It's quite clear now that people do NOT
grasp the nature of science from just studying science without the
philosophy of science. And no amount of dogmatizing errors based on
misconceptions is going to change the truth of their bankruptcy.
What I'm asking Carlip and the rest of you to do is to open your minds
just long enought to consider the possibility that you people could be
wrong, and to consider alternatives. And most of all, to give rational
reasons for your beliefs.
The purpose of science is to produce scientific knowledge by the
scientific method. And a large portion of that knowledge resides in
the laws of science.
Patrick
greywolf42
news:844a1b64.04052...@posting.google.com...
> "greywolf42" <min...@marssim-ss.com> wrote in message
news:<10bacr8...@corp.supernews.com>...
> > <car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu> wrote in message
> > news:c934pl$kk3$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu...
{snip higher levels}
> Laws are invariable relationships on values and/or events. They can be
> ideal or not (empirical, phenomenological -- although no law is
> required to be absolutely perfect). What I am saying is that there
> exists more than mere historical habit to call the "ideal gas law" a
> "law." Some laws are designed to describe an ideal model or situation,
> such as the Law of Inertia.
Patrick, you are unwilling to learn. In this way, your own science
education has failed you. For the most important part of education is
showing the student how to learn.
What you would like *physical law* to stand for does not equate with how the
common usage of the term came to be. The term is a social accident. There
is no such thing as a "physical law" in the scientific method.
{snip higher levels}
> > Patrick's tenacity to the 'definition' of 'law' in science is
> > unmatched in the newsgroup. I don't believe there's a single poster
> > he's not demanded to 'define law' at least once.
>
> And how many "definitions" have I received in reply?
I know for one that I have repeatedly reminded you that there is no such
thing in the scientific method. You've been told the same by several
others. How many times do you need to be told?
> And this a
> science newgroup. It has been very revealing. From both physicists
> (though not all of them) and non-physicists alike we have seen just
> how bad is science education in the West. Most of you people haven't
> the slightest idea of the centrality of physical laws in the
> epistemology of science.
Sure we do. It's null.
> What is a science if not a search for all the laws which describe the
> behavior of the phenomena under its domain?
The search for knowledge of the physical universe. Laws are for priests and
politicians.
> The scientific laws are
> the principal means of justifying scientific knowledge claims.
Nope. Equations are only descriptions of approximations of how things work.
Experiment is the principle means of justifying scientific knowledge.
> We
> trust the relativistic corrections to GPS on the basis of our
> relativistic laws of space, time, and motion.
Nope. We trust the GPS engineered system because it gets us where we are
going. We don't care what theory (if any) was used by those designing it.
(In fact, they allowed for any theory to be correct. It has an empirical
adjustment.)
> We count on these
> relativistic corrections to give us correct results day after day,
> year ofter year, precisely because they are derived from relativistic
> laws --- those invariable metrical relationships of relativity.
We don't even do that. (That would be silly from the point of view of the
engineers of the system.) The satellites are constanly updated to catch any
unexpected variations. No assumption is made that the relationships are
'invariable'. Let alone what theory they apply to.
> Carlip is trying to sell us the belief that to continue to claim that
> the label "physical law" is more important in the naming conventions
> of science beyond mere historical usage is naive or deluded; that it
> is out of touch with modern usage and any good sense.
Why are you trying to put words into his mouth, and/or guess what his next
effort is going to be? He simply corrected your claim about the historical
etiology of the term 'physical law.' He certainly didn't use the words
"naive" or "deluded." These are terms that *you* frequently use. He also
didn't make any allusions to "good sense".
> That is nonsense.
I agree that your overreaction is nonsense.
> I don't give a damn what modern usage is if it is
> rationalized on the basis a number of misconceptions.
That begs the question, of course.
> On what basis does Carlip KNOW where the Schwarzschild Radius, R, is
> for an arbitrary black hole anywhere in the known universe?
Steve did not claim absolute, perfect knowledge. He simply gave you a
historical review.
> That
> knowledge claim is justified on the basis of the law
>
> R = 2MG/c^2
>
> a relationship first introduced by the Rev John Michell in 1783, and
> is a relationship which by now is justified by induction (confidence
> gained by its repeated correct use over the decades, according to the
> Duhem-Quine Thesis). The point is that the relationship is either
> empirically correct or not correct,
The fallacy of the excluded middle. An equation can be 'correct' to certain
precision in certain scales, and 'incorrect' to other precisions or other
scales.
> regardless of which theories or traditions claim it.
And all that is irrelevant to the use of the social term "physical law."
> > No matter how often he's given
> > an answer similar to what you have provided.
>
> What "answers" have I been given?
Ones similar to what Steve provided to you, of course.
> A bunch of muddle-headed nonsense so far.
That you refuse to learn is a failing in your education.
> Let me get this right. You're saying that there is nothing in physics
> which is actually called a "law" that deserves today to be called a
> "law," except in begrudged deference to its historical usage? I ask
> because that is exactly the position taken by Carlip.
Actually, Steve took no position whatsoever on what might 'deserved to be
called a law.' He simply described the historical usage of the term.
And you are well aware that AFAIAC, there is nothing in the scientific
method that deserves to be called a 'law.'
> It is obvious that Ohm's law does not have the "generality" of
> Newton's Laws, but Newton's Law doesn't have the "generality" of
> Einstein's Law of Gravitation. So what?
Generality under the current paradigm has nothing to do with historical
usage.
> It's also obvious that a
> dollar is not as "general" as a hundred-dollar bills, which itself is
> not as "general" as a thousand-dollar bill, yet each is a form of
> money.
The marks on a bill in no way make the bill less 'general' than bills with
different marks.
> Generality is a completely irrelevant notion from the
> epistemological viewpoint.
Then why did you bring up the issue? Just to ravel it? Neither Steve nor I
mentioned generality.
> An invariable relationship on physical
> values is an invariable relationship, regardless of how "general" that
> relationship is compared to some other invariable relationship. Which
> invariable relationships "deserved" to be named by convention is a
> matter of practicality.
Neither Steve nor I brought up the issue of 'deservedness' or 'genearality.'
> Even Bode's Law is a legitimate invariable relationship on the orbits
> of the planets in some sense.
It's not invariable. It varies to certain precisions in every orbital
system within the solar system.
{snip the irrelevancy of details of the Titius/Bode series, gleaned from a
webpage}
Patrick Reany
addendum:
A physical law, such the equations of the gravitational
field, cannot be derived by purely logical processes.
-- Peter Bergmann, Introduction to the Theory of
Relativity, p. 178.
I'm just keeping a record of physicists do use "physical law" (or
something close to it) contrary to your claimed convention.
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Patrick Reany wrote:
>
> A physical law, such the equations of the gravitational
> field, cannot be derived by purely logical processes.
>
> -- Peter Bergmann, Introduction to the Theory of
> Relativity, p. 178.
>
> I'm just keeping a record of physicists do use "physical law" (or
> something close to it) contrary to your claimed convention.
Some do, some don't. I any case it has nothing to do with the quality of
the science produced. Arguing about -names of things- is a dry, empty
waste of time.
If Newton had called his three laws of motion, the three crumpets of
motion, the physics would still be the same.
Bob Kolker
Bilge
That doesn't make sense patrick. What you've been told is that
``law'' is used to mean too many incompatible things. All you've
done is provide one example of those things which are incompatible.
If you are going to argue, then the argument you have to make is
that ``law'' is used and has been used consistently, unless you
don't understand anything anyone has said.
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
> news:844a1b64.04052...@posting.google.com...
> > "greywolf42" <min...@marssim-ss.com> wrote in message
> news:<10bacr8...@corp.supernews.com>...
> > > <car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu> wrote in message
> > > news:c934pl$kk3$2...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu...
>
> {snip higher levels}
>
> > Laws are invariable relationships on values and/or events. They can be
> > ideal or not (empirical, phenomenological -- although no law is
> > required to be absolutely perfect). What I am saying is that there
> > exists more than mere historical habit to call the "ideal gas law" a
> > "law." Some laws are designed to describe an ideal model or situation,
> > such as the Law of Inertia.
>
> Patrick, you are unwilling to learn. In this way, your own science
> education has failed you. For the most important part of education is
> showing the student how to learn.
That depends on who is teaching.
>
> What you would like *physical law* to stand for does not equate with how the
> common usage of the term came to be. The term is a social accident. There
> is no such thing as a "physical law" in the scientific method.
What does the scientific method mean to you?
>
> {snip higher levels}
>
> > > Patrick's tenacity to the 'definition' of 'law' in science is
> > > unmatched in the newsgroup. I don't believe there's a single poster
> > > he's not demanded to 'define law' at least once.
> >
> > And how many "definitions" have I received in reply?
>
> I know for one that I have repeatedly reminded you that there is no such
> thing in the scientific method. You've been told the same by several
> others. How many times do you need to be told?
Talk is cheap. Anyone can SAY anything.
>
> > And this a
> > science newgroup. It has been very revealing. From both physicists
> > (though not all of them) and non-physicists alike we have seen just
> > how bad is science education in the West. Most of you people haven't
> > the slightest idea of the centrality of physical laws in the
> > epistemology of science.
>
> Sure we do. It's null.
>
> > What is a science if not a search for all the laws which describe the
> > behavior of the phenomena under its domain?
>
> The search for knowledge of the physical universe. Laws are for priests and
> politicians.
So, characterize for us in your own words the form that this
"knowledge of the physical universe" takes.
>
> > The scientific laws are
> > the principal means of justifying scientific knowledge claims.
>
> Nope. Equations are only descriptions of approximations of how things work.
> Experiment is the principle means of justifying scientific knowledge.
Granted, as a general rule, equations of physical content are
approximate. But at some point of the experimental testing process,
one usually eventually decides to affirm the relationship (hypothesis)
or reject the relationship under testing. If it's affirmed, that means
that we can count on that relationship to hold under some set of
conditions and that we accept this claim without further explicit
testing. At which point it's become a vetted law.
Patrick
Bill Hobba
Let me see. Dr Carlip said: 'When it comes to language, I'm not a
prescriptivist. If someone wants to talk about ``Einstein's law of
gravity,'' fine. The fact is that
most physicists don't, because the word ``law'' carries too much historical
baggage, and, because of that history, lumps together things that don't
belong together. It's as if someone invented a word for `green things less
than two centimeters high,'' to refer to grass (when it's short enough),
green books, and very shallow algae-filled streams. Such a concept exists,
but it's not very useful'. Now exactly how does what John C Taylor said
contradict that?
>
> Yet, Carlip is not a bad guy. He's obviously quite sincere in his
> beliefs. But he's wrong just the same. Carlip got his education about
> science in the same place that the rest of us did: from an educational
> system that has systematically removed the philosophy of science from
> science education. We reap the misconceptions which it has sown.
> Science turned against itself. It's quite clear now that people do NOT
> grasp the nature of science from just studying science without the
> philosophy of science. And no amount of dogmatizing errors based on
> misconceptions is going to change the truth of their bankruptcy.
>
> What I'm asking Carlip and the rest of you to do is to open your minds
> just long enought to consider the possibility that you people could be
> wrong, and to consider alternatives. And most of all, to give rational
> reasons for your beliefs.
You mean like the erroneous logic you used above? Patrick in case you have
not seen the error in your logic - hint - one is not most.
>
> The purpose of science is to produce scientific knowledge by the
> scientific method. And a large portion of that knowledge resides in
> the laws of science.
The purpose of science is to practice the scientific method - end of story.
Your added bits appended above a your own inventions. As I have said
elsewhere your beliefs are not the be all and end all - in fact IMHO they
are usually a crock of crap. Of course that is only my opinion - but
judging from the responses of others I am not the only one that holds it.
Thanks
Bill.
jmfb...@aol.com
news:<40b48fad$0$3156$61fe...@news.rcn.com>...
>> In article <c904ei$dml$1...@woodrow.ucdavis.edu>,
>> car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote:
>>
>> [I can't snip it.]
Note that Reaney did snip it without notation. I suspect
he didn't bother to read it even though he had a second
chance.
No, you didn't. You showed that the writeup that Mr. Carlip did
was correct.
> .. when he
>set himself up as spokesman for all physicists,
Which he didn't. He happens to have a lot of experience
WORKING in a particular part of the physics biz which you
apparently dismissed as not important when the use of
words in science is being discussed.
> .. even in his own field.
So, you are stating that people who do the work have no information
about the work?
>I showed that one of his own, John C. Taylor, mathematical physicist
>from Cambridge, used the phrase "Einstein's law of gravitation" on
>page 204 of his book Hidden Unity in Nature's Laws. Yet you want to
>ignore this disproof that Carlip knows what he is talking about
But he does know what he's talking about. That statement is
based on Mr. Carlip actually talking about the science.
> .. and
>reward his misconceptions and poor scholarship by putting this
>nonsense of his in the FAQs for this NG?
I suggested that his blurb go into the FAQ because more kiddies
have had confusion about the use of the word "law". Mr. Carlip's
writeup was intelligent, well-written, and concise. That means
that his explanation was easily understood using the least amount
of words, leaving enough pointers for those who want to learn
more about the subject. I consider it a work of art.
> This NG is rife with denial
>and dishonesty and a plethora of misconceptions about the nature of
>science.
I agree; you have been contributing about 1% of that plethora.
>
>Yet, Carlip is not a bad guy. He's obviously quite sincere in his
>beliefs. But he's wrong just the same. Carlip got his education about
>science in the same place that the rest of us did: from an educational
>system that has systematically removed the philosophy of science from
>science education. We reap the misconceptions which it has sown.
>Science turned against itself. It's quite clear now that people do NOT
>grasp the nature of science from just studying science without the
>philosophy of science. And no amount of dogmatizing errors based on
>misconceptions is going to change the truth of their bankruptcy.
>
>What I'm asking Carlip and the rest of you to do is to open your minds
>just long enought to consider the possibility that you people could be
>wrong, and to consider alternatives. And most of all, to give rational
>reasons for your beliefs.
Unfortunately, I think I was 100% correct about you when I
caught a hint that you were really advocating changes based
on Fundamentalist Christian movement.
>
>The purpose of science is to produce scientific knowledge by the
>scientific method. And a large portion of that knowledge resides in
>the laws of science.
If you had ever read about the Scientific Method, you would have
discovered there is no such thing as "laws" described in that
method. The method is a guide of how to go about formulating
an explanation for something one noticed that got one curious.
There is no 10 commandments that say, "x is something you cannot
change because it is a law." You are trying to wheedle these
scientists here until one finally states that "God's Law #2: f=ma".
They are not going to do that.
I used to have a boss exactly like you. He'ld sit in my office
having the most painful conversations with me because his goal,
before walking into the office, would be to get me to say
one particular arrangement of words. And he wouldn't quit until
I did say them out loud word-for-word what he had written down.
1. All these conversations were cold starts. It usually took me
an hour to figure out WTF he was talking about.
2. After I would figure out the subject of the talk, it would
take me another hour to figure out the precise arrangement of
words that he wanted to hear spout out of my mouth.
3. If I had an article (a, the, an) out of place the whole
fucking conversation would start over at #1.
Now, you are using the same techniques that he did. Since
I refused to spout words that would get me fired or ineligible
for a raise, he got very frustrated. The last time I saw him
he got committed for a nervous breakdown.
/BAH
Patrick Reany
> "Patrick Reany" <re...@asu.edu> wrote in message
[snip]
>
> >
> > The purpose of science is to produce scientific knowledge by the
> > scientific method. And a large portion of that knowledge resides in
> > the laws of science.
>
> The purpose of science is to practice the scientific method - end of story.
(Note: I was forced by groups.google.com to start a new thread as it
reported an error saying that it somehow lost the information it
needed for to make a reply.)
That's most inane thing you've said in a while. You might as well also
say that purpose of scientists is for them to practice the scientific
method, or the purpose of baseball is to practice of baseball, or that
the purpose of the production line is to get factory workers to do
their work in a line up. Why don't you say something useful for a
change, such as by telling us what is the purpose of the scientific
method. (Hopefully, you'll tell us something more insightful than
this: The purpose of the scientific method is to get people to become
scientists.)
Patrick
Patrick Reany
> Patrick Reany:
> >car...@no-physics-spam.ucdavis.edu wrote in message news:
> >> In sci.physics Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> wrote:
>
> >> When it comes to language, I'm not a prescriptivist. If someone wants
> >> to talk about ``Einstein's law of gravity,'' fine. The fact is that
> >> most physicists don't, because the word ``law'' carries too much
> >> historical baggage, and, because of that history, lumps together things
> >> that don't belong together.
> >
> >addendum:
> >
> > A physical law, such the equations of the gravitational
> > field, cannot be derived by purely logical processes.
> >
> > -- Peter Bergmann, Introduction to the Theory of
> > Relativity, p. 178.
> >
> >I'm just keeping a record of physicists do use "physical law" (or
> >something close to it) contrary to your claimed convention.
>
> That doesn't make sense patrick. What you've been told is that
> ``law'' is used to mean too many incompatible things.
Then you claim that Bergmann was wrong to use the terms, right?
Yes, I've been told, but I don't give a damn about being told; talk is
cheap. I demand proof, which has been totally lacking on the part of
those against me, including you. I don't ascribe to the fallacious
argument form of "appeal to authority" (argumentum ad verecundiam). So
far all I've gotten is rank emotionalism: "Gee, folks, just look at
the "difference" between Ohm's law and Newton's laws -- wow, they sure
look really different, don't they. Idiocy. Just define "physical law"
to find their similarities. I've already done that. I can't help it if
you people prefer to be emotional rather than logical and practical.
> All you've
> done is provide one example of those things which are incompatible.
> If you are going to argue, then the argument you have to make is
> that ``law'' is used and has been used consistently, unless you
> don't understand anything anyone has said.
So far I'd have to say that you are factually wrong. Every case I've
gone over recently of rules which are historically called "physical
laws," have ALL had the same form: They've all been in the form of a
set of conditionals being all true at once implying some set of
conclusions. If you find a single counterexample out of the totality
of those historical "physical laws," first tell us about it, second,
unless you can find a huge number of such anomalies, the better
reaction to this situation would be to reject the anomaly rather than
to reject the notion of "physical law."
There is a certain set of conditions which if met implies "Ohm's Law,"
V = IR; and there is a certain set of conditions which if met implies
"Newton's Laws," including F = ma. That they have different ranges of
generality is irrelevant. So, what is a "physical law"? "Physical
laws" take this form: If you have a certain set of physical conditions
met then one can infer a certain set of physical conclusions. This is
the primary basis on which science claims to be able to have
predictive knowledge.
The confusion comes from people incorrectly calling "V = IR" by itself
"Ohm's Law." Ohm's Law is the association of V=IR with certain
physical conditions that have to be met. Generally speaking, regarding
physical laws, those conditions are always sufficient but not always
necessary. If they are not necessary, then the law can be generalized.
If the conditions are both sufficient and necessary, then one can
infer the truth of the set of conditions associated to it as well if
the conclusion is true. That may not be a very tight restriction of
physical conditions, but it is something. And that's how the laws of
physics get used both ways.
Patrick