Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
Immortalista
1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on
some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for
example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and
therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans)
or
2. presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as
it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will
hold as they have always been observed to hold).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction
------------------------------------------
Two views of Deduction & Induction:
View 1: conclusion;
Deduction = infers particular from general truths
Induction = infers general from particular truths
View 2: conclusion;
Deduction = follows with absolute necessity
Induction = follows with some degree of probability
Deduction and Induction From
Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copi
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/
Sam Wormley
> What is the justification for either:
>
There isn't any.
Immortalista
The Problem of the Criterion
A general argument against the invocation of any standard for
knowledge has come to be known as "the problem of the
criterion." ...there have been disputes about standards of knowledge.
Some are about particular kinds of arguments that provide evidence for
knowledge claims. ...others are about the degree of evidential support
or reliability required for knowledge. The Pyrrhonian skeptics used an
argument designed to instill doubt that any such standard can be
established.
Suppose there is a dispute about a standard of knowledge. If the
dispute is to be settled rationally, there must be some means for
settling it. It would do no good of each side simply to assert its
position without argument. So how would a standard of knowledge (or
"criterion of truth," in the language of the Stoics) be defended? It
could only be defended by reference to some standard or other. If the
standard under dispute is invoked, then the question has been begged.
If another standard is appealed to, the question arises again, to be
answered either by circular reasoning or by appeal to yet another
standard. So either the process of invoking standards does not
terminate, or it ends in circular reasoning, and in neither case would
the dispute be settled rationally.
Marshall
> On Dec 12, 6:08 pm, Sam Wormley <sworml...@mchsi.com> wrote:
>
> > On 12/12/09 8:01 PM, Immortalista wrote:
>
> > > What is the justification for either:
>
> > There isn't any.
>
> The Problem of the Criterion
>
> [blah blah blah]
Immortalist is an automated clipping service. It posts a long
article, then some guy replies, and 2 minutes later, a lengthy
counterresponse that has nothing to do with the post it's
replying to. Not a reply a human could or would have typed
in that time.
At least it's a roughly on-topic clipping service, and not a
spambot.
Marshall
Immortalista
> On Dec 12, 6:10 pm, Immortalista <extro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 12, 6:08 pm, Sam Wormley <sworml...@mchsi.com> wrote:
>
> > > On 12/12/09 8:01 PM, Immortalista wrote:
>
> > > > What is the justification for either:
>
> > > There isn't any.
>
> > The Problem of the Criterion
>
> > [blah blah blah]
>
> Immortalist is an automated clipping service. It posts a long
> article, then some guy replies, and 2 minutes later, a lengthy
> counterresponse that has nothing to do with the post it's
> replying to. Not a reply a human could or would have typed
> in that time.
>
This is I the clipper! He responded that there was no justification
for either of the two alternatives I presented, and I asked what was
his criterion or standard?
Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding an meta-
justification standard for justifying emperical beliefs.
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.
2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.
6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.
7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely
justified sceptical beliefs.
The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical
justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to
this untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with
the apparent "regress" of one belief depending upon another which
depends upon another and so on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
(3) circle back upon itself in some way.
If we think about justification moving in a linear direction, with one
proposition becomeing the justification for another we run into an
viscious regress that doesnt seem to end. It can be open ended and go
on forever or it can become circular where each support depending on
the last leads to the same supports over time. This is how scepticism
defeated foundationalism. It seems that all we were left with a hope
for escape from this dilemma of no certain knowledge is a modified
version of the circular argument. Instead of a linear regress of
justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of evidences or
propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining
supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle,
different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate,
events in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a
competition amoungst such partial certainties, we gain at least the
best knowledge we can find.
> At least it's a roughly on-topic clipping service, and not a
> spambot.
>
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laAgZaHhT1A
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52xoRLh2dWw
> Marshall
tj Frazir
build run till it bust and build the next not to bust.
It might be just taking a part out and switching it untill it works.
Knowledge is when you know if its pulling so may amps the breaker pops
the motor is not turning .
Its not going to happen in an instant.
its work work work and if its the best then its the best .
You must know when its junk or neads to not be taking your time up.
quick to think and slow to speek.
Michael Gordge
> Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
Clue for the idiots, preceeding reasoning with an adjective does not
change the meaning of reasoing.
MG
Tim
So then deduction and induction are the same thing? Talk about idiocy!
Aatu Koskensilta
Preceding Kant with an adjective also does nothing! But do we not find,
in the official Objectivist doctrine and canon, no distinction between
inductive and other kinds of reasoning?
--
Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.kos...@uta.fi)
"Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, dar�ber muss man schweigen"
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
ZerkonXXXX
> What is the justification for either:
Self evident... or ... If you have to ask...
The base is reasoning. Here reason is being classified as one type or
another. So what is the justification for these classifications which
seems to force difference?
Taking these outside their own world and placing them into the world of
human utility in which they both might address a problem other than
themselves (eg: "why was The Red-Headed League Dissolved?"), the answer
becomes elementary.
Tim
> Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> writes:
> > On Dec 13, 1:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> Does inductive reasoning lead to knowledge?
>
> > Clue for the idiots, preceeding reasoning with an adjective does not
> > change the meaning of reasoing.
>
> Preceding Kant with an adjective also does nothing! But do we not find,
> in the official Objectivist doctrine and canon, no distinction between
> inductive and other kinds of reasoning?
>
Surely what we find in the Objectivist dogma is a complete and utter
lack of reasoning.
> --
> Aatu Koskensilta (aatu.koskensi...@uta.fi)
>
> "Wovon man nicht sprechan kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
Frederick Williams
> Induction = follows with some degree of probability
Try proving that! (Or read Hume.)
--
Pigeons were widely suspected of secret intercourse with the
enemy; counter-measures included the use of British birds of
prey to intercept suspicious pigeons in mid-air.
Christopher Andrew, 'Defence of the Realm', Allen Lane
Daniel T.
The problem is that all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary
definitions or inductive arguments.
Everything we know about reality is ultimately inductive. So what's your
point?
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> .... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary
> definitions or inductive arguments.
>
How so?
> Everything we know about reality is ultimately inductive.
This is a big claim! Got any argument for it?
--
dorayme
Daniel T.
> things that we know about reality might be relational.
>�
> For example, we know about lines as sums of points, areas as sums of
> lines, and volumes as sums of areas. The list goes on, backwards and
> forwards. Physics is just chock full of relational equations. These
> equations are things we say we (conditionally) know.
We *define* lines as sums of points and areas as sums of lines and
volumes as sums of areas.
I don't think you are disagreing with me. You seem to be simply bringing
up a particular case.
My basic point is that for all sound deductive arguments, there must be
a set of true premises. These premises are eather deductivly true (which
leads to a circle,) true by definition (as in your example,) or
inductivly true.
Daniel T.
> "Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> > .... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary definitions
> > or inductive arguments.
> >
>
> How so?
Every sound deductive argument requires true premises. These premises
must be proven true through either deductive or inductive arguments, or
by arbitrary definitions.
Note that the above statement is circular in regards to deductive
arguments and only stops at premises that are true either by definition
or deductively. Therefore, all deductive arguments ultimately rely on
either arbitrary definitions or inductive arguments.
I can see where you might want to quibble with me about the use of the
word "arbitrary" but the point here is that the definitions in question
cannot be justified through either deductive or inductive arguments, so
consider that to be the definition of "arbitrary" for this special case.
(The above deductive argument itself ultimately relies on definitions.)
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> My basic point is that for all sound deductive arguments, there must be
> a set of true premises. These premises are eather deductivly true (which
> leads to a circle,) true by definition (as in your example,) or
> inductivly true.
I doubt if a reasonable belief in a proposition has to fall into one of
these three categories.
It can be reasonable to believe something because there is nothing else
one can think of that explains as much. This is not obviously something
that can be squeezed into these straight jackets.
Not only is it not the case that it looks forced to think of explanation
as induction from cases but there is the question of statements which
are not "true by definition" (using your terms) but which are impossible
to deny, such as first person statements about how things *seem* to the
person.
--
dorayme
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > "Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> >
> > > .... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary definitions
> > > or inductive arguments.
> > >
> >
> > How so?
>
> Every sound deductive argument requires true premises.
Soundness in the sense of validity of argument has nothing to do with
the truth per se of the premises or the conclusions. This sort of
logical goodness is only about the relationship between the truth of
either.
Naturally an argument often is the worse for not having true premises in
any actual practical use.
> These premises
> must be proven true through either deductive or inductive arguments, or
> by arbitrary definitions.
>
No, this is incorrect or at least is not obvious. I replied in another
post on this matter.
--
dorayme
John Stafford
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
In deductive reasoning, arguments that depend upon how things "seem" is
immediately weak so the argument is not sound. Discard it. That's how it
works.
Patricia Aldoraz
>
> In deductive reasoning, arguments that depend upon how things "seem" is
> immediately weak so the argument is not sound. Discard it. That's how it
> works.
That is how *what* works exactly?
dorayme
<76ceb3ee-0a86-42c2...@z3g2000prd.googlegroups.com>,
Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
There are various types of weaknesses in arguments, one being the
premises do not support the conclusion, the other being the conclusion
is too obviously contained in the premises, another would be the
premises are false. These things need to be distinguished and some sort
of context mentioned otherwise sweeping generalizations look like false
knee jerk reactions to what was actually said.
Arguments that depend on how things seem are not immediately weak in the
sense that they *must* have false premises. They are not necessarily
weak in the sense that they *must* lack the entailment relationship.
A patient tells his doctor:
"I seem to see a fog when I first open my eyes in the mornings.
"There is never any fog at this time of the year.
"Therefore, there is something wrong with me"
There are even trivial but perfectly valid ones like:
"I seem to always think Mr. X is a bachelor!
Therefore I always seem to think Mr. X is an unmarried man."
--
dorayme
M Purcell
> In article <daniel_t-D773AE.18584313122...@earthlink.us.supernews.com>,
Yes, a proposition must be imagined first. And since there may be an
unimagined proposition that contradicts the known, I suppose the
certainty of an assumption is limited by our imagination.
John Stafford
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> In article
> <76ceb3ee-0a86-42c2...@z3g2000prd.googlegroups.com>,
> Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 14, 12:39 pm, John Stafford <n...@droffats.ten> wrote:
> > >
> > > In deductive reasoning, arguments that depend upon how things "seem" is
> > > immediately weak so the argument is not sound. Discard it. That's how it
> > > works.
> >
> > That is how *what* works exactly?
>
> [...].
I screwed up and addressed deductive reasoning. Sorry for that!
Patricia Aldoraz
I think there is a misunderstanding. The point is not about how a
proposition seems but rather that how some things seem to humans has
traditionally been argued to be incorrigible, not able to be doubted,
not able to be imagined wrong.
It has been argued that my seeming to see a red patch before my eyes
is something that needs no argument to establish, there is no evidence
beyond the act of it seeming so to me that could count as being
evidence for it. That rules out inductive reasoning being the
justification. And there is surely no deductive argument that brings
us to the proposition.
If such statements about my experience are neither deductively arrived
at nor inductively arived at, it does not augur well for the idea that
there is some circularity in a deductive argument that contains such
premises.
M Purcell
wrote:
The misunderstanding is yours.
> It has been argued that my seeming to see a red patch before my eyes
> is something that needs no argument to establish, there is no evidence
> beyond the act of it seeming so to me that could count as being
> evidence for it. That rules out inductive reasoning being the
> justification. And there is surely no deductive argument that brings
> us to the proposition.
The fact that you are ignorant of other evidence does not preclude
it's existance.
> If such statements about my experience are neither deductively arrived
> at nor inductively arived at, it does not augur well for the idea that
> there is some circularity in a deductive argument that contains such
> premises.
Justifying your experience because it is your experience is a circular
argument.
PD
The rationale for inductive reasoning is that it works expeditiously
in matters of science. The reason why it works is because of the
options of controlled experiment and abundant observational
opportunity.
This is in fact the crucial step, as the inference itself as an
internal mental process proves little.
This is the mistake that many hobbyists make, judging both theories
and the methodology used to produce them on the basis of the purely
*mental* process. On that basis, then deduction is more sound than
induction. This basis is attractive to hobbyists because it requires
no resources other than a brain. However, science involves observation
and measurement, and this additional component is what makes the
difference, even though that becomes prohibitive to many hobbyists.
Kevin B. Murphy
On 12-Dec-2009, Immortalista <extr...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on
> some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for
> example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and
> therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans)
> or
Generalizing doesn't lead to knowledge... If someone harbors a suspicion of
me based on a generalization then it is incumbent of me to confirm that
suspicion... but only if I am made aware of what I am suspected of.
--
Denial of Free Will makes the Knowledge of Order Absolute.
Patricia Aldoraz
> Justifying your experience because it is your experience is a circular
> argument.
But no one has proposed doing this?
Patricia Aldoraz
> On Dec 12, 8:01 pm, Immortalista <extro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> The rationale for inductive reasoning is that it works expeditiously
> in matters of science.
You seem unaware of the basic objection to this idea, namely that we
could only have confidence in it to the extent that we could be
confident that it go on working. And this latter is one of the main
problems in the idea of justifying induction in the first place.
M Purcell
Daniel T.
> "Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> > dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > > "Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > > .... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary
> > > > definitions or inductive arguments.
> > > >
> > >
> > > How so?
> >
> > Every sound deductive argument requires true premises.
>
> Soundness in the sense of validity of argument has nothing to do
> with the truth per se of the premises or the conclusions.
Soundness and validity have two different meanings. A "sound" argument
requires true premises, a "valid" argument does not.
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
OK, that is fair enough. I am never sure who knows what i this usenet
group or how quite they are using words.
This leaves your claim that all deductive arguments rely on arbitrary
definitions or inductive arguments. Be interested to see how you
establish this.
--
dorayme
Daniel T.
> "Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> > My basic point is that for all sound deductive arguments, there must be
> > a set of true premises. These premises are eather deductivly true (which
> > leads to a circle,) true by definition (as in your example,) or
> > inductivly true.
>
> I doubt if a reasonable belief in a proposition has to fall into one of
> these three categories.
>
> It can be reasonable to believe something because there is nothing else
> one can think of that explains as much. This is not obviously something
> that can be squeezed into these straight jackets.
The way you know that what you are thinking of explains so much is
through inductive reasoning. It has always explained things in the past.
Maybe if you give an example?
> Not only is it not the case that it looks forced to think of explanation
> as induction from cases but there is the question of statements which
> are not "true by definition" (using your terms) but which are impossible
> to deny, such as first person statements about how things *seem* to the
> person.
How things seem tells us nothing about how things are, the best we can
do is wrap them up in inductive arguments.
"That crow seems black" is not an argument of any sort. "I've asked 5
people who saw the crow, and they all have said that it seemed black."
is an inductive argument.
Again, maybe if you gave an example?
I'm certainly willing to modify my position. Can you present an argument
(i.e., syllogism) that doesn't fit the assertion I made?
Daniel T.
> Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Dec 14, 12:39 pm, John Stafford <n...@droffats.ten> wrote:
> > >
> > > In deductive reasoning, arguments that depend upon how things "seem" is
> > > immediately weak so the argument is not sound. Discard it. That's how it
> > > works.
> >
> > That is how *what* works exactly?
>
> There are various types of weaknesses in arguments, one being the
> premises do not support the conclusion, the other being the conclusion
> is too obviously contained in the premises, another would be the
> premises are false.
None of these are sound arguments though. My statement was regarding
sound arguments.
> Arguments that depend on how things seem are not immediately weak in the
> sense that they *must* have false premises. They are not necessarily
> weak in the sense that they *must* lack the entailment relationship.
>
> A patient tells his doctor:
>
> "I seem to see a fog when I first open my eyes in the mornings.
>
> "There is never any fog at this time of the year.
>
> "Therefore, there is something wrong with me"
The second premise relies on inductive reasoning (So far no fog has been
around at this time of year.) The above is an argument that depends on
inductive reasoning.
> There are even trivial but perfectly valid ones like:
>
> "I seem to always think Mr. X is a bachelor!
>
> Therefore I always seem to think Mr. X is an unmarried man."
"A bachelor is an unmarried man," is true by definition. So this
argument too fits my claim.
Daniel T.
Maybe if you presented such an argument I could asses it. "I seem to see
a red patch" is not an argument.
It may be that I have to include qualia as well as induction and
definition.
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> > Arguments that depend on how things seem are not immediately weak in the
> > sense that they *must* have false premises. They are not necessarily
> > weak in the sense that they *must* lack the entailment relationship.
> >
> > A patient tells his doctor:
> >
> > "I seem to see a fog when I first open my eyes in the mornings.
> >
> > "There is never any fog at this time of the year.
> >
> > "Therefore, there is something wrong with me"
>
> The second premise relies on inductive reasoning (So far no fog has been
> around at this time of year.) The above is an argument that depends on
> inductive reasoning.
You are concentrating on the possibly "inductive" premise whereas I
thought you were meaning that all the premises must be either
inductively or deductively arrived at in their turn. I was disputing
this.
You did say that you thought that everything we know about reality is
ultimately inductive and I was pointing out that it is not obviously so.
It may be under some definition of inductive I am unaware of?
I *really* do not know what you have in mind, unless it is the
reasonably well defined and what rather looks to me like non-reasoning
that goes "x has happened n number of times therefore it is likely to
happen again". I am completely with Hume on this. Though, unlike him, I
don't think this is how we really reason.
--
dorayme
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> "That crow seems black" is not an argument of any sort. "I've asked 5
> people who saw the crow, and they all have said that it seemed black."
> is an inductive argument.
>
> Again, maybe if you gave an example?
>
> I'm certainly willing to modify my position. Can you present an argument
> (i.e., syllogism) that doesn't fit the assertion I made?
I think there may be some miscommunication. It happens!
You originally said:
"... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary
definitions or inductive arguments."
and I accept that you are talking sound arguments meaning ones with true
premises and successful (rather than purported) entailment.
But arguments in logic or mathematics do not seem to me to have
inductive elements. And as for arbitrary definitions, it is easy to say
that we depend on these for nearly everything because out language
symbols have a degree of arbitrariness about them. But apart from that
the marks or sounds we use to convey meaning are arbitrary in this sense
(eg. I could use 'foo' instead of 'cat') it seems false to me to say all
arguments depend on induction or ese I don't really know what the claim
is.
--
dorayme
PD
wrote:
No, I get that. The scientific method and its use of induction does
not have any a priori basis for inherent superiority. It is purely an
operational observation, that the method when used in conjunction with
experimental evidence does seem to produce better results more quickly
than another investigative approach in that arena. I'm not saying that
we know WHY this is so, from an epistemological perspective. It just
historically is the case.
PD
dorayme
<7bccfd7e-1bf2-4bfd...@o28g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
PD <thedrap...@gmail.com> wrote:
Some comments, if I may butt in <g>:
1. It is not easy to know what people on this usenet group quite mean by
"induction". I am suspicious they might simply mean the hugely
interesting-question begging idea of any reasoning that was *not*
deductive!
Equally unsatisfactory is it merely meaning something as vague as
'scientific method'. Just think about this, scientists use all kinds of
reasoning, induction hardly begins to describe it!
2. For me, induction is a very simple thing, it is the argument form:
X has happened N number of times in circumstance C therefore next time C
happens, X will happen. A really really rotten argument form as Hume
pointed out and as Bertrand Russell's chicken did not find out! <g>
3. You say that the method of induction "when used in conjunction with
experimental evidence does seem to produce better results more quickly
than another investigative approach in that arena" But notice how very
vague this is. What counts as experimental *evidence*? What is the
method of induction if it is not what I understand it to be? And, if it
is what I understand it to be (see my 2 above), why is it at all
valuable to observe that it has worked in the past? You would not
observe and mention such if you did not think it was a *good* way of
reasoning. In other words, you are not quite avoiding, as you imply,
that it has an inherent superiority.
--
dorayme
PD
I certainly agree with that. It's also a mistake, and a common one,
that scientific knowledge gathering is "objective" rather than
"subjective". There are lots of checks and balances that strive toward
more objectivity, but it certainly isn't free from subjective
certainty or knowledge gathering methods.
>
> 2. For me, induction is a very simple thing, it is the argument form:
>
> X has happened N number of times in circumstance C therefore next time C
> happens, X will happen. A really really rotten argument form as Hume
> pointed out and as Bertrand Russell's chicken did not find out! <g>
Not from a scientific point of view. Induction involves the induction
of a generalized rule that applies not only to the observed
circumstances but to other circumstances as well. This is where its
power comes from.
As an example, it was noted that all objects near the surface of the
Earth fall with an acceleration that is about 10 m/s/s. It was also
noted that the Moon (which is not near the surface of the Earth) falls
with an acceleration that is about 3600 times smaller. It was also
noted that the Moon is about 60 times further away from the center of
the Earth than objects near the surface of the Earth. It was also
noted that for every force that object A exerts on B, there is an
equal and opposite force that B exerts on A. From this there was a
remarkable *induction* -- NOT a deduction -- that the force that is
responsible for acceleration of both the Moon and of objects near the
surface of the Earth follows the general rule: F = GMm/r^2.
Now this is a powerful induction, because it applies to objects other
than the ones near the surface of the Earth and at the Moon's
distance. It in fact applies to objects falling toward bodies other
than the Earth.
It is the induction of a *general* rule from particulars that permits
the experimental test. Because THEN you can say, "If this rule is
right, then we should be able to predict the acceleration of each of
the moons of Jupiter." And if that experimental test turns out well,
then the confidence in the induction increases.
M Purcell
>
> Some comments, if I may butt in <g>:
>
> 1. It is not easy to know what people on this usenet group quite mean by
> "induction". I am suspicious they might simply mean the hugely
> interesting-question begging idea of any reasoning that was *not*
> deductive!
So you wish to argue against your suspicion of what someone else might
mean by the word "induction"? Where you aware you are addressing five
newsgroups?
> Equally unsatisfactory is it merely meaning something as vague as
> 'scientific method'. Just think about this, scientists use all kinds of
> reasoning, induction hardly begins to describe it!
I have never heard the "scientific method" equated with "induction"
and I believe science uses the mathematical meaning of induction.
> 2. For me, induction is a very simple thing, it is the argument form:
>
> X has happened N number of times in circumstance C therefore next time C
> happens, X will happen. A really really rotten argument form as Hume
> pointed out and as Bertrand Russell's chicken did not find out! <g>
This is a simple overgeneralization, gotta watch out for those
exceptions. But there are just so many times you need to check the
cooking stove to see if it's hot.
> 3. You say that the method of induction "when used in conjunction with
> experimental evidence does seem to produce better results more quickly
> than another investigative approach in that arena" But notice how very
> vague this is. What counts as experimental *evidence*? What is the
> method of induction if it is not what I understand it to be? And, if it
> is what I understand it to be (see my 2 above), why is it at all
> valuable to observe that it has worked in the past? You would not
> observe and mention such if you did not think it was a *good* way of
> reasoning. In other words, you are not quite avoiding, as you imply,
> that it has an inherent superiority.
Experimental evidence is obtained under controlled conditions in an
effort to disprove a proposition.
dorayme
<b73f9030-4f84-4dcc...@x15g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
PD <thedrap...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Dec 15, 3:47 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
...
> > 2. For me, induction is a very simple thing, it is the argument form:
> >
> > X has happened N number of times in circumstance C therefore next time C
> > happens, X will happen. A really really rotten argument form as Hume
> > pointed out and as Bertrand Russell's chicken did not find out! <g>
>
> Not from a scientific point of view. Induction involves the induction
> of a generalized rule that applies not only to the observed
> circumstances but to other circumstances as well. This is where its
> power comes from.
>
Is this saying something different about the form of the argument?
Whether it is good or bad, we may dispute. But for now, are you at least
agreeing with me about the form, what we are going to label induction.
Your below comments rather make this bit unclear.
> As an example, it was noted that all objects near the surface of the
> Earth fall with an acceleration that is about 10 m/s/s. It was also
> noted that the Moon (which is not near the surface of the Earth) falls
> with an acceleration that is about 3600 times smaller. It was also
> noted that the Moon is about 60 times further away from the center of
> the Earth than objects near the surface of the Earth. It was also
> noted that for every force that object A exerts on B, there is an
> equal and opposite force that B exerts on A. From this there was a
> remarkable *induction* -- NOT a deduction -- that the force that is
> responsible for acceleration of both the Moon and of objects near the
> surface of the Earth follows the general rule: F = GMm/r^2.
>
> Now this is a powerful induction, because it applies to objects other
> than the ones near the surface of the Earth and at the Moon's
> distance. It in fact applies to objects falling toward bodies other
> than the Earth.
>
I have little idea what *logic* is involved here, there are a whole lot
of disparate things and someone has simply thought of a law or set of
laws that connect and explain them all. All the testing of this
hypothesis fails to break the hypothesis. This does not at all look like
any *form* of induction at all.
> It is the induction of a *general* rule from particulars
How is it induced in a logical sense from the particulars. Answer is it
is not. Humans are caused to think the general rule, they can think of
competing ones sometimes, from a survey of particulars. This is not a
logical process. Testing is logical, saying this explanation is the best
we have at the moment given the data is logical. But there is nothing
that is usefully called a logical induction. It is not good describing
what goes on in science reasonably well as you do and tacking on the
end: "That is deduction!" because I am not sure what exactly you are
referring to.
> that permits
> the experimental test. Because THEN you can say, "If this rule is
> right, then we should be able to predict the acceleration of each of
> the moons of Jupiter."
Notice this is more a deduction...
> And if that experimental test turns out well,
> then the confidence in the induction increases.
>
> >
> > 3. You say that the method of induction "when used in conjunction with
> > experimental evidence does seem to produce better results more quickly
> > than another investigative approach in that arena" But notice how very
> > vague this is. What counts as experimental *evidence*? What is the
> > method of induction if it is not what I understand it to be? And, if it
> > is what I understand it to be (see my 2 above), why is it at all
> > valuable to observe that it has worked in the past? You would not
> > observe and mention such if you did not think it was a *good* way of
> > reasoning. In other words, you are not quite avoiding, as you imply,
> > that it has an inherent superiority.
> >
> > --
> > dorayme
--
dorayme
dorayme
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> It is not good describing
> what goes on in science reasonably well as you do and tacking on the
> end: "That is deduction!" because I am not sure what exactly you are
> referring to.
oops...typo... that should read
"It is no good describing what goes on in science reasonably well as you
do and tacking on the end: "That is induction!"
--
dorayme
John Stafford
Inductive reasoning is the weakest kind of argument in the light of
Deductive Reasoning. However, we must look to its utility: for one, it
keeps Deductive Reasoning honest, or as honest as it can be.
One cannot exist without the other.
Patricia Aldoraz
> Inductive reasoning is the weakest kind of argument in the light of
> Deductive Reasoning.
So there are other types of reasoning that are stronger in the light
that deductive reasoning shines. Gosh!
> However, we must look to its utility: for one, it
> keeps Deductive Reasoning honest, or as honest as it can be.
>
Perhaps you might talk to the Walt Disney Studios to make an animation
of these matters.
> One cannot exist without the other.
As if you really know wtf you are talking about, as if you have a
firm conception of exactly what inductive reasoning is...
PD
The induction is the intuiting of a general rule from the particulars.
In my mind this is what induction MEANS. It means more than just
saying that a pattern of particulars will continue to exhibit that
pattern.
It is a *guess* of sorts, and this is what distinguishes it from being
a *deduction* from the particulars, in the sense that a deduction
would be a *necessary* consequence from the particulars. A guess is
not a necessary consequence, which is the reason why the induced
generality must then be tested, to see if the general rule does apply
to other particulars.
> Answer is it
> is not. Humans are caused to think the general rule, they can think of
> competing ones sometimes, from a survey of particulars.
That's right. And that's why there are often competing scientific
theories induced from the same set of particulars. Then what is done
is to go in the reverse direction and *deduce* consequences of those
competing theories to locate those places where they make different
predictions about what will be observed about other particulars. It is
those differences that are put to experimental test.
To recap, from a common set of particulars, two different theories may
be induced. The test of the induced theories is to deduce a prediction
about a different set of particulars where that theory should also
apply, and in particular it is useful to focus on those places where
the two theories yield different predictions about a new particular.
Then it is that particular that is set up in a controlled experiment
or sought in an observational search, and this tests which of these
two induced theories is more likely correct.
> This is not a
> logical process. Testing is logical, saying this explanation is the best
> we have at the moment given the data is logical. But there is nothing
> that is usefully called a logical induction. It is not good describing
> what goes on in science reasonably well as you do and tacking on the
> end: "That is deduction!" because I am not sure what exactly you are
> referring to.
>
> > that permits
> > the experimental test. Because THEN you can say, "If this rule is
> > right, then we should be able to predict the acceleration of each of
> > the moons of Jupiter."
>
> Notice this is more a deduction...
Yes. Science does an induction, followed by a deduction, followed by a
test.
John Stafford
logic.
dorayme
<fb79c657-8eb8-4910...@g31g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
PD <thedrap...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> The induction is the intuiting of a general rule from the particulars.
> In my mind this is what induction MEANS. It means more than just
> saying that a pattern of particulars will continue to exhibit that
> pattern.
>
> It is a *guess* of sorts, and this is what distinguishes it from being
> a *deduction* from the particulars,
Yes, OK, you are talking psychology and human propensity, not logic. I
was thinking more about the claim that it is a *logical* form of
reasoning.
--
dorayme
PD
>
> PD <thedraperfam...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > The induction is the intuiting of a general rule from the particulars.
> > In my mind this is what induction MEANS. It means more than just
> > saying that a pattern of particulars will continue to exhibit that
> > pattern.
>
> > It is a *guess* of sorts, and this is what distinguishes it from being
> > a *deduction* from the particulars,
>
> Yes, OK, you are talking psychology and human propensity, not logic. I
> was thinking more about the claim that it is a *logical* form of
> reasoning.
Induction IS a form of logic. It appears that what you consider logic
is *constrained* to be either deduction or a rather narrow assumption
that a pattern observed will continue to be observed (and the latter
isn't really "logic" in the sense you give the word, either).
Induction in the mathematical sense is a form of *deduction* in the
scientific science, because the conclusion is a *necessary*
consequence of the premises. Induction in the scientific sense does
not involve that sense of necessity.
dorayme
<bc3b2827-08ec-43d5...@e7g2000vbi.googlegroups.com>,
PD <thedrap...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Dec 16, 3:45 pm, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > In article
> > <fb79c657-8eb8-4910-b574-2679d3124...@g31g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
> >
> > PD <thedraperfam...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > The induction is the intuiting of a general rule from the particulars.
> > > In my mind this is what induction MEANS. It means more than just
> > > saying that a pattern of particulars will continue to exhibit that
> > > pattern.
> >
> > > It is a *guess* of sorts, and this is what distinguishes it from being
> > > a *deduction* from the particulars,
> >
> > Yes, OK, you are talking psychology and human propensity, not logic. I
> > was thinking more about the claim that it is a *logical* form of
> > reasoning.
>
> Induction IS a form of logic.
I have yet to see what form it has or understand this. I have fully
understood your psychological remarks and agree with them.
> It appears that what you consider logic
> is *constrained* to be either deduction
Yes, this part is true
> or a rather narrow assumption
> that a pattern observed will continue to be observed (and the latter
> isn't really "logic" in the sense you give the word, either).
Not quite sure about this part though, it seems unclear to me. I would
think that if something is logical then there must be some rule like
ways about it. There seems nothing particularly clearly rule like about
the psychological processes you describe.
--
dorayme
John Stafford
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
Inductive reasoning/logic's utility is to determine whether something is
likely or unlikely true.
Les Cargill
Mathematical induction is only used to extend the principle
being discussed to all the natural numbers. It doesn't map to what
people call "induction" outside of mathematics.
--
Les Cargill
dorayme
Les Cargill <lcarg...@comcast.net> wrote:
> PD wrote:
> >...Induction in the scientific sense does
> > not involve that sense of necessity.
>
If it does not involve *some* sense of necessity, it cannot really be
considered a type of logical reasoning. Probability will do for me, I am
not wanting deductive certainty. But as far as I can see there is no
logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than
not.
--
dorayme
Zinnic
> In article <hgbr3n$vn...@news.eternal-september.org>,
>
. But as far as I can see there is no
> logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than
> not.
But as far as I can see there is no form of induction that is other
than "more likely than not ".
Please inform my naivette.
Patricia Aldoraz
> In article <doraymeRidThis-C6FF71.08455117122...@news.albasani.net>,> > <fb79c657-8eb8-4910-b574-2679d3124...@g31g2000vbr.googlegroups.com>,
> > PD <thedraperfam...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > The induction is the intuiting of a general rule from the particulars.
> > > In my mind this is what induction MEANS. It means more than just
> > > saying that a pattern of particulars will continue to exhibit that
> > > pattern.
>
> > > It is a *guess* of sorts, and this is what distinguishes it from being
> > > a *deduction* from the particulars,
>
> > Yes, OK, you are talking psychology and human propensity, not logic. I
> > was thinking more about the claim that it is a *logical* form of
> > reasoning.
>
> Inductive reasoning/logic's utility is to determine whether something is
> likely or unlikely true.
It is a given that many people think there is a form of reasoning
called induction and that it is something to do with how science goes
somehow. And that it is something that humans use to determine the
likelihood of things happening. But dorayme is questioning that it is
any kind of logical reasoning as distinct from psychologically driven
ways of thinking. In this, of course, he is no great pioneer, he had a
most illustrious teacher from a few centuries back.
Patricia Aldoraz
Yes, sure, one can enumerate past instances of something and couch the
conclusion in cautious terms. This X was red, this Y was red...,
therefore This Z will probably be red. But this would not change the
problem of trying to justify that it is *logical* process. Anyone can
say the latter train of thoughts, the question is what makes it a
logical process rather than a description of how people behave.
jbriggs444
wrote:
> On Dec 17, 5:19 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 17, 12:12 am, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:> In article <hgbr3n$vn...@news.eternal-september.org>,
>
> > . But as far as I can see there is no
>
> > > logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than
> > > not.
>
> > But as far as I can see there is no form of induction that is other
> > than "more likely than not ".
> > Please inform my naivette.
The scenario of "it hurt when I put my hand on the stove" is not "more
likely than not" but rather "more than negligibly likely". However,
even that tentative probability estimate is good enough to act on and
avoid putting your hand on the stove a second time.
There's no 50/50 boundary condition on inductive reasoning. At least
not in my book. Your definition may vary.
> Yes, sure, one can enumerate past instances of something and couch the
> conclusion in cautious terms. This X was red, this Y was red...,
> therefore This Z will probably be red. But this would not change the
> problem of trying to justify that it is *logical* process. Anyone can
> say the latter train of thoughts, the question is what makes it a
> logical process rather than a description of how people behave.
Bayesian analysis?
The fact that it is capable of generating a conclusion? (albeit an
uncertain one)
Anyway, why do you care whether inductive reasoning is or is not
_called_ a "logical" process?
It is what it is regardless of what it is called and regardless of
which notional categories we choose to place it in or exclude it from.
John Stafford
<1f8687c7-56a9-41df...@a10g2000pre.googlegroups.com>,
jbriggs444 <jbrig...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Anyway, why do you care whether inductive reasoning is or is not
> _called_ a "logical" process?
>
> It is what it is regardless of what it is called and regardless of
> which notional categories we choose to place it in or exclude it from.
My view is that people new to logic misunderstand what it is - they are
most familiar with the simple, formal binary type of logic - that and
some are computer programmers where logic is binary.
Many misunderstand what fuzzy logic is, too.
Zinnic
wrote:
> On Dec 17, 5:19 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 17, 12:12 am, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:> In article <hgbr3n$vn...@news.eternal-september.org>,
>
> > . But as far as I can see there is no
>
> > > logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than
> > > not.
>
> > But as far as I can see there is no form of induction that is other
> > than "more likely than not ".
> > Please inform my naivette.
>
> Yes, sure, one can enumerate past instances of something and couch the
> conclusion in cautious terms. This X was red, this Y was red...,
> therefore This Z will probably be red.
That is an induction that Z is more likely than not to be red.
>But this would not change the problem of trying to justify that it is *logical* process. Anyone can
> say the latter train of thoughts, the question is what makes it a
> logical process rather than a description of how people behave.
To act on the above induction makes success more likely than not.
That is pragmatic not logical.
Y.Porat
> What is the justification for either:
>
> 1. generalising about the properties of a class of objects based on
> some number of observations of particular instances of that class (for
> example, the inference that "all swans we have seen are white, and
> therefore all swans are white," before the discovery of black swans)
> or
>
> 2. presupposing that a sequence of events in the future will occur as
> it always has in the past (for example, that the laws of physics will
> hold as they have always been observed to hold).
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction
>
> ------------------------------------------
>
> Two views of Deduction & Induction:
>
> View 1: conclusion;
> Deduction = infers particular from general truths
> Induction = infers general from particular truths
>
> View 2: conclusion;
> Deduction = follows with absolute necessity
> Induction = follows with some degree of probability
>
> Deduction and Induction From
> Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copihttp://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/
----------------------
if you want pionnering sciencve (ie advance)
you have to do a combination of some systems:
1 to use known observations
2
to make inductive suggestions
*that are based on that experimental data !!
in simpler words
to make new insights from the
existing data that didnt occur to any other
one before !!
and based on it it is preferred to add on it
predictions that can be verified by experiments later !!...
(it is not a job for parrots that are able only to quote the
existing !!)
and at the end of the day it becomes knowledge !!(that others can
parrot (:-)
ATB
Y.Porat
-----------------------------
jbriggs444
What makes you claim that "to act on the above induction makes success
more likely than not" if you also claim that there is no logical basis
for acting in such a manner.
Don't get me wrong. You could be right. Finagle could be in charge
of everything and the minute you think you've figured out the rules,
he could decide to change them. Induction could turn out to be the
exact wrong thing to rely on. But what's your alternative? Reach
into the hot stove for the pot of gold that wasn't there last time
precisely because it wasn't there last time? That doesn't sound very
smart.
Michael Gordge
>
> Preceding Kant with an adjective also does nothing!
He's a fucking idiot, however not as big an idiot as those Kantians
who regurgitate his POC garbage as being anything but trash.
> But do we not find,
> in the official Objectivist doctrine and canon, no distinction between
> inductive and other kinds of reasoning?
Thats simply because, preceeding reasoning with any kind of adjective
does not change the meaning of reasoning. Reasoning is man's only
means to knowledge.
MG
M Purcell
That leaves you out.
Michael Gordge
> So then deduction and induction are the same thing? Talk about idiocy!
Clue for the fucking Kantian idiot, the subject is reason / reasoning,
and reason / reasoning does not change in meaning just because its
preceeded by a fucking silly Kantian inspired adjective.
MG
Michael Gordge
>
> Surely what we find in the Objectivist dogma is a complete and utter
> lack of reasoning.
Ewe stupid dumb Kantian fuck, there is no reasoning going into the
garbage that the meaning of reasoning changes just because its
preceeded by an adjective.
MG
Michael Gordge
> That leaves you out.
And thats typical of a Kantian's contribution to any discussion on
reason, fucking idiot.
MG
Michael Gordge
> Everything we know about reality is ultimately inductive.
Example?
MG
Michael Gordge
> Soundness and validity have two different meanings. A "sound" argument
> requires true premises, a "valid" argument does not.
Clue for the clueless Kantians, a sound argument would be, 'true /
truth is the recognition of reality and its not possible to validate
fairy tales'.
MG
Michael Gordge
> It may be that I have to include qualia as well as induction and
> definition...
Still waiting for you to explain how preceeding fallacy with the
adjective logical changes the meaning of fallacy.
MG
Michael Gordge
>
> The way you know that what you are thinking of explains so much is
> through inductive reasoning. It has always explained things in the past.
>
> Maybe if you give an example?
Clue for the clueless Kantians, just as preceeding fallacy with
logical does nothing for the meaning of fallacy, so too, reasoning
does not change in meaning by preceeding it with the silly Kantian
inspired adjective inductive.
MG
Patricia Aldoraz
idea of some sort of objective necessity. Now this is not to insist
that a perfectly good logical argument must leave us with some
conclusion which points to an absolutely certain prediction.
> It is what it is regardless of what it is called and regardless of
> which notional categories we choose to place it in or exclude it from.
If one is questioning the idea, as dorayme is, that induction as he
defines it is any sort of logical reasoning, then it hardly helps to
say induction is what it is. What is it?
Patricia Aldoraz
> In article
> <1f8687c7-56a9-41df-8beb-4df0f15e9...@a10g2000pre.googlegroups.com>,
>
> jbriggs444 <jbriggs...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Anyway, why do you care whether inductive reasoning is or is not
> > _called_ a "logical" process?
>
> > It is what it is regardless of what it is called and regardless of
> > which notional categories we choose to place it in or exclude it from.
>
> My view is that people new to logic misunderstand what it is
And my view is that people new to philosophy itself and its
traditions, or who have difficulty getting the main ideas and problems
often start talking about quantum physics or fuzzy logic or whatever
the latest trendy thing is they have in their mind.
- they are
> most familiar with the simple, formal binary type of logic - that and
> some are computer programmers where logic is binary.
>
> Many misunderstand what fuzzy logic is, too.
Perhaps you misunderstand how difficult the essential heart of the
problem of induction is? If you think fuzzy logic addresses the
problem, and I am not ruling out that this might be an interesting
avenue to explore, enlighten us all on how it solves the problem.
Daniel T.
> "Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> > "That crow seems black" is not an argument of any sort. "I've
> > asked 5 people who saw the crow, and they all have said that it
> > seemed black." is an inductive argument.
> >
> > Again, maybe if you gave an example?
> >
> > I'm certainly willing to modify my position. Can you present an
> > argument (i.e., syllogism) that doesn't fit the assertion I made?
>
> I think there may be some miscommunication. It happens!
>
> You originally said:
>
> "... all deductive arguments rely on either arbitrary definitions or
> inductive arguments."
>
> and I accept that you are talking sound arguments meaning ones with
> true premises and successful (rather than purported) entailment.
>
> But arguments in logic or mathematics do not seem to me to have
> inductive elements. And as for arbitrary definitions, it is easy to
> say that we depend on these for nearly everything because out
> language symbols have a degree of arbitrariness about them.
Logic and mathematics are formal systems, their axioms are true by
definition and everything else is deductively derived from those axioms.
> But apart from that the marks or sounds we use to convey meaning are
> arbitrary in this sense (eg. I could use 'foo' instead of 'cat') it
> seems false to me to say all arguments depend on induction or ese I
> don't really know what the claim is.
By "arbitrary" I mean, cannot be found true through any deductive or
inductive argument. I'm willing to drop that particular word.
Patricia Aldoraz
> On Dec 17, 3:27 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Dec 17, 5:19 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
> > > On Dec 17, 12:12 am, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:> In article <hgbr3n$vn...@news.eternal-september.org>,
>
> > > . But as far as I can see there is no
>
> > > > logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than
> > > > not.
>
> > > But as far as I can see there is no form of induction that is other
> > > than "more likely than not ".
> > > Please inform my naivette.
>
> > Yes, sure, one can enumerate past instances of something and couch the
> > conclusion in cautious terms. This X was red, this Y was red...,
> > therefore This Z will probably be red.
>
> That is an induction that Z is more likely than not to be red.
>
Have you added something important that I missed? Perhaps you are
quibbling about the different possible interpretations of "This is
probably such and such" and "This such and such is more likely than
not"
> >But this would not change the problem of trying to justify that it is *logical* process. Anyone can
> > say the latter train of thoughts, the question is what makes it a
> > logical process rather than a description of how people behave.
>
> To act on the above induction makes success more likely than not.
> That is pragmatic not logical.
First, it is simply not true. There is a little variation on a fallacy
called the Gambler's which goes: I won on the first pull of the pokie,
I won on the second... therefore... this *form* of induction does not
make things more likely in any sense at all.
Daniel T.
Think of something you know, maybe something about sheep... There is
your example.
dorayme
<b85434a6-05e4-4809...@2g2000prl.googlegroups.com>,
Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Perhaps you misunderstand how difficult the essential heart of the
> problem of induction is? If you think fuzzy logic addresses the
> problem, and I am not ruling out that this might be an interesting
> avenue to explore, enlighten us all on how it solves the problem.
The idea of a logic is that it involves some degree at least of
necessity, of force. Fuzzy logic or probability logic is not obviously
helpful to supply this logical force (though it may well be a productive
line of enquiry). Perhaps somewhat promising is some idea of multi
valued truth where nothing is necessarily true or false. This may start
to capture some sort of logic of what we consider our reasonable
practices. But I very much doub if out of all this will come out some
clear and useful idea of an inductive form of argument. The word seems
often to simply conjure up anything that is "not deductive but good" or
"the way science operates". Pretty vague stuff, I think you will agree!
--
dorayme
John Stafford
conclusion you have a sample of one from which to begin to build a case.
John Stafford
dorayme <dorayme...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> In article
> <b85434a6-05e4-4809...@2g2000prl.googlegroups.com>,
> Patricia Aldoraz <patricia...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Perhaps you misunderstand how difficult the essential heart of the
> > problem of induction is? If you think fuzzy logic addresses the
> > problem, and I am not ruling out that this might be an interesting
> > avenue to explore, enlighten us all on how it solves the problem.
>
> The idea of a logic is that it involves some degree at least of
> necessity, of force.
What do you mean of necessity/force?
> Fuzzy logic or probability logic is not obviously
> helpful to supply this logical force (though it may well be a productive
> line of enquiry).
What is your expectation of the result of a 'logical force'?
> Perhaps somewhat promising is some idea of multi
> valued truth where nothing is necessarily true or false.
Multi-valued truth is nonproductive in any particular case.
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Logic and mathematics are formal systems, their axioms are true by
> definition and everything else is deductively derived from those axioms.
When an early man brings back two speared animals and another man brings
back three and there is no dispute about this but someone remarks that
one person brought back one more than the other, there are no axioms in
sight but there is a solid reasoning involved. But if a native comes in
with a brown dead animal never seen before and another with another
brown one of the same type... it does not look too much like reasoning
to me for one of them to conclude that all those animals are brown (not
even probably).
--
dorayme
dorayme
"Daniel T." <dani...@earthlink.net> wrote:
You mean anything that is known? Like that some sheep have nice warm
coats of wool. And this is an example of what?
--
dorayme
Les Cargill
> In article <daniel_t-EABA81...@earthlink.us.supernews.com>,
<snip>
>
> But arguments in logic or mathematics do not seem to me to have
> inductive elements.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction
<snip>
--
Les Cargill
dorayme
Les Cargill <lcarg...@comcast.net> wrote:
Crucial from that URL is:
"Mathematical induction should not be misconstrued as a form of
inductive reasoning, which is considered non-rigorous in mathematics
(see Problem of induction for more information). In fact, mathematical
induction is a form of deductive reasoning and can be quite rigorous."
(btw, your signature is malformed and does not get cut out whan a
newsreader goes to reply - as it should. See
"The formatting of the sig block is prescribed somewhat more firmly: it
should be displayed as plain text in a fixed-width font (no HTML,
images, or other rich text), and must be delimited from the body of the
message by a single line consisting of exactly two hyphens, followed by
a space, followed by the end of line ..." at
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signature_block>
)
--
dorayme
M Purcell
>
> The idea of a logic is that it involves some degree at least of
> necessity, of force. Fuzzy logic or probability logic is not obviously
> helpful to supply this logical force (though it may well be a productive
> line of enquiry). Perhaps somewhat promising is some idea of multi
> valued truth where nothing is necessarily true or false. This may start
> to capture some sort of logic of what we consider our reasonable
> practices. But I very much doub if out of all this will come out some
> clear and useful idea of an inductive form of argument. The word seems
> often to simply conjure up anything that is "not deductive but good" or
> "the way science operates". Pretty vague stuff, I think you will agree!
Inductive reasoning is probabilistic and pragmatic and I suspect it is
instinctive as well. But it also seems useful in providing testable
relationships the result of which may provide better deductive
premises.
spudnik
than the application of probability to logic;
when I stated that it "thus" could be
used as a formalism for quantum mechanics,
to a grad-student of Bart Kosko, the popularizer
of FL, it seemed to be only a matter of a half
of a year, before Kosko got a new book out to do that.
(of course, Zadeh may have created FL,
playing with Schroedinger's undead cat .-)
as for inductive versus deductive reasoning,
I only state, again & again, that *mathematically*
they are "one-to-one" or isomorphic,
as proven in a short, easy proof in *Mathematics Magazine*,
many years ago.
> Multi-valued truth is nonproductive in any particular case.
thus:
it'd be very difficult to prove that
Universe is not infinite, because
any telescope is limited in resolution etc.;
likewise, much "missing matter" is a)
the result of Einsteinmania (only using gravity), and b)
not properly sensed (infrared sensing is required
to reveal most optical data past "Z=1" -- which is,
now, beginning to be done -- and so on).
thus:
dood, see my sig -- new translations
into English of l'OEuvre.
> Dude, ever hear of Fermat's principle?
thus:
why do "pass/nofail" philosophers of science bother
with such a silly notion as Minkowski's phase-space
of "time & space forevermore on an equal footing, sic/um,
because you can draw a graph with time as one axis?"
thus:
what, standard construction?... if you do
as with the trigon, cutting the edges
parallel to the facets, you get tetrahedra & octahedra
... as is wellknown to every student of Bucky Fuller
(which could just be me .-)
>http://emis.impa.br/EMIS/journals/BAG/vol.41/no.2/b41h2her.pdf
thus:
was you champion of a name-dropping proof, or have you looked
at his avowedly nonstandard approach?
I can't even vouch for Smullyan's popular books,
althoughI did develop an alternative
to his method in the Sherlock Holmes one,
re chess.
--l'OEuvre!
http://wlym.com
http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles_2009/Relativistic_Moon.pdf
Tim
Poor stupid you, inductive and deductive were in use before Kant. Now,
back to the point, in your deluded world inductive and deductive
reasoning must be same thing, yes or no, sheep shagger?
Tim
So you agree, objectivist dogma is thoroughly devoid of reasoning.
It's about time, dopey.
Tim
> On Dec 13, 10:27 pm, Aatu Koskensilta <aatu.koskensi...@uta.fi> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Preceding Kant with an adjective also does nothing!
>
> He's a fucking idiot, however not as big an idiot as those Kantians
> who regurgitate his POC garbage as being anything but trash.
>
>
Now how does that adjective "fucking" change the meaning of idiot,
idiot?
Les Cargill
> In article <hgem2f$toi$1...@news.eternal-september.org>,
> Les Cargill <lcarg...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>> dorayme wrote:
>>> In article <daniel_t-EABA81...@earthlink.us.supernews.com>,
>> <snip>
>>> But arguments in logic or mathematics do not seem to me to have
>>> inductive elements.
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> --
>> Les Cargill
>
>
> Crucial from that URL is:
>
> "Mathematical induction should not be misconstrued as a form of
> inductive reasoning, which is considered non-rigorous in mathematics
> (see Problem of induction for more information). In fact, mathematical
> induction is a form of deductive reasoning and can be quite rigorous."
>
The PMI works, and inductive logic doesn't*. So of course they
are disparate. If you could, however map all swans to the
natural numbers, and prove that swan(n).isWhite ==> swan(n+1).isWhite,
then there ya go.
*completely.
<snip>
--
Les Cargill
jmfbahciv
<snip> Thread drift alert!
> Don't get me wrong. You could be right. Finagle could be in charge
I thought it was Murphy who was in charge. I never made anti-Finagle
incantations.
<snip>
/BAH
Zinnic
> On Dec 17, 9:49 am, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Dec 17, 3:27 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
>
> > > On Dec 17, 5:19 pm, Zinnic <zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
> > > > On Dec 17, 12:12 am, dorayme <doraymeRidT...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:> In article <hgbr3n$vn...@news.eternal-september.org>,
>
> > > > . But as far as I can see there is no
>
> > > > > logical form of induction that makes any conclusion more likely than
> > > > > not.
>
> > > > But as far as I can see there is no form of induction that is other
> > > > than "more likely than not ".
> > > > Please inform my naivette.
>
> > > Yes, sure, one can enumerate past instances of something and couch the
> > > conclusion in cautious terms. This X was red, this Y was red...,
> > > therefore This Z will probably be red.
>
> > That is an induction that Z is more likely than not to be red.
>
> > > say the latter train of thoughts, the question is what makes it a
> > > logical process rather than a description of how people behave.
>
> > To act on the above induction makes success more likely than not.
> > That is pragmatic not logical.
>
> more likely than not" if you also claim that there is no logical basis
> for acting in such a manner.
If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will end
up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the previous
200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the basis
that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction to
make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice.
> Don't get me wrong. You could be right. Finagle could be in charge
> of everything and the minute you think you've figured out the rules,
> he could decide to change them. Induction could turn out to be the
> exact wrong thing to rely on. But what's your alternative? Reach
> into the hot stove for the pot of gold that wasn't there last time
> precisely because it wasn't there last time? That doesn't sound very
> smart
When one relies on induction, one is not betting against the odds :-)
Zinnic
wrote:
> On Dec 18, 1:49 am,Zinnic<zeenr...@gate.net> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Dec 17, 3:27 am, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
It is common knowledge that the history of coin flips does not effect
the outcome of a subsequent flip. But be honest. Would you not bet on
the likelyhood of a continuation of the series if the previous 1,000
flips have had the same outcome? That is, would you not use induction
to conclude that the coin is not fair?
Patricia Aldoraz
Here is an argument that could be described as a good probabilistic
one:
There are 100 balls in this bag
There are 50 red ones
_______________________________
The chance of any one being red is 50%
But it is arguably one in which the conclusion cannot easily
(from a conceptual point of view) be denied after accepting
the premises. The premises seem to entail the conclusion.
There is a relationship of necessity between the premises
and the conclusion.
But if you say
This frog leaps.
This other frog leaps.
....
__________________
Probably all frogs leap
Then this is quite different, it does not follow, even by putting in
the word probably.
It is simply not any more probable than not, no matter how many frogs
are examined.
To suppose otherwise is to commit what dorayme calls a Reverse
Gambler's Fallacy.
Patricia Aldoraz
> If a fair coin is flipped, logic cannot demonstrate that it will end
> up as tails even though if it has ended up as tails in the previous
> 200 flips. However, in this case I would bet on tails on the basis
> that the coin may not be fair. That is I would be use induction to
> make a pragmatic rather than a logical choice.
>
If you had merely said that you would bet on the coin coming up
tails again if it had always come up tails on countless occasions
in the past, then no one would dispute your reasonableness.
But you go on to say you use induction as if this is some sort of
technique. And it is here where the real disagreements start.
Induction is either not an argument form, or if it is,
it is a manifestly inadequate one.
M Purcell
wrote:
> On Dec 18, 1:26 pm, M Purcell <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
> > Inductive reasoning is probabilistic and pragmatic and I suspect it is
> > instinctive as well. But it also seems useful in providing testable
> > relationships the result of which may provide better deductive
> > premises.
>
> Here is an argument that could be described as a good probabilistic
> one:
> There are 100 balls in this bag
> There are 50 red ones
> _______________________________
> The chance of any one being red is 50%
>
> But it is arguably one in which the conclusion cannot easily
> (from a conceptual point of view) be denied after accepting
> the premises. The premises seem to entail the conclusion.
> There is a relationship of necessity between the premises
> and the conclusion.
That is mathematical induction.
> But if you say
>
> This frog leaps.
> This other frog leaps.
> ....
> __________________
> Probably all frogs leap
>
> Then this is quite different, it does not follow, even by putting in
> the word probably.
> It is simply not any more probable than not, no matter how many frogs
> are examined.
> To suppose otherwise is to commit what dorayme calls a Reverse
> Gambler's Fallacy.
Both the Gambler's Fallacy and it's reverse are post hoc fallacies.
The validity of an inductive argument relies on the characteristic
being generalized as well as the number of observations, a disproof of
an inductive argument does not disprove all inductive arguments.
Rod Speed
Nope, because I realise that the result of a particular coin toss is completely independant of what has happened before.
Patricia Aldoraz
> Both the Gambler's Fallacy and it's reverse are post hoc fallacies.
What exactly does this mean? It is a fallacy before, during and after
the foolish gambler loses all his money thinking that because he has
lost so many times, he has a greater chance of winning the next time.
> The validity of an inductive argument relies on the characteristic
> being generalized as well as the number of observations, a disproof of
> an inductive argument does not disprove all inductive arguments.
Russell's chicken hardly improved its chances of surviving the next
day because it had survived all previous days. In fact, the more the
days, we know now, the less chance it had of surviving the next. Your
description is not decription of some form of reasoning that has any
kind of logic or validity or probability or an element of necessity.
M Purcell
wrote:
> On Dec 19, 10:43 am, M Purcell <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> > Both the Gambler's Fallacy and it's reverse are post hoc fallacies.
>
> What exactly does this mean? It is a fallacy before, during and after
> the foolish gambler loses all his money thinking that because he has
> lost so many times, he has a greater chance of winning the next time.
You should be able to look it up on the internet but basically it's
the false assumption a prior event effects the next event.
> > The validity of an inductive argument relies on the characteristic
> > being generalized as well as the number of observations, a disproof of
> > an inductive argument does not disprove all inductive arguments.
>
> Russell's chicken hardly improved its chances of surviving the next
> day because it had survived all previous days. In fact, the more the
> days, we know now, the less chance it had of surviving the next. Your
> description is not decription of some form of reasoning that has any
> kind of logic or validity or probability or an element of necessity.
That was gibberish.
M Purcell
wrote:
> On Dec 19, 10:43 am, M Purcell <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> > Both the Gambler's Fallacy and it's reverse are post hoc fallacies.
>
> What exactly does this mean? It is a fallacy before, during and after
> the foolish gambler loses all his money thinking that because he has
> lost so many times, he has a greater chance of winning the next time.
You should be able to look it up on the internet but basically it's
the false assumption a prior event effects the next event.
> > The validity of an inductive argument relies on the characteristic
> > being generalized as well as the number of observations, a disproof of
> > an inductive argument does not disprove all inductive arguments.
>
> Russell's chicken hardly improved its chances of surviving the next
> day because it had survived all previous days. In fact, the more the
> days, we know now, the less chance it had of surviving the next. Your
> description is not decription of some form of reasoning that has any
> kind of logic or validity or probability or an element of necessity.
Okay, it does look like you are using the Reverse Gamblers Fallacy.
There is no way of determining from past days if the next day will be
the chickens last.
Zinnic
wrote:
So let us accept that it is "a manifestly inadequate " argument. Then
maybe we can go on to decide by which criteria it is assessed as being
inadequate. On into the abyss, where induction casts adequate
shadows tot point the way out!
Patricia Aldoraz
> On Dec 18, 6:27 pm, Patricia Aldoraz <patricia.aldo...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 19, 10:43 am, M Purcell <sacsca...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> > > Both the Gambler's Fallacy and it's reverse are post hoc fallacies.
>
> > What exactly does this mean? It is a fallacy before, during and after
> > the foolish gambler loses all his money thinking that because he has
> > lost so many times, he has a greater chance of winning the next time.
>
> You should be able to look it up on the internet but basically it's
> the false assumption a prior event effects the next event.
>
The Gambler's Fallacy is thinking that your chances of heads coming up
increases the more that tails have come up in your previous losing
bets on heads. The usual context for uttering the expression "Post hoc
ergo propter hoc" - perhaps this is what you have in mind - is where
someone thinks that something that happens after another thing else is
therefore caused by this other thing.