Dlya fizikov-rossiyan: O trex tai:nax talanta.
Vitaliy Dugin
Tema: Tri pravila kratchai:shego puti k istine v fizike.
privetstvuu fizikov-rossiyan!
Proshu otozvat'sya na e-mail, esli material zainteresuet!
Genial'noe myshlenie v nauke eto vysshaya norma myshleniya,
k kotoroy moget priblizit'sya luboy fizik, esli on budet vesti
poisk pri pomoshi treh sleduushix pravil:
1. Vse poznaetsya v sravnenii.
Rassmotrim ddva primera narusheniya etogo pravila:
Primer pervy. Teoriya pul'siruuschey Vselennoy vyzvala v
kosmologii i kosmogonii ryad sleduuschix "belyx pyaten":
a] Iz dopplerovskoy interpretacii kosmologicheskogo krasnogo
smescheniya sleduet, chto galaktiki neravnopravny otnositel'no
Vselennoy. Eto neravnopravie podtvergdeno tem faktom, chto
simmetrichnuu kartinu krasnogo smesheniya moget obnarugit'
tol'ko nabludatel', naxodyaschiysya v centre Vselennoy.
Eto mogno pokazat' pri pomoschi formul effekta Dopplera.
b] Pochemu galaktiki "razbegautsya s uskoreniem?
v] Kakaya prichina umen'sheniya uskoreniya galaktik pri ix
subsvetovyx skorostyax "ubeganiya ot nas?
g] Pochemu ogranichena oblast' primeneniya vtorogo zakona
termodinamiki, soglasno kotoromu nashu Vselennuu ogidaet
teplovaya smert'?
d] Tak kak Vselennaya dolgna sgat'sya v tochku s nulevym
ob`emom, to kakaya prichina vyzovet ee novoe rogdenie? Vse eti
"belye pyatna" ustranyautsya iz nauki gipotezoy, soglasno
kotoroy Vselennaya eto efirny vzryv. On rasshiryaetsya v
beskonechnost' absolutnoy pustoty ili absolutnogo prostranstva.
Na modeli: na poverxnosti rezinovogo rasshiryauschegosya
shara vidno, kak "krasneet" "paket svetovyx voln" i kak s
uskoreniem "razbegautsya galaktiki. esche iz modeli vidno, chto
"galaktiki" ravnopravny otnositel'no poverxnosti shara ili
otnositel'no Vselennoy. Iz etoy modeli takge sleduet, chto
Vselennuu ogidaet teplovaya smert' soglasno vtoromu zakonu
termodinamiki.
Vtoroy primer. Fiziki otkazalIs' ot efira ne iz-za
otsutstviya efirnogo vetra v opyte Maykel'sona, a iz-za togo,
chto nikto iz uchenyx ne postroil postulatov teorii
neuvlekaemogo efira.
Mnou postroeny tri postulata etoy teorii. Esli eti postulaty
s vytekauschimi iz nix sledstviyami sravnit' s dvumya
postulatami STO i vytekauschimi iz mix sledstviyami, to
okagetsya, chto oba postulata STO yavlyautsya nespravedlivymi
gipotezami. A eto oznachaet, chto otkaz fizikov ot efira byl
neobosnovannym.
2. Vtoroe pravilo. Seychas sut' nekotoryx yavleniy kagdy
fizik moget ob`yasnit' po-svoemu. A nugno eto delat' sleduuschim
STANDARTNYM sposobom.
U kagdogo yavleniya est' ryad NEPOSREDSTVENNYX prichin,
vyzvavshix ego suschestvovanie. i est' ryad sledstviy,
NEPOSREDSTVENNO vytekauschix iz nego. Poetonu pri ob`yasnenii
lubogo yavleniya prirody nado vyyavlyat' i podtvergdat' faktami
naibol'shee chislo nazvannyx vyshe svyazey.
Mogno dokazat', chto chislo etix svyazey ogranicheno. A eto
oznachaet, chto VSE my budem vynugdeny prihodit' k odnoznachnomu
ob`yasneniu odnogo i togo ge yavleniya. V spore prav budet tot,
kto pokaget i podtverdit faktami naibol'shee chislo nazvannyx
vyshe svyazey ob`yasnyaemogo yavleniya.
Rassmotrim dva primera, gde danny sposob ne primenyalsya I
eto privelo k porageniu razuma v fizike.
--
С уважением, Виталий
Ilja Schmelzer
> Vtoroy primer. Fiziki otkazalIs' ot efira ne iz-za
> otsutstviya efirnogo vetra v opyte Maykel'sona, a iz-za togo,
> chto nikto iz uchenyx ne postroil postulatov teorii
> neuvlekaemogo efira.
A efir Lorentza?
Ilja
--
I. Schmelzer, <il...@ilja-schmelzer.net>, http://ilja-schmelzer.net
shuba
> "Vitaliy Dugin" <vit...@dugin.kharkov.com> writes:
> > Vtoroy primer. Fiziki otkazalIs' ot efira ne iz-za
> > otsutstviya efirnogo vetra v opyte Maykel'sona, a iz-za togo,
> > chto nikto iz uchenyx ne postroil postulatov teorii
> > neuvlekaemogo efira.
>
> A efir Lorentza?
Po moyemu mneniyu, Vash vopros uzhe udovletvoritel'no reshyon.
In a 1923 translation from German to Russian that I own, a professor
named T. Wolf at Saint Ignatius College in Falkenburg wrote an early
popularization of relativity. The end of chapter one gives the
following assessment (got koi8?):
"Óœ “≈€≈Œ…≈ ‹‘œ ¬ŸÃœ Œ≈ ’ƒœ◊Ã≈‘◊œ“…‘≈ÃÿŒœ ◊ ‘œÕ ”ÕŸ”Ã≈, fi‘œ
«…–œ‘≈⁄Ÿ ‹‘… ¬ŸÃ… ”œ⁄ƒ¡ŒŸ ad hoc. ˜ ∆…⁄…À≈ –œÀ¡ Œ≈ ¬ŸÃœ œ¬Œ¡“’÷≈Œœ
Œ… œƒŒœ —◊Ã≈Œ…≈, Àœ‘œ“œ≈ –œƒ‘◊≈“ƒ…Ãœ ¬Ÿ ‹‘œ –œ“¡⁄…‘≈ÃÿŒœ≈ …⁄Õ≈Œ≈Œ…≈
ƒÃ…ŒŸ … ◊“≈Õ≈Œ….
"Ӂ Ïœ“≈Œ√’ … ’ƒ¡Ãœ”ÿ ƒ¡‘ÿ ”Œœ”Œœ≈ œ¬'—”Œ≈Œ…≈ …⁄Õ≈Œ≈Œ…— ƒÃ…ŒŸ
’À¡⁄¡Œ…≈Õ Œ¡ ‘œ, fi‘œ ◊À“¡‘√≈ Œ¡⁄Ÿ◊¡¿‘ "‹∆…“ŒŸÕ ◊≈‘“œÕ", ‘œ ◊ œ¬›≈Õ
≈«œ «…–œ‘≈⁄¡ Õ¡Ãœ ’ƒœ◊Ã≈‘◊œ“…‘≈ÃÿŒ¡.
[..]
"Óœ ‘¡À À¡À Œ…À‘œ Œ≈ Õœ« ’À¡⁄¡‘ÿ Ã’fi€≈«œ ◊Ÿ»œƒ¡ …⁄ ⁄¡‘“’ƒŒ≈Œ…—,
”œ⁄ƒ¡◊€≈«œ”— ◊ “≈⁄’Ãÿ‘¡‘≈ œ–Ÿ‘œ◊ Ì≈ À≈Ãÿ”œŒ¡, ‘œ Œ¡ ◊“≈Õ—
’”–œÀœ…Ã…”ÿ Œ¡ ‹‘œÕ “≈€≈Œ……, œ‘ƒ¡◊¡— ƒœÃ÷Œœ≈ «≈Œ…¡ÃÿŒœ ÕŸ”Ã…
Ïœ“≈Œ√¡ (sic), Œœ ◊‘¡ Œ≈ Œ¡ƒ≈—Ã…”ÿ, fi‘œ Œ¡ ƒ≈‘”— Àœ«ƒ¡-Ã…¬œ
ƒ“’«œ≈ “≈€≈Œ…≈, Àœ‘œ“œ≈ ¬’ƒ≈‘ ”¡Õœ –œ ”≈¬≈ Õ≈Œ≈≈ Œ≈◊≈“œ—‘Œœ …
Àœ‘œ“œ≈ –œ ◊œ⁄Õœ÷Œœ”‘… Œ≈ –œ‘“≈¬’≈‘ ‘¡À…» ¬œÃÿ€…» ÷≈“‘◊ œ‘
œ¬ŸfiŒŸ» ◊⁄«Ã—ƒœ◊, À¡À…» ‘“≈¬’≈‘ «…–œ‘≈⁄¡ Ïœ“≈Œ√¡.
"Óœ ”Ã’fi…Ãœ”ÿ …Œ¡fi≈."
Eight decades later, not one thing has changed with respect to this
unsatisfactory nature of Lorentz' ether. It is quite clear to me why
it was abandoned in favor of SR. Whether some sort of return to the
ad hoc formulation might take hold in the future, I can't say. I have
serious doubts, but I don't think it will be due to Lorentz' ether
being more beautiful, more functional, or more intuitive than SR. To
suggest such things is almost certainly a losing proposition.
Û ’◊¡÷≈Œ…≈Õ,
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja пишет следующее:
> > "Vitaliy Dugin" <vit...@dugin.kharkov.com> writes:
> > > Vtoroy primer. Fiziki otkazalIs' ot efira ne iz-za
> > > otsutstviya efirnogo vetra v opyte Maykel'sona, a iz-za togo,
> > > chto nikto iz uchenyx ne postroil postulatov teorii
> > > neuvlekaemogo efira.
> >
> > A efir Lorentza?
>
> Po moyemu mneniyu, Vash vopros uzhe udovletvoritel'no reshyon.
It was a rhetorical question. IMHO the original claim was wrong. A
theory "neuvlekaemogo efira" has been created by Lorentz, contrary to
the original claim.
The question was not if the Lorentz ether is satisfactory or not from
various metaphysical points of view.
> Eight decades later, not one thing has changed with respect to this
> unsatisfactory nature of Lorentz' ether. It is quite clear to me why
> it was abandoned in favor of SR.
For me it is also quite clear. There was a clear and valid reason: a
relativistic theory of gravity (GR) and no competing ether theory of
gravity.
> Whether some sort of return to the ad hoc formulation might take
> hold in the future, I can't say. I have serious doubts, but I don't
> think it will be due to Lorentz' ether being more beautiful, more
> functional, or more intuitive than SR. To suggest such things is
> almost certainly a losing proposition.
I do not suggest such things. Instead I suggest that the ether theory
of gravity I propose (see GET.ilja-schmelzer.net) does not have the
problems of the old Lorentz ether theory. Instead, it has a nice
axiomatic foundation and explains relativistic symmetry.
Please try to apply the 80 year old arguments against the Lorentz
ether against GET. What survives?
shuba
> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> > Ilja –…€≈‘ ”Ã≈ƒ’¿›≈≈:
> > > "Vitaliy Dugin" <vit...@dugin.kharkov.com> writes:
> > > > Vtoroy primer. Fiziki otkazalIs' ot efira ne iz-za
> > > > otsutstviya efirnogo vetra v opyte Maykel'sona, a iz-za togo,
> > > > chto nikto iz uchenyx ne postroil postulatov teorii
> > > > neuvlekaemogo efira.
> > >
> > > A efir Lorentza?
> >
> > Po moyemu mneniyu, Vash vopros uzhe udovletvoritel'no reshyon.
>
> It was a rhetorical question. IMHO the original claim was wrong. A
> theory "neuvlekaemogo efira" has been created by Lorentz, contrary to
> the original claim.
I agree.
> The question was not if the Lorentz ether is satisfactory or not from
> various metaphysical points of view.
Okay. But the original quote was about why physicists have rejected
the ether.
> I suggest that the ether theory
> of gravity I propose (see GET.ilja-schmelzer.net) does not have the
> problems of the old Lorentz ether theory. Instead, it has a nice
> axiomatic foundation and explains relativistic symmetry.
>
> Please try to apply the 80 year old arguments against the Lorentz
> ether against GET. What survives?
The axiomatic foundation does give GET a stronger theoretical basis
compared to LET. Explanation of symmetry doesn't make much sense to
me. What survives are criticisms based on complexity and reliance on
unobservable physical entities. Whether these criticisms are strong or
weak depends in large part on how compelling one finds the axioms.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
>>>> "Vitaliy Dugin" <vit...@dugin.kharkov.com> writes:
>>>>> Vtoroy primer. Fiziki otkazalIs' ot efira ne iz-za
>>>>> otsutstviya efirnogo vetra v opyte Maykel'sona, a iz-za togo,
>>>>> chto nikto iz uchenyx ne postroil postulatov teorii
>>>>> neuvlekaemogo efira.
>>>>
>>>> A efir Lorentza?
>>>
>>> Po moyemu mneniyu, Vash vopros uzhe udovletvoritel'no reshyon.
>> It was a rhetorical question. IMHO the original claim was wrong. A
>> theory "neuvlekaemogo efira" has been created by Lorentz, contrary to
>> the original claim.
>
> I agree.
>
>> The question was not if the Lorentz ether is satisfactory or not from
>> various metaphysical points of view.
>
> Okay. But the original quote was about why physicists have rejected
> the ether.
But giving a wrong answer. One which I have rejected with LET as an
counter-example.
>> I suggest that the ether theory
>> of gravity I propose (see GET.ilja-schmelzer.net) does not have the
>> problems of the old Lorentz ether theory. Instead, it has a nice
>> axiomatic foundation and explains relativistic symmetry.
>> Please try to apply the 80 year old arguments against the Lorentz
>> ether against GET. What survives?
> The axiomatic foundation does give GET a stronger theoretical basis
> compared to LET. Explanation of symmetry doesn't make much sense to
> me.
Derivation of the most general GET Lagrangian from axioms, and
observation that for this Lagrangian the Einstein equivalence
principle holds, does not make sense to you?
> What survives are criticisms based on complexity and reliance on
> unobservable physical entities. Whether these criticisms are strong
> or weak depends in large part on how compelling one finds the
> axioms.
How compelling do you find them and why? Which of them are not
compelling?
shuba
> Derivation of the most general GET Lagrangian from axioms, and
> observation that for this Lagrangian the Einstein equivalence
> principle holds, does not make sense to you?
Not as an explanation of symmetry. But I've never considered
relativistic symmetry as something that needs to be broken apart
and put back together, either.
> > What survives are criticisms based on complexity and reliance on
> > unobservable physical entities. Whether these criticisms are strong
> > or weak depends in large part on how compelling one finds the
> > axioms.
>
> How compelling do you find them and why? Which of them are not
> compelling?
You seem to oversimplify. It's not clear that your EPR-realism
criterion leads to FTL causal effects and a preferred frame, or even
if it's realism at all. Pushing the quantum weirdness from place to
place doesn't make it go away. Other ideas can be formulated, such
as the so-called consistent histories interpretation. You say that
GET leads to easier quantization, but no one knows quite how to do
that yet. If your arguments are as obvious as you make them sound, I
wonder why they don't seem to resonate with recognized experts. As a
moderately interested layman, I could probably be persuaded toward
any theoretical idea that holds favor among the experts. In short,
my feeling is that attempting to solve metaphysical problems by the
introduction of unobservables is not a good general plan of doing
physics. If it leads to unique testable predictions, then it might
become a different story.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja wrote:
> > Derivation of the most general GET Lagrangian from axioms, and
> > observation that for this Lagrangian the Einstein equivalence
> > principle holds, does not make sense to you?
> Not as an explanation of symmetry. But I've never considered
> relativistic symmetry as something that needs to be broken apart
> and put back together, either.
It is, of course, your right to consider relativistic symmetry as
fundamental and therefore be happy with proposing it as an axiom.
But this was not the question.
In ether theory, GET or LET, relativistic symmetry is not fundamental,
but the fundamental structure is the classical framework of space and
time. In LET, relativistic symmetry appears as an accident of the
combination of the formulas for lenght contraction and time dilation,
which are postulated. It is reasonable criticism that these
postulates, containing explicit terms of type sqrt(1-v^2/c^2), are
quite artificial as axioms.
Now, my claim is that the situation in GET is much different.
Here are the axioms:
\begin{axiom}{independent variables} \label{afirst}
The independent variables of the theory are the following fields
defined on a Newtonian framework${\Bbb R^3\otimes R}$ with preferred
coordinates $X^i,T$: a positive density $\rho(X^i,T)$, a velocity
$v^i(X^i,T)$, a symmetric pressure tensor $p^{ij}(X^i,T), and an
unspecified number of ``inner steps of freedom'' $\varphi^m(X^i,T)$.
\end{axiom}
\begin{axiom}{Lagrange formalism}
There exists a weak covariant Lagrange formalism
\end{axiom}
\begin{axiom}{energy conservation law} \label{acontinuity}
The conservation law related by theorem \ref{Noether1} with
translational symmetry in time is proportional to the continuity
equation:
\begin{equation}
\frac{\delta S}{\delta X^0} \sim
\partial_t \rho + \partial_i (\rho v^i).
\end{equation}
\end{axiom}
\begin{axiom}{momentum conservation law} \label{aEuler} \label{alast}
The conservation laws related by theorem \ref{Noether1} with
translational symmetry in space is proportional to the Euler equation:
\begin{equation}
\frac{\delta S}{\delta X^j} \sim
\partial_t (\rho v^j) + \partial_i(\rho v^i v^j+p^{ij}).
\end{equation}
\end{axiom}
\begin{axiom}{negative pressure} \label{alast}\label{apressure}
The pressure tensor $p^{ij}(X^i,T)$ is negative definite
\end{axiom}
Except the last one (where I would prefer positive definiteness) all
these axioms seem to be very natural for a condensed matter theory.
Now, the EEP follows from these axioms.
>> How compelling do you find them and why? Which of them are not
>> compelling?
> You seem to oversimplify. It's not clear that your EPR-realism
> criterion leads to FTL causal effects and a preferred frame, or even
> if it's realism at all.
That it leads to FTL causal effects is simply Bell's theorem. You can
use the uncertainty of the word "realism" to deny that it is realism
at all, but that's cheap. You have no arguments for the thesis that a
common sense realist does not require EPR-realism simply as
self-evident.
That a preferred foliation follows I have proven in
subsection{Causality requires a preferred frame} of gr-qc/0001101.
But this argumentation is only another line of argumentation. It is
not the set of GET axioms.
> Pushing the quantum weirdness from place to place doesn't make it go
> away.
In Bohmian mechanics much of the weirdness is gone away.
> Other ideas can be formulated, such as the so-called consistent
> histories interpretation.
Yep. But this was not the question.
> You say that GET leads to easier quantization, but no one knows
> quite how to do that yet.
It's clear that many serious problems go away. Unfortunately my QFT
background is too bad to do the whole job myself.
> If your arguments are as obvious as you make them sound, I
> wonder why they don't seem to resonate with recognized experts.
Me too. I see some esthetical prejudice (and I can understand this
prejudice for people who have not seen the beauty of GET). They have
their own pet theories and therefore are not interested.
But nothing more.
> As a moderately interested layman, I could probably be persuaded
> toward any theoretical idea that holds favor among the experts. In
> short, my feeling is that attempting to solve metaphysical problems
> by the introduction of unobservables is not a good general plan of
> doing physics.
But that was not the reason for GET. (If you consider quantum gravity
not as a metaphysical problem - which you can, taking into account
that quantum gravity seems beyond the scope of experiment.)
shuba
> It is, of course, your right to consider relativistic symmetry as
> fundamental and therefore be happy with proposing it as an axiom.
> But this was not the question.
It was my answer, though. Taking a simple mathematical concept,
complicating it with unobservables, and then claiming that these
unobservables explain the original doesn't make much sense. Yes,
I do begin with this bias, as it seems quite natural. So far I
haven't seen strong reasons to give up this bias, but it's always
worth questioning one's biases.
Let's consider the first and most fundamental of the axioms that
you listed. For the sake of argument (and because my understanding
is limited), I'll agree that the axioms are natural in the sense
of condensed matter and lead to the equivalence principle. There is
nothing that strikes me as obviously unreasonable in any of them.
> \begin{axiom}{independent variables} \label{afirst}
> The independent variables of the theory are the following fields
> defined on a Newtonian framework${\Bbb R^3\otimes R}$ with preferred
> coordinates $X^i,T$: a positive density $\rho(X^i,T)$, a velocity
> $v^i(X^i,T)$, a symmetric pressure tensor $p^{ij}(X^i,T), and an
> unspecified number of ``inner steps of freedom'' $\varphi^m(X^i,T)$.
> \end{axiom}
First of all we have a R^3 x R spacetime. Why this choice, as
it goes against naive direct calculations? Should I now expect an
explanation of its associated symmetry to be necessary or useful?
In particular, why the preferred time? You keep saying EPR-realism
supports it or requires it, such as...
> That it leads to FTL causal effects is simply Bell's theorem. You can
> use the uncertainty of the word "realism" to deny that it is realism
> at all, but that's cheap. You have no arguments for the thesis that a
> common sense realist does not require EPR-realism simply as
> self-evident.
Then I see in other sources that this is not at all as clear as you
make it sound. For instance, see this very short archived post at
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2000-01/msg0021425.html among many
other longer and more detailed presentations that can be found. This
is also why I mentioned the consistent histories formulation, which
you dismissed as irrelevant to the discussion.
> > You say that GET leads to easier quantization, but no one knows
> > quite how to do that yet.
>
> It's clear that many serious problems go away. Unfortunately my QFT
> background is too bad to do the whole job myself.
>
> > If your arguments are as obvious as you make them sound, I
> > wonder why they don't seem to resonate with recognized experts.
>
> Me too. I see some esthetical prejudice (and I can understand this
> prejudice for people who have not seen the beauty of GET). They have
> their own pet theories and therefore are not interested.
> But nothing more.
Maybe they have considered enough differing viewpoints to make an
honest determination that your approach is unlikely to lead anywhere.
One disadvantage of being an outsider is the lack of an environment
where ideas are continually proposed and criticized by others. I am
sure there are many extremely smart theorists with beautiful ideas
that go down in flames in quality research groups. If what you call
FTL causal effects are only correlations, and other ideas (string
theories or loop quantum gravity, perhaps) give as much or more
promise at unification, what is the benefit of GET? The criticism
of your independent variables axiom as basically irrelevant and
unmeasurable scalar fields lumped onto GR seems valid to me.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
sorry for repetition.
shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
>> It is, of course, your right to consider relativistic symmetry as
>> fundamental and therefore be happy with proposing it as an axiom.
>> But this was not the question.
> It was my answer, though. Taking a simple mathematical concept,
> complicating it with unobservables, and then claiming that these
> unobservables explain the original doesn't make much sense. Yes,
> I do begin with this bias, as it seems quite natural. So far I
> haven't seen strong reasons to give up this bias, but it's always
> worth questioning one's biases.
I see no evidence in the axioms of GET that a simple concept has been
used and complicated. The GET axioms have, at their surface, nothing
to do with relativistic concepts. (Ok, they have been, in fact, found
by reverse engineering. But the idea to understand Noethers
conservation laws for translational symmetry as Euler-Lagrange
equations for the coordinates I have had much earlier.)
> Let's consider the first and most fundamental of the axioms that
> you listed. For the sake of argument (and because my understanding
> is limited), I'll agree that the axioms are natural in the sense
> of condensed matter and lead to the equivalence principle. There is
> nothing that strikes me as obviously unreasonable in any of them.
>
>> \begin{axiom}{independent variables} \label{afirst}
>> The independent variables of the theory are the following fields
>> defined on a Newtonian framework${\Bbb R^3\otimes R}$ with preferred
>> coordinates $X^i,T$: a positive density $\rho(X^i,T)$, a velocity
>> $v^i(X^i,T)$, a symmetric pressure tensor $p^{ij}(X^i,T), and an
>> unspecified number of ``inner steps of freedom'' $\varphi^m(X^i,T)$.
>> \end{axiom}
>
> First of all we have a R^3 x R spacetime. Why this choice, as
> it goes against naive direct calculations?
Which "naive calculations"? (String theory?)
> Should I now expect an explanation of its associated symmetry to be
> necessary or useful?
You should IMHO never expect an explanation for the fundamental
notions of a theory. Explanation means starting with something
fundamental as given and explaining something else, which is derived.
In this sense, GET explains the EEP, and a more fundamental atomic
ether theory will probably explain the continuous continuity equation
as the conservation law for ether particles and so on.
To ask for an explanation of R^3 x R in GET seems as reasonable as to ask
"explain why spacetime is curved" in GR.
> In particular, why the preferred time? You keep saying EPR-realism
> supports it or requires it, such as...
Yep. I will discuss this in a separate posting to sci.physics.research
because it is, essentially, a reply to the spr posting you refer to.
But before this I will update my web page about realism. (I will send
you a cc if done).
But it is not the only reason. The "problem of time" of GR
quantization is, essentially, the conflict between absolute QM time
and GR proper time. Introducing a preferred time solves this problem.
So I have even several independent reasons.
>>> If your arguments are as obvious as you make them sound, I
>>> wonder why they don't seem to resonate with recognized experts.
>> Me too. I see some esthetical prejudice (and I can understand this
>> prejudice for people who have not seen the beauty of GET). They have
>> their own pet theories and therefore are not interested.
>> But nothing more.
> Maybe they have considered enough differing viewpoints to make an
> honest determination that your approach is unlikely to lead anywhere.
I don't think so. They have pointed me to some interesting problems,
among them the fermion doubling problem and chiral gauge fields and
the constraints. They have succeded in showing that there remains
something to do. I would have a lot of nice problems of type "its
reasonable to expect that this can be done in this way, but it has to
be done".
> One disadvantage of being an outsider is the lack of an environment
> where ideas are continually proposed and criticized by others.
Yep.
> I am sure there are many extremely smart theorists with beautiful
> ideas that go down in flames in quality research groups.
Yep. To have a quality research group working on GET would be really
interesting.
> If what you call FTL causal effects are only correlations,
Check it yourself. Read Bell if you don't want to rely on my claims,
that's certainly high quality reading. Its worth to consider the game
http://ilja-schmelzer.net/realism/game.html to understand yourself
_what_ type of correlations are observed.
> and other ideas (string
> theories or loop quantum gravity, perhaps) give as much or more
> promise at unification, what is the benefit of GET?
If - but who knows? After 5% of the string people having worked 1
year on GET it would be more clear what we can expect from GET.
> The criticism of your independent variables axiom as basically
> irrelevant and unmeasurable scalar fields lumped onto GR seems valid
> to me.
It is partially caused by a misunderstanding about their nature
(preferred coordinates are very very special variables). This is
partially caused by the "weak covariant" form of the GET Lagrangian.
What remains is IMHO name-calling.
Ilja Schmelzer
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2000-01/msg0021425.html is criticized.
shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
>> It is, of course, your right to consider relativistic symmetry as
>> fundamental and therefore be happy with proposing it as an axiom.
>> But this was not the question.
> It was my answer, though. Taking a simple mathematical concept,
> complicating it with unobservables, and then claiming that these
> unobservables explain the original doesn't make much sense. Yes,
> I do begin with this bias, as it seems quite natural. So far I
> haven't seen strong reasons to give up this bias, but it's always
> worth questioning one's biases.
>
> Let's consider the first and most fundamental of the axioms that
> you listed. For the sake of argument (and because my understanding
> is limited), I'll agree that the axioms are natural in the sense
> of condensed matter and lead to the equivalence principle. There is
> nothing that strikes me as obviously unreasonable in any of them.
Thanks.
>> \begin{axiom}{independent variables} \label{afirst}
>> The independent variables of the theory are the following fields
>> defined on a Newtonian framework${\Bbb R^3\otimes R}$ with preferred
>> coordinates $X^i,T$: a positive density $\rho(X^i,T)$, a velocity
>> $v^i(X^i,T)$, a symmetric pressure tensor $p^{ij}(X^i,T), and an
>> unspecified number of ``inner steps of freedom'' $\varphi^m(X^i,T)$.
>> \end{axiom}
> First of all we have a R^3 x R spacetime. Why this choice, as
> it goes against naive direct calculations?
Which "naive direct calculations"? (Do you have in mind string theory
calculations which give something like 26, 11 or 10?)
> Should I now expect an explanation of its associated symmetry to be
> necessary or useful?
Whatever the theory - it always has fundamental assumptions which are
not explained. They may be explained only in yet another, more
fundamental theory. Thus, I don't think your question is reasonable.
(It is as reasonable as the typical crackpot request that "GR does not
explain" something.)
You can ask for some arguments supporting the axioms. I give them.
But in the case of R^3 x R I would like to ask why we have to reject
them. Last not least, science is a quite conservative enterprize. To
reject a principle, there should be good reasons. (In these
methodological arguments I follow gr-qc/9903045.) The reasons for
rejection of the Newtonian framework R^3 x R seem to be quite
insufficient.
> In particular, why the preferred time? You keep saying EPR-realism
> supports it or requires it,
yep, and much more than this IMHO cannot be expected. Moreover, I
give several independend arguments, not only EPRB but also the quantum
"problem of time".
> such as...
>> That it leads to FTL causal effects is simply Bell's theorem. You can
>> use the uncertainty of the word "realism" to deny that it is realism
>> at all, but that's cheap. You have no arguments for the thesis that a
>> common sense realist does not require EPR-realism simply as
>> self-evident.
> Then I see in other sources that this is not at all as clear as you
> make it sound. For instance, see this very short archived post at
> http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2000-01/msg0021425.html among many
> other longer and more detailed presentations that can be found. This
> is also why I mentioned the consistent histories formulation, which
> you dismissed as irrelevant to the discussion.
These are old and invalid arguments. And they do not even question my
thesis directly.
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2000-01/msg0021425.html writes:
> Nonetheless, the choice of experiment at one end does NOT affect the
> results at the other end! In particular, there is no way to use the
> experiment you do at one end to transmit a superluminal signal to
> the guy at the other end. The only way to notice the weird
> correlations is to compare the results at both ends, which you have
> to do the usual way: by sending a slower-than-light signal from one
> end to the other.
Violations of Bell's inequality have two realistic (EPR-compatible)
explanations: A->B or B->A. It _follows_ that they cannot be used to
transfer information. (Transfer A->B would contradict the explanation
based on B->A). It is quite impressive how agreement of a
_simple_consequence_ of an explanation with observation may be used as
an argument _against_ the explanation. Scientific methodology
reverted.
Moreover, the remaining power of the "it cannot be used"-argument is
IMHO destroyed after the simple application which allows to win in a
game, see ilja-schmelzer.net/realism/game.html.
> The trick is understanding the difference between correlation and
> causality. In quantum mechanics, measurements at spacelike
> separated points can be correlated in weird ways that would not be
> allowed in *classical* mechanics unless the choice of experiment
> performed at one end affected the results of the experiment at the
> other end.
The "correlation is not causation"-argument I have also handled many
times. My counter-argument is what I have named "telefon argument".
Assume there is a device which works like an FTL telefon. Now,
whatever you observe are only correlations - correlations between your
input and the output at the other end. Correlations which are
"weird", that means not allowed by classical realistic Einstein
causality. But we would be fools if we would accept this and continue
to believe into Einstein causality despite the existence of the FTL
telefon. Thus, there are correlations which we accept as sufficient
evidence for causation. The proponents of the "correlation is not
causation"-argument now have to explain the difference: why should we
accept an FTL telefon as falsification of Einstein causality but
Aspect not.
How something like the non-realistic "consistent histories" philosophy
which takes quantum strangeness more or less as given is relevant to
the question I don't understand. BTW, the FTL telefon argument works
here too. With "consistent histories" I can as well explain away
an FTL telefon.
Note the quasi-universality of the FTL telefon argument: the only
difference between EPR and FTL telefon is that the only realistic
explanation of the second is A->B, while we have two of them
(A->B and B->A) for the first.
(Once this makes this posting an implicit reply to
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/2000-01/msg0021425.html I make a xpost
to sci.physics.research and cc to John.
shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
>>> If your arguments are as obvious as you make them sound, I
>>> wonder why they don't seem to resonate with recognized experts.
>> Me too. I see some esthetical prejudice (and I can understand this
>> prejudice for people who have not understood the whole beauty of
>> GET). They have their own pet theories and therefore are not
>> interested. But nothing more.
> Maybe they have considered enough differing viewpoints to make an
> honest determination that your approach is unlikely to lead anywhere.
Maybe. But I see no evidence for this.
> One disadvantage of being an outsider is the lack of an environment
> where ideas are continually proposed and criticized by others. I am
> sure there are many extremely smart theorists with beautiful ideas
> that go down in flames in quality research groups. If what you call
> FTL causal effects are only correlations, and other ideas (string
> theories or loop quantum gravity, perhaps) give as much or more
> promise at unification, what is the benefit of GET?
Which approach gives more we can judge if somebody else with fresh
ideas and better QFT background will participate.
I will do what I can, but I cannot do everything alone.
> The criticism of your independent variables axiom as basically
> irrelevant and unmeasurable scalar fields lumped onto GR seems valid
> to me.
It is at least partially invalid (mingles the role of coordinates and
scalar fields), what remains is name-calling. I acknowledge that
writing down the Lagrangian in "weak covariant" form where the
preferred coordinates X^i(x) look like scalar fields suggests such
misunderstandings.
shuba
Ilja wrote:
> I see no evidence in the axioms of GET that a simple concept has been
> used and complicated. The GET axioms have, at their surface, nothing
> to do with relativistic concepts. (Ok, they have been, in fact, found
> by reverse engineering. But the idea to understand Noethers
> conservation laws for translational symmetry as Euler-Lagrange
> equations for the coordinates I have had much earlier.)
I think it's valid to consider that principles (such as EEP,
conservation laws, or the relativity principle) are actually more
fundamental than the axioms of a theory that lead to the principles.
As the EEP can be reached without the additional fields of an ether,
your approach does look artificially complicated to me. On the other
hand, it can reasonably be argued that some kind of complications
are needed for reconciling GR and QM, which ideally would lead to
the simplest possible physics.
> >> \begin{axiom}{independent variables} \label{afirst}
> >> The independent variables of the theory are the following fields
> >> defined on a Newtonian framework${\Bbb R^3\otimes R}$ with preferred
> >> coordinates $X^i,T$: a positive density $\rho(X^i,T)$, a velocity
> >> $v^i(X^i,T)$, a symmetric pressure tensor $p^{ij}(X^i,T), and an
> >> unspecified number of ``inner steps of freedom'' $\varphi^m(X^i,T)$.
> >> \end{axiom}
> >
> > First of all we have a R^3 x R spacetime. Why this choice, as
> > it goes against naive direct calculations?
>
> Which "naive calculations"? (String theory?)
If I think that space and time are measureable with my instruments,
spacetime is locally Minkowskian. That is what I meant.
> > Should I now expect an explanation of its associated symmetry to be
> > necessary or useful?
>
> You should IMHO never expect an explanation for the fundamental
> notions of a theory. Explanation means starting with something
> fundamental as given and explaining something else, which is derived.
>
> In this sense, GET explains the EEP, and a more fundamental atomic
> ether theory will probably explain the continuous continuity equation
> as the conservation law for ether particles and so on.
>
> To ask for an explanation of R^3 x R in GET seems as reasonable as to ask
> "explain why spacetime is curved" in GR.
You're the one who said GET explains relativistic symmetry, so I
thought I'd see if you were consistent. It appears not.
Arguing that GET explains relativistic symmetry or arguing that GR
explains the unobservability of the ether is equally fruitless. GR
has no need for the axioms of GET in any way, but GET does need to
conform to the relativity principle, which it denies philosophically
but preserves for observables.
> > In particular, why the preferred time? You keep saying EPR-realism
> > supports it or requires it, such as...
>
> Yep. I will discuss this in a separate posting to sci.physics.research
> because it is, essentially, a reply to the spr posting you refer to.
> But before this I will update my web page about realism. (I will send
> you a cc if done).
Okay. I did see the article you crossposted to s.p.research. The
FTL-telefon argument does not seem analogous, as QM correlations
cannot transmit information FTL. That is a big difference.
> > If what you call FTL causal effects are only correlations,
>
> Check it yourself. Read Bell if you don't want to rely on my claims,
> that's certainly high quality reading. Its worth to consider the game
> http://ilja-schmelzer.net/realism/game.html to understand yourself
> _what_ type of correlations are observed.
From what I can tell, you can win the game because you already
set up correlated particles beforehand. This avoids getting fined
and going to jail, and will work because QM is correct. But there is
no causal effect necessary that I can see. The particles do not
travel FTL. All you have is a change in probability due to known
correlations.
[..]
> It is partially caused by a misunderstanding about their nature
> (preferred coordinates are very very special variables). This is
> partially caused by the "weak covariant" form of the GET Lagrangian.
>
> What remains is IMHO name-calling.
Like considering everything you disagree with as positivistic
nonsense, I suppose. Philosophical arguments are mostly word
play and not worth much. What I like about the relativity principle
is that it is predominantly a mathematical statement of how physical
laws are invariant. And please, before you again repeat the tired
claim that this is not true, see the link below.
http://www.livingreviews.org/Articles/Volume1/1998-1rovelli/node11.html
I can fully understand why theorists would be reluctant to give
up a principle of proven value for a conception of realism that
needs to propped up by unobservable entities. If there is anything
of value in GET, it will be outside of the realm of the metaphysical.
Until and unless you can convince other theorists of this actual
value, I'll expect the common sense principle of relativity to prevail.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> I think it's valid to consider that principles (such as EEP,
> conservation laws, or the relativity principle) are actually more
> fundamental than the axioms of a theory that lead to the principles.
What is the difference between "principles" and "axioms"? IMHO
"axiom" has a more formal meaning. Axioms are used to define
theories. But these axioms can also be considered as basic principles
of the given theory.
In any given theory, the axioms are the most fundamental thing.
> As the EEP can be reached without the additional fields of an ether,
> your approach does look artificially complicated to me.
The EEP may be postulated and may be derived. In GR it is postulated,
in GET it is derived.
> > > First of all we have a R^3 x R spacetime. Why this choice, as
> > > it goes against naive direct calculations?
> >
> > Which "naive calculations"? (String theory?)
>
> If I think that space and time are measureable with my instruments,
> spacetime is locally Minkowskian. That is what I meant.
I start with axioms, not with measurements. It is the theory which
defines what is observable. GET is a nice illustration of this
principle.
> > > Should I now expect an explanation of its associated symmetry to be
> > > necessary or useful?
> > You should IMHO never expect an explanation for the fundamental
> > notions of a theory. Explanation means starting with something
> > fundamental as given and explaining something else, which is derived.
> >
> > In this sense, GET explains the EEP, and a more fundamental atomic
> > ether theory will probably explain the continuous continuity equation
> > as the conservation law for ether particles and so on.
> >
> > To ask for an explanation of R^3 x R in GET seems as reasonable as to ask
> > "explain why spacetime is curved" in GR.
>
> You're the one who said GET explains relativistic symmetry, so I
> thought I'd see if you were consistent. It appears not.
I'm consistent. Relativistic symmetry (the EEP) is explained, as I
have claimed. The axioms are not explained, but postulated. As in
every physical theory.
> Arguing that GET explains relativistic symmetry or arguing that GR
> explains the unobservability of the ether is equally fruitless.
The comparison is nonsensical. There is a difference: there is no
ether in GR, therefore GR does not explain anything about the ether.
But there is the EEP in GET, and it is derived there from axioms.
> GR has no need for the axioms of GET in any way,
Indeed, GR is a different theory.
> but GET does need to conform to the relativity principle, which it
> denies philosophically but preserves for observables.
GET does need to conform to observation, as well as GR. The EEP which
holds in above theories (postulated in GR, derived in GET) is in
agreement with observation.
> > > In particular, why the preferred time? You keep saying EPR-realism
> > > supports it or requires it, such as...
> >
> > Yep. I will discuss this in a separate posting to sci.physics.research
> > because it is, essentially, a reply to the spr posting you refer to.
> > But before this I will update my web page about realism. (I will send
> > you a cc if done).
>
> Okay. I did see the article you crossposted to s.p.research. The
> FTL-telefon argument does not seem analogous, as QM correlations
> cannot transmit information FTL. That is a big difference.
The FTL-phone argument is useful to reject a lot of arguments - all
arguments which may be, as well, applied to an FTL phone. For
example, it is sufficient to reject the "no free will" loophole - if
there is no free will we also cannot prove by observation that
an FTL phone really works.
There are, indeed, arguments which cannot be rejected by the FTL phone
argument. An FTL phone has one EPR-realistic explanation: A->B. A
Bell device has two EPR-realistic explanations: A->B or B->A. That's
the important difference. But that's the typical difference between
direct and indirect observation. Do you want to remove all indirect
observations from science? I doubt.
>
> > > If what you call FTL causal effects are only correlations,
> >
> > Check it yourself. Read Bell if you don't want to rely on my claims,
> > that's certainly high quality reading. Its worth to consider the game
> > http://ilja-schmelzer.net/realism/game.html to understand yourself
> > _what_ type of correlations are observed.
>
> From what I can tell, you can win the game because you already
> set up correlated particles beforehand. This avoids getting fined
> and going to jail, and will work because QM is correct. But there is
> no causal effect necessary that I can see. The particles do not
> travel FTL. All you have is a change in probability due to known
> correlations.
That's a typical argumentation which can be invalidated using the FTL
phone:
From what I can tell, you can talk because you already set up a phone
line beforehand. This will work because FTL phone theory is correct.
But there is no causal effect necessary that I can see. The phone
line does not travel FTL. All you have is a change in probability due
to known correlations.
(Here "FTL phone theory" is the theory which may be obtained from
a realistic FTL phone theory with FTL causal interaction by rejecting
the realistic interpretation and introducing a minimal interpretation
in a way similar to the way from Bohmian mechanics to minimal QM.)
> > It is partially caused by a misunderstanding about their nature
> > (preferred coordinates are very very special variables). This is
> > partially caused by the "weak covariant" form of the GET Lagrangian.
> > What remains is IMHO name-calling.
> Like considering everything you disagree with as positivistic
> nonsense, I suppose.
There are much more things I disagree with, so I doubt that I name
everything I disagree with "positivistic nonsense". I agree, if this
would be all I have against the things I call "positivistic nonsense"
it would be only name-calling. But I have the whole argumentation
given by Popper against positivism behind me.
> Philosophical arguments are mostly word
> play and not worth much.
Poppers argumentation is far away from being word play. Ignorance of
Popper is not an argument.
> What I like about the relativity principle
> is that it is predominantly a mathematical statement of how physical
> laws are invariant. And please, before you again repeat the tired
> claim that this is not true, see the link below.
Tired or not, my description of the situation (covariance a
possibility for all physical theories, the distinguishing feature of
GR is the absence of absolutes) follows MTW.
> http://www.livingreviews.org/Articles/Volume1/1998-1rovelli/node11.html
Nothing new to me, I have discussed Rovelli's gr-qc/9903045 in detail
in gr-qc/0001101. A key point of Rovelli's concept of active diff
invariance is the following:
---------
A theory is invariant under active diffs, when a smooth displacement
of the dynamical fields ({\em the dynamical fields alone\/}) over the
manifold, sends solutions of the equations of motion into solutions of
the equations of motion. Distinguishing a truly dynamical field,
namely a field with independent degrees of freedom, from a
nondynamical filed disguised as dynamical (such as a metric field $g$
with the equations of motion Riemann[g]=0) might require a detailed
analysis (for instance, hamiltonian) of the theory.
---------
Now, the interesting point is that analysis of the equations of motion
alone (for instance, hamiltonian) does not allow to distinguish a
nondynamical field disguised as dynamical. The covariant formulation
of GET is the counterexample - it has the same equations of motion as
GR with four dynamical scalar fields. The difference is the
geometrical character of these "fields" - they are preferred
coordinates, and therefore they have to fulfil global restrictions
and boundary conditions appropriate for preferred coordinates.
BTW, I like a lot of Rovelli's paper, especially the general
methodological concept. Quotes like "I am convinced of the reciprocal
usefulness of a dialog between physics and philosophy [] Newton,
Heisenberg and Einstein couldn't have done what they have done if they
weren't nurtured by (good or bad) philosophy. [] the ``wild''
scientist concludes that to do great science one has to explore
strange hypotheses, and {\em violate respected ideas\/}. The wildest
the hypothesis, the best. I think wilderness in physics is sterile.
The greatest revolutionaries in science were extremely, almost
obsessively, conservative."
> I can fully understand why theorists would be reluctant to give
> up a principle of proven value for a conception of realism that
> needs to propped up by unobservable entities.
Realism has no proven value. And the EPR criterion of reality is a
quite strange, artificial moonshine conjecture of EPR, which has
nothing to do with common sense realism and therefore may be easily
rejected without giving up anything interesting.
Amen
> If there is anything of value in GET, it will be outside of the
> realm of the metaphysical.
Not really. GET has two additional terms, but whatever they predict
may be predicted by GR by adding these terms by hand as "dark matter
terms". It predicts a flat universe, but this is possible in GR
too. So I doubt that experiment can decide here.
I see only one way: scientists should learn the lectures from
philosophy - the failure of logical positivism. They should learn
that Popper means not only "falsification" but also acceptance of
metaphysics as a part of every physical theory, therefore as an
important part of physics. And that the rejection of metaphysical
argumentation does not mean that scientists do not make metaphysical
choices, but that they make their metaphysical choices without
discussing them.
> Until and unless you can convince other
> theorists of this actual value, I'll expect the common sense
> principle of relativity to prevail.
What is common sense in the principle of relativity holds in GET too.
And, as long as ignorance is the only argument against GET, I do not
care too much about majority opinions, even of scientists.
shuba
> What is the difference between "principles" and "axioms"? IMHO
> "axiom" has a more formal meaning. Axioms are used to define
> theories. But these axioms can also be considered as basic principles
> of the given theory.
>
> In any given theory, the axioms are the most fundamental thing.
In mathematics, surely. In physics, it isn't so. Whether we
consider billiard-ball mechanics, field dynamics, point particle
interactions or anything else as fundamental, we end up reaching the
same destinations: conservation, relativity, least action, symmetry.
[..]
> The comparison is nonsensical. There is a difference: there is no
> ether in GR, therefore GR does not explain anything about the ether.
An unobservable ether in not in conflict with GR.
> But there is the EEP in GET, and it is derived there from axioms.
Suggesting to me that something about the EEP might be *more*
fundamental than the ether. If it were neither postulated nor
derived, the theory wouldn't be experimentally correct.
> GET does need to conform to observation, as well as GR. The EEP which
> holds in above theories (postulated in GR, derived in GET) is in
> agreement with observation.
That's my point above, exactly. Physics is an experimental science.
[..]
> That's a typical argumentation which can be invalidated using the FTL
> phone:
>
> From what I can tell, you can talk because you already set up a phone
> line beforehand. This will work because FTL phone theory is correct.
> But there is no causal effect necessary that I can see. The phone
> line does not travel FTL. All you have is a change in probability due
> to known correlations.
>
> (Here "FTL phone theory" is the theory which may be obtained from
> a realistic FTL phone theory with FTL causal interaction by rejecting
> the realistic interpretation and introducing a minimal interpretation
> in a way similar to the way from Bohmian mechanics to minimal QM.)
Well you've lost me here. If I tell you on the FTL-phone about the
contents of a radio message I sent ten seconds previously, and you
receive it before the radio message, there is a causal effect
necessary. This cannot be done with QM correlations.
As a side note, it would be interesting to see your criticism of the
following presentation by Vic Stenger (physicist, astronomer, noted
skeptic, and interestingly, visiting professor of philosophy),
who coincidentally has just posted to s.p.research.
http://spot.colorado.edu/~vstenger/Quantum/localepr.html
[snip some rather interesting comments about dynamical/nondynamical
fields and Carlo Rovelli's writings]
> > I can fully understand why theorists would be reluctant to give
> > up a principle of proven value for a conception of realism that
> > needs to propped up by unobservable entities.
>
> Realism has no proven value. And the EPR criterion of reality is a
> quite strange, artificial moonshine conjecture of EPR, which has
> nothing to do with common sense realism and therefore may be easily
> rejected without giving up anything interesting.
What's interesting is that the EPR criterion of realism does *not*
seem to hold, unless tenuously wrapped in an immunization of
unobservables.
> Amen
Yes, many churches base their entire dogma on criteria of realism
backed by unobservables. Here too, I prefer other principles.
> > If there is anything of value in GET, it will be outside of the
> > realm of the metaphysical.
>
> Not really. GET has two additional terms, but whatever they predict
> may be predicted by GR by adding these terms by hand as "dark matter
> terms". It predicts a flat universe, but this is possible in GR
> too. So I doubt that experiment can decide here.
>
> I see only one way: scientists should learn the lectures from
> philosophy - the failure of logical positivism. They should learn
> that Popper means not only "falsification" but also acceptance of
> metaphysics as a part of every physical theory, therefore as an
> important part of physics. And that the rejection of metaphysical
> argumentation does not mean that scientists do not make metaphysical
> choices, but that they make their metaphysical choices without
> discussing them.
I usually find arguments based on rigid adherence to particular
scientific philosophies to be sterile and unproductive, but I
don't think it is true that modern theorists are not discussing
the metaphysical aspects of their ideas. Just look at the pro/con
arguments about string theory, for instance.
I have stated where I find things in your axiomatic basis as
questionable. If GET cannot go beyond metaphysics, it is nothing
more than an interesting intellecutual exercise to rewrite GR. Many
of your ideas are worth consideration, certain above the usual level
of crap that is discussed here, but it's not as if these ideas are
absent from the scientific literature or thought. Here is one good
example from published physicists who do not appear to be crackpots.
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/0007031
It seems to me that these types of people are the ones you need to
convince of the usefulness and validity of GET. Simply painting
"scientists" with the wide brush of misapplication of the one true
interpretation of the prophet Popper is no substitute for showing
that you really have something new to offer.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja wrote:
> > What is the difference between "principles" and "axioms"? IMHO
> > "axiom" has a more formal meaning. Axioms are used to define
> > theories. But these axioms can also be considered as basic principles
> > of the given theory.
> >
> > In any given theory, the axioms are the most fundamental thing.
>
> In mathematics, surely. In physics, it isn't so. Whether we
> consider billiard-ball mechanics, field dynamics, point particle
> interactions or anything else as fundamental, we end up reaching the
> same destinations: conservation, relativity, least action, symmetry.
This already looks like a discussion about words (here "fundamental").
Because, in some sense, these "destinations" are reached by GET too
this seems to be of minor importance.
> > The comparison is nonsensical. There is a difference: there is no
> > ether in GR, therefore GR does not explain anything about the ether.
>
> An unobservable ether in not in conflict with GR.
>
> > But there is the EEP in GET, and it is derived there from axioms.
>
> Suggesting to me that something about the EEP might be *more*
> fundamental than the ether. If it were neither postulated nor
> derived, the theory wouldn't be experimentally correct.
Hm. Some effect X is observed, postulated in one theory, derived in
another one. It is quite typical that in this case the theory where
it is postulated is less fundamental (phenomenological). As an
example, consider the principles or equations of thermodynamics in
comparison with kinetic theory, or Kepler's theory in comparison with
Newtonian mechanics.
What suggests you that the situation with the EEP is different here?
> > GET does need to conform to observation, as well as GR. The EEP which
> > holds in above theories (postulated in GR, derived in GET) is in
> > agreement with observation.
>
> That's my point above, exactly. Physics is an experimental science.
I don't understand what is your point here. BTW I disagree with your
description of physics as "an experimental science". Physics uses
experiment to falsify theories. Theoretical physics is at least as
important. But IMHO much more important. What counts as the
revolution in science have been new theories (Newton, Einstein, QM),
while the continuously increasing accuracy of experiments is fine
but not the really interesting point.
>>> [typical argumentation against EPR snipped]
> > That's a typical argumentation which can be invalidated using the FTL
> > phone:
> >
> > From what I can tell, you can talk because you already set up a phone
> > line beforehand. This will work because FTL phone theory is correct.
> > But there is no causal effect necessary that I can see. The phone
> > line does not travel FTL. All you have is a change in probability due
> > to known correlations.
> >
> > (Here "FTL phone theory" is the theory which may be obtained from
> > a realistic FTL phone theory with FTL causal interaction by rejecting
> > the realistic interpretation and introducing a minimal interpretation
> > in a way similar to the way from Bohmian mechanics to minimal QM.)
>
> Well you've lost me here. If I tell you on the FTL-phone about the
> contents of a radio message I sent ten seconds previously, and you
> receive it before the radio message, there is a causal effect
> necessary. This cannot be done with QM correlations.
Indeed. That means, my _analogous_ argument is meaningless. You have
to explain now why your _original_ argument against the causal
interpretation of EPRB experiments is nonetheless not meaningless.
---------- snipped part ---------------------
> From what I can tell, you can win the game because you already
> set up correlated particles beforehand. This avoids getting fined
> and going to jail, and will work because QM is correct. But there is
> no causal effect necessary that I can see. The particles do not
> travel FTL. All you have is a change in probability due to known
> correlations.
---------- end snipped part ---------------------
My real argumentation is that this argument is _as_meaningless_ as my
analogous _meaningless_ pseudo-argument about FTL phones (and
therefore meaningless).
> As a side note, it would be interesting to see your criticism of the
> following presentation by Vic Stenger (physicist, astronomer, noted
> skeptic, and interestingly, visiting professor of philosophy),
> who coincidentally has just posted to s.p.research.
>
> http://spot.colorado.edu/~vstenger/Quantum/localepr.html
Thanks, I will try this in a separate post in s.p.research.
http://spot.colorado.edu/~vstenger/Quantum/localepr.html writes:
> As far back as 1953, French physicist Olivier Costa de Beauregard had
> argued that the EPR paradox could be resolved by including the action
> of advanced waves [Costa de Beauregard 1953]. He pointed out that the
> exclusion of advanced waves is a classical prejudice that has no a
> priori justification.
Of course, if we allow such extraordinary things like advanced waves
in contradiction with classical causality we simply reject the notion
of classical causality. But this can be done also in the case of
observation of an FTL phone. So, I think, the FTL metaargument is in
principle sufficient here too.
> > > I can fully understand why theorists would be reluctant to give
> > > up a principle of proven value for a conception of realism that
> > > needs to propped up by unobservable entities.
> >
> > Realism has no proven value. And the EPR criterion of reality is a
> > quite strange, artificial moonshine conjecture of EPR, which has
> > nothing to do with common sense realism and therefore may be easily
> > rejected without giving up anything interesting.
>
> What's interesting is that the EPR criterion of realism does *not*
> seem to hold, unless tenuously wrapped in an immunization of
> unobservables.
Sorry, EPR realism is IMO better understood as a methodological
principle. Similar to classical logic which forbids logical
contradictions, it forbids unexplainable correlations.
We can always give up classical logic, for example we can claim that
GR contradicts QM, above are well-tested theories, therefore classical
logic does not seem to hold. We prefer to believe into classical
logic and therefore search for a non-contradictory theory of quantum
gravity.
As well we can give up the EPR principle to search for realistic,
causal explanations of observed correletions. Whenever we observe
some strange correlation without obvious explanation we can give up
and say "seems, the thesis that everything has a realistic explanation
does not seem to hold".
Instead, what is observable is decided by the theory. There is no
metatheoretical notion of "unobservable". And if we accept
EPR-realism, Aspect's experiment is an (indirect) _observation_ of FTL
causal influences.
Indeed, what is indirect observation? You observe some effect Y, and
all possible realistic explanations of this observation include some
object X, then observing Y counts as indirect observation of X. BTW,
from appropriate point of view every observation is indirect in this
sense.
> > > If there is anything of value in GET, it will be outside of the
> > > realm of the metaphysical.
> >
> > Not really. GET has two additional terms, but whatever they predict
> > may be predicted by GR by adding these terms by hand as "dark matter
> > terms". It predicts a flat universe, but this is possible in GR
> > too. So I doubt that experiment can decide here.
> >
> > I see only one way: scientists should learn the lectures from
> > philosophy - the failure of logical positivism. They should learn
> > that Popper means not only "falsification" but also acceptance of
> > metaphysics as a part of every physical theory, therefore as an
> > important part of physics. And that the rejection of metaphysical
> > argumentation does not mean that scientists do not make metaphysical
> > choices, but that they make their metaphysical choices without
> > discussing them.
>
> I usually find arguments based on rigid adherence to particular
> scientific philosophies to be sterile and unproductive, but I
> don't think it is true that modern theorists are not discussing
> the metaphysical aspects of their ideas. Just look at the pro/con
> arguments about string theory, for instance.
>
> I have stated where I find things in your axiomatic basis as
> questionable. If GET cannot go beyond metaphysics, it is nothing
> more than an interesting intellecutual exercise to rewrite GR.
It is certainly already beyond an interesting intellecutual exercise
to rewrite GR. It has additional terms and makes, at least in
principle, predictions different from GR.
What I doubt is that experiment will really decide. Metaphysics,
especially also such things as feelings of beauty, are much more
influental in science than often assumed. In the domain of quantum
gravity, where we essentially have no experiments, they are, at least
today, decisive.
> Many of your ideas are worth consideration, certain above the usual
> level of crap that is discussed here, but it's not as if these ideas
> are absent from the scientific literature or thought. Here is one
> good example from published physicists who do not appear to be
> crackpots.
> http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/0007031
>
> It seems to me that these types of people are the ones you need to
> convince of the usefulness and validity of GET.
I have already had contact with Logunov, Rosu, Volovik
> Simply painting "scientists" with the wide brush of misapplication
> of the one true interpretation of the prophet Popper is no
> substitute for showing that you really have something new to offer.
This may be a false impression based on newsgroup dynamics. I'm
interested in discussions about GET with reasonable scientists.
Therefore I often criticize something posted by reasonable people
which is questionable in the light of GET or in contradiction with
GET. Because of the usual character of this newsgroup (discussions
with ether cranks) these are very often metaphysical statements, and
often positivistic claims which have been rejected long ago by Popper.
Popper is, for me, not a prophet but simply the most valuable source
for methodology of science. Something like a reference to MTW or
Einstein in gravity. I disagree with Popper in many points (for
example I'm anarchist, Popper defender of a welfare state).
shuba
> > > In any given theory, the axioms are the most fundamental thing.
> >
> > In mathematics, surely. In physics, it isn't so. Whether we
> > consider billiard-ball mechanics, field dynamics, point particle
> > interactions or anything else as fundamental, we end up reaching the
> > same destinations: conservation, relativity, least action, symmetry.
>
> This already looks like a discussion about words (here "fundamental").
> Because, in some sense, these "destinations" are reached by GET too
> this seems to be of minor importance.
That's true. Such minor semantic disputes are at the heart of
most metaphysical discussions. That's why I don't see GET as
serving a useful purpose if it doesn't go beyond metaphysics. In
that spirit, I have chosen to snip a lot of our discussion which
is probably going nowhere and getting too long, anyway.
To summarize about your FTL-phone arguments, I don't find them
at all analogous to EPR correlations, because no information is
transmitted in the latter.
> > What's interesting is that the EPR criterion of realism does *not*
> > seem to hold, unless tenuously wrapped in an immunization of
> > unobservables.
>
> Sorry, EPR realism is IMO better understood as a methodological
> principle. Similar to classical logic which forbids logical
> contradictions, it forbids unexplainable correlations.
>
> We can always give up classical logic, for example we can claim that
> GR contradicts QM, above are well-tested theories, therefore classical
> logic does not seem to hold. We prefer to believe into classical
> logic and therefore search for a non-contradictory theory of quantum
> gravity.
>
> As well we can give up the EPR principle to search for realistic,
> causal explanations of observed correletions. Whenever we observe
> some strange correlation without obvious explanation we can give up
> and say "seems, the thesis that everything has a realistic explanation
> does not seem to hold".
>
> Instead, what is observable is decided by the theory. There is no
> metatheoretical notion of "unobservable". And if we accept
> EPR-realism, Aspect's experiment is an (indirect) _observation_ of FTL
> causal influences.
You can pretend such "causal influences" are no different than
macroscopic causal influences, and you can pretend the quantum
world is as "real" in the same sense as the familiar macroscopic
world. I just find it quite a stretch, and very questionable
when you need such concepts as an unobservable preferred time
within your theory. It only sweeps the wierdness under the rug.
> Indeed, what is indirect observation? You observe some effect Y, and
> all possible realistic explanations of this observation include some
> object X, then observing Y counts as indirect observation of X. BTW,
> from appropriate point of view every observation is indirect in this
> sense.
I guess so. Again, it all boils down to what is defined as
realistic. Does an electron *really* have a definite position at
all times? It is of use to define a framework, unobservable in
principle, to *explain* the probabilistic nature of the quantum
world? Go ahead, if it makes you feel better, but at some point
I think we have to admit that nature, not physical theory,
determines what is real or what is fundamental.
[..]
> I have already had contact with Logunov, Rosu, Volovik
That's good. I hope it leads to useful collaboration.
> > Simply painting "scientists" with the wide brush of misapplication
> > of the one true interpretation of the prophet Popper is no
> > substitute for showing that you really have something new to offer.
>
> This may be a false impression based on newsgroup dynamics. I'm
> interested in discussions about GET with reasonable scientists.
> Therefore I often criticize something posted by reasonable people
> which is questionable in the light of GET or in contradiction with
> GET. Because of the usual character of this newsgroup (discussions
> with ether cranks) these are very often metaphysical statements, and
> often positivistic claims which have been rejected long ago by Popper.
>
> Popper is, for me, not a prophet but simply the most valuable source
> for methodology of science. Something like a reference to MTW or
> Einstein in gravity. I disagree with Popper in many points (for
> example I'm anarchist, Popper defender of a welfare state).
I'll admit that my characterization was a bit unfair. I have no
doubt that Popper makes many good points and is worth reading.
It's just that I place very low emphasis on philosophy of science
as a methodological tool to develop theories. Philosophers since
Popper haven't been silent on the weaknesses of various forms of
realism, either. Certainly metaphysics enters in to what
theorists do, but there are no hard and fast rules. The best
theorists have an inate sense of where to bend and break the
current methodologies, and simply produce ideas that work, and
present them to others for consideration. The philosophers come
in later, more useful in catagorizing the past than providing a
direction for the future.
If GET proves useful in helping to provide a quantum description
of gravity, wonderful. Same goes for string theory, or anything
else. That's what I mean by having something new to offer. I
don't care what spin the philosophers put on it.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> at all analogous to EPR correlations, because no information is
> transmitted in the latter.
I don't understand your point here. Last not least, that there is an
essential difference between the FTL phone and EPR I have never
questioned. And pointing out that there is a difference is in no way
a counterargument against an analogy argument. Last not least, if
there would be no difference there would be no analogy but identity,
and therefore no analogy argument.
> You can pretend such "causal influences" are no different than
> macroscopic causal influences, and you can pretend the quantum
> world is as "real" in the same sense as the familiar macroscopic
> world. I just find it quite a stretch, and very questionable
> when you need such concepts as an unobservable preferred time
> within your theory. It only sweeps the wierdness under the rug.
Hidden variables are not very weird at all. The only weird thing
which may be connected with them is why they are hidden. But this may
be usually proven (and therefore explained) in the theory.
>> Indeed, what is indirect observation? You observe some effect Y, and
>> all possible realistic explanations of this observation include some
>> object X, then observing Y counts as indirect observation of X. BTW,
>> from appropriate point of view every observation is indirect in this
>> sense.
> I guess so. Again, it all boils down to what is defined as
> realistic. Does an electron *really* have a definite position at
> all times?
Such questions have well-defined answers in a given realistic theory.
(Different answers for different theories).
> It is of use to define a framework, unobservable in principle, to
> *explain* the probabilistic nature of the quantum world?
It is of use to define theories to explain what we observe.
> Go ahead, if it makes you feel better, but at some point I think we
> have to admit that nature, not physical theory, determines what is
> real or what is fundamental.
This point is already admitted if we start doing science. Of course
it depends on nature if a given theory is true or not, and not on the
theory. Our physical theories are guesses about nature. And these
guesses, if they deserve the name "realistic", include guesses about
what is real and what is fundamental.
"Being EPR-realistic" is a structural property of some physical
theories.
>> Popper is, for me, not a prophet but simply the most valuable
>> source for methodology of science. Something like a reference to
>> MTW or Einstein in gravity. I disagree with Popper in many points
>> (for example I'm anarchist, Popper defender of a welfare state).
> I'll admit that my characterization was a bit unfair. I have no
> doubt that Popper makes many good points and is worth reading. It's
> just that I place very low emphasis on philosophy of science as a
> methodological tool to develop theories. Philosophers since Popper
> haven't been silent on the weaknesses of various forms of realism,
> either.
They have IMHO talked mostly nonsense (see Sokal's hoax).
> Certainly metaphysics enters in to what theorists do, but there are
> no hard and fast rules. The best theorists have an inate sense of
> where to bend and break the current methodologies, and simply
> produce ideas that work, and present them to others for
> consideration. The philosophers come in later, more useful in
> catagorizing the past than providing a direction for the future.
I hope to be a good theorist myself, and my "innate sense" suggests me
that we have to get rid of a lot of remaining positivistic
misconceptions in methodology.
> If GET proves useful in helping to provide a quantum description
> of gravity, wonderful. Same goes for string theory, or anything
> else. That's what I mean by having something new to offer. I
> don't care what spin the philosophers put on it.
This is something we can agree about.
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> [snip]
>
> > It is of use to define a framework, unobservable in principle, to
> > *explain* the probabilistic nature of the quantum world?
>
> It is of use to define theories to explain what we observe.
>
> > Go ahead, if it makes you feel better, but at some point I think we
> > have to admit that nature, not physical theory, determines what is
> > real or what is fundamental.
What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
> This point is already admitted if we start doing science. Of course
> it depends on nature if a given theory is true or not, and not on the
> theory.
A Freudian slip of the tongue, Ilja. Why do you
think that any one of the variables that humans like,
such as length, time, or mass, has anything intrinsically
to do with the objective universe? And if we cannot
find this connection, why should any human-made
theory be "true"? This goes way beyond the older
philosophical problem of not being able to prove truth,
though one may rightfully believe that one theory might
be true. This problem is more fundamental than that!
Before one can ask if a theory is true, one should ask
if everyone of the variables and concepts used within
the theory is true.
> Our physical theories are guesses about nature.
They are free creations. The theory of continuous
macroscopic matter is NOT a guess. It's a lunacy
that works anyway! And that's why it is still used.
Metaphysics be damned in science!!!!!
> And these
> guesses, if they deserve the name "realistic", include guesses about
> what is real and what is fundamental.
>
> "Being EPR-realistic" is a structural property of some physical
> theories.
In other words, an a priori modeling constraint
on the research program that underlies the theory.
> >> Popper is, for me, not a prophet but simply the most valuable
> >> source for methodology of science.
(Einstein is to me.)
> Something like a reference to
> >> MTW or Einstein in gravity. I disagree with Popper in many points
> >> (for example I'm anarchist, Popper defender of a welfare state).
>
> > I'll admit that my characterization was a bit unfair. I have no
> > doubt that Popper makes many good points and is worth reading. It's
> > just that I place very low emphasis on philosophy of science as a
> > methodological tool to develop theories. Philosophers since Popper
> > haven't been silent on the weaknesses of various forms of realism,
> > either.
>
> They have IMHO talked mostly nonsense (see Sokal's hoax).
The *irrelevance* of realism to effective theory building!
(Except from purely psychological perspective, then
it enters as a mere heuristic. I say "mere" in the metaphysical
sense, NOT in the formal effectiveness sense though. Heuristics
are really at the heart of theory building. But they don't lead
us to truth.)
> > Certainly metaphysics enters in to what theorists do, but there are
> > no hard and fast rules. The best theorists have an inate sense of
> > where to bend and break the current methodologies, and simply
> > produce ideas that work, and present them to others for
> > consideration. The philosophers come in later, more useful in
> > catagorizing the past than providing a direction for the future.
>
> I hope to be a good theorist myself, and my "innate sense" suggests me
> that we have to get rid of a lot of remaining positivistic
> misconceptions in methodology.
>
Never miss a chance to decry the boogie man
of positivism. Positivism was not intended to
be the end of metaphysics. It was intended to
get all the pointless metaphysical bickering and
a priori metaphysical dogmatism out of the way in
science that had been there as a result of the
powers that were back then in Comte's time: the
Catholic church and the secular powers. Comte's
intention was to let scientists be unrestrained
to the largest variety of models. That is still a very
good environment for doing physics. Even a
self-proclaimed anarchist, such as yourself, should
see the value of maintaining this form of
"positivism." Ilja, the dogmatist "anarchist." Now
that makes a lot of sense, right?
One can always retreat to natural philosophy to
bandy about one's beliefs about the REAL
nature of the universe. Ooooooooooooo!!!
Spooky stuff! Where's Moulder when we
need him?
I haven't yet figured out what the hell a self-proclaimed
anarchist wants to do with the TRUTH. Shout out
it perhaps. Put it on his fireplace mantle as a trophy?
Bury it in his garden?
Patrick
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
>> This point is already admitted if we start doing science. Of course
>> it depends on nature if a given theory is true or not, and not on the
>> theory.
> A Freudian slip of the tongue, Ilja. Why do you think that any one
> of the variables that humans like, such as length, time, or mass,
> has anything intrinsically to do with the objective universe?
I think that a theory which survives strong tests has something to do
with the objective universe. This "something" may be less than we
would like (usually it means only that the theory is a useful
approximation).
> And if we cannot find this connection, why should any human-made
> theory be "true"?
Why not?
> This goes way beyond the older
> philosophical problem of not being able to prove truth,
> though one may rightfully believe that one theory might
> be true. This problem is more fundamental than that!
Really?
> Before one can ask if a theory is true, one should ask
> if everyone of the variables and concepts used within
> the theory is true.
If the theory is true that means their variables and concepts are
true. Evidence that a theory is true is that it makes very nontrivial
predictions which agree with observation, or explains what has been
already observed.
>> Our physical theories are guesses about nature.
> They are free creations. The theory of continuous macroscopic matter
> is NOT a guess. It's a lunacy that works anyway! And that's why it
> is still used.
It was a guess, now we use it as an approximation.
> Metaphysics be damned in science!!!!!
Don't cry.
>> And these
>> guesses, if they deserve the name "realistic", include guesses about
>> what is real and what is fundamental.
>>
>> "Being EPR-realistic" is a structural property of some physical
>> theories.
>
> In other words, an a priori modeling constraint
> on the research program that underlies the theory.
Yep. But more comparable with methodological constraints (mathematical
formulation, no contradictions allowed) than with constraints of the
content (like fixation of a special symmetry group like Lorentz
invariance).
> The *irrelevance* of realism to effective theory building!
Of course it is possible, in principle, to create effective
(phenomenological) theories without a base in realism. But I see no
evidence that the rejection of realism has been fruitful in science.
>> I hope to be a good theorist myself, and my "innate sense" suggests me
>> that we have to get rid of a lot of remaining positivistic
>> misconceptions in methodology.
> Never miss a chance to decry the boogie man of
> positivism. Positivism was not intended to be the end of
> metaphysics. It was intended to get all the pointless metaphysical
> bickering and a priori metaphysical dogmatism out of the way in
> science
I agree that positivism has started with good intentions. So what?
Unfortunately good intentions do not lead to truth.
> Comte's intention was to let scientists be unrestrained to the
> largest variety of models.
Comparing this with the few bits of information I have about Comte I
doubt. But this does not matter.
> That is still a very good environment for doing physics. Even a
> self-proclaimed anarchist, such as yourself, should see the value of
> maintaining this form of "positivism." Ilja, the dogmatist
> "anarchist."
ROTFL. I'm certainly not dogmatic. To present anti-positivism as
dogmatism only because positivism has been directed against the
dogmatism of that time is cheap rhetorics.
> I haven't yet figured out what the hell a self-proclaimed
> anarchist wants to do with the TRUTH.
To have true theories is quite useful, they allow to make correct
predictions. The ability to make correct predictions is a useful tool
for anarchists as well as for other people. Moreover, its fun and
interesting to find out the truth.
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> writes:
> > Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> >> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> > What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
>
> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
*Your* personal best guess.
> >> This point is already admitted if we start doing science. Of course
> >> it depends on nature if a given theory is true or not, and not on the
> >> theory.
>
> > A Freudian slip of the tongue, Ilja. Why do you think that any one
> > of the variables that humans like, such as length, time, or mass,
> > has anything intrinsically to do with the objective universe?
>
> I think that a theory which survives strong tests has something to do
> with the objective universe. This "something" may be less than we
> would like (usually it means only that the theory is a useful
> approximation).
>
> > And if we cannot find this connection, why should any human-made
> > theory be "true"?
>
> Why not?
Typical evasion of a direct question. Ilja on his
own hopeless search for the Lost Dutchman's gold
mine of TRUTH.
> > This goes way beyond the older
> > philosophical problem of not being able to prove truth,
> > though one may rightfully believe that one theory might
> > be true. This problem is more fundamental than that!
>
> Really?
Really. You just have this irrational faith to preach
as a dogma.
> > Before one can ask if a theory is true, one should ask
> > if everyone of the variables and concepts used within
> > the theory is true.
>
> If the theory is true that means their variables and concepts are
> true.
Why should this rule be true? I have already
given examples to weaken belief in this dogma.
It seems like a circular argument to me. Just
a pure statement of faith on you part. It looks
more like religion to me.
If there is no proof that humans can uniquely
invent physical theories that work, then
there is no proof that the models used within
a good theory are true.
> Evidence that a theory is true is that it makes very nontrivial
> predictions which agree with observation, or explains what has been
> already observed.
>
> >> Our physical theories are guesses about nature.
>
> > They are free creations. The theory of continuous macroscopic matter
> > is NOT a guess. It's a lunacy that works anyway! And that's why it
> > is still used.
>
> It was a guess, now we use it as an approximation.
>
> > Metaphysics be damned in science!!!!!
>
> Don't cry.
Crying is hardly the emotion evoked.
> >> And these
> >> guesses, if they deserve the name "realistic", include guesses about
> >> what is real and what is fundamental.
> >>
> >> "Being EPR-realistic" is a structural property of some physical
> >> theories.
> >
> > In other words, an a priori modeling constraint
> > on the research program that underlies the theory.
>
> Yep. But more comparable with methodological constraints (mathematical
> formulation, no contradictions allowed) than with constraints of the
> content (like fixation of a special symmetry group like Lorentz
> invariance).
The continuous model of macroscopic matter causes
contradictions if you look at it too closely. We use
it anyway, and it doesn't lead anyone to believe that
it is true even though it works.
> > The *irrelevance* of realism to effective theory building!
>
> Of course it is possible, in principle, to create effective
> (phenomenological) theories without a base in realism. But I see no
> evidence that the rejection of realism has been fruitful in science.
I do. We do it all the time these days. Newton did it.
He didn't believe in real action at a distance. Nobody
believes in real gravitational or electromagnetic singularities.
We use them anyway. Isospin was never about "reality."
The principle of least action is just because. Planck's
black body radiation formula was not about physical
structure of reality. I'm sure I could go on and on with
examples from the last 150 years.
> >> I hope to be a good theorist myself, and my "innate sense" suggests me
> >> that we have to get rid of a lot of remaining positivistic
> >> misconceptions in methodology.
>
> > Never miss a chance to decry the boogie man of
> > positivism. Positivism was not intended to be the end of
> > metaphysics. It was intended to get all the pointless metaphysical
> > bickering and a priori metaphysical dogmatism out of the way in
> > science
>
> I agree that positivism has started with good intentions. So what?
> Unfortunately good intentions do not lead to truth.
The point is that you misrepresent positivism to
be only some extremist viewpoint, so that you can
knock that down. In logic, that's called a strawman
argument. Positivism isn't your real enemy --
practicality is.
> > Comte's intention was to let scientists be unrestrained to the
> > largest variety of models.
>
> Comparing this with the few bits of information I have about Comte I
> doubt. But this does not matter.
>
> > That is still a very good environment for doing physics. Even a
> > self-proclaimed anarchist, such as yourself, should see the value of
> > maintaining this form of "positivism." Ilja, the dogmatist
> > "anarchist."
>
> ROTFL. I'm certainly not dogmatic.
Yes, you are.
> To present anti-positivism as
> dogmatism only because positivism has been directed against the
> dogmatism of that time is cheap rhetorics.
The anarchist with an agenda to enforce
a dogma on others.
> > I haven't yet figured out what the hell a self-proclaimed
> > anarchist wants to do with the TRUTH.
>
> To have true theories is quite useful, they allow to make correct
> predictions. The ability to make correct predictions is a useful tool
> for anarchists as well as for other people. Moreover, its fun and
> interesting to find out the truth.
>
>
What does the search for TRUTH have to
do with anarchism? It's fun to delude oneself
that he or she has found the truth, right?
Patrick
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>>>> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
>>> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
>>
>> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
>
> *Your* personal best guess.
Your best guess may be a different one, no problem. But a theory which
is not realistic is, obviously, not a guess about what is real.
>>> And if we cannot find this connection, why should any human-made
>>> theory be "true"?
>> Why not?
> Typical evasion of a direct question.
Let's remember that I don't argue that any human-made theory _should_
be true. I argue that it, possibly, _may_ be true. Thus, I do not
have to answer your question.
> Ilja on his own hopeless search for the Lost Dutchman's gold mine of
> TRUTH.
My search is not hopeless. I have no certainty of success, and even
if I succeed I will never know it for sure, but this is far away from
hopeless.
>>> Before one can ask if a theory is true, one should ask
>>> if everyone of the variables and concepts used within
>>> the theory is true.
>> If the theory is true that means their variables and concepts are
>> true.
> Why should this rule be true?
If the variables or concepts of a theory are false I would not name
the theory true. That's simply the meaning of "true theory" AFAIU it.
> I have already given examples to weaken belief in this dogma.
Which dogma? Sounds like a misunderstanding.
> If there is no proof that humans can uniquely
> invent physical theories that work, then
> there is no proof that the models used within
> a good theory are true.
Of course there is no such proof. I have never claimed that such
proofs exist. Not for theories, not for their variables and concepts.
>>> Metaphysics be damned in science!!!!!
>>
>> Don't cry.
>
> Crying is hardly the emotion evoked.
Use of multiple exclamation marks and uppercase letters is in usenet
slang "crying".
>>>> "Being EPR-realistic" is a structural property of some physical
>>>> theories.
>>>
>>> In other words, an a priori modeling constraint
>>> on the research program that underlies the theory.
>>
>> Yep. But more comparable with methodological constraints (mathematical
>> formulation, no contradictions allowed) than with constraints of the
>> content (like fixation of a special symmetry group like Lorentz
>> invariance).
>
> The continuous model of macroscopic matter causes
> contradictions if you look at it too closely.
And this is, therefore, considered to be a problem of such theories.
And the cure for this problem is that they are today known to be
false, found to be approximations.
> We use it anyway, and it doesn't lead anyone to believe that it is
> true even though it works.
Yep, once a theory has such problems it is known that it cannot be
the whole truth.
>>> The *irrelevance* of realism to effective theory building!
>> Of course it is possible, in principle, to create effective
>> (phenomenological) theories without a base in realism. But I see no
>> evidence that the rejection of realism has been fruitful in science.
> I do. We do it all the time these days. Newton did it.
What? To reject EPR-realism? ROTFL.
> He didn't believe in real action at a distance. Nobody believes in
> real gravitational or electromagnetic singularities. We use them
> anyway.
Of course we use the best available approximation even if we know that
it is not the whole truth. No problem.
> Isospin was never about "reality."
And EPR-realism would have prevented the invention of isospin?
> The principle of least action is just because.
It is one result of various attempts to obtain a better understanding
of classical mechanics. I bet of attempts to better understand what
really happens.
> Planck's black body radiation formula was not about physical
> structure of reality.
Sure?
> I'm sure I could go on and on with examples from the last 150 years.
Examples for what? We cannot look into the minds of the people who
have made these things. We don't even know if they have rejected
EPR-realism themself. Probably they have not cared much and have
followed some intuitive naive version of realism. How do you want to
prove that the rejection of EPR-realism has been fruitful?
If we want to argue if the rejection of EPR-realism has been fruitful
or not, we have to look at the domain of science where it has
happened: the foundations of QM. The most interesting progress there
(Bell's inequality) has been related with Bohmian mechanics.
>> I agree that positivism has started with good intentions. So what?
>> Unfortunately good intentions do not lead to truth.
> The point is that you misrepresent positivism to
> be only some extremist viewpoint, so that you can
> knock that down.
I consider positivism not as some particular viewpoint, but as a
research program in scientific methodology. This research program has
failed and is as dead as possible for a philosophy.
> In logic, that's called a strawman argument. Positivism isn't your
> real enemy -- practicality is.
ROTFL. It's you who creates a strawman. Ilja - the opponent of
practicality. You made my day.
>> To present anti-positivism as dogmatism only because positivism has
>> been directed against the dogmatism of that time is cheap
>> rhetorics.
> The anarchist with an agenda to enforce a dogma on others.
ROTFL. I'm an anarchist who likes to argue. With some dogma enforced
on others I would have nobody to argue with.
>>> I haven't yet figured out what the hell a self-proclaimed
>>> anarchist wants to do with the TRUTH.
>> To have true theories is quite useful, they allow to make correct
>> predictions. The ability to make correct predictions is a useful tool
>> for anarchists as well as for other people. Moreover, its fun and
>> interesting to find out the truth.
> What does the search for TRUTH have to do with anarchism?
If you, during your search for truth, consider various philosophical,
political and economical theories, you may easily end with some
anarchistic theory as the best guess.
> It's fun to delude oneself that he or she has found the truth,
> right?
No, the really funny thing is the process to find it. To find
something new. Even to find errors in your previous argumentation.
Tom Clarke
> Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> writes:
> > Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> >>>> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> >>> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
> >>
> >> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
> >
> > *Your* personal best guess.
>
> Your best guess may be a different one, no problem. But a theory which
> is not realistic is, obviously, not a guess about what is real.
If I may interject. I always thought that the only requirements for a
physical
theory were that it be (mathematically) consistent and that it match
observations.
If these two are met then the theory is viable and has a shot at describing
what exists.
Do either of you agree with this?
Also, I think there might be some confusion between being "real" or
conforming to what exists and technical senses of the word "real"
as in discussions of the Bell inequalities. Realism in this later case
is usually "local realism" or "Einsein realism" which means that
events cannot be related to events which would require an influence
to travel faster than the speed of light (outside light cone).
But while theories such as vonNeuman QM fail at local realism,
the non-local effects are just correlations and are not causal so
that the theories are consistent and thus could correspond to
what exists. This would mean that what exists is not
"locally realistic", but it seems to me that the problem with this
is just one of a choice of human terminology.
Tom Clarke
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> writes:
> > Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> >>>> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> >>> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
> >>
> >> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
> >
> > *Your* personal best guess.
>
> Your best guess may be a different one, no problem. But a theory which
> is not realistic is, obviously, not a guess about what is real.
Correct. And there is NO need to worry about
making guesses at reality at all to do physics. If
that's where you find your muse then by all means
go for it yourself. You act as though someone is
trying to stop you. Certainly NOT me!
> >>> And if we cannot find this connection, why should any human-made
> >>> theory be "true"?
>
> >> Why not?
>
> > Typical evasion of a direct question.
>
> Let's remember that I don't argue that any human-made theory _should_
> be true. I argue that it, possibly, _may_ be true. Thus, I do not
> have to answer your question.
Then cutback on the dogmatism that
you claim you're not doing. ;-)
> > Ilja on his own hopeless search for the Lost Dutchman's gold mine of
> > TRUTH.
>
> My search is not hopeless. I have no certainty of success, and even
> if I succeed I will never know it for sure, but this is far away from
> hopeless.
Well, I'd say that you just defined what HOPELESS
means in this context!
> >>> Before one can ask if a theory is true, one should ask
> >>> if everyone of the variables and concepts used within
> >>> the theory is true.
>
> >> If the theory is true that means their variables and concepts are
> >> true.
>
> > Why should this rule be true?
>
> If the variables or concepts of a theory are false I would not name
> the theory true. That's simply the meaning of "true theory" AFAIU it.
By what standards then do you "name a theory
to be true," and by what standards do you "name
a model to be true"? Or substitute "false" if you
prefer.
> > I have already given examples to weaken belief in this dogma.
>
> Which dogma? Sounds like a misunderstanding.
>
> > If there is no proof that humans can uniquely
> > invent physical theories that work, then
> > there is no proof that the models used within
> > a good theory are true.
>
> Of course there is no such proof. I have never claimed that such
> proofs exist. Not for theories, not for their variables and concepts.
Give one reason why any variable at all
used by physicists should or might be "true."
> >>> Metaphysics be damned in science!!!!!
> >>
> >> Don't cry.
> >
> > Crying is hardly the emotion evoked.
>
> Use of multiple exclamation marks and uppercase letters is in usenet
> slang "crying".
Not in my book it ain't.
> >>>> "Being EPR-realistic" is a structural property of some physical
> >>>> theories.
> >>>
> >>> In other words, an a priori modeling constraint
> >>> on the research program that underlies the theory.
> >>
> >> Yep. But more comparable with methodological constraints (mathematical
> >> formulation, no contradictions allowed) than with constraints of the
> >> content (like fixation of a special symmetry group like Lorentz
> >> invariance).
> >
> > The continuous model of macroscopic matter causes
> > contradictions if you look at it too closely.
>
> And this is, therefore, considered to be a problem of such theories.
> And the cure for this problem is that they are today known to be
> false, found to be approximations.
Fine. But the point is that physicists can use
what works for certain purposes, regardless
of any notion of metaphysical truth involved.
> > We use it anyway, and it doesn't lead anyone to believe that it is
> > true even though it works.
>
> Yep, once a theory has such problems it is known that it cannot be
> the whole truth.
Oh, but it MUST have at least some "truth" running
around in there somewhere, right, Ilja?
> >>> The *irrelevance* of realism to effective theory building!
>
> >> Of course it is possible, in principle, to create effective
> >> (phenomenological) theories without a base in realism. But I see no
> >> evidence that the rejection of realism has been fruitful in science.
>
> > I do. We do it all the time these days. Newton did it.
>
> What? To reject EPR-realism? ROTFL.
Newton's gravitation was uncaused
-- a "just because." Posited as a time
independent equation of force.
> > He didn't believe in real action at a distance. Nobody believes in
> > real gravitational or electromagnetic singularities. We use them
> > anyway.
>
> Of course we use the best available approximation even if we know that
> it is not the whole truth. No problem.
>
> > Isospin was never about "reality."
>
> And EPR-realism would have prevented the invention of isospin?
I didn't say it would. Your contention has been all along
that it is useful, if not crucial, to be concerned about
the truth of deep reality to get good theories. I merely
showed that this is not true. It is useful to you, maybe,
but not useful to all others, many of whom have done
great things in physics in the last 150 years without it.
> > The principle of least action is just because.
>
> It is one result of various attempts to obtain a better understanding
> of classical mechanics. I bet of attempts to better understand what
> really happens.
>
> > Planck's black body radiation formula was not about physical
> > structure of reality.
>
> Sure?
It was phenomenological to account for the
high and low frequencies of radiation in/on a
black box. It was a purely mathematical
trick for Planck, with the later inference that it
could makes sense if oscillators could absorb
and emit at only quantified frequencies. But
though this is a great constraint on models
of the structure of matter, it is NOT a structure
itself. And the heuristics of the equation were
definitively NOT structure based. They
were more of the nature of mathematical
parameter playing, IIRC. It's been awhile
since I read up on this from Eisberg & Resnick's
Modern Physics.
> > I'm sure I could go on and on with examples from the last 150 years.
>
> Examples for what? We cannot look into the minds of the people who
> have made these things. We don't even know if they have rejected
> EPR-realism themself. Probably they have not cared much and have
> followed some intuitive naive version of realism. How do you want to
> prove that the rejection of EPR-realism has been fruitful?
I'm not about disproving anything. I'm about
arguing for *everything* that actually works.
Working is its own justification! Theories have
to work for a living.
> If we want to argue if the rejection of EPR-realism has been fruitful
> or not, we have to look at the domain of science where it has
> happened: the foundations of QM. The most interesting progress there
> (Bell's inequality) has been related with Bohmian mechanics.
Fine. But I argue that we need not adopt
any RULE to restrict ourselves to it or
to anything else. Keep the game wide
open to free creation and let competition
eliminate the stuff that doesn't measure up,
sotospeak.
> [snip]
>
> >> To have true theories is quite useful, they allow to make correct
> >> predictions. The ability to make correct predictions is a useful tool
> >> for anarchists as well as for other people. Moreover, its fun and
> >> interesting to find out the truth.
>
> > What does the search for TRUTH have to do with anarchism?
>
> If you, during your search for truth, consider various philosophical,
> political and economical theories, you may easily end with some
> anarchistic theory as the best guess.
I wouldn't myself. I find the notion
self contradictory.
Patrick
Patrick Reany
Tom Clarke wrote:
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>
> > Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> writes:
> > > Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> > >>>> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
> > >>> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
> > >>
> > >> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
> > >
> > > *Your* personal best guess.
> >
> > Your best guess may be a different one, no problem. But a theory which
> > is not realistic is, obviously, not a guess about what is real.
>
> If I may interject. I always thought that the only requirements for a
> physical
> theory were that it be (mathematically) consistent and that it match
> observations.
This is the consensus today, and I have the
impression that Ilja thinks it too "positivistic."
He wants theories to be on the search for the
truth of deep reality -- the reality that underlies
what our measurements read.
What you described above is objective to the degree
that measurement standards can be set prior
to their use and then the predictions are met
or not, as determined by the experimentalists,
by these standards. It's a sort of pass-fail
arrangement.
> If these two are met then the theory is viable and has a shot at describing
> what exists.
This is OK, but obviously subjective and
argumentative. Let all such pondering be
called anything but official science. I call
it natural philosophy. There should be a formal
recognized interaction between science and natural
philosophy as Francis Bacon recommended.
> Do either of you agree with this?
Pretty much for myself.
Patrick
Bilge
>I do. We do it all the time these days. Newton did it. He didn't
>believe in real action at a distance. Nobody believes in real
>gravitational or electromagnetic singularities.
Black holes?
> We use them anyway. Isospin was never about "reality."
What do you mean "Isospin was never about reality?" Isospin is
is about the reality that the nuclear forces are charge independent.
Attempt to explain the fact that the only bound state of two nucleons
is the deuteron and that the most stable system of 3 nucleons consists
of 2p1n (3He) while 1p2n (the triton) is unstable. Symmetries have
physical consequences. I assure you, I can find more "reality" in isospin
than you want to know about.
>The principle of least action is just because.
The basic idea is to try and impose as few conditions as possible
on nature and insure that the ones you do impose don't require more
miraculous coincidences than necessary.
> Planck's black body radiation formula was not about physical structure
>of reality. I'm sure I could go on and on with examples from the last
>150 years.
You really don't think planck and the rest of the physicists at
the time were more concerned with the implications of a discrete
system than simply getting the correct answer?
Physics IS about more than replicating data. It's just that replicating
data is the cost of admission.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>> Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> writes:
>>> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>>>>>> shuba <tim....@eudoramail.com> writes:
>>>>> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
>>>>
>>>> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
>>>
>>> *Your* personal best guess.
>>
>> Your best guess may be a different one, no problem. But a theory which
>> is not realistic is, obviously, not a guess about what is real.
> If I may interject. I always thought that the only requirements for
> a physical theory were that it be (mathematically) consistent and
> that it match observations.
I agree. On the other hand, a physical theory which is not realistic
does not give an answer to the question "what is real" (and should
not).
> If these two are met then the theory is viable and has a shot at describing
> what exists. Do either of you agree with this?
I agree.
> Also, I think there might be some confusion between being "real" or
> conforming to what exists and technical senses of the word "real"
> as in discussions of the Bell inequalities. Realism in this later case
> is usually "local realism" or "Einsein realism" which means that
> events cannot be related to events which would require an influence
> to travel faster than the speed of light (outside light cone).
I use realism in the technical sense of the EPR paper, but not as
"local realism". Einstein-locality is an independent assumption.
The most important example is Bohmian mechanics, which is completely
realistic in any sense but non-local. BTW, classical Newtonian theory
is also realistic and non-local.
> But while theories such as vonNeuman QM fail at local realism,
> the non-local effects are just correlations and are not causal so
> that the theories are consistent and thus could correspond to
> what exists.
They correspond in some way to what exist.
> This would mean that what exists is not "locally realistic", but it
> seems to me that the problem with this is just one of a choice of
> human terminology.
The EPR criterion of realism is more than terminology. Some confusion
between various notions of realism may be caused by uncertain
terminology. But EPR and Bell give a clear enough scientific
terminology. On the other hand, it is in good enough correspondence
with common sense realism in the following direction: something which
common sense accepts as "realistic" is EPR-realistic.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>>>>> What is "real," anyone at all, please let me know?
>>>> Our best guess what is real are our best realistic theories.
>>> *Your* personal best guess.
>> Your best guess may be a different one, no problem. But a theory
>> which is not realistic is, obviously, not a guess about what is
>> real.
> Correct. And there is NO need to worry about making guesses at
> reality at all to do physics. If that's where you find your muse
> then by all means go for it yourself. You act as though someone is
> trying to stop you. Certainly NOT me!
Fine.
>>>>> And if we cannot find this connection, why should any human-made
>>>>> theory be "true"?
>>
>>>> Why not?
>>
>>> Typical evasion of a direct question.
>>
>> Let's remember that I don't argue that any human-made theory _should_
>> be true. I argue that it, possibly, _may_ be true. Thus, I do not
>> have to answer your question.
>
> Then cutback on the dogmatism that
> you claim you're not doing. ;-)
I don't understand the meaning of this
>
>>> Ilja on his own hopeless search for the Lost Dutchman's gold mine of
>>> TRUTH.
>>
>> My search is not hopeless. I have no certainty of success, and even
>> if I succeed I will never know it for sure, but this is far away from
>> hopeless.
> Well, I'd say that you just defined what HOPELESS
> means in this context!
If you name this hopeless, the whole life is hopeless. Of course, you
have any right to define hopeless in this way, but IMHO life is in
general quite funny and I prefer another, more restrictive notion of
"hopeless".
> By what standards then do you "name a theory
> to be true," and by what standards do you "name
> a model to be true"? Or substitute "false" if you
> prefer.
Correspondence with reality. "Snow is white" is true if snow is white.
>> Of course there is no such proof. I have never claimed that such
>> proofs exist. Not for theories, not for their variables and concepts.
> Give one reason why any variable at all
> used by physicists should or might be "true."
In a formal sense, variables have no truth values, only statements
have. It was you who has connected truth with variables in this
discussion. I have been very sloppy accepting your choice of words
here, but don't plan to defend it.
>>> The continuous model of macroscopic matter causes
>>> contradictions if you look at it too closely.
>>
>> And this is, therefore, considered to be a problem of such theories.
>> And the cure for this problem is that they are today known to be
>> false, found to be approximations.
>
> Fine. But the point is that physicists can use
> what works for certain purposes, regardless
> of any notion of metaphysical truth involved.
I know, I have accepted this many times, and I wonder why you continue
to repeat it as if it is something new for me.
>>> We use it anyway, and it doesn't lead anyone to believe that it is
>>> true even though it works.
>> Yep, once a theory has such problems it is known that it cannot be
>> the whole truth.
> Oh, but it MUST have at least some "truth" running
> around in there somewhere, right, Ilja?
That's at least a reasonable guess, once it makes nontrivial
predictions which agree, nonetheless, with observation.
>>>>> The *irrelevance* of realism to effective theory building!
>>>> Of course it is possible, in principle, to create effective
>>>> (phenomenological) theories without a base in realism. But I see no
>>>> evidence that the rejection of realism has been fruitful in science.
>>> I do. We do it all the time these days. Newton did it.
>> What? To reject EPR-realism? ROTFL.
> Newton's gravitation was uncaused -- a "just because." Posited as a
> time independent equation of force.
I refer to a well-defined notion of realism used by EPR and Bell.
Your remark has nothing to do with this notion of realism.
>>> Isospin was never about "reality."
>> And EPR-realism would have prevented the invention of isospin?
> I didn't say it would. Your contention has been all along
> that it is useful, if not crucial, to be concerned about
> the truth of deep reality to get good theories.
No, my argumentation is much more in defense against the claims of
anti-realists who want to present the whole progress of science during
this century as arguments against realism.
I think, indeed, that it is helpful to search for realistic models.
But of course it is the personal choice of each scientist what he
considers to be helpful.
> It is useful to you, maybe, but not useful to all others, many of
> whom have done great things in physics in the last 150 years without
> it.
I agree. But we cannot know how the "many" have reached their
results. We are unable to judge about the "without it", especially if
"it" is something which is such a fundamental part of common sense as
realism.
>>> Planck's black body radiation formula was not about physical
>>> structure of reality.
>> Sure?
> It was phenomenological to account for the high and low frequencies
> of radiation in/on a black box. It was a purely mathematical trick
> for Planck, with the later inference that it could makes sense if
> oscillators could absorb and emit at only quantified
> frequencies. But though this is a great constraint on models of the
> structure of matter, it is NOT a structure itself.
A "formula about" it is, of course, not "a structure itself".
>> If we want to argue if the rejection of EPR-realism has been fruitful
>> or not, we have to look at the domain of science where it has
>> happened: the foundations of QM. The most interesting progress there
>> (Bell's inequality) has been related with Bohmian mechanics.
> Fine. But I argue that we need not adopt any RULE to restrict
> ourselves to it or to anything else. Keep the game wide open to free
> creation and let competition eliminate the stuff that doesn't
> measure up, sotospeak.
Competition with which rules?
Science is already free in the domain of creation of theories.
What has some rules is the competition between these theories.
>>> What does the search for TRUTH have to do with anarchism?
>> If you, during your search for truth, consider various philosophical,
>> political and economical theories, you may easily end with some
>> anarchistic theory as the best guess.
> I wouldn't myself. I find the notion self contradictory.
Anarchism as the absence of a state with monopoly of power is
certainly not self-contradictory. But I agree that self-contradictory
notions of anarchism exist.
Bilge
>Anarchism as the absence of a state with monopoly of power is
>certainly not self-contradictory. But I agree that self-contradictory
>notions of anarchism exist.
>
I have another definition: Anarchy isn't the absence of order; It's
the absence of orders.
Robert J. Kolker
Bilge wrote:
Nice turn of phrase. But in reality, it is not necessarily so. Consider
Somalia which is run by a network of War Lords. Plenty of orders and
decrees and not much social order. Or Afghanistan. With the Taliban gone
there is again a collection of War Lords with one as nominal head, the
Afghan version of King John. Lots of orders, and not much order. I
would say one's natural rights are in peril in Afghanistn at the moment
and probably will be for some time to come.
Bob Kolker (Libertarian by day, Anarchist by night)
Patrick Reany
"Robert J. Kolker" wrote:
Anarchy is against human nature. It just
might be possible with only a single human
on earth, but don't count on it.
Patrick
Tom Clarke
> Tom Clarke <tcl...@ist.ucf.edu> writes:
>
> I use realism in the technical sense of the EPR paper, but not as
> "local realism". Einstein-locality is an independent assumption.
I'm not so sure. I think you are saying if there exists something that
is repeatedly observable, then there exists an element of reality that
corresponds to that observable [sorry I forgot exact phrasing in EPR
paper].
But it seems to me that anything covered by a mathematically consistent
physical theory can meet this criteria. For the EPR seperated particles
type experiment the results can be viewed as showing that the two particles
are not isolated so that th element of reality is the two particles taken
together as a system. It is only when the exttract condition of no faster
than light correlation is added that a problem occurs and this is
Einstein causality.
> The most important example is Bohmian mechanics, which is completely
> realistic in any sense but non-local. BTW, classical Newtonian theory
> is also realistic and non-local.
But Bohmian mechanics has an infinitely extended existent. The two EPR
particles are not isolated seperate systems. Didn't Bohm have a concept
of "implicate order" where elemnts of reality were somehow tied together?
Bohm was a realist, but he was not an Einstein realist.
As a sort of quick "proof" of what I mean. If you have a consistent
mathematical physical theory then just tatke the mathematical entities
as what is real, and that physical theory is realistic.
An extreme case might be Everett's relative states interpretation of
QM, what is real is the universal Schrodinger wave function.
> > But while theories such as vonNeuman QM fail at local realism,
> > the non-local effects are just correlations and are not causal so
> > that the theories are consistent and thus could correspond to
> > what exists.
>
> They correspond in some way to what exist.
We are in some way in agreement.
> > This would mean that what exists is not "locally realistic", but it
> > seems to me that the problem with this is just one of a choice of
> > human terminology.
>
> The EPR criterion of realism is more than terminology. Some confusion
> between various notions of realism may be caused by uncertain
> terminology. But EPR and Bell give a clear enough scientific
> terminology.
I found the EPR definition
"A sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity is the possibility
of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system."
I guess I am saying that the problem is in the term "system".
is the system the one particle or the two particles in an EPR
experiment?
> On the other hand, it is in good enough correspondence
> with common sense realism in the following direction: something which
> common sense accepts as "realistic" is EPR-realistic.
Yes. That is the tension, between common sense and mathematics.
Tom Clarke
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
>> Tom Clarke <tcl...@ist.ucf.edu> writes:
>> I use realism in the technical sense of the EPR paper, but not as
>> "local realism". Einstein-locality is an independent assumption.
>
> I'm not so sure. I think you are saying if there exists something that
> is repeatedly observable, then there exists an element of reality that
> corresponds to that observable [sorry I forgot exact phrasing in EPR
> paper].
The original formulation: If, without in any way disturbing a system,
we can predict with certainty ... the value of a physical quantity,
then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this
physical quantity.
> But it seems to me that anything covered by a mathematically consistent
> physical theory can meet this criteria.
Of course, a requirement is that you have to _declare_ some of the
mathematical objects of the theory to be "elements of reality". A
theory which consists of formulas only and then some resulting
probability is a physical theory once we can compare the probabilities
with observation, but not (yet) a realistic theory.
I think that, indeed, any physical theory may be transformed into a
realistic one. And this is, IMHO, usually easy. But this
transformation is not unique. You have to make some choices.
The criterion also includes some connection with classical causality
(see the use of the words "predict" and "disturbing").
> For the EPR seperated particles type experiment the results can be
> viewed as showing that the two particles are not isolated so that
> the element of reality is the two particles taken together as a
> system. It is only when the extract condition of no faster than
> light correlation is added that a problem occurs and this is
> Einstein causality.
Yep. That's my point: realism and classical causality do not have any
problem with EPR experiments.
>> The most important example is Bohmian mechanics, which is completely
>> realistic in any sense but non-local. BTW, classical Newtonian theory
>> is also realistic and non-local.
> But Bohmian mechanics has an infinitely extended existent. The two EPR
> particles are not isolated seperate systems. Didn't Bohm have a concept
> of "implicate order" where elemnts of reality were somehow tied together?
> Bohm was a realist, but he was not an Einstein realist.
I don't know enough about Bohm's personal views. Relativistic BM is a
theory which is not Einstein-causal on the fundamental level, gives
Lorentz symmetry only on the observational level.
> As a sort of quick "proof" of what I mean. If you have a consistent
> mathematical physical theory then just take the mathematical entities
> as what is real, and that physical theory is realistic.
Yep. In some sense, BM is an operation of this kind applied to QM.
But BM has to make some choices: preference for coordinates, and adds
an equation for the coordinates.
Such modifications are necessary: as a mathematical entity, an object
(say a gauge potential) may have no equation. If we declare the gauge
potential to be real, we have to define its behaviour - to define some
equation. Thus, we also have to declare some gauge condition to be
the _real_ equation.
Note also the non-trivial interaction with causality.
But, I agree, it seems that every theory can be made realistic, by
adding some additional structure. If this is correct, then
EPR-realism is not a physical restriction but a methodological one: we
should formulate our theories in EPR-realistic form.
We can compare this with the situation with general covariance.
Kretschmann's thesis is that every physical theory can be presented in
general covariant form. And we have learned that this presentation is
a useful tool, gives a better understanding.
In a similar way I see realism as such a tool of presenting theories.
It would be, in this case, as reasonable to say "please formulate your
theory in a covariant way and then come back" as "please formulate
your theory in an EPR-realistic way and then come back".
>>> But while theories such as vonNeuman QM fail at local realism,
>>> the non-local effects are just correlations and are not causal so
>>> that the theories are consistent and thus could correspond to
>>> what exists.
That some correlation are "only correlations but not causal" requires
some notion of causality (and IMHO therefore of reality). Thus, this
claim is meaningless without a notion of realism. If we accept EPR
realism, it is false.
> I found the EPR definition "A sufficient condition for the reality
> of a physical quantity is the possibility of predicting it with
> certainty, without disturbing the system."
> I guess I am saying that the problem is in the term "system".
> is the system the one particle or the two particles in an EPR
> experiment?
If we want to be able to apply Einstein causality then two far away
particles are separate systems. It is, in this case, locality, which
allows to consider the two particles as separated.
>> On the other hand, it is in good enough correspondence with common
>> sense realism in the following direction: something which common
>> sense accepts as "realistic" is EPR-realistic.
> Yes. That is the tension, between common sense and mathematics.
But I think that this tension is, in our case, not the problematic
part.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Anarchy is against human nature.
Not at all. Accepting a state is against human nature, it is done
only in large societies (much larger than natural for human nature).
Ilja Schmelzer
> Bilge wrote:
> > I have another definition: Anarchy isn't the absence of order; It's
> > the absence of orders.
> Nice turn of phrase. But in reality, it is not necessarily so. Consider
> Somalia which is run by a network of War Lords. Plenty of orders and
> decrees and not much social order. Or Afghanistan.
Also don't mingle stateless situations with anarchistic theory. Somalia and
Afghanistan are not examples of societies which have chosen to follow some
anarchistic model. Instead, they are results of fights between various
fractions who want to establish states.
(There are some tribal-anarchistic elements in above societies which
make states less stable.)
Tom Clarke
I agree wtih most of what you say, in a general way.
In my first post on this thread I wrote
" it seems to me that the problem with this
is just one of a choice of human terminology."
In this latest response you say:
"a requirement is that you have to _declare_ some of the
mathematical objects of the theory to be "elements of reality"."
"But this
transformation is not unique. You have to make some choices."
"But BM has to make some choices: preference for coordinates, and adds
an equation for the coordinates"
When I wrote "human terminology" I meant something like human "choices".
So I think we are not so far apart, but your way of putting this is probably
better.
........
You didn't comment at all on my mention of Everett's
relative state formulation. I do wonder what you opinion
of this is.
But one point of mine I'm not sure you got had to do with
treating the EPR particles as seperate systems. I alluded to
Bohm in this
> > But Bohmian mechanics has an infinitely extended existent. The two EPR
> > particles are not isolated seperate systems. Didn't Bohm have a concept
> > of "implicate order" where elemnts of reality were somehow tied together?
> > Bohm was a realist, but he was not an Einstein realist.
>
> I don't know enough about Bohm's personal views.
Bohm's 1980 book: "Wholeness and the implicate order" talks about this
stuff. I read it years ago and it has since been republished in 1995 and
I don't know if new material has been added. Personal memory fades
as well.
Ah, I found a book review:
http://www.thymos.com/mind/bohm.html
At any rate, my point has to do with the fact that it is a choice to
consider the EPR particles each as a seperate system.
The system of the two particles does not allow a causal, undisturbed
prediction of the momentum of either of the particles. It is a human
choice to consider the particles seperately and to then reason that
the momentum of one can be predicted exactly.
The universe may not work this way. As Bohm might say the
implicate order is that the particles are a system (joined by his
psi function if you like his theory). Explicately, or apparently,
the particles may be seperate, but the universe just does not
work that way.
You mentioned vector potential I think. You can split E and B
files, but they really are a part of the same entity described by
vector potential (among other ways). You can split E and B
by choice, but then funny things can happen if you are not
careful. This might be sort of an anlogy to being unable to
consider the EPR particles seperately.
> If we want to be able to apply Einstein causality then two far away
> particles are separate systems. It is, in this case, locality, which
> allows to consider the two particles as separated.
Good time for a question. What do you think of locality?
> >> On the other hand, it is in good enough correspondence with common
> >> sense realism in the following direction: something which common
> >> sense accepts as "realistic" is EPR-realistic.
>
> > Yes. That is the tension, between common sense and mathematics.
>
> But I think that this tension is, in our case, not the problematic
> part.
The mathematics works, so if you just accept the math, there is no
problem.
I'll quote from the Bohm book review:
Bohm's solution is to contrast the "explicate order" that we perceive
(for example, the Cartesian order) and that Physics describess with
the "implicate order", which is an underlying, hidden layer of relationships.
The explicate order is but a manifestation of the implicate order. Space and
time,
for example, are "forms" of the explicate order that are derived
from the implicate order.
The explicate order is "common sense", I think.
Tom Clarke
Patrick Reany
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@attbi.com> writes:
> > Bilge wrote:
> > > I have another definition: Anarchy isn't the absence of order; It's
> > > the absence of orders.
>
> > Nice turn of phrase. But in reality, it is not necessarily so. Consider
> > Somalia which is run by a network of War Lords. Plenty of orders and
> > decrees and not much social order. Or Afghanistan.
>
> Also don't mingle stateless situations with anarchistic theory. Somalia and
> Afghanistan are not examples of societies which have chosen to follow some
> anarchistic model. Instead, they are results of fights between various
> fractions who want to establish states.
>
That is why there is no such thing as anarchism
in a world of more than one person. Either
people want to rule over others, or people
confederate together to protect themselves from
being forcibly ruled over by others. That's
human nature. Ilja, if you ever find yourself in
a world all by yourself, you would be free to setup
your anarchy.
In any case, physics by anarchy is nonsensical
to me. Rules for the ruleless?! Order for the
orderless?! It makes no sense!
Patrick
Robert J. Kolker
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> Patrick Reany <re...@asu.edu> writes:
>
>>Anarchy is against human nature.
>>
>
> Not at all. Accepting a state is against human nature, it is done
> only in large societies (much larger than natural for human nature).
Historically, anarchy has been the longest lived mode of social
regulation. During the hunter-gatherer phase of our existence,
governments and states simply did not exist. There were extended
families more or less run by either dominant males or dominant females.
Governments did not exist until about 10,000 years ago, when agriculture
created fixed property which required defense. With the crops came the
warriors necessary to defend the land and the cattle against attacking
strangers. Once people began living in villages, towns and cities, the
ruling class emerged (along with war and slavery).
Government is the result of strife and theft. That is why there are no
good governments (nor were there ever any). There are only bad
governments and worse governments.
Bob Kolker
shuba
[re: no information transfer possible in EPR correlations]
> I don't understand your point here. Last not least, that there is an
> essential difference between the FTL phone and EPR I have never
> questioned. And pointing out that there is a difference is in no way
> a counterargument against an analogy argument. Last not least, if
> there would be no difference there would be no analogy but identity,
> and therefore no analogy argument.
The whole purpose of a phone is to transmit information. If it
can't transmit information, it is broken. I do not understand
the analogy. A phone with an unreal ability to send only signals
that cannot be used to transfer information is an analogy of
realism? I'd expect an analogy of realism to make more sense.
> Hidden variables are not very weird at all. The only weird thing
> which may be connected with them is why they are hidden. But this may
> be usually proven (and therefore explained) in the theory.
Spukhafte Fernwirkungen. The weirdness seems inherent in the
quantum workings of the natural world. Your axioms, though
plausible, don't do anything to remove the weirdness for me.
Just the opposite, in fact.
[snip general agreement]
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> relative state formulation. I do wonder what you opinion
> of this is.
Not a very favorite one.
IMHO it is reasonable to compare it with BM. They have something in
common: As in BM, as in MWI there exist a global wave functions
Psi(Q,t), which follows the Schroedinger equation without any
collapse. As in BM, as in MWI we need something else which plays the
role of the "real dead cat" (in the collapse interpretation the "real
cat" may be represented by the collapsed wave function, which is
impossible without collapse). This "real cat" may be represented by
some Q(t).
It does not matter how to _name_ this Q(t) - the actual position of
the cat, or the universe Q where we (or "the observer") are located
now. The set of all Q is the set of all possible configurations or
universes.
Now, the difference is that BM describes the set of all Q in precise
terms (more accurate, each version of BM has its own, well-defined set
of {Q}), while MWI remains uncertain (AFAIU) about it. As well, BM
describes an equation for the Q(t), while MWI remains silent.
quant計h/0110148 seems interesting:
"It is emphasized that a many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory
exists only to the extent that the associated basis problem is
solved. The core basis problem is that the robust enduring states
specified by environmental decoherence effects are essentially
Gaussian wave packets that form continua of non-orthogonal
states. Hence they are not a discrete set of orthogonal basis states
to which finite proba- bilities can be assigned by the usual
rules. The natural way to get an orthogonal basis without going
outside the Schroedinger dynamics is to use the eigenstates of the
reduced density matrix, and this idea is the basis of some recent
attempts by many-worlds proponents to solve the basis problem.
But these eigenstates do not enjoy the locality and quasi-classicality
properties of the states defined by environmental decoherence effects,
and hence are not satisfactory preferred basis states. This core
problem needs to be addressed and resolved before a many-worlds-type
interpretation can be said to exist."
This corresponds to my criticism in the following way: BM simply
postulates a set {Q} (position instead of momentum). MWI hopes to
survive without such an explicit choice, and if this works it would be
nice. But there has to be done something more before "it can be said
to exist".
> But one point of mine I'm not sure you got had to do with
> treating the EPR particles as seperate systems. I alluded to
> Bohm in this
> > > But Bohmian mechanics has an infinitely extended existent. The two EPR
> > > particles are not isolated seperate systems. Didn't Bohm have a concept
> > > of "implicate order" where elemnts of reality were somehow tied together?
> > > Bohm was a realist, but he was not an Einstein realist.
> >
> > I don't know enough about Bohm's personal views.
> Ah, I found a book review:
> http://www.thymos.com/mind/bohm.html
I like Bohmian mechanics (which I consider, following Bell, as a
precise, ontological interpretation of QM), but I was not impressed by
this type of speculations about the mind. IMHO too esoteric. This is
only a personal feeling, I don't want to argue against the late Bohm,
but it should be clear that BM is something which may be discussed
without any connection to mind and consciousness.
> At any rate, my point has to do with the fact that it is a choice to
> consider the EPR particles each as a seperate system. The system of
> the two particles does not allow a causal, undisturbed prediction of
> the momentum of either of the particles. It is a human choice to
> consider the particles seperately and to then reason that the
> momentum of one can be predicted exactly.
It is a human choice to choose some theory. But in the context of
each theory, the things should be well-defined and human choice is
irrelevant. (Or human choice is some complex object inside the theory,
something like a robot, which has to follow the precise rules of this
theory, so that something about it may be predicted.)
> The universe may not work this way.
Indeed. In this case the particular theory is false, and our best
chance to observe this is to observe a difference between predictions
and observation.
> You mentioned vector potential I think. You can split E and B
> files, but they really are a part of the same entity described by
> vector potential (among other ways). You can split E and B
> by choice, but then funny things can happen if you are not
> careful. This might be sort of an anlogy to being unable to
> consider the EPR particles seperately.
Yep. If we consider them as separate particles which can interact with
each other only limited by c, we can derive Bell's inequalities, which
are false, falsified by observation.
But note that the consideration of the quantum system as separate or
not is not the main point of Bell's inequalities. Last not least,
they are about correlations between _free_choices_of_experimenters_
and _results_ of their subsequent observations, and the quantum devices
may be considered as black boxes.
> > If we want to be able to apply Einstein causality then two far away
> > particles are separate systems. It is, in this case, locality, which
> > allows to consider the two particles as separated.
>
> Good time for a question. What do you think of locality?
I think it is violated on the fundamental (hidden) level. And the
violation of Bell's inequality is the indirect observation of these
violations.
It may be that there is some much larger C so that a future theory may
be C-local. So I don't think this proves some inherent non-locality.
Instead, I think locality (as well as determinism) are properties of
theories which often change if we switch to a more fundamental theory.
Determinism: deterministic chaos (-) -> Newtonian theory (+) ->
quantum theory (-) -> Bohmian mechanics (+) -> ...
Locality: Newtonian theory (-) -> SR/GR (+) -> Bohmian mechanics (-)
-> ...
Thus, we should not think that our current answer is the final one.
> > > Yes. That is the tension, between common sense and mathematics.
> >
> > But I think that this tension is, in our case, not the problematic
> > part.
>
> The mathematics works, so if you just accept the math, there is no
> problem.
I argue against the following line of argumentation: EPR realism is a
formal notion, common sense realism something informal, thus, they are
different. Therefore, if we reject EPR realism, that means nothing
about common sense realism, we can remain common sense realists.
Instead, EPR realism is a formal but very weak form of realism. If
you reject EPR realism you cannot use almost anything in common sense
realism without implicitly contradicting yourself.
> I'll quote from the Bohm book review: Bohm's solution is to contrast
> the "explicate order" that we perceive (for example, the Cartesian
> order) and that Physics describess with the "implicate order", which
> is an underlying, hidden layer of relationships. The explicate
> order is but a manifestation of the implicate order. Space and time,
> for example, are "forms" of the explicate order that are derived
> from the implicate order.
> The explicate order is "common sense", I think.
I disagree. Such a difference between "explicate" and "implicate"
order is known to every common sense conspiracy theorist. And
conspiracy theories, even if they are often nonsensical and funny
(Bielefeld ;-)), are nonetheless classical realistic common sense
theories. And almost everybody finds some (moderate) conspiracy
theory (depending on political direction with CIA, Big Business, KGB
and/or Al Quaida as main actors) (partially) plausible.
I should mention some others: atomic theory (the hidden discrete atoms
lead to "explicate" continuous matter), my ether theory ("hidden"
preferred frame leads to "explicate" EEP) are all realistic "common
sense" theories. Presenting "common sense" as too stupid, unable to
grasp a round Earth, is a way to underemphasize the seriousness of
the rejection of EPR realism.
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja wrote:
> [re: no information transfer possible in EPR correlations]
>> I don't understand your point here. Last not least, that there is an
>> essential difference between the FTL phone and EPR I have never
>> questioned. And pointing out that there is a difference is in no way
>> a counterargument against an analogy argument. Last not least, if
>> there would be no difference there would be no analogy but identity,
>> and therefore no analogy argument.
> The whole purpose of a phone is to transmit information. If it
> can't transmit information, it is broken. I do not understand
> the analogy. A phone with an unreal ability to send only signals
> that cannot be used to transfer information is an analogy of
> realism? I'd expect an analogy of realism to make more sense.
It seems, I have to explain the role of analogy arguments. A text
which I plan to put on my homepage in a few days (a translation of the
German version ilja-schmelzer.net/Diskussion/Vergleiche.html made
today).
-------------------------------------------
Analogy Argumentation
In discussion, I often use analogy arguments. This often leads to
misunderstandings about the role and power of analogy arguments. If I
compare some A and A', often people seem to think that it is
reasonable to argue "There is a difference between A and A', so your
argument does not hold". But, of course, there are always
differences. Else, there would be no analogy but identity, and,
therefore, no valid analogy argument at all. And some people, indeed,
seem to think that analogy argumentation is always invalid.
So, it seems useful to explain the logic of analogy argumentation (as
I use it) in some detail, with formal, logical background.
General Scheme: Analogy Arguments as Counterarguments
Analogy arguments I usually use as counterarguments against
justifications. "Justification" is some argument of type
A. That's why B.
or one of it's many grammatical variants (with "because of", "owing
to", "due to", "since", "hence" and so on). There are also a lot of
other words for this type of argumentation (explanation, causal
connection)
Justification Assumes Generalization
Now, in typical cases of justifications above claims A and B are
usually true. Or, if at least one of them is false, the whole
justification is obviously false too. Thus, let's assume that above
claims A and B are true.
But this, obviously, does not mean that the justification is
true. Justification requires more. And at least one part of this
"more" is that it may be generalized. Thus, there is some class C of
situations, circumstances or whatever, where this justification may be
applied: A as well as B are functions of c in C, and if the
justification is valid, then the following claim is valid too:
for all c in C if A(c) then B(c).
Here we use "if ... then" already in the pure logical meaning: it is
true if B(c) is true or A(c) is not true. Note that we do not claim
that "for all c in C if A(c) then B(c)" is the same as "B because
A". It isn't. The causal connection does not follow from the truth
table. We need only one direction: if there is a causal connection,
then there should be some possibility of generalization.
Thus, we interpret a statement "B because A" as a strong logical
argumentation in the following way:
In C, there is a causal connection A(c) => B(c);
Therefore:
For all c in C if A(c) then B(c)
We have, in our situation, A(x). We have x in C.
Therefore:
We have B(x).
Now, this argumentation may be proven to be false by a
counterexample. The counterexample is some other y in C with the
following properties:
y is in C;
We have A(y);
We have not B(y);
Therefore:
"For all c in C if A(c) then B(c)" is false;
Now, presenting this y is the "analogy argument".
What Is The Correct Generalization?
The main problem is, of course, to establish the "domain of
application" C of the argumentation correctly. Usually (or at least
often) the domain of application is defined implicitly, follows from
the context of the discussion.
In some sense, this is not a failure but a feature, and it seems to be
the real difference between a real justification A(.) => B(.) and the
large but special table of truth values "For all c in C if A(c) then
B(c)" that the domain of application remains open, and the
justification may be applied to a much more general situation, a
situation which we have not had in mind then we have established the
justification.
Nonetheless, quite often some restrictions of the domain of
application of the justification are more or less obvious or clear
from the context and therefore omitted. Thus, the "real" justification
is "if A(c) and R1(c) and R2(c) and R3(c) then B(c)" where R1, R2, R3
and so on are restrictions of the domain of application of the
justification which are assumed but omitted in the text. In this case,
a counter-example y so that A(y) is true but for one of the
restrictions R(y) is false is not really a counterexample.
How I Present The Counterexample
As a reasonable way to present such analogy arguments I try to replace
x with y in the original text:
> B(x) because A(x).
B(y) because A(y)?
This way has the following advantage: I don't have to present my
interpretion of the details of the argumentation (that means, my guess
about C and about omitted conditions R(c) which follow from the
context). The only thing which I specify about my interpretation is
the following: "IMHO you assume here some C so that y is in C, and for
all restrictions R(c) which have been omitted for simplicity we have
R(y)".
Reasonable Counterarguments Against Analogy Arguments
From the previous description it follows what are reasonable
counterarguments against the analogy argument. There are obviously
reasonable possibilities:
>> B(x) because A(x)
> B(y) because A(y)?
No. I have assumed in this argument R(x), but we have not R(y).
Another reasonable reply:
>> B(x,x') because A(x,x')
> B(y,x') because A(y,x')?
No. My argument is about x'. The correct analogy would be
B(x,y) because of A(x,y), which holds.
or, more general
>> B(x) because A(x)
> B'(y) because A'(y)?
No. The correct analogy would be
"B(y) because of A(y)", which holds.
But, certainly, every reasonable reply should refer to the original
argumentation, somehow defend it, clarify its meaning or modify
it. What is unreasonable is the rejection of the comparison itself.
>> B(x) because A(x)
> B(y,x') because A(y,x')?
You cannot compare x with y. R(x) but not R(y).
What is missed here is the connection between R(.) and the original
argumentation:
>> B(x) because A(x)
> B(y,x') because A(y,x')?
You cannot compare x with y. R(x) but not R(y). But R(x) I have
implicitly assumed in my argumentation.
would be already a reasonable reply.
-------------------------------------------
Let's now look at your reply:
> The whole purpose of a phone is to transmit information. If it
> can't transmit information, it is broken. I do not understand
> the analogy. A phone with an unreal ability to send only signals
> that cannot be used to transfer information is an analogy of
> realism? I'd expect an analogy of realism to make more sense.
This reply does not refer to any of the original argumentations which
I have tried to question with the FTL phone argument. Therefore, it is
one of the type of reply I have named here "unreasonable".
Note: you can "understand" the meaning of the FTL phone argument only
as a rejection of some particular other argument - usually an argument
of type
$$ A(Bell's device) explains (Bell's device) without using FTL.
which I reject with the analogy argument
$ A(FTL phone) explains (FTL phone) without using FTL?
>> Hidden variables are not very weird at all. The only weird thing
>> which may be connected with them is why they are hidden. But this
>> may be usually proven (and therefore explained) in the theory.
> Spukhafte Fernwirkungen. The weirdness seems inherent in the
> quantum workings of the natural world. Your axioms, though
> plausible, don't do anything to remove the weirdness for me.
> Just the opposite, in fact.
First, the GET axioms are not about quantum effects, they are about a
classical ether. It is not even their purpose to explain quantum
weirdness.
Second, Bohmian mechanics removes much of quantum weirdness, but
certainly not all of it. I certainly prefer to have some "spukhafte
Fernwirkungen" for some time in comparison with giving up searching
for causal realistic explanations at all. The progress of science
often has transformed "spukhafte" objects into accepted objects -
atoms, quarks, genes, and so on. But the only way to find this out,
to distinguish phlogiston from oxygen, is to look at theories which
describe them as real, propose their properties, theories which may be
falsified or rejected by Ockham's razor as unnecessarily complex.
But to give up the search for realistic explanation is not such a way.
And a rejection with Ockham's razor should be based on comparison with
a simpler realistic theory, not on comparison with a theory which does
not explain the effect in a realistic way and therefore does not solve
the problem of explanation.
Ilja Schmelzer
>> Also don't mingle stateless situations with anarchistic
>> theory. Somalia and Afghanistan are not examples of societies which
>> have chosen to follow some anarchistic model. Instead, they are
>> results of fights between various fractions who want to establish
>> states.
> That is why there is no such thing as anarchism
> in a world of more than one person. Either
> people want to rule over others, or people
> confederate together to protect themselves from
> being forcibly ruled over by others. That's
> human nature.
There is nothing wrong with cooperating together. This is not
forbidden in anarchy.
> That's human nature.
At least my personal "human nature" has not forbidden me to live
in an anarchistic way in small groups.
Of course, these groups have existed in the territory of a state. But
the members of these small groups have not decided to follow the rules
of the state to solve group-internal problems, nor have they
established own state-like rules.
> Ilja, if you ever find yourself in a world all by yourself, you
> would be free to setup your anarchy.
I'm free to setup an anarchistic environment whereever I live. By
choosing friends who care more about their/our interests than about a
particular states laws, friends who consider it as unethical to call
the police to solve internal problems.
> In any case, physics by anarchy is nonsensical to me. Rules for the
> ruleless?! Order for the orderless?! It makes no sense!
Science is a nice example of working anarchy. There is no "government
of science" which has the superiour power of deciding about the truth
of scientific theories.
shuba
[snip formalism of analogy]
> Let's now look at your reply:
>
> > The whole purpose of a phone is to transmit information. If it
> > can't transmit information, it is broken. I do not understand
> > the analogy. A phone with an unreal ability to send only signals
> > that cannot be used to transfer information is an analogy of
> > realism? I'd expect an analogy of realism to make more sense.
>
> This reply does not refer to any of the original argumentations which
> I have tried to question with the FTL phone argument. Therefore, it is
> one of the type of reply I have named here "unreasonable".
Fine with me. Physics is not generally dependent on analogies to
magic phones, nor even analogies to existing devices with known
mechanisms. Outside of debate school, analogies are usually used
to paint a sensible picture to assist one's understanding. The
FTL phone simply doesn't do that for me.
> Note: you can "understand" the meaning of the FTL phone argument only
> as a rejection of some particular other argument - usually an argument
> of type
>
> $$ A(Bell's device) explains (Bell's device) without using FTL.
>
> which I reject with the analogy argument
>
> $ A(FTL phone) explains (FTL phone) without using FTL?
It is still not obvious to me that there is any FTL to begin
with, and transfering the weirdness inside a phone is no help.
> >> Hidden variables are not very weird at all. The only weird thing
> >> which may be connected with them is why they are hidden. But this
> >> may be usually proven (and therefore explained) in the theory.
>
> > Spukhafte Fernwirkungen. The weirdness seems inherent in the
> > quantum workings of the natural world. Your axioms, though
> > plausible, don't do anything to remove the weirdness for me.
> > Just the opposite, in fact.
>
> First, the GET axioms are not about quantum effects, they are about a
> classical ether. It is not even their purpose to explain quantum
> weirdness.
If they don't help understanding in this area, GET is of little
worth, other than as a kludge to hold onto R^3 x R spacetime.
> Second, Bohmian mechanics removes much of quantum weirdness, but
> certainly not all of it. I certainly prefer to have some "spukhafte
> Fernwirkungen" for some time in comparison with giving up searching
> for causal realistic explanations at all. The progress of science
> often has transformed "spukhafte" objects into accepted objects -
> atoms, quarks, genes, and so on. But the only way to find this out,
> to distinguish phlogiston from oxygen, is to look at theories which
> describe them as real, propose their properties, theories which may be
> falsified or rejected by Ockham's razor as unnecessarily complex.
>
> But to give up the search for realistic explanation is not such a way.
> And a rejection with Ockham's razor should be based on comparison with
> a simpler realistic theory, not on comparison with a theory which does
> not explain the effect in a realistic way and therefore does not solve
> the problem of explanation.
The more I read your descriptions of realism, the more I become
convinced that physics has taken an entirely logical path, and
strives for realistic explanations, even today. There are times,
however, when admitting that we don't have complete answers is a
more rational plan than attempting to force nature's secrets into
inaccessible black boxes, and pretending it's an explanation.
---Tim Shuba---
Ilja Schmelzer
> Ilja wrote:
> [snip formalism of analogy]
>> Let's now look at your reply:
>>> The whole purpose of a phone is to transmit information. If it
>>> can't transmit information, it is broken. I do not understand
>>> the analogy. A phone with an unreal ability to send only signals
>>> that cannot be used to transfer information is an analogy of
>>> realism? I'd expect an analogy of realism to make more sense.
>>
>> This reply does not refer to any of the original argumentations which
>> I have tried to question with the FTL phone argument. Therefore, it is
>> one of the type of reply I have named here "unreasonable".
>
> Fine with me. Physics is not generally dependent on analogies to
> magic phones, nor even analogies to existing devices with known
> mechanisms. Outside of debate school, analogies are usually used
> to paint a sensible picture to assist one's understanding. The
> FTL phone simply doesn't do that for me.
Sorry, but the "formalism of analogy" you have snipped has shown that
the analogies I use are in no way used "to paint a sensible picture to
assist one's understanding". Instead, they are used to prove the
faults of certain arguments.
Therefore, it doesn't matter that the FTL phone does not "paint a
sensible picture" for you. If you ignore it, you ignore valid
counterarguments against the arguments which I criticize. If you
continue to use these faulty original arguments, you deserve the label
"ignorant".
>> Note: you can "understand" the meaning of the FTL phone argument only
>> as a rejection of some particular other argument - usually an argument
>> of type
>>
>> $$ A(Bell's device) explains (Bell's device) without using FTL.
>>
>> which I reject with the analogy argument
>>
>> $ A(FTL phone) explains (FTL phone) without using FTL?
> It is still not obvious to me that there is any FTL to begin with,
> and transfering the weirdness inside a phone is no help.
If you accept classical realism (the EPR criterion of reality) than
the violation of Bell's inequality proves that there is FTL. The EPR
criterion is something which is "obvious" for the common sense.
This is a simple straightforward argumentation without any need
to use the FTL phone argument.
The FTL phone argument I start to use when I'm confronted with a
special subclass of arguments against this straightforward
argumentation. Especially arguments of type "X explains the
violations without FTL".
>>>> Hidden variables are not very weird at all. The only weird thing
>>>> which may be connected with them is why they are hidden. But this
>>>> may be usually proven (and therefore explained) in the theory.
>>
>>> Spukhafte Fernwirkungen. The weirdness seems inherent in the
>>> quantum workings of the natural world. Your axioms, though
>>> plausible, don't do anything to remove the weirdness for me.
>>> Just the opposite, in fact.
>>
>> First, the GET axioms are not about quantum effects, they are about a
>> classical ether. It is not even their purpose to explain quantum
>> weirdness.
>
> If they don't help understanding in this area, GET is of little
> worth, other than as a kludge to hold onto R^3 x R spacetime.
False. GET shows the compatibility of our world with a preferred
frame (needed in Bohmian mechanics) even in the domain of relativistic
gravity. This removes one important counterargument against Bohmian
mechanics. Thus, "GET axioms are not about quantum effects" does not
mean "GET is of little worth". There are also a lot of other questions
in nature there GET may prove its value.
>> Second, Bohmian mechanics removes much of quantum weirdness, but
>> certainly not all of it. I certainly prefer to have some "spukhafte
>> Fernwirkungen" for some time in comparison with giving up searching
>> for causal realistic explanations at all. The progress of science
>> often has transformed "spukhafte" objects into accepted objects -
>> atoms, quarks, genes, and so on. But the only way to find this out,
>> to distinguish phlogiston from oxygen, is to look at theories which
>> describe them as real, propose their properties, theories which may
>> be falsified or rejected by Ockham's razor as unnecessarily
>> complex.
>> But to give up the search for realistic explanation is not such a
>> way. And a rejection with Ockham's razor should be based on
>> comparison with a simpler realistic theory, not on comparison with
>> a theory which does not explain the effect in a realistic way and
>> therefore does not solve the problem of explanation.
> The more I read your descriptions of realism, the more I become
> convinced that physics has taken an entirely logical path, and
> strives for realistic explanations, even today. There are times,
> however, when admitting that we don't have complete answers is a
> more rational plan than attempting to force nature's secrets into
> inaccessible black boxes, and pretending it's an explanation.
I would agree but the "however" confuses me. It is also IMHO more
rational to admit that QM is incomplete, then pretending QM is an
explanation.
BM is an attempt to open the black box at least for theoretical
research.