Recently I posted a link to a web page detailing how it's possible to
interpret SR without relativity of simultaneity (this is the page:
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/nigelg.johnson/RelSimul.html). The upshot
of the responses was that the page details a "LET" type theory, that
there are similar theories out there and, although they are as
consistent with observations as SR they are usually shunned by
theorists. Tim Shuba eventually pointed to an article of Tom Roberts
explaining why LET type theories are not taken seriously. The article
is at:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=3838AA2A.829F46AD%40lucent.com.
This is a point by point response to that article, leading to the
conclusion that, in my opinion, LET interpretations of SR should be
taken as seriously as the more conventional. For the sake of a label
I'll call the unconventional interpretation of SR that I'm trying to
defend quantised Lorentzian Relativity (QLR).
Here goes - this is rather long so fell free to just dip into specific
points. Each section starts with a brief summary of the point to which
I'm trying to reply. Point 4 is the "meatiest". (The first two points
are in Tom Robert's preamble, hence the odd numbering):
-1 "Conventional SR is more symmetric than QLR". (My interpretation of
Tom Roberts's words, not a direct quote). Response: Yes it is, in a
Steady State Universe, because QLR DOES require a frame to be singled
out as "special". However, it is just as symmetric as SR plus the Big
Bang, as the latter singles out an originating frame for the universe
anyway. But why should the Big Bang frame be the preferred frame of
QLR? If space has a structure then I find it difficult to imagine how
that structure could appear to be stationary to an observer, unless
that observer was occupying the Big Bang frame (just from simple
consideration of the old "inflating balloon" analogy). The only
preferred frame required is one that already exists.
0 "LET excludes geometry, as all "ether" theories are coordinate
based." (Again, my interpretation of Tom Robert's words). Response:
I'm not sure QLR does exclude geometry. The structure of space it
postulates could itself be distorted. For example, contraction of
space units could be used as a way of "explaining" gravitational time
dilation. I believe that GR theoreticians use the concept of "rubbery
rulers", i.e. "rulers" that expand and contract, as an occasional
alternative to the more usual "warpage" model when solving problems
(If I'm wrong here please correct!).
1 "The preferred frame is unobservable." (Again, my interpretation of
Tom Robert's words). Prosaically, if the preferred frame is equated
with the Big Bang frame, then it's possible the preferred frame could
be identified by observing the CMBR. However, though I strongly
suspect this is true, the CMBR does not date from the time of the Big
Bang itself, and is not entirely "smooth", so rather than potentially
digress at this point I'm not going to fall back on the CMBR.
So back to the main discussion. First, I think this particular
criticism of QLR type theories is potentially circular. The
circularity is this: relativity of simultaneity seems to rule out FTL
information transfer; therefore there can be no FTL information
transfer; therefore there can be no way to "detect" a preferred frame
in QLR type theories as, for all speeds of information transfer, up to
and including the speed of light, QLR's predictions must be the same
as conventional SR. Therefore QLR is weakened and relativity of
simultaneity holds true.
QLR doesn't have relativity of simultaneity, and therefore does not
rule out FTL information transfer. To give one simple example of how
you can detect the preferred frame once you allow FTL information
transfer: (well, it's just engineering at this point!:)), you could
set up an instantaneous "time signal". Have an observer sit in one
inertial frame and "listen" to the signal as it accelerates. The point
at which the signal "ticks" fastest is the "speed", relative to the
observer, of the preferred frame (as moving observers clocks are
"really" dilated, "stationary" clocks merely appear dilated to moving
observers due to the distorted way they measure space and time. An
instantaneous signal would be "directly" perceived by the moving
observers, so wouldn't be distorted). Finally, in the "SR and
Symmetry" section of my web page I describe an experiment using Big
Bang "clocks", that again (I think, but am ready to be corrected!)
allows the Big Bang frame (and therefore the QLR preferred frame) to
be detected, in theory, although I admit that this one would a
challenge in practise!
2 "This unobservability of the ether frame borders on a reductio ad
absurdum in math." Response: This criticism doesn't apply if my
arguments at 1 are true.
3 "The assumption of a unique ether frame is directly analogous to the
assumption that there is a preferred frame in a Euclidean space."
Response: I don't think this is a fair analogy, as we are dealing here
with a "space" that has itself expanded out of a quasi-singularity,
and the "rules" that will apply within that space, not a space that
sits within some type of pre-existing not quite Euclidean "frame".
4 "In every viable ether theory one's measurement tools must change in
an unobservable manner if one is moving wrt the ether. This seems both
counterintuitive and strange -- it's as if these effects were
diabolically constructed simply to make the viable ether theories
indistinguishable from SR." Response: I've taken this as the same
point that QLR type theories require some special "mechanism" to cause
the distortions to the measurements taken by the moving observer. This
is an important criticism.
However, I just don't think it's true. The "distortions" to the
measurements of the moving observer are just caused by the effects of
motion relative to the preferred frame.
I touch upon this (though not with sufficient emphasis) in the "Basic
Effects on Clocks and Rulers" section of my web page. For example,
there I use "light clocks" to stand in for all clocks, at which point
the "time dilation" of the tick rate of the clock is just the
consequence of the effects of the clock's motion on the light bouncing
backwards and forwards inside the clock (the observer is moving, but
the motion of anything that travels at the speed of light is still
coupled to the underlying structure of space). Apparent
desynchronisation of clocks arises as the observer sees light from
clocks in "front" arrive sooner than light from clocks "behind".
Length contraction arises as a direct consequence of this
desynchronisation: without length contraction the "front" of objects
would appear to have "moved away" from the "backs" of objects (as the
images from in front arrive sooner than those from behind, so show
objects having travelled further) and lengths, to the moving observer,
would appear to increase. This would cause properties such as
"potential energy" to appear to spontaneously change within the moving
observer's frame, at least where the force-carrying particles involved
travel at the speed of light. Moving objects therefore contract along
the direction of motion (an effect that also allows "light clocks"
arranged in the direction of motion to "tick" at the same rate as
those that are orthogonal).
I think all the other effects of SR and QLR then flow from the above.
In QLR terms I suspect all we need are the known laws of physics
combined with an underlying structure of space and a quantised time to
produce the SR effects.
5 This point is specifically not directed at LET type theories.
6 "Ether theories require a new postulate for every new phenomenon
that is discovered, which basically states that the ether applies to
it in the same ways the ether applies to electromagnetism." Response:
QLR just postulates a quantised space and a quantised time. This
mandates a maximum speed at which effects can propagate without
skipping out space units during a time unit, i.e. a maximum speed for
what we could call "continuous propagation". In QLR any effects that
travel at the maximum speed of continuous propagation (effectively the
maximum speed of "movement" as conventionally defined) will be
naturally coupled to the structure of "space-time" and therefore
naturally exhibit the same effects as electromagnetism.
To conclude I suspect QLR emerges directly from a simple quantisation
of space and time plus the known laws of physics. I therefore do not
believe that theories of this kind should be considered any less
seriously than conventional interpretations of SR (those involving
relativity of simultaneity).
Since you give no indication of how this theory is quantized, why
not use the name more commonly used on this newsgroup, LET?
> 0 "LET excludes geometry, as all "ether" theories are coordinate
> based." (Again, my interpretation of Tom Robert's words).
I am not sure what you mean here, I guess that you are not
interpreting Tom's words well.
> 1 "The preferred frame is unobservable." (Again, my interpretation of
> Tom Robert's words). Prosaically, if the preferred frame is equated
> with the Big Bang frame, then it's possible the preferred frame could
> be identified by observing the CMBR.
No, the preferred frame is unobservable in SR and LET. If you do
not understand this then you do not understand either theory.
> QLR doesn't have relativity of simultaneity, and therefore does not
> rule out FTL information transfer.
That is true in a sense, but do you understand what restrictions
LET does have?
>To give one simple example of how
> you can detect the preferred frame once you allow FTL information
> transfer: (well, it's just engineering at this point!:)), you could
> set up an instantaneous "time signal".
The benefit of LET is that it makes exactly the same predictions
as SR. If you try to get round this fact you shoot yourself in the foot
since you are then proposing a theory that does not agree with
experiment.
> 2 "This unobservability of the ether frame borders on a reductio ad
> absurdum in math." Response: This criticism doesn't apply if my
> arguments at 1 are true.
Which they are not.
>
> 4 "In every viable ether theory one's measurement tools must change in
> an unobservable manner if one is moving wrt the ether. This seems both
> counterintuitive and strange -- it's as if these effects were
> diabolically constructed simply to make the viable ether theories
> indistinguishable from SR."
> Response: I've taken this as the same
> point that QLR type theories require some special "mechanism" to cause
> the distortions to the measurements taken by the moving observer. This
> is an important criticism.
> However, I just don't think it's true. The "distortions" to the
> measurements of the moving observer are just caused by the effects of
> motion relative to the preferred frame.
Fine, you can say there is no mechanism which causes clocks to
slow and rulers to shrink if you like but you should be aware that
many LET supporters claim the existence of a mechanism as
an advantage.
In any case you seem to go on to propose a mechanism.
> I touch upon this (though not with sufficient emphasis) in the "Basic
> Effects on Clocks and Rulers" section of my web page. For example,
> there I use "light clocks" to stand in for all clocks,...
With what justification?
> Apparent
> desynchronisation of clocks arises as the observer sees light from
> clocks in "front" arrive sooner than light from clocks "behind".
True, but this has nothing to do with relativity.
> Length contraction arises as a direct consequence of this
> desynchronisation: without length contraction the "front" of objects
> would appear to have "moved away" from the "backs" of objects (as the
> images from in front arrive sooner than those from behind, so show
> objects having travelled further) and lengths, to the moving observer,
> would appear to increase. This would cause properties such as
> "potential energy" to appear to spontaneously change within the moving
> observer's frame, at least where the force-carrying particles involved
> travel at the speed of light.
This is meaningless drivel.
>
> 6 "Ether theories require a new postulate for every new phenomenon
> that is discovered, which basically states that the ether applies to
> it in the same ways the ether applies to electromagnetism."
> Response:
> QLR just postulates a quantised space and a quantised time.
As I read this it becomes more and more apparent that you have
no idea what you are talking about.
> To conclude I suspect QLR ...
You seem to be arguing for LET in preference to SR without much
understanding of either theory. LET has the great advantage that it
exactly the same experimental predictions as SR.
If you are proposing a theory that is different from LET, firstly you
need to tell us exactly what it is, something you have not even started
to do, then you need to show that it is consistent with experiment.
Until you have done both those things your ideas are 'dead on arrival'
as Uncle Al would say.
Martin Hogbin
First people should understand what Tom's position is. In case you have not
read Tom's excellent article (something I think all posters to this group
should do) I would like to post its conclusion:
In summary, there are good reasons for the ether to be absent from modern
physics; virtually all modern physicists consider these reasons both
cogent and sufficient (at least those modern physicists who have actively
considered the issue), and no ether theory is part of modern physics.
While the viable ether theories are equivalent to SR in the sense that
they are experimentally indistinguishable, they are most definitely NOT
equivalent to SR in either mathematical elegance, explanatory power, or
suitability as a starting point for further theories. But it is these
latter properties which are most important for the basic theories of
physics.
Note that Tom correctly states aether theories are experimentally equivalent
to SR. Since any theory that predicts the same experimental facts is
scientifically as good as any other it is not on scientific grounds Tom (and
myself) reject other theories. Modern science also takes into account other
things, such as elegance, coherence with other theories (eg GR) and number
of assumptions. If you wish to support aether theories it is these areas
you need to address, not an analysis of your preferred philosophical
position. By taking that tack all you are saying is that my criteria for
elegance etc is different to yours. You are perfectly at liberty to do so,
but most people I know reject something that is in principle unobservable.
The question is why you prefer such a position when it causes all sorts of
other problems eg how do you mesh it with GR? My understanding is aether
based gravitational theories are possible and (at least at present) are
experimentally indistinguishable from GR but lack it coherence and elegance.
Thanks
Bill
Bill Hobba wrote:
> other problems eg how do you mesh it with GR? My understanding is aether
> based gravitational theories are possible and (at least at present) are
> experimentally indistinguishable from GR but lack it coherence and elegance.
You raise a very interesting point in your excellent posting (most of
which I clipped in to save disk space). The soundness of a theory rests
exclusively on its prediction record and failure to be falsified
objectively. You prefer non aetheric theories (as I do) on the grounds
of elegance and coherence.
Elegance is subjective. Can coherence be put on an objective basis?
The preference for elegance is somewhat related to the quasi religious
belief that reality is really simple once you have the right theory for
it. I disagree. I think the deeper one digs, the messier it gets. If
mathematical complexity is a measure of messiness, I think I have made
the point.
Reality is neither messy nor simple. Reality is.
Bob Kolker
Tom's article is inaccurate here.
1.) SR as well as ether theories equivalent to SR are not viable
because they don't describe gravity, while theories which describe
gravity exist.
2.) There is a viable ether theory of gravity, see gr-qc/0205035, it
is not equivalent to SR, but has the GR Einstein equations as a limit.
3.) This theory is comparable in mathematical elegance with GR (it
combines the beautiful GR math with the beautiful harmonic coordinates
and the also beautiful ADM decomposition).
4.) This theory derives the Einstein equivalence principle (which has
to be postulated in GR) from simple ether axioms and therefore has
more explanatory power.
5.) It seems quit suitable as a starting point for further theories.
See hep-th/0209167.
> Note that Tom correctly states aether theories are experimentally equivalent
> to SR. Since any theory that predicts the same experimental facts is
> scientifically as good as any other it is not on scientific grounds Tom (and
> myself) reject other theories. Modern science also takes into account other
> things, such as elegance, coherence with other theories (eg GR) and number
> of assumptions. If you wish to support aether theories it is these areas
> you need to address, not an analysis of your preferred philosophical
> position.
These areas are addressed. I note, BTW, the coherence with QM (no
"problem of time") and realistic causal hidden variable theories
like Bohmian mechanics (they need a preferred frame).
> The question is why you prefer such a position when it causes all sorts of
> other problems eg how do you mesh it with GR? My understanding is aether
> based gravitational theories are possible and (at least at present) are
> experimentally indistinguishable from GR but lack it coherence and elegance.
I would be very interested to see your argumentation about elegance
and coherence.
In GR, people have observed, independently, that there are two quite
beautiful things which seem to have no purpose in GR: harmonic
coordinates and the ADM decomposition. My ether theory combines them
all, in a quite elegant way, into one theory.
Moreover, there are some interesting advantages: well-defined local
energy-momentum conservation laws, no big bang and black hole
singularities. Would you like to compare the beauty of above theories
in these two particular questions?
Ilja
--
I. Schmelzer, <il...@ilja-schmelzer.net>, http://ilja-schmelzer.net
Of course elegance is subjective. Of course coherence can not be put on an
objective basis. But what people choose as their basis for elegance can be
telling. As Tom correctly points out in his article the basis of much of
physics lies in symmetry. As Feynman points out symmetry is what remains
the same when things change. There is an excellent quote on this issue in
Gravitation and Space-time by Ruffini that I will not bore people with here;
bottom line is the greater the symmetry in the resulting theory the simpler
it is ie the quest for symmetry is a quest for simplicity ie what is the
easiest and simplest way of looking at reality. Those that cling to an
aether reject the symmetry offered by the Lorentz transformation (and
embodied in the principle of relativity) in favour of an underlying reality
more in line with common sense (ie the existence of an aether enables you to
cling to the idea of an absolute time, length etc). It is this rejection of
simplicity in favour of a common sense that has been extended beyond its
area of applicability that I object to.
Robert Kolker wrote
> The preference for elegance is somewhat related to the quasi religious
> belief that reality is really simple once you have the right theory for
> it. I disagree. I think the deeper one digs, the messier it gets. If
> mathematical complexity is a measure of messiness, I think I have made
> the point.
Fair enough point. My personnel belief (and I emphasize it is a belief) is
that the reason physics is messier as we find out more is either we are
looking at it the wrong way or there is a deeper more elegant theory lurking
about. I firmly believe at rock bottom nature has some kind of dazzling
symmetry that research will eventually reveal. Then again I may be wrong.
Unlike religious zealots I admit I may be wrong; it is the role of future
research based on experimental evidence that will shed light of the
question. That after all is what science is all about.
Robert Kolker wrote
> Reality is neither messy nor simple. Reality is.
Reality is; but the question of if it is messy or simple is what future
research will reveal. And of course in science you never know if you have
the final answer. If you have a dazzlingly elegant and beautiful theory it
may be proven messy by the next experiment and conversely. So I would not
say reality is neither messy nor simple I would say one adopts the
philosophical position that allows progress to be made. Unequivocally the
aether has not allowed progress to be made; the search for symmetry is what
has proven to be a better paradigm.
Thanks
Bill
1. My article discussed ONLY the "local limit" in which SR and LET
apply. You bring in lots of other baggage. Yes, SR and LET have
limited domains of applicability -- so what? all other theories
do also (some have larger domains than others).
2. In modern cosmology (based on GR models), the big bang in no way
"singles out an originating frame for the universe".
3. If one desires to base one's cosmology on an ether, one must either
find some reason to exclude the other theories in the equivalence
class, or accept them all. But they are mutually incompatible....
And it seems quite difficult to come up with a physical reason
to select LET over the others.
> But why should the Big Bang frame be the preferred frame of
> QLR? If space has a structure then I find it difficult to imagine how
> that structure could appear to be stationary to an observer, unless
> that observer was occupying the Big Bang frame (just from simple
> consideration of the old "inflating balloon" analogy).
What God whispered in your ear and told you this?
A counterexample: in QED the vacuum is Lorentz-covariant. Harking back
to your (poor) words: the "structure" of space is the same to all
inertial observers, and they can all CONSIDER it to be at rest wrt
themselves. In another (quite loose) sense, the "structure" of spacetime
is moving at c wrt all observers [I mean this in the sense that the
light cones t every event form the "structure" of spacetime].
> The only
> preferred frame required is one that already exists.
What God whispered in your ear to tell you there already exists such a
frame?
> 0 "LET excludes geometry, as all "ether" theories are coordinate
> based." (Again, my interpretation of Tom Robert's words).
I haven't a clue how you got that. The article you quoted does not even
contain the word "geometry".
> Response:
> I'm not sure QLR does exclude geometry. The structure of space it
> postulates could itself be distorted. For example, contraction of
> space units could be used as a way of "explaining" gravitational time
> dilation. I believe that GR theoreticians use the concept of "rubbery
> rulers", i.e. "rulers" that expand and contract, as an occasional
> alternative to the more usual "warpage" model when solving problems
> (If I'm wrong here please correct!).
You are completely wrong about "rubbery rulers" in GR.
And none of the theories in that equivalence class say anything at all
about gravitation.
> 1 "The preferred frame is unobservable." (Again, my interpretation of
> Tom Robert's words).
In every theory of the equivalence class, yes.
> Prosaically, if the preferred frame is equated
> with the Big Bang frame, then it's possible the preferred frame could
> be identified by observing the CMBR.
Nope. The CMBR defines the CMBR dipole=0 frame. Nothing more.
> [...] relativity of simultaneity seems to rule out FTL
> information transfer; therefore there can be no FTL information
> transfer; therefore there can be no way to "detect" a preferred frame
> in QLR type theories as, for all speeds of information transfer, up to
> and including the speed of light, QLR's predictions must be the same
> as conventional SR. Therefore QLR is weakened and relativity of
> simultaneity holds true.
In no theory of the equivalence class is FTL communication possible. In
no theory of the equivalence class can the ether frame be detected via
measurements of any kind. Every different theory of that equivalence
class has a different notion of the relativity of simultaneity.
> QLR doesn't have relativity of simultaneity, and therefore does not
> rule out FTL information transfer.
If QLR is a member of the equivalence class (and from your definition of
QLR it is), then this is wrong.
> To give one simple example of how
> you can detect the preferred frame once you allow FTL information
> transfer: (well, it's just engineering at this point!:)), you could
> set up an instantaneous "time signal".
You assume INSTANTANEOUS signaling everywhere and everywhen. That's MUCH
MUCH MUCH stronger a condition than FTL signaling. No theory of the
equivalence class has either, of course.
> 2 "This unobservability of the ether frame borders on a reductio ad
> absurdum in math." Response: This criticism doesn't apply if my
> arguments at 1 are true.
It does apply to the subject of the article: the ether theories of that
equivalence class. As your "QLR' belongs to that class, your arguments
are quite simply wrong.
> 3 "The assumption of a unique ether frame is directly analogous to the
> assumption that there is a preferred frame in a Euclidean space."
> Response: I don't think this is a fair analogy, as we are dealing here
> with a "space" that has itself expanded out of a quasi-singularity,
> and the "rules" that will apply within that space, not a space that
> sits within some type of pre-existing not quite Euclidean "frame".
You are confusing ideas quite foreign to my article with statements of
the article. No theory of that equivalence class has a big bang.
> 4 "In every viable ether theory one's measurement tools must change in
> an unobservable manner if one is moving wrt the ether. This seems both
> counterintuitive and strange -- it's as if these effects were
> diabolically constructed simply to make the viable ether theories
> indistinguishable from SR." Response: I've taken this as the same
> point that QLR type theories require some special "mechanism" to cause
> the distortions to the measurements taken by the moving observer. This
> is an important criticism.
> However, I just don't think it's true. The "distortions" to the
> measurements of the moving observer are just caused by the effects of
> motion relative to the preferred frame.
How? Why? What property of the ether ensures these changes are EXACTLY
the same as the preditions of SR?
> 6 "Ether theories require a new postulate for every new phenomenon
> that is discovered, which basically states that the ether applies to
> it in the same ways the ether applies to electromagnetism." Response:
> QLR just postulates a quantised space and a quantised time. This
> mandates a maximum speed at which effects can propagate without
> skipping out space units during a time unit, i.e. a maximum speed for
> what we could call "continuous propagation". In QLR any effects that
> travel at the maximum speed of continuous propagation (effectively the
> maximum speed of "movement" as conventionally defined) will be
> naturally coupled to the structure of "space-time" and therefore
> naturally exhibit the same effects as electromagnetism.
Why are neutrinos so "coupled"? You still need to postulate in one way
or another that they are. Ditto for Ws and Zs and....
> To conclude I suspect QLR emerges directly from a simple quantisation
> of space and time plus the known laws of physics.
Then you need to show this. But the "known laws of physics" seem to
contradict your claims (hint: SR is among them)....
> I therefore do not
> believe that theories of this kind should be considered any less
> seriously than conventional interpretations of SR (those involving
> relativity of simultaneity).
You seem unaware that the real attraction of SR to modern physicists is
its symmetry. Symmetry principles have been the means to most if not all
advances in fundamental theories over the last century (hmmm. it's
probably since phytsics was born....). Before you destroy Lorentz
symmetry with a preferred-frame ether, you need to display a compelling
reason to do so. You haven't even begun to understand the complexity of
the problem, much less made any progress toward such a demonstration...
Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
HA Lorentz himself believed in a prefered frame aether that, to
put it in the words of Einstein himself, contracted matter (the MM
interferometer) just "sufficient to compensate for the difference in
time".
Would a consistant, cumulative, six nanosecond difference in the
"airliner (aether drift) experiment" present a sufficient "compelling
reason" to accept a preferred-frame aether.
stephen kearney td780
I must thank Tom for posting this to emphasize the importance of symmetry.
I do not believe it can be stated too often. Perhaps if people studied
Langragian mechanics (from say my favorite book - Landau - Mechanics) then
they would understand that symmetry lies at the heart of even Newtonian
Mechanics. When this is grasped then you're better prepared to understand
why the symmetry of SR embodied on the principle of relativity is the key
point and things like time dilation etc are a direct result of this
symmetry. Postulating an unobservable aether breaks the symmetry; its only
value is to preserve a common sense formulated in areas that relativity is
not applicable too.
Thanks
Bill
So what indeed: I don't think the OP was saying othwerwise...
> 2. In modern cosmology (based on GR models), the big bang in no way
> "singles out an originating frame for the universe".
I find this statement #2 very strange. As I understand it, it is
postulated that space and time did not exist before the Big Bang.
Modelling from very short times after the BB pictures an expansion of
the space of the Universe, eventually reducing the density of matter
and radiation it contains to the values we see now. Since this space
has always encompassed the whole Universe, including all the matter
and radiation in it, we have no frame of reference against which we
could assign any motion of the Universe as a whole. IOW, as far as we
can see, there is no "outside the Universe" relative to which we could
detect any motion or rotation of the Universe.
Moreover, since as the OP knows we can now define an inertial frame
with zero linear and angular velocities against both the background
radiation (which is thought to have originated quite soon after the
BB) and the distributed visible matter of the Universe, it seems to me
entirely legitimate to "single out" the unique inertial frame so
identified, and to refer to it as "an originating frame for the
Universe", at least in the sense that the assumed originating event
(BB) by definition was unique and could not have been detectably
moving wrt anything outside, and that this therefore singles out this
frame and no other.
> 3. If one desires to base one's cosmology on an ether, one must either
> find some reason to exclude the other theories in the equivalence
> class, or accept them all. But they are mutually incompatible....
> And it seems quite difficult to come up with a physical reason
> to select LET over the others.
What is this "equivalence class" stuff about? Do you mean that all
inertial frames are equivalent in any reasonable ether theory? If so,
that seems to me no more reason to talk about equivalence classes than
in SR, which shares the same property. The difference with LET is
that the equivalence of all i.f. arises precisely and only because
light travels isotropically in only one i.f., and nothing can overtake
a light signal in that i.f. The equivalence arises in SR by
assumption only - a far weaker case and lacking a tenable model of
light propagation, in my view. The physical reason to select a
particular i.f. to play the part of the "ether" in LET is that there
can obviously be only one frame with the necessary properties of
determining light speed and making it an upper limit. And that of the
Big Bang, as determined empirically by observations on the CMBR and
thousands of galaxies, is the only reasonable candidate. It remains
the only reasonable candidate even if there is some other explanation
than the BB for the CMBR and the apparent expansion.
> > But why should the Big Bang frame be the preferred frame of
> > QLR? If space has a structure then I find it difficult to imagine how
> > that structure could appear to be stationary to an observer, unless
> > that observer was occupying the Big Bang frame (just from simple
> > consideration of the old "inflating balloon" analogy).
>
> What God whispered in your ear and told you this?
>
> A counterexample: in QED the vacuum is Lorentz-covariant. Harking back
> to your (poor) words: the "structure" of space is the same to all
> inertial observers, and they can all CONSIDER it to be at rest wrt
> themselves. In another (quite loose) sense, the "structure" of spacetime
> is moving at c wrt all observers [I mean this in the sense that the
> light cones t every event form the "structure" of spacetime].
Yes, they can all CONSIDER it to be at rest wrt themselves in LET,
too, even if it is not, as clearly shown e.g. by the "relativity of
simultaneity". LET makes it very clear that this arises simply
because inertial observers can each ASSUME as a convenient fiction
that light is moving isotropically at c relative to them, but of
course they are all, in general, wrong about that. Lorentz covariance
is hardly a counterexample against LET: it's what you get from it.
[...]
> And none of the theories in that equivalence class say anything at all
> about gravitation.
Nor does SR. I would expect that the extension of LET to gravitation
entails a dependence of the local value of c on gravitational
potential, very much along the lines of Einstein's earliest thoughts
on GR.
>
>
> > 1 "The preferred frame is unobservable." (Again, my interpretation of
> > Tom Robert's words).
>
> In every theory of the equivalence class, yes.
Exactly as in SR.
> > Prosaically, if the preferred frame is equated
> > with the Big Bang frame, then it's possible the preferred frame could
> > be identified by observing the CMBR.
>
> Nope. The CMBR defines the CMBR dipole=0 frame. Nothing more.
Come on! A unique, zero-velocity frame referenced on the whole
Universe, matching within experimental uncertainties a zero-velocity
and zero-rotation frame referenced on thousands of galaxies?! What
more do you want as a plausible candidate for the preferred,
light-carrying frame? It is unarguably unique, and what an amazing,
stupendous coincidence it is that we can derive not only the results,
but the very postulates of SR, from the simple assumption that this
frame identifies the ether in LET!
> > [...] relativity of simultaneity seems to rule out FTL
> > information transfer; therefore there can be no FTL information
> > transfer; therefore there can be no way to "detect" a preferred frame
> > in QLR type theories as, for all speeds of information transfer, up to
> > and including the speed of light, QLR's predictions must be the same
> > as conventional SR. Therefore QLR is weakened and relativity of
> > simultaneity holds true.
>
> In no theory of the equivalence class is FTL communication possible. In
> no theory of the equivalence class can the ether frame be detected via
> measurements of any kind.
I do wish you would drop this meaningless equivalence class stuff.
Apart from that, I fully agree with you, here.
[... snipped more FTL stuff]
> > 4 "In every viable ether theory one's measurement tools must change in
> > an unobservable manner if one is moving wrt the ether. This seems both
> > counterintuitive and strange -- it's as if these effects were
> > diabolically constructed simply to make the viable ether theories
> > indistinguishable from SR." Response: I've taken this as the same
> > point that QLR type theories require some special "mechanism" to cause
> > the distortions to the measurements taken by the moving observer. This
> > is an important criticism.
> > However, I just don't think it's true. The "distortions" to the
> > measurements of the moving observer are just caused by the effects of
> > motion relative to the preferred frame.
>
> How? Why? What property of the ether ensures these changes are EXACTLY
> the same as the preditions of SR?
As I have posted many times, both to you and others, the required
property is solely and only that nothing can overtake light/e-m fields
in a single universal i.f. Length-contractions, clock-slowings,
mutual time dilations, relativity of simultaneity, and all the rest,
then follow from the interplay of Newton's 3rd Law and
retarded-potential effects, exactly as described by Feynman (as a
modern example - he was not the first!) in Vol.2, Sec.21-6 of his
Lectures on Physics - which I am sure you know well - it is still in
print and should be available in every decent academic library and at
least by order through any public library.
> > 6 "Ether theories require a new postulate for every new phenomenon
> > that is discovered, which basically states that the ether applies to
> > it in the same ways the ether applies to electromagnetism." Response:
> > QLR just postulates a quantised space and a quantised time. This
> > mandates a maximum speed at which effects can propagate without
> > skipping out space units during a time unit, i.e. a maximum speed for
> > what we could call "continuous propagation". In QLR any effects that
> > travel at the maximum speed of continuous propagation (effectively the
> > maximum speed of "movement" as conventionally defined) will be
> > naturally coupled to the structure of "space-time" and therefore
> > naturally exhibit the same effects as electromagnetism.
>
> Why are neutrinos so "coupled"? You still need to postulate in one way
> or another that they are. Ditto for Ws and Zs and....
Because they can not travel faster than light: simple as that.
[...]
> > I therefore do not
> > believe that theories of this kind should be considered any less
> > seriously than conventional interpretations of SR (those involving
> > relativity of simultaneity).
>
> You seem unaware that the real attraction of SR to modern physicists is
> its symmetry. Symmetry principles have been the means to most if not all
> advances in fundamental theories over the last century (hmmm. it's
> probably since phytsics was born....).
Any symmetry MUST be describable in terms of elementary physical
interactions consistent with the rest of physics. Those are what
often break assumed symmetries.
> Before you destroy Lorentz
> symmetry with a preferred-frame ether,
Far from destroying it, that explains, via a physical mechanism, why
the symmetries are observed.
[...]
> Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
Trevor Morris
Only if:
1) the clocks involved were demonstrated to have a resolution of ~1 ns
or less IN THIS SITUATION (e.g. by being flown in similar airplanes
but in small circles).
2) a convincing theory is presented which explains not only this
particular non-null result, but ALSO explains why each and every
one of the hundreds of SR-testing experiments already performed
had a null result. Note many of them are MUCH more sensitive....
Note that current atomic clocks cannot meet (1). And (2) requires a
VASTLY more sophisticated ether theory than I have seen around here.
I must except Ilja Schmeltzer's theory, as I have had no
time to study it. But I strongly suspect it predicts a null
result for this experiment (or at least an unmeasurably small
result).
Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
> What is this "equivalence class" stuff about?
You have to go back and read the articles the original poster
referenced. That was a trilogy in which I described and discussed two
equivalence classes of theories:
1. Theories that are experimentally indistinguishable from SR.
2. Theories that are mathematically identical to SR (in that they
share the same set of theorems).
Note that (1) includes all experimentally-unrefuted ether theories,
with the possible exception of theories that "live in the error bars"
(but the error bars are incredibly small...).
These three articles were posted together, and had Subjects:
Theories Equivalent to SR
Why the Ether is Unobservable
Why the Ether is Not Part of Modern Physics
The OP gave a google link to this last article:
http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=3838AA2A.829F46AD%40lucent.com
> Do you mean that all
> inertial frames are equivalent in any reasonable ether theory?
No. Don't guess, go read what I wrote. The equivalence is among
THEORIES, not frames.
> Yes, they can all CONSIDER it to be at rest wrt themselves in LET,
> too, even if it is not, as clearly shown e.g. by the "relativity of
> simultaneity". LET makes it very clear that this arises simply
> because inertial observers can each ASSUME as a convenient fiction
> that light is moving isotropically at c relative to them, but of
> course they are all, in general, wrong about that. Lorentz covariance
> is hardly a counterexample against LET: it's what you get from it.
Yes. LET is a member of both equivalence classes I mentioned above. <shrug>
>>Nope. The CMBR defines the CMBR dipole=0 frame. Nothing more.
> Come on! A unique, zero-velocity frame referenced on the whole
> Universe,
Not true. The CMBR dipole=0 frame here differs from the CMBR dipole=0
frame over there. This has been observed (reference in the FAQ, I believe).
Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
Tom Roberts wrote:
> Old Physics wrote:
>
>> Tom Roberts <tjro...@lucent.com> wrote in message
>> news:<3E46A9E1...@lucent.com>...
>>
>>> [...]
>>
>> Would a consistant, cumulative, six nanosecond difference in the
>> "airliner (aether drift) experiment" present a sufficient "compelling
>> reason" to accept a preferred-frame aether.
>
>
> Only if:
> 1) the clocks involved were demonstrated to have a resolution of ~1 ns
> or less IN THIS SITUATION (e.g. by being flown in similar airplanes
> but in small circles).
>
> 2) a convincing theory is presented which explains not only this
> particular non-null result, but ALSO explains why each and every
> one of the hundreds of SR-testing experiments already performed
> had a null result. Note many of them are MUCH more sensitive....
>
> Note that current atomic clocks cannot meet (1).
1 nanosecond ? Is a 1 Ghz oscillator that unstable ?
are you sure it is not a picosecond ?
Hayek.
--
The small particles wave at
the big stars and get noticed.
:-)
Esteemed Mr. Roberts,
Desperatly seeking a VASTLY more sophisticated aether theory would
seem to violate occams razor. Perhaps you, like Stephen Hawkins, see
it as a principle of "economy" and cut out all features of the theory
which cannot be observed (specifically the aether).
I seek simplicity. The equasion sqrt 1-(v/c)^2 for contraction
and its inverse for time-mass dilation.
The principle of the experiment is simple, the faster you travel
through the aether the slower the tic toc of your clock. The "small
circles" approach would cancel out this effect.
The best way to proceed would be to use the same strategy as the
Hafale and Keating experiment except one jet would only make the east
bound flights toward Aquarius and the second jet, west only toward
Leo. My prediction would be a difference of about 1500 seconds, about
four times the SR prediction.
This would of course be a more expensive undertaking, but it could
be modified to use regularly schedualed flights.
It is my understanding that there has never been an SR experiment
that looked for an effect due to cosmic directionality. If there have
been a hundred SR tests, perhaps the hundred and one test could
include this feature, if only to put it to rest.
And put this crackpot, yours truly, out of business.
stephen kearney, thalean day 944781
Actually, Mr. Hayek, Tom might have us on this one. The agilent
Cs beam clock is accurate to 5 parts in 10^13 or about a billionth of
a second in 35 minutes.
Still, since the effect is cumulative, several sets of flights
would make any time difference more pronounced and this could lead to
a more thurough repeat of the HK SR experiment.
Then, always east toward Aquarius, and west toward Leo, could be
compared with always east toward Leo and west toward Aquarius.
SR of course predicts a zero, null, result.
sk td 944782
> It is my understanding that there has never been an SR experiment
> that looked for an effect due to cosmic directionality. If there have
> been a hundred SR tests, perhaps the hundred and one test could
> include this feature, if only to put it to rest.
> And put this crackpot, yours truly, out of business.
>
> stephen kearney, thalean day 944781
Stephen, are you aware that the original experiments of Michelson and
Morley were repeated at different times of the day and year precisely
to look for a cosmic directionality effect? Although pre-SR, these
were certainly SR-relevant experiments. Morley continued to look for
such an effect for many years afterwards, but his claim to find a
small residual effect of cosmic directionality has never been widely
accepted, the found effects usually being ascribed to uncorrected
experimental uncertainties. The reason for that is that LET predicts
a precisely zero effect, as does SR, so finding any effect at all
would conflict with both approaches. Whatever SR predicts, so will
LET, when correctly applied, including in experiments of the type you
are advocating. The advantage of LET is that it provides a clear
physical model explaining the postulates of SR in terms of fundamental
physical processes.
The unobservability of the ether in experiments involving measurements
of mass, length and time is explained fully by LET, and depends upon
the existence of a single, unique reference frame (the "ether",
however it works at the quantum level) for all light/e-m propagation,
in which nothing can move faster than a light-signal in vacuo. I keep
giving the reference to Feynman's Lectures on Physics, Vol.2 Sec.21-6
which sets out "how naturally Maxwell's equations lead to the Lorentz
transformation". IOW, the existence of an ether in which Maxwell's
equations apply and in which nothing can move faster than light in
vacuo is certainly a *sufficient* physical basis to deliver the
postulates and hence all the results of SR, and I argue that such a
basis is also *necessary*. Of course, SR itself can not possibly be
"wrong" since it is based on postulates which are essentially
well-confirmed statements of the outcomes of certain measurement
procedures. But it does not give the necessary physical reasons why
such procedures *must* give those results: LET does.
Trevor Morris
There is a simple reason, simplicity.
And the CMBR frame is an ideal candidate for a preferred frame.
> > However, I just don't think it's true. The "distortions" to the
> > measurements of the moving observer are just caused by the effects of
> > motion relative to the preferred frame.
>
> How? Why? What property of the ether ensures these changes are EXACTLY
> the same as the preditions of SR?
See gr-qc/0205035.
> > 6 "Ether theories require a new postulate for every new phenomenon
> > that is discovered, which basically states that the ether applies to
> > it in the same ways the ether applies to electromagnetism."
> Why are neutrinos so "coupled"? You still need to postulate in one way
> or another that they are. Ditto for Ws and Zs and....
There is, indeed, such a "need". But, as other "needs" in science,
especially the "need" to agree with observation, it has two sides.
If nature fulfills the "need", it is an argument in favour of the
theory which has such a "need".
Lorentz has proposed a solution for this "need": That the forces which
hold matter together are electromagnetic. In this case, it follows
from the symmetries of the Maxwell equations that material rulers have
similar symmetries.
EM and weak force follow the same speed of light - from point of view
of relativity, nothing follows. From point of view of ether theory,
there is a need for unification. Was their unification successful?
Eletroweak force, strong force and gravity have the same speed. From
point of view of relativity, nothing follows. From point of view of
ether theory (see gr-gc/0205035) they should be unified. Should we
spend our time for search of their unification?
> You seem unaware that the real attraction of SR to modern physicists is
> its symmetry. Symmetry principles have been the means to most if not all
> advances in fundamental theories over the last century (hmmm. it's
> probably since phytsics was born....).
I'm very aware of this attraction. Of course, symmetry principles are
important. Modern physicists have also learned to value approximate
symmetries. And they have learned that symmetries may appear in
approximations as effective symmetries.
From this point of view the belief that relativistic symmetry is
fundamental is a quite strange, irrational belief.
> Before you destroy Lorentz symmetry with a preferred-frame ether,
> you need to display a compelling reason to do so.
I have presented such evidence here over the years. It has been
mostly ignored.
It shows up in EPR-Bell, in the impossibility of GR quantization
(problem of time, black hole information loss problem),
local energy-momentum conservation for gravity.
Yep. Symmetry is an important technical tool for the understanding of
a physical theory.
But note: Symmetries change if theories change. If you remain on the
same level (classical mechanics, special-relativistic theories,
quantum theories, general-relativistic theories) you preserve the same
symmetry group. But if you shift to a more fundamental theory,
preserving the symmetry group seems to be a bad guess.
> Postulating an unobservable aether breaks the symmetry;
So what? There are lots of approximate, broken symmetries in the
world.
> its only value is to preserve a common sense formulated in areas
> that relativity is not applicable too.
It is your unfounded claim that in these areas common sense is not
applicable.
Yes. The continuous theory developed in gr-qc/0205035 gives exact Einstein
equivalence principle.
[...]
>
> stephen kearney, thalean day 944781
Oops! Re. my previous reply to you, it was of course Dayton Miller
(not Morley!) who found the small residual MMX directional effect I
mentioned.
Trevor Morris
Trevor Morris wrote:
> procedures. But it does not give the necessary physical reasons why
> such procedures *must* give those results: LET does.
LET does not tell us what the aether is made of, nor does it tell us why
the aether does not slow the planets down. The problem with aether is
that is does not seem to interact mechanically with other matter. Aether
raises more questions than it answers. Lorentz did not tell us why
motion through the aether should squash little round electrons into
ellipsoids either. So aether is as much a mystery as no-aether.
Since the aether hypothesis does not appear to be necessary, why make
it? If ever a set of facts are discovered that cannot be explained in
any other way than by some kind of aether, sure as sunrise, the aether
hypothesis shall be revived.
History Lesson:
Look what happened with particulate light. The Young experiments in 1801
(or thereabouts) seemed to bury the Newton light particle hypothesis
forever. Then in 1905 Einstein uses the Planck results and light atoms
(aka photons) to explain the photo electric effect. Et Voila!
Particulate light is with us again! And so it remains, even unto this day.
Bob Kolker
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> Yes. The continuous theory developed in gr-qc/0205035 gives exact Einstein
> equivalence principle.
Ilja, does your theory explain anything that other theories do not? If
so, there is a good reason to have your theory. If not, what advantage
accrues to your theory (other than that it is Your Baby). What would the
rest of us get out of it?
Bob Kolker
> Ilja, does your theory explain anything that other theories do not?
Yep, the Einstein equivalence principle.
GR has to postulate it. So it is postulated, not explained.
In GLET, the axioms do not include the EEP. It follows.
> If so, there is a good reason to have your theory. If not, what
> advantage accrues to your theory (other than that it is Your
> Baby). What would the rest of us get out of it?
1.) A theory without big bang and black hole singularities (these
singularities have been named "the greatest crisis in physics").
2.) A theory with local energy and momentum conservation
3.) A theory which may be easily quantized, without "problem of time"
and so on.
4.) A theory compatible with classical realism and Bohmian mechanics.
I note you have chosen to pick up only on a relatively minor point in
my posting. I have looked at your papers (again). They do not
address adequately the substantive points I am making. I still find
unconvincing your claim that different combinations of predicted
measurement results constitute an infinity of separate ether theories,
any more than choosing different postulates for SR that still lead to
the LTs constitute an infinity of SR theories. On your basis, if
there is an infinity of ETs there is also an infinity of SRs - both
ideas equally pointless, I would say.
> > Do you mean that all
> > inertial frames are equivalent in any reasonable ether theory?
>
> No. Don't guess, go read what I wrote. The equivalence is among
> THEORIES, not frames.
Your "equivalence" appears to be among alternative statements of the
same theories. Indeed, I would say that LET and SR are essentially
the same theory, with SR potentially starting from a fairly wide range
of empirical observations and LET starting from specific, physical
concepts which can explain all of those same observations in terms of
fundamental physical processes. SR and LET are two sides of the same
coin, or better, the same theory approached from opposite directions.
> > Yes, they can all CONSIDER it to be at rest wrt themselves in LET,
> > too, even if it is not, as clearly shown e.g. by the "relativity of
> > simultaneity". LET makes it very clear that this arises simply
> > because inertial observers can each ASSUME as a convenient fiction
> > that light is moving isotropically at c relative to them, but of
> > course they are all, in general, wrong about that. Lorentz covariance
> > is hardly a counterexample against LET: it's what you get from it.
>
> Yes. LET is a member of both equivalence classes I mentioned above. <shrug>
So why did you say your example of Lorentz covariance was a
counterexample to LET?
> >>Nope. The CMBR defines the CMBR dipole=0 frame. Nothing more.
> > Come on! A unique, zero-velocity frame referenced on the whole
> > Universe,
>
> Not true. The CMBR dipole=0 frame here differs from the CMBR dipole=0
> frame over there. This has been observed (reference in the FAQ, I believe).
>
>
> Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
Depends whether you think of an expanding inertial frame as one or
many. Clearly, in terms of light propagation over cosmic distances in
a unique Big Bang model, we have a unique, expanding frame in which we
would expect that the local value of c is everywhere single-valued at
any time and isotropic. Hyperbolic geometry in which "parallel" lines
(defined in terms of light rays) diverge suits such a frame very well
on the large scale, and it remains a unique frame. Observation of a
zero-dipole CMBR frame from anywhere in the Universe means that you
have identified the local motion of a "fundamental particle/observer"
(McCrea, Milne??) expanding with the space of the Universe according
to the Hubble (or whatever) Law.
Everywhere inertial, everywhere unique: one frame. And of course you
do not need the LTs to convert measurements among such observers,
which I feel really clinches the argument that CMBR=0-dipole anywhere
identifies a single inertial frame of reference, albeit an apparently
expanding one. SR follows if light propagates everywhere
isotropically and as the "first signal" wrt to that frame. Is that an
amazing coincidence, or a tenable physical explanation of SR, would
you say?
Trevor Morris
Old Physics wrote:
I just checked myself.
According to
http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/cesium.html
It is 2ns per day.
And since you need more a day to go around the Earth
with commercial airliners, Tom is correct.
But I was under the impression it was 1 ns per second,
and that seemed unreasonably low precision.
In fact, 2 ns per day gives us 0.023 picoseconds/second.
That's more like it.
> Still, since the effect is cumulative, several sets of flights
> would make any time difference more pronounced and this could lead to
> a more thurough repeat of the HK SR experiment.
> Then, always east toward Aquarius, and west toward Leo, could be
> compared with always east toward Leo and west toward Aquarius.
> SR of course predicts a zero, null, result.
I am very interested in your claim and I think I found a
much easier way to test it. But I am more careful now,
because the first time, I overlooked something obvious.
It won't be long now.
Your Hayek.
Ace snipping, Bob: congratulations! LET tells us what basic property "empty
space" must have if SR is to be a valid theory. Theories and models of the
quantum vacuum will eventually have to fill in the details.
> nor does it tell us why
> the aether does not slow the planets down.
That question does not arise if there is no evidence that empty space slows
the planets down, and I know of none.
> The problem with aether is
> that is does not seem to interact mechanically with other matter.
Whoa, Hoss! Who said anything about ether being "other matter": of course
it isn't! Its interaction with matter is as empty (i.e. matter-free) space
having the property of carrying light and all kinds of radiated energy
isotropically at a characteristic and limiting speed, c.
> Aether
> raises more questions than it answers. Lorentz did not tell us why
> motion through the aether should squash little round electrons into
> ellipsoids either. So aether is as much a mystery as no-aether.
Lorentz, I think, credited "us" with more knowledge and intelligence than
most of us have. If you can't pick up the implicit clues he gave (or can't
be bothered to read his papers), look at Feynman's Lectures on Physics,
Vol.2, Sec.21-6 to see "how naturally Maxwell's equations lead to the
Lorentz transformations" by retarded potenntial effects. The field around a
moving charge is automatically "squashed" because changes in the field can
move outwards only at the speed of light in the ether. That is how it
works: no mystery at all, just basic physics delivering automatically the
basis of what otherwise has to be "postulated"!
> Since the aether hypothesis does not appear to be necessary, why make
> it? If ever a set of facts are discovered that cannot be explained in
> any other way than by some kind of aether, sure as sunrise, the aether
> hypothesis shall be revived.
It is regularly revived in quantum vacuum theories: what is the big deal
about admitting it works for SR too? How about if it explains Einstein's
two postulates on which he based SR in terms of basic, well known physics
like retarded potentials, Newton's 3rd Law and conservation of energy?
Isn't that better than just taking a couple of empirical observations and
making them postulates? Surely some explanation of why the postulates are
valid is both necessary and of the keenest interest?
> History Lesson:
>
> Look what happened with particulate light. The Young experiments in 1801
> (or thereabouts) seemed to bury the Newton light particle hypothesis
> forever. Then in 1905 Einstein uses the Planck results and light atoms
> (aka photons) to explain the photo electric effect. Et Voila!
> Particulate light is with us again! And so it remains, even unto this day.
>
> Bob Kolker
Sorry, Bob: the only things "photons" have in common with particles is that
they are countable, and are emitted and absorbed in localised interactions.
Light certainly travels through space like a transverse e-m wave: period. I
know the history: it is called wave-particle duality. Not very good, but it
is all we have, so far.
Trevor Morris
---
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Are you interested in the answer? See gr-qc/0205035. Matter fields
describe ether properties too.
> The problem with aether is that is does not seem to interact
> mechanically with other matter.
There is no "other matter".
Of course, if the speed of light is a property of the ether, then
everything which follows a wave equation with the speed of light in it
is part of the ether. That means everything in the standard model.
> Aether raises more questions than it answers.
Afraid of interesting questions?
> Lorentz did not tell us why motion through the aether should squash
> little round electrons into ellipsoids either.
For the answer see gr-qc/0205035.
> Since the aether hypothesis does not appear to be necessary, why
> make it?
Of course, nothing in science is necessary. Even science itself is
not necessary. Of course, if confronted with the facts, you can throw
away causality or realism. If you don't, then the violation of Bell's
inequality proves the existence of a preferred frame.
> If ever a set of facts are discovered that cannot be explained in
> any other way than by some kind of aether, sure as sunrise, the
> aether hypothesis shall be revived.
There are already facts which cannot be explained in any other way.
Except you count the rejection of causality or realism as
"explanations". But any imaginable fact can be "explained" if we
throw away realism or causality. Note that God is, in comparison,
a classical causal realistic explanation.
William MorrisPOP_Server=pop.freeuk.net wrote:
> Sorry, Bob: the only things "photons" have in common with particles is that
> they are countable, and are emitted and absorbed in localised interactions.
> Light certainly travels through space like a transverse e-m wave: period. I
> know the history: it is called wave-particle duality. Not very good, but it
> is all we have, so far.
Waves do not explain the photo electric effect. The energy of a
maxwellian wave is proportion to the square of amplitude. Frequency does
not enter into the calculation. However the energy of an electron
evicted from a metal is linear (with a bias term) to the frequency of
the light. Light is particles. Period. Light/matter interactions are
facilitated by a spin 1 boson.
Bob Kolker
>> Ilja, does your theory explain anything that other theories do not?
> Yep, the Einstein equivalence principle.
> GR has to postulate it. So it is postulated, not explained.
> In GLET, the axioms do not include the EEP. It follows.
Do you need other (additional) axioms ? -
When you compare the parts of the curvature vector (of a
trajectory in V_4) with the parts of Newton's equation,
the EEP follows in GR too.
>> If so, there is a good reason to have your theory. If not, what
>> advantage accrues to your theory (other than that it is Your
>> Baby). What would the rest of us get out of it?
> 1.) A theory without big bang and black hole singularities (these
> singularities have been named "the greatest crisis in physics").
If one properly calculates the tensor equations from GR, he/she
gets particles instead of singularities. Does your theory use
similar equations ?
> 2.) A theory with local energy and momentum conservation
> 3.) A theory which may be easily quantized, without "problem of time"
> and so on.
> 4.) A theory compatible with classical realism and Bohmian mechanics.
> Ilja
> --
> I. Schmelzer, <il...@ilja-schmelzer.net>, http://ilja-schmelzer.net
Ilja, give me the time to study your theory !
Even, since your theory seems great, it is essential for you to know
the results from numerical simulations according to the source-free
Einstein-Maxwell equations. (May be, one can understand the results
within your theory, and nobody can more call the theory Your Baby. ;)
Ulrich Bruchholz
And particles do not explain how the light gets from the source to the
photocathode.
[...]
Mr. Morris,
I should have been much more careful. I should have written that
it is my understanding that there has never been an aether drift
experiment, USING TIME, that looked for an effect due to cosmic
directionality (our motion away from the center of the "big re birth"
of our island universe).
Lorentz explained the null result of the MMX as the REAL
contraction of matter relative to the aether. This was the original
meaning of the "Lorentz contraction".
This explained how light could have a true absolute speed of
299,792,458 m/s at the same time as it would have the same apparent
constant speed no matter how matter moved relative to it.
It is this absolute velocity relative to an absolute (stationary)
aether that my experiment is designed to uncover.
I hold that matter is contained energy that is carried by an
aether with a dinsity equal to half the mass of the sun per cc. Such
an aether *must* yeild a time difference in violation of SR.
stephen kearney, thalean day 944782
Of course I meant a time difference "of about 1500 NANO seconds".
BTW, if such a difference did show up how would you explain it, Tom.
sk td 782
I meant a resolution of ~1 ns FOR MEASURING THE CLAIMED 6ns EFFECT.
That implies a 6-sigma measurement, which makes it statistically
believable.
As this measurement takes 36 hours, this requires clocks with an
accuracy and stability of a few parts in 10^15 for a 36-hour period
while being flown in aircraft. Atomic clocks are not that good, AFAIK.
Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
Of course I need axioms. But they are not additional - they are
completely different, they are axioms appropriate and natural for an
ether theory.
> When you compare the parts of the curvature vector (of a
> trajectory in V_4) with the parts of Newton's equation,
> the EEP follows in GR too.
The EEP is postulated, so it "follows" in a trivial way A=>A.
>>> If so, there is a good reason to have your theory. If not, what
>>> advantage accrues to your theory (other than that it is Your
>>> Baby). What would the rest of us get out of it?
>> 1.) A theory without big bang and black hole singularities (these
>> singularities have been named "the greatest crisis in physics").
> If one properly calculates the tensor equations from GR, he/she
> gets particles instead of singularities.
No. There are famous theorems that in GR you obtain singularities.
> Does your theory use similar equations ?
My theory gives some additional terms which prevent the black hole and
big bang singularities.
> Ilja, give me the time to study your theory !
No problem.
> Even, since your theory seems great, it is essential for you to know
> the results from numerical simulations according to the source-free
> Einstein-Maxwell equations.
Numerical simulations are a quite subtle problem. There are a lot of
things which can be done in a wrong way.
>would conflict with both approaches. Whatever SR predicts, so will
>LET, when correctly applied, including in experiments of the type you
>are advocating. The advantage of LET is that it provides a clear
>physical model explaining the postulates of SR in terms of fundamental
>physical processes.
If it predicts exactly the same thing as special relativity, then
it has no advantage whatsoever. Something that cannot be detected
cannot affect anything either. The fact that you have no problem
attributing different routes on a globe to geometry but won't
attribute the lengths of worldlines to geometry, is a failure on
your part.
Since when can particles not traverse some distance? If you really want
to compare your waves to photons, tell me the conditions necessary for
two waves to interfere.
Apart from "predicting" SR itself, as I wrote above (and in more detail in
the part you snipped).
> Something that cannot be detected
> cannot affect anything either.
Its effect is detected whenever SR and GR are confirmed by experiment.
> The fact that you have no problem
> attributing different routes on a globe to geometry but won't
> attribute the lengths of worldlines to geometry, is a failure on
> your part.
>
Ah well, nobody is perfect :>)
TM
I didn't say they could not. But they have the velocity of their source
added on, and light, as you know very well, does not.
> If you really want
> to compare your waves to photons, tell me the conditions necessary for
> two waves to interfere.
I'm sure you know that already. Can you tell me the conditions for
particles to interfere?
TM
In fact, the MMX apparatus can be thought of as a pair of light-clocks set
at right angles to each other. Imagine very short pulses of light instead
of a continuous source. A shift in the interference fringes would be
equivalent to a differential change in the flight times of the pulses along
the arms of the interferometer. So as I said, the MMX, repeated at
different times of the day and year is equivalent to the kind of clock
experiment you are suggesting. In LET, as in SR, such experiments are bound
to give null results.
> Lorentz explained the null result of the MMX as the REAL
> contraction of matter relative to the aether. This was the original
> meaning of the "Lorentz contraction".
Indeed: but "when moving in..." rather than "relative to..." the ether.
> This explained how light could have a true absolute speed of
> 299,792,458 m/s at the same time as it would have the same apparent
> constant speed no matter how matter moved relative to it.
> It is this absolute velocity relative to an absolute (stationary)
> aether that my experiment is designed to uncover.
> I hold that matter is contained energy that is carried by an
> aether with a dinsity equal to half the mass of the sun per cc. Such
> an aether *must* yeild a time difference in violation of SR.
>
> stephen kearney, thalean day 944782
I congratulate you for trying to develop a model of how the ether works in
detail, but if your model gives a different result from SR and LET in an MMX
or any more direct moving-clock-timing experiments, I would take a very hard
look at to see why, because it would be in conflict with all the many
experimental confirmations of the predictions of SR/LET.
Trevor Morris
Well, unfortunately, the idea that electromagnetic forces hold matter
together is incorrect. The electron is a simple example. It's not neutral
and since like charge repels, the charge distribution can't be held to-
gether by electrical forces. Even more problematic is that the any
classical theory of the electron is completely unrenormalizable.
[...]
>I'm very aware of this attraction. Of course, symmetry principles are
>important. Modern physicists have also learned to value approximate
>symmetries. And they have learned that symmetries may appear in
>approximations as effective symmetries.
I think you have something backwards here. _Breaking_ the
symmetries is the origin of what we observe. A symmetry implies
something is _not_ observable. If SU(2)_L x U(1)_Y were not
broken, everything would be massless and there would be no
weak force or electromagnetic force. There are many ways the
symmetry can be broken one of which leaves a particular combination
of the generators for SU(2) and U(1)_Y, unbroken. The linear
combination of the generators, (1/2)(T3 + Y) is the electric
charge. That leaves a different U(1) symmetry unbroken, namely
E&M.
Since your model is a condensed matter model of sorts, I can't
see how this aspect could be fundamentally different from the
standard model. Particles appear in the standard model in exactly
the same way that massive photons and cooper pairs appear from a
bogoliubov transformation in a superconductor.
>From this point of view the belief that relativistic symmetry is
>fundamental is a quite strange, irrational belief.
Why is that strange? If you follow the the basic idea behind the
standard model further up the energy scale, it's not that hard to
imagine that special relativity is what was left as a local theory
from some symmetry breaking process. In this case, it appears as
a the geometry we see rather than particles, but those kinds of
distinctions are more a matter of perspective. I doubt the concept
of time or space has much meaning to am electron.
[...]
>I have presented such evidence here over the years. It has been
>mostly ignored.
>
>It shows up in EPR-Bell, in the impossibility of GR quantization
>(problem of time, black hole information loss problem),
>local energy-momentum conservation for gravity.
It hasn't been ignored, or at least I haven't ignored it. (1) I don't
agree that any of those problems you mention are necessarily problems, (2)
I don't agree that you've you've presented a solution. I'm not referring
to either of your articles here.
I'm referring particularly to bohmian mechanics as a "solution" to the
epr problem and I don't believe I've ever received a satisfactory answer
to my question of how bohmian mechanics can explain identical particles
and boltzmann counting. Your primary criteria in choosing bohmian
mechanics was to restore what you call "classical reality" to quantum
mechanics. OK, that being the case, every particle in an ensemble should
have the degrees of freedom that a particle has. If you have N particles
in m_i states, and the particles have some underlying independent reality,
then the number of configuration of those N particles should give a
classical distribution with the factor N!/\product m_i! This is not
a hidden variables issue or something solvable via a "pilot wave"
as far as I've been able to determine. All you have to do is be able
to count the particles. If you want "classical reality", then shouldn't
you be able to distinguish two particles if there are two particles
in your ensemble?
I didn't ask me. I asked you.
> Can you tell me the conditions for
>particles to interfere?
Just as soon as you provide me the condition I requested for comparison.
That is a very unclear statement. Does it mean you think the velocity of
the source is also added to that of light? If so, I've got news for you.
> >
> >> If you really want
> >> to compare your waves to photons, tell me the conditions necessary for
> >> two waves to interfere.
> >
> >I'm sure you know that already.
>
> I didn't ask me. I asked you.
So you don't know? OK. Generally, interference fringes are spatial
variations of resultant amplitude, due to phase differences between two wave
trains. The waves alternately supplement and cancel each other, forming
(with light) bright and dark fringes, respectively. To interfere when
recombined, the wave trains must be sufficiently coherent. IOW, they must
come from a common source and the path difference between them must not be
too great. If you want any more, look it up.
>
> > Can you tell me the conditions for particles to interfere?
>
> Just as soon as you provide me the condition I requested for comparison.
Your turn, I think.
>> When you compare the parts of the curvature vector (of a
>> trajectory in V_4) with the parts of Newton's equation,
>> the EEP follows in GR too.
> The EEP is postulated, so it "follows" in a trivial way A=>A.
As I above said, one must not postulate it. (May be, one needs
another postulate in return, but I'd not quarrel about it.)
..
>>> 1.) A theory without big bang and black hole singularities (these
>>> singularities have been named "the greatest crisis in physics").
>> If one properly calculates the tensor equations from GR, he/she
>> gets particles instead of singularities.
> No. There are famous theorems that in GR you obtain singularities.
Yes, it is as I said. I know your famous theorems (Einstein & Pauli,
extended from Papapetrou & Treder). Unfortunately, these seem not
quite exactly depict nature (though mathematically faultless).
One must take the chaotical development during the computation
into consideration,
http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/ .
Before you biasedly consider it as crankery, have first a look
at `brief.txt' or `briefger.txt' in above directory.
>> Does your theory use similar equations ?
> My theory gives some additional terms which prevent the black hole and
> big bang singularities.
Oh, I'd find additional terms not nice. (For that reason, I made
no new theory, but tried to better calculate the known equations.
With success, as you can see for yourself.)
..
>> Even, since your theory seems great, it is essential for you to know
>> the results from numerical simulations according to the source-free
>> Einstein-Maxwell equations.
> Numerical simulations are a quite subtle problem.
Numerical simulations are per definitionem never a problem, but a way
to solve problems. (May be, that way can be subtle. Otherwise, all
already knew my results.)
> There are a lot of
> things which can be done in a wrong way.
For that reason, you shall see for yourself. How shall your theory
survive, if you disregard simplest facts ?
Ulrich
> Well, unfortunately, the idea that electromagnetic forces hold matter
> together is incorrect. The electron is a simple example. It's not neutral
> and since like charge repels, the charge distribution can't be held to-
> gether by electrical forces. Even more problematic is that the any
> classical theory of the electron is completely unrenormalizable.
But the stability of the electron is not a problem for the explanation
of Lorentz contraction of usual (mechanical) rulers.
You can consider a simple three-particle "atomic model" with protons,
neutrons, electrons as elementary particles and nucleons as composed
point particles, and only electromagnetic force. This approximation
is sufficient to explain the whole domain of classical condensed
matter theory. In this sense, the idea that electromagnetic forces
hold matter together is correct. And this is the sense which is
relevant for the explanation of MMX and similar experiments.
>> I'm very aware of this attraction. Of course, symmetry principles are
>> important. Modern physicists have also learned to value approximate
>> symmetries. And they have learned that symmetries may appear in
>> approximations as effective symmetries.
> I think you have something backwards here. _Breaking_ the
> symmetries is the origin of what we observe. A symmetry implies
> something is _not_ observable. If SU(2)_L x U(1)_Y were not
> broken, everything would be massless and there would be no
> weak force or electromagnetic force. There are many ways the
> symmetry can be broken one of which leaves a particular combination
> of the generators for SU(2) and U(1)_Y, unbroken. The linear
> combination of the generators, (1/2)(T3 + Y) is the electric
> charge. That leaves a different U(1) symmetry unbroken, namely
> E&M.
My remark about approximate symmetries was not a remark about
electroweak symmetry breaking. What I have had in mind was
approximate chiral symmetry of strong interactions used as an
explanation for small pion masses as "approximate massless Goldstone
bosons". An example of an effective large distance symmetry is the
symmetry group of the elasticity tensor of crystals, which differs
from the underlying crystal symmetry.
> Since your model is a condensed matter model of sorts, I can't
> see how this aspect could be fundamentally different from the
> standard model. Particles appear in the standard model in exactly
> the same way that massive photons and cooper pairs appear from a
> bogoliubov transformation in a superconductor.
Agreement. I'm quite happy with such typical condensed-matter-like
properties of the standard model.
>> From this point of view the belief that relativistic symmetry is
>> fundamental is a quite strange, irrational belief.
>
> Why is that strange?
The symmetry of the more fundamental theory is usually different from
the symmetry of the less fundamental theory. Starting from Flat Earth
to spherical Earth. Do you have a counterexample?
> If you follow the the basic idea behind the standard model further
> up the energy scale,
There is no such animal as a basic idea behind the standard model.
(Except that bosons are gauge fields.)
> it's not that hard to imagine that special relativity is what was
> left as a local theory from some symmetry breaking process.
Sounds like you agree that the more fundamental symmetry group will be
different. But you seem to insist that it includes local Lorentz
symmetry.
>> I have presented such evidence here over the years. It has been
>> mostly ignored.
>> It shows up in EPR-Bell, in the impossibility of GR quantization
>> (problem of time, black hole information loss problem),
>> local energy-momentum conservation for gravity.
> It hasn't been ignored, or at least I haven't ignored it. (1) I don't
> agree that any of those problems you mention are necessarily problems,
Something not really in contradiction with my description as "ignored".
> (2) I don't agree that you've you've presented a solution.
Fine. Let's see. I'm ready to discuss any of the problems in my
"solved" list.
> I'm referring particularly to bohmian mechanics as a "solution" to the
> epr problem and I don't believe I've ever received a satisfactory answer
> to my question of how bohmian mechanics can explain identical particles
> and boltzmann counting.
This problem is solved by Bohmian field theory.
Note that Bohmian mechanics is not bound to the notion of particles.
It is tied to the notion of configuration space in canonical
quantization. Thus, for quantum field theory the adequate Bohmian
version is also a field theory.
Bohmian mechanics consists of the Schroedinger equation as the guiding
equation. In QFT, the configuration space becomes a functional space
(a space of functions Q=psi(x) in some space of functions), the wave
function becomes a functional Psi(Q). The guiding equation becomes an
equation d_t Q = <Psi J Psi>/<Psi Psi>. It defines the evolution of a
field configuration. You have no particle picture here.
If you believe the possibly resulting functional-analytical problems
are an argument - I agree. I propose to solve them in an atomic ether
theory where the continuous fields appear to be continuous
approximations of discrete properties. Thus, there will be, again, a
multi-particle Bohmian theory. But there is no relation between these
particles (ether atoms) and the fermions/bosons we observe, which are
analoguous to phonons in condensed matter theory.
> Your primary criteria in choosing bohmian mechanics was to restore
> what you call "classical reality" to quantum mechanics.
Note: I need BM only to prove that classical realism (a very weak
notion - weak enough to include BM) is compatible with the observable
world. Then, classical realism + violation of Bell's inequality
proves a preferred frame.
> OK, that being the case, every particle in an ensemble should
> have the degrees of freedom that a particle has. If you have N particles
> in m_i states, and the particles have some underlying independent reality,
No. According to Bohmian field theory, the underlying reality is the
field.
Particles are only secondary quantum effects.
I'd quarrel about it.
>>>> 1.) A theory without big bang and black hole singularities (these
>>>> singularities have been named "the greatest crisis in physics").
>
>>> If one properly calculates the tensor equations from GR, he/she
>>> gets particles instead of singularities.
>
>> No. There are famous theorems that in GR you obtain singularities.
>
> Yes, it is as I said. I know your famous theorems (Einstein & Pauli,
> extended from Papapetrou & Treder).
AFAIK the theorems are attributed to Penrose and Hawking.
> Unfortunately, these seem not quite exactly depict nature (though
> mathematically faultless). One must take the chaotical development
> during the computation into consideration,
Of course they consider the exact continuous equations, not
computations. Possible chaos is taken into account.
> http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/ .
> Before you biasedly consider it as crankery, have first a look
> at `brief.txt' or `briefger.txt' in above directory.
There is a well-known and accepted proof about the necessity of
singularities in the continuous equations. There are your
computations. There is no proof that your computations accurately
approximate the continuous equations. Even if your scheme gives the
accurate limit for a fine enough grid, how can we be sure that your
grid was fine enough?
>>> Does your theory use similar equations ?
>> My theory gives some additional terms which prevent the black hole and
>> big bang singularities.
> Oh, I'd find additional terms not nice.
As long as they appear in a very natural way from simple axioms, I see
no problem.
>>> Even, since your theory seems great, it is essential for you to know
>>> the results from numerical simulations according to the source-free
>>> Einstein-Maxwell equations.
>> Numerical simulations are a quite subtle problem.
> Numerical simulations are per definitionem never a problem, but a way
> to solve problems.
If you don't even understand that there is a problem, namely the
problem to prove that the numerical result gives some approximation of
the continuous equation, I cannot help you.
>> There are a lot of things which can be done in a wrong way.
> For that reason, you shall see for yourself.
Feel free to post your discretization scheme.
>> >I didn't say they could not. But they have the velocity of their source
>> >added on, and light, as you know very well, does not.
>>
>> It adds exactly the same way.
>
>That is a very unclear statement. Does it mean you think the velocity of
>the source is also added to that of light? If so, I've got news for you.
v' = (v+c)/(1+(vc/c^2) = (v+c)/(1+(v/c))
= c (v+c)/(v+c) = c
Uh, what news would that be? It looks to me like, if light photons
propagate at c, then the velocity, v', of a photon added to a source
moving at v, is, uuhhh, c.
Are you saying that particles that aren't photons don't have velocities
that add to the source velocities in the same way? I mean, if I'm on
a rocketship moving at 0.9 c relative to the earth and fire a missle at
0.9c relative to me, are you telling me that the earth will see the
missle with a velocity of 1.8 c just because the missle isn't a photon?
>> >I'm sure you know that already.
>>
>> I didn't ask me. I asked you.
>
>So you don't know? OK.
If I didn't know, then it wouldn't be very obvious to me that you
haven't given me an answer. If you don't wish to do so, I understand,
since you idea of waves propagating in medium will go out the window.
>Generally, interference fringes are spatial variations of resultant
>amplitude, due to phase differences between two wave trains.
Then why is it that two sources never interfere, unless they are really
the same source? Take two light bulbs, for example. Or even use two
lasers. Why is it that I don't get a standing wave when I aim two lasers
at each other? Both are coherent sources. Ssince you don't seem to realize
that coherence is inexplicable classically, I'll give you the sources as a
freebie. Now, classically, those two sorces should have a well-defined
phase relationship. You should be able to move them untill the "wave
trains" cancel, just like you can with any wave in a medium, from which
you've derived the analogy you think makes the propagation of light
somehow more physical if a medium is used.
[...]
>too great. If you want any more, look it up.
You didn't answer the question. I didn't ask what the result was
if two waves interfered. I asked what conditions were necessary to
produce interference. If you think you answered the question, then
to the best I can tell, what you told me was that any two sources
will produce an interference pattern. That is absolutely false, so
your explanation is wrong. If you don't like the way I interpret
an condescending remark being passed off as an anwer, then don't
act like an ass and simply answer the the question. If you can't,
just say so and that will also be acceptable.
>>> Can you tell me the conditions for particles to interfere?
>>
>> Just as soon as you provide me the condition I requested for comparison.
>
>Your turn, I think.
I haven't receieved the answer to my question yet. And, I really would
like to have you answer this, just so I can shoot holes in your idea
about waves being any more physical than particles. I'd much prefer that
to having to continue trying to get you to answer what should be a
rather simple question based upon your simple "physical" picture. You can
easily find my explanation in precise terms by reading my latest response
to richard herring, though it's a bit more complex than this situation
requires. But, if you can understand it, it's all there. If you need to
wait for the translation, you'll need to answer my question first.
Ah, now I get it! You are using the relativistic velocity addition formula,
which is based on the Maxwell-Lorentz-ether-wave model (or Einstein's
no-ether version, if you prefer)! Sorry, no marks for that: it is not
applicable. In your ballistic-light Universe the Lorentz transformations do
not exist. So, if you are moving away at 0.9c and fire a missile towards me
at 0.9c, it will never get to me because it will be at rest relative to me.
Otoh, there will be nothing to stop you firing it at, say, 10c, so have fun!
Good old Galileo, he will be pleased!
> >> >I'm sure you know that already.
> >>
> >> I didn't ask me. I asked you.
> >
> >So you don't know? OK.
>
> If I didn't know, then it wouldn't be very obvious to me that you
> haven't given me an answer. If you don't wish to do so, I understand,
> since you idea of waves propagating in medium will go out the window.
>
>
> >Generally, interference fringes are spatial variations of resultant
> >amplitude, due to phase differences between two wave trains.
>
> Then why is it that two sources never interfere, unless they are really
> the same source? Take two light bulbs, for example. Or even use two
> lasers. Why is it that I don't get a standing wave when I aim two lasers
> at each other? Both are coherent sources. Ssince you don't seem to realize
> that coherence is inexplicable classically, I'll give you the sources as a
> freebie. Now, classically, those two sorces should have a well-defined
> phase relationship. You should be able to move them untill the "wave
> trains" cancel, just like you can with any wave in a medium, from which
> you've derived the analogy you think makes the propagation of light
> somehow more physical if a medium is used.
Well, dear reader, after that little tirade from Bilge, you may be excused
for wondering why he snipped the following two sentences from my previous
post:
"To interfere when recombined, the wave trains must be sufficiently
coherent. IOW, they must
come from a common source and the path difference between them must not be
too great."
So, the answers to Bilge's new questions were already there. I wonder why
he wasted his own and everyone else's time by snipping them.
> [...]
- there's the snip, folks!
> >too great. If you want any more, look it up.
>
> You didn't answer the question.
Yes, I did. See above.
> I didn't ask what the result was
> if two waves interfered. I asked what conditions were necessary to
> produce interference. If you think you answered the question, then
> to the best I can tell, what you told me was that any two sources
> will produce an interference pattern. That is absolutely false,
So it is, but that is not what I said.
> so
> your explanation is wrong. If you don't like the way I interpret
> an condescending remark being passed off as an anwer, then don't
> act like an ass and simply answer the the question. If you can't,
> just say so and that will also be acceptable.
I have already answered the question.
> >>> Can you tell me the conditions for particles to interfere?
> >>
> >> Just as soon as you provide me the condition I requested for
comparison.
> >
> >Your turn, I think.
>
> I haven't receieved the answer to my question yet.
Yes, you have.
> And, I really would
> like to have you answer this, just so I can shoot holes in your idea
> about waves being any more physical than particles.
Where did I say that? What I say, for the record, is that light propagation
is best modelled as if it is e-m waves, and in emission and absorption
events light has some particle-like properties - i.e. wave/particle duality
exists (as it does for particles, too).
> I'd much prefer that
> to having to continue trying to get you to answer what should be a
> rather simple question based upon your simple "physical" picture. You can
> easily find my explanation in precise terms by reading my latest response
> to richard herring, though it's a bit more complex than this situation
> requires. But, if you can understand it, it's all there. If you need to
> wait for the translation, you'll need to answer my question first.
I have, so I await the translation. Make it as simple as you like: I'm not
proud. Still your turn.
Aha! That explains your remark. My comment here is that this model
(strong isospin), failed as a serious candidate for the strong
interaction, for that very reason (along ith the fact, that the neutron
and proton have different masses). The SU(2) of nuclear isospin is
still used extensively in nuclear physics, because for all practical
purposes, you can treat it as exact, insert the neutron proton mass
difference where required and write the coulomb potential in irreducible
tensor form using the isospin, to account for the charge, since the
nuclear forces are believed to be charge independent (in fact, by
writing the coulomb potential this way, it's possible to chheck this).
To the best of my knowledge, there has never been any experiment
performed which has given clear evidence for meson currents in
the nucleus (I've done one of those, so it's something with which
I'm somewhat familiar). The simple shell model in which the protons
and neutrons are treated as nucleons in a phenomenological potential
has always been able to account for the nuclear structure in cases
where it's possible to calculate how the effect of meson currents
might give a result which deviates from the shell model prediction.
Esentially, the SU(2) of nuclear isospin is used because the symmetry
is better than the rest of the model in which it's used and lots of
really strong requirements on nuclear structure can be made just
by counting neutrons and protons.
[...]
>
>The symmetry of the more fundamental theory is usually different from
>the symmetry of the less fundamental theory. Starting from Flat Earth
>to spherical Earth. Do you have a counterexample?
The statement that the symmetry is "different" is not really very
precise. What "different" means in terms of a symmetry which is broken, is
that some of the original symmetry is hidden by the symmetry breaking. The
original symmetry hasn't gone away, it just isn't a symmetry of the vacuum
any longer. Instead, the symmetry that's lost represents different,
distinct vacuua. For example, the SO(3) symmetry of a ferro- magnet heated
above the curie temperature, is spontaneously broken down to SO(2) as it
cools below the curie temperature and the ferro- magnet acquires a
preferred orientation -- the direction of the frozen in magnetization.
However, the direction of the magnetization is entirely random (or else
the original symmetry wouldn't have been a symmetry in the first place).
The symmetry which was lost is not really lost, but remains in the
infinite number of possible directions (distinct vacua) that are possible
at the phase transition. Applied to the universe, one must consider the
ferromagnet infinite in extent. In that case, it's not possible to reach
another of the possible vacua, because that would require rotating an
infinite number of dipoles to change the orientation. The symmetry is
still there, but it's "hidden".
>> If you follow the the basic idea behind the standard model further
>> up the energy scale,
>
>There is no such animal as a basic idea behind the standard model.
>(Except that bosons are gauge fields.)
Sure there is. The gauge bosons are merely a result, not the
motivation. The basic idea is that one can describe an interaction
by an invariance principle. If the interaction involves masses,
then the manifest invariance is broken.
>
>> it's not that hard to imagine that special relativity is what was
>> left as a local theory from some symmetry breaking process.
>
>Sounds like you agree that the more fundamental symmetry group will be
>different. But you seem to insist that it includes local Lorentz
>symmetry.
Not different. Some of the symmetry will be hidden. If you have
a parabola and rotate it around the symmetry axis, you have a
surface with cylindrical symmetry. Call that a potential. If insted,
you have a quartic, it can look more or less like a parabola or
have a W shape depending upon the relative sign of the term.
If a phase transition results in a chage of the relative sign.
then the symmetry about the azituthal direction still exists,
but the minimum (vacuum state) is not located there and isn't
the vacuum which corresponds to the universe with that potential.
[...]
>> I'm referring particularly to bohmian mechanics as a "solution" to the
>> epr problem and I don't believe I've ever received a satisfactory answer
>> to my question of how bohmian mechanics can explain identical particles
>> and boltzmann counting.
>
>This problem is solved by Bohmian field theory.
As of the moment, I haven't seen anything that solves it, so
I can't really say that the problem is solved satisfactorily.
>Note that Bohmian mechanics is not bound to the notion of particles.
Uh, wait a second. Exactly how does this idea conform to the notion
of "classical reality" as you have often insisted the universe must
possess? If you are going to give up the idea of a particle being
a "thing", what have you retained that gives any meaning to "things"
following "trajectories" or having "locations"? If you want to give
that up, you might as well not make a big fuss over giving up definite
trajectories or locations, since apparently, nothing traverses any
of those trajectories or is ever located at one of those definite
locations. That would seem to defeat the reason for bohmian mechanics
in the first place.
>It is tied to the notion of configuration space in canonical
>quantization. Thus, for quantum field theory the adequate Bohmian
>version is also a field theory.
At that point, you might as well just say that the deterministic
features of bohmian mechanics have been rendered essentially a
meaningless formality, retained only for dogmatic reasons.
>Bohmian mechanics consists of the Schroedinger equation as the guiding
>equation. In QFT, the configuration space becomes a functional space
>(a space of functions Q=psi(x) in some space of functions), the wave
>function becomes a functional Psi(Q). The guiding equation becomes an
>equation d_t Q = <Psi J Psi>/<Psi Psi>. It defines the evolution of a
>field configuration. You have no particle picture here.
In that case, what's the point? (Neglecting the issue that the
schroedinger equation is not a field theory). I find it rather
ironic that I give more reality to the field theories than you
appear to do. I'm willing to call the things we define as electrons,
electrons.
>If you believe the possibly resulting functional-analytical problems
>are an argument - I agree. I propose to solve them in an atomic ether
>theory where the continuous fields appear to be continuous
>approximations of discrete properties. Thus, there will be, again, a
>multi-particle Bohmian theory. But there is no relation between these
>particles (ether atoms) and the fermions/bosons we observe, which are
>analoguous to phonons in condensed matter theory.
But don't the properties of the phonons depend upon the underlying
interaction in the condensed matter? Is not a cooper pair a higgs boson
which has a definite physical manifestation as a particle? I don't see
that the method of solving the problem (pertubative vs lattice) changes
anything other than the approach to the same effective theory. The
theory is no less an effective theory simply by changing the method
of obtaining solutions.
>> Your primary criteria in choosing bohmian mechanics was to restore
>> what you call "classical reality" to quantum mechanics.
>
>Note: I need BM only to prove that classical realism (a very weak
>notion - weak enough to include BM) is compatible with the observable
>world. Then, classical realism + violation of Bell's inequality
>proves a preferred frame.
I think you are being rather arbitrary in what you call "classical
realism" so that it really has little to do with any "classical
realism" at all. You've discarded every classical idea but one.
>> OK, that being the case, every particle in an ensemble should
>> have the degrees of freedom that a particle has. If you have N particles
>> in m_i states, and the particles have some underlying independent reality,
>
>No. According to Bohmian field theory, the underlying reality is the
>field.
Then what is a 4He atom in superfluid 4He? In principle, one could
place 4He atoms one-by-one into a chamber and then cool the chamber
of atoms placed into an evacuated chamber and then cool it until the
phase transition occurs. What changes other than the states available
to the 4He atoms? How about a fermi surface? If I manufacture a
silicon wafer, is everything under the fermi surface no longer what
was in the silicon I started with, just because I prepared the
silicon as a single crystal?
>Particles are only secondary quantum effects.
But, those are the effects I don't think are consistent with
bohmian mechanics. Those effects originate in the same place that
every other quantum "effect" originates: the uncertainty principle.
If you accept the uncertainty principle as it applies to field
operators, then I don't really see how you can deny it applies to
anything else.
> The statement that the symmetry is "different" is not really very
> precise. What "different" means in terms of a symmetry which is broken, is
> that some of the original symmetry is hidden by the symmetry breaking.
Again, my remark was not about electroweak broken symmetry.
>>> If you follow the the basic idea behind the standard model further
>>> up the energy scale,
>>
>> There is no such animal as a basic idea behind the standard model.
>> (Except that bosons are gauge fields.)
> Sure there is. The gauge bosons are merely a result, not the
> motivation. The basic idea is that one can describe an interaction
> by an invariance principle. If the interaction involves masses,
> then the manifest invariance is broken.
Different people can have very different ideas about such things.
The standard model is, more or less, a phenomenological theory.
With lots of interesting patterns.
>>> it's not that hard to imagine that special relativity is what was
>>> left as a local theory from some symmetry breaking process.
>> Sounds like you agree that the more fundamental symmetry group will be
>> different. But you seem to insist that it includes local Lorentz
>> symmetry.
> Not different. Some of the symmetry will be hidden.
Ok.
>>> I'm referring particularly to bohmian mechanics as a "solution" to the
>>> epr problem and I don't believe I've ever received a satisfactory answer
>>> to my question of how bohmian mechanics can explain identical particles
>>> and boltzmann counting.
>>
>> This problem is solved by Bohmian field theory.
>
> As of the moment, I haven't seen anything that solves it, so
> I can't really say that the problem is solved satisfactorily.
>
>> Note that Bohmian mechanics is not bound to the notion of particles.
>
> Uh, wait a second. Exactly how does this idea conform to the notion
> of "classical reality" as you have often insisted the universe must
> possess?
Classical realism requires that a realistic theory describes a set of
possible universes (or states of the universe) lambda in Lambda and a
classical probability distribution rho(lambda) on it as the set of
states. Then, some evolution on these states.
In the case of Bohmian mechanics, lambda = {Psi(Q),Q}. The evolution
is deterministic, so we need only delta-like probability
distributions.
> If you are going to give up the idea of a particle being
> a "thing", what have you retained that gives any meaning to "things"
> following "trajectories" or having "locations"?
BM does not care much about locations. The trajectories are
trajectories in the configuration space Q=Q(t).
> If you want to give that up, you might as well not make a big fuss
> over giving up definite trajectories or locations,
What I don't plan to give up is classical realism. As you may realize
now, this is an extremely weak set of assumptions. It is not bound to
special concepts like locality, space, locations, trajectories.
I would like to argue that classical realism is simply one of the laws
of consistent reasoning. If you know Jaynes argumentation (if not,
google on s.p.research with "Jaynes" or "Bayesian" will give you the
links and interesting discussions) classical probability theory in the
Bayesian sense may be justified as the laws of consistent reasoning.
I think his argumentation may be extended to realism as well: If you
have a Bayesian probability distribution over the set of statements,
it seems possible to construct some underlying set so that it becomes
a Kolmogorovian probability theory on this set.
> That would seem to defeat the reason for bohmian mechanics
> in the first place.
The reason I use Bohmian mechanics is the existence proof for a realistic
theory (in the sense Bell has used in his proof of the inequalities).
For this purpose, BM is fine.
>> It is tied to the notion of configuration space in canonical
>> quantization. Thus, for quantum field theory the adequate Bohmian
>> version is also a field theory.
> At that point, you might as well just say that the deterministic
> features of bohmian mechanics have been rendered essentially a
> meaningless formality, retained only for dogmatic reasons.
Whatever, the point is that the theory exists, may be formulated.
Then, it is realistic, even deterministic.
>> Bohmian mechanics consists of the Schroedinger equation as [sorry,
>> and] the guiding equation. In QFT, the configuration space becomes
>> a functional space (a space of functions Q=psi(x) in some space of
>> functions), the wave function becomes a functional Psi(Q). The
>> guiding equation becomes an equation d_t Q = <Psi J Psi> /<Psi Psi>
>> . It defines the evolution of a field configuration. You have no
>> particle picture here.
> In that case, what's the point?
Classical realism, which is not about particles or space or such
things, but much more fundamental and much more important.
> (Neglecting the issue that the schroedinger equation is not a field
> theory).
A Schroedinger-like functional formalism is possible for quantum field
theory.
> I find it rather ironic that I give more reality to the field
> theories than you appear to do. I'm willing to call the things we
> define as electrons, electrons.
That's not important. I'm also willing to call the things we define
as phonons phonons.
>> If you believe the possibly resulting functional-analytical problems
>> are an argument - I agree. I propose to solve them in an atomic ether
>> theory where the continuous fields appear to be continuous
>> approximations of discrete properties. Thus, there will be, again, a
>> multi-particle Bohmian theory. But there is no relation between these
>> particles (ether atoms) and the fermions/bosons we observe, which are
>> analoguous to phonons in condensed matter theory.
> But don't the properties of the phonons depend upon the underlying
> interaction in the condensed matter?
Yep. But nonetheless the atoms should be distinguished from the
phonons.
> Is not a cooper pair a higgs boson which has a definite physical
> manifestation as a particle?
I don't know enough about cooper pairs and higgs bosons to comment this.
> I don't see that the method of solving the problem (pertubative vs
> lattice) changes anything other than the approach to the same
> effective theory. The theory is no less an effective theory simply
> by changing the method of obtaining solutions.
I do not doubt that QFT as well as the Bohmian field theory version
are effective field theories. I find a lattice regularization
attractive also for some other reasons, connected with quantization of
gravity.
You know, the theory in gr-qc/0205035 includes continuity and Euler
equations. First order equations, not nice for quantization. But in
condensed matter theory we manage their quantization - all we have to
do is to quantize the atomic theory. Which is something like a
comoving lattice, so that rho is no longer a variable on the lattice
nodes at all, but a large distance variable (number of lattice nodes).
>> Note: I need BM only to prove that classical realism (a very weak
>> notion - weak enough to include BM) is compatible with the observable
>> world. Then, classical realism + violation of Bell's inequality
>> proves a preferred frame.
> I think you are being rather arbitrary in what you call "classical
> realism" so that it really has little to do with any "classical
> realism" at all. You've discarded every classical idea but one.
First, it is the notion of realism defended by EPR and Bell, or at
least quite close to it. And IMHO I use it in a quite consistent way.
I have discarded every classical idea but one? Not really - I do
insist only on this one classical idea. The other classical ideas are
less important, I can live very well without them. But this one is
the only idea I insist on, because the rejection seems to be a
complete rejection of realistic, scientific reasoning. This
particular idea seems to me like a part of extended logic.
And there is exactly no reason to give up this one idea.
You may be correct that naming this idea "classical realism" gives a
wrong picture, suggesting that the "classical realist" insists on much
more, like space, particles, trajectories, lots of other unnecessary
assumptions which can easily given up without any problem. Therefore
people think they can easily give up such a "classical realism",
nothing to bother about, stupid old prejudices.
Instead, classical realism - the thing you have to give up to claim
that Einstein causality holds - means to give up something much more
fundamental, much closer to elementary common sense (in the positive
sense of this word), to consistent reasoning, to extended logic.
>>> OK, that being the case, every particle in an ensemble should
>>> have the degrees of freedom that a particle has. If you have N particles
>>> in m_i states, and the particles have some underlying independent reality,
>> No. According to Bohmian field theory, the underlying reality is the
>> field.
> Then what is a 4He atom in superfluid 4He?
A quite complex state of this field.
>> Particles are only secondary quantum effects.
> But, those are the effects I don't think are consistent with
> bohmian mechanics.
Bohmian mechanics is identical in its probability predictions to
standard quantum mechanics. That's a quite simple mathematical
theorem, it follows essentially by construction. So, do you believe
these effects are inconsistent with quantum mechanics?
> Those effects originate in the same place that every other quantum
> "effect" originates: the uncertainty principle.
Fine. In this case, we can ignore these complex effects and possible
functional-analytical problems and consider the connection between
classical (say two-particle) Schroedinger theory and the related
Bohmian theory.
> If you accept the uncertainty principle as it applies to field
> operators, then I don't really see how you can deny it applies to
> anything else.
I don't deny the uncertainty principle also for classical Schroedinger
theory, so field theory seems irrelevant. It is well-known that the
Bohmian trajectories Q(t) are unobservable, so there is no
contradiction.
> dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) writes:
>
> > OK, that being the case, every particle in an ensemble should
> > have the degrees of freedom that a particle has. If you have N particles
> > in m_i states, and the particles have some underlying independent reality,
>
> No. According to Bohmian field theory, the underlying reality is the
> field.
>
No. You have to distinguish between Bohm and Schmelzer, and the
former believed in an "underlying reality" beneath the field
concept. For instance:
"... as we shall see, there is good reason to assume the
existence of a sub quantum-mechanical level that is more
fundamental ..." [1, p. 69]
"...Chapters III and IV shows that fields and particles are
closely linked in an even deeper way, in the sense that both are
probably opposite sides of some still more general type of entity
..." [1, p. 138]
[1] David Bohm, "Cause & Chance in Modern Physics," _University
of Pennsylvania Press_, 1957/1961.
--
Stephen
s...@speicher.com
Ignorance is just a placeholder for knowledge.
Printed using 100% recycled electrons.
-----------------------------------------------------------
>
>Ah, now I get it! You are using the relativistic velocity addition formula,
>which is based on the Maxwell-Lorentz-ether-wave model (or Einstein's
>no-ether version, if you prefer)!
No, you don't get it. I'm using the formula I derived from considering
an infinitessimal transformation which preserves the speed of light.
Coincidently, it gives me rotations also, which gives a similar
transformation for the slopes of lines rotated by an angle A:
m' = (m1 + m2)/(1 - m1 m2)
which looks amazingly like the relativistic addition of velocities:
\beta' = (\beta_1 + \beta_2)/(1 + \beta_1\beta_2)
[...]
>Well, dear reader, after that little tirade from Bilge, you may be excused
>for wondering why he snipped the following two sentences from my previous
>post:
I snipped it because it didn't answer the question.
>"To interfere when recombined, the wave trains must be sufficiently
>coherent. IOW, they must
>come from a common source and the path difference between them must not be
>too great."
That does _NOT_ answer the question. All you've done is sidestep
the issue by defining two "kinds" of light. In case it doesn't
sink in, explaining the difference between coherent and incoherent
is what you need to explain.
[...]
>>
>> You didn't answer the question.
>
>Yes, I did. See above.
OK. I'll assume you cannot answer the question, since you spend
so much effort trying to avoid it.
>
>> I didn't ask what the result was
>> if two waves interfered. I asked what conditions were necessary to
>> produce interference. If you think you answered the question, then
>> to the best I can tell, what you told me was that any two sources
>> will produce an interference pattern. That is absolutely false,
>
>So it is, but that is not what I said.
It is what you said. You haven't said anything different.
[...]
>> And, I really would
>> like to have you answer this, just so I can shoot holes in your idea
>> about waves being any more physical than particles.
>
>Where did I say that?
Where you continue to insist that E&M radiation is a wave in
a medium as some sort of physicality argument. Once you answer
my question, I'll make it painfully obvious just how unphysical
that picture is.
[...]
>
>I have, so I await the translation. Make it as simple as you like: I'm not
>proud. Still your turn.
I have not yet received an answer to my question. I suspect that
the reason is that you can't. If that's the case, just say so.
I'm not going to stop asking.
> Of course they consider the exact continuous equations, not
> computations.
Even. Do you not see the point ?
> Possible chaos is taken into account.
Doubts permitted ?
>> http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/ .
>> Before you biasedly consider it as crankery, have first a look
>> at `brief.txt' or `briefger.txt' in above directory.
> There is a well-known and accepted proof about the necessity of
> singularities in the continuous equations.
according to the "conventional" algorithm I learnt in the school
to solve PDE's.
> There are your
> computations. There is no proof that your computations accurately
> approximate the continuous equations.
You claim that, since you ignore the results. That "proof" is in
the results, man !
> Even if your scheme gives the
> accurate limit for a fine enough grid, how can we be sure that your
> grid was fine enough?
That is no problem at all. There are clear tendencies in the chaotical
behaviour which let conclude it at any fine grid. And that is
fundamentally different from that you point out.
..
>>> Numerical simulations are a quite subtle problem.
>> Numerical simulations are per definitionem never a problem, but a way
>> to solve problems.
> If you don't even understand that there is a problem, namely the
> problem to prove that the numerical result gives some approximation of
> the continuous equation, I cannot help you.
You must not help me. ;-/ In return, I notice that you have no clue
at all of the dependence of the results on the algorithm. Ask persons
who have some experience in that stuff. And the algorithm, which
Ilja Schmelzer likes, is not necessarily the right. Here one must
ask nature. And that is 1:0 for me, as you can easily see on the
quoted result list.
..
> Feel free to post your discretization scheme.
fb08p1.jpg in http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/feld_ber.zip
Ulrich
Bollocks. You can only have a transformation that preserves the velocity of
light if you use the Maxwell-Lorentz-ether-wave model of light which both
LET and SR use, even if SR denies the fact. With ballistic light
propagation THERE CAN BE NO SUCH TRANSFORMATION: it is inconsistent with the
ballistic model
> [...]
> >Well, dear reader, after that little tirade from Bilge, you may be
excused
> >for wondering why he snipped the following two sentences from my
previous
> >post:
>
> I snipped it because it didn't answer the question.
>
> >"To interfere when recombined, the wave trains must be sufficiently
> >coherent. IOW, they must
> >come from a common source and the path difference between them must not
be
> >too great."
>
> That does _NOT_ answer the question. All you've done is sidestep
> the issue by defining two "kinds" of light. In case it doesn't
> sink in, explaining the difference between coherent and incoherent
> is what you need to explain.
Jesus H Christ! Where did I "define two kinds of light"? I specified
"sufficient coherence" as a condition for interference. Incoherence means
that there is no fixed phase relationship between the wave trains - as in
light beams from two different sources or from the same source over too long
a path difference (i.e. emission time-difference). Now, "coherent
particles" I really would like to hear about.
> [...]
> >>
> >> You didn't answer the question.
> >
> >Yes, I did. See above.
>
> OK. I'll assume you cannot answer the question, since you spend
> so much effort trying to avoid it.
>
> >
> >> I didn't ask what the result was
> >> if two waves interfered. I asked what conditions were necessary to
> >> produce interference. If you think you answered the question, then
> >> to the best I can tell, what you told me was that any two sources
> >> will produce an interference pattern. That is absolutely false,
> >
> >So it is, but that is not what I said.
>
> It is what you said. You haven't said anything different.
Lying bastard. Show me where I said or even implied that "any two sources
will produce an interference pattern".
> [...]
> >> And, I really would
> >> like to have you answer this, just so I can shoot holes in your idea
> >> about waves being any more physical than particles.
> >
> >Where did I say that?
>
> Where you continue to insist that E&M radiation is a wave in
> a medium as some sort of physicality argument. Once you answer
> my question, I'll make it painfully obvious just how unphysical
> that picture is.
More lies! Waves in a medium are no more and no less "physical" than
particles, and I again challenge you to show where I said anything
different. The point is about the suitability of models for different
situations.
> [...]
> >
> >I have, so I await the translation. Make it as simple as you like: I'm
not
> >proud. Still your turn.
>
> I have not yet received an answer to my question. I suspect that
> the reason is that you can't. If that's the case, just say so.
> I'm not going to stop asking.
I have answered all the questions you put, including reinserting my answers
where you had deleted them and made up different ones. My answers are the
same as those anyone can check in a text book on light. You have invented
statements I did not make and attributed them to me, which makes you a liar
and a cheat. I challenge you now to post an explanation of how interference
between two coherent light beams can be modelled in terms of light
propagating as particles. If you have a good answer to that question, or a
reference to where it can be found in a reputable source, you must post it
now if you are to retain any shred of credibility. If you come back yet
again bleating about my not answering your questions (when it is evident to
anyone who can read and knows any physics at all that I have), we will all
know that you really have no answer worth giving.
[...]
>> That does _NOT_ answer the question. All you've done is sidestep
>> the issue by defining two "kinds" of light. In case it doesn't
>> sink in, explaining the difference between coherent and incoherent
>> is what you need to explain.
>
>Jesus H Christ! Where did I "define two kinds of light"? I specified
>"sufficient coherence" as a condition for interference.
There must be two kinds of light, since you need to specify
coherent light or incoherent light. I just wan't to know about
light. I wasn't aware there was more than one kind.
>Incoherence means
>that there is no fixed phase relationship between the wave trains - as in
>light beams from two different sources or from the same source over too long
>a path difference (i.e. emission time-difference). Now, "coherent
>particles" I really would like to hear about.
First answer my question or else just tell me you can't. Tell
me the conditions for light to interfere. If you have to specify
what kind of light, I have to assume you think there are two kinds
of light. I am not aware that two kinds of light exist. Does your
idea of a physical model model require this?
[...]
>>
>> It is what you said. You haven't said anything different.
>
>Lying bastard. Show me where I said or even implied that "any two sources
>will produce an interference pattern".
Are you instead insisting that there are two kinds of light?
[...]
>> Where you continue to insist that E&M radiation is a wave in
>> a medium as some sort of physicality argument. Once you answer
>> my question, I'll make it painfully obvious just how unphysical
>> that picture is.
>
>More lies!
Which part is a lie? The part where I say that you insist E&M radiation
is a wave in a medium, or the part that I predict how obviously unphysical
your model will appear idf you ever answer the question? If you are
suggesting that you don't think E&M radiation is wave in a medium,
then I'll admit that I misunderstood your reason for light needing
an ether. If you refer to my prediction, we won't know how to decide
on that one until you give me an answer.
>Waves in a medium are no more and no less "physical" than
>particles, and I again challenge you to show where I said anything
>different. The point is about the suitability of models for different
>situations.
In message-id: <104499867...@demeter.uk.clara.net>
you said:
"And particles do not explain how the light gets from the source to
the photocathode."
-------
And then after being told by me, that they get there the same way
any other particle would, you insisted that wasn't true and proceeded
to assert the velocities didn't add correctly. Then, I showed that
the velocities, do add correctly, and you said I wasn't allowed to
obtain the result the way that I obtained it. Sounds to me like you
think have said exactly what you claim not to have said, in a number
of posts. And that is only this thread.
>> >I have, so I await the translation. Make it as simple as you like: I'm
>not
>> >proud. Still your turn.
>>
>> I have not yet received an answer to my question. I suspect that
>> the reason is that you can't. If that's the case, just say so.
>> I'm not going to stop asking.
>
>I have answered all the questions you put, including reinserting my answers
You apparently don't understand the question. If you'll tell me what
part you don't understand, I'll repeat it and try to expand upon the
word that isn't clear.
William MorrisPOP_Server=pop.freeuk.net wrote:
> I challenge you now to post an explanation of how
interference
> between two coherent light beams can be modelled
> in terms of light propagating as particles.
Sorry to pop in here.
You should see the photon as a quantum phenomenon and
not as a Newtonian object.
Construct a Heisenberg box around the place where the
photon is interfering. Notice I say photon, singular.
In this box, the photon particle is free to move at what
speeds it want, and is causing an E field here and an M
field there, so that statistically, over many photons,
Maxwell's equations are met. It also moves back and
forth in this box and sideways. Being an hyper-'light'
particle, and in the box, it is not subjected to any
inertia. It interferes with its own fields, or if you
prefer, its own virtual fotons it creates and absorbs.
It is definitely capable of going to two slits at once,
interfering with itself after the slits, retracting back
through one slit, and hitting the absorber according to
the random outcome of the interference. The pattern
looks indeed as if two waves have interfered.The same
particle 'waving' wildly from one slit to another.
This description of the photon, which I deduced from my
"inertialess" model, largely coincides with the
mathematical treatise Baez presents for a photon, where
he combines all empirical Quantum laws found and deduces
how gosthly a photon looks like. He calls them
schmotons, I can only imagine because they are schmeered
out over some region.:-)
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/photon/
Enjoy.
Your Hayek.
--
The small particles wave at
the big stars and get noticed.
:-)
There isn't, and I have not said there is.
> >Incoherence means
> >that there is no fixed phase relationship between the wave trains - as
in
> >light beams from two different sources or from the same source over too
long
> >a path difference (i.e. emission time-difference). Now, "coherent
> >particles" I really would like to hear about.
>
> First answer my question or else just tell me you can't. Tell
> me the conditions for light to interfere. If you have to specify
> what kind of light, I have to assume you think there are two kinds
> of light. I am not aware that two kinds of light exist. Does your
> idea of a physical model model require this?
As you know perfectly well, coherence is a property which wave trains may
have in varying degrees, and is not a "kind of light" which you keep
foolishly trying to insist I claimed it was. I realise that the concept of
coherence is, to say the least, a problem for a particle model of light,
which is one of the many reasons no-one (except you?) seriously any more
tries to use such a model to describe light propagation.
[...]
>
> In message-id: <104499867...@demeter.uk.clara.net>
> you said:
>
> "And particles do not explain how the light gets from the source to
> the photocathode."
>
> And then after being told by me, that they get there the same way
> any other particle would, you insisted that wasn't true and proceeded
> to assert the velocities didn't add correctly. Then, I showed that
> the velocities, do add correctly, and you said I wasn't allowed to
> obtain the result the way that I obtained it.
You're not. You can not borrow something (in this case the Lorentz
transformation) which inherently entails a wave model of e-m propagation and
stick it on to a particle model of e-m propagation.
[...]
> >
> >I have answered all the questions you put, including reinserting my
answers
where you deleted them [as here].
>
> You apparently don't understand the question. If you'll tell me what
> part you don't understand, I'll repeat it and try to expand upon the
> word that isn't clear.
>
I understand the question and I have answered it. Even if am completely
wrong in saying that a wave model is the best one for describing light
propagation (which I am not), what have you got to lose by showing us your
particle model which you claim is better? You might get a Nobel prize for
it. Or not.
However, you will have to bear in mind that it is not valid to use the LTs
in a particle model of light. You can use them for any other kind of
particle, but not for light if you think it is particulate in nature when
travelling from a source. The reason is that the LTs are consistent with
the assumption that material particles and bodies interact via e-m and other
forces which can not travel faster than light in vacuo, a property not
consistent with the idea that light and the other fields themselves travel
like particles. For example, why should particles in empty space have a
limiting speed, other than because they are composed of fields which move
through space like waves? If you want to model light particles as wave
packets, feel free: you might get somewhere, but they are still waves.
I again challenge you (or anyone else) to provide a self-consistent,
verified model of light propagation purely as particles without
illegitimately borrowing any properties (like the LTs and the entailed speed
limit) from a wave model. Otherwise, kindly stop wasting my time.
There isn't, and I have not said there is.
> >Incoherence means
> >that there is no fixed phase relationship between the wave trains - as
in
> >light beams from two different sources or from the same source over too
long
> >a path difference (i.e. emission time-difference). Now, "coherent
> >particles" I really would like to hear about.
>
> First answer my question or else just tell me you can't. Tell
> me the conditions for light to interfere. If you have to specify
> what kind of light, I have to assume you think there are two kinds
> of light. I am not aware that two kinds of light exist. Does your
> idea of a physical model model require this?
As you know perfectly well, coherence is a property which wave trains may
have in varying degrees, and is not a "kind of light" which you keep
foolishly trying to insist I claimed it was. I realise that the concept of
coherence is, to say the least, a problem for a particle model of light,
which is one of the many reasons no-one (except you?) seriously any more
tries to use such a model to describe light propagation.
[...]
>
> In message-id: <104499867...@demeter.uk.clara.net>
> you said:
>
> "And particles do not explain how the light gets from the source to
> the photocathode."
>
> And then after being told by me, that they get there the same way
> any other particle would, you insisted that wasn't true and proceeded
> to assert the velocities didn't add correctly. Then, I showed that
> the velocities, do add correctly, and you said I wasn't allowed to
> obtain the result the way that I obtained it.
You're not. You can not borrow something (in this case the Lorentz
transformation) which inherently entails a wave model of e-m propagation and
stick it on to a particle model of e-m propagation.
[...]
> >
> >I have answered all the questions you put, including reinserting my
answers
where you deleted them [as here].
>
> You apparently don't understand the question. If you'll tell me what
> part you don't understand, I'll repeat it and try to expand upon the
> word that isn't clear.
>
I understand the question and I have answered it. Even if am completely
wrong in saying that a wave model is the best one for describing light
propagation (which I am not), what have you got to lose by showing us your
particle model which you claim is better? You might get a Nobel prize for
it. Or not.
However, you will have to bear in mind that it is not valid to use the LTs
in a particle model of light. You can use them for any other kind of
particle, but not for light if you think it is particulate in nature when
travelling from a source. The reason is that the LTs are consistent with
the assumption that material particles and bodies interact via e-m and other
forces which can not travel faster than light in vacuo, a property not
consistent with the idea that light and the other fields themselves travel
like particles. For example, why should particles in empty space have a
limiting speed, other than because they are composed of fields which move
through space like waves? If you want to model light particles as wave
packets, feel free: you might get somewhere, but they are still waves.
I again challenge you (or anyone else) to provide a self-consistent,
verified model of light propagation purely as particles without
illegitimately borrowing any properties (like the LTs and the entailed speed
limit) from a wave model. Otherwise, kindly stop wasting my time.
TM
>> No. According to Bohmian field theory, the underlying reality is the
>> field.
> No. You have to distinguish between Bohm and Schmelzer, and the
> former believed in an "underlying reality" beneath the field
> concept. For instance:
> "... as we shall see, there is good reason to assume the
> existence of a sub quantum-mechanical level that is more
> fundamental ..." [1, p. 69]
>
> "...Chapters III and IV shows that fields and particles are
> closely linked in an even deeper way, in the sense that both are
> probably opposite sides of some still more general type of entity
> ..." [1, p. 138]
>
> [1] David Bohm, "Cause & Chance in Modern Physics," _University
> of Pennsylvania Press_, 1957/1961.
You have to distinguish the beliefs of Bohm from claims about the
ontology in a realistic theory named "Bohmian field theory". I have
not made any claims about Bohm's beliefs.
I see no point, only confusion on your side.
>> Possible chaos is taken into account.
>
> Doubts permitted ?
Feel free to doubt whatever you like. Feel free to find the weak
places in these theorems.
>>> http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/ .
>>> Before you biasedly consider it as crankery, have first a look
>>> at `brief.txt' or `briefger.txt' in above directory.
>> There is a well-known and accepted proof about the necessity of
>> singularities in the continuous equations.
> according to the "conventional" algorithm I learnt in the school
> to solve PDE's.
Conventional discretization schemes often fail.
>> There are your computations. There is no proof that your
>> computations accurately approximate the continuous equations.
> You claim that, since you ignore the results. That "proof" is in the
> results, man!
How? The "result" are some discrete computations. How can these
computations prove that the result of the computations approximates
the continuous equation?
>> Even if your scheme gives the accurate limit for a fine enough
>> grid, how can we be sure that your grid was fine enough?
> That is no problem at all. There are clear tendencies in the
> chaotical behaviour which let conclude it at any fine grid. And that
> is fundamentally different from that you point out.
First, nobody has claimed that there is no chaos. The theorems tell
only that there will be singularities. Second, tendencies are not a
proof.
>>>> Numerical simulations are a quite subtle problem.
>>> Numerical simulations are per definitionem never a problem, but a
>>> way to solve problems.
>> If you don't even understand that there is a problem, namely the
>> problem to prove that the numerical result gives some approximation of
>> the continuous equation, I cannot help you.
> You must not help me. ;-/ In return, I notice that you have no clue
> at all of the dependence of the results on the algorithm.
LOL. This is what I try to explain you. You have continuous
equations, and there are lots of algorithms to compute approximate
solutions. They often give very different results, especially because
some of them are simply wrong (do not give the correct continuous
limit), and others are very inaccurate.
> Ask persons who have some experience in that stuff.
LOL.
> And the algorithm, which Ilja Schmelzer likes, is not necessarily
> the right.
I have not made a claim which discretization scheme I prefer.
> Here one must ask nature.
No. If you want to find approximate solutions of a given continuous
equation, you have to ask numerical mathematics, for proofs of
convergence theorems and so on.
> And that is 1:0 for me, as you can easily see on the quoted result list.
LOL.
>> Feel free to post your discretization scheme.
> fb08p1.jpg in http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/feld_ber.zip
This is a picture, not a discretization scheme.
But I see, you use simple central differences.
Such computations prove nothing.
[*nonanswer and other nonsense snipped*]
Had I known you would take my use of "believed" to mean something
other than "thought" I would have been more careful in my wording
to begin with. But, if you yourself choose to disregard Bohm's
own thoughts about the work which he did, in favor of what is
convenient for your interpretation, well, then, that is
completely up to you. I, for one, choose not to so ignore and I
take Bohm's views and theory together into an entire context.
> I see no point, only confusion on your side.
>>> Possible chaos is taken into account.
>>
>> Doubts permitted ?
> Feel free to doubt whatever you like. Feel free to find the weak
> places in these theorems.
The doubts refer to "Possible chaos is taken into account."
I never searched for "weak places". You pointed out the theorems
as alleged obstacle to my results.
>>>> http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/ .
>>>> Before you biasedly consider it as crankery, have first a look
>>>> at `brief.txt' or `briefger.txt' in above directory.
>>> There is a well-known and accepted proof about the necessity of
>>> singularities in the continuous equations.
>> according to the "conventional" algorithm I learnt in the school
>> to solve PDE's.
> Conventional discretization schemes often fail.
I believe, here is the confusion (which is of course on my side).
Here I must ask you: Does the theorem that you mean (by Penrose and
Hawking) consider any "discretization" ?
>>> There are your computations. There is no proof that your
>>> computations accurately approximate the continuous equations.
>> You claim that, since you ignore the results. That "proof" is in the
>> results, man!
> How? The "result" are some discrete computations.
How can computations be results ?
> How can these
> computations prove that the result of the computations approximates
> the continuous equation?
Not computations do that but indications from nature.
Have you not read `sc_works.txt' ? But I'm afraid that you only
looked for allegedly cranky words instead of trying to understand
what I did. May I quote:
| Now I did a lot of computations with several values of the integration
| constants. During each computation I counted the steps until the physical
| components took on an amount of 1 . (That could be a kind of event
| horizon). As well, the number of steps has periodic behaviour in relation
| to the integration constants. Maximal numbers of steps appeared when the
| values of the integration constants were identical with the values of spin,
| charge, and magnetical momentum from literature (of course normalized for
| the computer).
Is that so hard to understand ? That are real tests !
>>> Even if your scheme gives the accurate limit for a fine enough
>>> grid, how can we be sure that your grid was fine enough?
>> That is no problem at all. There are clear tendencies in the
>> chaotical behaviour which let conclude it at any fine grid. And that
>> is fundamentally different from that you point out.
> First, nobody has claimed that there is no chaos. The theorems tell
> only that there will be singularities. Second, tendencies are not a
> proof.
Did I claim that ? And the singularities from the initial conditions
are within the limit surfaces (in the gauged coordinates), i.e. do
locally not exist.
[snip]
> LOL. This is what I try to explain you. You have continuous
> equations, and there are lots of algorithms to compute approximate
> solutions. They often give very different results, especially because
> some of them are simply wrong (do not give the correct continuous
> limit), and others are very inaccurate.
Agree. What is with the closed formulae as solutions (I above meant) ?
What refer the theorems to ?
..
>> Here one must ask nature.
> No. If you want to find approximate solutions of a given continuous
> equation, you have to ask numerical mathematics, for proofs of
> convergence theorems and so on.
I heard physicists who unshakably claim that nature be the highest
authority.
Ulrich Bruchholz
stephen kearney, thalean day 944785
> I realise that the concept of
> coherence is, to say the least, a problem for a particle model of light,
> which is one of the many reasons no-one (except you?) seriously any more
> tries to use such a model to describe light propagation.
Let's check the words of the man that Trevor Morris likes to cite
(and misquote, and occasionally invent words for).
"I want to emphasize that light comes in this form --
particles. It is very important to know that light behaves
like particles, especially for those of you who have gone to
school, where you were probably told something about light
behaving like waves. I'm telling you the way it *does*
behave -- like particles."
Richard Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and
Matter, 1985 ( p.15).
> Even if am completely
> wrong in saying that a wave model is the best one for describing light
> propagation (which I am not), what have you got to lose by showing us your
> particle model which you claim is better? You might get a Nobel prize for
> it. Or not.
http://www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1965/index.html
The prize has already been given. Classical electromagnetism was
subsumed decades ago. Its replacement kicks your arse.
---Tim Shuba---
My comment was not restricted to electroweak symmetry and I gave
two examples, a ferromagnet, which is a broken geometric symmetry
and a superconductor which is a broken U(1) symmetry. Symmetry
breaking as I described is a universal feature in condensed matter
physics.
[...]
>> Sure there is. The gauge bosons are merely a result, not the
>> motivation. The basic idea is that one can describe an interaction
>> by an invariance principle. If the interaction involves masses,
>> then the manifest invariance is broken.
>
>Different people can have very different ideas about such things.
>The standard model is, more or less, a phenomenological theory.
>With lots of interesting patterns.
The reason it would be considered phenomenological is because it
contains parameters derived from measurements (e.g., \alpha, \hbar, c,
etc). To the extent that any theory can't derive those values, that theory
is phenomenological. On the other hand, given those parameters, the
standard model is a precise description of the current universe. It doesn't
describe the universe at unification temperatures, only because the
underlying gauge group is not pinned down. The term "effective theory"
means the theory is described by a lagrangian constructed for the vacuum
of the broken symmetry, rather than the vacuum of the unbroken symmetry.
The lagrangian derived from the unifying gauge group represents the
"correct" description of the unbroken symmetry. It's like saying that
the description of a silicon crystal is an effective theory of silicon.
The theory describes the silicon crystal, but isn't a theory of silicon
in the vapour phase. It's still the correct theory for the crystalline
phase.
[...]
>> If you are going to give up the idea of a particle being
>> a "thing", what have you retained that gives any meaning to "things"
>> following "trajectories" or having "locations"?
>
>BM does not care much about locations. The trajectories are
>trajectories in the configuration space Q=Q(t).
If there is a trajectory, something has to be on it, or else it
isn't very closely related to a trajectory. Since a trajectory describes
a location as a function of time, I can't see how bohmian mechanics
can not "care" about locations.
>> If you want to give that up, you might as well not make a big fuss
>> over giving up definite trajectories or locations,
>
>What I don't plan to give up is classical realism. As you may realize
>now, this is an extremely weak set of assumptions. It is not bound to
>special concepts like locality, space, locations, trajectories.
That pretty much means your idea of classical realism is unique to
yourself. In between posts, I've scavenged a few more articles on
bohmian mechanics, referenced from sheldon goldstein's web site.
Since he seems to be the defacto spokesperson spearheading the acceptance
drive for bohmian mechanics, I've more or less taken his viewpoint as
the canonical position on what it means. His view seems quite different
from yours on the subject, but since he describes it thoroughly, it's
the only description I have. And I don't find his description very
compelling.
>I would like to argue that classical realism is simply one of the laws
>of consistent reasoning. If you know Jaynes argumentation (if not,
>google on s.p.research with "Jaynes" or "Bayesian" will give you the
>links and interesting discussions) classical probability theory in the
>Bayesian sense may be justified as the laws of consistent reasoning.
>I think his argumentation may be extended to realism as well: If you
>have a Bayesian probability distribution over the set of statements,
>it seems possible to construct some underlying set so that it becomes
>a Kolmogorovian probability theory on this set.
I don't see how this would actually negate any interpretation of
quantum mechanics, much less favor the bohmian viewpoint over any
other.
[...]
>Whatever, the point is that the theory exists, may be formulated.
>Then, it is realistic, even deterministic.
As you (as well as sheldon goldstein) have described the theory, I
nothing which is any more deterministic than any other interpretation.
The only difference is that bohmian mechanics has taken the position
that the existence of the "guiding" equation makes it deterministic
and ignored everything else by defining it to be outside the realm
of quantum mechanics or else assumes the quantum mechanical part
and shows that, yes indeed, the rest is deterministic. As examples,
sheldon goldstein selectively discards the problems with relativity
as being the realm of relativity, while quite willingly makes use of
others which I assume he knows are relativistic in origin, to promote
his view point as does: http://xxx.lanl.gov/ps/quant-ph/9504010.ps,
berndl, daumert and durr, regarding spin and statistics:
"According to orthodox quantum mechanics the very notion of
indistinguishable particles seems to be grounded on the non-
existence of particle trajectories and on the practical
difficulty of distinguishing identical particles at two
different time."
Well, no, that isn't the case, it just happens to be convenient to
the argument. The particles are not indistinguishable due to any
practical difficulty, since the entropy would serve to label them
as distict particles. They go on to say:
"Indeed, the usual symmetry conditions on the wavefunction
arise naturally when the Bohmian approach is applied to
indistinguishable particles."
They go on to say a little more if you're interested, but just from this
comment, it appears they are missing the point. The indistinguishability
is the issue, not what one can do once one assumes the particles are
indistinguishable. For example, the above says nothing about why classical
particles aren't indistinguisble in any way which doesn't allude to the
uncertainty principle, which has been essentially ruled out as anything
more than a classical problem of lacking information rather than the
non-existence of it.
In short, if I take sheldon goldstein's description of bohmian
mechanics as the accepted description of bohmian mechanics, I
can't see that it offers any additional facet of "classical realism"
than any other interpretation, and requires a rather ugly assumption
that its supposed virtues are somehow irrelevant anyway, since none
of this so-called "determinism" is ever evident in any experiment.
[...]
>
>> In that case, what's the point?
>
>Classical realism, which is not about particles or space or such
>things, but much more fundamental and much more important.
According sheldon goldtein's website, my impression is that none
of what I presume to be the "more fundamental" details are observable
through experiments. At the same time that philosophy seems take the
unobservable aspects as having more reality than the observable ones.
[...]
>> I find it rather ironic that I give more reality to the field
>> theories than you appear to do. I'm willing to call the things we
>> define as electrons, electrons.
>
>That's not important. I'm also willing to call the things we define
>as phonons phonons.
I am as well. That's why I have no problem referring to the phonons
in a superconductor as phonons or the virtual particles in a feynman
diagram as virtual. As far as I can tell, throught history, physicists
have assigned physical meanings to particular mathematical constructs.
It was probably more obvious when the construct was L = r x p, but
L is still nothing but a particular grouping of terms that reflects
a particular symmetry in a physical system.
>
>>> If you believe the possibly resulting functional-analytical problems
>>> are an argument - I agree. I propose to solve them in an atomic ether
>>> theory where the continuous fields appear to be continuous
>>> approximations of discrete properties. Thus, there will be, again, a
>>> multi-particle Bohmian theory. But there is no relation between these
>>> particles (ether atoms) and the fermions/bosons we observe, which are
>>> analoguous to phonons in condensed matter theory.
>
>> But don't the properties of the phonons depend upon the underlying
>> interaction in the condensed matter?
>
>Yep. But nonetheless the atoms should be distinguished from the
>phonons.
>
>> Is not a cooper pair a higgs boson which has a definite physical
>> manifestation as a particle?
>
>I don't know enough about cooper pairs and higgs bosons to comment this.
A previous reference I gave for an article by chris quigg gives a
very good description of this and a (somewhat simplified) condensed
matter picture of the standard model.
>
>> I don't see that the method of solving the problem (pertubative vs
>> lattice) changes anything other than the approach to the same
>> effective theory. The theory is no less an effective theory simply
>> by changing the method of obtaining solutions.
>
>I do not doubt that QFT as well as the Bohmian field theory version
>are effective field theories. I find a lattice regularization
>attractive also for some other reasons, connected with quantization of
>gravity.
It might very well be the right way to solve the problem of quantizing
gravity, but to the best I can determine, lattice theories are just a
different approach to a problem which is unsuitable for perturbation
theory. Conversely, lattice calculations seem to run into difficulty
where peturbation theory works well. So, essentially, I see the two
approaches as somewhat dependent upon what one wants to solve.
>You know, the theory in gr-qc/0205035 includes continuity and Euler
>equations.
Yes, I know. One of the things I found puzzling was why you preferred
to make the continuity equations part of the axioms rather than a
consequence of the lagrangian.
[...]
>First, it is the notion of realism defended by EPR and Bell, or at
>least quite close to it. And IMHO I use it in a quite consistent way.
You might use it consistently, but I can't really figure out
what justifies the term "classical realism" from the way you
apply it.
>I have discarded every classical idea but one? Not really - I do
>insist only on this one classical idea. The other classical ideas are
>less important, I can live very well without them. But this one is
>the only idea I insist on, because the rejection seems to be a
>complete rejection of realistic, scientific reasoning. This
>particular idea seems to me like a part of extended logic.
However, in my opinion, all I'm doing is abandoning a classical
viewpoint where it doesn't apply, in which case, I simply have to
come to terms with what does apply and in doing so, I am doing exactly
what scientific reasoning would tell me I should do.
>And there is exactly no reason to give up this one idea.
>
>You may be correct that naming this idea "classical realism" gives a
>wrong picture, suggesting that the "classical realist" insists on much
>more, like space, particles, trajectories, lots of other unnecessary
>assumptions which can easily given up without any problem. Therefore
>people think they can easily give up such a "classical realism",
>nothing to bother about, stupid old prejudices.
Well, as far as a large fraction of the participants in this newsgroup
are concerned, your idea of "classical realism" a lot closer to the
abstractions they dislike in the more standard descriptions than what they
would consider classical realism. I also doubt that if you asked a dozen
people what the considered to be classical realism, you'd get about 20
different answers, depending upon who you asked. I can easily picture some
people having a different idea every time you asked them.
I also tend to disagree with some of the way the traditional answers
treat what's realistic, in that, often people to want to sit on the fence
by not commiting themselves to giving physical meaning to the mathematical
objects, like virtual particles, being manipulated. So, I'm not being
one-sided here, it's just that you use "realism" as a criteria a lot.
>Instead, classical realism - the thing you have to give up to claim
>that Einstein causality holds - means to give up something much more
>fundamental, much closer to elementary common sense (in the positive
>sense of this word), to consistent reasoning, to extended logic.
I don't really think causality is applicable at the quantum scale. That
doesn't preclude an overall large scale causal universe. If I take the
uncertainty relations for the electric field, then I find that the fields
may be precisely measured (i.e., E'(x',t') and E(x,t) commute), everywhere
but the hypersurfaces defined by +/-(x-x') = c(t-t'), so that the fields
may be measured precisely except when a signal can pass between the
observers with the speed of propagation of the signal. I can turn that
argument around and define a causal relationship by one which can be
connected by a signal, or in otherwords, the interference that exists by
virtue of the uncertainty relations allows me to define what relationships
are causal and which are not.
[...]
>
>Bohmian mechanics is identical in its probability predictions to
>standard quantum mechanics. That's a quite simple mathematical
>theorem, it follows essentially by construction. So, do you believe
>these effects are inconsistent with quantum mechanics?
What I believe is that what is consistent with quantum mechanics is the
observable parts of the theory. I think the unobservable aspects which
bohmian mechanics declares as unobservable despite existing, run contrary
to the motivation for bohmian mechanics. In my opinion, what can be
measured, in principle, is what exists. If I want to establish a virtual
pion as a physical object, it's possible to create an experiment in which
the virtual pion emits real radiation. In bohmian mechanics, it's not
possible to put any object on one of those trajectories and know that the
object will be right where you expect it. All you can say is that _if_ you
could put an object on such a trajectory, it would follow that trajectory.
But then, bohmian mechanics goes on to say it's not possible, even in
principle to do that. At least according sheldon goldstein's website.
>> Those effects originate in the same place that every other quantum
>> "effect" originates: the uncertainty principle.
>
>Fine. In this case, we can ignore these complex effects and possible
>functional-analytical problems and consider the connection between
>classical (say two-particle) Schroedinger theory and the related
>Bohmian theory.
>
>> If you accept the uncertainty principle as it applies to field
>> operators, then I don't really see how you can deny it applies to
>> anything else.
>
>I don't deny the uncertainty principle also for classical Schroedinger
>theory, so field theory seems irrelevant. It is well-known that the
>Bohmian trajectories Q(t) are unobservable, so there is no
>contradiction.
In that case it doesn't matter if you discard it, since there is
absolutely no possibility of it being able to affect anything which
can be observed. Otherwise, the trajectories would be observable.
Feel free! :>)
> You should see the photon as a quantum phenomenon and
> not as a Newtonian object.
Ah! Not just a particle "moving like any other particle", as our pal "Bilge"
maintains!
> Construct a Heisenberg box around the place where the
> photon is interfering. Notice I say photon, singular.
>
> In this box, the photon particle is free to move at what
> speeds it want, and is causing an E field here and an M
> field there, so that statistically, over many photons,
> Maxwell's equations are met. It also moves back and
> forth in this box and sideways. Being an hyper-'light'
> particle, and in the box, it is not subjected to any
> inertia. It interferes with its own fields, or if you
> prefer, its own virtual fotons it creates and absorbs.
>
> It is definitely capable of going to two slits at once,
> interfering with itself after the slits, retracting back
> through one slit, and hitting the absorber according to
> the random outcome of the interference. The pattern
> looks indeed as if two waves have interfered.The same
> particle 'waving' wildly from one slit to another.
Well, there are certainly a lot of new hypotheses there, and at least,
unlike our pal Bilge you are prepared to offer them for discussion. With my
limited knowledge of QED, I will not try to comment at the moment, except
that such a scheme looks a very complex way to think about describing
something which is so simple on the basis of a wave model of propagation.
And we are I hope talking about models rather than "ultimate reality" here.
If you can make up a model that works and does not conflict with
observations, that will be very well done! You will need better informed
critics than me, though, to test your ideas on properly.
> This description of the photon, which I deduced from my
> "inertialess" model, largely coincides with the
> mathematical treatise Baez presents for a photon, where
> he combines all empirical Quantum laws found and deduces
> how gosthly a photon looks like. He calls them
> schmotons, I can only imagine because they are schmeered
> out over some region.:-)
>
> http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/photon/
>
> Enjoy.
>
> Your Hayek.
Thanks very much for that reference: I did "enjoy", and I think it is very
well written. Baez and Weiss discuss broadly the problem of relating in QED
the classical concept of wave amplitude with the equivalent quantum photon
density, and the whole thing is an excellent teach-in on QED.
The last two pages, entitled "Michael Weiss: Flooding the spacetime plain"
and "Michael Weiss: Anschaulichkeit, Abscheulichkeit" are the most relevant
to these exchanges with Bilge. Some points from the long history of the
light-particles /-waves debate are summarised, with no firm conclusion
either way, and the reader is finally told to "watch this space". Iow,
"wave particle duality" still reigns, and I can find nothing to improve on
the "light travels like a wave and interacts like particles" mantra which
Bilge seems to find so offensive. Of course, there are specific situations
where neither model quite fits, but that only means the various theories are
not complete yet. Physics would become rather boring if they were, don't
you think?
Trevor Morris
You failed to snip the one sentence of mine above which shows quite clearly
even to anyone who has read none of this thread so far that you continue to
lie about what I have said. That can lead to only one correct conclusion,
which is that you have lost the argument.
Trevor Morris
I have never misquoted Feynman, or invented words for him. I have
frequently quoted Sec. 21-6 in Vol.2 of his "Lectures on Physics" in which
(and here I quote) he "only wished to show how naturally the Maxwell
equations lead to the Lorentz transformation." That was the quote: the
following is my commentary (Shuba is too dumb to know the difference, so I
have to point it out for his benefit - he is ignorant of the "square
brackets" convention for inserted or commenting text, for example).
The Section in question derives the Lienard-Wiechert potentials for the
retarded field around a charge moving through a Maxwellian "ether". It
offers a physical explanation for the Lorentz length contraction and "time
dilation" of LET and SR. Feynman (again for Shuba's benefit) did not draw
explicit attention to that fact, but nevertheless quite clearly linked the
validity of the Lorentz transformation to the ether model, just as Lorentz
had done in LET.
>
> "I want to emphasize that light comes in this form --
> particles. It is very important to know that light behaves
> like particles, especially for those of you who have gone to
> school, where you were probably told something about light
> behaving like waves. I'm telling you the way it *does*
> behave -- like particles."
>
> Richard Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and
> Matter, 1985 ( p.15).
Out of context, that can not be evaluated properly. Did he go on to say
that light really travels through space like little bullets or "any other
kind of particle" like "Bilge", with the velocity of the source added on? (I
am damn sure he did not). Or was he discussing the emission and absorption
processes that are best modelled by quantum theory? Given the title of the
book, my money is on the latter alternative, even if it is a popularised
version (judging from the title).
>
> > Even if am completely
> > wrong in saying that a wave model is the best one for describing light
> > propagation (which I am not), what have you got to lose by showing us
your
> > particle model which you claim is better? You might get a Nobel prize
for
> > it. Or not.
>
> http://www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1965/index.html
>
> The prize has already been given. Classical electromagnetism was
> subsumed decades ago. Its replacement kicks your arse.
>
>
> ---Tim Shuba---
Tough on Bilgey, then. Classical electromagnetism still describes light
propagation a damn sight better than QED does. Though, given that last
idiotic remark of yours, I don't know why I am bothering to even try a
rational reply.
Trevor Morris
William MorrisPOP_Server=pop.freeuk.net wrote:
> Hayek <hay...@nospam.xs4all.nl> wrote in message
news:3E4CDBFE...@nospam.xs4all.nl...
>
>
>>
>> William MorrisPOP_Server=pop.freeuk.net wrote:
>>
>>> I challenge you now to post an explanation of how
>> interference
>>> between two coherent light beams can be modelled in
>>> terms of light propagating as particles.
>>
>>
>> Sorry to pop in here.
>>
>
> Feel free! :>)
>
>
>> You should see the photon as a quantum phenomenon
>> and not as a Newtonian object.
>>
>
> Ah! Not just a particle "moving like any other
> particle", as our pal "Bilge" maintains!
It is not a wave, moving like a snake, either...
>> Construct a Heisenberg box around the place where
>> the photon is interfering. Notice I say photon,
>> singular.
>>
>> In this box, the photon particle is free to move
>> at what speeds it want, and is causing an E field
>> here and an M field there, so that
>> statistically, over many photons, Maxwell's
>> equations are met. It also moves back and forth
>> in this box and sideways. Being an hyper-'light'
particle,
>> and in the box, it is not subjected to any inertia.
>> It interferes with its own fields, or if you prefer,
>> its own virtual fotons it creates and absorbs.
>>
>> It is definitely capable of going to two slits at
>> once, interfering with itself after the slits,
>> retracting back through one slit, and hitting the
>> absorber according to the random outcome of the
>> interference. The pattern looks indeed as if two
>> waves have interfered.The same particle 'waving'
>> wildly from one slit to another.
>>
>
> Well, there are certainly a lot of new hypotheses
> there, and at least, unlike our pal Bilge you are
> prepared to offer them for discussion.
I thought of this, and only later I read that Dirac had
said "a photon only interferes with itself" . So it is
not that new. And even the wave theory cannot explain
this. It follows naturally from my view, and I did not
even know about Dirac's statement then.
With my
> limited knowledge of QED, I will not try to comment
> at the moment, except that such a scheme looks a
> very complex way to think about describing something
> which is so simple on the basis of a wave model of
> propagation.
Just remove the inertia. It is simple.
I just tought of something I planned to use in another
discussion with Bilge.
If you remove the inertia, you can longer speak of
motion, it becomes "teleportation". Think of it.
It is easy. Exactly this kind of behaviour is seen in
QM. Add to that : inertia sets the speed of light,
without inertia : no limit, again, what we observe in
some Quantum experiments.
> And we are I hope talking about models rather than
> "ultimate reality" here.
Everone putting forward a model, aims at reality .:-)
I think and dare to hope there will always be a new
frontier. The old discussions are also getting boring
:-), as you might have noticed. Now I realize that John
Cleese and the Pythons missed an opportunity, in one of
their many sketches where a discussion degrades to a
yes/no argument, they could have suddenly changed yes/no
to particle/wave or even relative/absolute. Question of
'layering' humor. I bet that lot of people with physics
knowledge would have gone rotfl-ing.
Hayek.
--
The small particles wave at
the big stars and get noticed.
:-)
> > the classical concept of wave amplitude with the
> equivalent quantum photon density, and the whole
> thing is an excellent teach-in on QED.
>
> The last two pages, entitled "Michael Weiss:
> Flooding the spacetime plain" and "Michael Weiss:
> Anschaulichkeit, Abscheulichkeit" are the most
> relevant to these exchanges with Bilge. Some
> points from the long history of the light-particles
> /-waves debate are summarised, with no firm
> conclusion either way, and the reader is finally
> told to "watch this space". Iow, "wave particle
> duality" still reigns, and I can find nothing to
> improve on the "light travels like a wave and
> interacts like particles" mantra which Bilge seems
> to find so offensive. Of course, there are
> specific situations where neither model quite fits,
> but that only means the various theories are not
> complete yet. Physics would become rather boring
> if they were, don't you think?
I think and dare to hope there will always be a new
frontier. The old discussions are also getting boring
:-), as you might have noticed. Now I realize that John
Cleese and the Pythons missed an opportunity, in one of
their many sketches where a discussion degrades to a
yes/no argument, they could have suddenly changed yes/no
to particle/wave or even relative/absolute. Question of
'layering' humor. I bet that lot of people with physics
knowledge would have gone rotfl-ing.
[...]
>Tough on Bilgey, then. Classical electromagnetism still describes light
>propagation a damn sight better than QED does.
Please explain light-light scattering using classical electromagnetism.
Feel free to choose whichever type of light your model requires for this.
>Though, given that last
>idiotic remark of yours, I don't know why I am bothering to even try a
>rational reply.
I don't know why you bother either, since you aren't capable of
a rational reply. Practice only goes so far without any ability.
I comprehend that you used the relativistic formula for velocity addition
when you should not have done so. Light is definitely not "just like any
other particles" in how it travels through space.
> [...]
>
> >Tough on Bilgey, then. Classical electromagnetism still describes light
> >propagation a damn sight better than QED does.
>
> Please explain light-light scattering using classical electromagnetism.
See http://www.photonics.com/spectra/tech/read.asp?techid=1279
I have said that a wave model is the best for describing light propagation,
and that absorption and emission processes demonstrate some particle-like
properties, namely localisation of energy and countability of events.
Photon-photon scattering, which involves electrons and positrons produced
from the vacuum under extreme high-field conditions, is an example of such
an absorption/emission process. Btw, in the web page I refer to, there is
mention of a very classical 30 MV/m electric field strength. Such processes
always entail interactions between light and matter, even when as in this
case the matter is produced from a virtual state in "empty" space.
I really don't want to upset you any more (my very first lie to you! :>) but
don't you think that the production of fundamental particles from "empty"
space gives some credibility to the idea that empty space could also have
something to do with controlling the speed of e-m radiation travelling
through it? And possibly be some sort of unique frame of reference for it,
God forbid? Dirac thought so.
Why do I bother? You will only delete and substitute some fantasy of your
own.
[...]
TM
So, you don't think light is relativistic?
>Light is definitely not "just like any other particles" in how it
>travels through space.
I showed you that it is.
>
>> [...]
>>
>> >Tough on Bilgey, then. Classical electromagnetism still describes light
>> >propagation a damn sight better than QED does.
>>
>> Please explain light-light scattering using classical electromagnetism.
>
>See http://www.photonics.com/spectra/tech/read.asp?techid=1279
I already know how it occurs. In fact I drew one of the feynman diagrams
for someone in another response just a short while ago. I asked you to
explain it using maxwell's theory.
>I have said that a wave model is the best for describing light propagation,
>and that absorption and emission processes demonstrate some particle-like
>properties, namely localisation of energy and countability of events.
So, you think light can't be explained by just one model? Uh, how
many models are necessary before you get all of it covered?
>I really don't want to upset you any more (my very first lie to you! :>) but
>don't you think that the production of fundamental particles from "empty"
>space gives some credibility to the idea that empty space could also have
>something to do with controlling the speed of e-m radiation travelling
>through it?
Not in any way that you might imagine.
>And possibly be some sort of unique frame of reference for it,
>God forbid? Dirac thought so.
You're no dirac.
>
>Why do I bother? You will only delete and substitute some fantasy of your
>own.
I don't know. Why do you bother? You apparently can't answer a simple
question when pressed to do so and instead have to argue about the
argument. I agree, it's a waste of your time to post.
> Ilja Schmelzer:
>
> >dub...@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net (Bilge) writes:
> >
> >> If you are going to give up the idea of a particle being
> >> a "thing", what have you retained that gives any meaning to "things"
> >> following "trajectories" or having "locations"?
> >
> >BM does not care much about locations. The trajectories are
> >trajectories in the configuration space Q=Q(t).
>
> If there is a trajectory, something has to be on it, or else it
> isn't very closely related to a trajectory. Since a trajectory describes
> a location as a function of time, I can't see how bohmian mechanics
> can not "care" about locations.
>
Ilja is mistaken here in regard to Bohm. In Bohmian mechanics the
particle really has a precise position and momentum, but which is
"hidden" until one gives up some of the usual assumptions in
regard to the \psi function, which are developed as part of
Bohm's theory.
"In our interpretation, however, we assert that the at
present 'hidden' precisely definable particle positions
and momenta determine the results of each measurement
process ..."
[...]
"In connection with this problem, we shall show that
if, as suggested in Paper I, Secs. 4 and 9, we give up
the three mutually consistent special assumptions
leading to the same results as those of the usual
interpretation, the particle position and momentum can
in principle be measured simultaneously with unlimited
precision."
[...]
"The usual interpretation of the quantum theory implies
that we must renounce the possibility of describing an
individual system in terms of a precisely defined
conceptual model. We have, however, proposed an
alternative interpretation which does not imply such a
renunciation, but which instead leads us to regard a
quantum-mechanical system as a synthesis of a precisely
definable particle and a precisely definable \psi-field
which exerts a force on this particle."
-- David Bohm, "A Suggested Interpretation of the
Quantum Theory in Terms of 'Hidden' Variables. II,"
_Physical Review_, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 180-193,
January 15, 1952.
But, since Ilja has made abundantly clear that he does not read
the "Holy Scripts" written by the original people developing the
theory, I suppose he would not know anything about what Bohm
actually wrote.
Well, we know that explaining light-light scattering is impossible by purely
classical means. Plus since the EM vacuum was tossed out for CED (mainly
because no one know how to describe it at the time), it is really
impossible. But I think that maybe if we put in the concept of the quantum
vacuum for CED, it might not be impossible to expain it semi-classically
eventually. Basically that is what I am working on.
| See http://www.photonics.com/spectra/tech/read.asp?techid=1279
This is exactly what I have been looking for. I see that this article is
Jan 2002. Has this experiment been done yet? Or do you know of any
progress on it?
| I have said that a wave model is the best for describing light
propagation,
| and that absorption and emission processes demonstrate some particle-like
| properties, namely localisation of energy and countability of events.
| Photon-photon scattering, which involves electrons and positrons produced
| from the vacuum under extreme high-field conditions, is an example of such
| an absorption/emission process. Btw, in the web page I refer to, there is
| mention of a very classical 30 MV/m electric field strength. Such
processes
| always entail interactions between light and matter, even when as in this
| case the matter is produced from a virtual state in "empty" space.
I am not so sure that a quanta of EM energy is even a wave so to speak. If
we think that it is quantized by its source and it is just an excitation of
virtual particle pairs in the EM quantum vacuum as it passes thru them, then
it is really the virtual pairs that are waving. How can we really tell the
difference? Just like how QED has photons briefly changing into a virtual
pair and then back to a "point-like" particle. What kind of magic is this?
Common sense would tell me that the dang virtual pairs are always existing
in some kind of energy state and then they are "excited" and "aligned" when
EM energy "flows" thru them. Just like what happens around bare electric
charge.
Regards,
FrediFizzx
[remove humor to reply]
http://www.flashrock.com/upload/photon/photon.html
http://www.flashrock.com/upload/photon.pdf
http://members.aol.com/flashrock3/pub/photon.pdf
The article looks to me like staking a claim on the idea and inviting
collaboration. I don't know how far it has got. What I find especially
interesting is the highly classical framework of their idea - microwaves in
cavities, at high field strength (30 MV/m) and energy density. They
evidently hope to excite the vacuum into the non-linearities needed to
modify Maxwell's equations and show the effect.
What indeed? But at least it is a shot at providing some kind of
visualisation of the processes, bordering on the semi-classical, perhaps, so
let's not knock it (!) :>)
> Common sense would tell me that the dang virtual pairs are always existing
> in some kind of energy state and then they are "excited" and "aligned"
when
> EM energy "flows" thru them. Just like what happens around bare electric
> charge.
>
> Regards,
>
> FrediFizzx
> [remove humor to reply]
>
> http://www.flashrock.com/upload/photon/photon.html
> http://www.flashrock.com/upload/photon.pdf
> http://members.aol.com/flashrock3/pub/photon.pdf
Well, that sounds reasonable enough in principle. It is just what typically
happens with waves in a medium, of course: only the energy is actually
transported along at the wave's characteristic speed - the bits of the
medium just stay in one place and oscillate around a mean state.
Trevor Morris
This looks to me like an INCREDIBLY difficult experiment. For several
reasons:
1) It's not clear to me at all that it is possible to simultaneously
excite TM01 waves of one frequency and TE01 waves of a different
frequency in the same cavity. I cannot envision the geometry at all.
If it is possible, I suspect that the waves will have frequencies
in the ratio of small integers, and that introduces systematics
that probably make the intended observation imposible.
2) Hoping for ~30 MV/meter is quite a challenge. The collaboration of
which I am a member has run vacuum RF cavities ~20 MV/meter at 805
MHz, but going significantly higher is a serious challenge. The
limit is dark current, and sometimes multipactoring....
3) I suspect 30 MV/meter is woefully short of what is required....
I have not yet followed up on that website.... I doubt our collaboration
would be very interested in pursuing this, unless we can find additional
funding for it. But it's worth a few hours investigation -- THANKS!
Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
As a followup to this, I was thinking that maybe it might not be
impossible after all to explain light-light scattering with Maxwell's
equations if we stop assuming div E = 0 and curl B = dE/dt for the
quantum vacuum. While these are true macroscopically, they are not
true microscopically at the quantum level. Rho and J just take on a
different "character" at the quantum level. Now to just figure out
what it is. I think maybe it has something to do with time being much
different down there.
FrediFizzx
I suspect the proposers are having some trouble with that too: there is a
remark that "the shape of existing niobium cavities must be modified."
Well, maybe they have worked it out!
> If it is possible, I suspect that the waves will have frequencies
> in the ratio of small integers, and that introduces systematics
> that probably make the intended observation imposible.
>
> 2) Hoping for ~30 MV/meter is quite a challenge. The collaboration of
> which I am a member has run vacuum RF cavities ~20 MV/meter at 805
> MHz, but going significantly higher is a serious challenge. The
> limit is dark current, and sometimes multipactoring....
>
> 3) I suspect 30 MV/meter is woefully short of what is required....
As you say, it's enough to rip some electrons out of the cavity walls, but
out of the vacuum...?
> I have not yet followed up on that website.... I doubt our collaboration
> would be very interested in pursuing this, unless we can find additional
> funding for it. But it's worth a few hours investigation -- THANKS!
>
>
> Tom Roberts tjro...@lucent.com
OK: I thought it was interesting because of its "classical" features, but I
would want some more convincing to fund it extensively...
> Had I known you would take my use of "believed" to mean something
> other than "thought" I would have been more careful in my wording
> to begin with.
Careful wording does not help you here. Because I have not made
claims about Bohm's thoughts too. The only thing I'm interested in is
the hidden variable theory which has been found by Bohm and therefore
has been named "Bohmian mechanics".
> But, if you yourself choose to disregard Bohm's own thoughts about
> the work which he did, in favor of what is convenient for your
> interpretation, well, then, that is completely up to you.
I'm interested in the theory. I do not disregard any argument that my
current interpretation of this theory is incorrect. But once I have
seen the formulas of the theory, authority alone is no longer a
convincing argument.
> I, for one, choose not to so ignore and I take Bohm's views and
> theory together into an entire context.
It seems, our disagreement about the importance of original sources is
a more fundamental one about the scientific method itself.
[Snip ...]
>
> As a followup to this, I was thinking that maybe it might not be
> impossible after all to explain light-light scattering with
> Maxwell's equations if we stop assuming div E = 0 and curl
> B = dE/dt for the quantum vacuum. ...
On what scale? A cublic meter, cubic centimeter, a cublic
nanometer? You know what is said about assume, to assume any
idealized conditions actually exist in nature in any limit is
probably folly.
> ... While these are true macroscopically, they are not true
> microscopically at the quantum level. ...
I ageed as stated above.
> ... Rho and J just take on a different "character" at the quantum
> level. ...
Here I'll disagree if, by character you do MEAN different properties.
> ... Now to just figure out what it is. ...
That is (or should be) the eternal quest
> ... I think maybe it has something to do with time being much
> different down there.
This statement does not make any sense to me. What do you mean?
Paul Stowe
>> Again, my remark was not about electroweak broken symmetry.
> My comment was not restricted to electroweak symmetry and I gave
> two examples, a ferromagnet, which is a broken geometric symmetry
> and a superconductor which is a broken U(1) symmetry. Symmetry
> breaking as I described is a universal feature in condensed matter
> physics.
Of course, there are many examples of broken symmetry. In this sense,
it may be named universal. But there are many other ways of changing
symmetry between a fundamental theory and their
approximation. Starting from Flat Earth (E^2) to spherical Earth (O(3)).
>>> Sure there is. The gauge bosons are merely a result, not the
>>> motivation. The basic idea is that one can describe an interaction
>>> by an invariance principle. If the interaction involves masses,
>>> then the manifest invariance is broken.
>> Different people can have very different ideas about such things.
>> The standard model is, more or less, a phenomenological theory.
>> With lots of interesting patterns.
> The reason it would be considered phenomenological is because it
> contains parameters derived from measurements (e.g., \alpha, \hbar,
> c, etc). To the extent that any theory can't derive those values,
> that theory is phenomenological.
I don't think this is the difference.
> On the other hand, given those parameters, the standard model is a
> precise description of the current universe.
And precision is certainly not what makes a theory phenomenological.
> It doesn't describe the universe at unification temperatures, only
> because the underlying gauge group is not pinned down. The term
> "effective theory" means the theory is described by a lagrangian
> constructed for the vacuum of the broken symmetry, rather than the
> vacuum of the unbroken symmetry.
> The lagrangian derived from the unifying gauge group represents the
> "correct" description of the unbroken symmetry. It's like saying that
> the description of a silicon crystal is an effective theory of silicon.
> The theory describes the silicon crystal, but isn't a theory of silicon
> in the vapour phase. It's still the correct theory for the crystalline
> phase.
IMHU "effective field theory" is a little more general, as described
by Weinberg in hep-th/9702027. What you describe is the IMHO less
general program of grand unification.
>>> If you are going to give up the idea of a particle being
>>> a "thing", what have you retained that gives any meaning to "things"
>>> following "trajectories" or having "locations"?
>> BM does not care much about locations. The trajectories are
>> trajectories in the configuration space Q=Q(t).
> If there is a trajectory, something has to be on it, or else it
> isn't very closely related to a trajectory. Since a trajectory describes
> a location as a function of time, I can't see how bohmian mechanics
> can not "care" about locations.
You should understand the difference between trajectories in an
abstract configuration space Q(t) and trajectories of particles (their
locations) x(t) in space.
They coinside only in single particle theory. Already in two-particle
theory they are different (Q = {x_1,x_2}). In field theory (Q =
{phi(x)}) they have nothing to do with each other.
>>> If you want to give that up, you might as well not make a big fuss
>>> over giving up definite trajectories or locations,
>> What I don't plan to give up is classical realism. As you may realize
>> now, this is an extremely weak set of assumptions. It is not bound to
>> special concepts like locality, space, locations, trajectories.
> That pretty much means your idea of classical realism is unique to
> yourself.
In this case, please show the difference between the notion of realism
proposed by the EPR criterion of reality or the notion of realism used
by Bell to prove his theorem with my idea of classical realism.
> In between posts, I've scavenged a few more articles on
> bohmian mechanics, referenced from sheldon goldstein's web site.
> Since he seems to be the defacto spokesperson spearheading the acceptance
> drive for bohmian mechanics, I've more or less taken his viewpoint as
> the canonical position on what it means. His view seems quite different
> from yours on the subject, but since he describes it thoroughly, it's
> the only description I have. And I don't find his description very
> compelling.
In this case, please describe where you see the differences between
the Goldstein group and me. Of course, there is one difference: many
proponents of BM search for Lorentz-invariant versions of BM despite
Bell's theorem and try to minimize the conflict between relativity and
BM.
>> I would like to argue that classical realism is simply one of the laws
>> of consistent reasoning. If you know Jaynes argumentation (if not,
>> google on s.p.research with "Jaynes" or "Bayesian" will give you the
>> links and interesting discussions) classical probability theory in the
>> Bayesian sense may be justified as the laws of consistent reasoning.
>> I think his argumentation may be extended to realism as well: If you
>> have a Bayesian probability distribution over the set of statements,
>> it seems possible to construct some underlying set so that it becomes
>> a Kolmogorovian probability theory on this set.
> I don't see how this would actually negate any interpretation of
> quantum mechanics,
Quite simple, the assumptions about realism used by Bell in his proof
simply become "rules of consistent reasoning".
>> Whatever, the point is that the theory exists, may be formulated.
>> Then, it is realistic, even deterministic.
> As you (as well as sheldon goldstein) have described the theory, I
> [see?] nothing which is any more deterministic than any other
> interpretation.
Strange. The result of each experiment is predefined by the initial
state, probability is caused by absence of knowledge about the initial
values, as in classical thermodynamics. This was the program of
the "hidden variable" explanation of quantum uncertainty.
> The only difference is that bohmian mechanics has taken the position
> that the existence of the "guiding" equation makes it deterministic
Of course. This was the classical notion of determinism, at least I
see no difference.
> and ignored everything else by defining it to be outside the realm
> of quantum mechanics
about which "everything else" are you talking?
> or else assumes the quantum mechanical part and shows that, yes
> indeed, the rest is deterministic.
I don't understand.
> As examples, sheldon goldstein selectively discards the problems
> with relativity as being the realm of relativity, while quite
> willingly makes use of others which I assume he knows are
> relativistic in origin, to promote his view point as does:
> http://xxx.lanl.gov/ps/quant-ph/9504010.ps, berndl, daumert and
> durr, regarding spin and statistics:
>
> "According to orthodox quantum mechanics the very notion of
> indistinguishable particles seems to be grounded on the non-
> existence of particle trajectories and on the practical
> difficulty of distinguishing identical particles at two
> different time."
>
> Well, no, that isn't the case, it just happens to be convenient to
> the argument.
Yep, and this is also Goldstein's position. He continues: "This might
lead to the expectation .... However, this is not so."
> In short, if I take sheldon goldstein's description of bohmian
> mechanics as the accepted description of bohmian mechanics, I
> can't see that it offers any additional facet of "classical realism"
> than any other interpretation, and requires a rather ugly assumption
> that its supposed virtues are somehow irrelevant anyway, since none
> of this so-called "determinism" is ever evident in any experiment.
Again, for the major part of my argumentation your personal opinion
about Bohmian mechanics is irrelevant. Feel free to dislike it - the
point is that it proves the existence of a classical realistic theory,
therefore removing any arguments of type "classical realism is
incompatible with observation".
>>> In that case, what's the point?
>> Classical realism, which is not about particles or space or such
>> things, but much more fundamental and much more important.
> According sheldon goldtein's website, my impression is that none of
> what I presume to be the "more fundamental" details are observable
> through experiments. At the same time that philosophy seems take the
> unobservable aspects as having more reality than the observable
> ones.
The difference between BM and other QM interpretations is, of course,
more philosophical. The observable predictions are the same. This is
certainly not an argument in favour of one of the other
interpretations - simply all QM interpretations are on equal foot as
far as we care about observations.
Thus, to decide about our preferences we have to compare the
metaphysical, philosphical differences. And in this comparison
BM is IMHO a clear winner: clear ontology, classical realism,
in competition with confusion and mystery.
>>> I don't see that the method of solving the problem (pertubative vs
>>> lattice) changes anything other than the approach to the same
>>> effective theory. The theory is no less an effective theory simply
>>> by changing the method of obtaining solutions.
>>
>> I do not doubt that QFT as well as the Bohmian field theory version
>> are effective field theories. I find a lattice regularization
>> attractive also for some other reasons, connected with quantization of
>> gravity.
>
> It might very well be the right way to solve the problem of quantizing
> gravity, but to the best I can determine, lattice theories are just a
> different approach to a problem which is unsuitable for perturbation
> theory. Conversely, lattice calculations seem to run into difficulty
> where peturbation theory works well. So, essentially, I see the two
> approaches as somewhat dependent upon what one wants to solve.
You compare them as two ways to compute predictions from a given
continuous field theory. I consider some sufficiently simple lattice
theories as natural candidates (better: simple models) for a more
fundamental (atomic ether) theory.
>> You know, the theory in gr-qc/0205035 includes continuity and Euler
>> equations.
> Yes, I know. One of the things I found puzzling was why you
> preferred to make the continuity equations part of the axioms rather
> than a consequence of the lagrangian.
Very simple, to be able to derive the Lagrangian.
Of course, you can have it the other way too, postulate the Lagrangian
and derive the continuity equation. But then the question appears
"why this Lagrangian". The question "why this continuity equation"
sounds less natural.
>> First, it is the notion of realism defended by EPR and Bell, or at
>> least quite close to it. And IMHO I use it in a quite consistent way.
> You might use it consistently, but I can't really figure out
> what justifies the term "classical realism" from the way you
> apply it.
Do you have a better idea? This concept certainly preserves classical
logic and classical probability theory, contrary to "quantum logic".
It is also contrary to the usual version of "many world
interpretation" which is sometimes named "realistic" too. (But note
that the Bohmian wave function is a function on the space of the "many
worlds" - the configuration space.)
>> I have discarded every classical idea but one? Not really - I do
>> insist only on this one classical idea. The other classical ideas
>> are less important, I can live very well without them. But this one
>> is the only idea I insist on, because the rejection seems to be a
>> complete rejection of realistic, scientific reasoning. This
>> particular idea seems to me like a part of extended logic.
> However, in my opinion, all I'm doing is abandoning a classical
> viewpoint where it doesn't apply, in which case, I simply have to
> come to terms with what does apply and in doing so, I am doing
> exactly what scientific reasoning would tell me I should do.
You abandon some classical viewpoint. There are two possibilities:
First, this is a secondary, less important viewpoint (like particles
vs. fields as fundamental, dimension of space, curled dimensions in
string theory). In this case, I don't care.
Second, you reject fundamentals, like logic, probability theory,
realism. In this case, you are not abandoning something which does
not apply - instead, it is your free, deliberate and metaphysical
decision to abandon it, because you have the choice: you can accept
Bohmian mechanics, where these these principles apply.
If you reject Bohmian mechanics, there are also two choices: You can
reject it as not beautiful, and search for a better one, without
questioning the fundamental principles of classical realism. That's
the usual scientific way - we often don't like many particular
features of existing theories, search for better solutions.
Second, you reject it and abandon the fundamental principles.
Nonetheless, this rejection of BM is not a justification for the
rejection of classical realism. You have to justify the rejection of
classical realism in some other way. You cannot rely on any conflict
with observation.
>> And there is exactly no reason to give up this one idea.
>> You may be correct that naming this idea "classical realism" gives a
>> wrong picture, suggesting that the "classical realist" insists on much
>> more, like space, particles, trajectories, lots of other unnecessary
>> assumptions which can easily given up without any problem. Therefore
>> people think they can easily give up such a "classical realism",
>> nothing to bother about, stupid old prejudices.
> Well, as far as a large fraction of the participants in this newsgroup
> are concerned, your idea of "classical realism" a lot closer to the
> abstractions they dislike in the more standard descriptions than what they
> would consider classical realism.
Full ack. But who cares about this "large fraction"? Let's better
care about EPR and Bell. BTW, I think in one direction there is
agreement even with this "large fraction": Theories which the "large
fraction" accepts as realistic are also realistic in the EPR-Bell
sence.
That's no accident, but the way EPR have introduced it (as a
"criterion of reality", leaving open if there may be other, additional
criteria for realistic theories) and Bell has used it (as an
assumption to prove a general property of all realistic theories).
> I also doubt that if you asked a dozen people what the considered to
> be classical realism, you'd get about 20 different answers,
> depending upon who you asked. I can easily picture some people
> having a different idea every time you asked them.
Ack. Therefore I try to specify my notion of classical realism in a
very specific, detailed way, and try to follow the definitions given
in scientific literature.
> I also tend to disagree with some of the way the traditional answers
> treat what's realistic, in that, often people to want to sit on the fence
> by not commiting themselves to giving physical meaning to the mathematical
> objects, like virtual particles, being manipulated. So, I'm not being
> one-sided here, it's just that you use "realism" as a criteria a lot.
I understand your discomfort with the use of "realism". If it helps
you, replace in your mind "realism" by "EPRBellism" in every of my
postings.
>> Instead, classical realism - the thing you have to give up to claim
>> that Einstein causality holds - means to give up something much
>> more fundamental, much closer to elementary common sense (in the
>> positive sense of this word), to consistent reasoning, to extended
>> logic.
> I don't really think causality is applicable at the quantum scale.
If you use BM, you have classical causality for nothing (ok, for
accepting hidden variables including a hidden preferred frame).
So, there is zero empirical evidence for your belief.
> I can turn that argument around and define a causal relationship by
> one which can be connected by a signal, or in otherwords, the
> interference that exists by virtue of the uncertainty relations
> allows me to define what relationships are causal and which are not.
But this is a clear change of meaning, inspired by positivistic
metaphysics: it restricts causal connections to causal connections
which are directly observable and usable.
The redefinition is obvious: An observation which has two classical
realistic explanations - (A->B) or (B->A) - is an indirect observation
of a causal connection between A and B. But it cannot be used for
information transfer, because information transfer A=>B would be in
contradiction with explanation B->A.
>> Bohmian mechanics is identical in its probability predictions to
>> standard quantum mechanics. That's a quite simple mathematical
>> theorem, it follows essentially by construction. So, do you believe
>> these effects are inconsistent with quantum mechanics?
> What I believe is that what is consistent with quantum mechanics is
> the observable parts of the theory. I think the unobservable aspects
> which bohmian mechanics declares as unobservable despite existing,
> run contrary to the motivation for bohmian mechanics.
This is false, AFAIK about the historical motivations for bohmian
mechanics. (Stephen may know better.)
The hidden variable program was to find a theory which gives the
observable predictions of QM in a way analoguous to the
thermondynamical limit of Newtonian theory - an underlying
deterministic theory, and an initial classical probability
distribution which predicts the observable QM probability
distributions.
> In my opinion, what can be measured, in principle, is what exists.
This is classical positivism. In realism (Poppers fallibism) the
situation is reverse. We have a theory, which defines the ontology
(what exists). Then, starting from the definition, it is derived what
is observable, what can be measured. Using these predictions, we test
our theories, and the theories which fail are rejected as falsified.
Nothing in this picture suggests that everything what exists should be
observable. Nothing in this picture suggests even that it is easy to
derive what is observable in a given theory. But the theory is simply
not yet given, as a realistic theory, if it is not defined what is.
> If I want to establish a virtual pion as a physical object, it's
> possible to create an experiment in which the virtual pion emits
> real radiation.
This is something I don't even care about. This is the usual common
sense misleading notion of realism, which is confused by questions
like "Are armchairs real? They are not, what is real are atoms. But
are atoms real? No, quarks are real." and so on. This sort of
questions is a consequence of your wish to derive existence from
observation. It is meaningless if we start from the priority of
theory. In this case, everything is simple: If we consider everyday
common sense realism, armchairs are real, because armchairs are
objects in this theory. Atoms are real in atomic theory. Instead, in
QCD not atoms but quarks are real.
> In bohmian mechanics, it's not possible to put any object on one of
> those trajectories and know that the object will be right where you
> expect it. All you can say is that _if_ you could put an object on
> such a trajectory, it would follow that trajectory. But then,
> bohmian mechanics goes on to say it's not possible, even in
> principle to do that. At least according sheldon goldstein's
> website.
It sounds much better if you would replace "goes on to say" by "derives".
>>> If you accept the uncertainty principle as it applies to field
>>> operators, then I don't really see how you can deny it applies to
>>> anything else.
>> I don't deny the uncertainty principle also for classical Schroedinger
>> theory, so field theory seems irrelevant. It is well-known that the
>> Bohmian trajectories Q(t) are unobservable, so there is no
>> contradiction.
> In that case it doesn't matter if you discard it, since there is
> absolutely no possibility of it being able to affect anything which
> can be observed. Otherwise, the trajectories would be observable.
The trajectories are not observable in BM because this follows from
the equations. We do not need additional principles, we derive them.
> Ilja is mistaken here in regard to Bohm.
Again, I have not made any statement about Bohm.
> In Bohmian mechanics the particle really has a precise position and
> momentum, but which is "hidden" until one gives up some of the usual
> assumptions in regard to the \psi function, which are developed as
> part of Bohm's theory.
My statement that in Bohmian mechanics we have trajectories in the
configuration space is correct. Instead, momentum (understood as the
result of a QM momentum measurement) is not defined.
> "In our interpretation, however, we assert that the at
> present 'hidden' precisely definable particle positions
> and momenta determine the results of each measurement
> process ..."
Your point here being?
Once you have a trajectory, you can, of course, define a "momentum"
p=mv. But this "momentum" is unobservable. There is no necessity for
a special name for the expression m dQ/dt in BM, and to name it
momentum is confusing, because it is not what is measured in QM
momentum measurement. A situation comparable to "relativistic mass"
vs. "rest mass".
An interesting point is that the result of a QM momentum measurement
depends in the Bohmian picture not only on the initial position of the
measured object, but also on the initial position of the measurement
instrument.
> "In connection with this problem, we shall show that
> if, as suggested in Paper I, Secs. 4 and 9, we give up
> the three mutually consistent special assumptions
> leading to the same results as those of the usual
> interpretation, the particle position and momentum can
> in principle be measured simultaneously with unlimited
> precision."
Your point here being?
(A "problem" with this from modern point of view is that it is not
easy to give them up. Decoherence leads to quantum equilibrium.)
> "The usual interpretation of the quantum theory implies
> that we must renounce the possibility of describing an
> individual system in terms of a precisely defined
> conceptual model. We have, however, proposed an
> alternative interpretation which does not imply such a
> renunciation, but which instead leads us to regard a
> quantum-mechanical system as a synthesis of a precisely
> definable particle and a precisely definable \psi-field
> which exerts a force on this particle."
Your point here being?
> But, since Ilja has made abundantly clear that he does not read the
> "Holy Scripts" written by the original people developing the theory,
> I suppose he would not know anything about what Bohm actually wrote.
As usual, I prefer (and recommend) modern literature about Bohmian
mechanics.
I have guessed so.
> I never searched for "weak places".
So, your doubts are irrelevant.
> You pointed out the theorems as alleged obstacle to my results.
I pointed to these theorems as known mathematical facts about the
continuous Einstein equations. They lead to singularities. Point.
If you think otherwise, there should be something wrong or with these
theorems or with your thoughts.
>>>>> http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/ .
>>>>> Before you biasedly consider it as crankery, have first a look
>>>>> at `brief.txt' or `briefger.txt' in above directory.
>>>> There is a well-known and accepted proof about the necessity of
>>>> singularities in the continuous equations.
>>> according to the "conventional" algorithm I learnt in the school
>>> to solve PDE's.
>> Conventional discretization schemes often fail.
> I believe, here is the confusion (which is of course on my side).
> Here I must ask you: Does the theorem that you mean (by Penrose and
> Hawking) consider any "discretization" ?
No. It is a claim about the continuous equations.
>>>> There are your computations. There is no proof that your
>>>> computations accurately approximate the continuous equations.
>
>>> You claim that, since you ignore the results. That "proof" is in the
>>> results, man!
>
>> How? The "result" are some discrete computations.
>
> How can computations be results ?
That's my question to you. You claim to have results, and it looks
like you point to some numerical computations. If you agree that
numerical computations, in itself, are not results, you have not been
able to communicate what are your results.
>> How can these computations prove that the result of the
>> computations approximates the continuous equation?
> Not computations do that but indications from nature.
"Indications" or results?
> Have you not read `sc_works.txt' ? But I'm afraid that you only
> looked for allegedly cranky words instead of trying to understand
> what I did. May I quote:
>
> | Now I did a lot of computations with several values of the integration
> | constants. During each computation I counted the steps until the physical
> | components took on an amount of 1 . (That could be a kind of event
> | horizon). As well, the number of steps has periodic behaviour in relation
> | to the integration constants. Maximal numbers of steps appeared when the
> | values of the integration constants were identical with the values of spin,
> | charge, and magnetical momentum from literature (of course normalized for
> | the computer).
>
> Is that so hard to understand ? That are real tests !
Hm. If this is your result, then I have the following picture: You
have some black box (some program on your computer) which computes
some numbers (steps until something strange happens) in dependence on
some input variables. Your result is that for observable values of
the input variables the output has some special properties.
This is something I would name an interesting observation.
>> First, nobody has claimed that there is no chaos. The theorems tell
>> only that there will be singularities. Second, tendencies are not a
>> proof.
>
> Did I claim that ?
Your description has left such an impression.
> And the singularities from the initial conditions are within the
> limit surfaces (in the gauged coordinates), i.e. do locally not
> exist.
Let's look where we have started to argue about singularities:
---------------------------------------
>> 1.) A theory without big bang and black hole singularities (these
>> singularities have been named "the greatest crisis in physics").
> If one properly calculates the tensor equations from GR, he/she
> gets particles instead of singularities.
No. There are famous theorems that in GR you obtain singularities.
---------------------------------------
If you make computations only locally, you may avoid singularties. I
agree. But then, what is the point of your remark?
>> LOL. This is what I try to explain you. You have continuous
>> equations, and there are lots of algorithms to compute approximate
>> solutions. They often give very different results, especially because
>> some of them are simply wrong (do not give the correct continuous
>> limit), and others are very inaccurate.
> Agree. What is with the closed formulae as solutions (I above meant) ?
> What refer the theorems to ?
(BTW, bitte nicht plenken, www.sockenseite.de/usenet/plenken.html)
The theorem refers to some quite general initial conditions in the
continuous equations. Especially not only to special (like
analytical) solutions. Something like positive energy conditions for
the energy-momentum tensor of matter and some initial conditions
similar to those of the universe backward in time or before a
gravitational collapse.
>>> Here one must ask nature.
>> No. If you want to find approximate solutions of a given continuous
>> equation, you have to ask numerical mathematics, for proofs of
>> convergence theorems and so on.
> I heard physicists who unshakably claim that nature be the highest
> authority.
My claim was that your results are something different than a claim
made by Nature.
The scale is going to have to be dynamic. I would guess it would start
around or near the size of an atom (10^-10 meters).
| > ... While these are true macroscopically, they are not true
| > microscopically at the quantum level. ...
|
| I ageed as stated above.
|
| > ... Rho and J just take on a different "character" at the quantum
| > level. ...
|
| Here I'll disagree if, by character you do MEAN different properties.
I guess my idea here would be that charge density and current density
microscopically for the quantum vacuum has to be described by different
means. When you start "seeing" more of bare charge microscopically, div E =
rho does not hold up exactly.
| > ... Now to just figure out what it is. ...
|
| That is (or should be) the eternal quest
|
| > ... I think maybe it has something to do with time being much
| > different down there.
|
| This statement does not make any sense to me. What do you mean?
The idea is that quantum particles can see the "pure" vacuum where time is
either non-existant of is a mix of no time with time set by c. So they end
up being like "wavy" string objects.
FrediFizzx
> Stephen Speicher <s...@speicher.com> writes:
>
> > But, if you yourself choose to disregard Bohm's own thoughts about
> > the work which he did, in favor of what is convenient for your
> > interpretation, well, then, that is completely up to you.
>
> I'm interested in the theory. I do not disregard any argument that my
> current interpretation of this theory is incorrect. But once I have
> seen the formulas of the theory, authority alone is no longer a
> convincing argument.
>
But the same formulas can be used by differing physical theories,
just as is the case with special relativity and the Lorentz ether
theory. This is not an issue of "authority," but rather an issue
of simple identification of fact.
I really couldn't care less about what theories you accept; I am
simply pointing out that when you refer to the Bohm or the
Lorentz theory, the meaning which _they_ attach to their
mathematical formalism is what defines _their_ theory. If you
choose to remain ignorant of what Bohm and Lorentz actually
wrote, that's fine, as long as you do not persist in attributing
to the originators of a theory that which really is your own
view, or, perhaps, a view you gleaned from a secondary or
tertiary source.
> Stephen Speicher <s...@speicher.com> writes:
> > But, since Ilja has made abundantly clear that he does not read the
> > "Holy Scripts" written by the original people developing the theory,
> > I suppose he would not know anything about what Bohm actually wrote.
>
> As usual, I prefer (and recommend) modern literature about Bohmian
> mechanics.
>
And that is perfectly fine, except when you, or the secondary
literature, attribute to the originator of the theory, ideas
which are contrary -- or, just different -- to the originator's
own. It does a disservice to the likes of a Lorentz or a Bohm to
use their names attached to ideas which really are not their own,
regardless of whether those ideas are better or worse than the
ideas of the originator of the theory.
>> As usual, I prefer (and recommend) modern literature about Bohmian
>> mechanics.
> And that is perfectly fine, except when you, or the secondary
> literature, attribute to the originator of the theory, ideas
> which are contrary -- or, just different -- to the originator's
> own.
I don't do such things. Please support your accusation with quotes.
I argue about properties of theories, not ideas of their originators.
> It does a disservice to the likes of a Lorentz or a Bohm to
> use their names attached to ideas which really are not their own,
> regardless of whether those ideas are better or worse than the
> ideas of the originator of the theory.
It is not my idea to name the variant of special relativity with
preferred frame and a stationary ether interpretation "Lorentz ether".
As well it is not my idea to name the variant of quantum theory which
consists of the Schroedinger equation for a wave function Psi(Q,t) on
configuration space and the "guiding equation"
d_t Q = <Psi J Psi>/<Psi Psi>,
and gives standard QM predictions for quantum equilibrium, "Bohmian
mechanics". Instead, these are well-established standard scientific
naming conventions. I don't argue about such naming conventions,
because I have more interesting things to argue about.
The ideas are connected with the theories, not with their originators.
>> I'm interested in the theory. I do not disregard any argument that my
>> current interpretation of this theory is incorrect. But once I have
>> seen the formulas of the theory, authority alone is no longer a
>> convincing argument.
> But the same formulas can be used by differing physical theories,
> just as is the case with special relativity and the Lorentz ether
> theory.
This is a very special case. Usually such differences are named
different interpretations of the same physical theory.
> This is not an issue of "authority," but rather an issue of simple
> identification of fact.
If you think that there are different interpretations of Bohmian
mechanics, feel free to argue about this. In this case I have no
problem to clarify that I propose the modern interpretation a la
Goldstein. But I don't think the differences are large enough to
justify different denotations.
> I really couldn't care less about what theories you accept; I am
> simply pointing out that when you refer to the Bohm or the Lorentz
> theory, the meaning which _they_ attach to their mathematical
> formalism is what defines _their_ theory.
I disagree. BTW, is there an absolute space in Newtonian theory or is
NT a relativistic theory (with Galilean relativity)?
> If you choose to remain ignorant of what Bohm and Lorentz actually
> wrote, that's fine, as long as you do not persist in attributing to
> the originators of a theory that which really is your own view, or,
> perhaps, a view you gleaned from a secondary or tertiary source.
I don't. If you find such misattributions in my posting, please
correct me.
> Stephen Speicher <s...@speicher.com> writes:
> > On 17 Feb 2003, Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> >> Stephen Speicher <s...@speicher.com> writes:
> >>> But, since Ilja has made abundantly clear that he does not read the
> >>> "Holy Scripts" written by the original people developing the theory,
> >>> I suppose he would not know anything about what Bohm actually wrote.
>
> >> As usual, I prefer (and recommend) modern literature about Bohmian
> >> mechanics.
>
> > And that is perfectly fine, except when you, or the secondary
> > literature, attribute to the originator of the theory, ideas
> > which are contrary -- or, just different -- to the originator's
> > own.
>
> I don't do such things. Please support your accusation with quotes.
>
I did, but you just ignored them.
This is pointless, just as was the "discussion" about Lorentz.
However, since you do not read the "Holy Scripts" of Lorentz or
Bohm, it would be interesting for you to list the two or three
sources each which you have used to gain your knowledge about the
Lorentz Ether Theory and Bohmian mechanics.
[snip]
>> You pointed out the theorems as alleged obstacle to my results.
> I pointed to these theorems as known mathematical facts about the
> continuous Einstein equations. They lead to singularities. Point.
And I pointed out that these singularities don't disturb me. Point.
[snip]
>> Here I must ask you: Does the theorem that you mean (by Penrose and
>> Hawking) consider any "discretization" ?
> No. It is a claim about the continuous equations.
Ok. So it is not relevant for the simulations.
[snip]
>>> How can these computations prove that the result of the
>>> computations approximates the continuous equation?
>> Not computations do that but indications from nature.
> "Indications" or results?
I mean really indications. Concretely coincidences of the inserted
integration constants at most stable solutions with known quantities
of particles. But such indications can be included in results, as
here is the case.
>> Have you not read `sc_works.txt' ? But I'm afraid that you only
>> looked for allegedly cranky words instead of trying to understand
>> what I did. May I quote:
>>
>> | Now I did a lot of computations with several values of the integration
>> | constants. During each computation I counted the steps until the physical
>> | components took on an amount of 1 . (That could be a kind of event
>> | horizon). As well, the number of steps has periodic behaviour in relation
>> | to the integration constants. Maximal numbers of steps appeared when the
>> | values of the integration constants were identical with the values of spin,
>> | charge, and magnetical momentum from literature (of course normalized for
>> | the computer).
>>
>> Is that so hard to understand ? That are real tests !
> Hm. If this is your result, then I have the following picture: You
> have some black box (some program on your computer) which computes
> some numbers (steps until something strange happens) in dependence on
> some input variables. Your result is that for observable values of
> the input variables the output has some special properties.
Your "picture" is not bad. :-) The input variables are the integration
constants to insert into the initial conditions.
> This is something I would name an interesting observation.
I willingly agree. Observation is the first step in science, and one
should not forget that.
[snip]
> If you make computations only locally, you may avoid singularties. I
> agree. But then, what is the point of your remark?
That the singularities are no obstacle for the simulations.
>>> LOL. This is what I try to explain you. You have continuous
>>> equations, and there are lots of algorithms to compute approximate
>>> solutions. They often give very different results, especially because
>>> some of them are simply wrong (do not give the correct continuous
>>> limit), and others are very inaccurate.
>> Agree. What is with the closed formulae as solutions (I above meant) ?
>> What refer the theorems to ?
> (BTW, bitte nicht plenken, www.sockenseite.de/usenet/plenken.html)
Ooh, now I must look at the Sockenseite to see what you mean with
"plenken". Or does it mean that you not see the context of the
closed formulae with above ?
> The theorem refers to some quite general initial conditions in the
> continuous equations. Especially not only to special (like
> analytical) solutions. Something like positive energy conditions for
> the energy-momentum tensor of matter and some initial conditions
> similar to those of the universe backward in time or before a
> gravitational collapse.
Ok.
>>>> Here one must ask nature.
>>> No. If you want to find approximate solutions of a given continuous
>>> equation, you have to ask numerical mathematics, for proofs of
>>> convergence theorems and so on.
>> I heard physicists who unshakably claim that nature be the highest
>> authority.
> My claim was that your results are something different than a claim
> made by Nature.
I hope that the past tense exactly describes what you mean. ;)
Ulrich
>>> And that is perfectly fine, except when you, or the secondary
>>> literature, attribute to the originator of the theory, ideas
>>> which are contrary -- or, just different -- to the originator's
>>> own.
>>
>> I don't do such things. Please support your accusation with quotes.
> I did, but you just ignored them.
Then please give the Msg-Id again. The quote from me in Message-ID:
<Pine.LNX.4.33.03021...@localhost.localdomain> was
> >BM does not care much about locations. The trajectories are
> >trajectories in the configuration space Q=Q(t).
This is a clear attribution to BM (Bohmian mechanics), not to Bohm
himself.
> This is pointless, just as was the "discussion" about Lorentz.
No. This is already a personal accusation
> However, since you do not read the "Holy Scripts" of Lorentz or
> Bohm,
I have never said that I have not read Bohm. But I clearly prefer the
modern presentation of BM, without "quantum potential" and with the
guiding equation in the form
dQ/dt = <Psi J Psi>/<Psi Psi>
instead of all this unnecessary quantum potential stuff of the 1952
paper.
Moreover, I also have not said that I never read Holy Scripts.
Especially I have read parts of the Bible, Das Kapital, a lot of
Lenin, Stirner, Popper, Kant, Einstein's and Poincare's 1905 papers,
EPR, Bell and other candidates for Holy Scripts. I simply don't
consider it to be necessary to read them in _science_, which is an
important difference between science and other domains. But if you
argue with non-scientists (marxists, christian fundamentalists, many
philosophers) you have no choice but have to read them. I seems, I
have to add Stephen Speicher to this list of non-scientists.
There are some Holy Scripts I have not read, including Lorentz's
papers. For your future use in low-level ad hominem attacks, some
other Holy Scripts I have not read: Euclid, Archimedes, Einstein's
1915 GR papers, the original Heisenberg and Schroedinger QM papers.
> it would be interesting for you to list the two or three sources
> each which you have used to gain your knowledge about the Lorentz
> Ether Theory and Bohmian mechanics.
Why should it be interesting for me? I already know the sources which
I have used to learn this stuff.
But once you seem to be so interested about my (very unimportant)
personal reading list, I can give you the list of my online favorites
from my internal home page which I have created at the time I have
learned BM. Unfortunately it is far away from being up to
date. Moreover, by its nature it contains only the online sources.
quant-ph/9511005
quant-ph/9512027
quant-ph/9902018
quant-ph/9504010
quant-ph/9510027
quant-ph/9511016
quant-ph/9512028
quant-ph/9601013
gr-qc/9406028
quant-ph/9602020
quant-ph/9607004
quant-ph/9512031
quant-ph/9902059
The basic facts about the Lorentz ether I have learned as part of the
basic education about special relativity. Fortunately, the education
which Bell proposes in "how to teach special relativity" has been
sufficiently close to the education I have received at the Moscow
State University. Among the "Holy Scripts" I have read about this at
that time was a Russian translation of the Poincare relativity paper,
translated and propagated by the Logunov group, and the Einstein
Leyden lecture.
What disturbs you is your free choice. Something I do not object to.
>>> Here I must ask you: Does the theorem that you mean (by Penrose and
>>> Hawking) consider any "discretization" ?
>
>> No. It is a claim about the continuous equations.
>
> Ok. So it is not relevant for the simulations.
If you don't claim that your simulations have anything to do with the
continuous equation, I agree.
Else, if the results of a simulation is in conflict with a proven fact
about the continuous equations this is a serious indication that the
simulation has not much to do with the continuous theory.
>>> | Now I did a lot of computations with several values of the integration
>>> | constants. During each computation I counted the steps until the physical
>>> | components took on an amount of 1 . (That could be a kind of event
>>> | horizon). As well, the number of steps has periodic behaviour in relation
>>> | to the integration constants. Maximal numbers of steps appeared when the
>>> | values of the integration constants were identical with the values of spin,
>>> | charge, and magnetical momentum from literature (of course normalized for
>>> | the computer).
>>> Is that so hard to understand ? That are real tests !
>> Hm. If this is your result, then I have the following picture: You
>> have some black box (some program on your computer) which computes
>> some numbers (steps until something strange happens) in dependence on
>> some input variables. Your result is that for observable values of
>> the input variables the output has some special properties.
> Your "picture" is not bad. :-) The input variables are the integration
> constants to insert into the initial conditions.
>
>> This is something I would name an interesting observation.
>
> I willingly agree. Observation is the first step in science, and one
> should not forget that.
AFAIR, the numbers have been numbers from nucleons, proton, neutron
and so on?
>>> Agree. What is with the closed formulae as solutions (I above meant) ?
>>> What refer the theorems to ?
>
>> (BTW, bitte nicht plenken, www.sockenseite.de/usenet/plenken.html)
>
> Ooh, now I must look at the Sockenseite to see what you mean with
> "plenken".
Yep. Or choose whatever else you find with google.
[snip]
> If you don't claim that your simulations have anything to do with the
> continuous equation, I agree.
> Else, if the results of a simulation is in conflict with a proven fact
> about the continuous equations this is a serious indication that the
> simulation has not much to do with the continuous theory.
I see no conflict at all.
But when I hear "proven fact about the continuous equations", I get
bellyache. When you mean the singularity theorems, I get shapes.
That all is neither proven nor fact, per definitionem.
Actually, the simulations run according to "continuous equations"
but (of course) with finite differences.
[snip nice but ancient text]
> AFAIR, the numbers have been numbers from nucleons, proton, neutron
> and so on?
Of course.
http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/brief.txt
Otherwise, I had not a single reason to fight for a few results from
numerical simulations, and permanently let insult me from close-
minded persons.
Ulrich
Above a Knudsen value of unity [λ/s, s = scale length] for the mean
vortex lattice (λ ≈ 1E-9m) div E = rho will not be strictly true...
That definition assumes a smooth continuum which requires λ/s < 1.
>> ... Now to just figure out what it is. ...
>
> That is (or should be) the eternal quest
>
>>> ... I think maybe it has something to do with time being much
>>> different down there.
>>
>> This statement does not make any sense to me. What do you mean?
>
> The idea is that quantum particles can see the "pure" vacuum where
> time is either non-existant of is a mix of no time with time set
> by c. So they end up being like "wavy" string objects.
You mean like little wavy stringy loops?
Paul Stowe
Well sigh, so much for trying to insert greek/math symbols...
> Above a Knudsen value of unity [λ/s, s = scale length] for the mean
^
Greek small Lambda
> vortex lattice (λ ≈ 1E-9m) div E = rho will not be strictly true...
^
~=...
[...]
>> The reason it would be considered phenomenological is because it
>> contains parameters derived from measurements (e.g., \alpha, \hbar,
>> c, etc). To the extent that any theory can't derive those values,
>> that theory is phenomenological.
>
>I don't think this is the difference.
But that is essentially the meaning of phenomenological. The shell
model of atomic or nuclear structure is a phenomemological model,
for example. One has a basic model and then fits the potentials
phenomenologically. In atomic theory, things seem closer to first
principles because the mean field approximation is really good
due to the proton electron mass ratio. However, that picture still
has a lot of phenomenology where it comes to casually interpreting
velocities and such.
>> On the other hand, given those parameters, the standard model is a
>> precise description of the current universe.
>
>And precision is certainly not what makes a theory phenomenological.
I did't intend for the word "prescise" to be meant as a "goodness of
fit indicator to data". I meant "precise" as in, the standard model
provides the description of the current universe (apart from gravity).
It' doesn't describe the earliest times in the universe, which is
what a truly fundamental theory would describe. However, a truly
fundamental theory would not describe the universe we see today,
except as an eventual consquence, given certain parameters, like
temperature, etc. Hard to say exactly what parameters are essential
at this point, though.
[...]
>IMHU "effective field theory" is a little more general, as described
>by Weinberg in hep-th/9702027. What you describe is the IMHO less
>general program of grand unification.
I take an effective field theory to by a theory of a particular
(vacuum) state which doesn't exhibit the full symmetry of the
unbroken vacuum. Weinberg's paper is somewhat more detailed, but
I don't really have any objections to the details he gives. Essentially,
he classifies string theory as something other than an effective
theory, but from what I have been able to determine regarding string
theory, one basically talks about symmetry breaking in terms of
spacetime dimensions.
>> If there is a trajectory, something has to be on it, or else it
>> isn't very closely related to a trajectory. Since a trajectory describes
>> a location as a function of time, I can't see how bohmian mechanics
>> can not "care" about locations.
>
>You should understand the difference between trajectories in an
>abstract configuration space Q(t) and trajectories of particles (their
>locations) x(t) in space.
I do, but (1) the quantity X\Psi = x\psi, give a position, (2) I can't
see how one can give any more reality to an abstract configuration space
unless it has some connection to a real location.
>They coinside only in single particle theory. Already in two-particle
>theory they are different (Q = {x_1,x_2}). In field theory (Q =
>{phi(x)}) they have nothing to do with each other.
My objection has has nothing to do with what you call your labels
on the particles in a multiparticle configuration. It has to do with
being able to distinctly label them in the first place. If you can
say that particle A has a label, particle B has a different label
and that serves to distinguish particle A from particle B (i.e.,
the labels make it possible, _even_in_principle_, to determine that
you counted two objects, rather than the same object twice, then
you must count the entropy associated with the permutation associated
with switching the labels. The configuration is distict, and it
resides in the configuration space to which you refer.
[...]
>> That pretty much means your idea of classical realism is unique to
>> yourself.
>
>In this case, please show the difference between the notion of realism
>proposed by the EPR criterion of reality or the notion of realism used
>by Bell to prove his theorem with my idea of classical realism.
I don't consider "classical realism" to admit non-locality. In any case,
I really don't consider the philosophical intricacies associated with
trying to formally classify the metaphysics, particularly relevant to the
physics. Personal philosophy may be important in motivating someone to
develop a particular theoretical idea, but the philosophical basis for a
particular theory is is worthless if the theory doesn't agree with
experiment. If a theory does agree with experiment, then the philosophical
motivation is still irrelevant if that philosophy can't be applied more
broadly so that it acts as some sort of successful guiding principle
beyond a single, narrow application. If such a principle does turn out to
have broad application, then one might consider the principle itself to
have merit in its own right. But, I really can't consider what you call
"classical realism" to be a point in favor (or against) your models. The
term, as you use it, implies a greater connection to reality than is
justified. Prior to responding, I read a few philosophy articles regarding
einstein, bell, the epr paradox, realism, postivism, etc., and I saw no
universal consensus on just what "classical realism" entailed, beyond the
realism in classical physics. If a completely new philosophical viewpoint
emerged, which led to a rapid understanding of nature, then it would make
no difference if it ran contrary to any or all highly regarded
philosophical views, or if it was outrageously unorthodox, that viewpoint
would be justified by the advance in understanding it provided. After all,
if a particular ontology suddenly were to clarify a great many mysteries,
it's logical validity would most likely be self-evident.
>In this case, please describe where you see the differences between
>the Goldstein group and me.
One major difference seems to be with regard to the role of operators.
Goldstein states this with regard to the spin:
"From a Bohmian perspective there is no hint of paradox in any of this
unless we are seduced by naive realism about operators into insisting,
despite its evident impossibility, that the spin operators correspond
to genuine properties of the particles."
I get quite a different impression of how you view the operators from
your lattice article andfrom your responses. You essentially define
properties by the operators you choose. For example, I really see no
reason that the way you've cjosen to write the dirac operator should lead
to different _physics_ that what one obtains with the dirac equation.
You've chosen a different formalism, but you place a lot of emphasis on
the physics embodied in that choice such that you identify the particles
in the standard model based purely on the operators you've chosen (and
which I still can't see the identificaion you've made). This seems to me,
to be a major difference in your view of bohmian mechanics and goldstein
view. Personally, I would find goldstein's view to be considerably less
appealing than yours onthis point, assuming that I've surmised the
difference correctly.
>Of course, there is one difference: many
>proponents of BM search for Lorentz-invariant versions of BM despite
>Bell's theorem and try to minimize the conflict between relativity and
>BM.
I would argue that no conflict with bell's theorem and relativity exists
in the first place.
>> I don't see how this would actually negate any interpretation of
>> quantum mechanics,
>
>Quite simple, the assumptions about realism used by Bell in his proof
>simply become "rules of consistent reasoning".
I believe that quantum mechanics does not need that to offer "rules of
consistent reasoning". Personally, I don't think it's possible for you
to successfully combine quantum mechanics with the realism you seek,
and be logically consistent. The realism is completely buried in something
with no physical manifestation whatsoever. You can't manipulate or
quantify the deterministic aspects in anyway that would enable one
to use it to draw conclusions about quantum syatems which are any less
probabilistic rhan any other interpretation. Those trajectories are
essentially meaningless apart from whatever metaphysical comfort one
gains from believing they mean something.
[...]
>Strange. The result of each experiment is predefined by the initial
>state, probability is caused by absence of knowledge about the initial
>values, as in classical thermodynamics. This was the program of
>the "hidden variable" explanation of quantum uncertainty.
There is a very fundamental difference between what "lack of knowledge"
means classically and quantum mechanically. Classically, the lack of
knowledge only implies that the knowledge is impractical to obtain.
Quantum mechanically, it means the information doesn't exist, so that
there is nothing _to_ obtain. This is my fundamental argument regarding
entropy and boltzmann counting. Classically, all of that "lack of
knowledge" about the system, is contained in the entropy. Since there are
N paricles in m_i states, every permutation is a distinct configuration
which differs by the possibility of labeling the particles and being able
to choose two and swap them (regardless of the practical difficulty).
Quantum mechanics says that no such labeling is possible. If you place a
white marble into a bag of white marbles, and then draw a marble from the
bag, you have chosen the same marble. Not just _effectively_ the same
marble, otherwise you would really be choosing one of N possible possible
marbles which corresponds to N different possibile configurations of the
system. Whether or not you can tell two white marbles apart is irrelevant.
Nature would be able to do so and you could measure that via the entropy.
----
Since this is getting rather long, I'll stop here and pick up on
the rest shortly and avoid respoonding with a long and rambling
article that covers too many topics.
> That isn't an example of a broken symmetry.
That's what I have tried to say. This is "one of many other ways of
changing symmetry"
>>> The reason it would be considered phenomenological is because it
>>> contains parameters derived from measurements (e.g., \alpha, \hbar,
>>> c, etc). To the extent that any theory can't derive those values,
>>> that theory is phenomenological.
>> I don't think this is the difference.
> But that is essentially the meaning of phenomenological.
No. Phenomenological means starting from the phenomena. We introduce
new terms because the theory does not fit observation.
There have been important non-phenomenological steps in the
development of the standard model: the general concept of gauge
theory, quarks, the prediction of b- and t-quark, Z-boson. But there
have been much more phenomenological steps. Therefore, as a whole, I
would name the theory phenomenological.
>>> If there is a trajectory, something has to be on it, or else it
>>> isn't very closely related to a trajectory. Since a trajectory describes
>>> a location as a function of time, I can't see how bohmian mechanics
>>> can not "care" about locations.
>>
>> You should understand the difference between trajectories in an
>> abstract configuration space Q(t) and trajectories of particles (their
>> locations) x(t) in space.
>
> I do, but (1) the quantity X\Psi = x\psi, give a position,
Some operator which is important in one-particle theory. Note also
that operators for measurements are not fundamental in BM, but
derived.
> (2) I can't see how one can give any more reality to an abstract
> configuration space unless it has some connection to a real
> location.
Of course, there is some relation to real locations. Especially,
configurations in BFT are functions on locations: Q = {psi(x)} \in
F(R^3)
>> They coinside only in single particle theory. Already in two-particle
>> theory they are different (Q = {x_1,x_2}). In field theory (Q =
>> {phi(x)}) they have nothing to do with each other.
> My objection has has nothing to do with what you call your labels
> on the particles in a multiparticle configuration. It has to do with
> being able to distinctly label them in the first place. If you can
> say that particle A has a label, particle B has a different label
> and that serves to distinguish particle A from particle B (i.e.,
> the labels make it possible, _even_in_principle_, to determine that
> you counted two objects, rather than the same object twice, then
> you must count the entropy associated with the permutation associated
> with switching the labels. The configuration is distict, and it
> resides in the configuration space to which you refer.
The point is that you can have quite different configuration spaces.
For what you name "labelled particles" we would choose the space of
ordered pairs (Q = {x_1,x_2}). We can as well consider the space of
unordered pairs as a configuration space. Or the space of atomic
distributions of type delta(x-x_1) + delta(x-x_2) in L^-1(R^3).
>>> That pretty much means your idea of classical realism is unique to
>>> yourself.
>> In this case, please show the difference between the notion of realism
>> proposed by the EPR criterion of reality or the notion of realism used
>> by Bell to prove his theorem with my idea of classical realism.
> I don't consider "classical realism" to admit non-locality.
First, that's simply a naming convention. And for your version of
realism there is already an established name: "local realism".
I don't think this name is appropriate, it would be better to name
this thing "Einstein-causal realism", but I can live with "local
realism".
> In any case, I really don't consider the philosophical intricacies
> associated with trying to formally classify the metaphysics,
> particularly relevant to the physics.
Using this formal classification, Bell has been able to prove a
nontrivial theorem with physical, testable predictions. Classical
realism + Einstein causality => Bell's inequality = falsified
_physical_ prediction.
This is relevant to physics, in a quite obvious way.
> If such a principle does turn out to have broad application, then
> one might consider the principle itself to have merit in its own
> right.
It has very broad application, it is simply common sense which we
apply (mostly implicit) every day.
> But, I really can't consider what you call "classical realism" to be
> a point in favor (or against) your models.
That's because we have given it a name. So you can reject it in your
words without rejecting it in practice. But I don't think you can
really reject it in your considerations. If you want to reject
_consistently_ such a common sense principle like classical realism,
you would have to start from the scratch, reconsidering all your
argumentations if they depend on this principle. For this purpose,
you could not rely on human control, which will easily slip over
implicit uses of common sense principles. You would have to formalize
science completely, especially to formalize a weaker version of
realism, and to allow only this weaker version in all your
considerations.
> The term, as you use it, implies a greater connection to reality
> than is justified.
No. Classical realism, as I use it, is as justified as possible for a
general principle.
> Prior to responding, I read a few philosophy articles regarding
> einstein, bell, the epr paradox, realism, postivism, etc., and I saw
> no universal consensus on just what "classical realism" entailed,
> beyond the realism in classical physics.
Don't expect any consensus among philosophers. That's not yet
science. I don't think we should care much about disagreements
between philosophers. The scientific method is (more or less) Poppers
method. As shown by Sokal, there is a lot of junk in modern
philosophy.
I'm interested not so much in junk philosophy but in a scientific
(means based on/compatible with Popper scientific method) notion of
realism. Which, IMHO should be based on well-defined axioms like the
EPR criterion of reality or the assumtions about reality (except
Einstein causality) used in Bell's theorem.
> If a completely new philosophical viewpoint emerged, which led to a
> rapid understanding of nature, then it would make no difference if
> it ran contrary to any or all highly regarded philosophical views,
> or if it was outrageously unorthodox, that viewpoint would be
> justified by the advance in understanding it provided.
I disagree. With the rejection of classical realism we already reject
something which is essential, necessary for a reasonable notion of
"understanding". Of course, formally one can reject logic, but the
result can be only illogical babble, but not understanding.
> After all, if a particular ontology suddenly were to clarify a great
> many mysteries, it's logical validity would most likely be
> self-evident.
But we are not talking here about particular ontologies, but about the
rejection of ontology.
>> In this case, please describe where you see the differences between
>> the Goldstein group and me.
>
> One major difference seems to be with regard to the role of operators.
> Goldstein states this with regard to the spin:
>
> "From a Bohmian perspective there is no hint of paradox in any of this
> unless we are seduced by naive realism about operators into insisting,
> despite its evident impossibility, that the spin operators correspond
> to genuine properties of the particles."
> I get quite a different impression of how you view the operators
> from your lattice article andfrom your responses. You essentially
> define properties by the operators you choose. For example, I really
> see no reason that the way you've chosen to write the dirac operator
> should lead to different _physics_ that what one obtains with the
> dirac equation.
But this is an article not about Bohmian mechanics, but about the
field equations of the standard model. Dirac equations are, BTW,
classical field equations, analoguous to the classical Maxwell
equations. Their quantization/Bohmianization is a separate step.
> You've chosen a different formalism, but you place a lot of emphasis on
> the physics embodied in that choice such that you identify the particles
> in the standard model based purely on the operators you've chosen (and
> which I still can't see the identificaion you've made). This seems to me,
> to be a major difference in your view of bohmian mechanics and goldstein
> view. Personally, I would find goldstein's view to be considerably less
> appealing than yours onthis point, assuming that I've surmised the
> difference correctly.
The attractive point of Bohmian mechanics regarding operators is that
the whole operator formalism which has to be postulated in QM may be
derived in BM.
Moreover, the derivation in BM leads to a more general class of
measurements, namely positive operator measures, instead of the
projector measures of quantum theory. This more general class
contains physically important measurements, especially inaccurate
common measurements of position and momentum.
But this derivation in no way invalidates the way operators are used
in QM.
>> Of course, there is one difference: many
>> proponents of BM search for Lorentz-invariant versions of BM despite
>> Bell's theorem and try to minimize the conflict between relativity and
>> BM.
> I would argue that no conflict with bell's theorem and relativity exists
> in the first place.
The conflict exists, it is "classical realism and Einstein causality
=> false"
>>> I don't see how this would actually negate any interpretation of
>>> quantum mechanics,
>> Quite simple, the assumptions about realism used by Bell in his proof
>> simply become "rules of consistent reasoning".
> I believe that quantum mechanics does not need that to offer "rules
> of consistent reasoning".
Rules of consistent reasoning (extended logic) is something I already
have. Something I have no reason to give up whatever happens in
nature. Why?
1.) Because I already use these rules to _justify_ the scientific
method. Without them, there would be no science.
2.) Because, whatever strange happens in nature, there is no need to
give up consistent reasoning, because to construct some (possibly
non-beautiful) consistent theory which describes this behaviour is
always possible.
3.) Because, whatever strange happens in nature, I prefer to consider
these strange things as an open scientific problem, some puzzle which
I have to solve, instead of rejecting the rules of consistent
reasoning.
> Personally, I don't think it's possible for you to successfully
> combine quantum mechanics with the realism you seek, and be
> logically consistent.
Sorry, but this is simply an already proven theorem. BM is logically
consistent, and BM is a classical realistic theory in my sense, and BM
predicts exactly what QM predicts. What I "seek" in your words I have
already reached.
>> Strange. The result of each experiment is predefined by the initial
>> state, probability is caused by absence of knowledge about the initial
>> values, as in classical thermodynamics. This was the program of
>> the "hidden variable" explanation of quantum uncertainty.
> There is a very fundamental difference between what "lack of knowledge"
> means classically and quantum mechanically. Classically, the lack of
> knowledge only implies that the knowledge is impractical to obtain.
> Quantum mechanically, it means the information doesn't exist, so that
> there is nothing _to_ obtain.
And in BM, the information exists, but is unreachable for internal
observers. So, there is not much difference between your version of
classical "lack of knowledge" and the BM version.
> This is my fundamental argument regarding
> entropy and boltzmann counting. Classically, all of that "lack of
> knowledge" about the system, is contained in the entropy. Since there are
> N paricles in m_i states, every permutation is a distinct configuration
> which differs by the possibility of labeling the particles and being able
> to choose two and swap them (regardless of the practical difficulty).
> Quantum mechanics says that no such labeling is possible. If you place a
> white marble into a bag of white marbles, and then draw a marble from the
> bag, you have chosen the same marble. Not just _effectively_ the same
> marble, otherwise you would really be choosing one of N possible possible
> marbles which corresponds to N different possibile configurations of the
> system. Whether or not you can tell two white marbles apart is irrelevant.
> Nature would be able to do so and you could measure that via the entropy.
I understand your point. The information which _exists_ in BM is
information about the trajectory in the configuration space Q(t). A
Bohmian theory which describes indistinguishable particles should be a
theory with a configuration space which does not allow to distinguish
"permutations of particles". If Q is an ordered pair {x_1,x_2}, these
"two particles" are distinguishable. But if Q is, for example, a sum
of delta functions Q = {delta(x-x_1)+delta(x-x_2)} subset L^-1(R^3),
these "particles" are indistinguishable.
> I see no conflict at all.
> But when I hear "proven fact about the continuous equations", I get
> bellyache. When you mean the singularity theorems, I get shapes.
> That all is neither proven nor fact, per definitionem.
So you reject classical mathematics - standard mathematical proofs
about continuous equations? Or do you think that these particular
theorems are false?
In the first case, you are a crank. In the second case, please
details.
> Actually, the simulations run according to "continuous equations"
> but (of course) with finite differences.
Thus, something which a priori has nothing to do with the "continuous
equations"
> [snip nice but ancient text]
>> AFAIR, the numbers have been numbers from nucleons, proton, neutron
>> and so on?
> Of course.
> http://home.t-online.de/home/Ulrich.Bruchholz/brief.txt
In this case, it may be interesting that there is a quite simple
variant of the standard model - QCD with two massless quarks - which
allows to predict almost all data for nucleons, proton, neutron and so
on with quite good accuracy.
Nonetheless, this simple theory is false, to explain all observable
data we need the much more complex standard model.
Thus, a very simple theory which gives these numbers already exists,
but is not very interesting from todays point of view.