understanding qm
Oh No
‘If one wants to be clear about what is meant by “position of an
object”, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
experiments by which the “position of an electron” can be measured;
otherwise this term has no meaning at all’ (Heisenberg, 1927).
What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
Regards
--
Charles Francis
moderator sci.physics.foundations.
charles (dot) e (dot) h (dot) francis (at) googlemail.com (remove spaces and
braces)
X-Phy
> �If one wants to be clear about what is meant by �position of an
> object�, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
> experiments by which the �position of an electron� can be measured;
> otherwise this term has no meaning at all� (Heisenberg, 1927).
>
> What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
> theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
> come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
Physics is the study of the sensible world, so the theories must be
tested against experiment. If a theory predicts a position, we should
be able to measure the position to compare with, and that is possible
only if there is a definite experiment by which it can be measured.
The experiment must also be described by the theory. Conversly, if a
physical quantity is measured, the theory must describe it. Note that
also special relativity is obtained through the definition of position
and time measurement.
That is quite general, and there is no reason it permits to understand
everything. It isn't quantum mechanics which isn't understood, but
the reality it claims to describe. If we transpose the statement to
the spin orientation, even though we have a way to measure it, there
is still a conflict with causality, or at least with the conceptual
coherence. This conflict is in the theory, but not necessarily in
reality ; what isn't understood is automatically translated into a
conflict.
Thus in quantum mechanics, there is the measurement problem, and
that's why it isn't understood.
--
~~~~ clmasse on free F-country
Liberty, Equality, Profitability.
Oh No
>> object”, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
>> experiments by which the “position of an electron” can be measured;
>> otherwise this term has no meaning at all’ (Heisenberg, 1927).
>>
>> What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
>> theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
>> come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
>
>Physics is the study of the sensible world, so the theories must be
>tested against experiment. If a theory predicts a position, we should
>be able to measure the position to compare with, and that is possible
>only if there is a definite experiment by which it can be measured.
>The experiment must also be described by the theory. Conversly, if a
>physical quantity is measured, the theory must describe it. Note that
>also special relativity is obtained through the definition of position
>and time measurement.
Yes, but this is all in support of what I say.
>That is quite general, and there is no reason it permits to understand
>everything. It isn't quantum mechanics which isn't understood, but
>the reality it claims to describe.
But the reality it describes is very well seen Feynman diagrams. There
is just the myth that these are only a calculational device.
> If we transpose the statement to
>the spin orientation, even though we have a way to measure it, there
>is still a conflict with causality, or at least with the conceptual
>coherence. This conflict is in the theory, but not necessarily in
>reality ; what isn't understood is automatically translated into a
>conflict.
Spin is not easy to understand, but it is clear that relativistic
quantum mechanics both makes it necessary and defines its behaviour. I
do not think this is such a problem.
>Thus in quantum mechanics, there is the measurement problem, and
>that's why it isn't understood.
The measurement problem is not so much a problem, once one realises that
one does not explain collapse from the Schroedinger equation, but rather
explains the Schroedinger equation from the requirements of the
probability interpretation.
X-Phy
> >That is quite general, and there is no reason it permits to understand
> >everything. �It isn't quantum mechanics which isn't understood, but
> >the reality it claims to describe.
> But the reality it describes is very well seen Feynman diagrams. There
> is just the myth that these are only a calculational device.
Described is not the same as understood. Understood implies some sort
of consistency: logical, conceptual...
> > If we transpose the statement to
> >the spin orientation, even though we have a way to measure it, there
> >is still a conflict with causality, or at least with the conceptual
> >coherence. �This conflict is in the theory, but not necessarily in
> >reality ; what isn't understood is automatically translated into a
> >conflict.
> Spin is not easy to understand, but it is clear that relativistic
> quantum mechanics both makes it necessary and defines its behaviour. I
> do not think this is such a problem.
I was aluding to spin correlation over large distance, aka
entanglement.
> >Thus in quantum mechanics, there is the measurement problem, and
> >that's why it isn't understood.
> The measurement problem is not so much a problem, once one realises that
> one does not explain collapse from the Schroedinger equation, but rather
> explains the Schroedinger equation from the requirements of the
> probability interpretation.
In any case, the postulate of projection must be introduced somewhere,
since a remote observer must know which outcome have been singled out
in order to know its own probabilities of outcome. It's the same
issue of entanglement.
--
X-Phy
Oh No
>On 13 nov, 15:16, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> >That is quite general, and there is no reason it permits to understand
>> >everything. �It isn't quantum mechanics which isn't understood, but
>> >the reality it claims to describe.
>
>> But the reality it describes is very well seen Feynman diagrams. There
>> is just the myth that these are only a calculational device.
>
>Described is not the same as understood. Understood implies some sort
>of consistency: logical, conceptual...
Graphs do have a logical and conceptual consistency. An ultimate
structure for matter in terms of graphs also provides a natural
interpretation of uncertainty, since we only know the macroscopic
properties of the graph describing a given physical situation, not the
ultimate configuration of lines and vertices. It is not difficult to
show that this uncertainty has the mathematical form of qm. My point is
that the demonstrations which show this have been available for quite
some time, so I don't understand why they are rejected without
justification.
>
>> > If we transpose the statement to
>> >the spin orientation, even though we have a way to measure it, there
>> >is still a conflict with causality, or at least with the conceptual
>> >coherence. �This conflict is in the theory, but not necessarily in
>> >reality ; what isn't understood is automatically translated into a
>> >conflict.
>
>> Spin is not easy to understand, but it is clear that relativistic
>> quantum mechanics both makes it necessary and defines its behaviour. I
>> do not think this is such a problem.
>
>I was aluding to spin correlation over large distance, aka
>entanglement.
Indeed, it is not easy to understand. But once one understands that
distance is an emergent property the logical fault in the expression
"spin correlation over large distance" at least becomes clear.
>
>> >Thus in quantum mechanics, there is the measurement problem, and
>> >that's why it isn't understood.
>
>> The measurement problem is not so much a problem, once one realises that
>> one does not explain collapse from the Schroedinger equation, but rather
>> explains the Schroedinger equation from the requirements of the
>> probability interpretation.
>
>In any case, the postulate of projection must be introduced somewhere,
>since a remote observer must know which outcome have been singled out
>in order to know its own probabilities of outcome. It's the same
>issue of entanglement.
Yes, but the projection postulate is only the collapse of a probability
when the outcome becomes known. If we understand this in probability
theory, we should have no problem introducing it in qm.
maxwell
> �If one wants to be clear about what is meant by �position of an
> object�, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
> otherwise this term has no meaning at all� (Heisenberg, 1927).
>
> What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
> theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
> come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
>
> Regards
>
> --
> Charles Francis
> moderator sci.physics.foundations.
> charles (dot) e (dot) h (dot) francis (at) googlemail.com (remove spaces and
> braces)
>
> http://www.rqgravity.net
For over 100 years now, physics has been dominated by positivism and
phenomenology so it is not surprising that physics theories based on
these assumptions have got their 'knickers in a twist'. Only a
positivist would assume that the position of an object is synonymous
with its measurement. One cannot possibly think that Jupiter did not
have a position (relative to the Earth) at midnight in London on
January 1, 1500 even though Jupiter's existence (never mind its
position) was unknown at that time) or the Moon had a position exactly
5,000 years earlier when mankind had no idea of how to measure
celestial objects.
The key insights of QM were the realization that we are all made of
discrete electrons AND that 'observation' (which precedes all
measurements) of an electron by humans inevitably alters its motion
(momentum) in a non-predictable manner. This does NOT mean that
electrons, in reality, do not always have a location (that's what it
means to be a point particle) but it does mean that our theories need
to carefully distinguish the actual location of electrons from our
measurements of such locations. Wave mechanics (and its equivalent
math theories) was one attempt to describe simple electron system in
terms only of statistical RESULTS of measurements. The attempt to
extend this technique beyond the hydrogen atom to even the helium atom
has been an embarrassing failure. Any claim that QM explains the
periodic table is simple hubris as ALL inter-electronic interactions
have been completely ignored.
Oh No
>On Nov 13, 2:05 am, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>> ‘If one wants to be clear about what is meant by “position of an
>> object”, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
>> experiments by which the “position of an electron” can be measured;
>> otherwise this term has no meaning at all’ (Heisenberg, 1927).
>>
>> What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
>> theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
>> come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> --
>> Charles Francis
>> moderator sci.physics.foundations.
>> charles (dot) e (dot) h (dot) francis (at) googlemail.com (remove spaces and
>> braces)
>>
>> http://www.rqgravity.net
>
>For over 100 years now, physics has been dominated by positivism and
>phenomenology so it is not surprising that physics theories based on
>these assumptions have got their 'knickers in a twist'. Only a
>positivist would assume that the position of an object is synonymous
>with its measurement.
There is no such assumption. It is an observation, and hence an
empirical fact. Of course, you may wish to assume something else, but
that takes you into the realm of fantasy.
>One cannot possibly think that Jupiter did not
>have a position (relative to the Earth) at midnight in London on
>January 1, 1500 even though Jupiter's existence (never mind its
>position) was unknown at that time) or the Moon had a position exactly
>5,000 years earlier when mankind had no idea of how to measure
>celestial objects.
This is not a counter example. It does not matter that these positions
were unknown, nor that they had not been given numerical values at the
time. They existed in principle, and are calculable now in principle,
and hence are measurable. This is a very different thing from the
position of an electron which does not always exist even in principle.
>The key insights of QM were the realization that we are all made of
>discrete electrons AND that 'observation' (which precedes all
>measurements) of an electron by humans inevitably alters its motion
>(momentum) in a non-predictable manner. This does NOT mean that
>electrons, in reality, do not always have a location (that's what it
>means to be a point particle) but it does mean that our theories need
>to carefully distinguish the actual location of electrons from our
>measurements of such locations.
You ignore the fact. First, electrons do not always have location. If
they did nature would obey very different laws from those we observe.
Second, to be a point particle simply means not to have size. It has
nothing to do with location.
>Wave mechanics (and its equivalent
>math theories) was one attempt to describe simple electron system in
>terms only of statistical RESULTS of measurements. The attempt to
>extend this technique beyond the hydrogen atom to even the helium atom
>has been an embarrassing failure. Any claim that QM explains the
>periodic table is simple hubris as ALL inter-electronic interactions
>have been completely ignored.
>
If you wish to post this sort of fantasy please do not post on this
newsgroup.
X-Phy
> >Described is not the same as understood. �Understood implies some sort
> >of consistency: logical, conceptual...
> Graphs do have a logical and conceptual consistency.
Sure, but that is the whole theory with its interpretation that must
be consistent.
> An ultimate
> structure for matter in terms of graphs also provides a natural
> interpretation of uncertainty, since we only know the macroscopic
> properties of the graph describing a given physical situation, not the
> ultimate configuration of lines and vertices. It is not difficult to
> show that this uncertainty has the mathematical form of qm.
Of course, since the graph already stems from qm. You only changed
the axioms. Then, what you are doing is nothing else than the paths
integral quantization. After Feynman, you say that every trajectory
is possible, and when there are interactions, that every topology and
every configuration are possible.
> My point is
> that the demonstrations which show this have been available for quite
> some time, so I don't understand why they are rejected without
> justification.
It brings nothing new in itself.
> >I was aluding to spin correlation over large distance, aka
> >entanglement.
> Indeed, it is not easy to understand. But once one understands that
> distance is an emergent property the logical fault in the expression
> "spin correlation over large distance" at least becomes clear.
It is not enough to understand, you have to provide a description of
the process of measuring the position consistently inside your theory,
where space-time is no longer a prior framework. You see it is not
merely the Schr�dinger equation.
> >> The measurement problem is not so much a problem, once one realises that
> >> one does not explain collapse from the Schroedinger equation, but rather
> >> explains the Schroedinger equation from the requirements of the
> >> probability interpretation.
> >In any case, the postulate of projection must be introduced somewhere,
> >since a remote observer must know which outcome have been singled out
> >in order to know its own probabilities of outcome. �It's the same
> >issue of entanglement.
> Yes, but the projection postulate is only the collapse of a probability
> when the outcome becomes known. If we understand this in probability
> theory, we should have no problem introducing it in qm.
That it be a real field or probabilities changes nothing. What is
important is the transfer of information, and a variation of
probability is a variation of information.
--
X-Phy
X-Phy
> >One cannot possibly think that Jupiter did not
> >have a position (relative to the Earth) at midnight in London on
> >January 1, 1500 even though Jupiter's existence (never mind its
> >position) was unknown at that time) or the Moon had a position exactly
> >5,000 years earlier when mankind had no idea of how to measure
> >celestial objects.
On 14 nov, 23:36, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
> This is not a counter example. It does not matter that these positions
> were unknown, nor that they had not been given numerical values at the
> time. They existed in principle, and are calculable now in principle,
> and hence are measurable.
No, they aren't measurable, and as such don't belongs to the domain of
physics. We can only say that our (up to now valid) theory calculate
a value to this observable. We can't test our theory against these
fantasied measurements, so we can't know if it was valid at that
time. Consequently, it is not possible at all to assign them any
value, although we can think of a probable value. In which latter
case, it is an issue of faith, not of science.
Now, the existence in principle is another animal. It is internal to
a theory only.
> This is a very different thing from the
> position of an electron which does not always exist even in principle.
> >Wave mechanics (and its equivalent
> >math theories) was one attempt to describe simple electron system in
> >terms only of statistical RESULTS of measurements. �The attempt to
> >extend this technique beyond the hydrogen atom to even the helium atom
> >has been an embarrassing failure. Any claim that QM explains the
> >periodic table is simple hubris as ALL inter-electronic interactions
> >have been completely ignored.
> If you wish to post this sort of fantasy please do not post on this
> newsgroup.
It is not a failure, even though the practical calculation is not
always tractable without unjustified approximations. Yet, there are
numerical methods like Hartree-Fock that don't ignore the inter-
electronic interactions.
--
X-Phy
Oh No
>> Thus spake maxwell <s...@shaw.ca>
>
>> >One cannot possibly think that Jupiter did not
>> >have a position (relative to the Earth) at midnight in London on
>> >January 1, 1500 even though Jupiter's existence (never mind its
>> >position) was unknown at that time) or the Moon had a position exactly
>> >5,000 years earlier when mankind had no idea of how to measure
>> >celestial objects.
>
>On 14 nov, 23:36, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> This is not a counter example. It does not matter that these positions
>> were unknown, nor that they had not been given numerical values at the
>> time. They existed in principle, and are calculable now in principle,
>> and hence are measurable.
>
>No, they aren't measurable, and as such don't belongs to the domain of
>physics. We can only say that our (up to now valid) theory calculate a
>value to this observable. We can't test our theory against these
>fantasied measurements, so we can't know if it was valid at that time.
>Consequently, it is not possible at all to assign them any value,
>although we can think of a probable value. In which latter case, it is
>an issue of faith, not of science.
I disagree with you. It is not possible to distinguish "measured" from
"calculated from measured values", since very often the latter is what
measurements actually do. It is no less valid to say that we can now
measure what the position of Jupiter was at Jan 1500 than it is to say
that we can use radar to measure distance, or a wire chamber to measure
the behaviour of an electron in a scattering experiment. Indeed, this is
a central objection to positivism as a philosophy. It makes sweeping
statements regarding measurement without first thinking that we should
study what measurement actually is.
Oh No
>On 14 nov, 10:14, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> >Described is not the same as understood. �Understood implies some sort
>> >of consistency: logical, conceptual...
>
>> Graphs do have a logical and conceptual consistency.
>
>Sure, but that is the whole theory with its interpretation that must
>be consistent.
of course
>
>> An ultimate
>> structure for matter in terms of graphs also provides a natural
>> interpretation of uncertainty, since we only know the macroscopic
>> properties of the graph describing a given physical situation, not the
>> ultimate configuration of lines and vertices. It is not difficult to
>> show that this uncertainty has the mathematical form of qm.
>
>Of course, since the graph already stems from qm. You only changed
>the axioms. Then, what you are doing is nothing else than the paths
>integral quantization. After Feynman, you say that every trajectory
>is possible, and when there are interactions, that every topology and
>every configuration are possible.
>
>> My point is
>> that the demonstrations which show this have been available for quite
>> some time, so I don't understand why they are rejected without
>> justification.
>
>It brings nothing new in itself.
Even if that it true, it is not a reason for the rejection of a
consistent interpretation in terms of particles, and its replacement by
an inconsistent interpretation in terms of fields.
>
>> >I was aluding to spin correlation over large distance, aka
>> >entanglement.
>
>> Indeed, it is not easy to understand. But once one understands that
>> distance is an emergent property the logical fault in the expression
>> "spin correlation over large distance" at least becomes clear.
>
>It is not enough to understand, you have to provide a description of
>the process of measuring the position consistently inside your theory,
>where space-time is no longer a prior framework. You see it is not
>merely the Schr�dinger equation.
Of course. I start with a simplified definition in terms of the radar
method, and I derive Maxwell's equations and the Lorentz force law,
which shows the emergence of distance in all generality.
>
>> >> The measurement problem is not so much a problem, once one realises that
>> >> one does not explain collapse from the Schroedinger equation, but rather
>> >> explains the Schroedinger equation from the requirements of the
>> >> probability interpretation.
>
>> >In any case, the postulate of projection must be introduced somewhere,
>> >since a remote observer must know which outcome have been singled out
>> >in order to know its own probabilities of outcome. �It's the same
>> >issue of entanglement.
>
>> Yes, but the projection postulate is only the collapse of a probability
>> when the outcome becomes known. If we understand this in probability
>> theory, we should have no problem introducing it in qm.
>
>That it be a real field or probabilities changes nothing. What is
>important is the transfer of information, and a variation of
>probability is a variation of information.
But that is an important change. There is no issue concerning the
measurement problem if it is understood as a change of information,
whereas an instantaneous change in a material field is an inconsistency.
Ilja
> You ignore the fact. First, electrons do not always have location. If
> they did nature would obey very different laws from those we observe.
False. In pilot wave theory (with electrons as particles), electrons
have
positions. Nonetheless, the theory is equivalent to QM, so no need
for very different laws from those we observe.
I do not think having electrons as fundamental particles is a good
idea,
they are much more like phonons in condensed matter theory, but this
does not mean there exists some experimental evidence against
electrons being fundamental particles with a well-defined position.
Oh No
>On 15 Nov., 03:36, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> You ignore the fact. First, electrons do not always have location. If
>> they did nature would obey very different laws from those we observe.
>
>False. In pilot wave theory (with electrons as particles), electrons
>have
>positions. Nonetheless, the theory is equivalent to QM, so no need
>for very different laws from those we observe.
This is a very different notion of position from the one which
introduced this thread
‘If one wants to be clear about what is meant by “position of an
object”, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
experiments by which the “position of an electron” can be measured;
otherwise this term has no meaning at all’ (Heisenberg, 1927).
Moreover, it is not acceptable to me because it is a non-local theory,
whereas I claim a local interpretation of qm is both possible and
correct once one recognises that one's notion of locality must be
changed to take into account the absence of position as a fundamental
property.
>
>I do not think having electrons as fundamental particles is a good
>idea,
>they are much more like phonons in condensed matter theory, but this
>does not mean there exists some experimental evidence against
>electrons being fundamental particles with a well-defined position.
>
I, otoh, think it is a very good idea, and moreover that it is a proven
idea. I find so-called analogy between phonons and quantum fields quite
unjustified and ultimately nonsensical.
X-Phy
> >> My point is
> >> that the demonstrations which show this have been available for quite
> >> some time, so I don't understand why they are rejected without
> >> justification.
> >It brings nothing new in itself.
> Even if that it true, it is not a reason for the rejection of a
> consistent interpretation in terms of particles,
Agreed.
> and its replacement by
> an inconsistent interpretation in terms of fields.
I think the ground of the rejection is that it doesn't allow the
second quantization, which is a dogma today. But are you able to get
the same predictions?
> >> Yes, but the projection postulate is only the collapse of a probability
> >> when the outcome becomes known. If we understand this in probability
> >> theory, we should have no problem introducing it in qm.
> >That it be a real field or probabilities changes nothing. �What is
> >important is the transfer of information, and a variation of
> >probability is a variation of information.
> But that is an important change. There is no issue concerning the
> measurement problem if it is understood as a change of information,
> whereas an instantaneous change in a material field is an inconsistency.
The inconsistency lies in the conflict with causality, but there is
the same inconsistency when it is only probabilities.
--
X-Phy
X-Phy
> >No, they aren't measurable, and as such don't belongs to the domain of
> >physics. �We can only say that our (up to now valid) theory calculate a
> >value to this observable. �We can't test our theory against these
> >fantasied measurements, so we can't know if it was valid at that time.
> >Consequently, it is not possible at all to assign them any value,
> >although we can think of a probable value. �In which latter case, it is
> >an issue of faith, not of science.
On 16 nov, 10:13, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
> I disagree with you. It is not possible to distinguish "measured" from
> "calculated from measured values", since very often the latter is what
> measurements actually do. It is no less valid to say that we can now
> measure what the position of Jupiter was at Jan 1500 than it is to say
> that we can use radar to measure distance, or a wire chamber to measure
> the behaviour of an electron in a scattering experiment. Indeed, this is
> a central objection to positivism as a philosophy. It makes sweeping
> statements regarding measurement without first thinking that we should
> study what measurement actually is.
Indeed, we should realize that a measurement has a meaning only in the
framework of a theory, and that a test of a theory can therefore be
performed only through the comparision of at least two measured
values. But that is exactely what I said, the theory must be tested
through the comparision of the value calculated from measured values,
and the result of the direct measurement. But the latter is missing.
--
X-Phy
mercury
In my opinion Understanding QM is dificult (in fact impossible)
because there are two main obstacles which one is thought to accept
when learning modern physics.
1. Special Theory of relativity
2. The probabilistic nature of the wave function (WF)
On the first subject:
A) There is a clear evidence that something can travel faster than
light: quantum teleportation
In 25% of the cases the quantum state of the Alice particle is
transfered to Bob's particle immediately.
This is a fact - nevermind whether somebody knows (applying the
classical channel) or not.
I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
B) I have recently disscussed the issue of the emmission of light in a
cavity on the thread
Simple? fundamental question about EM in cavity
QM does not allow for a photon to be created at the point of the
emmiting electron in an atom because Heisenberg Uncertrainty will be
broken. In fact the photon is created as a standing wave (better a
packet of standing waves due to imperfection of the cavity) in the
whole space of the cavity AT ONCE IMMEDIATELY. This is in fact what
QED accepts tacitly. For me QED is succesful exactly because it
tacitly admits that.
I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
On the second subject:
The WF mimics probability so very very very well that one is almost
left with no chance but to accept it is not a physically real object.
A) But I wonder how can Mach Zehnder interferometer results with a
single photon be explained without accepting that from the second arm
a real wave is not acting (without inter-) on the photon of course
together with that in the first arm.
I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
B) I think Heisenberg Uncertainty gives a clue that in fact the WF is
real and it holds some energy (in fact highly diluted). When one
constrains the volume where a particle is present the WF is pressed
(loosely speakig) and the energy of WF is concentrated in the particle
sometimes so it can get higher impulses.
Ilian
brad
> �If one wants to be clear about what is meant by �position of an
> object�, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
> otherwise this term has no meaning at all� (Heisenberg, 1927).
>
> What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
> theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
> come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
I think this is more a philosophical than a physical problem. We agree
that spacetime
is dynamic, yet ignore that its dynamism means that intervals have no
meaning
on their most fundamental levels. Time and/or space will vary
according to the
situation under consideration.
It really is our parochial view of spacetime ingrained
by the fact that time and space are virtually fixed for everyday life.
What sense
can be had by trying to define the location of an electron when
spacetime cannot be defined
for the electron to exist in? Hence, probablity! Once we define the
space, we find it! And we
call this wave function collapse, when it is only a refinement of
definition.
It is our attempt to tie classical qualities, poorly defined
qualities, (mass, distance, time) to fundamental
origins that lead to problems.
Brad
Oh No
>
>> >No, they aren't measurable, and as such don't belongs to the domain of
>> >physics. �We can only say that our (up to now valid) theory calculate a
>> >value to this observable. �We can't test our theory against these
>> >fantasied measurements, so we can't know if it was valid at that time.
>> >Consequently, it is not possible at all to assign them any value,
>> >although we can think of a probable value. �In which latter case, it is
>> >an issue of faith, not of science.
>
>On 16 nov, 10:13, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> I disagree with you. It is not possible to distinguish "measured" from
>> "calculated from measured values", since very often the latter is what
>> measurements actually do. It is no less valid to say that we can now
>> measure what the position of Jupiter was at Jan 1500 than it is to say
>> that we can use radar to measure distance, or a wire chamber to measure
>> the behaviour of an electron in a scattering experiment. Indeed, this is
>> a central objection to positivism as a philosophy. It makes sweeping
>> statements regarding measurement without first thinking that we should
>> study what measurement actually is.
>
>Indeed, we should realize that a measurement has a meaning only in the
>framework of a theory,
I agree with you this far.
>and that a test of a theory can therefore be
>performed only through the comparision of at least two measured
>values.
I think the most important theoretical principle we have for science is
the general principle of relativity, but the general principle cannot be
tested with any measured values.
>But that is exactely what I said, the theory must be tested
>through the comparision of the value calculated from measured values,
>and the result of the direct measurement. But the latter is missing.
I don't think that matters.
Oh No
>On 16 nov, 10:17, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> >> My point is
>> >> that the demonstrations which show this have been available for quite
>> >> some time, so I don't understand why they are rejected without
>> >> justification.
>
>> >It brings nothing new in itself.
>
>> Even if that it true, it is not a reason for the rejection of a
>> consistent interpretation in terms of particles,
>
>Agreed.
>
>> and its replacement by
>> an inconsistent interpretation in terms of fields.
>
>I think the ground of the rejection is that it doesn't allow the
>second quantization, which is a dogma today. But are you able to get
>the same predictions?
Yes. In effect I get exactly the same theory. I just interpret it
differently.
>
>> >> Yes, but the projection postulate is only the collapse of a probability
>> >> when the outcome becomes known. If we understand this in probability
>> >> theory, we should have no problem introducing it in qm.
>
>> >That it be a real field or probabilities changes nothing. �What is
>> >important is the transfer of information, and a variation of
>> >probability is a variation of information.
>
>> But that is an important change. There is no issue concerning the
>> measurement problem if it is understood as a change of information,
>> whereas an instantaneous change in a material field is an inconsistency.
>
>The inconsistency lies in the conflict with causality, but there is
>the same inconsistency when it is only probabilities.
if its only probabilities I don't see an inconsistency. Instantaneous
change in probability takes place with change of knowledge. But that is
no big deal, because change in probability is not a change in physics.
X-Phy
> >through the comparision of the value calculated from measured values,
> >and the result of the direct measurement. But the latter is missing.
On 22 nov, 22:01, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
> I don't think that matters.
So, if that doesn't matter, how do you test the theory, so that it be
proven that the position of Jupiter at the time was exactly the
calculated one? That isn't the role of physics, it hasn't all that
magical power. Imagine just a second that the theory is only valid
for a limited span of time, for it don't take into account a small
perturbation that becomes mesurable only on a large time scale, and
which has no important cosmological consequence.
--
X-Phy
X-Phy
> if its only probabilities I don't see an inconsistency. Instantaneous
> change in probability takes place with change of knowledge. But that is
> no big deal, because change in probability is not a change in physics.
Unless it is a change of probability without a change of knowledge, I
didn't know that a change of probability, and thus of knowledge, could
occur without a transfert of information. That transfer would
necessarily be from the location of the first measurement, to the one
of the second one. And still in today's physics, even a "material
field" is nothing less than the sum of informations (or knowledge or
probability) and laws about it. There is a possibility where no
information transfer is necessary, and it is a hidden variable
theory. Perhaps there is no inconsistency, but I can't grasp where is
the consistency in all that.
--
X-Phy
X-Phy
> In my opinion Understanding QM is dificult (in fact impossible)
> because there are two main obstacles which one is thought to accept
> when learning modern physics.
>
> 1. Special Theory of relativity
> 2. The probabilistic nature of the wave function (WF)
Many misunderstanding and misconceptions in the following.
> On the first subject:
>
> A) There is a clear evidence that something can travel faster than
> light: quantum teleportation
> In 25% of the cases the quantum state of the Alice particle is
> transfered to Bob's particle immediately.
> This is a fact - �nevermind whether somebody knows (applying the
> classical channel) or not.
>
> I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
That is already know from the EPR paradox and Aspect's experiment.
What is also already known is that there is no information transfert,
as this setup can't be used to communicate. Be it teleportation or
any conceited concept, you have to compare both ends to conclude, and
so you can't any faster than light signal. I would be glad to see a
(not spurious) proof of superluminal signal.
> B) I have recently disscussed the issue of the emmission of light in a
> cavity on the thread
>
> � � Simple? fundamental question about EM in cavity
>
> QM does not allow for a photon to be created at the point of the
> emmiting electron in an atom because Heisenberg Uncertrainty will be
> broken. In fact the photon is created as a standing wave (better a
> packet of standing waves due to imperfection of the cavity) in the
> whole space of the cavity AT ONCE IMMEDIATELY. This is in fact what
> QED accepts tacitly. For me QED is succesful exactly because it
> tacitly admits that.
>
> I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
Heisenberg uncertainty occur only for a measurement, which isn't the
case. The simple first quantized electrodynamic theory, from which
the HUR derives, is sufficient to describe the phenomenon. And as the
electron isn't localized, there is no problem. The picture of points
and wavy line is false, let's remember that it is nothing more than a
graphical symbol for fields.
It is false to say that QED accepts it, since it is only in one mode.
But the physical reality is the superposition of many mode, and that
superposition vanishes at large distances. It would be like saying
that the propagation of a pulse on a clothes line breaks causality
because it can be writen as a superposition of sinuso�dal waves.
There is an exact classical analogy when a guitar string is plucked:
the initial signal is a pulse, but the result is periodic. The ultra-
violet catastroph remains, but you disn't address it either.
> On the second subject:
>
> The WF mimics probability so very very very well that one is almost
> left with no chance but to accept it is not �a physically real object.
What is a physical real object?
> A) But I wonder how can Mach Zehnder interferometer results with a
> single photon be explained without accepting that from the second arm
> a real wave is not acting (without inter-) on the photon of course
> together with that in the first arm.
>
> I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
There is no statement.
> B) I think Heisenberg Uncertainty gives a clue that in fact the WF is
> real and it holds some energy (in fact highly diluted). When one
> constrains the volume where a particle is present the WF is pressed
> (loosely speakig) and the energy of WF is concentrated in the particle
> sometimes so it can get higher impulses.
HUR is only a consequency of the wave function (and of the definition
of momentum,) it can say nothing more. A short pulse on a clohes line
has high wave number Fourier components.
--
X-Phy
Oh No
theory. I cited the general principle of relativity, as a scientific
principle. Imv the general principle is necessary to science. If we
cannot assume that local laws of physics are always and everywhere the
same, I cannot see that it even makes sense to investigate what the laws
of physics are, because at any time they might be something else. If we
can assume that the laws of physics are always and everywhere the same,
then our calculation of the position of Jupiter is already conclusive,
and needs no further checking.
X-Phy
> >proven that the position of Jupiter at the time was exactly the
> >calculated one? �That isn't the role of physics, it hasn't all that
> >magical power. �Imagine just a second that the theory is only valid
> >for a limited span of time, for it don't take into account a small
> >perturbation that becomes mesurable only on a large time scale, and
> >which has no important cosmological consequence.
On 24 nov, 09:36, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
> I think we agreed that all measurement must take place in the context of
> theory. I cited the general principle of relativity, as a scientific
> principle. Imv the general principle is necessary to science. If we
> cannot assume that local laws of physics are always and everywhere the
> same, I cannot see that it even makes sense to investigate what the laws
> of physics are, because at any time they might be something else. If we
> can assume that the laws of physics are always and everywhere the same,
> then our calculation of the position of Jupiter is already conclusive,
> and needs no further checking.
Yes, the laws are everywhere and everywhen the same (if not, physics
would be impossible, which shows that physics, and science in general,
isn't necessarily universal), but which are they? It is that question
that is addressed. The laws are a summary of all the observations,
and a priori don't go beyond. Even the general principle of
relativity is a consequence of observations, since it is possible to
find laws, whatever they are.
--
X
Oh No
>> >So, if that doesn't matter, how do you test the theory, so that it be
>> >proven that the position of Jupiter at the time was exactly the
>> >calculated one? �That isn't the role of physics, it hasn't all that
>> >magical power. �Imagine just a second that the theory is only valid
>> >for a limited span of time, for it don't take into account a small
>> >perturbation that becomes mesurable only on a large time scale, and
>> >which has no important cosmological consequence.
>
>On 24 nov, 09:36, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> I think we agreed that all measurement must take place in the context of
>> theory. I cited the general principle of relativity, as a scientific
>> principle. Imv the general principle is necessary to science. If we
>> cannot assume that local laws of physics are always and everywhere the
>> same, I cannot see that it even makes sense to investigate what the laws
>> of physics are, because at any time they might be something else. If we
>> can assume that the laws of physics are always and everywhere the same,
>> then our calculation of the position of Jupiter is already conclusive,
>> and needs no further checking.
>
>Yes, the laws are everywhere and everywhen the same (if not, physics
>would be impossible, which shows that physics, and science in general,
>isn't necessarily universal), but which are they?
It shows that we cannot *prove* that science is universal, and hence
that we must *assume* science is universal, for if we do not, there is
no science.
> It is that question
>that is addressed. The laws are a summary of all the observations,
>and a priori don't go beyond.
If that were so, there would be no predictions, and if no predictions
there would be no applications or technology.
> Even the general principle of
>relativity is a consequence of observations, since it is possible to
>find laws, whatever they are.
It cannot be a consequence, or it would not apply outside the light
cone, or indeed anywhere where there are no observations. In fact we
assume it applies always and everywhere.
X-Phy
> >and a priori don't go beyond.
On 24 nov, 20:50, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
> If that were so, there would be no predictions, and if no predictions
> there would be no applications or technology.
No. There can be prediction, but these predictions aren't necessarily
verified a priori (prior to observation.) That it is possible to have
reliable predictions is beyond human understanding (or is a
metaphysical issue,) and can't be discussed here. Anyway, in the case
of a extrapolation in time of present observations, the reliability
decreases as time increases.
> > Even the general principle of
> >relativity is a consequence of observations, since it is possible to
> >find laws, whatever they are.
> It cannot be a consequence, or it would not apply outside the light
> cone, or indeed anywhere where there are no observations. In fact we
> assume it applies always and everywhere.
Yes, but if we could find any law, it would have no sense assuming it.
--
X
mercury
> On 19 nov, 14:56, mercury <il...@abv.bg> wrote:
>
> > On the first subject:
>
> > A) There is a clear evidence that something can travel faster than
> > light: quantum teleportation
> That is already know from the EPR paradox and Aspect's experiment.
> What is also already known is that there is no information transfert,
> as this setup can't be used to communicate. Be it teleportation or
> any conceited concept, you have to compare both ends to conclude, and
> so you can't any faster than light signal. I would be glad to see a
> (not spurious) proof of superluminal signal.
>
There is a misunderstanding.
I didnt and dont say at all that there is any communication.
What I say is that there is a distant change in the qauntum state (QS)
of bob 's particle (polarization or spin). There is no need Bob to
receive signals and to understand that there is a change. There is no
need of Bob at all in order to change the QS of the 2 particle in the
EPR pair.
What I say is that there is an instant change in 75% and in 25% the
state is transfered.
That's another issue if Bob can not understand that.
What I say is that this change travel in the sense of happens
immidiately. If we accept that something is floating from EPR partner
1 to EPR partner 2 it must travel instanly or circumvent the spacetime
somehow.
> > B) I have recently disscussed the issue of the emmission of light in a
> > cavity on the thread
>
> > Simple? fundamental question about EM in cavity
>
> > QM does not allow for a photon to be created at the point of the
> > emmiting electron in an atom because Heisenberg Uncertrainty will be
> > broken.
> Heisenberg uncertainty occur only for a measurement, which isn't the
> case. The simple first quantized electrodynamic theory, from which
> the HUR derives, is sufficient to describe the phenomenon. And as the
> electron isn't localized, there is no problem. The picture of points
> and wavy line is false, let's remember that it is nothing more than a
> graphical symbol for fields.
> It is false to say that QED accepts it, since it is only in one mode.
> But the physical reality is the superposition of many mode, and that
> superposition vanishes at large distances. It would be like saying
> that the propagation of a pulse on a clothes line breaks causality
> because it can be writen as a superposition of sinusoïdal waves.
> There is an exact classical analogy when a guitar string is plucked:
> the initial signal is a pulse, but the result is periodic. The ultra-
> violet catastroph remains, but you disn't address it either.
I disagree on the following reason.
Yes, HUP is derived from measurement (gamma ray microscope) but in
fact it is a Fourier decomposition of a wave in a limited area (no
matter how the wave is confined therein). If by the birth of the
photon its probability is zero everywhere and 1 at the next vicinity
of the electron than the Fourier decomposition would point to very
high frequencicies at the begining of existence of the photon. Even
the application of HUP to the electron wouldnt save the case because
the electron is massiv and has small uncertainty dx but the photon is
massless and if it's probability is concentarated in such region this
would lead to ultrahigh energies.
1. If as you say it is an impulse initially travelling as a classical
wave as on a guitar string than one should register very high energy
photons initially with some probability.
2. Secondly for a radiation from an atom in a cavity of L/ 4 (far
detuned) and the probability moving like an impulse there must be
photons registered after L/4c period. QED says there won't be such
which is clear since Planck derivation of the Black body radiation law
(in the cavity there are ony those modes with l = d/2 e.g. d=l/4 is
not suported.
3. Nevertheless a wavepacket can be decomposed into different modes
and then we say that some mode extinguish themselves it is I think an
approximation for the ideal case and in fact the impulse should move
for sometime before dissipation as a soliton. Then one would not have
zero nodes of the probability in the cavity, which are observed.
> > On the second subject:
>
> > The WF mimics probability so very very very well that one is almost
> > left with no chance but to accept it is not a physically real object.
>
> What is a physical real object?
>
> > A) But I wonder how can Mach Zehnder interferometer results with a
> > single photon be explained without accepting that from the second arm
> > a real wave is not acting (without inter-) on the photon of course
> > together with that in the first arm.
>
> > I would be glad to see how one can disprove this.
>
> There is no statement.
> --
> X-Phy
I will comment this later.
Ilian
X-Phy
> > > A) There is a clear evidence that something can travel faster than
> > > light: quantum teleportation
> > That is already know from the EPR paradox and Aspect's experiment.
> > What is also already known is that there is no information transfert,
> > as this setup can't be used to communicate. �Be it teleportation or
> > any conceited concept, you have to compare both ends to conclude, and
> > so you can't any faster than light signal. �I would be glad to see a
> > (not spurious) proof of superluminal signal.
> There is a misunderstanding.
>
> I didnt and dont say at all that there is any communication.
Relativity is only about the travel of information, that is,
communication.
> What I say is that there is a distant change in the qauntum state (QS)
> of bob 's particle (polarization or spin). There is no need Bob to
> receive signals and to understand that there is a change. There is no
> need of Bob at all in order �to change the QS of the 2 particle in the
> EPR pair.
That's a point of view, but how do you verify that experimentally? In
order to be able to make the comparision, you have to wait some time
until a signal comes from both ends. During that time, that which you
think travel faster than light has enough time to arrive at light
speed. QM doesn't describe anything real that travel faster than
light. Therefore there is no evidence at all that something can
travel faster than light, neither empirically, nor philosophically.
> What I say is that there is an instant change in 75% and in 25% the
> state is transfered.
> That's another issue if Bob can not understand that.
> What I say is that this change travel in the sense of happens
> immidiately. If we accept that something is floating from EPR partner
> 1 to EPR partner 2 it must travel instanly or circumvent the spacetime
> somehow.
Ditto for teleportation.
> > > B) I have recently disscussed the issue of the emmission of light in a
> > > cavity on the thread
> > >
> > > � � Simple? fundamental question about EM in cavity
> > >
> > > QM does not allow for a photon to be created at the point of the
> > > emmiting electron in an atom because Heisenberg Uncertrainty will be
> > > broken.
> > Heisenberg uncertainty occur only for a measurement, which isn't the
> > case. �The simple first quantized electrodynamic theory, from which
> > the HUR derives, is sufficient to describe the phenomenon. �And as the
> > electron isn't localized, there is no problem. �The picture of points
> > and wavy line is false, let's remember that it is nothing more than a
> > graphical symbol for fields.
> > It is false to say that QED accepts it, since it is only in one mode.
> > But the physical reality is the superposition of many mode, and that
> > superposition vanishes at large distances. �It would be like saying
> > that the propagation of a pulse on a clothes line breaks causality
> > because it can be writen as a superposition of sinuso�dal waves.
> > There is an exact classical analogy when a guitar string is plucked:
> > the initial signal is a pulse, but the result is periodic. �The ultra-
> > violet catastroph remains, but you disn't address it either.
> I disagree on the following reason.
> Yes, HUP is derived �from measurement (gamma ray microscope) but in
> fact it is a Fourier decomposition of a wave in a limited area (no
> matter how the wave is confined therein). If by the birth of the
> photon its probability is zero everywhere and 1 at the next vicinity
> of the electron than the Fourier decomposition would point to very
> high frequencicies at the begining of existence of the photon.
So what? You aren't measuring the energy of the photon at that time.
You measure it asymptotically far, when all the high frequencies have
disappear. And even with high frequencies components, the energy of
the em is bounded, since it is exactely the same as the one of the
pulse.
> Even
> the application of HUP to the electron wouldnt save �the case because
> the electron is massiv and has small uncertainty dx but the photon is
> massless and if it's probability is concentarated in such region �this
> would lead to ultrahigh energies.
> 1. If as you say it is an impulse initially travelling as a classical
> wave as on a guitar string than one should register very high energy
> photons initially with some probability.
How?
> 2. Secondly for a radiation from an atom in a cavity of L/ 4 (far
> detuned) and the probability moving like an impulse �there must be
> photons registered after L/4c period. QED says there won't �be such
> which is clear since Planck derivation of the Black body radiation law
> (in the cavity there are ony those modes with l = d/2 e.g. d=l/4 is
> not suported.
Now second quantization is introduced, but the basic principle is
unchanged. The photons are always registered asymptotically far. In
second quantization, high energy components must be less populated
because of the discretization of the energy levels. That is, for a
high frequency mode to be present, it must contain at least one
quantum, which is of high energy with respect to the available
energy. Though, anew all that is a Fourier transformed description.
In the pusle basis, there is a mathematically equivalent description,
but much more complex since not using harmonic oscillators, which are
easy to quantize.
> 3. Nevertheless a wavepacket can be decomposed into different modes
> and then we say that some mode extinguish themselves it is I think an
> approximation for the ideal case and in fact the impulse should move
> for sometime before dissipation as a soliton. Then one would not have
> zero nodes of the probability in the cavity, which are observed.
--
X
mercury
> On 26 nov, 15:03, mercury <il...@abv.bg> wrote:
>
> > > > A) There is a clear evidence that something can travel faster than
> > > > light: quantum teleportation
>
> Relativity is only about the travel of information, that is,
> communication.
Yes it is now. But before QT discovery relativity insisted that
nothing! can travel faster than light. Now it is restated and says
information can not travel faster.
>
> > What I say is that there is a distant change in the qauntum state (QS)
> > of bob 's particle (polarization or spin). There is no need Bob to
> > receive signals and to understand that there is a change. There is no
> > need of Bob at all in order to change the QS of the 2 particle in the
> > EPR pair.
>
> That's a point of view, but how do you verify that experimentally?
I am not a specialist in QT but I think there is experimental
prove!!!!!
Bob can measure (if he is there and wants to – this of course is not
necessary) his particle after the measurement proceeded by Alice but
much before the classical light signal arrives to his end. After
receiving the information (arrival of the light signal from Alice
about her results) he will convince himself (in 75%) that something
happened at the other end at the time Alice made her measurement and
this has an immediate effect on his particle. So we must conclude that
there is possible that something travels immediately.
You can not say that this something travels together with the light
signal.
>
> > > > B) I have recently disscussed the issue of the emmission of light in a
> > > > cavity on the thread
>
> > > > Simple? fundamental question about EM in cavity
>
> > > > QM does not allow for a photon to be created at the point of the
> > > > emmiting electron in an atom because Heisenberg Uncertrainty will be
> > > > broken.
> > > Heisenberg uncertainty occur only for a measurement, which isn't the
> > > case. The simple first quantized electrodynamic theory, from which
> > > the HUR derives, is sufficient to describe the phenomenon. And as the
> > > electron isn't localized, there is no problem. The picture of points
> > > and wavy line is false, let's remember that it is nothing more than a
> > > graphical symbol for fields.
> > > It is false to say that QED accepts it, since it is only in one mode.
> > > But the physical reality is the superposition of many mode, and that
> > > superposition vanishes at large distances. It would be like saying
> > > that the propagation of a pulse on a clothes line breaks causality
> > > because it can be writen as a superposition of sinusoïdal waves.
> > > There is an exact classical analogy when a guitar string is plucked:
> > > the initial signal is a pulse, but the result is periodic. The ultra-
> > > violet catastroph remains, but you disn't address it either.
> > I disagree on the following reason.
> > Yes, HUP is derived from measurement (gamma ray microscope) but in
> > fact it is a Fourier decomposition of a wave in a limited area (no
> > matter how the wave is confined therein). If by the birth of the
> > photon its probability is zero everywhere and 1 at the next vicinity
> > of the electron than the Fourier decomposition would point to very
> > high frequencicies at the begining of existence of the photon.
>
> So what? You aren't measuring the energy of the photon at that time.
> You measure it asymptotically far, when all the high frequencies have
> disappear. And even with high frequencies components, the energy of
> the em is bounded, since it is exactely the same as the one of the
> pulse.
If we consider a pulse classically and decompose it into modes
(standing waves) with the amplitudes going down at high frequencies it
will show a pulse propagating along x and hitting the wall of a cavity
for example. But these modes don’t have any physical meaning. They are
just mathematical representation. No wonder there can’t be any sign of
a wave asymptotically.
In the quantum case it is quite opposite. The pulse should be a linear
superposition from modes (standing waves) and these standing waves
have exact physical meaning – they are defined in every textbook on
QED as photons. I understand a mode as the probability for presence of
the photon – it potentially exists in the space of the whole mode and
when is registered somewhere in the mode - the mode collapses
(together with the other modes of the packet of the pulse).
Firstly and most significantly if these modes are present (and they
are present because there is the pulse/all frequencies or coefficients
before all modes will be exactly zero only when there is no emission –
no pulse/) one should measure them even asymptotically far (or near
the other end of a cavity if the emitting atom is on the one wall of
it.). Because it’s a superposition of these modes and if there are
amplitudes for high frequencies they can be measured at any place and
at any time (even asymptotically far away from the pulse). Of course
high frequencies would be quenched but would not be zero.
Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
excited atom – so one must only have frequencies lower than that E/h .
This again inhibits a localized packet which the pulse should be (at
least initially).
>
> > Even
> > the application of HUP to the electron wouldnt save the case because
> > the electron is massiv and has small uncertainty dx but the photon is
> > massless and if it's probability is concentarated in such region this
> > would lead to ultrahigh energies.
> > 1. If as you say it is an impulse initially travelling as a classical
> > wave as on a guitar string than one should register very high energy
> > photons initially with some probability.
>
> How?
Is answered above.
>
> > 2. Secondly for a radiation from an atom in a cavity of L/ 4 (far
> > detuned) and the probability moving like an impulse there must be
> > photons registered after L/4c period. QED says there won't be such
> > which is clear since Planck derivation of the Black body radiation law
> > (in the cavity there are ony those modes with l = d/2 e.g. d=l/4 is
> > not suported.
>
> Now second quantization is introduced, but the basic principle is
> unchanged. The photons are always registered asymptotically far. In
> second quantization, high energy components must be less populated
> because of the discretization of the energy levels. That is, for a
> high frequency mode to be present, it must contain at least one
> quantum, which is of high energy with respect to the available
> energy. Though, anew all that is a Fourier transformed description.
> In the pusle basis, there is a mathematically equivalent description,
> but much more complex since not using harmonic oscillators, which are
> easy to quantize.
I consider exactly in fact second quantization – the wave is quantized
by the cavity condition. If the pulse travels through L/4 there should
a high amplitude in one of the modes at that time. Second quantization
doesn’t allow photons at L/4 but the pulse picture does.
>
> X- Скриване на цитирания текст -
>
> - Показване на цитирания текст -
X-Phy
>> communication.
On 2 d�c, 19:35, mercury <il...@abv.bg> wrote:
> Yes it is now. But before QT discovery relativity insisted that
> nothing! can travel faster than light. Now it is restated and says
> information can not travel faster.
Relativity doesn't exclude space-like intervals. Between two
independent
events, a faster that light speed can be calculated. But such an
interval
is impossible if there is a causal relationship between the events,
that is,
one of them can influence the occurrence of the other, which is the
same as
a communication or travel of information. A direct consequence is
that no
particle can travel faster than light, since they all are described by
an
equation that is essentially a causal relationship. Yet, the phase
velocity
of a wave can be greater than light, like for an electron in vacuum,
but it
can be shown there is no transfer of information, which is done at the
group
velocity.
Actually, relativity only says that the light speed is a constant, and
from
that the remaining follows, since allowing transfer of information
faster
than light lead to contradictions, as light carries information.
>> > What I say is that there is a distant change in the qauntum state (QS)
>> > of bob 's particle (polarization or spin). There is no need Bob to
>> > receive signals and to understand that there is a change. There is no
>> > need of Bob at all in order to change the QS of the 2 particle in the
>> > EPR pair.
>> That's a point of view, but how do you verify that experimentally?
> I am not a specialist in QT but I think there is experimental
> prove!!!!!
There is no other experimental data than the measured polarizations.
The
probability distribution at one end is the same whether there is a
measurement at the other end or not, and whatever its outcome. So
there is
no way to experimentally see such an effect.
> Bob can measure (if he is there and wants to - this of course is not
> necessary) his particle after the measurement proceeded by Alice but
> much before the classical light signal arrives to his end. After
> receiving the information (arrival of the light signal from Alice
> about her results) he will convince himself (in 75%) that something
> happened at the other end at the time Alice made her measurement and
> this has an immediate effect on his particle. So we must conclude that
> there is possible that something travels immediately.
> You can not say that this something travels together with the light
> signal.
Correlation isn't the same as transfer of information. Bob can't
know, in
any way, what was the measurement outcome of Alice before he receive
the
light signal. Consequently, the measurement outcome of Bob isn't
influenced
by the one of Alice. Experimentally, there is no way to observe a
communication, only a correlation. This correlation would also exist
if
there were a hidden variable, and in that case it is plain obvious
there is
no communication.
>> So what? You aren't measuring the energy of the photon at that time.
>> You measure it asymptotically far, when all the high frequencies have
>> disappear. And even with high frequencies components, the energy of
>> the em is bounded, since it is exactly the same as the one of the
>> pulse.
> If we consider a pulse classically and decompose it into modes
> (standing waves) with the amplitudes going down at high frequencies it
> will show a pulse propagating along x and hitting the wall of a cavity
> for example. But these modes don't have any physical meaning. They are
> just mathematical representation. No wonder there can't be any sign of
> a wave asymptotically.
>
> In the quantum case it is quite opposite. The pulse should be a linear
> superposition from modes (standing waves) and these standing waves
> have exact physical meaning - they are defined in every textbook on
> QED as photons. I understand a mode as the probability for presence of
> the photon - it potentially exists in the space of the whole mode and
> when is registered somewhere in the mode - the mode collapses
> (together with the other modes of the packet of the pulse).
That's an elaborate picture, the pixels of that picture is that the em
field
no longer has a determinate value, but a probability amplitude for
every
possible value. That leads to give a probability amplitude to the
photon.
> Firstly and most significantly if these modes are present (and they
> are present because there is the pulse/all frequencies or coefficients
> before all modes will be exactly zero only when there is no emission -
> no pulse/) one should measure them even asymptotically far (or near
> the other end of a cavity if the emitting atom is on the one wall of
> it.). Because it's a superposition of these modes and if there are
> amplitudes for high frequencies they can be measured at any place and
> at any time (even asymptotically far away from the pulse). Of course
> high frequencies would be quenched but would not be zero.
Assuming they can be measured asymptotically far, it can also be only
a
correlation, and not a travel of information. Actually, they are
virtual
photons, that appear if enough energy is lent by the measuring
apparatus.
> Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
> excited atom - so one must only have frequencies lower than that E/h .
> This again inhibits a localized packet which the pulse should be (at
> least initially).
That is true only for detected photons, but they can't be detected
because
of conservation of energy. They superpose in a destructive
interference.
> I consider exactly in fact second quantization - the wave is quantized
> by the cavity condition. If the pulse travels through L/4 there should
> a high amplitude in one of the modes at that time. Second quantization
> doesn't allow photons at L/4 but the pulse picture does.
That's not second quantization.
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> Correlation isn't the same as transfer of information. �Bob can't
> know, in
> any way, what was the measurement outcome of Alice before he receive
> the
> light signal. �Consequently, the measurement outcome of Bob isn't
> influenced by the one of Alice.
Plainly wrong. Imagine Alice is throwing dices, and the result is
classically
transferred to Bob. The communication goes through Charles. Possibly,
Charles throws his own dice, and, instead of transferring Alice's
result, transfers his own result. Or may be their sum (mod 6) + 1.
Clearly, considering the statistics, Bob can't know, in any way which
does not
incorporate another communication channel, if Charles has modified the
signal. Your logic would be "consequently, the value received by Bob
isn't influenced by Charles."
>�Experimentally, there is no way to observe a
> communication, only a correlation. �This correlation would also exist
> if there were a hidden variable, and in that case it is plain obvious
> there is no communication.
But, given the violation of Bell's inequality, we can exclude an
explanation in terms of hidden variables without communications.
By the way, there are also hidden variable theories which have FTL
communication. In particular, de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.
X-Phy
> On 11 Dez., 06:28, X-Phy <xphysic...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Correlation isn't the same as transfer of information. �ｿｽBob can't
> > know, in
> > any way, what was the measurement outcome of Alice before he receive
> > the
> > light signal. �ｿｽConsequently, the measurement outcome of Bob isn't
> > influenced by the one of Alice.
> Plainly wrong. Imagine Alice is throwing dices, and the result is
> classically
> transferred to Bob. �ｿｽThe communication goes through Charles. Possibly,
> Charles throws his own dice, and, instead of transferring Alice's
> result, transfers his own result. Or may be their sum (mod 6) + 1.
>
> Clearly, considering the statistics, Bob can't know, in any way which
> does not
> incorporate another communication channel, if Charles has modified the
> signal. Your logic would be "consequently, the value received by Bob
> isn't influenced by Charles."
Sure, but what is the connection with what I wrote?
> >�ｿｽExperimentally, there is no way to observe a
> > communication, only a correlation. �ｿｽThis correlation would also exist
> > if there were a hidden variable, and in that case it is plain obvious
> > there is no communication.
> But, given the violation of Bell's inequality, we can exclude an
> explanation in terms of hidden variables without communications.
Of course, what I meant is that correlation is more general than
communication. QM is sort of in a gray zone, or at a frontier. It's
a third way.
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> On 11 d�c, 07:13, Ilja <ilja.schmel...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 11 Dez., 06:28, X-Phy <xphysic...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > know, in
> > > any way, what was the measurement outcome of Alice before he receive
> > > the
> > > influenced by the one of Alice.
> > Plainly wrong. Imagine Alice is throwing dices, and the result is
> > classically
> > Charles throws his own dice, and, instead of transferring Alice's
> > result, transfers his own result. Or may be their sum (mod 6) + 1.
>
> > Clearly, considering the statistics, Bob can't know, in any way which
> > does not
> > incorporate another communication channel, if Charles has modified the
> > signal. Your logic would be "consequently, the value received by Bob
> > isn't influenced by Charles."
>
> Sure, but what is the connection with what I wrote?
In my example, the conclusion is plainly wrong, because by
construction the value received by Bob can be influenced by Charles.
Similarly, your analoguous conclusion is plainly wrong for the same
reasons. That an influence is undetectable by consideration of
probability distributions does not mean that no influence exists.
> > But, given the violation of Bell's inequality, we can exclude an
> > explanation in terms of hidden variables without communications.
>
> Of course, what I meant is that correlation is more general than
> communication. �QM is sort of in a gray zone, or at a frontier. �It's
> a third way.
The explanation for correlations always involves some information
transfer. Not necessarily between Alice and Bob, there may be also a
common cause. But correlation cries for explanation, and explanation
is something with certain well-defined properties: Or an explanation
with direct causation in one or the other direction, or an explanation
by a common cause. That's all. Other "alternative" explanations are
simply mysticism.
Once a non-FTL common cause explanation for the QM correlations is not
possible, one needs some FTL.
Or one has to give up realism and accept mystical "explanations" which
do not explain anything.
It is that simple.
glird
> ‘If one wants to be clear about what is meant by “position of an
> object”, for example of an electron..., then one has to specify definite
> experiments by which the “position of an electron” can be measured;
> otherwise this term has no meaning at all’ (Heisenberg, 1927).
>
> What I don't get is that, since this goes back to 1927, and Stone's
> theorem goes back to 1932 and justifies the Schroedinger equation, how
> come everybody doesn't understand quantum mechanics already?
Because a man named Max said that the psi in Schrodinger's equation
stood for "probability'. In fact, though,if you look at his paper,
“Four Lectures on Wave Mechanics”, Blackie and Sons, London, 1928),
you will find there,
"For the pressure, p, say, we should have a wave equation,
2a - (1/u2)p =
0 . . . . . (10),
u being the constant velocity of propagation of longitudinal waves,
the only waves possible in the case of a fluid. We should have to try
to find the most general solution of this partial differential
equation that satisfies certain boundary conditions at the surface of
a vessel. ...
"In the case of the waves which are to replace in our thought the
motion of the electron, there must also be some quantity p, subject to
a wave equation like equation (1), though we cannot yet tell the
physical meaning of p. Let us put this question aside for the moment."
"In equation (10) we shall have to put ... Substituting ... and
replacing the letter p by [psi] ..."
Not probability waves; not mystery and dice; just psi for p for
pressure!!
In his equation (10), p was initially defined as "pressure". That is
exactly what it does denote: pressure. Given up, presumably, because
you can't have pressure (nor an electromagnetic wave) in an empty
void. Schrödinger’s for p, for pressure, is the psi in all the
quantum wave equations then and now.
glird
glird
>
>Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
In planck's equation. e = hf, e denotes a quantity of energy, h
denotes a quantum of action and f denotes the frequency of the emitted
waves. Accordingly, f = E/f IS the frequency. How, then, can one
"only have frequencies lower than that"?
glird
mercury
> On Dec 2, 1:35�pm, mercury <il...@abv.bg> wrote:
>
>
>
> >Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
> >excited atom � so one must only have frequencies lower than that E/h
>
> denotes a quantum of action and f denotes the frequency of the emitted
> "only have frequencies lower than that"?
>
> glird
That�s because of Heisenberg�s uncertainty � dE.dt < h
And dp.dx <h E=p.c for em radiation.
There has to be a wave packet � a single sin wave is not localized at
infinity.
Ilian
mercury
> Correlation isn't the same as transfer of information. Bob can't
> know, in any way, what was the measurement outcome of Alice before he
> receive the light signal. Consequently, the measurement outcome of
> Bob isn't influenced by the one of Alice.
Sorry about the delay - reason being flu.
I feel you need a more decisive prove. Here I try:
1. Suppose Bob has taken a Schr�dinger cat with him. The death of the
cat hangs upon the quantum state of a number of atoms which are
coupled to the EPR photons of Bob (Bob and Alice share many EPR
pairs). If the spin of some atom is up poison is released and kills
the cat. If spin is down poison is not released and the cat stays
alive.
If Alice does nothing with her photon Number 1 the Bob�s atom N1 stays
in quantum superposition of up/down and the cat is neither dead no
alive. So if Alice doesn�t measure none of her photons the cat is in
superposition. If Bob opens the cage he may find the cat alive. (at
least in 50% or even he may save it as the poison should be released
at the time of opening).
If Alice measures her photon N1 then atom N1 at Bob�s place can turn
up and kill the cat (50%). If Alice wants to kill the cat surely she
would measure as many photons as she has until she receives that some
of Bobs atoms is up which kills the cat. If one opens the cage the cat
should be dead and it is surely killed by the actions of Alice.
2. By that example it follows that Alice can influence events at space-
like intervals instantly.
3. She would also know the result of her actions (as she would know
what the polarization of the Bobs photon is after her measurement). So
there is transfer of information too. Alice gets instant info about
the polarization of Bob�s EPR photon.
>
>
>
> >> So what? You aren't measuring the energy of the photon at that time.
> >> You measure it asymptotically far, when all the high frequencies have
> >> disappear. And even with high frequencies components, the energy of
> >> the em is bounded, since it is exactly the same as the one of the
> >> pulse.
> > If we consider a pulse classically and decompose it into modes
> > (standing waves) with the amplitudes going down at high frequencies it
> > will show a pulse propagating along x and hitting the wall of a cavity
> > for example. But these modes don't have any physical meaning. They are
> > just mathematical representation. No wonder there can't be any sign of
> > a wave asymptotically.
>
> > In the quantum case it is quite opposite. The pulse should be a linear
> > superposition from modes (standing waves) and these standing waves
> > have exact physical meaning - they are defined in every textbook on
> > QED as photons. I understand a mode as the probability for presence of
> > the photon - it potentially exists in the space of the whole mode and
> > when is registered somewhere in the mode - the mode collapses
> > (together with the other modes of the packet of the pulse).
>
Here is an error in my reason. The modes are not probabilities but
amplitudes (complex).
Nevertheless this doesn�t change much. At the instant of the birth of
the photon the amplitudes can build a well defined wave packet located
at the emitting electron. So one would have very high frequencies in
order to create the packet. The next instant these modes would not
cover each other anymore even at very great distances (mathematically
at infinity). As the energy is in the modes one should be able to
measure photons at infinity or not quite (with low probability of
course) very soon after the electron emits.
> > Firstly and most significantly if these modes are present (and they
> > are present because there is the pulse/all frequencies or coefficients
> > before all modes will be exactly zero only when there is no emission -
> > no pulse/) one should measure them even asymptotically far (or near
> > the other end of a cavity if the emitting atom is on the one wall of
> > it.). Because it's a superposition of these modes and if there are
> > amplitudes for high frequencies they can be measured at any place and
> > at any time (even asymptotically far away from the pulse). Of course
> > high frequencies would be quenched but would not be zero.
>
> Assuming they can be measured asymptotically far, it can also be only
> a correlation, and not a travel of information. Actually, they are
> virtual photons, that appear if enough energy is lent by the measuring
> apparatus.
These photons should be connected to the emitting electron by the
energy law. So there would a very clear cause and effect connection.
>
> > Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
> > excited atom - so one must only have frequencies lower than that E/h .
> > This again inhibits a localized packet which the pulse should be (at
> > least initially).
>
> That is true only for detected photons, but they can't be detected
> because of conservation of energy. They superpose in a destructive
> interference.
>
> > I consider exactly in fact second quantization - the wave is quantized
> > by the cavity condition. If the pulse travels through L/4 there should
> > a high amplitude in one of the modes at that time. Second quantization
> > doesn't allow photons at L/4 but the pulse picture does.
>
> That's not second quantization.
Yes. The amplitudes have to be quantized. But this doesn�t change
anything.
I repeat if the pulse travels through L/4 there should a high
amplitude in one of the modes at time L/4c.
>
> --
> X-Phy- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Best wishes:
Ilian
mercury
>
>
>
> >Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
> >excited atom � so one must only have frequencies lower than that E/h
>
> denotes a quantum of action and f denotes the frequency of the emitted
> "only have frequencies lower than that"?
>
> glird
There must be energies and frequencies (e=hf) around one central
energy because of Heisenberg uncertainty dE.dt > h (dt the lifetime of
the state). If one has just one E,f then the probability is
proportional to sin^2 and so the photon appears at infinity. The
wavepacket solves the problem just initially as I point out in my
reply to xphy.
Ilian
glird
> On Dec 17, 8:37 am, glird <gl...@aol.com> wrote:
> > On Dec 2, 1:35 pm, mercury <il...@abv.bg> wrote:
> > >Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
>
> > In Planck's equation, e = hf, e denotes a quantity of energy, h
> > denotes a quantum of action and f denotes the frequency of the emitted
> > "only have frequencies lower than that"?
>
> And dp.dx <h E=p.c for em radiation.
> Ilian
A single sin wave is not localized at any given point either.
(Neither is a wave packet.)
Regardless even so, Born's uncertainty relations deal with the
PROBABILITY of the frequency being _*higher*_ or lower than Planck's
value of f. How, then, can one "only have frequencies lower than
that"?
Btw, assuming that your E represents the same thing as my e, then e
= hf yields
f = E/h, not f = E/f. [Thank you, Ilian, for not calling me a jackass
or {to use Androcles' favorite word} a "fuckwit", for having made that
silly little error.]
glird
glird
> On Dec 11, 3:28 am, X-Phy <xphysic...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > know, in �any way, what was the measurement outcome of Alice before he
> > receive the light signal. �Consequently, the measurement outcome of
> > Bob isn't influenced �by the one of Alice.
>
> Sorry about the delay - reason being flu.
>
>
> 1. Suppose Bob has taken a Schr�dinger cat with him. The death of the
> cat hangs upon the quantum state of a number of atoms which are
> coupled to the EPR photons of Bob (Bob and Alice share many EPR
> pairs). If the spin of some atom is up poison is released and kills
> the cat. If spin is down poison is not released and the cat stays
> alive.
>
> If Alice does nothing with her photon Number 1 the Bob�s atom N1 stays
> in quantum superposition of up/down and the cat is neither dead no
> alive. So if Alice doesn�t measure none of her photons the cat is in
> superposition. If Bob opens the cage he may find the cat alive. (at
> least in 50% or even he may save it as the poison should be released
> at the time of opening).
>
> If Alice measures her photon N1 then atom N1 at Bob�s place can turn
> up and kill the cat (50%). If Alice wants to kill the cat surely she
> would measure as many photons as she has until she receives that some
> of Bobs atoms is up which kills the cat. If one opens the cage the cat
> should be dead and it is surely killed by the actions of Alice.
>
> 2. By that example it follows that Alice can influence events at space-
> like intervals instantly.
>
> 3. She would also know the result of her actions (as she would know
> what the polarization of the Bobs photon is after her measurement). So
> there is transfer of information too. Alice gets instant info about
> the polarization of Bob�s EPR photon.
>
>
>
>
>
> > >> You measure it asymptotically far, when all the high frequencies have
> > virtual �photons, that appear if enough energy is lent by the measuring
> > apparatus.
>
> These photons should be connected to the emitting electron by the
> energy law. So there would a very clear cause and effect connection.
>
> > > Secondly the high frequencies are limited by the energy E of the
> > > excited atom - so one must only have frequencies lower than that E/h .
> > > This again inhibits a localized packet which the pulse should be (at
> > > least initially).
>
> > That is true only for detected photons, but they can't be detected
> > interference.
>
> > > I consider exactly in fact second quantization - the wave is quantized
> > > by the cavity condition. If the pulse travels through L/4 there should
> > > a high amplitude in one of the modes at that time. Second quantization
> > > doesn't allow photons at L/4 but the pulse picture does.
>
> > That's not second quantization.
>
> Yes. The amplitudes have to be quantized. But this doesn�t change
> anything.
> I repeat if the pulse travels through L/4 there should a high
> amplitude in one of the modes at time L/4c.
>
> Ilian
There is a HUGE difference between the "probability" of an event
compared to the status of the event at a given time.
After saying "The death of the cat hangs upon the quantum state of a
number of atoms", there were many sentences starting with or
containing the word "if". All such sentences are based on
probabilities.
Regardless of the statistical likelihood of any such if-event
happening, the cat in the box is either alive or dead at a given
instant, whether or not anyone knows it or opens the box and looks.
glird
mercury
There couldnt be many higher f because the atom is excited to an
energy level. Surely there wont be energies higher than E+dE, but
there can be E lower than E-dE at least principally - though very
unlikely for me. (dE= h/dt ).
Ilian
mercury
> compared to the status of the event at a given time.
> number of atoms", there were many sentences starting with or
> probabilities.
> � Regardless of the statistical likelihood of any such if-event
> happening, the cat in the box is either alive or dead at a given
> instant, whether or not anyone knows it or opens the box and looks.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
There is practically just one if - the choice of Alice what to do!!
If Alice wants to kill the cat surely she would measure as many
photons as she has until she receives that some of Bobs atoms is up
which kills the cat.
Ilian
X-Phy
>> > Plainly wrong. Imagine Alice is throwing dices, and the result is
>> > classically
>> > transferred to Bob. The communication goes through Charles. Possibly,
>> > Charles throws his own dice, and, instead of transferring Alice's
>> > result, transfers his own result. Or may be their sum (mod 6) + 1.
>> >
>> > Clearly, considering the statistics, Bob can't know, in any way which
>> > does not incorporate another communication channel, if Charles has
>> > modified the
>> > signal. Your logic would be "consequently, the value received by Bob
>> > isn't influenced by Charles."
>> Sure, but what is the connection with what I wrote?
> In my example, the conclusion is plainly wrong, because by
> construction the value received by Bob can be influenced by Charles.
> Similarly, your analoguous conclusion is plainly wrong for the same
> reasons. That an influence is undetectable by consideration of
> probability distributions does not mean that no influence exists.
I think we aren't speaking about the same thing. As influence, I mean
a causal relation. As there is no way to know the outcome of Alice at
the time of measurement, there can't be a causal relation. In the
example you give, there is a communication channel between Charles and
Bob, the signal must not be faster than light, or there is a way to
know the signal reaching Charles and the one leaving it before
measuring at Bob's.
To say the truth, I don't know what to think. Perhaps you are right,
but that isn't obvious to me.
>> Of course, what I meant is that correlation is more general than
>> communication. QM is sort of in a gray zone, or at a frontier. It's
>> a third way.
> The explanation for correlations always involves some information
> transfer.
No, QM explain the correlation, and it have been shown that there is
no information transfer.
> Not necessarily between Alice and Bob, there may be also a
> common cause. But correlation cries for explanation, and explanation
> is something with certain well-defined properties: Or an explanation
> with direct causation in one or the other direction, or an explanation
> by a common cause. That's all. Other "alternative" explanations are
> simply mysticism.
No, you make a logical step that you haven't justified. Besides, you
can't call the alternative explanations [necessarily] "mystical"
before knowing
them all.
> Once a non-FTL common cause explanation for the QM correlations is not
> possible, one needs some FTL.
FTL have been shown not to occur. The only remaining possibilty is
that you logical step above is false.
> Or one has to give up realism and accept mystical "explanations" which
> do not explain anything.
> It is that simple.
Non sequitur.
Many people think realism isn't necessary, and that positivism is
sufficient. That's not my case, I rather think that some hidden
assumption is to be identified and eliminated, just like yours.
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> On 12 d�c, 19:26, Ilja <ilja.schmel...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> > In my example, the conclusion is plainly wrong, because by
> > construction the value received by Bob can be influenced by Charles.
> > Similarly, your analoguous conclusion is plainly wrong for the same
> > reasons. That an influence is undetectable by consideration of
> > probability distributions does not mean that no influence exists.
>
> I think we aren't speaking about the same thing. �As influence, I mean
> a causal relation.
I'm too. The message Bob receives is causally influenced by Charles.
It may be simply the value chosen by Charles, out of his free will.
It may be the sum modulo 6 +1 of the value chosen by Charles
and the original message. It may be the unchanged original message,
by Charles free choice not to change it. In every of these scenarios,
there clearly is a causal relation between Charles free decisions and
the value received by Bob.
What else could you mean with "causal relation"?
>�As there is no way to know the outcome of Alice at
> the time of measurement, there can't be a causal relation.
Translation in my example: As there is no way to know for Bob
which of the decisions has been made by Charles, there
can't be causal relation between Charles decisions and the
value received by Bob. Clearly nonsense.
> >> Of course, what I meant is that correlation is more general than
> >> communication. QM is sort of in a gray zone, or at a frontier. It's
> >> a third way.
> > The explanation for correlations always involves some information
> > transfer.
>
> No, QM explain the correlation, and it have been shown that there is
> no information transfer.
QM certainly does not explain the correlations. It gives formulas
to compute them, that's all. The point of the minimal interpretation
is the refusal to give explanations.
> > Not necessarily between Alice and Bob, there may be also a
> > common cause. But correlation cries for explanation, and explanation
> > is something with certain well-defined properties: Or an explanation
> > with direct causation in one or the other direction, or an explanation
> > by a common cause. That's all. �Other "alternative" explanations are
> > simply mysticism.
>
> No, you make a logical step that you haven't justified.
Which one? I need, of course, a definition of explanation. This
definition
is, essentially, the principle of common cause.
>�Besides, you
> can't call the alternative explanations [necessarily] "mystical"
> before knowing them all.
I certainly can call them that way. The rejection of realism is
mystics.
Point. That's the natural definition of mystics: The claim that no
realistic explanation exists. I have a certain definition of realism,
the
corresponding definition of mystics follows automatically, and
whatever the alternative explanation, it has to be mystical according
to this definition.
> > Once a non-FTL common cause explanation for the QM correlations is not
> > possible, one needs some FTL.
>
> FTL have been shown not to occur.
How this? We cannot use the effect for FTL information transfer.
That's all and quite different.
>�The only remaining possibilty is
> that you logical step above is false.
Laughable. Assume you have only two explanations for some
situation you observe: Or A gives information to B, or B gives
information to A.
Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
information
to B by influencing A. Is this possible? Clearly not. It
contradicts
one of the two possible explanations: If it is only B who gives
information
to A, you cannot give information to B by telling something to A.
The same works in the other direction too. You cannot use the hidden
channel to transfer information to A by telling something to B.
Because
this would contradict the first explanation.
I conclude that one cannot use the observation to transfer
information.
You conclude from this that above explanations have to be false.
Combining this, we have proven the following:
"Or A gives information to B, or B gives information to A =>
Nor A gives information to B, nor B gives information to A"
>From pure logic. Quite strange, not? Combine this with the
tautologies
"A gives information to B => A gives information to B, or B gives
information to A"
"Nor A gives information to B, nor B gives information to A =>
A does not give information to B"
and we obtain even more curious conclusions
"A gives information to B => A does not give information to B"
and have found the final contradiction in logic.
Not? Where is the error? Obviously in your part of the logic,
which I'm unable to formalize.
> > Or one has to give up realism and accept mystical "explanations" which
> > do not explain anything.
> > It is that simple.
>
> Non sequitur.
sequitur.
> Many people think realism isn't necessary, and that positivism is
> sufficient.
Many people believe in creationism. So what?
That positivism is not sufficient has been proven in detail
by Popper, and there is not much to add to his proof. Ignorance
of Popper is clearly not an argument.
X-Phy
>> > In my example, the conclusion is plainly wrong, because by
>> > construction the value received by Bob can be influenced by Charles.
>> > Similarly, your analoguous conclusion is plainly wrong for the same
>> > reasons. That an influence is undetectable by consideration of
>> > probability distributions does not mean that no influence exists.
>> I think we aren't speaking about the same thing. As influence, I mean
>> a causal relation.
> I'm too. The message Bob receives is causally influenced by Charles.
> It may be simply the value chosen by Charles, out of his free will.
> It may be the sum modulo 6 +1 of the value chosen by Charles
> and the original message. It may be the unchanged original message,
> by Charles free choice not to change it. In every of these scenarios,
> there clearly is a causal relation between Charles free decisions and
> the value received by Bob.
>
> What else could you mean with "causal relation"?
>> As there is no way to know the outcome of Alice at
>> the time of measurement, there can't be a causal relation.
> Translation in my example: As there is no way to know for Bob
> which of the decisions has been made by Charles, there
> can't be causal relation between Charles decisions and the
> value received by Bob. Clearly nonsense.
In your example, there is information traveling from Charles slower
than light. Causal relation is possible. But in the case of a
quantum mechanical correlation, a causal relation is impossible since
it would be faster than light, and thus lead to inconsistencies.
That's what I state by: "there is no way to know the outcome of Alice
at the time of measurement." It is obvious Alice can't influence Bob,
since at the time of Bob measurement, there is always an observator
for which Alice has not yet performed the measurement, and another one
for which she has. An influence is synonymous to an inconsistency.
For you example to be contradictory, there must be a quantum
correlation between Charles and Bob, but in that case, the same
reasoning shows that Charles has no influence.
>> > Not necessarily between Alice and Bob, there may be also a
>> > common cause. But correlation cries for explanation, and explanation
>> > is something with certain well-defined properties: Or an explanation
>> > with direct causation in one or the other direction, or an explanation
>> > by a common cause. That's all. Other "alternative" explanations are
>> > simply mysticism.
>> No, you make a logical step that you haven't justified.
> Which one?
>From the properties of an explanation to the possible forms.
> I need, of course, a definition of explanation. This definition is,
> essentially, the principle of common cause.
You can also make a definition of red and say that QM isn't red.
>> Besides, you
>> can't call the alternative explanations [necessarily] "mystical"
>> before knowing them all.
> I certainly can call them that way. The rejection of realism is
> mystics.
You can't call the alternative explanations "not realistic" before
knowing them all.
>> > Once a non-FTL common cause explanation for the QM correlations is not
>> > possible, one needs some FTL.
>> FTL have been shown not to occur.
> How this? We cannot use the effect for FTL information transfer.
> That's all and quite different.
If there is no information transfer, there is no causal relation,
otherwise a variation of the cause can't be known by the effect, that
won't vary, while a causal relation implies that the effect depends on
the cause.
>> The only remaining possibilty is
>> that you logical step above is false.
> Laughable. Assume you have only two explanations for some
> situation you observe: Or A gives information to B, or B gives
> information to A.
> Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
> information
> to B by influencing A. Is this possible? Clearly not. It
> contradicts
> one of the two possible explanations: If it is only B who gives
> information
> to A, you cannot give information to B by telling something to A.
I don't understand. It contradicts one explanation, but the other
remains.
> The same works in the other direction too. You cannot use the hidden
> channel to transfer information to A by telling something to B.
> Because
> this would contradict the first explanation.
>
> I conclude that one cannot use the observation to transfer
> information.
>
> You conclude from this that above explanations have to be false.
>
> Combining this, we have proven the following:
>
> "Or A gives information to B, or B gives information to A =>
> Nor A gives information to B, nor B gives information to A"
>
> From pure logic. Quite strange, not? Combine this with the
> tautologies
>
> "A gives information to B => A gives information to B, or B gives
> information to A"
> "Nor A gives information to B, nor B gives information to A =>
> A does not give information to B"
>
> and we obtain even more curious conclusions
> "A gives information to B => A does not give information to B"
> and have found the final contradiction in logic.
>
> Not? Where is the error? Obviously in your part of the logic,
> which I'm unable to formalize.
The one I just gave?
The problem with QM is that we reason in term of space, yet the wave
function isn't a function of space, but of the configuration space.
The
correlation is in configuration space, not in ordinary space. And
since hidden variables are excluded, all the configurations are actual
at the same time. So in all rigor we can't speak about something
traveling between Alice and Bob, it is only a correlation in
configuration space, and no causal relation. There is neither a common
cause, since the projection occurs on the wave function, that is a
single entity.
>> Many people think realism isn't necessary, and that positivism is
>> sufficient.
> Many people believe in creationism. So what?
What is you argument for the necessity of realism?
> That positivism is not sufficient has been proven in detail
> by Popper, and there is not much to add to his proof. Ignorance
> of Popper is clearly not an argument.
Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, so it fulfills Popper's requirement,
even in positivism.
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> On 26 d�c, 15:49, Ilja <ilja.schmel...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> In your example, there is information traveling from Charles slower
> than light. Causal relation is possible. But in the case of a
> quantum mechanical correlation, a causal relation is impossible since
> it would be faster than light, and thus lead to inconsistencies.
Why should information travelling faster than light lead to
inconsistencies? The assumption of FTL information transfer
in a preferred frame is consistent.
> That's what I state by: "there is no way to know the outcome of Alice
> at the time of measurement." It is obvious Alice can't influence Bob,
> since at the time of Bob measurement, there is always an observator
> for which Alice has not yet performed the measurement, and another one
> for which she has. An influence is synonymous to an inconsistency.
No. If the transformation travels faster than light in a preferred
frame, nothing
becomes inconsistent. Simply almost all (except one) observers use
a "time coordinate" which does not correspond to the preferred time.
Of course, you can use a "time coordinate" which has no relation
to fundamental causality. It is simply a coordinate with no physical
meaning. That's all. No inconsistency.
> >From the properties of an explanation to the possible forms.
> > I need, of course, a definition of explanation. This definition is,
> > essentially, the principle of common cause.
>
> You can also make a definition of red and say that QM isn't red.
I can. So your point is that my definition of realism is
inappropriate?
Support this with arguments.
> >> Besides, you
> >> can't call the alternative explanations [necessarily] "mystical"
> >> before knowing them all.
> > I certainly can call them that way. The rejection of realism is
> > mystics.
>
> You can't call the alternative explanations "not realistic" before
> knowing them all.
I know they don't have the standard form of realistic explanations.
That's sufficient to classify them as mystical.
> >> FTL have been shown not to occur.
> > How this? We cannot use the effect for FTL information transfer.
> > That's all and quite different.
>
> If there is no information transfer, there is no causal relation,
> otherwise a variation of the cause can't be known by the effect, that
> won't vary, while a causal relation implies that the effect depends on
> the cause.
Read again. Don't mingle "one cannot use effect X for information
transfer"
with "there is no information transfer".
> > Laughable. Assume you have only two explanations for some
> > situation you observe: Or A gives information to B, or B gives
> > information to A.
> > Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
> > information
> > to B by influencing A. Is this possible? Clearly not. It
> > contradicts
> > one of the two possible explanations: If it is only B who gives
> > information
> > to A, you cannot give information to B by telling something to A.
>
> I don't understand. It contradicts one explanation, but the other
> remains.
But the one explanation allows to explain the effect.
How can it be that one explanation allows to explain the effect,
but is in contradiction with a technical application of this effect?
> > Not? Where is the error? Obviously in your part of the logic,
> > which I'm unable to formalize.
>
> The one I just gave?
>
> The problem with QM is that we reason in term of space, yet the wave
> function isn't a function of space, but of the configuration space.
I know. This is what leads to non-locality, or FTL causal influences.
> And
> since hidden variables are excluded, all the configurations are actual
> at the same time. So in all rigor we can't speak about something
> traveling between Alice and Bob, it is only a correlation in
> configuration space, and no causal relation. There is neither a common
> cause, since the projection occurs on the wave function, that is a
> single entity.
Correlations without a common cause - that's mystics. And your
text around this does not make it less mystical.
By the way, hidden variables are not excluded. There is a well-known
simply realistic theory - de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.
> What is your argument for the necessity of realism?
It is an important part of the scientific method itself. If you reject
realism, you reject the search for realistic, causal explanations of
observable correlations.
This does not prove any necessity of realism, because there is none,
simply because there is no necessity for science too. If you don't
like to do science, there are lot's of other jobs in the world. One
can
also give up science in parts - for example, continue to search for
realistic causal explanations in all other sciences except fundamental
physics clearly works fine, for all other sciences except fundamental
physics.
So, please don't ask for some necessity. Look at it from another
point of view: Realism is a very general, fundamental principle of
science in general, even part of the scientific method: It is a
methodological
prescription to search for realistic explanations of observed
correlations.
To give it up, one would need really strong arguments.
There are none. All known physics are compatible with realism. There
are
realistic alternatives or variants for all physical theories.
One may not like these theories, because they need a preferred frame.
But some esthetical preferrence for more mystical theories (the
preferred
frame is the common sense) is certainly not sufficient for the
rejection of
realism.
Of course, those who like mystics will prefer a "curved spacetime"
instead of an inhomogenenous ether, and quantum mystics instead
of a simple pilot wave. And they will also like a rejection of
realism,
quantum logic or many worlds. But the esthetical preference for
mystics is not a scientific argument.
> > That positivism is not sufficient has been proven in detail
> > by Popper, and there is not much to add to his proof. Ignorance
> > of Popper is clearly not an argument.
>
> Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, so it fulfills Popper's requirement,
> even in positivism.
Popper is much more than fallibilism. I suggest you to read him.
X-Phy
> Why should information travelling faster than light lead to
> inconsistencies?
Because for some observer the effect is before the cause.
> The assumption of FTL information transfer
> in a preferred frame is consistent.
A prefered frame can't be shown by experiment, so that is a mystical
assumption, like you call it.
>> That's what I state by: "there is no way to know the outcome of Alice
>> at the time of measurement." It is obvious Alice can't influence Bob,
>> since at the time of Bob measurement, there is always an observator
>> for which Alice has not yet performed the measurement, and another one
>> for which she has. An influence is synonymous to an inconsistency.
> No. If the transformation travels faster than light in a preferred
> frame, nothing
> becomes inconsistent. Simply almost all (except one) observers use
> a "time coordinate" which does not correspond to the preferred time.
You have a similar situation, since the preferred frame is unkown, we
don't know whether Alice has performed his measurement or not.
Indeed, the speed of the whole setup can be changed, without any
observational difference. There is no experimental way to see the
preferred frame through the outcomes at Bob.
>> You can also make a definition of red and say that QM isn't red.
> I can. So your point is that my definition of realism is
> inappropriate?
> Support this with arguments.
Saying that QM isn't red doesn't imply that some sort or causal
relation must exist. That is the logical step lacking.
>> You can't call the alternative explanations "not realistic" before
>> knowing them all.
> I know they don't have the standard form of realistic explanations.
> That's sufficient to classify them as mystical.
You don't know if they aren't realistic. There is nothing in the
definition of realism that something specific must be the cause of
otherthing specific. The logical step is still lacking.
I can think of two hidden assumptions:
1. A prior space-time exist. Yet, the wave function is a fonction of
configuration space, not ordinary space.
2. The two photons are well separated objects. Yet, there is a wave
function on the configuation space of both photon, and they are
indistinguishable.
You don't know if a realistic explanation exist without one or both of
those assumptions, so you can affirm every explanation is mystical.
Actually, I think of a counter-example.
>> If there is no information transfer, there is no causal relation,
>> otherwise a variation of the cause can't be known by the effect, that
>> won't vary, while a causal relation implies that the effect depends on
>> the cause.
> Read again. Don't mingle "one cannot use effect X for information
> transfer" with "there is no information transfer".
An information transfer we can't be informed of isn't an information
transfer, by definition. In the case at hand, there is no transfer of
information between Alice and Bob, therefore there is no causal
relation.
>> > Laughable. Assume you have only two explanations for some
>> > situation you observe: Or A gives information to B, or B gives
>> > information to A.
>> > Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
>> > information
>> > to B by influencing A. Is this possible? Clearly not. It
>> > contradicts
>> > one of the two possible explanations: If it is only B who gives
>> > information
>> > to A, you cannot give information to B by telling something to A.
>> I don't understand. It contradicts one explanation, but the other
>> remains.
> But the one explanation allows to explain the effect.
> How can it be that one explanation allows to explain the effect,
> but is in contradiction with a technical application of this effect?
I understand nothing in your assumption
>> And
>> since hidden variables are excluded, all the configurations are actual
>> at the same time. So in all rigor we can't speak about something
>> traveling between Alice and Bob, it is only a correlation in
>> configuration space, and no causal relation. There is neither a common
>> cause, since the projection occurs on the wave function, that is a
>> single entity.
> Correlations without a common cause - that's mystics. And your
> text around this does not make it less mystical.
You haven't proven that.
> By the way, hidden variables are not excluded. There is a well-known
> simply realistic theory - de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.
The pilot wave theory has other features that aren't acceptable. It
can't be formulated in special relativity, and it involves a non-local
"quantum" potential. *Local* hidden variable have been excluded, that
doesn't exclude the pilot wave theory, but it is already a non local
theory that didn't enter into the contest in the first place.
>> What is your argument for the necessity of realism?
> It is an important part of the scientific method itself. If you reject
> realism, you reject the search for realistic, causal explanations of
> observable correlations.
>
> This does not prove any necessity of realism, because there is none,
> simply because there is no necessity for science too.
No, for science positivism is enough. Positivism entails obvervation
and logics alone. Anything else, including realism, is metaphysical
since not based on observation.
Now you can't claim that quantum phenomena belong to the domain of
science. Doing so is equivalent to imposing a constraint on reality.
We can't constrain reality, only scientifical theories.
> So, please don't ask for some necessity. Look at it from another
> point of view: Realism is a very general, fundamental principle of
> science in general, even part of the scientific method: It is a
> methodological
> prescription to search for realistic explanations of observed
> correlations.
>
> To give it up, one would need really strong arguments.
No, one need nothing. Anyway, you don't know whether QM has a
realistic formulation or not, we only know that there aren't some
causal realtions.
> There are none. All known physics are compatible with realism.
That's a sophism.
> There are realistic alternatives or variants for all physical theories.
>
> One may not like these theories, because they need a preferred frame.
Because they aren't falsifyable.
>> Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, so it fulfills Popper's requirement,
>> even in positivism.
> Popper is much more than fallibilism. I suggest you to read him.
Popper may believe in what he want, even in creationism, that's not my
business.
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> On 30 d�c 2009, 14:38, Ilja <ilja.schmel...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> > Why should information travelling faster than light lead to
> > inconsistencies?
>
> Because for some observer the effect is before the cause.
These observers simply use bad coordinates.
> > The assumption of FTL information transfer
> > in a preferred frame is consistent.
>
> A prefered frame can't be shown by experiment, so that is a mystical
> assumption, like you call it.
There is certainly nothing mystical with a preferred frame.
"Mystical" I use to describe something incompatible with common sense
realism, inconsistent in the usual understanding.
Common sense realism is quite comfortable and compatible
with a human inability to distinguish by observation states which are
really different.
> >> �An influence is synonymous to an inconsistency.
> > No. If the transformation travels faster than light in a preferred
> > frame, nothing
> > becomes inconsistent. �Simply almost all (except one) observers use
> > a "time coordinate" which does not correspond to the preferred time.
>
> You have a similar situation, since the preferred frame is unknown, we
> don't know whether Alice has performed his measurement or not.
We don't know a lot of things, but not knowing something about
reality does never lead to inconsistencies in reality.
> Indeed, the speed of the whole setup can be changed, without any
> observational difference. �There is no experimental way to see the
> preferred frame through the outcomes at Bob.
I know. According to the current theory (which in principle is always
only an approximation of some more fundamental, true theory) we
are unable to see the difference. Why should this be problematic?
> >> You can also make a definition of red and say that QM isn't red.
> > I can. So your point is that my definition of realism is
> > inappropriate?
> > Support this with arguments.
> Saying that QM isn't red doesn't imply that some sort or causal
> relation must exist. �That is the logical step lacking.
My justification for realism is methodological: Realism, as I define
it,
is a preference for theories which give causal explanations for
observed
correlations. A theory which gives a causal explanation has to be
preferred
in comparison with a theory which simply describes (or "predicts"
starting
with postulates not based on causal explanations) the observable
correlations.
Of course, I have to make some nontrivial assumption, and realism is
a
nontrivial assumption. And nontrivial assumptions cannot be derived
logically
from nothing.
And I give a quite specific definition of the meaning of causal
explanations.
Not without this. If you think this definition is not adequate, give a
better one.
> >> You can't call the alternative explanations "not realistic" before
> >> knowing them all.
> > I know they don't have the standard form of realistic explanations.
> > That's sufficient to classify them as mystical.
>
> You don't know if they aren't realistic. �There is nothing in the
> definition of realism that something specific must be the cause of
> otherthing specific.
A realistic theory should describe what really exists. And it should
specify the real causal connections between these really existing
objects (beables).
>�The logical step is still lacking.
>
> I can think of two hidden assumptions:
>
> 1. A prior space-time exist. �Yet, the wave function is a fonction of
> configuration space, not ordinary space.
No. The definition of realism I use does not mention notions of
spacetime.
It mentions only causality. Causality has, of course, some direction:
causes cause effects. But this is a much more abstract notion than
spacetime.
> 2. The two photons are well separated objects. �Yet, there is a wave
> function on the configuation space of both photon, and they are
> indistinguishable.
The definition of realism I use do not even mention "photon" or
"wave function". So I clearly don't make hidden assumptions about
them.
> You don't know if a realistic explanation exist without one or both of
> those assumptions, so you can affirm every explanation is mystical.
I know, because my notion of realism does not make assumptions
about them.
> Actually, I think of a counter-example.
That would be nice.
> > Read again. Don't mingle "one cannot use effect X for information
> > transfer" with "there is no information transfer".
>
> An information transfer we can't be informed of isn't an information
> transfer, by definition.
The violation of Bell's inequality informs us about the fact that
some information transfer has happened, or from A to B, or
from B to A. It does not inform us about the direction of this
information transfer.
Anyway, your "definition" is obviously heavily positivistic:
All what exists has to be observable.
>�In the case at hand, there is no transfer of
> information between Alice and Bob, therefore there is no causal
> relation.
Positivistic nonsense.
> >> > Laughable. Assume you have only two explanations for some
> >> > situation you observe: �Or A gives information to B, or B gives
> >> > information to A.
> >> > Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
> >> > information
> >> > to B by influencing A. �Is this possible? �Clearly not. �It
> >> > contradicts
> >> > one of the two possible explanations: �If it is only B who gives
> >> > information
> >> > to A, you cannot give information to B by telling something to A.
> >> I don't understand. �It contradicts one explanation, but the other
> >> remains.
> > But the one explanation allows to explain the effect.
> > How can it be that one explanation allows to explain the effect,
> > but is in contradiction with a technical application of this effect?
>
> I understand nothing in your assumption.
What is complicate with this assumptions?
We see an effect - correlation. A correlation can be explained
in three ways: A influences B, B influences A, or some common
cause C influences A as well as B.
We can exclude the last explanation: It would not allow a violation
of Bell's inequality. Thus, only two explanations survive:
A influences B, or B influences A.
Each of the two explanations allows to explain all observable
facts. But the two explanations contradict each other - there
are no closed causal loops. So only one of them can be true.
Whatever our technical invention based on the effect, the
same possibilities for explanation remain: The technical device
may be explained by a causal influence from A to B. But
it may also be explained by a causal influence from B to A.
Now, assume you can build a device which transfers information
from A to B. Certainly, such a device cannot be explained by
a causal influence from B to A. Thus, a contradiction.
> > Correlations without a common cause - that's mystics. And your
> > text around this does not make it less mystical.
>
> You haven't proven that.
Of course, I cannot prove this by logics without defining mystics.
And to define mystics as acceptance of violations of common sense
about causality is a quite natural one.
> > By the way, hidden variables are not excluded. There is a well-known
> > simply realistic theory - de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.
>
> The pilot wave theory has other features that aren't acceptable.
No. Certainly there is nothing unacceptable which in its seriousness
is comparable with giving up realism, with leaving observations
completely without explanations. However bad, an explanation is
better than no explanation.
>�It can't be formulated in special relativity, and it involves a non-local
> "quantum" potential. �*Local* hidden variable have been excluded, that
> doesn't exclude the pilot wave theory, but it is already a non local
> theory that didn't enter into the contest in the first place.
It certainly can be formulated in special relativity - it simply uses
a preferred frame for this purpose.
There is nothing in a hidden preferred frame which contradicts
common sense about realism and causality.
> >> What is your argument for the necessity of realism?
> > It is an important part of the scientific method itself. If you reject
> > realism, you reject the search for realistic, causal explanations of
> > observable correlations.
>
> > This does not prove any necessity of realism, because there is none,
> > simply because there is no necessity for science too.
>
> No, for science positivism is enough.
Positivism is certainly not enough, because it is simply nonsensical.
Read Popper for a rejection of positivism.
>�Positivism entails obvervation and logics alone.
You certainly cannot base science on observation and logics alone.
The good old problem of induction prevents this.
> �Anything else, including realism, is metaphysical
> since not based on observation.
Solve the problem of induction on observation and logics alone,
and then come back.
> Now you can't claim that quantum phenomena belong to the domain of
> science. �Doing so is equivalent to imposing a constraint on reality.
> We can't constrain reality, only scientifical theories.
We make, with our scientific theories, nontrivial hypotheses about
reality. Hypotheses which are certainly not derived from observation
and logics alone - no prediction can be derived from past observations
and pure logic.
> > To give it up, one would need really strong arguments.
>
> No, one need nothing. �Anyway, you don't know whether QM has a
> realistic formulation or not, we only know that there aren't some
> causal realtions.
We know that QM allows realistic formulations: Several such
formulations
are known, in particular pilot wave theory.
> > There are realistic alternatives or variants for all physical theories.
> > One may not like these theories, because they need a preferred frame.
>
> Because they aren't falsifyable.
They are. They allow to derive all the predictions made by quantum
theory,
thus, are as falsifiable as quantum theory itself.
You confuse missing falsifiability of a theory (this would be a reason
to reject a theory)
with missing excess falsifiability in comparison with another theory
(this puts the theory
only at equal foot with the other theory).
Moreover, my lattice model (ilja-schmelzer.de/clm) makes lots of
predictions about properties of the standard model of particle
physics,
properties which have to be postulated out of nothing, without
any explanation, in the standard model.
> > Popper is much more than fallibilism. I suggest you to read him.
> Popper may believe in what he want, even in creationism, that's not my
> business.
Ok, you are indeed free to believe whatever you want, including
creationism and positivism, and ignore any arguments against these
nonsensical theories. It is your free choice to believe in positivism
and to ignore the detailed and excellent refutation of positivism
presented
by Popper.
That's similar to religious self-immunization: A true believer is
supposed
not to read atheistic arguments - that's anathema, evil.
A good positivist is supposed not to read arguments against
positivism.
That's metaphysics, that means, evil.
(The really funny thing is that he doesn't even recognize that
positivism is
also philosophy, metaphysics: You cannot derive positivism from
observation and logic.)
Oh No
>Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, so it fulfills Popper's requirement,
>even in positivism.
I don't think it is falsifiable, or that there will ever be an
experiment to falsify it.
glird
>
>< Assume you have only two explanations for some
situation you observe: �Or A gives information to B, or B gives
information to A.
Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
information to B by influencing A. �Is this possible? �Clearly not.
�It contradicts one of the two possible explanations: �If it is only B
who gives information to A, you cannot give information to B by
telling something to A.
tautologies ... and we obtain even more curious conclusions
"A gives information to B �=> A does not give
information to B"
and have found the final contradiction in logic. >
The "final contradiction" in the "logic" of STR goes like this:
If A is true then so is B.
A says "B is true".
B says "A is false".
glird
======================================= MODERATOR'S COMMENT:
I don't think this has any relevance to anything under discussion
X-Phy
"Ilja" <ilja.sc...@googlemail.com> a �crit dans le message de
news:96f57f57-2cfb-42eb-b028-
ecb3a2...@22g2000yqr.googlegroups.com...
> "Mystical" I use to describe something incompatible with common sense
> realism, inconsistent in the usual understanding.
>
> Common sense realism is quite comfortable and compatible
> with a human inability to distinguish by observation states which are
> really different.
That's metaphysics, by definition.
>> Indeed, the speed of the whole setup can be changed, without any
>> observational difference. There is no experimental way to see the
>> preferred frame through the outcomes at Bob.
> I know. According to the current theory (which in principle is always
> only an approximation of some more fundamental, true theory) we
> are unable to see the difference. Why should this be problematic?
We can't claim there is a difference if we are unable to see a
difference.
Moreover, a scientific theory must be based on a minimal set of
assumptions.
A preferred frame is simply a useless assumption, therefore a
superfluous
one.
> My justification for realism is methodological: Realism, as I define
> it, is a preference for theories which give causal explanations for
> observed correlations. A theory which gives a causal explanation has to be
> preferred in comparison with a theory which simply describes (or "predicts"
> starting with postulates not based on causal explanations) the observable
> correlations.
That doesn't mean that the causal explanation must belong to a
predefined,
restricted set. You didn't justify the logical step that leads to the
set
you gave.
> Of course, I have to make some nontrivial assumption, and realism is
> a nontrivial assumption. And nontrivial assumptions cannot be derived
> logically from nothing.
>
> And I give a quite specific definition of the meaning of causal
> explanations.
> Not without this. If you think this definition is not adequate, give a
> better one.
It isn't the definition, it is an unjustified application to a
specific
case.
>> You don't know if they aren't realistic. There is nothing in the
>> definition of realism that something specific must be the cause of
>> otherthing specific.
> A realistic theory should describe what really exists. And it should
> specify the real causal connections between these really existing
> objects (beables).
In QM, we don't know what are the really existing objects. It is not
necessary a photon at Alice's and a photon at Bob's. Indeed, the QM
description already doesn't describe it so.
>> I can think of two hidden assumptions:
>>
>> 1. A prior space-time exist. Yet, the wave function is a fonction of
>> configuration space, not ordinary space.
> No. The definition of realism I use does not mention notions of
> spacetime.
Not the definition, but your application to that particular case.
> It mentions only causality. Causality has, of course, some direction:
> causes cause effects. But this is a much more abstract notion than
> spacetime.
When requiring a FTL communication, you allude to a prior space-time.
Now
in the sensible space-time, prior or not, there is no FTL
communication.
>> 2. The two photons are well separated objects. Yet, there is a wave
>> function on the configuation space of both photon, and they are
>> indistinguishable.
> The definition of realism I use do not even mention "photon" or
> "wave function". So I clearly don't make hidden assumptions about
> them.
Again, not the definition but your application. You reason from the
measurement on the localized photons, now there is no evidence they
are the
really existing objects.
>> You don't know if a realistic explanation exist without one or both of
>> those assumptions, so you can affirm every explanation is mystical.
> I know, because my notion of realism does not make assumptions
> about them.
Not your notion, but yourself.
>> Actually, I think of a counter-example.
> That would be nice.
It would be nicer if you understood why your logical step isn't
justified.
>> > Read again. Don't mingle "one cannot use effect X for information
>> > transfer" with "there is no information transfer".
>> An information transfer we can't be informed of isn't an information
>> transfer, by definition.
> The violation of Bell's inequality informs us about the fact that
> some information transfer has happened, or from A to B, or
> from B to A. It does not inform us about the direction of this
> information transfer.
No, it informs us that there is no local hidden variable, and together
with
information transfer, that doesn't exhaust all (realistic)
possibilities.
> Anyway, your "definition" is obviously heavily positivistic:
> All what exists has to be observable.
No, an information is what informs, if it doesn't inform it isn't
information, period. It is a tautology.
>> In the case at hand, there is no transfer of
>> information between Alice and Bob, therefore there is no causal
>> relation.
> Positivistic nonsense.
No, it is the definition of a causal relation.
>> >> > Laughable. Assume you have only two explanations for some
>> >> > situation you observe: Or A gives information to B, or B gives
>> >> > information to A.
>> >> > Now think about the possibility to use the effect to transfer
>> >> > information
>> >> > to B by influencing A. Is this possible? Clearly not. It
>> >> > contradicts
>> >> > one of the two possible explanations: If it is only B who gives
>> >> > information
>> >> > to A, you cannot give information to B by telling something to A.
>> >> I don't understand. It contradicts one explanation, but the other
>> >> remains.
>> > But the one explanation allows to explain the effect.
>> > How can it be that one explanation allows to explain the effect,
>> > but is in contradiction with a technical application of this effect?
You should have said, use the effect to transmit information *either
way*.
You only showed that the hypothesis "you have only two explanations"
is
false, therefore there should be other explanations.
> We see an effect - correlation. A correlation can be explained
> in three ways: A influences B, B influences A, or some common
> cause C influences A as well as B.
Unjustified logical step.
> We can exclude the last explanation: It would not allow a violation
> of Bell's inequality.
And unjustified logical step. There remains the possibility of a non-
local
hidden variable.
Moreover, we don't know what is A and B. We don't observe a
correlation
between Alice and Bob, it is impossible. We observe a correlation
between
the measurements at Alice and Bob, at another common point.
> And to define mystics as acceptance of violations of common sense
> about causality is a quite natural one.
You should define common sense and prove it is necessary. I'm afraid
we are
going astray. You call mystic all that doesn't please you, we can't
discuss
about subjectivities.
>> > By the way, hidden variables are not excluded. There is a well-known
>> > simply realistic theory - de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory.
>> The pilot wave theory has other features that aren't acceptable.
> No. Certainly there is nothing unacceptable which in its seriousness
> is comparable with giving up realism, with leaving observations
> completely without explanations. However bad, an explanation is
> better than no explanation.
The pilot wave theory isn't an explanation, it is a mathematical
transformation that separate the local and the non-local part. The
non-local part is still without explanation.
>> It can't be formulated in special relativity, and it involves a non-local
>> "quantum" potential. *Local* hidden variable have been excluded, that
>> doesn't exclude the pilot wave theory, but it is already a non local
>> theory that didn't enter into the contest in the first place.
> It certainly can be formulated in special relativity - it simply uses
> a preferred frame for this purpose.
Yes, and Galilean transformation, it can't be formulated in covariant
form.
>> >> What is your argument for the necessity of realism?
>> > It is an important part of the scientific method itself. If you reject
>> > realism, you reject the search for realistic, causal explanations of
>> > observable correlations.
>> > This does not prove any necessity of realism, because there is none,
>> > simply because there is no necessity for science too.
>> No, for science positivism is enough.
> Positivism is certainly not enough, because it is simply nonsensical.
Why should Nature be sensical? As I have said, you impose constraints
on
Nature, not on the theories, and it is impossible. That quantum
phenomena
would have no realistic explanation can't be ruled out from pure
thinking.
> Read Popper for a rejection of positivism.
That's a metaphysical creed.
>> Positivism entails obvervation and logics alone.
> You certainly cannot base science on observation and logics alone.
> The good old problem of induction prevents this.
No, each induction must obey two requirements: that the starting point
be
logically derived from it, and that it be verified by observation.
There is
nothing else necessary. Observation isn't empirism.
>> Anything else, including realism, is metaphysical
>> since not based on observation.
> Solve the problem of induction on observation and logics alone,
> and then come back.
There is no problem of induction, it is a mere try-error process.
>> Now you can't claim that quantum phenomena belong to the domain of
>> science. Doing so is equivalent to imposing a constraint on reality.
>> We can't constrain reality, only scientifical theories.
> We make, with our scientific theories, nontrivial hypotheses about
> reality. Hypotheses which are certainly not derived from observation
> and logics alone - no prediction can be derived from past observations
> and pure logic.
So what?
All what we need in science, is to describe reality and make
predictions.
So, all what we need is experimental test and consistency, that is,
theories
that don't contradict themselves. The way in which the theories are
obtained doesn't matter. Anything else is an issue of taste, and
doesn't
belong to science but to philosophy.
>> No, one need nothing. Anyway, you don't know whether QM has a
>> realistic formulation or not, we only know that there aren't some
>> causal realtions.
> We know that QM allows realistic formulations: Several such
> formulations are known, in particular pilot wave theory.
If the pilot wave theory is so perfect, why hasn't it overridden
orthodox
QM?
>> > There are realistic alternatives or variants for all physical theories.
>> > One may not like these theories, because they need a preferred frame.
>> Because they aren't falsifyable.
> They are. They allow to derive all the predictions made by quantum
> theory, thus, are as falsifiable as quantum theory itself.
Save that they make one superfluous, supplementary assumption.
> Ok, you are indeed free to believe whatever you want, including
> creationism and positivism, and ignore any arguments against these
> nonsensical theories. It is your free choice to believe in positivism
> and to ignore the detailed and excellent refutation of positivism
> presented by Popper.
What is important is the grounds of the refutation, and those ground
are
purely metaphysical.
> That's similar to religious self-immunization:
You become offensive. I'm not necessarily dumper than you.
--
X-Phy
X-Phy
> >Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, so it fulfills Popper's requirement,
> >even in positivism.
> I don't think it is falsifiable, or that there will ever be an
> experiment to falsify it.
The Aspect's experiment could have falsify it. Which other feature
wouldn't be falsifyable?
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> On 4 jan, 15:41, Ilja <ilja.schmel...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> > "Mystical" I use to describe something incompatible with common sense
> > realism, inconsistent in the usual understanding.
>
> > Common sense realism is quite comfortable and compatible
> > with a human inability to distinguish by observation states which are
> > really different.
>
> That's metaphysics, by definition.
Metaphysics is unavoidable part of physics. Another result of Popper
which you will probably ignore.
> > I know. According to the current theory (which in principle is always
> > only an approximation of some more fundamental, true theory) we
> > are unable to see the difference. �Why should this be problematic?
>
> We can't claim there is a difference if we are unable to see a
> difference.
Why this? There are two guys. Each claims it was the other who has
beaten him first. In this situation, I believe at most one of them is
right,
and the other lies, even if I'm unable to observe the difference (they
look
equally damaged).
> Moreover, a scientific theory must be based on a minimal set of
> assumptions.
> A preferred frame is simply a useless assumption, therefore a
> superfluous
> one.
It is certainly not. Once we have to given one of the aims of science
-
the search for realistic explanations - if we ignore it. That's far
too much.
> > My justification for realism is methodological: Realism, as I define
> > it, is a preference for theories which give causal explanations for
> > observed correlations. A theory which gives a causal explanation has to be
> > preferred in comparison with a theory which simply describes (or "predicts"
> > starting with postulates not based on causal explanations) the observable
> > correlations.
>
> That doesn't mean that the causal explanation must belong to a
> predefined,
> restricted set. �You didn't justify the logical step that leads to the
> set you gave.
Present other simple explanations if you like.
> > Of course, I have to make some nontrivial assumption, and realism is
> > a nontrivial assumption. �And nontrivial assumptions cannot be derived
> > logically from nothing.
> > And I give a quite specific definition of the meaning of causal
> > explanations.
> > Not without this. If you think this definition is not adequate, give a
> > better one.
>
> It isn't the definition, it is an unjustified application to a
> specific case.
In this case, give a better causal explanation for the violation of
the BI.
> > A realistic theory should describe what really exists. And it should
> > specify the real causal connections between these really existing
> > objects (beables).
>
> In QM, we don't know what are the really existing objects. �It is not
> necessary a photon at Alice's and a photon at Bob's. �Indeed, the QM
> description already doesn't describe it so.
And therefore QM is not a realistic theory. A realist needs a better
theory.
QM counts at best as a description of observations.
> >> I can think of two hidden assumptions:
>
> >> 1. A prior space-time exist. Yet, the wave function is a fonction of
> >> configuration space, not ordinary space.
> > No. The definition of realism I use does not mention notions of
> > spacetime.
>
> Not the definition, but your application to that particular case.
All the things located at the same event can easily influence each
other. This assumption seem quite simple and natural to me.
> > It mentions only causality. Causality has, of course, some direction:
> > causes cause effects. But this is a much more abstract notion than
> > spacetime.
> When requiring a FTL communication, you allude to a prior space-time.
> Now in the sensible space-time, prior or not, there is no FTL
> communication.
I assume that for arbitrary pairs of events A,B a violation of BI can
be reached.
Then, it is a general consequence, which does not depend on spacetime
models,
that there is some causal influence: A->B, or B->A. Why you think
there
is no FTL communication is beyond me.
> >> 2. The two photons are well separated objects. Yet, there is a wave
> >> function on the configuation space of both photon, and they are
> >> indistinguishable.
> > The definition of realism I use do not even mention "photon" or
> > "wave function". So I clearly don't make hidden assumptions about
> > them.
>
> Again, not the definition but your application. �You reason from the
> measurement on the localized photons, now there is no evidence they
> are the really existing objects.
"Photons" have in my opinion a similar status of reality as phonons.
That means, a rather weak one. I don't care much about their reality.
The real things in the BI as the macroscopic decisions of the
experimenters
which direction to measure and the macroscopic detector clicks. All
they
are, without doubt, real.
> >> An information transfer we can't be informed of isn't an information
> >> transfer, by definition.
> > The violation of Bell's inequality informs us about the fact that
> > some information transfer has happened, or from A to B, or
> > from B to A. �It does not inform us about the direction of this
> > information transfer.
>
> No, it informs us that there is no local hidden variable, and together
> with information transfer, that doesn't exhaust all (realistic)
> possibilities.
Of course, mysticists can make different conclusions from the
same facts. This doesn't change the conclusions made by
realists.
> >> > But the one explanation allows to explain the effect.
> >> > How can it be that one explanation allows to explain the effect,
> >> > but is in contradiction with a technical application of this effect?
>
> You should have said, use the effect to transmit information *either
> way*.
> You only showed that the hypothesis "you have only two explanations"
> is
> false, therefore there should be other explanations.
No. There are two valid explanations. There should not be any other
explanations, once we have two reasonable ones. Simply they are in
conflict with your positivism, which is not strange, because
positivism
is nonsensical.
> > We see an effect - �correlation. �A correlation can be explained
> > in three ways: �A influences B, B influences A, or some common
> > cause C influences A as well as B.
>
> Unjustified logical step.
That's the principle of common cause. If you think I have forgotten
some assumption, explain. Ok, there may be different common causes
C_i. This doesn't change much. Everything else is mysticism - to
allow for unexplainable correlations.
> > We can exclude the last explanation: It would not allow a violation
> > of Bell's inequality.
>
> And unjustified logical step. �There remains the possibility of a non-
> local hidden variable.
This doesn't change the main conclusion, namely that Einstein
locality
is wrong.
> Moreover, we don't know what is A and B. �We don't observe a
> correlation
> between Alice and Bob, it is impossible. �We observe a correlation
> between
> the measurements at Alice and Bob, at another common point.
Your point being? We should not believe the claims of Alice and
Bob about their observations? That's not serious. With similar
requirements we should not believe any scientific experiment made
by others.
> > And to define mystics as acceptance of violations of common sense
> > about causality is a quite natural one.
>
> You should define common sense and prove it is necessary.
I don't think so. I define the parts of common sense like realism
and causality which I think are necessary to do science in a
reasonable
way. For the question under consideration, this part of common sense
is sufficient. In some future conflict between, say, string theory and
my
ether model of the SM, some other parts of common sense may become
important. Only then I will start to think about formalizations.
> You call mystic all that doesn't please you, we can't
> discuss about subjectivities.
Only what contradicts common sense. Like correlations without
causes. A very restricted domain of application, restricted for
the need of the problem of violation of BI.
> >> The pilot wave theory has other features that aren't acceptable.
> > No. Certainly there is nothing unacceptable which in its seriousness
> > is comparable with giving up realism, with leaving observations
> > completely without explanations. However bad, an explanation is
> > better than no explanation.
>
> The pilot wave theory isn't an explanation, it is a mathematical
> transformation that separate the local and the non-local part. �The
> non-local part is still without explanation.
It has the traditional form of explanation we know from Newtionian
theory. The local behaviour (force/velocity) depends on a function
defined on the whole configuration space (V(q)/psi(q)).
> > It certainly can be formulated in special relativity - it simply uses
> > a preferred frame for this purpose.
>
> Yes, and Galilean transformation, it can't be formulated in covariant
> form.
Who cares about Galilean symmetry? I don't.
> >> >> What is your argument for the necessity of realism?
> >> > It is an important part of the scientific method itself. If you reject
> >> > realism, you reject the search for realistic, causal explanations of
> >> > observable correlations.
> >> > This does not prove any necessity of realism, because there is none,
> >> > simply because there is no necessity for science too.
> >> No, for science positivism is enough.
> > Positivism is certainly not enough, because it is simply nonsensical.
>
> Why should Nature be sensical? �As I have said, you impose constraints
> on Nature, not on the theories, and it is impossible.
Sorry, but I impose restrictions on theories. I distinguish
realistic, causal
theories from non-realistic, positivistic nonsense. This is possible.
>�That quantum phenomena
> would have no realistic explanation can't be ruled out from pure
> thinking.
With pure thinking, realistic replacements of QM have been already
found.
> > Read Popper for a rejection of positivism.
>
> That's a metaphysical creed.
No, that's good argumentation against positivism you can find there.
But, ok, your choice: Stay an ignorant positivist if you like. I
couldn't
care less.
> >> Positivism entails obvervation and logics alone.
> > You certainly cannot base science on observation and logics alone.
> > The good old problem of induction prevents this.
>
> No, each induction must obey two requirements: that the starting point
> be
> logically derived from it, and that it be verified by observation.
> There is
> nothing else necessary. �Observation isn't empirism.
LOL, a positivistic solution of the problem of induction. You
made my day.
> > We make, with our scientific theories, nontrivial hypotheses about
> > reality. �Hypotheses which are certainly not derived from observation
> > and logics alone - no prediction can be derived from past observations
> > and pure logic.
>
> So what?
So positivism/empiricism who pretends otherwise is stupid nonsense.
> All what we need in science, is to describe reality and make
> predictions.
> So, all what we need is experimental test and consistency, that is,
> theories
> that don't contradict themselves. �The way in which the theories are
> obtained doesn't matter. �Anything else is an issue of taste, and
> doesn't
> belong to science but to philosophy.
But with positivism, you have to give up to describe some "reality".
Ok, some part of science survives this. But an essential part of
science - the search for explanations - has to be given up because
of a nonsensical philosophy of science.
> If the pilot wave theory is so perfect, why hasn't it overridden
> orthodox QM?
Because positivism has a nice self-immunization strategy: According
to positivism, considering philosophy of science is anathema,
metaphysics,
forbidden for a true believer. Similar to the self-immunizations of
the various
religions, which also contain memes that one should not consider the
arguments of the opponents.
> >> Because they aren't falsifyable.
> > They are. They allow to derive all the predictions made by quantum
> > theory, thus, are as falsifiable as quantum theory itself.
>
> Save that they make one superfluous, supplementary assumption.
So what? It does not make pilot wave theory less falsifiable that you
believe one assumption is superfluous.
> > Ok, you are indeed free to believe whatever you want, including
> > creationism and positivism, and ignore any arguments against these
> > nonsensical theories. It is your free choice to believe in positivism
> > and to ignore the detailed and excellent refutation of positivism
> > presented by Popper.
>
> What is important is the grounds of the refutation, and those ground
> are purely metaphysical.
LOL. The positivistic meme: Metaphysical arguments are evil.
> > That's similar to religious self-immunization:
>
> You become offensive.
Sorry if this offends you, but I think the similarity is quite close.
> �I'm not necessarily dumper than you.
As well, all the people believing in various religions are not
necessarily
dumper than me.
Oh No
>On 6 jan, 23:38, Oh No <N...@charlesfrancis.wanadoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> >Quantum mechanics is falsifiable, so it fulfills Popper's requirement,
>> >even in positivism.
>
>> I don't think it is falsifiable, or that there will ever be an
>> experiment to falsify it.
>
>The Aspect's experiment could have falsify it.
The Aspect experiment could only have falsified qm if it wasn't true.
But it is true, so it couldn't have falsified it. :-)
X-Phy
> All the things located at the same event can easily influence each
> other. This assumption seem quite simple and natural to me.
As soon as you speak about an event, you speak about space-time, since
by
definition an event is a point in space-time.
>> You should have said, use the effect to transmit information *either
>> way*. You only showed that the hypothesis "you have only two
>> explanations" is false, therefore there should be other explanations.
> No. There are two valid explanations.
Which lead to a contradiction.
>> The pilot wave theory isn't an explanation, it is a mathematical
>> transformation that separate the local and the non-local part. The
>> non-local part is still without explanation.
> It has the traditional form of explanation we know from Newtionian
> theory. The local behaviour (force/velocity) depends on a function
> defined on the whole configuration space (V(q)/psi(q)).
Newtonian theory is dead for a long time.
>> > It certainly can be formulated in special relativity - it simply uses
>> > a preferred frame for this purpose.
>> Yes, and Galilean transformation, it can't be formulated in covariant
>> form.
> Who cares about Galilean symmetry? I don't.
B�hms theory implies Galilean transformation, since it can't be
express in a
covariant form.
>> All what we need in science, is to describe reality and make predictions.
>> So, all what we need is experimental test and consistency, that is,
>> theories that don't contradict themselves. The way in which the theories
>> are obtained doesn't matter. Anything else is an issue of taste, and
>> doesn't belong to science but to philosophy.
> But with positivism, you have to give up to describe some "reality".
>
> Ok, some part of science survives this. But an essential part of
> science - the search for explanations - has to be given up because
> of a nonsensical philosophy of science.
No, scientists aren't searching for explanations, only philosophers
do.
>> If the pilot wave theory is so perfect, why hasn't it overridden
>> orthodox QM?
> Because positivism has a nice self-immunization strategy: According
> to positivism, considering philosophy of science is anathema,
> metaphysics,
The, pilot wave theory isn't rejected because of philosophy. It makes
no
sense to prefer a non realistic theory on grounds that realism is
metaphysics.
And I'll stop here, it is burdensome. You have the correct thinking,
and
everyone not agreeing with you is a mislead mystic, I've got it.
--
X-Phy
Ilja
> On 13 jan, 15:21, Ilja <ilja.schmel...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> > All the things located at the same event can easily influence each
> > other. This assumption seem quite simple and natural to me.
>
> As soon as you speak about an event, you speak about space-time, since
> by definition an event is a point in space-time.
That's fine, I see no problem here.
> >> You should have said, use the effect to transmit information *either
> >> way*. �You only showed that the hypothesis "you have only two
> >> explanations" is false, therefore there should be other explanations.
> > No. There are two valid explanations.
> Which lead to a contradiction.
Indeed, only one of them can be true. And the realistic model
has to specify which, even if observation is not suffficient to tell
which of them is wrong. This distinguishes, in particular, realistic
theories from positivistic descriptions of observations.
> >> The pilot wave theory isn't an explanation, it is a mathematical
> >> transformation that separate the local and the non-local part. The
> >> non-local part is still without explanation.
> > It has the traditional form of explanation we know from Newtionian
> > theory. The local behaviour (force/velocity) depends on a function
> > defined on the whole configuration space (V(q)/psi(q)).
>
> Newtonian theory is dead for a long time.
I know, but it has defined our standards of scientific explanation
for centuries. These standards have been nice and reasonable, and
there is no reason to use others.
> >> > It certainly can be formulated in special relativity - it simply uses
> >> > a preferred frame for this purpose.
> >> Yes, and Galilean transformation, it can't be formulated in covariant
> >> form.
> > Who cares about Galilean symmetry? I don't.
>
> B�hms theory implies Galilean transformation, since it can't be
> express in a covariant form.
There is no such implication. And there is no necessity to
express a theory in covariant form. The standard form, in
absolute coordinates, is fine.
> >> All what we need in science, is to describe reality and make predictions.
> > But with positivism, you have to give up to describe some "reality".
> > Ok, some part of science survives this. But an essential part of
> > science - the search for explanations - has to be given up because
> > of a nonsensical philosophy of science.
>
> No, scientists aren't searching for explanations, only philosophers
> do.
Ok, there are some positivist "scientists" who do not search for
explanations, the only problem is why to name them scientists?
Ideologs may be more appropriate for people not interested in
explanations.
> >> If the pilot wave theory is so perfect, why hasn't it overridden
> >> orthodox QM?
> > Because positivism has a nice self-immunization strategy: According
> > to positivism, considering philosophy of science is anathema,
> > metaphysics,
>
> The, pilot wave theory isn't rejected because of philosophy. �It makes
> no
> sense to prefer a non realistic theory on grounds that realism is
> metaphysics.
This sentence does not make sense.
> And I'll stop here, it is burdensome. �You have the correct thinking,
> and everyone not agreeing with you is a mislead mystic, I've got it.
Its your choice if you decide to ignore Popper's argumentation
and stop to search for explanations.
If you think description without explanation is already science,
go on the street and describe the people you see - this would
be already "science" in your understanding. But I doubt anybody
will publish this.