If our minds are only computational, then we can't even imagine a "material universe"!
Neil B.
modeled in terms of computational intelligence, etc. Computations work
with numbers in effect, and can't represent anything that isn't some
sort of mathematical structure. Well, as modal realists have explained:
the very idea of substantial existence ("real stuff" being distinct from
Platonic forms) cannot be coherently defined and explained in strictly
logical terms. We not only can't explain why some possible worlds, have
a special trait called "existing" and others don't, we can't even
explain what the distinction consists of to start with. Hence thinkers
like David Lewis said all such worlds "exist" with equal standing. This
leads to the IMHO hilarious irony for "materialist thinkers" like Dan
Dennett: if our minds are only computational, then we can't even
conceive a "material universe"!
Note that the thinking done in a model simulation is just like that in a
"real world" - if both are defined in AI terms. Hence, the AI entity
can't even frame the thought, "I am a material being and not just part
of a program simulation or Platonic structure of math (as in MUH.) It is
ironic, that those who believe in AI concepts of human thought *have to
be modal realists* to be honest and can't even be genuine
"materialists." They implicitly don't believe in a way to conceive of
substantial worlds being distinct from the mathematical process itself
(although most don't realize it and continue to play along.) Hence, all
such worlds exist and there is no point in "physics" or materialism per
se. Even all cartoons would be real worlds. Note that we have Bayesian
expectation problems about own in such a case: we'd be more likely to be
in a world that was just coherent enough to create us, but no better
(and not inclined to stay that way - since changes are of course
"describable" features of a concept world too!)
Neither can we logically define "real flowing time" as a special way for
reality to be, distinct from simply there being a configuration of
points and lines (world-lines) in a "space" of four-dimensions. Yes, we
*represent* time events in math, but there is no definition of it as a
distinct entity, no mathematical way to point to the "t" in dx/dt and
say, "That is some special, qualitatively different trait and not in
kind like the "x". Yet somehow our minds grasp or profess these
distinctions, as they do the idea of "consciousness" being special. I
don't think that's a coincidence. And if a CI/AI proponent is going to
gripe that our minds are computational and that "consciousness" can't be
logically defined or explained, then neither can "real flowing time" or
even the idea that for example our thoughts happen in "real material
brains" and not just some Platonic math structure (similar to a point
made by Jaron Lanier.) I call this dilemma "the brain as a fact" (as
mere computations distinct from "incarnation") in comparison to the old
conundrum, how does any of us know he or she isn't really a brain in a
vat being fed simulations Matrix-style.
Neil B.
"Neil B." <neil_...@caloricmail.com> wrote in message
news:k7KdnU1aLLA3qQDX...@posted.widowmaker...
Note, the idea of a "real universe" that isn't just a mathematical
construct is like the didactic notion in philosophy of mind that there's
a difference between being "really conscious" versus being an
unconscious "zombie" that acts just like people. I call a conceptual
possible universe that isn't "incarnated" like ours is felt to be, a
"mombie" (for modal-realism zombie.) If, like Dan Dennett, you think
that the idea of zombies is incoherent because it isn't definable, then
to be consistent you have to be a modal realist and accept that the
distinction between "real" and mombie universes isn't coherent either.
In similar vein, we could make a distinction between universes in which
"time really flows" versus "block worlds" in which the 4-D world-line
structure is just taken as a given, and the sense of a moving present is
an illusion etc. Time-zombies: tombies?
Surfer
<neil_...@caloricmail.com> wrote:
>
>".... if our minds are only computational, then we can't even
>conceive a "material universe"!
>
Good point. Perhaps this is better.
Process Physics: Self-Referential Information and Experiential
Reality
http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/Articles/LSI05/Cahill-FinalPaper.pdf
<Start extract>
This model of reality, which is profoundly different from the current
model, is based on deep issues involving the notion that reality is
self-referential �information�. This leads us to the notion that
reality is essentially mind-like, and that from this arises a new
account of space and the quantum, as well as new notions
about the possible nature of consciousness. Most importantly all the
experiments that the physicists have carried out over the last century
and more superbly support this new theory. It will be shown
that the Process Philosophers were correct all along; and that the
mainstream physicists, for reasons that are now easy to understand,
got it very wrong, and misled themselves even more so than they
misled others.
<End extract>
Neil B.
"Surfer" <n...@spam.net> wrote in message
news:eaiq95ti73ef5mo77...@4ax.com...
Thanks. I will look at this, but meanwhile it's hard to see how they
would distinguish which "possible worlds" become real in any sense and
which don't. There is a hard problem of reality, not just a hard problem
of
consciousness!
marc
"Neil B." <neil_...@caloricmail.com> wrote in message Platonic structure
of math (as in MUH.)
> I call this dilemma "the brain as a fact" (as mere computations distinct
> from "incarnation") in comparison to the old conundrum, how does any of us
> know he or she isn't really a brain in a vat being fed simulations
> Matrix-style.
Just shows how confused people can get when unable to distinguish between
map and territory.
Marc
Neil B.
"marc" <bo...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote in message
news:1dqnm.44706$Pt1....@newsfe19.ams2...
difference between map and territory? To the modal realists, there isn't
one. I think there is (from conscious intuition and possible
counter-examples like flowing time and genuine randomness) but admit
there is no strict logical way to disprove their thesis.
alien8er
> "marc" <bo...@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote in message
>
> news:1dqnm.44706$Pt1....@newsfe19.ams2...
>
>
>
> > structure
> > of math (as in MUH.)
>
> >> I call this dilemma "the brain as a fact" (as mere computations
> >> distinct
> >> from "incarnation") in comparison to the old conundrum, how does any
> >> of us
> >> know he or she isn't really a brain in a vat being fed simulations
> >> Matrix-style.
>
> > Just shows how confused people can get when unable to distinguish
> > between
> > map and territory.
>
> > Marc
>
> Good point to bring up. I think the question becomes, so what *is* the
> difference between map and territory?
We can not know. All we can do is draw maps- first, because all the
information we have to work with is filtered through our sensorium,
and second because it is manipulated in ways we barely understand by
our neural networks before our consciousnesses get hold of it _and
while_ we think about it.
> To the modal realists, there isn't
> one. I think there is (from conscious intuition and possible
> counter-examples like flowing time and genuine randomness) but admit
> there is no strict logical way to disprove their thesis.
Not relevant because we do not think logically. We think
associatively but we invented (started drawing a certain kind of map
we named) logic because we see certain things in the data we get
through our senses that appear to operate logically.
There is no evidence that reality, the thing we can not see
completely, actually does operate either logically or associatively,
or by some other rule set, or ANY rule set in particular.
Consider mathematical physics; some of reality is adequatedly
modeled by Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics but not all of
it. Some of its features are better modeled (mapped) by the
Relativities, and some by quantum mechanics. The only hint within any
of these disciplines (maps) where exactly you have to switch to
another are what are called "singularities", places where the math
predicts things that we either can demonstrate don't happen or that
_seem_ as if they shouldn't happen.
Our maps overlap in many places but there are gaps. As long as those
gaps exist we know our mapmaking skills are inadequate.
But we can not know what the territory itself is. Some people
believe that extending our minds beyond our skulls frinst into
computers will help, but that will only allow us to use different
maps.
But as I said, don't obsess over it. We seem to have pretty good
maps for much of reality these days.
Mark L. Fergerson
marc
news:b5e8608e-c694-45eb...@12g2000pri.googlegroups.com...
> > Just shows how confused people can get when unable to distinguish
> > between
> > map and territory.
>
> > Marc
>
> Good point to bring up. I think the question becomes, so what *is* the
> difference between map and territory?
We can not know. All we can do is draw maps- first, because all the
information we have to work with is filtered through our sensorium,
and second because it is manipulated in ways we barely understand by
our neural networks before our consciousnesses get hold of it _and
while_ we think about it.
While it is the case that we are unable to clearly delineate the degree to
which the map accurately reflects the territory, converging empirical
validation of mathematically supported models affords a measure of
increasing confidence in the accuracy of the maps, at least compared to
previous maps. Whether this confidence will continue to increase or turn out
to be unfounded is an open question. If you discount gaining direct access
to the territory through some sort of mental state (mysticism etc) then this
mapping is the best we can do, not withstanding the limitations and
characteristics inherent in our modes of understaing as mentioned. All this
of course assumes there is a territory independent of the mappers, that is,
an external 'reality' pre-dating the arrival of the mappers.
> To the modal realists, there isn't
> one. I think there is (from conscious intuition and possible
> counter-examples like flowing time and genuine randomness) but admit
> there is no strict logical way to disprove their thesis.
Not relevant because we do not think logically. We think
associatively but we invented (started drawing a certain kind of map
we named) logic because we see certain things in the data we get
through our senses that appear to operate logically.
Logic is essentailly a matter of arbitrary definitions and of itself
guarantees to reveal nothing about the external world. Whether we think
logically or otherwise about the external world is academic since our
understanding of it through mapping depends on empirical validation. Logic
can prove or disporove anything depending on the propositions used but if
the propositions are without empirical validation then the resulting logic
is just a word game.
There is no evidence that reality, the thing we can not see
completely, actually does operate either logically or associatively,
or by some other rule set, or ANY rule set in particular.
Our maps, however limited or hazy, demonstrate that reality operates
consistently enough to enable the formulations of rules that encapsulate its
behavior to some meaningful degree. Claiming that we cannot know anything
about reality and hence that we cannot know about whatever rules it may or
may not follow is vacuous, somewhere between an arbitrary assertion and
sophistry.
Consider mathematical physics; some of reality is adequatedly
modeled by Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics but not all of
it. Some of its features are better modeled (mapped) by the
Relativities, and some by quantum mechanics. The only hint within any
of these disciplines (maps) where exactly you have to switch to
another are what are called "singularities", places where the math
predicts things that we either can demonstrate don't happen or that
_seem_ as if they shouldn't happen.
Singularities are a good example of the limitation of our current
understanding as our maps can't handle where the math seems to lead. Just
means that more work on the map is required, or maybe drawing a new map.
Our maps overlap in many places but there are gaps. As long as those
gaps exist we know our mapmaking skills are inadequate.
Absolutely.
But we can not know what the territory itself is. Some people
believe that extending our minds beyond our skulls frinst into
computers will help, but that will only allow us to use different
maps.
It is the case that we do not know what the territory is but that does not
justify claiming that we cannot know what the territory is. The ultimate
degree of correspondence able to be achieved between map and territory is an
open question. Sort of reminds me of those who believe in some god or other
and state that this god is unknowable but don't seem to have any problem
knowing that the god is knowable enough to be declared unknowable.
Marc
Neil B.
though, when you say "Logic is essentially a matter of arbitrary
"necessary structure of entailment" in logic and math, that would have
to be "discovered" in like form by other intelligent beings. They too
would find out that sqrt(2) was irrational, there is a unique form of
the quadratic equation, presumable Cantor's argument that the infinity
of irrationals is more than the infinity of rationals, and perhaps argue
about the continuum hypothesis like we do. The second part of your
statement is true: logic doesn't guarantee anything about the external
world. Some physicists hoped they could use math to show why this world
existed and was like this, but there is nothing in logic to bless a
given structure with that special, incarnate "realness" or even define
what that means. We have to be empiricists not only about the properties
of our world and its laws, but even the very sense of it being real and
not "a mathematical structure."
marc
> Thanks for your efforts, compelling take on the problem. One point though,
> when you say "Logic is essentially a matter of arbitrary definitions and
> of itself guarantees to reveal nothing about the external world." Logic
> isn't really "arbitrary" because we expect a "necessary structure of
> entailment" in logic and math, that would have to be "discovered" in like
> form by other intelligent beings.
We can expect whatever we want but there is no guarantee that reality will
comply. I am not equating logic with math (notwithstanding which, if either,
may be prior) since logic in general usage refers to arbitrary rules for
evaluating various types of propositional constructs and hence is arbitrary.
Quantum phenomena demonstrate how the logic we once considered as an
inviolable and reliable instrument for describing the world isn't. We can
expect any kind of necessary structure from any axiomatic system but that is
just a product inherent in its axioms and rules.
They too
> would find out that sqrt(2) was irrational, there is a unique form of the
> quadratic equation, presumable Cantor's argument that the infinity of
> irrationals is more than the infinity of rationals, and perhaps argue
> about the continuum hypothesis like we do.
It seems likely from our experience with the results of modeling the
external world with mathematics that intelligent aliens would have a
mathematics similar to ours, and probably with lots of interesting extra
bits as well.
The second part of your
> statement is true: logic doesn't guarantee anything about the external
> world. Some physicists hoped they could use math to show why this world
> existed and was like this, but there is nothing in logic to bless a given
> structure with that special, incarnate "realness" or even define what that
> means. We have to be empiricists not only about the properties of our
> world and its laws, but even the very sense of it being real and not "a
> mathematical structure."
It is human nature to want external reality conform to our various ways of
explaining it (not to mention naively assuming that we can explain it) ,
from natural phenomena deities to anthropomorphized deities to mental
constructs to mathematics. The history of investigating the world is an
ongoing series of replacing previous understanding and explanations in the
light of new discovery so we just have to keep on investigating as best we
can and see where it leads, not really knowing at this stage whether the
degree and direction of apparent progress will turn out to be a triumph of
reason or a disappointing chimera.
Marc
Neil B.
mathematicians, and I too, are "realists" instead. We think that math is
basically a "real structure", albeit with some possible literal
ambiguity (like the continuum hypothesis.) We also consider logic a part
of math - in particular set theory and some related branches. Few would
presume we could construct a logic that was very similar to standard
logic, but divergent in various random or arbitrary ways. Yet we can
construct a totally different form of logic, as you rightly point out
(and that could better represent our actual world, like quantum logic.)
IOW, if it's an apple it must be rightly apple-like. But it could be an
orange instead, in which case it needs to be rightly orange-like.
Different members of the tribe, but they can't be just any old thing. It
still has to hang together according to various interlocking
"entailments,"
marc
>>
> Marc, you must be a "constructivist" about math. I think most
> mathematicians, and I too, are "realists" instead. We think that math is
> basically a "real structure", albeit with some possible literal ambiguity
> (like the continuum hypothesis.) We also consider logic a part of math -
> in particular set theory and some related branches. Few would presume we
> could construct a logic that was very similar to standard logic, but
> divergent in various random or arbitrary ways. Yet we can construct a
> totally different form of logic, as you rightly point out (and that could
> better represent our actual world, like quantum logic.) IOW, if it's an
> apple it must be rightly apple-like. But it could be an orange instead, in
> which case it needs to be rightly orange-like. Different members of the
> tribe, but they can't be just any old thing. It still has to hang together
> according to various interlocking "entailments,"
In ordinary language, I consider myself to be a realist about reality as my
view is that we simply don't know how reality is fundamentally constituted.
Furthermore, whether we ever will be able to know is an open question as
reality may be ultimately unknowable either because its inherent nature is
not accessible to our inherent ways of understanding or because it is just
too complicated, or something else. However, we continually strive to
understand and do so by positing various tenets upon which we base our
understanding - one example being the assumed nature of mathematics (and its
relationship to logic) and the implication for the external world of
whatever the particular assumption. Mathematics can be used to concoct any
number of structures given a set of axioms and rules and logic can be used
to concoct any number of worlds given a set of axioms and rules so hanging
together through 'interlocking entailments' may or may not be relevant
depending on the arbitrarily selected axioms and rules set.
We can think whatever we like about mathematics, logic, the world, god or
anything else but absent empirical validation it is all essentially just
speculation with varying degrees of credibility and contention. Empirical
verification is the ultimate arbiter and it doesn't matter what who or how
many scientists/mathematicians/logicians/philosophers etc think. However it
seems to be human nature that we can't resist believing we have found 'the
answer' [insert you preferred assumption(s) here] and then declaring we have
achieved understanding by projecting the assumptions onto the external
world.
Marc
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
> We can think whatever we like about mathematics, logic, the world, god or
> anything else but absent empirical validation it is all essentially just
> speculation with varying degrees of credibility and contention. Empirical
> verification is the ultimate arbiter and it doesn't matter what who or how
> many scientists/mathematicians/logicians/philosophers etc think.
And even that is no guarantee. In the early 90's I was contracted
to alter the basic "personality" of a Japanese industrial robot.
The problem was, the manufacturerer didn't want anyone messing
with their designs and refused to provide schematics or source
code. The approach in such cases is to employ a "disassembler",
a program that imposes an 8 bit structure, and in which one
PRETENDS that some bytes perform actions (operators bytes) and
some bytes are acted upon (operand bytes), even though there is
NOTHING THAT ACTUALLY CORRESPONDS TO THIS DISTINCTION. It's
something we have to pretend is there in order to accurately
predict the robots behavior.
I suspect that
particle physics is somewhat in the same boat. We have to
PRETEND that reality is comprised of entities that persist
in space through time that are endowed with properties in
order to ACCURATELY PREDICT how "things" will behave. But in
the end, these too are probably human inventions. Thinking
is thinging, is the way I like to put it, and with out
imposing the concept of a THING we can't think at all,
even though there is nothing in nature that corresponds to
this concept.
Phil
.
Neil B.
> "alien8er" <alie...@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:b5e8608e-c694-45eb...@12g2000pri.googlegroups.com...
>> > Just shows how confused people can get when unable to distinguish
>> > between
>> > map and territory.
>>
>> > Marc
>>
>> Good point to bring up. I think the question becomes, so what *is*
>> the
>> difference between map and territory?
>
> We can not know. All we can do is draw maps- first, because all the
> information we have to work with is filtered through our sensorium,
> and second because it is manipulated in ways we barely understand by
> our neural networks before our consciousnesses get hold of it _and
> while_ we think about it.
>
>
> But we can not know what the territory itself is. Some people
> believe that extending our minds beyond our skulls frinst into
> computers will help, but that will only allow us to use different
> maps.
>
> It is the case that we do not know what the territory is but that does
> not justify claiming that we cannot know what the territory is. The
> ultimate degree of correspondence able to be achieved between map and
> territory is an open question. Sort of reminds me of those who believe
> in some god or other and state that this god is unknowable but don't
> seem to have any problem knowing that the god is knowable enough to be
> declared unknowable.
>
> Marc
more about X (like God) than the bare fact it must exist and by negation
(if argument is that "something" more fundamental than the universe/s
must be what necessarily exists, and the existence of the universe is
contingent on It etc.) A "worldly" (but very perplexing) example might
be, what happens to the wave function when it is observed? We can't
really understand, it is thus far "unknowable."
J. Horikx
> Thinking
>is thinging, is the way I like to put it, and with out
>imposing the concept of a THING we can't think at all,
>even though there is nothing in nature that corresponds to
>this concept.
Thats exactly the Kantian concept of what a "thing" is. (not a "thing
in itself", but just a "thing". According to the dutch wikipedia, that
is: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substantie )
JH
marc
In terms of an X like God, the thinker is doing nothing more than expressing
belief that X does (probably assuming 'must') exist and trying to pass off
this belief as a 'fact', ie amenable to objective (communal and external)
verification. Asserting we can't know more than the 'fact' of its existence
is just a way of rationalizing justification for bypassing the possibilty of
any manner of objective verification and hence the possibility exposing the
belief to disproof.
In terms of an external world, the thinker is saying that we can treat its
existence as objective 'fact' (within our concept of fact) but that since
our understanding of its fundamental nature is described by models and
(necessarily) mediated through our cognitive processes we can't be confident
of how accurately our knowledge and description of the external world
reflects its fundamental nature.
and by negation
> (if argument is that "something" more fundamental than the universe/s must
> be what necessarily exists, and the existence of the universe is
> contingent on It etc.)
Conclusions can be drawn from any given premise but if the premise is
arbitrary then there is no reason to treat the conclusion as necessarily
relevant to the external world - just an example when logic represents
nothing more than a formalised word game if its premises/propositions do
not/cannot avail themselves of objective verification.
A "worldly" (but very perplexing) example might
> be, what happens to the wave function when it is observed? We can't really
> understand, it is thus far "unknowable."
Indeed this is a good example demonstrating that interpreting the results of
what our modelling tools yield in terms of our innate and experiential
conceptualisation patterns may be misleading or irrelevant when it comes to
understanding the fundamental nature of the external world. Since we have
evolved in an environment that seems to be significantly unrepresentative of
how we (so far) find the external world to be fundamentally constituted in
terms of GR and QM, it is not surprising that our innate modes of cognition
are inadequate for fundamentally understanding the external world.
I agree what 'happens' at measurement is not understood and hence unknown
but not that it is necessarily unknowable - it may or may not be the case
but time will eventually tell as we will either find a new way to explain it
or decide that trying to understand it in our terms is a hopeless task,
declare it is unknowable and give up. Whether there have been/are/will be
alien intelligences who might fare differently is another matter :)
Marc