This group
Steve Ansell
What surprises me most about the current discussion is that some of the same
people who, just a few months ago, were flaming Bob Stubblefield for posting
inappropriate material are now coming to the aid of Hans Huttle, whose postings
are not "sci", "philosophy", or "tech". Not to bring back that (dreaded)
discussion again, but Stubblefield's postings do fit into at least one of those
categories and possibly more. Things seemed to be going fine in this group
for a while. There were generally two strains of discussion and those not
interested in what Stubblefield had to say could simply ignore the entire
thread (which is actually easier to do than just ignore certain articles). This
is one of the reasons I don't understand Huttle's postings. If he *really*
believes that Objectivism is such a joke and so trivial that all it deserves
is satire then why should he dedicate such a great deal of time writing about
it? I'm sure he derives a great deal of pleasure from occasionally trapping
someone into responding to one of his post and starting up a discussion like
the one going on now, but I don't see how it could really be worth the effort.
(Then again, I don't see a lot of things in his postings :-> ) At any rate,
wouldn't his postings be more appropriate for a new group under the rec.humor
category? Something like "rec.humor.philosophy" (I know a few philosophies
I'd like to poke fun at :-> ) or, "rec.humor.satire" would be appropriate.
But, then, this would probably defeat the whole purpose of his post
ings.
May your logic bugs be minimized,
-Steven T. Ansell
.........................._______________________________________
. .|Internet: stan...@ucdavis.edu |
. "Save the World: .| ccs...@pollux.ucdavis.edu|
. Spread Capitalism." .|BITNET: stansell@ucdavis |
. -W.G. .|UUCP: ucdavis!stansell |
. .| ucdavis!pollux!ccs005 |
..........................---------------------------------------
Torkel Franzen
>What surprises me most about the current discussion is that some of the same
>people who, just a few months ago, were flaming Bob Stubblefield for posting
>inappropriate material are now coming to the aid of Hans Huttel,
>whose postings are not "sci", "philosophy", or "tech". Not to bring
>back that (dreaded) discussion again, but Stubblefield's postings do
>fit into at least one of those categories and possibly more. Things
>seemed to be going fine in this group for a while. There were
>generally two strains of discussion and those not interested in what
>Stubblefield had to say could simply ignore the entire thread (which
>is actually easier to do than just ignore certain articles).
There is much in what you say, of course. Stubblefield's postings are
philosophical, whereas Huttel's are satirical and humorous only. But I'm
not sure that anybody has "come to the aid" of Hans Huttel in the sense
of claiming that his postings are appropriate in this newsgroup. Rather,
the claim has been that his postings are funny and/or that Stubblefield's
articles are awful.
As for "rec.humor.philosophy", Huttel did try to get talk.humor.objectivism
created, but this was voted down...Similarly sci.philosophy.objectivism
was voted down. Many had high hopes for talk.philosophy.objectivism, but
the proposal, which was handled by T.Wells, was apparently botched somehow.
Does anybody know what became of it?
>This is one of the reasons I don't understand Huttel's postings. If he
>*really* believes that Objectivism is such a joke and so trivial that
>all it deserves is satire then why should he dedicate such a great
>deal of time writing about it?
Not that I know what Huttel's attitude is, but why do you say "so trivial
that all it deserves is satire"? Satire is often directed at persons,
institutions, ideas that are considered highly important by the
satirist. If something is truly trivial, there is no point in
attempting any satire. In the case of Objectivism I would say that it
is not at all trivial. It is indeed a small sect (particularly if we
count only the ardent activists like Stubblefield), but its intellectual
pretensions are sufficiently influential to deserve being satirized.
Aaron Watters
> Not that I know what Huttel's attitude is, but why do you say "so trivial
>that all it deserves is satire"? Satire is often directed at persons,
>institutions, ideas that are considered highly important by the
>satirist. If something is truly trivial, there is no point in
>attempting any satire. In the case of Objectivism I would say that it
>is not at all trivial. It is indeed a small sect (particularly if we
>count only the ardent activists like Stubblefield), but its intellectual
>pretensions are sufficiently influential to deserve being satirized.
Agreed. Satire can be the best way to pull the discourse down from
stratispheric abstraction. On rare occasions satire can even incite
an author to substantiate formerly telegraphic generalizations. I
suppose there is a point where it becomes trite, unproductive, and
mean, however. I hope we all stop short of that point. -aaron.
Joshua D. Guttman
people who, just a few months ago, were flaming Bob Stubblefield for posting
inappropriate material are now coming to the aid of Hans Huttle, whose postings
are not "sci", "philosophy", or "tech". Not to bring back that (dreaded)
discussion again, but Stubblefield's postings do fit into at least one of those
categories and possibly more.
I disagree, I suppose. I think Stubblefield's postings are a good deal less
philosophical (was this the "one category" you meant?) because they're so
wooden, so naive. After a Stubblefield posting, you need something tonic, and
H\"uttel's postings are.
Josh
Steve Ansell
>
> There is much in what you say, of course. Stubblefield's postings are
>philosophical, whereas Huttel's are satirical and humorous only. But I'm
>not sure that anybody has "come to the aid" of Hans Huttel in the sense
>of claiming that his postings are appropriate in this newsgroup. Rather,
>the claim has been that his postings are funny and/or that Stubblefield's
>articles are awful.
You are correct in saying that none have explicitly aided Hans in posting
inappropriately, but by using it is a form of implicit support to use this
group to state how humorous you find his postings and how much pleasure you
got out of them. In a sense this is saying that you think his postings are
all right and that you would like to see more of them. On the other hand I
think that postings saying things like "doesn't this guy have a life" or some
such have the exact same effect and also help to encourage his postings (even
though their intent is the opposite). If they are indeed funny then they
belong in some other newsgroup, and I don't find Stubblefield's postings
"awful".
> As for "rec.humor.philosophy", Huttel did try to get talk.humor.objectivism
>created, but this was voted down...Similarly sci.philosophy.objectivism
>was voted down. Many had high hopes for talk.philosophy.objectivism, but
>the proposal, which was handled by T.Wells, was apparently botched somehow.
>Does anybody know what became of it?
I know, I helped vote down r.h.o and tried to help pass s.p.o! As for
the "talk" group last I heard it did pass, but because of all the forgeries
that recently infested the Net, Bill Wells would not post ANYTHING including
the results of the voting. I am going to mail him to find out if he ever
will post them so we can get the group.
>
> Not that I know what Huttel's attitude is, but why do you say "so trivial
>that all it deserves is satire"? Satire is often directed at persons,
>institutions, ideas that are considered highly important by the
>satirist. If something is truly trivial, there is no point in
>attempting any satire. In the case of Objectivism I would say that it
>is not at all trivial. It is indeed a small sect (particularly if we
>count only the ardent activists like Stubblefield), but its intellectual
>pretensions are sufficiently influential to deserve being satirized.
>
>
I work under the premise that something which is evil, or wrong ultimately
has no power. Regardless of how many people an incorrect idea influences it
will eventually conflict with reality when a person attempts to put it into
practice and the person will either dispose of the flawed idea or suffer what
ever the consequences are of holding it. In and of itself evil can not move
the world. It only gains a foothold through the sanction of people who "know
better". In this sense, all evil (ideas, actions, people) is less powerful
to make profound changes than good is. This is why I regard ideas that are
blatantly in contrast with reality as trivial and not worthy of any amount
of serious intellectual consideration.
Satire is the act of over-emphasising those aspects of something that a
person believes to be wrong. If used carefully it can be a productive tool
in pointing out the inaccuracies of a theory or the flawed areas of some
action. It does this by trivializing those aspects which the satirist wishes
to emphasize. It is like showing how utterly ridiculous the results would
be if the idea were to be taken to an extreme. Satire can be applied to
something which a person believes to be important, but must be applied to
those areas which are more or less trivial.
If the only type of response that a certain set of ideas merits is satire
and *nothing* else then those ideas can not be considered important (at least
not by the satirist). If there were some amount of content that a person
viewed as important or significant then the proper response would be to deal
with it on an intellectual level to determine and/or expose its status. If
there exists no such content then the proper response is, perhaps, none at
all or a person may allow himself the leisure of "making light of" the entire
system through some mechanism such as satire.
I am sure I am probably using some terms differently that most people do
so let me re-state what my question was. I was only expressing curiousity
in why someone spend such a great deal of time criticizing something which
they do not like. I can not imagine it being worth my time to write up a
satire every time someone who holds a certain set of ideas posts something.
It's difficult enough finding time for all the things I enjoy, so why waste
time and effort criticizing those things I don't enjoy.
I will not be continuing this thread as I find it neither interesting or
productive. Even after reading the comments I have just written I see no
place for this discussion to go.
Torkel Franzen
>I work under the premise that something which is evil, or wrong ultimately
>has no power. Regardless of how many people an incorrect idea influences it
>will eventually conflict with reality when a person attempts to put it into
>practice and the person will either dispose of the flawed idea or suffer what
>ever the consequences are of holding it.
A truly pious thought..unfortunately, ideas (sometimes put forward
as "scientific") of no intellectual merit whatever can have grave
consequences in the real world, the most obvious examples being
various forms of racism or extreme nationalism. You seem to be
assuming that people can only hurt themselves. Now objectivism, as I
see it, is nothing at all like racism. It is in no way "evil". It's
just claptrap and fifth rate philosophy, a prop or window dressing for
a set of attitudes that very naturally appeal to many adolescents, and
less naturally (to my mind) to people in other categories. Whether
somebody who takes such a view of objectivism chooses to ignore the
manifestations of this claptrap in this newsgroup, or attempts to draw
its proponents into a detailed examination of its philosophical
pretensions (pretty difficult with Stubblefield!) or takes satiric pot
shots at it, is largely a matter of individual temperament and
inclination.
John Wilber
>In article <76...@aggie.ucdavis.edu> ccs005@pollux (Steve Ansell) writes:
>>I work under the premise that something which is evil, or wrong ultimately
>>has no power. Regardless of how many people an incorrect idea influences it
>>will eventually conflict with reality when a person attempts to put it into
>>practice and the person will either dispose of the flawed idea or suffer what
>>ever the consequences are of holding it.
> A truly pious thought..unfortunately, ideas (sometimes put forward
>as "scientific") of no intellectual merit whatever can have grave
>consequences in the real world, the most obvious examples being
>various forms of racism or extreme nationalism. You seem to be
>assuming that people can only hurt themselves. Now objectivism, as I
>see it, is nothing at all like racism. It is in no way "evil". It's
>just claptrap and fifth rate philosophy,
Come off it dude! That's got to be the most unconvincing "argument" I have
heard. If you are going to make a criticism, why not explain why you
think you are right and what fallacies are involved? What makes objectivism
"claptrap"? What makes it "fifth-rate"? You must have some better
arguments than that...or maybe you just don't know what you are talking about.
>a prop or window dressing for
>a set of attitudes that very naturally appeal to many adolescents, and
>less naturally (to my mind) to people in other categories.
Another brilliant analysis..."objectivism is just for kids". It sounds like
the kind of arguments 5 year-olds make..."X is only for sissies.".
>Whether
>somebody who takes such a view of objectivism chooses to ignore the
>manifestations of this claptrap in this newsgroup, or attempts to draw
>its proponents into a detailed examination of its philosophical
>pretensions (pretty difficult with Stubblefield!)
Agreed, but you must admit he has not been too well treated here.
>or takes satiric pot
>shots at it, is largely a matter of individual temperament and
>inclination.
Of course, beyond any consideration would be the approach that some
intelligent discussion could occur, right Torkel?
Posts like this are about on par with Hans'. There's absolutely no
analysis of the ideas involved and no basis for anyone to be convinced
you are right. At least Hans had some humour in HIS meaningless diatribes.
Do you really think arguments from intimidation are worthy of net.bandwidth?
Torkel Franzen
>Come off it dude! That's got to be the most unconvincing "argument" I have
>heard. If you are going to make a criticism, why not explain why you
>think you are right and what fallacies are involved? What makes objectivism
>"claptrap"? What makes it "fifth-rate"? You must have some better
>arguments than that...or maybe you just don't know what you are
>talking about.
These are baffling remarks. Why on earth do you assume that I was presenting
an argument or criticizing objectivism? Please try to read quoted passages
in the context of the exchange in which they occur.
As for criticizing or arguing against objectivism, I have no such
ambition, any more than I seek to criticize or argue against
Scientology, Jehovah's Witnesses, or other sects.
On the other hand, objectivist philosophy being fifth rate by no means
precludes individual objectivists making worthwhile contributions to
philosophical discussions. There are wide variations in this regard. For
example,
>Geez! And people think that "A is A" and "Existence Exists" are nonsense!
>What sort of philosophy can you hope to develop if as a fundamental
>assumption you accept that X exists is inherently untrue? This seems
>nonsensical on the face of it unless some alternative definition of
>existance is at work here. I am interested in seeing the progression
>of this proof.
>It is exactly because of this kind of presumption that Rand had to start at
>such an elementary (perhaps even tautological) level.
This is pretty extreme, even for an objectivist. Obviously without knowing
anything about Russell's philosophy, you unhesitatingly make up fantasies
about "fundamental assumptions that 'X exists' is inherently untrue" and
proceed to babble on this basis. I'm sorry, but this kind of thing does not
suggest that there would be any point in entering into any discussion
with you on philosophical matters.
John Wilber
>In article <10...@chaph.usc.edu> wil...@nunki.usc.edu (John Wilber) writes:
> >Come off it dude! That's got to be the most unconvincing "argument" I have
> >heard. If you are going to make a criticism, why not explain why you
> >think you are right and what fallacies are involved? What makes objectivism
> >"claptrap"? What makes it "fifth-rate"? You must have some better
> >arguments than that...or maybe you just don't know what you are
> >talking about.
> These are baffling remarks. Why on earth do you assume that I was presenting
>an argument or criticizing objectivism?
Calling something "fifth-rate" and "claptrap" sure sounds critical to me.
What would you call it? Praise? ;-)
Presumably your post was intended to convey some information or ideas. All
you get across by scoffing without analysis is the message "Torkel doesn't
like objectivism.". This is not a particularly interesting bit of trivia
for most of us I suspect.
> As for criticizing or arguing against objectivism, I have no such
>ambition, any more than I seek to criticize or argue against
>Scientology, Jehovah's Witnesses, or other sects.
In what sense is objectivism a religion any more than any other philosophy
is? I can't speak for everyone else, but I am quite open to intelligent
discussion of the issues. You seem to be the one who is closed-minded
on the subject...who's refusing to even discuss philosophical issues here?
What is this group for anyway? If there are flaws in objectivism I WANT TO
FIND THEM. I have read all of the anti-objectivist books I can find and
I am always looking for more good arguments. If you have some I am interested
in hearing them. Don't be a jerk on the subject just because you don't
like Mr. Stubblefield.
> On the other hand, objectivist philosophy being fifth rate by no means
>precludes individual objectivists making worthwhile contributions to
>philosophical discussions. There are wide variations in this regard. For
>example,
> >Geez! And people think that "A is A" and "Existence Exists" are nonsense!
> >What sort of philosophy can you hope to develop if as a fundamental
> >assumption you accept that X exists is inherently untrue? This seems
> >nonsensical on the face of it unless some alternative definition of
> >existance is at work here. I am interested in seeing the progression
> >of this proof.
> >It is exactly because of this kind of presumption that Rand had to start at
> >such an elementary (perhaps even tautological) level.
> This is pretty extreme, even for an objectivist. Obviously without knowing
>anything about Russell's philosophy, you unhesitatingly make up fantasies
>about "fundamental assumptions that 'X exists' is inherently untrue" and
>proceed to babble on this basis.
If you look at recent messages you will not that people have been complaining
statements like "Existence Exists" and "A is A" are so obvious as to be
unimportant (among other things). Here we have a statement "X exists" is
invalid, an example of why one must explicitly state even obviously true
ideas like identity. I admit I am no expert on Russell (though I am not
completely unfamiliar with his writings), but I doubt you are much of
an expert on Rand either. If there are misunderstandings on my part about
Russell, I would like to discuss them. I am almost certain you have some
kind of misconceptions about Rand, and if you were any kind of scholar
you would want to discuss them as well. If you remain obstinate, it should
be clear to everyone who has the open mind here and whose is closed.
Torkel Franzen
>Calling something "fifth-rate" and "claptrap" sure sounds critical to me.
>What would you call it? Praise? ;-)
>Presumably your post was intended to convey some information or ideas. All
>you get across by scoffing without analysis is the message "Torkel doesn't
>like objectivism.". This is not a particularly interesting bit of trivia
>for most of us I suspect.
Again I suggest that you read articles in context. In the present
case I was responding to Steven Ansell, who wondered why anybody who
thought so little of objectivism as Hans Huttel apparently does would
take the time to satirize it. I answered that intellectually worthless
ideas may be important and/or dangerous. To avoid giving the
impression that I thought objectivism dangerous or evil, I clarified
my view of it, explaining that several reactions to objectivism were
to my mind reasonable, and a matter of individual preference,
including ignoring it, arguing with it, satirizing it. I have no
objection if you claim that this information is of little interest and
anyway lacks technical philosophical content. What I do object to is
your mechanically fastening onto the occurrence of phrases like
"objectivism is claptrap" and going into the "prove it!" routine. There
do exist nuances in human communication.
>In what sense is objectivism a religion any more than any other philosophy
>is?
For one thing, in its depiction of the battle of "philosophies"...
>If there are flaws in objectivism I WANT TO
>FIND THEM. I have read all of the anti-objectivist books I can find and
>I am always looking for more good arguments.
You have my best wishes. However, I have no inclination to attempt to
refute the doctrines of either objectivism or any other sect. Since it
appears that talk.philosophy.objectivism will be created sooner or later,
you will no doubt have opportunities to meet objections there.
>If there are misunderstandings on my part about Russell, I would like
>to discuss them.
But is this reasonable? Why should we start from your fantasies about
Russell's philosophical views and attempt to correct them?
>kind of misconceptions about Rand, and if you were any kind of scholar
>you would want to discuss them as well.
Too true! And I would also of course want to discuss scientology. I guess
I'll just have to face it: I'm no kind of scholar.
>If you remain obstinate, it should be clear to everyone who has the open
>mind here and whose is closed.
Alas, Prejudice is my middle name.
Torkel Franzen
>What is this group for anyway? If there are flaws in objectivism I WANT TO
>FIND THEM. I have read all of the anti-objectivist books I can find and
>I am always looking for more good arguments. If you have some I am
>interested in hearing them.
Please disregard my earlier response to your article, which was dictated
by my then-hatred of reason. On re-reading your comments, I'm disturbed.
What do you mean by 'flaws in objectivism'? Please present these flaws. I'm
inclined to suspect that you have been influenced by altruists. The idea
of flaws in objectivism is obviously one that can only be attributed to
a pathological hatred of reason.
--
Good premises. - "How about it, Mr Fnorgul?"
John Strong
I don't know which is more painful. To see the
caricature of Classical Philosophy represented by the
postings of R. Stubblefield and the other Ann Rand
devotees. Or to read the criticisms of Mr.
Stubblefield's detractors, whose remarks show in
painfully clear terms how deeply the self confident
hegemony of Cartesianism in its various manifestations
(logical positivism, behaviorism, etc.) is ingrained in
our culture. The pervasiveness of it can be seen in the
sophisticated and unsophisticated alike, from the
sophmoric sort of postings that start off by reflecting
on the philosophical implications of the last Star Trek
episode, to the Olympian (and very entertaining) musings
of Mr. Franzen and to the hair-splitting of some of the
thread's mathematicians, always ready to "clear the air"
by formalizing the whole matter in some notation or
another (information theory, elementary analysis, set
theory, .... mathematicians will be mathematicians).
Oh well. Maybe I was born in the wrong century,
but as long as I am in this one I may as well accept that
I am fated to be anachronistic gadfly, because I just
can't let this origy of metaphysical solipsism go on
without a comment. So here goes.
I realize that I am exposing myself to all kinds
of ridicule from the logical positivists and behaviorists
of the net by saying this (and you are legion, I know),
but the simple truth is that contrary to what Mr.
Stubblefield claims to be an important axiom and what the
rest of you claim to be a boringly obvious truism,
EXISTENCE DOES **NOT** EXIST.
No. This is no joke. This is not objectivist
humor. I am merely espousing publicly a doctrine that is
not aired all that frequently these days. This is a
central tenet of the philosophy of Saint Thomas Acquinas.
Now, I can not claim to be a Thomist, because, strictly
speaking, to do so would imply that I subscribe to a
large volume of philosophical and theological opinions,
part of which I disagree with, part of which I don't
understand, and part of which I've never become
acquainted with, but I *am* familiar with several of the
basic points of Thomistic metaphysics and that's enough,
fortunately, to immunize me from the worst excesses of
modern philosophy, and modern philosophy, is deeply
deeply sick.
The main problem with modern philosophy, as I see
it, especially the anglo-saxon "empiricist" tradition, is
that it is so enamoured with the conceptual tools it has
been able to borrow from the sciences that it has set
about disallowing certain types of knowledge and
experience in order to make reality fit the form of its
conceptual apparatus. (A case of form dictating content
if ever there was one!). There are a lot of ways in which
it does this, but one of the most important, a Cartesian
legacy, is to assume that the only truth about which we
can be "certain" is **logical** truth. That is the
assumption behind Descartes' Cogito. He reasoned that
*thinking* is the *one* thing which a person cannot deny
that he does without contradicting himself. Thinking
requires a thinker, he reasoned further, therefore the
thinker must conclude that he exists. I think, ergo I am,
courtesy of the principle of contradiction.
But there are other sorts of knowledge, truth,
and ways of knowing the truth, that do not rest upon the
principle of contradiction for their validity. In
particular, there is what some metaphysicians call
"judgement". Without going into a detailed theory of
judgement, I can sum up what it means for me by saying
that I believe that we know things **to exist**, and that
it is not the same thing to know that a thing exists and
to abstract a thing's various properties (or essences to
use medieval terminology) from it. The latter produces a
conceptual description of a thing, the former informs us
that the thing exists. It is a subtle way of looking at
experience, because noone denies that all existing things
have properties. There is no such thing as a propertyless
object, and there is certainly no such thing as a kind of
empty class called "existence" that adds nothing to the
thing but "being". The assumption that existence had to
be one of either:
1.) a conceptual super class or
2.) meaningless altogether
is the tripwire which philosophers in the West have been
stumbling on ever since Descartes reacted to a
degenerated scholasticism by producing a whole new
epistemological method.
If existence were just a kind of property of the
sort that scientists can classify and interrelate, albeit
an "empty" property, then knowledge of existence would be
no different from any other form of conceptual knowledge.
And due to the analytic mind's stubborn refusal to see
anything as meaningful unless it can be conceptualized,
our most natural reflex is to inquire as to whether there
might be something like an ethereal "empty" property
called "existence" or "being". Some people actually
believe that they have found such a thing. Apparently
some of those people become Objectivists. "Existence
exists!!". Excelsior!
I submit, instead, that the experience of
existing things is a separate form of knowledge which is
not reducible to any other form of knowledge. Existence
is not a thing. It is not a property. It does not "exist"
in the sense that a thing exists. But neither is it
meaningless. We can have knowledge of existence even
though it is conceptually irreducible.
This way of looking at things is in fundamental
opposition to the (Cartesian) way of looking things,
which assumes that knowledge of the outside world must be
filtered ***through*** something called the "senses"
before it reaches our brains. The net result being that
we can never have direct knowledge of the object of our
senses, we can't have knowledge of its existence, in
particular, but only a kind of untrustworthy sensory copy
of the real thing. Since Hegel, in fact, many moderns
have come to believe that there *is* *no*
thing-in-itself. As a philosopher friend of mine put it:
"The problem with logical positivists and behaviorists is
that they think they are the only ones who exist!".
The problem, however, with this Cartesian
agnosticism about the trustworthiness of the senses is
that it assumes that **the senses** exist! And that we
can have the same kind of direct knowledge of this
"thing" called the senses which was considered so
untrustworthy when it was applied to the external world.
To my amused surprize I have noticed that at
least a few net posters have stumbled onto this fly in
the Cartesian ointment. John Baez, who, if I recall
correctly, has characterized himself as a logical
positivist on previous occasions, had this to say:
"... it's rather odd how we think of
consciousness as a "container" (containing "thoughts" in
the broad Cartesian sense), and that we may feel less
sure of the contents than the existence of the
container."
Exactly. On another occasion, in fact, (though I
no longer have that posting on disk), John professed to
be just as certain of the existence of the external world
as of his own thinking. Bulls eye again! John, Are you
*sure* that you're a logical positivist? Yes, I know that
you guys have the Verification Principle and all that,
but in the positivist scheme of things the only thing
anyone can verify is that their sense data confirm their
conceptual model of reality. Either the notion of sense
data as a bridge between our subjective world and the
world out 'yonder is still there in positivism, or, if
the positivism is more sophisticated, it will express
itself as some form of full-blown idealism.
In fact, I accuse all logical positivists, and
most moderns for that matter who have absorbed a
rough-and-ready implicit sort of Cartesianism through the
mass media, of being crypto-Cartesians and solipsists. In
particular, I submit that a logical positivist can not
consistently hold that
1.) the only kind of knowledge of metaphysical
significance which we can have about a
physical object is its scientific description
and at the same time hold that
2.) he is as sure of the existence of the
external world as he is of his own thinking.
Implicit in 1.), in my opinion, is that he is
*only* certain of his own thinking, a la Descartes. How
so, you ask, given the admirable profession of
experimental science to verify all conceptual hypotheses
through rigorous experiment? What could be more
empirical? What could be more down-to-earth? Aren't
logical positivists and behaviorists, after all, the
intellectual progeny of the British Empiricists? What
could be more empirical than an empiricist?
Well, I submit that an "empiricist" who claims
that we can exhaustively describe a thing with a
mathematical model is leaving out something very
important. He is leaving out the fact that no matter how
exhaustively we describe something, right down to its
very quarks, we shall never be able to explain why it
***exists***. We shall never be able to answer
Aristotle's question "Why is there Something and not
Nothing?". If we ignore that question, or suspect that
someday science will answer it for us (given a big enough
particle accelerator or sophisticated enough model of
mathematical physics or a clever enough script writer for
Star Trek), or claim the question to be "meaningless" or
"puerile" or "outdated", then we are ignoring that we
somehow can know that *things* *simply* *exist*, an
inexplicable **irreducible** fact, a fact as obvious as
the noses on our faces. If we ignore *that*, then we are
pretty lousy empiricists.
And, by the way, one of the consequencies of
**not** adopting an existentialist metaphysics of the
sort I am describing here, even though it provides us
with a simpler and neater reality (yes, logical
positivism, perhaps, is the philosophical analog to
George Bush's "kinder gentler" America, only it produces
a "simpler neater reality" instead), all packagable in
the formulas of symbolic logic, is that it leaves a host
of other problems in its wake. The problem of the
One-and-the-Many and individuation are two notable
examples. Anglosaxon school philosophers agonize over
these problems postulating "bare particulars" to explain
identity or cogitating on the significance of a thing's
"place" to explain its individuation. What a tragic waste
of brain waves.
Allow me to close this by relating an exchange
which took place between the philosopher Max Black and A.
J. Ayer the founding father of logical positivism, as an
example of the contorsions one works oneself into when he
refuses to recognize existence and existential judgement.
Ayer holds, of course, that the only thing which
individuates an object, the only thing which
distinguishes it from other "identical" objects, is its
properties. Necessarily so, since in the logical
positivist scheme of things properties are the **only**
kind of knowledge we can have of a thing. Ayer maintains,
in other words, that if two objects are distinct they
**must** differ in at least **one** property, be it place
or something else. In answer to this Max Black, an
advocate of "bare particulars" (never mind what "bare
particulars" are, suffice to say that they bear a family
likeness to the objectivists' existing "Existence")
provides the following paradigm. Imagine a universe with
two identical spheres of chemically pure iron connected
by a rod in their center such that they are
indistinguishable except by relative position. Only, in
this universe there is no relative position because there
is nothing to relate to (remember that you the "observer"
are *not* in the universe). Is this a logically possible
universe? Ayer admitted that it was. No internal
contradictions. Max Black asked, "if properties are what
individuate then how do we account for the individuation
of these two identical spheres?". To this Ayer - and this
is to his credit - replied quite simply that he was
*completely* baffled. He could only reiterate that he
could not see how anything but properties could be
responsible for individuation and yet he could find no
flaw in Max Black's paradigm. Perhaps some of the logical
positivists of the net would like to have a shot at it?
- John Strong
* Member in goodstanding of Texas Thomists, Austin Chapter. *
* We have 4 members and are stagnant. Used to have 5 but *
* one is now deceased. *
Anders G|ransson
It was somewhat disturbing to see a serious article in this group.
Lately I have been used to glance through it to see the latest
insults (to reason?).
Now, I can't say I understood everything in the article. The following
remark by John Strong;
jstrong> The problem, however, with this Cartesian
jstrong> agnosticism about the trustworthiness of the senses is
jstrong> that it assumes that **the senses** exist! And that we
jstrong> can have the same kind of direct knowledge of this
jstrong> "thing" called the senses which was considered so
jstrong> untrustworthy when it was applied to the external world.
reminded me of this paragraph in Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil,
chapter 1 "On the Prejudices of Philosophers", paragraph 15):
[text omitted]
And others even say that the external word is
the work of our organs? But then our body, as
a part of this external world, would be the
work of our organs! But then our organs
themselves would be - the work of our organs!
It seems to me that this is a complete *reductio
ad absurdum*, assuming that the concept of a
*causa sui* is something fundamentally absurd.
Consequently, the external world is *not* the
work of our organs - ?
(" causa sui " is explained by the translator Walter Kaufmann as:
"Something that is its own cause - a term traditionally applied
to God." I guess a thomist knows these terms.)
Is the likeness just superficial?
Regards Anders
p.s.
In the ongoing debate on logic you can hear things like:
"It is an axiom that logic is valid." In my view this
statement approaches the limits of "reason" itself.
--
name(!): Anders G|ransson
Chris Holt
>
> Please disregard my earlier response to your article, which was dictated
>by my then-hatred of reason. On re-reading your comments, I'm disturbed.
>What do you mean by 'flaws in objectivism'? Please present these flaws. I'm
>inclined to suspect that you have been influenced by altruists. The idea
>of flaws in objectivism is obviously one that can only be attributed to
>a pathological hatred of reason.
Oh no! They've done it, they've done it! Was it the rubber hoses?
Sensory deprivation? Existence deprivation??? (or a year's free
subscription to rec.sport.pantyhose?) Who knows where those
evil purveyors of unclouded reason will strike next?!
>
>Good premises. - "How about it, Mr Fnorgul?"
Fnorgul is Lugronf spelled backwards...
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris...@newcastle.ac.uk Computing Lab, U of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Algebraic expression is something that is to be surpassed..."
Torkel Franzen
In article <13...@peyote.cactus.org> jst...@peyote.cactus.org (John Strong)
writes:
>I realize that I am exposing myself to all kinds
>of ridicule from the logical positivists and behaviorists
>of the net by saying this (and you are legion, I know),
>but the simple truth is that contrary to what Mr.
>Stubblefield claims to be an important axiom and what the
>rest of you claim to be a boringly obvious truism,
>EXISTENCE DOES **NOT** EXIST.
Actually, saying that 'existence does not exists' seems to me just as
reasonable as saying 'existence exists'. The latter is no more boringly
obvious than the former. They're both formulas; what, if anything, they
mean can only be ascertained by questioning their proponents. What you
have to say about existence not existing certainly seems a lot more
interesting than what objectivists have to say about existence existing.
However, Ayer was by no means the founding father of logical positivism.
Chris Holt
>thread's mathematicians, always ready to "clear the air"
>by formalizing the whole matter in some notation or
>another (information theory, elementary analysis, set
>theory, .... mathematicians will be mathematicians).
Some of us try to make (admittedly feeble) contributions to
rec.objectivist.humour. Sigh.
>EXISTENCE DOES **NOT** EXIST.
> I submit, instead, that the experience of
>existing things is a separate form of knowledge which is
>not reducible to any other form of knowledge. Existence
>is not a thing. It is not a property. It does not "exist"
>in the sense that a thing exists. But neither is it
>meaningless. We can have knowledge of existence even
>though it is conceptually irreducible.
I submit that I don't have such knowledge. It does not exist in the
sense of a thing existing, because it is a concept (as with numbers);
but if there is a mechanism by which one can obtain direct knowledge
of existence, I am existence-blind. But then, I'm also god-blind.
> ... In fact, I accuse all logical positivists, and
>most moderns for that matter who have absorbed a
>rough-and-ready implicit sort of Cartesianism through the
>mass media, of being crypto-Cartesians and solipsists. In
>particular, I submit that a logical positivist can not
>consistently hold that
>
> 1.) the only kind of knowledge of metaphysical
> significance which we can have about a
> physical object is its scientific description
>
>and at the same time hold that
>
> 2.) he is as sure of the existence of the
> external world as he is of his own thinking.
Right; so we ditch (2). Suits me.
> Well, I submit that an "empiricist" who claims
>that we can exhaustively describe a thing with a
>mathematical model is leaving out something very
>important. He is leaving out the fact that no matter how
>exhaustively we describe something, right down to its
>very quarks, we shall never be able to explain why it
>***exists***. We shall never be able to answer
>Aristotle's question "Why is there Something and not
>Nothing?". If we ignore that question, or suspect that
>someday science will answer it for us (given a big enough
>particle accelerator or sophisticated enough model of
>mathematical physics or a clever enough script writer for
>Star Trek), or claim the question to be "meaningless" or
>"puerile" or "outdated", then we are ignoring that we
>somehow can know that *things* *simply* *exist*, an
>inexplicable **irreducible** fact, a fact as obvious as
>the noses on our faces. If we ignore *that*, then we are
>pretty lousy empiricists.
It's not obvious to me, when your things are other than sense data.
> ... Imagine a universe with
>two identical spheres of chemically pure iron connected
>by a rod in their center such that they are
>indistinguishable except by relative position. Only, in
>this universe there is no relative position because there
>is nothing to relate to (remember that you the "observer"
>are *not* in the universe).
Cheat; you've switched viewpoints. The structure has position within
itself, else its shape would be impossible to determine; it might be
a cube instead of what you've described. What is impossible is to
determine the orientation of the structure. But in our universe,
it may be impossible to determine the orientation of a hydrogen
molecule; so what? That doesn't make it isomorphic to a single,
unattached atom.
Jeff Dalton
>of ridicule from the logical positivists and behaviorists
>of the net by saying this (and you are legion, I know),
>but the simple truth is that contrary to what Mr.
>Stubblefield claims to be an important axiom and what the
>rest of you claim to be a boringly obvious truism,
>EXISTENCE DOES **NOT** EXIST.
While it is true that the Net is full of verificationists and
falsificationists, who employ the sort of behaviorism that implies, it
is *not* full of Logical Positivists and Behaviorists. Nor have "the
rest of" us claimed "existence exists" is a truism. Indeed, some have
taken the "existence is not a predicate" line, which brings their
views close to yours at a significant point.
> to immunize me from the worst excesses of
>modern philosophy, and modern philosophy, is deeply
>deeply sick.
This is the same sort of approach the Objectivists take: those who
disagree with them are not just wrong, their views are evidence of a
fundamental sickness.
To make this sort of case seem convincing, and because the alternative
is a lengthy and detailed analysis of a wide range of views, you'll be
tempted to simplify and to take certain, relatively easy to refute,
positions as expressing the essentials of all the rest. Unfortunately,
you haven't resisted this temptation as much as you should have.
One point that's bound to come up is that A. J. Ayer is not the
founding father of logical positivism. This in itself is a rather
trivial error, but the attempt to reduce the views of so many people
to "logical positivism" and logical positivism to something like what
Ayer expressed in _Language, Truth, and Logic_ is not. If you want
to argue against the analytic tradition in philosophy, fine. But
you have to do more that argue against positivism and behaviorism.
Another point where you have the non-Objectivists wrong concerns the
question of certainty and the role of logic. Not all assume that
logical truths are certain, much less that they are the only certain
truths. Rather, perhaps following Quine, some would say that no
"truths" are immune from revision. It is the claim to have found
some certain knowledge that they find suspect.
> But there are other sorts of knowledge, truth,
>and ways of knowing the truth, that do not rest upon the
>principle of contradiction for their validity.
But who ever said otherwise? I am now typing this article. It is
only the Objectivists, if even they, who would try to construe a
denial of my claim as some sort of logical contradiction.
> This way of looking at things is in fundamental
>opposition to the (Cartesian) way of looking things,
>which assumes that knowledge of the outside world must be
>filtered ***through*** something called the "senses"
>before it reaches our brains. The net result being that
>we can never have direct knowledge of the object of our
>senses, we can't have knowledge of its existence, in
>particular, but only a kind of untrustworthy sensory copy
>of the real thing. Since Hegel, in fact, many moderns
>have come to believe that there *is* *no*
>thing-in-itself. As a philosopher friend of mine put it:
>"The problem with logical positivists and behaviorists is
>that they think they are the only ones who exist!".
I think you are quite wrong to confuse an attack on a certain
technical term (thing-in-itself) with some sort of denial of
external reality.
Nonetheless, it certainly is the case that our experience of the world
is filtered through our senses. That is why some of us need glasses
and hearing aids and why it made a difference when telescopes were
invented. There is nothing more suspect about this claim than there
is about the claim that our visual experience of distant objects is
mediated by light.
What is suspect, on the other hand, is the idea that there is a
thing-in-itself, inaccessible to our senses or other investigations,
and somehow more real than any of the objects (trees, dogs, people,
etc) in our experience. That is, it is the people who insist on the
thing-in-itself who regard our "filtered" knowledge as knowledge of
some sort of inferior copy.
You, however, seem to think we can have some kind of direct knowledge
of things-in-themselves, or at least of their "existence". One
doesn't have to be a positivist or a behaviorist to ask how this
works, how you know when the result is correct or when you've made
a mistake, and so on.
> The problem, however, with this Cartesian
>agnosticism about the trustworthiness of the senses is
>that it assumes that **the senses** exist! And that we
>can have the same kind of direct knowledge of this
>"thing" called the senses which was considered so
>untrustworthy when it was applied to the external world.
But why have you assumed that it is the *same* kind of direct
knowledge? And why say that sort of direct knowledge was
*untrustworthy*? Surely the claim was not that some direct
knowledge was untrustworthy but that our knowledge wasn't direct.
So I'm puzzled as to where you think these so-called Cartesians have
gone wrong. There's nothing especially wrong with the notion of more
or less direct knowledge, as we can see by considering the difference
between first and second hand reports:
The problem with this agnosticism about the trustworthiness
of other people is that it assumes other people exist. And
that we can have the same kind of direct knowledge of other
people which was considered so untrustworthy when applied to
the things they tell us about.
I suspect you're generating an artificial problem in one way or
another.
> "... it's rather odd how we think of
>consciousness as a "container" (containing "thoughts" in
>the broad Cartesian sense), and that we may feel less
>sure of the contents than the existence of the
>container."
This is a different case, because it doesn't mention the
external world.
> Exactly. On another occasion, in fact, (though I
>no longer have that posting on disk), John professed to
>be just as certain of the existence of the external world
>as of his own thinking. Bulls eye again!
If that's all you wanted to claim, it shouldn't require a message
of such length; but it's hard to see what else you have in mind.
> Well, I submit that an "empiricist" who claims
>that we can exhaustively describe a thing with a
>mathematical model is leaving out something very
>important. He is leaving out the fact that no matter how
>exhaustively we describe something, right down to its
>very quarks, we shall never be able to explain why it
>***exists***. We shall never be able to answer
>Aristotle's question "Why is there Something and not
>Nothing?".
You haven't answered this question either. Your claim that we
"somehow can know that *things* *simply* *exist*, an inexplicable
**irreducible** fact" is explicitly not an answer, because it's
left as "inexplicable". So this is hardly a point for you and
against the "empiricist".
You go on to say this fact is "as obvious as the noses on our faces".
But if it were that obvious, no one would offer pages of explanation
in an effort to support it. The problem is that "things exist" is
obvious on some interpretations, but not on others. Once "thing" and
"exist" are used in a specific technical sense, it can be far from
obvious that things exist.
>Ayer holds, of course, that the only thing which
>individuates an object, the only thing which
>distinguishes it from other "identical" objects, is its
>properties.
Well, it isn't just Ayer, or just positivists, who hold this.
> Imagine a universe with
>two identical spheres of chemically pure iron connected
>by a rod in their center such that they are
>indistinguishable except by relative position. Only, in
>this universe there is no relative position because there
>is nothing to relate to (remember that you the "observer"
>are *not* in the universe).
How would you distinguish this from a universe in which there is one
sphere connected to itself by a curved rod?
> Perhaps some of the logical
>positivists of the net would like to have a shot at it?
First tell me how you think we should think of this situation.
If you can't do better than Ayer, we can't use this problem to
chose between you.
-- Jeff
John Wilber
>In article <13...@peyote.cactus.org> jst...@peyote.cactus.org (John Strong)
> writes:
> >I realize that I am exposing myself to all kinds
> >of ridicule from the logical positivists and behaviorists
> >of the net by saying this (and you are legion, I know),
> >but the simple truth is that contrary to what Mr.
> >Stubblefield claims to be an important axiom and what the
> >rest of you claim to be a boringly obvious truism,
> >EXISTENCE DOES **NOT** EXIST.
> Actually, saying that 'existence does not exists' seems to me just as
>reasonable as saying 'existence exists'.
Of course the defnitions of the words being used here need to be defined,
but it certainly seems wrong given the common definitions of the words
involved. Do you guys still think that objectivists use the english
language in a strange way? Notice the quiet acquiesence with which
Torkel accepts this conclusion as compared to the torrent of flame
he generates when confronted by arguments to the contrary.
>The latter is no more boringly obvious than the former. They're both
formulas; what, if anything, they mean can only be ascertained by questioning
their proponents.
Of course we have all observed the vigor with which Torkel has questioned
Objectivists on this issue. ;-)
I agree by the way that without definitions that statements of this kind
don't mean anything (or are as false as they appear on their face). Using
the common definitions it would SEEM that I exist, that all the things I use
every day exist. If they (and I) don't exist then something tricky is
certainly going on.
>What you
>have to say about existence not existing certainly seems a lot more
>interesting than what objectivists have to say about existence existing.
Rather than discuss how interesting the argument is, isn't it more important
to determine if it says anything that is TRUE? Should our approach to
philosophy be a search for the interesting or for the true? (Clearly
the former can be entertaining, but does it really get us anywhere?)
Anders G|ransson
wilber> Should our approach to
wilber> philosophy be a search for the interesting or for the true? (Clearly
wilber> the former can be entertaining, but does it really get us anywhere?)
I vote for the interesting. Truth we have had enough of.
regards Anders
David M Tate
The idea is to come up with things that are
1. meaningful
2. true
3. interesting (i.e. have nontrivial content).
"A is A" fails #3; "Existence exists" fails #1; careful explanations of what
"Existence exists" is intended to mean have so far failed #3.
I can sit here all day and say "I am me", and it'll be true every time, but
no one will have learned anything. Truth, in and of itself, is insufficient.
John Strong, on the other hand, has introduced a point of view whose *truth* is
as yet undetermined, but which is certainly interesting and nontrivial. This
makes it an attractive topic for consideration, because it has the potential
to satisfy all 3 points above (i.e. we might learn something). What's more,
he has presented his thoughts in a fashion which allows us to compare them to
past thoughts, see how they borrow from some and attempt to refute others, and
so on. This gives us a basis for an approach to evaluating the *truth* of the
views. [I feel like I'm teaching kindergarten here...]. Had he just made a
bunch of unrelated and unsupported claims, there would have been no such basis,
and useful discussion of the ideas would have been impossible.
--
David M. Tate | "May your fondest wish be granted."
dt...@unix.cis.pitt.edu |
"A Man for all Seasonings" | --Traditional Chinese Curse.
Jeff Dalton
>> Actually, saying that 'existence does not exists' seems to me just as
>>reasonable as saying 'existence exists'.
>
>Of course the defnitions of the words being used here need to be defined,
>but it certainly seems wrong given the common definitions of the words
>involved.
Which, if any, definition of "existence" and "exist" do you have in
mind? I know you've said something in answer to that question, but
here you seem to be pretending no answer is required. But as Torkel
says,
The latter is no more boringly obvious than the former. They're
both formulas; what, if anything, they mean can only be ascertained
by questioning their proponents.
>I agree by the way that without definitions that statements of this kind
>don't mean anything (or are as false as they appear on their face). Using
>the common definitions it would SEEM that I exist, that all the things I use
>every day exist. If they (and I) don't exist then something tricky is
>certainly going on.
Indeed, and if that's what you said, rather than the less clear
"existence exists", there wouldn't be all this pointless discussion.
abh...@ecs.umass.edu
truth that we have the prevalent premise that philosophy is something not
of much practical value nor connected to reality. The above response is an
example of this premise. Since there is no practical use of philosophy and
it cannot help us in our lives, let it just entertain us; Anders says.
Anders, we do have the newsgroups rec.humor and rec.humor.funny ;-)
- Ajoy K. Bhatia
Torkel Franzen
>Since there is no practical use of philosophy and
>it cannot help us in our lives, let it just entertain us; Anders says.
>Anders, we do have the newsgroups rec.humor and rec.humor.funny ;-)
I believe Anders is away on vacation at present..however, in the
meantime, I submit that he says nothing of the kind. Your suggestion
that he claims that philosophy has no practical use and cannot help
us in our lives is just a piece of fantasy on your part. Right?