Metaphysical Realism & Anti-Realism
Gary Merrill
This may be my last posting to this newsgroup for a while. We have
just been informed that access to newsgroups that are not "computer
related" will be terminated next week. If this in fact happens,
it may take me a while to get an account on another system having
access to the forbidden groups.
Despite my initial impressions, I have come to believe that Leo
Smith neither is nor really wishes to be a mystic. I think instead
that he simply wants to reject metaphysical realism. Accordingly,
I offer here *one* approach to familiarization with the types of
issues that appear to interest him (and others participating in this
thread). Below, I will give some brief reasons why this route may
be preferred to others.
Let's start by taking the position of *metaphysical realism* to be
the view that there is one correct and objective description of how
the world really is (what are the things in it and how are they
related).
Over a dozen years ago Hilary Putnam dropped what some have referred
to as a "bomb" on the position of metaphysical realism. Since that
time there have been a number of responses to this, and there is a
small collection of relatively brief papers in which the issues are
discussed both clearly and carefully. I recommend the following:
[1] "Realism and Reason" (reprinted in _Meaning_and_the_Moral_
Sciences, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) by Hilary Putnam.
This is his original attack on metaphysical realism. It
is not long (it was an address to the American Philosophical
Association), but is quite difficult to read and follow (even
for a professional).
[2] "Models and Reality", _Journal_of_Symbolic_Logic_ 45 (1980).
By Hilary Putnam
A much more technical version of the argument.
[3] "The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism", _Philosophy_
of_Science_ 47 (1980). By G. H. Merrill
A reconstruction of Putnam's argument, a criticism of its
flaws, and a recommendation of how the metaphysical realist
may respond to that argument. If you want to depend upon the
accuracy of my reconstuction, you can skip [1] and [2].
[4] "New Work for a Theory of Universals", _Australasian_Journal_
of_Philosophy_ 61 (1983). By David Lewis.
The final section of this takes up the suggestion of [3]
and develops a realist's response to [1] and [2].
[5] "Putnam's Paradox", _Australasian_Journal_of_Philosophy_ 62
(1984).
A further development of the response initiated in [4].
The advantages of pursuing the issues surrounding metaphysical realism
via these papers are:
A. There are very few papers here (you can even skip [1] and [2]
since the arguments are summarized in the other papers).
B. The papers [4] and [5] are very non-technical and concentrate
on the "real philosophy" at issue. You can skip the technical
stuff in [1] and [3] and still benefit from the discussions
there.
C. You get a quick and precise introduction to fundamental problems
without having to read 3,000 pages in the history of philosophy
and a dozen philosophers.
D. What's being done here is what people would refer to as "real
metaphysics" -- not philosphy of language or "linguistic philosophy".
If you do decide to look at these and you don't have much background
in philosophy, you may discover that you become involved in a process
akin to unraveling your socks. Once you pull on this thread, it
gets longer and longer. You will want to pursue questions concerning
such things as: natural kinds, projectible predicates, theory
construction, acceptance and rejection, and so on. Some additional
"background" papers in this regard are:
[6] The papers "Speaking of Objects", "Ontological Relativity",
and "Natural Kinds" in _Ontological_Relativity_and_Other_Essays
by W. V. Quine (Columbia Univ. Press, 1969).
[7] "Three Forms of Realism" by G. H. Merrill, _American_Philosophical_
Quarterly_ 17 (1980).
This relatively brief paper (8 pages) discusses views pertaining
to realism/anti-realism of Carnap, Quine, Sellars, and van
Fraassen (and my own) in an attempt to lay the groundwork for
a non-postivistic anti-realist philosophy of science.
One problem with this approach is that some of the papers are in
journals and have not been reprinted in readily available books.
But if you have access to a university library, you shouldn't have
a problem in making copies.
I'm sure that since the latest of these papers was published others
(and perhaps books) must have been published as well. However, when
I left my cosy tenured position in academia I did not look back, and
so I am ignorant of the recent literature. (In fact, I became aware
of David Lewis's two papers only a few months ago.) Others may
have alternative suggestions, but if you are interested in issues
pertaining to such notions as metaphysical realism, theoretical entities,
"correctness" of theories, etc., this is a good way to jump in.
--
Gary H. Merrill [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC 27513 / (919) 677-8000
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