Realism Vs Constructivism (2nd-order cybernetics)- epistemology in the 21st Century
Mr Michael Bibby
interesting source of discussion.
The fundamental explanatory shift from realism to constructivism is that
‘phenomenon’ are no longer seen as ontologically given, that is, they are no
longer seen as anchored in some ‘mind-independent reality’, but rather brought
forth by the mind itself through the very process of apprehension. Phenomenon
are defined as objects and events which we isolate in our experiences, that is,
the objects which we take as our subject (including what I now say) are brought
forth by the drawing of a distinction which circumscribes the object and
distinguishes it against a background- the context is the recursion of an
operationally closed system within which the system we study is embedded- i.e.,
the mind is an *epistemological* solipsist such that “we ourselves are the
depositories of the evidence of the subject which we consider.” -that is, we
cannot transcend the domain of our experiences.
For example; it is of no surprise that mathematics is such a useful language for
describing observations when one considers that those observations were defined
in mathematical terms. A thing is what it is by virtue of what we make it; when
we measure a theoretical entity with some piece of measuring equipment we define
such entities as units of measurement; “properties are defined as invariants of
measurement devices”, through operational definitions (i.e., “to measure means
to compare two phenomena with each other, one of which already assigned with a
dimension.”); that is, we define theoretical entities and there ‘essential’
properties in observational terms- when we observe we define just what it is we
are observing.
Ordinarily, in the realist world view, ‘phenomena’ are ‘objectivised’ in that
they are seen as ‘ontologically given’, that is, they are explained by recourse
to transcendental reality- hence the distinction between ‘representation’ and
‘reality’ (and the idea that knowledge ‘represents’ reality). In the
constructivist world view, on the other hand, phenomena are seen as
system-relative constructions which are no longer explained in terms of a
transcendental reality, but instead are seen as viable constructions built upon
the basis of pre-existing constructs in a hierarchically organized manner (built
up over the course of ontogenic development), and, as far as the system is
concerned, these models are its environment, because the system is operationally
closed and interacts with its own internal states in a recursive manner (i.e.,
hence the iteration of consciousness ad infinitum). ‘To know’, in this
construal, is to be viable in an environment, instead of possessing ‘true
descriptions’ of ontologically objective reality.
given the operational closure of the cognitive system (i.e., the mind is an
*epistemological* solipsist), we cannot transcend the domain of our experiences;
therefore, recourse to a transcedental reality does not make a whole lot of
sense- especially when one considers that experiences can be explained without
such a metaphysical domain- hence, realism is rationally indefensible and
obsolete. And, by extension, all explanations must be circular i.e., we can no
longer rest content with black-box explanatory principles which themselves need
explaning (ad infinitum) such as 'information', 'meaning', and so on as these
are merely human-constructs; therefore, we must model phenomena in themselves,
that is, we must model our model in our own model making it complete (this is
like thinking in circles), that is, our explanations need to be self-reflexive
in that they must include themselves in themselves and apply themselves to
themselvs- this way, our descriptions give rise to the very phenomena they
describe instead of explaning them away in black box explanatory principles and
accept responcibility for the models we construct by modelling ourselves in our
own model instead of 'blaming' some outside reality which we cannot know.
Considering the fact that these ideas are relatively new (nothing is ever new
under the sun- this orientation has its roots in the sceptics) I was wondering
if anyone had any comments, objections and criticisms as this explanatory shift
has the power to be the next copernican revolution and opens the way to a whole
new way of thinking about science. below are some quotes which might help
clarify this orientation, usually called 'radical constructivism' or 'second
order cybernetics'.
"a scientific practice that fails to question itself does not, properly
speaking, know what it does. embedded in, or taken by, the object that it takes
as its object, it reveals something of the object, but something which is not
objectivized since it consists of the very principle of apprehension of the
object" Bourdieu
"the understanding doesnt draw its laws from nature, it prescribes them to
nature." Kant
"intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself" Piaget
"the object of all science, whether natural science or psychology, is to
co-ordinate our experiences and to bring them into a logical order" Einstein
"the context is the recursion of systems within which the system we study is
embedded instead of being the cloud of statistical epiphenoma generated by our
attempts to study it." Beer
"objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without observers"
Foerster
mickeyd
mickedy
The Sophist
> i have posted this message elsewhere, but think that it might provide an
> interesting source of discussion.
>
>
> The fundamental explanatory shift from realism to constructivism is that
> ‘phenomenon’ are no longer seen as ontologically given, that is, they are no
> longer seen as anchored in some ‘mind-independent reality’, but rather brought
> forth by the mind itself through the very process of apprehension. Phenomenon
> are defined as objects and events which we isolate in our experiences, that is,
> the objects which we take as our subject (including what I now say) are brought
> forth by the drawing of a distinction which circumscribes the object and
> distinguishes it against a background- the context is the recursion of an
> operationally closed system within which the system we study is embedded- i.e.,
> the mind is an *epistemological* solipsist such that “we ourselves are the
> depositories of the evidence of the subject which we consider.” -that is, we
> cannot transcend the domain of our experiences.
Sounds vaguely like _The Logical Structure of the World_, by Carnap.
Though he actually filled in some details, and in most people's opinion,
succeeded thereby in showing the approach couldn't work. Still, it's
not utterly unpromising. You might want to look into Carnap, and also
Goodman, _The Structure of Appearance_, and possibly after all that the
Lewis paper _Policing the Aufbau_.
--
Aaron Boyden
"I may have done this and that for sufferers; but always I seemed to
have done better when I learned to feel better joys."
-Thus spoke Zarathustra
Jim Jastrzebski
Message-id: <bfqhfv$mu4$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>
>
<snip>
>
>Considering the fact that these ideas are relatively new
>(nothing is ever new under the sun- this orientation has
>its roots in the sceptics) I was wondering if anyone had
>any comments, objections and criticisms as this
>explanatory shift has the power to be the next
>copernican revolution and opens the way to a
>whole new way of thinking about science.
It is probably better to leave science to scientists
rather than worry about improving it through some
new revolution.
<snip>
>"the understanding doesnt draw its laws from nature,
>it prescribes them to nature." Kant
Maybe it was like this in his times, not any more though.
Now understanding draws its laws from nature, even if
some idiots (see e.g. "big bang" crowd) try to prescribe
their laws to nature and use administrative means to
"convince" their opponents that their laws are the laws
of nature (as the church tried to do before them and
failed too).
<snip>
>"the object of all science, whether natural science or
>psychology, is to co-ordinate our experiences and to
>bring them into a logical order" Einstein
How it "opens the way to a whole new way of thinking
about science?" Wasn't it always like that for about last
6,000 years?
<snip>
>"objectivity is the delusion that observations could be
>made without observers" Foerster
This is not what objectivity is. This is what Foester
thinks, for some unknown reason, what objectivity is.
But who really cares what Foester thinks, and why it
would need to be discussed? What it might change
in the way the normal scientists (like e.g. Einstein,
see quote above) understand science? Why would
we want to change the way the scientists understand
the world if it works so well? Only because some
philosophers feel useless and would like to do
something? Let them study some sciences, convert
themselves into scientists, and help to discover the
objective truths that are not discovered yet.
BTW, there was an author who fully analyzed those
things already and even wrote a novel about them
("Atlas Shrugged"). If you read it you won't need
any other discussion of this subject. This subject is
already dead, you just need to learn why it died. This
book is a good novel and a good description of the
case, despite its many philosophical shortcomings,
so just filter them out.
-- Jim
Mr Michael Bibby
>Mr Michael Bibby wrote:
>> i have posted this message elsewhere, but think that it might provide a=
>n
>> interesting source of discussion.
>>=20
>>=20
>> The fundamental explanatory shift from realism to constructivism is tha=
>t
>> =91phenomenon=92 are no longer seen as ontologically given, that is, th=
>ey are no
>> longer seen as anchored in some =91mind-independent reality=92, but rat=
>her brought
>> forth by the mind itself through the very process of apprehension. Phen=
>omenon
>> are defined as objects and events which we isolate in our experiences, =
>that is,
>> the objects which we take as our subject (including what I now say) are=
> brought
>> forth by the drawing of a distinction which circumscribes the object an=
>d
>> distinguishes it against a background- the context is the recursion of =
>an
>> operationally closed system within which the system we study is embedde=
>d- i.e.,
>> the mind is an *epistemological* solipsist such that =93we ourselves ar=
>e the
>> depositories of the evidence of the subject which we consider.=94 -that=
> is, we
>> cannot transcend the domain of our experiences.
>
>Though he actually filled in some details, and in most people's opinion, =
>
>succeeded thereby in showing the approach couldn't work. Still, it's=20
>not utterly unpromising. You might want to look into Carnap,
its not carnap, im not a logical positivist, quite the contrary, but it is
somewhat reminscent of the copenhagen interpretation.
and also=20
>Goodman, _The Structure of Appearance_, and possibly after all that the=20
>Lewis paper _Policing the Aufbau_.
and no, its not predicated upon Goodmans 'many worlds' idea, but these are non
the less interesting ideas.
>--=20
>Aaron Boyden
>
>"I may have done this and that for sufferers; but always I seemed to
>have done better when I learned to feel better joys."
> -Thus spoke Zarathustra
>
>
>
mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>Message-id: <bfqhfv$mu4$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>
>>
><snip>
>>
>>Considering the fact that these ideas are relatively new
>>(nothing is ever new under the sun- this orientation has
>>its roots in the sceptics) I was wondering if anyone had
>>any comments, objections and criticisms as this
>>explanatory shift has the power to be the next
>>copernican revolution and opens the way to a
>>whole new way of thinking about science.
>
>It is probably better to leave science to scientists
>rather than worry about improving it through some
>new revolution.
yes, i am leaving their various methods and methodologies (what they do in the
doing of what they do) to scientists as this is only of perhipheral
consideration to the topic at hand: the realist framework in which science is
carried out.
><snip>
>
>>"the understanding doesnt draw its laws from nature,
>>it prescribes them to nature." Kant
>
>Maybe it was like this in his times, not any more though.
>Now understanding draws its laws from nature, even if
>some idiots (see e.g. "big bang" crowd) try to prescribe
>their laws to nature and use administrative means to
>"convince" their opponents that their laws are the laws
>of nature (as the church tried to do before them and
>failed too).
i have always said that scientific realism is no better or worst than any other
ideology. when you say "..Now understanding draws its laws from nature.."
just what did you have in mind? this is the very idea that i am challanging,
physical concepts are "free creations of the human mind" - they are
human-specific constructs fabricated by the mind of man as he bring his world
into somekind of logical order, they are 'mental-scaffolds'- lets call a spade a
spade.
><snip>
>
>>"the object of all science, whether natural science or
>>psychology, is to co-ordinate our experiences and to
>>bring them into a logical order" Einstein
>
>How it "opens the way to a whole new way of thinking
>about science?" Wasn't it always like that for about last
>6,000 years?
>
><snip>
>
>>"objectivity is the delusion that observations could be
>>made without observers" Foerster
>
>This is not what objectivity is. This is what Foester
>thinks, for some unknown reason, what objectivity is.
this formulation is obviously an attack on the empiricists much worn motto
"observation are the touchstone to objectivity"- if observations are the
'touchstone' to anything it is subjectivity; there is no 'view from nowhere'
what we have is a 'view from somewhere'-hence; "objectivity is the delusion that
observations could be made without observers"
>But who really cares what Foester thinks, and why it
>would need to be discussed? What it might change
>in the way the normal scientists (like e.g. Einstein,
>see quote above) understand science? Why would
>we want to change the way the scientists understand
>the world if it works so well?
that’s a good question. there are various reasons for challenging scientific
realism and proposing a constructivist framework for science. for example,
traditionally, when a scientific theory is able to account for a range of
phenomena it is often assimilated into the existing 'body' of scientific
knowledge- that is, once a workable solution is found it is usually retained.
however, this leads to a sort of 'set-effect' whereby the workable solution is
often seen as the only solution. subsequently, in the existing framework,
scientists are often limited in the development of novel conceptual structures
by existing conceptual structures- this is usually expressed by saying that
theoretical constructs are historical constructions- this is quite apparent in
many specialty science disciplines today where scientists are limited by
existing constraints as they are, more or less, ‘forced’ to work under existing
paradigms- which is simply to say that conceptual revolutions in science always
occur against strong resistance). further to this, and by extension, a
constructivist orientation to science opens up new insights into existing
problems (i.e., the framing problem and the symbol grounding problem are no
longer problematic in a constructivists framework, they are only problematic in
a realist framework) while at the same time offering new methods and
methodologies for attacking these problems. But, perhaps most importantly, human
technologies are applied to human affairs, or, as I always say; human theories
have human consequences, this is most relavent to the social sciences,
therefore, we ought to accept responicibility for the models we make by
modelling ourselves in our own models; “since all models are made by some
observer, the observer must be included in his model for it to be complete, this
applied in particular to those cases where the very process of model building
changes the phenomena being modelled.” This, the last, is an important ethical
consideration, as you can see, ethics is built into the very epistemology of
constructivism. Presently, in the realist framework, ‘reality’ is blamed for the
models we construct, that is, we root our models in a mind independent reality
and objectivize them (i.e., phenomena are described and explaned in terms of
some ontologically objective reality which exists independently of what we think
and do). This is unsatisfactory, especially when one considers that despite the
fact that theoretical entities are defined in observational terms, they are
‘explained’ and ‘described’ terms which are independent of our means and ways of
observing: this is perhaps the single biggest scandal in science to date. put
simply, scientists rhetorically authoratize their claims when they have
absolutely no authority to do so. there are many prima facie reasons for
thinking that a constructivists science (or what Riegler called an 'observing
scienec') would be more viable than a realists science (an 'unobserving
science').
>Only because some
>philosophers feel useless and would like to do
>something? Let them study some sciences, convert
>themselves into scientists, and help to discover the
>objective truths that are not discovered yet.
"objective truth"- sounds like a magical fairytale. tell me something, what is
this so called objective truth? is it universally true? how do you 'know' when
you have found it? how is such knowledge even possible? what reasons are there
for thinking that their is such a thing as 'objective truth'? what are the
reasons for thinking that such a truth is knowable? so on and so forth
mickeyd
Jim Jastrzebski
Message-id: <bfspok$2a$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>
>>>"the understanding doesnt draw its laws from nature,
>>>it prescribes them to nature." Kant
>>
>>Maybe it was like this in his times, not any more though.
>>Now understanding draws its laws from nature, even if
>>some idiots (see e.g. "big bang" crowd) try to prescribe
>>their laws to nature and use administrative means to
>>"convince" their opponents that their laws are the laws
>>of nature (as the church tried to do before them and
>>failed too).
>
>i have always said that scientific realism is no better or
>worst than any other ideology. when you say
>"..Now understanding draws its laws from nature.." just
>what did you have in mind? this is the very idea that i am
>challanging, physical concepts are "free creations of the
>human mind" - they are human-specific constructs fabricated
>by the mind of man as he bring his world into somekind of
>logical order, they are 'mental-scaffolds'- lets call a
>spade a spade.
Isn't a spade just a creation of human mind? Does it exist
outside of it? What about an airplane or a TV set? Are
there any objective "laws of nature" that make them work or
all of it is just magic that might have worked in completely
different way if human mind has chosen so?
>there is no 'view from nowhere' what we have is a 'view
>from somewhere'-hence; "objectivity is the delusion that
>observations could be made without observers"
(1) How "view from somewhere" limits the "objectivity"
in your opinion?
(2) How existence of observers limits "objectivity"
in your opinion?
You should define "objectivity" because it looks like we
use different definitions.
In physics "objective" is anything that doesn't change
under coordinate transformation (and then it is called
"invariant"), i.e. it is observed as the same by any
observer. E.g. the number of heads that you have, and
some other "invariant" numbers. On the other hand two
events in various points in space can't be "objectively"
simultaneous since "simultaneous" is a subjective idea
for any observer, however they can be objectively
simultaneous when they happen at the same point in space.
Your sentence has no sense in physics, and since you most
likely have your own idea of "objective" it should be
stated so we know what we are discussing here.
>>Why would we want to change the way the scientists
>>understand the world if it works so well?
>that’s a good question. there are various reasons for
>challenging scientific realism and proposing a
>constructivist framework for science. for example,
>traditionally, when a scientific theory is able to
>account for a range of phenomena it is often assimilated
>into the existing 'body' of scientific knowledge- that
>is, once a workable solution is found it is usually
>retained.
Which of course is dictated by "common sense".
>however, this leads to a sort of 'set-effect' whereby
>the workable solution is often seen as the only
>solution.
But never by scientists, or at least not by those
smart enough to count, so you are creating problem that
then you treat as a real problem. This makes the most of
the rest of your reasoning irrelevant. I just respond
to some other points that you make, so you might know
to what to respond:
>subsequently, in the existing framework, scientists are
>often limited in the development of novel conceptual
>structures by existing conceptual structures- this is
>usually expressed by saying that theoretical constructs
>are historical constructions- this is quite apparent in
>many specialty science disciplines today where scientists
>are limited by existing constraints as they are, more or
>less, ‘forced’ to work under existing paradigms- which is
>simply to say that conceptual revolutions in science
>always occur against strong resistance).
The resistance is not because people don't like to think
but because they don't like to lose their positions as
scientists when their "sciences" become irrelevant. The
good example is the "big bang" cosmology that I mentioned
before, which provides good living to many scientists.
None of them seriously believes that the universe is
really expanding (except perhaps a few real dummies) but
to close all those projects based on expanding universe
model would put out of business a lot of good folks and so
the idea of expanding universe is kept alive as long as
it is possible to milk it so all scientists have time to
milk it first to the bitter end and then have time to
convert to something else. For the time being the papers
showing that the expansion of the universe makes no sense
are not published, but as soon as all scientists whose
jobs depend on the idea of expanding universe switch to
more secure jobs you will see how everybody starts
claiming that he never really believed in this ridiculous
idea that the universe is expanding. It is also how it
happened with "Copernican Revolution". Every astronomer
who had any sense knew of course that the sun is in the
center of our solar system but all of them pretended to
believe what the church wanted them to believe not to
lose their positions and possibly their lives. Today,
with a capitalist system around, where scientists are
practically slaves of the system, losing a position is
equivalent of losing one's life. From the distance it
might look like conservatism in scientific thinking but
that's why you shouldn't analyze things from a distance
to large to understand those things.
>further to this, and by extension, a
>constructivist orientation to science opens up new
>insights into existing problems (i.e., the framing
>problem and the symbol grounding problem are no longer
>problematic in a constructivists framework, they are
>only problematic in a realist framework) while at the
>same time offering new methods and methodologies for
>attacking these problems.
This is one of those things that you can't know when
you don't do science yourself just imagine how it is
done. That's why scientists always laugh at
philosophers when they hear them talking about how
they can help scientists, whithout even knowing what
scientists are really doing.
>But, perhaps most importantly, human technologies are
>applied to human affairs, or, as I always say; human
>theories have human consequences, this is most relevant
>to the social sciences,
??? There are no such sciences yet. Are you planning
for the year 3,000 or you are talking about so called
social "sciences"?
>... therefore, we ought to accept responicibility for
>the models we make by modelling ourselves in our own
>models; since all models are made by some observer,
>the observer must be included in his model for it to
>be complete,
A conclusion that is not connected to the premise in
a logical way. Why the observer is to be included in
the model? Especially in such sciences as cosmology
where unlike in quantum physics the observation does
not influence anything.
<snip for brevity>
>"objective truth"- sounds like a magical fairytale.
>tell me something, what is this so called objective
>truth? is it universally true? how do you 'know' when
>you have found it?
Objective truth is universally true and it is a
prediction that becomes reality when all the conditions
for it to become reality are met. E.g. if you have a
properly loaded and functioning gun and you direct it
at yourself and pull the trigger the truth is that you
may harm yourself so better don't do it even if you
don't believe that objective truth exists. Of course it
is not the only example and I wonder why you can't
think about one yourself.
>how is such knowledge even possible?
The method is called "induction". It is not a perfect
method but is good enough to not to try this trick
with the gun that I mentioned above, to find out if it
provides truth or not.
>what reasons are there for thinking that their is
>such a thing as 'objective truth'? what are the
>reasons for thinking that such a truth is knowable?
Experience. It is the base of induction. Without
experience you can't have any knowledge of truth of
course nor any reason to think that there is one.
That's why kids believe everything they are told and
why creation of gods were possible in human cultures.
While the humanity gathers experience, more and more
of our prejudices die and more and more of our
inventions work. Why would they if not for the simple
reason that we have learned something true about the
nature?
I wonder what would be your answer to the above
question. Do you think that we really can't figure
out what are the stars build of (as some wise men
predicted that we'll never be able to) and we are
just kidding ourselves thinking that it is mostly
hydrogen? Or do you insist that we can't know what
hydrogen is, if it exists, or whether stars exist,
or whether we exist?
-- Jim
>mickeyd
Mr Michael Bibby
>"Mr Michael Bibby" s403...@student.uq.edu.au
>Message-id: <bfspok$2a$1...@bunyip.cc.uq.edu.au>
>
>>>>"the understanding doesnt draw its laws from nature,
>>>>it prescribes them to nature." Kant
>>>
>>>Maybe it was like this in his times, not any more though.
>>>Now understanding draws its laws from nature, even if
>>>some idiots (see e.g. "big bang" crowd) try to prescribe
>>>their laws to nature and use administrative means to
>>>"convince" their opponents that their laws are the laws
>>>of nature (as the church tried to do before them and
>>>failed too).
>>
>>i have always said that scientific realism is no better or
>>worst than any other ideology. when you say
>>"..Now understanding draws its laws from nature.." just
>>what did you have in mind? this is the very idea that i am
>>challanging, physical concepts are "free creations of the
>>human mind" - they are human-specific constructs fabricated
>>by the mind of man as he bring his world into somekind of
>>logical order, they are 'mental-scaffolds'- lets call a
>>spade a spade.
>
>Isn't a spade just a creation of human mind?
yes, a spade is a human-specific construct.
>Does it exist
>outside of it?
i dont know, and i dont profess to know. i am not an anti-realist nor am i a
solipsist- i am metaphysically agnostic
>What about an airplane or a TV set? Are
>there any objective "laws of nature" that make them work or
>all of it is just magic that might have worked in completely
>different way if human mind has chosen so?
this is a fallacy, it is not an 'either or' proposition. this argument is used
alot by staunch supporters of scientific realism, but it is a false dichotomy.
as for 'objective laws of nature' how would i know, how could i possibly know.
like i said i am metaphysically agnostic: radical constructivism is a theory of
doing and *not* a theory of 'being'. yes, we 'adduce' (through inference,
abduction, deduction, reflection, assimliation and so on) 'laws' to explain
'lawful' relations which are observed to exist. however, the mind of man is an
epistemological solipsist (not an *ontological* solipsist), that is, it is an
operationally closed, self-referential system such that we always interact
recursively with our own internal states- we cannot transcend the domain of our
experiences. know, YES of course we observe lawful behaviour and create mental
models that enable us to *explain* and *describe*, *predict* and *control*
phenomena- we are in agreement here i hope. now, we often tend to 'ground' such
models in reality, that is, we 'root' our descriptions of phenomena in a
'transcendental reality' (which supposedly exists outside of the mind,
independently of what we think and do)- which does not make a whole lot of sense
when you consider the fact that all we have access to is our own internal
states!
>
>
>
>>there is no 'view from nowhere' what we have is a 'view
>>from somewhere'-hence; "objectivity is the delusion that
>>observations could be made without observers"
>
>(1) How "view from somewhere" limits the "objectivity"
>in your opinion?
>
>(2) How existence of observers limits "objectivity"
>in your opinion?
>
>You should define "objectivity" because it looks like we
>use different definitions.
>
>In physics "objective" is anything that doesn't change
>under coordinate transformation (and then it is called
>"invariant")
it is simply missleading to call intersubjective cooberation 'objectivity'
because it implies that their is something 'epi'-subjective about what is
invarient (see my first post where i mention invariance). -ive gotta go, ill try
and respond to the remaing latter.
mickeyd