Moral Philosophy and Flying Pigs
Michael Zeleny
>m...@ptyx.com wrote:
>>aug...@micron.net wrote:
>>>m...@ptyx.com wrote:
>>>>j...@ncgr.org wrote:
>>>>[...]
>>>>>I think the two (greatness and moral rationalism) are at least independent
>>>>>(if not negatively correlated). Cf. Oediups at Colonus, the Iliad, Job,
>>>>>or the Oeresteia. All of them have access to moral structure, but that
>>>>>structure develops from organic, and hence situated, principles, rather
>>>>>than from objective ones. And the "result" is only appreciated through
>>>>>experience, rather than principles. Seems to me that great art will tend
>>>>>to pertain to the former, rather than the latter, but that's probably
>>>>>tautologous; an artifact of the dictionary I'm inclined to use.
>>>>There is some doubt as to whether any experience can be appreciated
>>>>outside of antecedent principles. I am not interested in arguing
>>>>against the empiricist prejudice; the modern locus classicus for
>>>>that is Leibniz' New Essays. Likewise, your parochial metaphysics
>>>>of organic situation reduces to Aristotelian hylomorphism, which I
>>>>see no reason to accept.
>>>I feel compelled to lodge a protest against this gratuitous invocation
>>>of Aristotle. Casting an eye over Jeff's remarks (and I submit that
>>>the eye is not an uninformed one), I can see no cause for it save the
>>>bare word "organic"--an insufficient hook to hang hylomorphism on,
>>>clearly.
>>>And if hylomorphism is so hopeless, perhaps you can name a concrete
>>>substance which is not made of anything?
>>I expected my remark to befuddle the uninformed, as came to pass. But
>>surely *you* can do better than that. Hylomorphism is a thesis about
>>identity, provenance, and ultimate makeup. (See Z.8, 1033a24ff.) Of
>>these three aspects, the one relevant to the present discussion is the
>>first. Jeff has claimed that "moral structure [.....] develops from
>>organic, and hence situated, principles, rather than from objective
>>ones." I picked on the implication deriving situated from organic, in
>>the way the Aristotelian ipseity incorporates haecceity, and ran with
>>it. (This is overdetermined by linking with Furth's identification of
>>living matter as the paradigm of Aristotelian substance.) Consider
>>what it would mean to claim that certain moral principles are situated
>>organically. As exemplified in the foregoing remarks, this attitude
>>captures the cladistic point of view, that there could be only as many
>>phylogenetic origins of morality as there actually are. For that is
>>what *this* tribe mean by a moral principle: anything similar thereto,
>>which had originated elsewhere, by *our* definition could not count as
>>one. (Compare to Putnam and Burge on the Twin Earth counterparts of
>>water, tigers, arthritis, and contracts.) And here the pheneticist,
>>in as much as he retains the bare vestiges of old-fashioned idealized
>>morphology, is playing his comic role of the fusty Rationalist: moral
>>principles must apply equally to *this* and *that*, for as long as
>>their objects remain formally indistinguishable in all relevant ways.
>But principles, moral or otherwise, are not things that "come-to-be",
>hence not concrete substances, hence not things which fall under the
>ambit of 1033a24ff. As things which can be tokened here or there, on
>this stone or in that speech, they have no material aspect.
Sure thing, reading "tokened" as "expressed by tokens". (Platonists
have no use for types.) But by parity of reading, moral principles
can be regarded as organically situated in practices undertaken in
conformance therewith. So we get a common metonym: the scepter for
the king. Inman's problem is confusing the direction of ontological
dependence. No principle can be grounded in a concrete substance.
>I still say that Jeff's point of view would be as welcome in the
>Lyceum as a dog in a bowling-alley. The organicization of formal
>entities is not something I find in Aristotle.
What is your take on Furth?
>Paul J.
>
>P.S. My dictionary hides under the bed when it sees you coming.
Your dictionary has nothing to fear from this lexicomaniac.
Cordially -- Mikhail Zel...@math.ucla.edu * M...@ptyx.com ** www.ptyx.com
God: "Sum id quod sum." ** 7576 Willow Glen Road, Los Angeles, CA 90046
Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum." * 213.876.8234 (fon) * 213.876.8054 (fax)
Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est quod sum." **** www.alonzo.org
established on 2.26.1958 ** itinerant philosopher * will think for food
Paul Johnson
This is a figure of speech; I thought we were talking about the
things themselves. You'll agree that principles are not literally
alive.
> So we get a common metonym: the scepter for
> the king. Inman's problem is confusing the direction of ontological
> dependence. No principle can be grounded in a concrete substance.
>
>>I still say that Jeff's point of view would be as welcome in the
>>Lyceum as a dog in a bowling-alley. The organicization of formal
>>entities is not something I find in Aristotle.
>
> What is your take on Furth?
The only thing I have of Furth's is his literal translation of
books Zeta through Iota. So you'll have to furnish the thesis
in question. But if you're just talking about the one identified
above (that living matter is the paradigmatic Aristotelian
substance), then I'd agree that only living bodies count as
full-fledged concrete substances, with artifacts (for now)
falling short, being midway between living beings and heaps
of sand on the unity continuum. But if the issue is who wins
the title of primary ousia, form or the concrete individual,
I'd say the controversy is pointless. Form is prior in some
ways, the composite is prior in others.
Paul J.
PAC
Paul Johnson wrote in message <36329D...@micron.net>...
My gosh, you guys really are flying way up there, at least flying high
on some kind of pleasure fit to uproot snouts with truffles. I suggest the
simplest approach totally devoid of any accumulated baggage and tottering
structures thereof.
How about just empathy? That’s the most obvious one in that we
certainly can be represented as self-consciousness entities, and that
automatically qualifies us for identity with our fellow “others”. Empathy
swarms in knowing full well that whatever happens to us also feels the same
way to our fellow citizens. The strongest foundation for morality could be
the knowledge of how much it hurts, and therefore in reciprocally avoiding
the pain to others we also avoid the pain to ourselves - at least it feels
that way to a deep degree.
All one needs for that said morality is an entity with
self-consciousness. And it's pretty unsinkable, but, unfortunately, why
something feels pleasurable and is in flow with the grand-harmony of things
is another discussion.
Phil C.
Do what feels good
Doing it feels like something
Good from the bottom to the
Topless
The sun came shining in on my head
And brought warmth where dark
Was dark from despair and
Hylomorphism (sorry I slipped)
(And again...) haecceity (what?)
I can't hear you again over washed water
From beaten skies and flashing thunder
Falling-granite-cutting-rocks down
To small-sized reading books saying
Basically saying the same thing
(If i ever read it right.)
Michael Zeleny
>>>>>>[...]
I will, but my agreement is beside the point. There are respectable
viewpoints that ground axiological principles in the evolved natures
of living things who espouse them. Grice's treatment in The Concept
of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
Inman's experiential mutterings.
>>So we get a common metonym: the scepter for
>>the king. Inman's problem is confusing the direction of ontological
>>dependence. No principle can be grounded in a concrete substance.
>>>I still say that Jeff's point of view would be as welcome in the
>>>Lyceum as a dog in a bowling-alley. The organicization of formal
>>>entities is not something I find in Aristotle.
>>What is your take on Furth?
>The only thing I have of Furth's is his literal translation of
>books Zeta through Iota. So you'll have to furnish the thesis
>in question. But if you're just talking about the one identified
>above (that living matter is the paradigmatic Aristotelian
>substance), then I'd agree that only living bodies count as
>full-fledged concrete substances, with artifacts (for now)
>falling short, being midway between living beings and heaps
>of sand on the unity continuum. But if the issue is who wins
>the title of primary ousia, form or the concrete individual,
>I'd say the controversy is pointless. Form is prior in some
>ways, the composite is prior in others.
Right. That is what the mediaeval controversy was all about.
>Paul J.
j...@ncgr.org
> the king. Inman's problem is confusing the direction of ontological
> dependence. No principle can be grounded in a concrete substance.
Perhaps you were confused by my use of the word "organic". If you
review what I wrote, you'll see that the "concreteness" of the
subject is not my point. If we were talkikng about material, I'd
be advocating emergence rather than reduction, but I think that kind
of discussion would be a red herring, or a digression. I'm suggesting
that the "moral" in works like Oedipus at Colonus, Job, the Iliad, and
the Oeresteia is not derived from principles that could've been reasoned
out beforehand, because they are developed "organically" within the
situation. And I think these are great works of art. Hence, some art
can be great without being affiliated with "moral rationalism".
Granted, it's not a very modern thing to appreciate.
I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
that the moralism they concern is rational. Oedipus starts out with a
semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
and punished. By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
in it.
Paul Johnson wrote:
> > I still say that Jeff's point of view would be as welcome in the
> > Lyceum as a dog in a bowling-alley.
I love that!
Jeff Inman
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aug...@micron.net
Notice that this move is possible, minus the "evolved", whether
you locate the universalia in re or in la-la land. I can make
no sense of "evolved natures", by the way, but will reluctantly
take your word for it that a view which incorporates them can
be respectable.
> Grice's treatment in The Concept
> of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
> to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
> epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
> Inman's experiential mutterings.
The link with virtue ethics I can see. That this flows out of the
metaphysics of substance is less clear. Notice that in the derivation
of the main ethical positions of NE (especially 1095a13-1098b9),
hylomorphism is not brought in as a premise in any of the arguments.
>>>So we get a common metonym: the scepter for
>>>the king. Inman's problem is confusing the direction of ontological
>>>dependence. No principle can be grounded in a concrete substance.
>
>>>>I still say that Jeff's point of view would be as welcome in the
>>>>Lyceum as a dog in a bowling-alley. The organicization of formal
>>>>entities is not something I find in Aristotle.
>
>>>What is your take on Furth?
>
>>The only thing I have of Furth's is his literal translation of
>>books Zeta through Iota. So you'll have to furnish the thesis
>>in question. But if you're just talking about the one identified
>>above (that living matter is the paradigmatic Aristotelian
>>substance), then I'd agree that only living bodies count as
>>full-fledged concrete substances, with artifacts (for now)
>>falling short, being midway between living beings and heaps
>>of sand on the unity continuum. But if the issue is who wins
>>the title of primary ousia, form or the concrete individual,
>>I'd say the controversy is pointless. Form is prior in some
>>ways, the composite is prior in others.
>
> Right. That is what the mediaeval controversy was all about.
Yes, but I was referring to the controversy in Aristotelian
scholarship (raging particularly from 1985-90, when no fewer
than four books taking Zeta-Eta-Theta-Iota as their focus
came out--by Loux, Charlotte Witt, Mary Louise Gill, and
Furth; if you haven't read it, I recommend (the Platonist)
Loux's _Primary Ousia_) over how to read the _Metaphisica_.
Paul J.
T.H. Chance
I'm suggesting
> that the "moral" in works like Oedipus at Colonus, Job, the Iliad, and
> the Oeresteia is not derived from principles that could've been reasoned
> out beforehand, because they are developed "organically" within the
> situation. And I think these are great works of art. Hence, some art
> can be great without being affiliated with "moral rationalism".
> Granted, it's not a very modern thing to appreciate.
The ultimate moral and rational principle that governs the Greek works
mentioned supra is Zeus. As Sophocles says, "there is nothing here that is
not Zeus."
> I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
> even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
> that the moralism they concern is rational.
I'm sure that our Greek authors would disagree with you.
Oedipus starts out with a
> semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
> and punished.
There is nothing semi-rational about this. Apollo, who knows the mind of
Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
> holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
> meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
> outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
> in it.
Indeed, there is a mystery in it. But it is a mark of the rational man to
recognize and so find a place for mysteries in life.
regards,
thc
j...@ncgr.org
> j...@ncgr.org wrote:
> > I'm suggesting
> > that the "moral" in works like Oedipus at Colonus, Job, the Iliad, and
> > the Oeresteia is not derived from principles that could've been reasoned
> > out beforehand, because they are developed "organically" within the
> > situation. And I think these are great works of art. Hence, some art
> > can be great without being affiliated with "moral rationalism".
> > Granted, it's not a very modern thing to appreciate.
>
> The ultimate moral and rational principle that governs the Greek works
> mentioned supra is Zeus. As Sophocles says, "there is nothing here that is
> not Zeus."
The character of Zeus is not easily codified into principles that
can be applied universally and rationally. That's why he's interesting,
and that's why he makes a believable god. Many greeks and trojans
were killed while Zeus was allowing himself to be distracted by Hera
on Mt. Ida. For example.
> > I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
> > even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
> > that the moralism they concern is rational.
>
> I'm sure that our Greek authors would disagree with you.
How nice for you.
> > Oedipus starts out with a
> > semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
> > and punished.
>
> There is nothing semi-rational about this. Apollo, who knows the mind of
> Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
Things work out a bit other than it looks like, though. As in the
Iliad, gods at cross purposes may eventually be discovered to be
united. But the union comes about (develops) through the action.
> > By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
> > holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
> > meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
> > outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
> > in it.
>
> Indeed, there is a mystery in it. But it is a mark of the rational man to
> recognize and so find a place for mysteries in life.
Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
(as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
inadequate.
The Lord Of Lemmings
> > > that the "moral" in works like Oedipus at Colonus, Job, the Iliad, and
> > > the Oeresteia is not derived from principles that could've been reasoned
> > > out beforehand, because they are developed "organically" within the
> > > situation. And I think these are great works of art. Hence, some art
> > > can be great without being affiliated with "moral rationalism".
> > > Granted, it's not a very modern thing to appreciate.
> >
> > mentioned supra is Zeus. As Sophocles says, "there is nothing here that is
> > not Zeus."
>
> The character of Zeus is not easily codified into principles that
> can be applied universally and rationally. That's why he's interesting,
> and that's why he makes a believable god. Many greeks and trojans
> were killed while Zeus was allowing himself to be distracted by Hera
> on Mt. Ida. For example.
>
> > > even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
> > > that the moralism they concern is rational.
> >
>
> How nice for you.
>
> > > semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
> > > and punished.
> >
> > Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
>
> Things work out a bit other than it looks like, though. As in the
> Iliad, gods at cross purposes may eventually be discovered to be
> united. But the union comes about (develops) through the action.
>
> > > holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
> > > meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
> > > outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
> > > in it.
> >
> > recognize and so find a place for mysteries in life.
>
> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
> inadequate.
>
> Jeff Inman
I believe Plato or his contemporaries originated the idea of super-morality
which even the Gods were subject to. After all, they were subject to the
Fates, why not to moral law? Hence the idea of "natural law" that was so
popular among the Enlightenment thinkers.
/-------------------------------------------------------------\
| A little learning is a dangerous thing; | Hemlock? |
| Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring;| Never touch |
| There, shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, | the stuff |
| And drinking largely sobers us again. | myself! |
| - Alexander Pope | - Mal-2 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Scientia Claus, Lord Of Lemmings |
| a.k.a Andrew Glasgow <am...@cornell.edu> |
| http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/3474/ |
\-------------------------------------------------------------/
Michael Zeleny
>>>>>>[...]
Perhaps you are confused by your own denial of concreteness. Take
away the irreducible Aristotelian haecceity, or thisness of your
particular situation, and its nature can be reasoned out beforehand,
in the abstract, from the properties that it bears.
>I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
>even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
>that the moralism they concern is rational. Oedipus starts out with a
>semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
>and punished. By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
>holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
>meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
>outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
>in it.
No doubt there is a mystery in everything. But peevishly insisting on
its primacy over any conceivable explanation is the conversation-stopper
of a pre-pubescent boy publicly relishing his naughtiness for its own
sake, while his long-suffering family patiently awaits his imminent
discovery of more introverted ways of self-centered time-wasting.
>Paul Johnson wrote:
>>>I still say that Jeff's point of view would be as welcome in the
>>>Lyceum as a dog in a bowling-alley.
>I love that!
Indeed you do.
Michael Zeleny
>>>>>>>>[...]
Surely the locus classicus of evolved natures is Descartes' doctrine
of divine creation of eternal truths. And if universalia are ante
rem, their grounding therein cannot involve ontological precedence.
>>Grice's treatment in The Concept
>>of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
>>to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
>>epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
>>Inman's experiential mutterings.
>The link with virtue ethics I can see. That this flows out of the
>metaphysics of substance is less clear. Notice that in the derivation
>of the main ethical positions of NE (especially 1095a13-1098b9),
>hylomorphism is not brought in as a premise in any of the arguments.
Consider in 1097a10-14, what it means to say that a doctor studies not
health in itself, but the health of a particular man. A telling remark.
Thanks for the pointer -- I have seen all but Loux.
j...@ncgr.org
> j...@ncgr.org wrote:
> >Perhaps you were confused by my use of the word "organic". If you
> >review what I wrote, you'll see that the "concreteness" of the
> >subject is not my point. [...]
> Perhaps you are confused by your own denial of concreteness. Take
> away the irreducible Aristotelian haecceity, or thisness of your
> particular situation, and its nature can be reasoned out beforehand,
> in the abstract, from the properties that it bears.
Yes. Take away the construction and the material and the details of
shape and size, and a hat is the same as a cup.
> >I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
> >even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
> >that the moralism they concern is rational. Oedipus starts out with a
> >semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
> >and punished. By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
> >holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
> >meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
> >outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
> >in it.
>
> No doubt there is a mystery in everything. But peevishly insisting on
> its primacy over any conceivable explanation is the conversation-stopper
> of a pre-pubescent boy publicly relishing his naughtiness for its own
> sake, while his long-suffering family patiently awaits his imminent
> discovery of more introverted ways of self-centered time-wasting.
So it's self-centered and introverted time-wastage I'm witnessing,
when you blather on about rationalism and disguise as smooth
erudition your pique at discovering any opposition? For an exemplar
of maturity, you sure sound like a petulant academic washout.
If you're going to argue that no art is great which offers any
contrast to moral rationalism, it can hardly be surprising if
the contradictions you encounter dispute the primacy of rationalism.
I'd hardly consider it a show stopper. You might carry on with your
arguement about "evolved capacities" or whatever that was. I think
it's a bad argument, but perhaps with enough latin, you can make it
fly. You do have the advantage, after all, that anyone who brings
up mystery as an argument can be dismissed a priori. (Hey, some
latin!)
Ron Hardin
> Perhaps you are confused by your own denial of concreteness. Take
> away the irreducible Aristotelian haecceity, or thisness of your
> particular situation, and its nature can be reasoned out beforehand,
> in the abstract, from the properties that it bears.
Aristotelian haecceity is jarring, but the paragraph is redeemed
by the bears.
--
Ron Hardin
rhha...@mindspring.com
On the internet, nobody knows you're a jerk.
Michael Zeleny
>>>Perhaps you were confused by my use of the word "organic". If you
>>>review what I wrote, you'll see that the "concreteness" of the
>>>subject is not my point. [...]
>>Perhaps you are confused by your own denial of concreteness. Take
>>away the irreducible Aristotelian haecceity, or thisness of your
>>particular situation, and its nature can be reasoned out beforehand,
>>in the abstract, from the properties that it bears.
>Yes. Take away the construction and the material and the details of
>shape and size, and a hat is the same as a cup.
A silly parallel. Consider instead Leibniz' apocryphal hunt for
visible differences in the shapes of distinct snowflakes. The claim
is that any two distinct things differ in formal aspects, which are
subject to study by, and prediction through, rational consideration.
>>>I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
>>>even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
>>>that the moralism they concern is rational. Oedipus starts out with a
>>>semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
>>>and punished. By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
>>>holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
>>>meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
>>>outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
>>>in it.
>>No doubt there is a mystery in everything. But peevishly insisting on
>>its primacy over any conceivable explanation is the conversation-stopper
>>of a pre-pubescent boy publicly relishing his naughtiness for its own
>>sake, while his long-suffering family patiently awaits his imminent
>>discovery of more introverted ways of self-centered time-wasting.
>So it's self-centered and introverted time-wastage I'm witnessing,
>when you blather on about rationalism and disguise as smooth
>erudition your pique at discovering any opposition? For an exemplar
>of maturity, you sure sound like a petulant academic washout.
If you are looking for maturity, the Usenet is the place least likely
to satisfy your educational needs. By contrast, a grade school yard
is an excellent resource for learning to confine your onanism to
private quarters.
>If you're going to argue that no art is great which offers any
>contrast to moral rationalism, it can hardly be surprising if
>the contradictions you encounter dispute the primacy of rationalism.
>I'd hardly consider it a show stopper. You might carry on with your
>arguement about "evolved capacities" or whatever that was. I think
>it's a bad argument, but perhaps with enough latin, you can make it
>fly. You do have the advantage, after all, that anyone who brings
>up mystery as an argument can be dismissed a priori. (Hey, some
>latin!)
The trouble with your claim is that bringing up mystery as an argument
can serve only to buttress the principle of sufficient reason, whereby
anything that is the case is subject to demonstration, and everything
that is not the case is subject to refutation, by apodeictic argument.
The moment you start talking, you refute yourself. All that remains
is the naughty boy posturing.
Puss in Boots
> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
> inadequate.
"The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an
infinity of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it
cannot see this far." (Pascal, somewhere in the _Pensees_.)
-- Moggin
Lewis Mammel
> Yes. Take away the construction and the material and the details of
> shape and size, and a hat is the same as a cup.
When I was in Boy Scouts, I took my sister's Girl Scout canteen
on camping trip once, and when I was being teased about it, I
resorted to my belief in essentials and replied, "It holds water."
The parry, which was deemed in excellent form by the assembled judges,
came instantly: "A thimble holds water." and to this I had no
answer. Indeed I've been mulling that one over for thirty years.
Lew Mammel, Jr.
T.H. Chance
j...@ncgr.org wrote
I'm suggesting
that the "moral" in works like Oedipus at Colonus, Job, the Iliad, and
the Oeresteia is not derived from principles that could've been reasoned
out beforehand, because they are developed "organically" within the
situation. And I think these are great works of art. Hence, some art
can be great without being affiliated with "moral rationalism".
Granted, it's not a very modern thing to appreciate.
THC
The ultimate moral and rational principle that governs the Greek works
mentioned supra is Zeus. As Sophocles says, "there is nothing here that is
not Zeus."
j...@ncgr.org wrote
The character of Zeus is not easily codified into principles that
can be applied universally and rationally. That's why he's interesting,
and that's why he makes a believable god. Many greeks and trojans
were killed while Zeus was allowing himself to be distracted by Hera
on Mt. Ida. For example.
THC
Your example proves the point you are trying to refute. Homer uses this
little scene from Book 14 of the Iliad to demonstrate what would happen,
were Rationality Itself put to sleep by the forces of Partiality. Also,
Homer makes it clear, through his judicious use of details, that Reason
can never be put fully to sleep. One reason to study the four hundred
years of thought between Homer and Plato is to discover the brilliant ways
that Zeus and friends are "codified into...rationally."
> > > I do agree that these works concern morals, and that their greatness
> > > even depends on their powerful connections with morality, but just not
> > > that the moralism they concern is rational.
> >
> > I'm sure that our Greek authors would disagree with you.
>
> How nice for you.
Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
artistic achievement.
> > > Oedipus starts out with a
> > > semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
> > > and punished.
> >
> > There is nothing semi-rational about this. Apollo, who knows the mind of
> > Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
>
> Things work out a bit other than it looks like, though. As in the
> Iliad, gods at cross purposes may eventually be discovered to be
> united. But the union comes about (develops) through the action.
Let me suggest that if you have any point to make here, then make it with
some concreteness and cite the proper texts. As such, your remarks supra
are hopelessly abstract.
> > > By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
> > > holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
> > > meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
> > > outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
> > > in it.
> >
> > Indeed, there is a mystery in it. But it is a mark of the rational man to
> > recognize and so find a place for mysteries in life.
>
> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
> inadequate.
What you need to do here is to demonstrate that these "areas" outside the
limits of rationality are indeed "worthy of inquiry." And how, pray tell,
do you propose to achieve this end?
j...@ncgr.org
> j...@ncgr.org wrote:
> >Michael Zeleny <zel...@math.ucla.edu> wrote:
> >>j...@ncgr.org wrote:
>
> >>>review what I wrote, you'll see that the "concreteness" of the
>
> >>Perhaps you are confused by your own denial of concreteness. Take
> >>away the irreducible Aristotelian haecceity, or thisness of your
> >>particular situation, and its nature can be reasoned out beforehand,
> >>in the abstract, from the properties that it bears.
>
> >shape and size, and a hat is the same as a cup.
>
> visible differences in the shapes of distinct snowflakes. The claim
> is that any two distinct things differ in formal aspects, which are
> subject to study by, and prediction through, rational consideration.
I wouldn't doubt that a person could be commited to rationalism and
could find things to do in whatever direction he pointed himself.
It remains whether there might not be orthogonal concerns which the
strict rationalist will never encounter, such as may be found in
great works of art that do not necessarily champion moral rationalism.
Any two distinct things differ in situation, as well. It's not a
silly parallel. The difference between *this* hat and *this* cup is
that *this* is this hat, and *this* is this cup.
[...]
> The trouble with your claim is that bringing up mystery as an argument
> can serve only to buttress the principle of sufficient reason, whereby
> anything that is the case is subject to demonstration, and everything
> that is not the case is subject to refutation, by apodeictic argument.
Hey, this is starting to get interesting. I don't understand what
you mean be "subject to", though. Perhaps you meant that whatever is
the case is demonstrated, and what is not is refuted. Sounds pretty
sensible to me. Of course "that which is" remains bound up with
interpretation and The Subject, so it's not particularly helpful
if one intends on getting out there and proving things about what
people should do, or even proving things about snowflakes. Part
(most) of "what is" about each snowflake must be trimmed off by a
rationalist, like turning a hat into a cup.
> The moment you start talking, you refute yourself. All that remains
> is the naughty boy posturing.
How does talking imply reflexive refutation, again? It must be part
of that "subject to" that I didn't understand, before.
Cóta Mór
Boots) wrote:
>
>> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
>> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
>> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
>> inadequate.
>
> "The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an
>infinity of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it
>cannot see this far." (Pascal, somewhere in the _Pensees_.)
Care to give some examples, Einstein?
j...@ncgr.org
> j...@ncgr.org wrote
> I'm suggesting
> that the "moral" in works like Oedipus at Colonus, Job, the Iliad, and
> the Oeresteia is not derived from principles that could've been reasoned
> out beforehand, because they are developed "organically" within the
> situation. And I think these are great works of art. Hence, some art
> can be great without being affiliated with "moral rationalism".
> Granted, it's not a very modern thing to appreciate.
>
> THC
> The ultimate moral and rational principle that governs the Greek works
> mentioned supra is Zeus. As Sophocles says, "there is nothing here that is
> not Zeus."
>
> j...@ncgr.org wrote
> The character of Zeus is not easily codified into principles that
> can be applied universally and rationally. That's why he's interesting,
> and that's why he makes a believable god. Many greeks and trojans
> were killed while Zeus was allowing himself to be distracted by Hera
> on Mt. Ida. For example.
>
> THC
> Your example proves the point you are trying to refute. Homer uses this
> little scene from Book 14 of the Iliad to demonstrate what would happen,
> were Rationality Itself put to sleep by the forces of Partiality.
You're saying the Zeus of the Iliad is an emblem of rationality?
If so, I suggest that it is a rationality that is inaccessible to
humans. I haven't claimed that these works are opposed to any kind
of order or principle whatsoever, but just that they are not
foundations for "moral rationalism" (which I'm assuming we all
feel agreed about defining). The Zeus of the Iliad does indeed
seem to have a relationship with ordering principles, but, as with
the other works I mentioned, that order is not accessible before the
fact. It is only understood in process. At the beginning of the
Iliad, it sure seems like there are a lot of divided loyalties, and
work at cross purposes. Only by the end has the community of gods
achieved some (surprising) coherence. If that is the ultimate design
of Zeus, and is accomplished with abstract principles, then it is achieved
in a way and with principles that are not made apparent to the reader
(listener), and are not handily applied to other situations. The beauty
of the development, to me, is that way in which the development of the
community of gods parallels the development in the community of men.
> THC:
> Also,
> Homer makes it clear, through his judicious use of details, that Reason
> can never be put fully to sleep.
Now it's your turn to offer support.
> One reason to study the four hundred
> years of thought between Homer and Plato is to discover the brilliant ways
> that Zeus and friends are "codified into...rationally."
I thought they were murdered.
> Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
> work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
> have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
> think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
> undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
> brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
> artistic achievement.
There's always Nietzsche.
> > > > Oedipus starts out with a
> > > > semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be caught
> > > > and punished.
> > >
> > > There is nothing semi-rational about this. Apollo, who knows the mind of
> > > Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
> >
> > Things work out a bit other than it looks like, though. As in the
> > Iliad, gods at cross purposes may eventually be discovered to be
> > united. But the union comes about (develops) through the action.
>
> Let me suggest that if you have any point to make here, then make it with
> some concreteness and cite the proper texts. As such, your remarks supra
> are hopelessly abstract.
That would be ironic, wouldn't it? Me being abstract, and you requiring
a situated example. Anyhow, I've grounded it a bit, now.
> > > > By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
> > > > holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened in the
> > > > meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the abstract,
> > > > outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
> > > > in it.
> > >
> > > Indeed, there is a mystery in it. But it is a mark of the rational man to
> > > recognize and so find a place for mysteries in life.
> >
> > Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
> > rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
> > (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
> > inadequate.
>
> What you need to do here is to demonstrate that these "areas" outside the
> limits of rationality are indeed "worthy of inquiry." And how, pray tell,
> do you propose to achieve this end?
Very simple. I say so. I make an assertion. I back it up with
as much poetic power as I have access to. Are you expecting
nuanced abstract arguments? Tsk.
Ted Samsel
: Lewis Mammel <lhma...@ameritech.net> wrote:
: > j...@ncgr.org wrote:
: >
: > > Yes. Take away the construction and the material and the details of
: > > shape and size, and a hat is the same as a cup.
: > When I was in Boy Scouts, I took my sister's Girl Scout canteen
: > on camping trip once, and when I was being teased about it, I
: > resorted to my belief in essentials and replied, "It holds water."
: > The parry, which was deemed in excellent form by the assembled judges,
: > came instantly: "A thimble holds water." and to this I had no
: > answer. Indeed I've been mulling that one over for thirty years.
: Another great story from you, and well told. I don't know if you
: intended it as a disagreement, though. It sounds to me perfectly
: consonant with what I was trying to say. The girlscoutness of a
: canteen is only abstracted away at one's peril. I'd call your
: snippet a piece of worthy artistry, and I note that it seems
: relatively unburdened with moral rationalism. QED.
When I was in Boy Scouts, I took a Girl Scout aluminum mess kit and tried
to use it as a sort of dutch oven to bake something in it. I had seen
done in one of the old Scout Field Book and much to my the surprise,
all I pulled out of the coals was the handle. Even then, in the early
'60s, things weren't like they used to be. I assume the older Field Book
was using a steel mess kit or that the GS mess kit was innately inferior.
Or something.
Now all my dutch ovens are made of cast iron.
--
Ted Samsel....tejas@infi.net (or tbsa...@richmond.infi.net)
"do the boogie woogie in the South American way"
Rhumba Boogie- Hank Snow (1955)
Francis Muir
>
> Now all my dutch ovens are made of cast iron.
What a wonderful epitaph
F
Don Tuite
> When I was in Boy Scouts, I took a Girl Scout aluminum mess kit and tried
> to use it as a sort of dutch oven to bake something in it. I had seen
> done in one of the old Scout Field Book and much to my the surprise,
> all I pulled out of the coals was the handle. Even then, in the early
> '60s, things weren't like they used to be. I assume the older Field Book
> was using a steel mess kit or that the GS mess kit was innately inferior.
> Or something.
>
> Now all my dutch ovens are made of cast iron.
The BS messkit circa 1955 was certainly aluminum, including the handle
for the frypan, which attached with a wing-nut, served to clamp the
whole shebang together when not in use, and got damn hot when you fried
bacon in the pan.
But this is about books. What edition of the Field Book did you have,
Ted? (Note that this is not the _Handbook for Boys_. The _Boy Scout
Field Book_ was like a graduate-level text, compared to the _Handbook_.)
Sometime in that era, I received a Field Book for plagiarizing a joke
from the Readers' Digest and sending it to Boys' Life, and I don't
recall seeing the mess-kit dutch oven trick in it. I do recall that The
Field Book covered masturbation in one of the later chapters. "No real
boy would. . . ", that section began. Nobody in our troop would admit
to being a real boy.
I had to cook some biscuits in a dutch oven as part of the requirements
for my cooking merit badge. Accomplishing that in an area where
generations of boy scouts had stripped the ground and trees of all dead
hardwood took considerable persistence. (And developing a taste for
crusted-over Bisquick dough.)
Don
Ted Samsel
: Ted Samsel wrote:
: > When I was in Boy Scouts, I took a Girl Scout aluminum mess kit and tried
: > to use it as a sort of dutch oven to bake something in it. I had seen
: > done in one of the old Scout Field Book and much to my the surprise,
: > all I pulled out of the coals was the handle. Even then, in the early
: > '60s, things weren't like they used to be. I assume the older Field Book
: > was using a steel mess kit or that the GS mess kit was innately inferior.
: > Or something.
: >
: > Now all my dutch ovens are made of cast iron.
: The BS messkit circa 1955 was certainly aluminum, including the handle
: for the frypan, which attached with a wing-nut, served to clamp the
: whole shebang together when not in use, and got damn hot when you fried
: bacon in the pan.
Boy howdy, yes!
: But this is about books. What edition of the Field Book did you have,
: Ted? (Note that this is not the _Handbook for Boys_. The _Boy Scout
: Field Book_ was like a graduate-level text, compared to the _Handbook_.)
I had the Brown one. I think it is at my folks in the boxes of old Boy's
Lifes that my mother is saving for me. (I know, "Brown" is rather vague
to document an edition, but I also recall a Field Book from the WWII
days that was full of nifty Civil Defense type things. You know,
mobilizing the neighborhood to seek out Nazi spies, usw.)
: Sometime in that era, I received a Field Book for plagiarizing a joke
: from the Readers' Digest and sending it to Boys' Life,
I thought all the jokes in The Hitchin' Rack (I think that was the name
of the comedy page) were plagiarized from the Readers' Digest...
and I don't
: recall seeing the mess-kit dutch oven trick in it. I do recall that The
: Field Book covered masturbation in one of the later chapters. "No real
: boy would. . . ", that section began. Nobody in our troop would admit
: to being a real boy.
There's always been a sense of unreality about boyhood.
ObBook1: WHACK YOUR PORCUPINE by B. Kliban
: I had to cook some biscuits in a dutch oven as part of the requirements
: for my cooking merit badge. Accomplishing that in an area where
: generations of boy scouts had stripped the ground and trees of all dead
: hardwood took considerable persistence. (And developing a taste for
: crusted-over Bisquick dough.)
We were lucky. We got to camp where the mesquite had been chainplowed up.
So there was lots of wood and lots of thorns and stickerburrs.
ObBook2: THE BOOK OF CAMP-LORE AND WOODCRAFT by Dan Beard
Tells you how to clean a porcupine.
Alan R. Light
>In rec.arts.books Don Tuite <don_...@kvo.com> wrote:
>: Sometime in that era, I received a Field Book for plagiarizing a joke
>: from the Readers' Digest and sending it to Boys' Life,
>
>I thought all the jokes in The Hitchin' Rack (I think that was the name
>of the comedy page) were plagiarized from the Readers' Digest...
Most of them weren't nearly good enough to have been plagiarized
from anything better than decades of grade-school playgrounds.
I liked the story about the Dutch Oven. My favourite story from Boy Scouts
has to do with a boy who bragged all week about how much fun he would have
when we went rapelling on Friday, and when he got to the top of the tower,
broke down crying. He was without a doubt the biggest, strongest boy
in the troop, too.
I knew better than to brag about it -- I had been up the tower before,
and knew I was going to be terrified. The height wasn't so bad,
just 29 feet, and I've felt better going down an 80 foot tower,
but it swayed a lot in the wind, and somehow the rungs on the ladder
had been designed so that they turned in your grip.
Um, books, books. How about those merit badge books?
Yay, merit badge books!
Alan
--
alight@ / http://users.vnet.net/alight \
vnet. / Free etexts @ http://www.ipl.org \
net / and http://www.cs.cmu.edu/books.html \
aug...@micron.net
><aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>>Paul Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>>>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>>>>Paul Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>>>>>m...@ptyx.com wrote:
>>>>>>>aug...@micron.net wrote:
>
Uh-oh. It's the Stool of Repentance for me if I'm screwing
this up. But it seems so straightforward: evolved implies
changed, and natures are universals (for Descartes, certainly,
and also for Aristotle), whatever else they may be. So we're
looking for some universals that change? I don't think so,
but am willing to listen to arguments and page references.
> And if universalia are ante
> rem, their grounding therein cannot involve ontological precedence.
What is meant by "their grounding therein"? Explanatory
precedence would seem to be the relevant category for us, if
either of them are.
>>>Grice's treatment in The Concept
>>>of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
>>>to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
>>>epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
>>>Inman's experiential mutterings.
>
>>The link with virtue ethics I can see. That this flows out of the
>>metaphysics of substance is less clear. Notice that in the derivation
>>of the main ethical positions of NE (especially 1095a13-1098b9),
>>hylomorphism is not brought in as a premise in any of the arguments.
>
> Consider in 1097a10-14, what it means to say that a doctor studies not
> health in itself, but the health of a particular man. A telling remark.
It means that doctors haven't changed much over the years. But mine
(Ross) has "For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
man." It's an observation, not something derived from the metaphysics.
Loux casts the chix into the shade.
Paul J.
Puss in Boots
> >> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
> >> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
> >> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
> >> inadequate.
> > "The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an
> >infinity of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it
> >cannot see this far." (Pascal, somewhere in the _Pensees_.)
adh...@deifir.ie (Cóta Mór):
> Care to give some examples, Einstein?
You just did.
-- Moggin
tejas
> Um, books, books. How about those merit badge books?
> Yay, merit badge books!
Those aren't books, those are pamphlets son!
ObFineScoutingBook: A Cub Scout Den mother's guide that my mom got when
she was a Den mother in the '50s. A bunch of great
and currently considered unsafe projects like making
long punks attached to fire works (home made!)
that would slide up the kite string to be ignited in
the proximity of your opponents' kites to set them
ablaze and tumbling to the ground like wounded
Messerschmitts. Wish I knew where that was.
--
TBSa...@richmond.infi.net (also te...@infi.net)
'Do the boogie woogie in the South American way'
Hank Snow THE RHUMBA BOOGIE
Michael Zeleny
>zel...@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny) wrote:
>>j...@ncgr.org wrote:
>>>Michael Zeleny <zel...@math.ucla.edu> wrote:
>>>>j...@ncgr.org wrote:
>>>>>Perhaps you were confused by my use of the word "organic". If you
>>>>>review what I wrote, you'll see that the "concreteness" of the
>>>>>subject is not my point. [...]
>>>>Perhaps you are confused by your own denial of concreteness. Take
>>>>away the irreducible Aristotelian haecceity, or thisness of your
>>>>particular situation, and its nature can be reasoned out beforehand,
>>>>in the abstract, from the properties that it bears.
>>>Yes. Take away the construction and the material and the details of
>>>shape and size, and a hat is the same as a cup.
>>A silly parallel. Consider instead Leibniz' apocryphal hunt for
>>visible differences in the shapes of distinct snowflakes. The claim
>>is that any two distinct things differ in formal aspects, which are
>>subject to study by, and prediction through, rational consideration.
>I wouldn't doubt that a person could be commited to rationalism and
>could find things to do in whatever direction he pointed himself.
>It remains whether there might not be orthogonal concerns which the
>strict rationalist will never encounter, such as may be found in
>great works of art that do not necessarily champion moral rationalism.
What a work champions is not always the same as what it exemplifies,
and thereby upholds.
>Any two distinct things differ in situation, as well. It's not a
>silly parallel. The difference between *this* hat and *this* cup is
>that *this* is this hat, and *this* is this cup.
Thank you for confirming my diagnosis of hylomorphism with your
emphatic pronouns. Where would bad philosophers be without such
typographic embellishments?
>[...]
>>The trouble with your claim is that bringing up mystery as an argument
>>can serve only to buttress the principle of sufficient reason, whereby
>>anything that is the case is subject to demonstration, and everything
>>that is not the case is subject to refutation, by apodeictic argument.
>Hey, this is starting to get interesting. I don't understand what
>you mean be "subject to", though. Perhaps you meant that whatever is
>the case is
can be
> demonstrated, and what is not is
can be
> refuted. Sounds pretty
>sensible to me. Of course "that which is" remains bound up with
>interpretation and The Subject, so it's not particularly helpful
>if one intends on getting out there and proving things about what
>people should do, or even proving things about snowflakes. Part
>(most) of "what is" about each snowflake must be trimmed off by a
>rationalist, like turning a hat into a cup.
I don't see this as incumbent.
>>The moment you start talking, you refute yourself. All that remains
>>is the naughty boy posturing.
>How does talking imply reflexive refutation, again? It must be part
>of that "subject to" that I didn't understand, before.
By talking, you expose your subject matter to the likelihood of
understanding, which vitiates its mystery.
ing. J.M.A. Oppers
Don Tuite wrote:
> Ted Samsel wrote:
>
> > When I was in Boy Scouts, I took a Girl Scout aluminum mess kit and tried
> > to use it as a sort of dutch oven to bake something in it. I had seen
> > done in one of the old Scout Field Book and much to my the surprise,
> > all I pulled out of the coals was the handle. Even then, in the early
> > '60s, things weren't like they used to be. I assume the older Field Book
> > was using a steel mess kit or that the GS mess kit was innately inferior.
> > Or something.
> >
> > Now all my dutch ovens are made of cast iron.
>
> The BS messkit circa 1955 was certainly aluminum, including the handle
> for the frypan, which attached with a wing-nut, served to clamp the
> whole shebang together when not in use, and got damn hot when you fried
> bacon in the pan.
>
> But this is about books. What edition of the Field Book did you have,
> Ted? (Note that this is not the _Handbook for Boys_. The _Boy Scout
> Field Book_ was like a graduate-level text, compared to the _Handbook_.)
>
> Sometime in that era, I received a Field Book for plagiarizing a joke
> from the Readers' Digest and sending it to Boys' Life, and I don't
> recall seeing the mess-kit dutch oven trick in it. I do recall that The
> Field Book covered masturbation in one of the later chapters. "No real
> boy would. . . ", that section began. Nobody in our troop would admit
> to being a real boy.
>
> I had to cook some biscuits in a dutch oven as part of the requirements
> for my cooking merit badge. Accomplishing that in an area where
> generations of boy scouts had stripped the ground and trees of all dead
> hardwood took considerable persistence. (And developing a taste for
> crusted-over Bisquick dough.)
>
> Don
Btw, sometimes, I use an old pelgrim oven. I do not know from which country.
But the Dutch recipy book I use is much much much older than I am : so, I know
how to make and bottle 'country boys' and 'country girls'. However I haven't
tried
yet : probably I will not survive its bouquet, because I am not an expert
Scottish
blender yet<smile><smile>.
Jac.
Ming the Mirthless
Hmm. So you reckon that Einstein's theories demonstrate that "there
is an infinity of things which are beyond [reason]"? Is that how your
sudden descent into the cryptic is to be interpreted? Well, I don't
think that's right. Einstein's theories demonstrate no such thing.
If you want to try to draw that conclusion from the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics then that's another story, but
perhaps at this point you're out of your depth? I'd stick to chasings
mice if I was you.
PAC
Ming the Mirthless wrote in message <363846b...@news.xara.com>...
The problem here being that even to state "care to give me some examples"
implies uncertainty (as in a principle also) as to someone who does not have
absolute knowledge on the subject. If one does not have absolute knowledge
on the subject, then to a certain degree rationality must either be
considered undeveloped, or surrounded in contrast by something other than
it. For example, as being subsumed by consciousness: consciousness is
consciousness of something (different than consciousness), but that
something ontologically _must_ be there to evade its grasp for rationality
(and "consciousness" to exist as consciousness) not to be absolute - which
it isn’t.
This doesn’t make necessarily that reason must me surrounded by an opposing
contrast that must be different to the core (ALA Sartre), but does imply
either a bear-dwelling Platonic cave, dancing slowly towards the light, or a
Hegelian (or maybe Heraclitus knew more about the subject) type of
development that reason must aspire (in a very mystic way I might add as
being important to rationality also) to a "truth" that is unfolding and
revealing to itself, else we’d always be right and in the know. The terms of
reason wouldn’t quite apply to its own self, then being something that
in-itself is undetermined, and rationality then not being very reasonable at
all.
At what point does uncertainty in our own reasonings create for rationality
something different than just being rational?
I’m sorry for not using a compendium of philosophical terms, but I nous very
little about such stuff the other being forgotten. Besides, I feel another
diatribe coming up...
Phil C
O Gato Gordo
Correct. Rationality is a process, rather than a fixed state of
affairs. We might agree that absolute knowledge cannot be attained,
but I'd argue that you can get as close as you like, and that is
confirmed by the mysteries of the ages that have succombed to reason,
particularly in the last two centuries. However, that isn't really
what was being argued before:-
> "The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an infinity
>of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it cannot see
>this far." (Pascal)
That seems to argue that there are mysteries which reason cannot
penetrate. Having read Pascal myself, I know which ones he was
referring to. I wonder if those are the same as the original poster
was referring to?
Puss in Boots
>>>> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
>>>> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
>>>>> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
>>>>> inadequate.
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots):
>>>> "The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an
>>>>infinity of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it
>>>>cannot see this far." (Pascal, somewhere in the _Pensees_.)
adh...@deifir.ie (Cóta Mór):
>>> Care to give some examples, Einstein?
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots):
>> You just did.
frow...@your.posts (Ming the Mirthless):
> Hmm. So you reckon that Einstein's theories demonstrate that "there
> is an infinity of things which are beyond [reason]"? Is that how your
> sudden descent into the cryptic is to be interpreted?
[...]
Not if you ask me. I reckon Cóta Mór demonstrated the feebleness
of reason which "cannot see this far."
-- Moggin
j...@ncgr.org
> Correct. Rationality is a process, rather than a fixed state of
> affairs. We might agree that absolute knowledge cannot be attained,
> but I'd argue that you can get as close as you like, and that is
> confirmed by the mysteries of the ages that have succombed to reason,
> particularly in the last two centuries. However, that isn't really
> what was being argued before:-
>
> > "The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an infinity
> >of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it cannot see
> >this far." (Pascal)
>
> That seems to argue that there are mysteries which reason cannot
> penetrate. Having read Pascal myself, I know which ones he was
> referring to. I wonder if those are the same as the original poster
> was referring to?
Let's not get ahead of ourselves. Sometimes a mystery is just a mystery.
j...@ncgr.org
> Jeff Inman wrote:
> >I wouldn't doubt that a person could be commited to rationalism and
> >could find things to do in whatever direction he pointed himself.
> >It remains whether there might not be orthogonal concerns which the
> >strict rationalist will never encounter, such as may be found in
> >great works of art that do not necessarily champion moral rationalism.
>
> What a work champions is not always the same as what it exemplifies,
> and thereby upholds.
Kinda weak. Before, you were making a universal statement. I'm
claiming that the works I mentioned (and others, too, I suppose)
neither champion nor exemplify moral rationalism, and are yet
great art.
> >Any two distinct things differ in situation, as well. It's not a
> >silly parallel. The difference between *this* hat and *this* cup is
> >that *this* is this hat, and *this* is this cup.
>
> Thank you for confirming my diagnosis of hylomorphism with your
> emphatic pronouns. Where would bad philosophers be without such
> typographic embellishments?
In your shoes? It amazes me to be found akin to Aristotle, who
always seemed (to me) an extremely intelligent irritant precisely
because he seems both to champion and to exemplify a mode of inquiry
with which I find myself at odds. The endless dichotomization seems
just the ticket for a moral rationalist; analysis made into a
shield. I doubt that he and I could mean the same thing by "*this*
is this cup".
I tried to appreciate Aristotle. There were moments in _The Physics_
when he seemed to me to capture interesting questions, though I admit
I was struggling to follow, as well. But there's only one brief
passage where I can remember feeling genuine pleasure, and that was
the bit in the _Ethics_ where he speaks of "pride" in a way that seems
to transcend his usual rationalism. Perhaps it was secretly inserted
by some garrulous arab scholar, in the 10th century.
> > MZ wrote:
> >> The trouble with your claim is that bringing up mystery as an argument
> >> can serve only to buttress the principle of sufficient reason, whereby
> >> anything that is the case is subject to demonstration, and everything
> >> that is not the case is subject to refutation, by apodeictic argument.
>
> >Hey, this is starting to get interesting. I don't understand what
> >you mean be "subject to", though. Perhaps you meant that whatever is
> >the case is
MZ:
> can be
> > demonstrated, and what is not is
MZ:
> can be
> > refuted.
Well, now we're back to drinking out of girlscout canteens and
telling the guys that "hey, it holds water". When you say that "what
is" "can be" demonstrated, you imply that such a demonstration could
be repeated under different circumstances. But, prior to its stripping
down and refitting for the purposes of analytical conquest, "what is"
must certainly include those circumstances. Removing "what is" from
circumstances, is making a conclusion of your premise. Thus, there is
only one demonstration, and this is it. The ground for analytical
explorations is something that is imposed.
> > MZ wrote:
> >> The moment you start talking, you refute yourself. All that remains
> >> is the naughty boy posturing.
>
> > How does talking imply reflexive refutation, again? It must be part
> > of that "subject to" that I didn't understand, before.
>
> By talking, you expose your subject matter to the likelihood of
> understanding, which vitiates its mystery.
I spent a lot of time talking with Moggin about _Job_ and I don't
think we settled the matter. (I claim that this unsettlability,
this ambiguity which is distinct from vagueness, is part of what
marks the excellence of that story. You're free to disagree, or to
suggest that it's bad art. But, otherwise, it looks like your thesis
is contradicted.) I doubt if talking has ever settled anything in
a way that could be considered strictly rational, that is: objective.
That goes double for moral questions.
O Gato Gordo
Boots) wrote:
>
>> Hmm. So you reckon that Einstein's theories demonstrate that "there
>> is an infinity of things which are beyond [reason]"? Is that how your
>> sudden descent into the cryptic is to be interpreted?
>
>of reason which "cannot see this far."
Any volunteers to play Batman against this guy's Riddler?
PAC
>On Thu, 29 Oct 1998 07:57:20 -0800, "PAC" <phil...@gte.net> wrote:
>>Ming the Mirthless wrote in message <363846b...@news.xara.com>...
>>>Boots) wrote:
>>>>j...@ncgr.org:
>>>>
>>>>> >> Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
>>>>> >> rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
>>>>> >> (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is
necessarily
>>>>> >> inadequate.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> > "The final judgement of reason is to admit that there is an
>>>>> >infinity of things which are beyond it. Reason is but feeble if it
>>>>> >cannot see this far." (Pascal, somewhere in the _Pensees_.)
>>>>
>>>>adh...@deifir.ie (Cóta Mór):
>>>>
>>>>> Care to give some examples, Einstein?
>>>>
>>>
>>>Hmm. So you reckon that Einstein's theories demonstrate that "there
>>>is an infinity of things which are beyond [reason]"? Is that how your
>>>think that's right. Einstein's theories demonstrate no such thing.
>>>If you want to try to draw that conclusion from the Copenhagen
>>>interpretation of quantum mechanics then that's another story, but
>>>perhaps at this point you're out of your depth? I'd stick to chasings
>>>mice if I was you.
>>
>>The problem here being that even to state "care to give me some examples"
>>implies uncertainty (as in a principle also) as to someone who does not
have
>>absolute knowledge on the subject. If one does not have absolute knowledge
>>on the subject, then to a certain degree rationality must either be
>>considered undeveloped
>
>affairs. We might agree that absolute knowledge cannot be attained,
>but I'd argue that you can get as close as you like, and that is
>confirmed by the mysteries of the ages that have succombed to reason,
>particularly in the last two centuries.
You can get close, avoiding circles, but the mystery still remains. But
the point to the credit of those who argue differently is that the universe
is much better assumed as sensible or coherent, and cannot really be
interpreted as else or one small patch of incoherency would topple the whole
affair down or remain totally invisible, not being able to relate to the
rest.
So even though as specific entities we are "lifted" from the proceedings
so that our interpretations will never mesh, we still might not be able to
avoid relating the universe to a rational basis in the same way that the
universe maintains its consistency, as opposed to relations of such chaos
that no patterns could possibly exist.
The foundation of that smacks kind of like rationalism, in that we can't
escape it, and that synchronicity must be maintained and is the basis for
rationalistic interpretations, but that's different than saying that nothing
can escape our reason, which due to our separation is automatically escaped,
rather that the universe is based on a coherency that is closest
approximated by us as being rational-like.
>However, that isn't really
>what was being argued before:-
That's never stopped me yet (>:
Michael Zeleny
>>>>>>>>>>[...]
The standard reference is a letter to Mersenne of 27 May 1630. The
upshot is that on the View from Nowhere, all things have been evolved
by the same sort of causality as that involved in their creation. The
Anglo-American tendency being to discount all philosophical doctrines
unsuitable to a five-minute synopsis in an undergraduate classroom,
Descartes has not been taken at his word in most of the literature.
The prevailing latent attitude is one made explicit by Frankfurt: God
can do anything, logic be damned, including making a stone too heavy
for Him to lift. Jean-Luc Marion has written a number of vaguely
existentializing tomes around the matter, without mentioning the
lapidary issue.
>>And if universalia are ante
>>rem, their grounding therein cannot involve ontological precedence.
>What is meant by "their grounding therein"? Explanatory
>precedence would seem to be the relevant category for us, if
>either of them are.
How is explanatory precedence relevant to the viewpoints that ground
axiological principles in the evolved natures of living things who
espouse them? We are talking metaphysics, not epistemology, whence my
objection to your claim that such grounding is possible, minus the
"evolved", whether [I] locate the universalia in re or in la-la land.
>>>>Grice's treatment in The Concept
>>>>of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
>>>>to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
>>>>epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
>>>>Inman's experiential mutterings.
>>>The link with virtue ethics I can see. That this flows out of the
>>>metaphysics of substance is less clear. Notice that in the derivation
>>>of the main ethical positions of NE (especially 1095a13-1098b9),
>>>hylomorphism is not brought in as a premise in any of the arguments.
>>Consider in 1097a10-14, what it means to say that a doctor studies not
>>health in itself, but the health of a particular man. A telling remark.
>It means that doctors haven't changed much over the years. But mine
>(Ross) has "For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
>but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
>man." It's an observation, not something derived from the metaphysics.
I was looking at the Perseus project, which has the Loeb translation.
The therapeutic point seems central to me. But what do you see as
Aristotle's argument for he main ethical positions of NE?
Now we only need Ron to impugn chix as a class.
Michael Zeleny
If free will is a physical reality, human order, as nomos, need not be
accessible either before or after the fact, in order to be susceptible
in principle to a comprehensive rational explanation.
>>THC:
>>Also,
>>Homer makes it clear, through his judicious use of details, that Reason
>>can never be put fully to sleep.
>Now it's your turn to offer support.
>>One reason to study the four hundred
>>years of thought between Homer and Plato is to discover the brilliant ways
>>that Zeus and friends are "codified into...rationally."
>I thought they were murdered.
>>Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
>>work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
>>have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
>>think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
>>undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
>>brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
>>artistic achievement.
>There's always Nietzsche.
Unfortunately, your moral and intellectual standing vis-a-vis Fritz
Nietzsche does not begin to approach Dan Quayle's relation to JFK.
Well, there you have it. The source of your confusion appears to lie
in your notion that the cultivation of a goatee and guest appearances
in glossy men's magazines redound to compelling poetic power. Perhaps
you ought to consider an alternative venue affording you better chances
of making a profound impression with your raw masculinity. I suggest a
Girl Scout campsite.
T.H. Chance
Yes, twice now, though I'm sure my claim seems strange to one ignorant of Homer.
> If so, I suggest that it is a rationality that is inaccessible to
> humans.
Not so to Homer, Aeschylus, and Sophocles.
I haven't claimed that these works are opposed to any kind
> of order or principle whatsoever, but just that they are not
> foundations for "moral rationalism" (which I'm assuming we all
> feel agreed about defining).
Methinks you are about to equivocate on 'foundations for "moral
rationalism"'. That these Greek authors did not write prolegomena to the
fundations of moral rationalism need not be said. But if you think their
thought is not grounded in moral rationalism, then perhaps you need to
think more.
> The Zeus of the Iliad does indeed
> seem to have a relationship with ordering principles, but, as with
> the other works I mentioned, that order is not accessible before the
> fact. It is only understood in process.
True. One must first read the Iliad before one can see and so understand
the moral rationalism at the foundations of Greek thought.
At the beginning of the
> Iliad, it sure seems like there are a lot of divided loyalties, and
> work at cross purposes.
True. They are fighting a war.
Only by the end has the community of gods
> achieved some (surprising) coherence. If that is the ultimate design
> of Zeus, and is accomplished with abstract principles, then it is achieved
> in a way and with principles that are not made apparent to the reader
> (listener), and are not handily applied to other situations.
It is achieved in the way that Homer designed it. That it has not been
done abstractly just means that Homer has followed the principles of
classical art.
The beauty
> of the development, to me, is that way in which the development of the
> community of gods parallels the development in the community of men.
Yes, this experience of the *kalon* is frequently felt by students in
Greek Mythology 1.
>> > THC:
>> > Also,
>> > Homer makes it clear, through his judicious use of details, that Reason
>> > can never be put fully to sleep.
>>
> Now it's your turn to offer support.
Aphro's zOnE of course, as would be obvious to anyone who has read book 14
with understanding.
>> > One reason to study the four hundred
>> > years of thought between Homer and Plato is to discover the brilliant ways
>> > that Zeus and friends are "codified into...rationally."
>>
> I thought they were murdered.
O kruptikos anEp, please explain your meaning to us mortals more fully!
>> > Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
>> > work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
>> > have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
>> > think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
>> > undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
>> > brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
>> > artistic achievement.
>>
> There's always Nietzsche.
Now there you go. Asked to give an account of your claims on Greek
thought, and what do you do? Take flight behind the great bogeyman of
Modernitat. But lets return to premodernism, to Aeschylus, Sappho, and
Pindar, so that we can test your claims up against the great thinkers of
antiquity.
>> > > > > Oedipus starts out with a
>> > > > > semi-rational moralism. Someone killed the king, and he must be
>caught
>> > > > > and punished.
>> > > >
>> > > > There is nothing semi-rational about this. Apollo, who knows the
mind of
>> > > > Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
>> > >
>> > > Things work out a bit other than it looks like, though. As in the
>> > > Iliad, gods at cross purposes may eventually be discovered to be
>> > > united. But the union comes about (develops) through the action.
>> >
>> > Let me suggest that if you have any point to make here, then make it with
>> > some concreteness and cite the proper texts. As such, your remarks supra
>> > are hopelessly abstract.
>>
> That would be ironic, wouldn't it? Me being abstract, and you requiring
> a situated example. Anyhow, I've grounded it a bit, now.
You've grounded nothing. If you have anything to say about Sophocles, get
out your text and make your points. Be sure to cite the line numbers and
any Greek words that are important to your position.
>> > > > > By the end of the trilogy, we know that the nation that
>> > > > > holds his tomb will be blessed. Something interesting happened
in the
>> > > > > meantime, and I don't think it has a worthy explanation in the
>abstract,
>> > > > > outside of character, development, and situation. There's a mystery
>> > > > > in it.
>> > > >
>> > > > Indeed, there is a mystery in it. But it is a mark of the rational
>man to
>> > > > recognize and so find a place for mysteries in life.
>> > >
>> > > Rephrased: it is the duty of the rational man to discover that
>> > > rationality has limits, and that there are worthy areas of inquiry
>> > > (as well as great works of art) for which rationalism is necessarily
>> > > inadequate.
>> >
>> > What you need to do here is to demonstrate that these "areas" outside the
>> > limits of rationality are indeed "worthy of inquiry." And how, pray tell,
>> > do you propose to achieve this end?
>>
> Very simple. I say so. I make an assertion. I back it up with
> as much poetic power as I have access to. Are you expecting
> nuanced abstract arguments? Tsk.
Not any more.
Paul M. Johnson
If you mean the letter that begins:
"You ask me what kind of cause God is of the eternal
truths he has established. I answer: the same kind
of cause of them as of all things he has created:
namely the efficient and the total cause. For he is
certainly Author of the essence of creatures, as well
as of their existence; now this essence is nothing
other than the eternal truths."
my Geach and Anscombe collection give the date as 27 May, 1631.
Whether or not this is the one, it does seem to imply that
there is no evolution of natures, since natures are essences,
and essences are here identified with eternal (hence,
unchanging) truths.
> The
> Anglo-American tendency being to discount all philosophical doctrines
> unsuitable to a five-minute synopsis in an undergraduate classroom,
> Descartes has not been taken at his word in most of the literature.
> The prevailing latent attitude is one made explicit by Frankfurt: God
> can do anything, logic be damned, including making a stone too heavy
> for Him to lift. Jean-Luc Marion has written a number of vaguely
> existentializing tomes around the matter, without mentioning the
> lapidary issue.
>
>>>And if universalia are ante
>>>rem, their grounding therein cannot involve ontological precedence.
>
>>What is meant by "their grounding therein"? Explanatory
>>precedence would seem to be the relevant category for us, if
>>either of them are.
>
> How is explanatory precedence relevant to the viewpoints that ground
> axiological principles in the evolved natures of living things who
> espouse them? We are talking metaphysics, not epistemology, whence my
> objection to your claim that such grounding is possible, minus the
> "evolved", whether [I] locate the universalia in re or in la-la land.
Let me expand a bit. As you know, a position on the problem
of universals falls into one of three camps--that of realism,
nominalism, or conceptualism. Aristotle's position on this,
I take it, is that of an odd sort of realist--universals
exist, but only as impressed, as it were, on a material
substrate. A universal that lacks instances, lacks being.
And so we have the designation "in rebus". Fine. But "post
rem" is wrong, since concrete individuals likewise cannot
exist without form. So *this* sort of dependency runs in both
directions. But what makes Aristotle's virtue ethics
incompatible with Platonism, it seems to me, is not this
"in rebus" vs. "ante rem" difference, but rather the one
he identifies at 1096a16:
"The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit
Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority
and posteriority (which is the reason why they did
not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all
numbers);"
This is the Platonic doctrine which is incompatible with
Aristotelian ethics. To be sure, the Platonists are also
wrong on the ante rem/in rebus issue. That's just bad
metaphysics on their part, but it doesn't keep them from
following the correct path in ethics. The doctrine
identified above, however, does. He goes on:
"but the term 'good' is used both in the category
of substance and in that of quality and in that of
relation, and that which is *per se*, i.e.
substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for
the latter is like an offshoot and accident of
being); so that there could not be a common Idea
set over all these goods" (1096a19-23)
What the Platonists don't seem to understand is that goodness,
like being, is said in many ways. 'Good' is equivocal in
the "pros hen" manner. And what we're after in ethical
theory, according to A, is not the Good, but a special case
of the Good-for-Substance, the Good for man.
Where does explanatory precedence come in? It's the deeper
agreement that the Peripatetics and Platonists share: that
the universal, the form, is prior "in account" to the
concrete individual, since to give an account of the
individual--to explain what it is--you have to bring in
the form, but not conversely. It is this sort of priority
that I assumed would be front-and-center in any "grounding"
activity. But I guess it's just the haziness of this
"grounding" category that's got me guessing.
>>>>>Grice's treatment in The Concept
>>>>>of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
>>>>>to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
>>>>>epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
>>>>>Inman's experiential mutterings.
>
>>>>The link with virtue ethics I can see. That this flows out of the
>>>>metaphysics of substance is less clear. Notice that in the derivation
>>>>of the main ethical positions of NE (especially 1095a13-1098b9),
>>>>hylomorphism is not brought in as a premise in any of the arguments.
>
>>>Consider in 1097a10-14, what it means to say that a doctor studies not
>>>health in itself, but the health of a particular man. A telling remark.
>
>>It means that doctors haven't changed much over the years. But mine
>>(Ross) has "For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
>>but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
>>man." It's an observation, not something derived from the metaphysics.
>
> I was looking at the Perseus project, which has the Loeb translation.
> The therapeutic point seems central to me. But what do you see as
> Aristotle's argument for he main ethical positions of NE?
1097a15-1098a20. And the heart of this is 1097b24-1098a17:
through the examination of cases, we are led to the general
formula for goodness-in-a-substance: an x is a good x iff
the x performs its ergon (function) well. We then derive the
ergon for man, and then complete the syllogism. The rest
is elaboration.
Paul J.
[...]
Lewis Mammel
>
> On Thu, 29 Oct 1998 18:30:50 -0400, mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in
> Boots) wrote:
> >
> >> Hmm. So you reckon that Einstein's theories demonstrate that "there
> >> is an infinity of things which are beyond [reason]"? Is that how your
> >> sudden descent into the cryptic is to be interpreted?
> >
> >of reason which "cannot see this far."
>
> Any volunteers to play Batman against this guy's Riddler?
It's very simple. The challenge, "Care to give some examples, Einstein?" was
met with the reply, "You just did", meaning that he did just give AN example
of ( his own ) reason's inability to penetrate.
This error was compounded by supposing that the reference was to Einstein, and
as Livy liked to say, "from then on it was more of a butchery than a battle."
Lew Mammel, Jr.
O Gato Gordo
>
> You can get close, avoiding circles, but the mystery still remains.
Does it? For example, Newton's laws were revealed as partial and
one-sided by Einstein, but that doesn't prevent them being used in the
immense majority of mechanics calculations to this day. In what sense
is it correct to describe them as true or false - or both? And in
what way is mechanics still "mysterious"?
j...@ncgr.org
> >> > thch...@mother.com (T.H. Chance) wrote:
> >> >> The ultimate moral and rational principle that governs the Greek works
> >> >> mentioned supra is Zeus. As Sophocles says, "there is nothing here that
> >> >> is not Zeus."
>
> >> > The character of Zeus is not easily codified into principles that
> >> > can be applied universally and rationally. That's why he's interesting,
> >> > and that's why he makes a believable god. Many greeks and trojans
> >> > were killed while Zeus was allowing himself to be distracted by Hera
> >> > on Mt. Ida. For example.
> > THC
> >> Your example proves the point you are trying to refute. Homer uses this
> >> little scene from Book 14 of the Iliad to demonstrate what would happen,
> >> were Rationality Itself put to sleep by the forces of Partiality.
> > You're saying the Zeus of the Iliad is an emblem of rationality?
>
> Yes, twice now, though I'm sure my claim seems strange to one ignorant
> of Homer.
I wouldn't know about that. But I can tell you that repeating yourself
hasn't gone far towards convincing someone familiar with Homer that you
are actually talking about something you've read, and not merely pasting
your opinion about the Homeric gods onto Homer.
> Inman:
> > If so, I suggest that it is a rationality that is inaccessible to
> > humans.
>
> Not so to Homer, Aeschylus, and Sophocles.
Perhaps it's time to make your case?
> > I haven't claimed that these works are opposed to any kind
> > of order or principle whatsoever, but just that they are not
> > foundations for "moral rationalism" (which I'm assuming we all
> > feel agreed about defining).
>
> Methinks you are about to equivocate on 'foundations for "moral
> rationalism"'.
Who says "methinks" anymore? If you're about to discover that
"moral rationalism" can mean something that doesn't support your
point then just deal with it.
> That these Greek authors did not write prolegomena to the
> fundations of moral rationalism need not be said. But if you think their
> thought is not grounded in moral rationalism, then perhaps you need to
> think more.
Hmmmm. The fact that Achilles wrath, or Odysseus' slaughter of the
suitors, is justified, is consonant with principles of honor. I'm sure
Zeleny could come up with some latin to suggest that such prinicple implies
an abstractable objective order, which can be codified and applied
universally, but I doubt if it will prove any more convincing in latin.
> > The Zeus of the Iliad does indeed
> > seem to have a relationship with ordering principles, but, as with
> > the other works I mentioned, that order is not accessible before the
> > fact. It is only understood in process.
>
> True. One must first read the Iliad before one can see and so understand
> the moral rationalism at the foundations of Greek thought.
You're contradicting yourself. When you agree with my statement, you
are agreeing that it is not moral rationalism that is exemplified.
> > At the beginning of the
> > Iliad, it sure seems like there are a lot of divided loyalties, and
> > work at cross purposes.
>
> True. They are fighting a war.
Having gods at cross purposes suggests conflicted principles to me.
How about you?
> > Only by the end has the community of gods
> > achieved some (surprising) coherence. If that is the ultimate design
> > of Zeus, and is accomplished with abstract principles, then it is achieved
> > in a way and with principles that are not made apparent to the reader
> > (listener), and are not handily applied to other situations.
>
> It is achieved in the way that Homer designed it. That it has not been
> done abstractly just means that Homer has followed the principles of
> classical art.
If that's true, then Homer's design, and the fucking "principles of
classical art" do not lean on moral rationalism.
> > The beauty
> > of the development, to me, is that way in which the development of the
> > community of gods parallels the development in the community of men.
>
> Yes, this experience of the *kalon* is frequently felt by students in
> Greek Mythology 1.
At which point you inform them that this is all just "principles of
classical art", and -- take your word for it -- Homer is fully committed
to moral rationalism, just like THC is.
> > THC:
> >> Also,
> >> Homer makes it clear, through his judicious use of details, that Reason
> >> can never be put fully to sleep.
> > Now it's your turn to offer support.
>
> Aphro's zOnE of course, as would be obvious to anyone who has read book 14
> with understanding.
What then is the point of the poet in mentioning that many soldiers from
both sides were killed while Zeus did in fact sleep?
> >> One reason to study the four hundred
> >> years of thought between Homer and Plato is to discover the brilliant ways
> >> that Zeus and friends are "codified into...rationally."
> > I thought they were murdered.
>
> O kruptikos anEp, please explain your meaning to us mortals more fully!
Where are they now that you have replaced them with rational principles?
You no longer need them. You've killed them off and usurped their
authority. It is now the individual rational mind that makes your moral
decisions. Or so you seem to be arguing.
> >> Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
> >> work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
> >> have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
> >> think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
> >> undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
> >> brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
> >> artistic achievement.
> > There's always Nietzsche.
>
> Now there you go. Asked to give an account of your claims on Greek
> thought, and what do you do? Take flight behind the great bogeyman of
> Modernitat. But lets return to premodernism, to Aeschylus, Sappho, and
> Pindar, so that we can test your claims up against the great thinkers of
> antiquity.
Ancient Greece is to Nietzsche as classical Rome is to Machiavelli.
> >> >> Jeff Inman:
> >> >> > Oedipus starts out with a semi-rational moralism. Someone
> >> >> > killed the king, and he must be caught and punished.
> >> > THC:
> >> >> There is nothing semi-rational about this. Apollo, who knows the
> >> >> mind of
> >> >> Zeus, demands that the murderer be punished.
He does that in the Oeresteia, too. But it seems that his is not
the only perspective to be considered. There are conflicts.
> >> > Things work out a bit other than it looks like, though. As in the
> >> > Iliad, gods at cross purposes may eventually be discovered to be
> >> > united. But the union comes about (develops) through the action.
> >> Let me suggest that if you have any point to make here, then make it with
> >> some concreteness and cite the proper texts. As such, your remarks supra
> >> are hopelessly abstract.
> > That would be ironic, wouldn't it? Me being abstract, and you requiring
> > a situated example. Anyhow, I've grounded it a bit, now.
> You've grounded nothing. If you have anything to say about Sophocles, get
> out your text and make your points. Be sure to cite the line numbers and
> any Greek words that are important to your position.
Don't have my texts here. I guess you'll remember the part where it
is revealed that the nation the has Oedipus' tomb will be blessed.
What would you say is the rational moral of the story? Make sure it's
expressed in universal terms; no individual circumstances, or "path
of life" or stuff like that.
Richard Harter
>Who says "methinks" anymore?
Sundry folk do.
Richard Harter, c...@tiac.net, The Concord Research Institute
URL = http://www.tiac.net/users/cri, phone = 1-978-369-3911
If you can laugh at something it can't hurt you.
It can kill you but it can't hurt you.
j...@ncgr.org
> j...@ncgr.org (Jeff Inman) wrote:
> > THC wrote:
> >> Jeff Inman wrote:
> >> The character of Zeus is not easily codified into principles that
> >> can be applied universally and rationally. That's why he's interesting,
> >> and that's why he makes a believable god. Many greeks and trojans
> >> were killed while Zeus was allowing himself to be distracted by Hera
> >> on Mt. Ida. For example.
> >> Your example proves the point you are trying to refute. Homer uses this
> >> little scene from Book 14 of the Iliad to demonstrate what would happen,
> >> were Rationality Itself put to sleep by the forces of Partiality.
> > You're saying the Zeus of the Iliad is an emblem of rationality?
> > If so, I suggest that it is a rationality that is inaccessible to
> > humans. I haven't claimed that these works are opposed to any kind
> > of order or principle whatsoever, but just that they are not
> > foundations for "moral rationalism" (which I'm assuming we all
> > feel agreed about defining). The Zeus of the Iliad does indeed
> > seem to have a relationship with ordering principles, but, as with
> > the other works I mentioned, that order is not accessible before the
> > fact. It is only understood in process. At the beginning of the
> > Iliad, it sure seems like there are a lot of divided loyalties, and
> > work at cross purposes. Only by the end has the community of gods
> > achieved some (surprising) coherence. If that is the ultimate design
> > of Zeus, and is accomplished with abstract principles, then it is achieved
> > in a way and with principles that are not made apparent to the reader
> > (listener), and are not handily applied to other situations. The beauty
> > of the development, to me, is that way in which the development of the
> > community of gods parallels the development in the community of men.
> If free will is a physical reality, human order, as nomos, need not be
> accessible either before or after the fact, in order to be susceptible
> in principle to a comprehensive rational explanation.
That's a big "if". The jury is still out on whether "free will" is
even a meaningful concept. I take it you anticipate that the
complexities will be thrown away and the result reified in "physical
reality" (another vague concept). Meanwhile ...
Something may be accessible to reductive reason "in principle" while yet
remaining necessarily inaccessible in practice. One situation in which
this would crop up is when the reduction itself strips away the essense
of what was to be explained.
> THC:
> >>Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
> >>work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
> >>have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
> >>think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
> >>undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
> >>brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
> >>artistic achievement.
>
> >There's always Nietzsche.
>
> Unfortunately, your moral and intellectual standing vis-a-vis Fritz
> Nietzsche does not begin to approach Dan Quayle's relation to JFK.
I am not proposing to exemplify Nietzsche's moral and intellectual
qualities, but simply observing that his work is relevant to the
question. Perhaps you already knew that and so, faced with the
choice of dealing with a difficulty or rendering one of your patented
toneless insults, chose the easier route.
> THC:
> >>What you need to do here is to demonstrate that these "areas" outside the
> >>limits of rationality are indeed "worthy of inquiry." And how, pray tell,
> >>do you propose to achieve this end?
>
> >Very simple. I say so. I make an assertion. I back it up with
> >as much poetic power as I have access to. Are you expecting
> >nuanced abstract arguments? Tsk.
>
> Well, there you have it. The source of your confusion appears to lie
> in your notion that the cultivation of a goatee and guest appearances
> in glossy men's magazines redound to compelling poetic power. Perhaps
> you ought to consider an alternative venue affording you better chances
> of making a profound impression with your raw masculinity. I suggest a
> Girl Scout campsite.
Right on. It's nice of you to share your turf. I guess those people
who call you a pedantic windbag have got you all wrong.
PAC
O Gato Gordo wrote in message <363dae9e...@news.xara.com>...
We don't know all there is to know about nothing. So the mystery still
remains as something hidden beneath the veils of our current understanding.
And I agree with your point here, that the "truth" seems to be something
that advances with our understanding, yet if the total truth is an
impenetrable that can't be grasped, which it is, then we're still left with
a reality that can't be penetrated by our finite reasonings as separated
subjects. A big mystery no matter how close our reason gets.
As far as what is more true or false, to the very depths of the object
in question; unless we totally are assimilated into any object under
discussion, then we can't know the absolute truth of any said object, but we
can approach it, yet our separation as the observer prevents the total truth
from being realized. So being in the process of getting closer to the truth
implies a process of getting into synchronicity with the object in question
as much as possible, yet knowing full well that we'll never totally fall
into the bean patch.
Another mystery (>; from one point of view.
Phil C.
Ken MacIver
>j...@ncgr.org wrote:
>
>
>>Who says "methinks" anymore?
>
>Sundry folk do.
Methinks many folks in rab use this term.
K.
Michael Zeleny
These considerations have no relevance against rationalism, which is a
thesis that involves the nature of being before invoking the modes of
acquaintance therewith.
>>THC:
>>>>Clever response, but you have yet to give a classical author or classical
>>>>work that proves your point. I'm not saying you can't do it; just that you
>>>>have yet to do it. You might try Sappho 16 (others have); but even here I
>>>>think Zeleny's point is ultimately demonstrated. Sappho's attempt to
>>>>undermine Rationality in favor of Eros can only be done through a
>>>>brilliant exercise of Rationality; the result is sophistry, a dubious
>>>>artistic achievement.
>>>There's always Nietzsche.
>>Unfortunately, your moral and intellectual standing vis-a-vis Fritz
>>Nietzsche does not begin to approach Dan Quayle's relation to JFK.
>I am not proposing to exemplify Nietzsche's moral and intellectual
>qualities, but simply observing that his work is relevant to the
>question. Perhaps you already knew that and so, faced with the
>choice of dealing with a difficulty or rendering one of your patented
>toneless insults, chose the easier route.
Nothing hard is required in dismissing a shallow name-dropper.
>>THC:
>>>>What you need to do here is to demonstrate that these "areas" outside the
>>>>limits of rationality are indeed "worthy of inquiry." And how, pray tell,
>>>>do you propose to achieve this end?
>>>Very simple. I say so. I make an assertion. I back it up with
>>>as much poetic power as I have access to. Are you expecting
>>>nuanced abstract arguments? Tsk.
>>Well, there you have it. The source of your confusion appears to lie
>>in your notion that the cultivation of a goatee and guest appearances
>>in glossy men's magazines redound to compelling poetic power. Perhaps
>>you ought to consider an alternative venue affording you better chances
>>of making a profound impression with your raw masculinity. I suggest a
>>Girl Scout campsite.
>Right on. It's nice of you to share your turf. I guess those people
>who call you a pedantic windbag have got you all wrong.
Call us back when you get over this petulant child routine.
Michael Zeleny
>>>>>>>>>>>>[...]
Geach and Anscombe are characteristically sloppy. More relevant is
the point that efficient causation responsible for the creation of
essences involves a temporal order that justifies the evolutionary
idiom even without summoning occasionalism to the rescue.
Thank you for giving us an opportunity to revisit this text. I still
maintain that the dithering medic of 1097a10-14 is proleptic for this
position. Now, superficial grammatical distinctions notwithstanding,
why do you think Aristotle does not make a similar move in the matter
of the term "true"?
>Where does explanatory precedence come in? It's the deeper
>agreement that the Peripatetics and Platonists share: that
>the universal, the form, is prior "in account" to the
>concrete individual, since to give an account of the
>individual--to explain what it is--you have to bring in
>the form, but not conversely. It is this sort of priority
>that I assumed would be front-and-center in any "grounding"
>activity. But I guess it's just the haziness of this
>"grounding" category that's got me guessing.
My take on this point is that Aristotle wants to have it both ways.
In the matter of explaining universalia in rebus, Mill makes a lot
more sense with his philistine simplicity.
>>>>>>Grice's treatment in The Concept
>>>>>>of Value is definitive, but any virtue ethicist can be expected to get
>>>>>>to this point sooner or later. I blame Aristotle and his scholastic
>>>>>>epigoni with their universalia in re or post rem, who made possible
>>>>>>Inman's experiential mutterings.
>>>>>The link with virtue ethics I can see. That this flows out of the
>>>>>metaphysics of substance is less clear. Notice that in the derivation
>>>>>of the main ethical positions of NE (especially 1095a13-1098b9),
>>>>>hylomorphism is not brought in as a premise in any of the arguments.
>>>>Consider in 1097a10-14, what it means to say that a doctor studies not
>>>>health in itself, but the health of a particular man. A telling remark.
>>>It means that doctors haven't changed much over the years. But mine
>>>(Ross) has "For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way,
>>>but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular
>>>man." It's an observation, not something derived from the metaphysics.
>>I was looking at the Perseus project, which has the Loeb translation.
>>The therapeutic point seems central to me. But what do you see as
>>Aristotle's argument for he main ethical positions of NE?
>1097a15-1098a20. And the heart of this is 1097b24-1098a17:
>through the examination of cases, we are led to the general
>formula for goodness-in-a-substance: an x is a good x iff
>the x performs its ergon (function) well. We then derive the
>ergon for man, and then complete the syllogism. The rest
>is elaboration.
My claim is that all this talk of goodness-in-a-substance ineluctably
leads to Inman's New-Agey, organically situated moral relativism.
j...@ncgr.org
> >> If free will is a physical reality, human order, as nomos, need not be
> >> accessible either before or after the fact, in order to be susceptible
> >> in principle to a comprehensive rational explanation.
> > That's a big "if". The jury is still out on whether "free will" is
> > even a meaningful concept. I take it you anticipate that the
> > complexities will be thrown away and the result reified in "physical
> > reality" (another vague concept). Meanwhile ...
> >
> > Something may be accessible to reductive reason "in principle" while yet
> > remaining necessarily inaccessible in practice. One situation in which
> > this would crop up is when the reduction itself strips away the essense
> > of what was to be explained.
> These considerations have no relevance against rationalism, which is a
> thesis that involves the nature of being before invoking the modes of
> acquaintance therewith.
If your "theory" on the nature of being requires you to mutilate the
phenomena in question before any examination can take place, you can
hardly claim to be getting acquainted with it.
Michael Zeleny
>>>>If free will is a physical reality, human order, as nomos, need not be
>>>>accessible either before or after the fact, in order to be susceptible
>>>>in principle to a comprehensive rational explanation.
>>>That's a big "if". The jury is still out on whether "free will" is
>>>even a meaningful concept. I take it you anticipate that the
>>>complexities will be thrown away and the result reified in "physical
>>>reality" (another vague concept). Meanwhile ...
>>>
>>>Something may be accessible to reductive reason "in principle" while yet
>>>remaining necessarily inaccessible in practice. One situation in which
>>>this would crop up is when the reduction itself strips away the essense
>>>of what was to be explained.
>>These considerations have no relevance against rationalism, which is a
>>thesis that involves the nature of being before invoking the modes of
>>acquaintance therewith.
>If your "theory" on the nature of being requires you to mutilate the
>phenomena in question before any examination can take place, you can
>hardly claim to be getting acquainted with it.
Rationalism is not a thesis about what can be known in practice. For
example, it is nowise vitiated by there being arithmetical facts not
susceptible to an articulation, much less an explanation, before the
heat death of the universe.
David J. Loftus
Methinks this is no idle speculation, verily.
David Loftus
("Rhetorical Devices R Us")
Robert Teeter
: : I do recall that The
: : Field Book covered masturbation in one of the later chapters. "No real
: : boy would. . . ", that section began. Nobody in our troop would admit
: : to being a real boy.
Did you mean that the way it reads?
Ted Samsel:
: There's always been a sense of unreality about boyhood.
Exactly.
ObBook: In the Bear Manual (bears being one of the grades of Cub
Scouts) I had, there were instructions for making a crystal set.
It involved sandwiching layers of foil and cardboard, IIRC. I
never got it to work. Did anyone here make one of these?
--
Bob Teeter (rte...@netcom.com) | http://www.wco.com/~rteeter/
"Like all those possessing a library, Aurelian was aware that he
was guilty of not knowing his in its entirety."
-- Borges, "The Theologians"
Ted Samsel
: Don Tuite:
: : : I do recall that The
: : : Field Book covered masturbation in one of the later chapters. "No real
: : : boy would. . . ", that section began. Nobody in our troop would admit
: : : to being a real boy.
: Did you mean that the way it reads?
: Ted Samsel:
: : There's always been a sense of unreality about boyhood.
: Exactly.
: ObBook: In the Bear Manual (bears being one of the grades of Cub
: Scouts) I had, there were instructions for making a crystal set.
: It involved sandwiching layers of foil and cardboard, IIRC. I
: never got it to work. Did anyone here make one of these?
Yes, but I bought a real condensor. I think aluminum doesn't work that
well and thin copper might have been better, but crystal radios were
rather dinosauric even in the early '60s.
ObOtherScienceProject: The Van deGraaf Generator.
--
Ted Samsel....tejas@infi.net (or tbsa...@richmond.infi.net)
"do the boogie woogie in the South American way"
Rhumba Boogie- Hank Snow (1955)
Ron Hardin
> Yes, but I bought a real condensor. I think aluminum doesn't work that
> well and thin copper might have been better, but crystal radios were
> rather dinosauric even in the early '60s.
It ought to work okay. I assume it two strips of aluminum foil
rolled up into a nifty looking electronic component with paper
in between. I think real capacitors use aluminum, as I remember
from disassembling them long ago. The paper was oiled or waxed or
something though.
You could get a wildly wrong capacitance value though.
I built a crystal set not a year ago in fact, scrounging
components from a Radio Shack crystal set kit for a MW
loop antenna. You can build a nice MW loop with the variable
capacitor and then convert it back into a working crystal set
by using the high impendence earphone in series with their diode
connected across it.
Meanwhile the MW loop increases the daytime range of your lowly
AM radio to several hundred miles.
--
Ron Hardin
rhha...@mindspring.com
On the internet, nobody knows you're a jerk.
Lewis Mammel
>
> Ted Samsel wrote:
> > Yes, but I bought a real condensor. I think aluminum doesn't work that
> > well and thin copper might have been better, but crystal radios were
> > rather dinosauric even in the early '60s.
>
> It ought to work okay. I assume it two strips of aluminum foil
> rolled up into a nifty looking electronic component with paper
> in between. I think real capacitors use aluminum, as I remember
> from disassembling them long ago. The paper was oiled or waxed or
> something though.
>
> You could get a wildly wrong capacitance value though.
When I was a TA for freshman physics we did a lab measuring
capacitance by using a scope to measure the discharge time
constant in a simple RC circuit. I made a capacitor by interleaving
aluminum foil with sheets of plastic from garbage bags and pressing
them between two boards. I could modulate the capacitance by pressing
down on the boards. I forget the value of the capacitance, but it was
insanely puny. It gave me respect for disk capacitor technology, which
I assume achieves a small "d" in "A/d".
Lew Mammel, Jr.
aug...@micron.net
>Paul M. Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>><aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>>>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>>>><aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>>>>>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>>>>>>Paul Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>>>>>>>>Paul Johnson <aug...@micron.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>m...@ptyx.com wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>aug...@micron.net wrote:
>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>[...]
>
Okay, I'll look into this further.
Could it be because the cases are not similar? I am unaware
of anything in Aristotle which could be called a theory of
truth, but what there is in large part seems to be located
in _De Interpretatione_, where truth appears to be predicated
of certain combinations of words and also of certain thoughts
(if one of these is primary, or if there's a theory of content
hanging around anywhere, this too has escaped me). I remember
somewhere a pronouncement which runs, approximately: "To say
of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not, is
truth." Not much help.
>>Where does explanatory precedence come in? It's the deeper
>>agreement that the Peripatetics and Platonists share: that
>>the universal, the form, is prior "in account" to the
>>concrete individual, since to give an account of the
>>individual--to explain what it is--you have to bring in
>>the form, but not conversely. It is this sort of priority
>>that I assumed would be front-and-center in any "grounding"
>>activity. But I guess it's just the haziness of this
>>"grounding" category that's got me guessing.
>
> My take on this point is that Aristotle wants to have it both ways.
And the question is whether or not the universe has obliged him.
> In the matter of explaining universalia in rebus, Mill makes a lot
> more sense with his philistine simplicity.
Where, please? You can toss in any other good references that
come to mind as well, as I'm beginning to get interested in the
issue and have almost nothing on the shelves that deals with it.
And I claim that it is a distant relative, and note that "ineluctably
leads" is not a logical relation. I also note that Aristotle's is
only an inter-, and not an intra-, species relativism.
It's also a very well-motivated analysis. If you think about how
we evaluate artifacts for goodness--what makes for a good knife or
a good computer--it fits his analysis. Same with things like what
it is to be a good pianist, accountant, chess-player. Even animals
we evaluate like this. What's a good badger? One that is good *at*
being a badger, one who does the distinctively badgerly things well.
And why should it be any different for humans. A good man is one
that is good at being a man. And what is it to be a man? Well,
just plug in the formula for the essence of man (and clearly it's
the differentia that's of interest). Makes perfect sense.
Of course, what is opposed to a good man here is...a lousy man,
and not an evil man. I suppose that might be considered a defect
in the theory.
What a realist of your stripe can't explain is why a statement like
"Glenn Gould is a good pianist" does not mean the same as "Glenn
Gould is good and Glenn Gould is a pianist."
Paul J.
Michael Zeleny
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>[...]
Let me know if you can figure it out better than the usual suspects
listed below. I am assuming that Descartes had thought these things
through very meticulously.
I should amend my charge by noting that Rhetoric 1356b adds this gem:
Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some
one, and is persuasive and convincing either at once and in and
by itself, or because it appears to be proved by propositions
that are convincing; further, no art has the particular in view,
medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but
what is good for this or that class of persons (for this is a
matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the
particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true
science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what
seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates
or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class
of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw
conclusions from any random premises--for even madmen have some
fancies--but it takes its material from subjects which demand
reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common
subjects of deliberation.
As you have suggested, Ari is eminently capable of nuanced expression
even after overstating his case, such as it may be.
>Could it be because the cases are not similar? I am unaware
>of anything in Aristotle which could be called a theory of
>truth, but what there is in large part seems to be located
>in _De Interpretatione_, where truth appears to be predicated
>of certain combinations of words and also of certain thoughts
>(if one of these is primary, or if there's a theory of content
>hanging around anywhere, this too has escaped me). I remember
>somewhere a pronouncement which runs, approximately: "To say
>of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not, is
>truth." Not much help.
See Metaphysics, Gamma 7, 1011b25-7. The relevant part is in Section
5, 1009a6ff, which argues against various doctrines assimilating truth
to appearances. Whence my question: if what we are after in ethical
theory is not the Good in and of itself, but merely a special case of
the Good-for-Substance, the Good for man, why is it not the case that
scientific theory should likewise aim at the True-for-Substance, the
True for man?
>>>Where does explanatory precedence come in? It's the deeper
>>>agreement that the Peripatetics and Platonists share: that
>>>the universal, the form, is prior "in account" to the
>>>concrete individual, since to give an account of the
>>>individual--to explain what it is--you have to bring in
>>>the form, but not conversely. It is this sort of priority
>>>that I assumed would be front-and-center in any "grounding"
>>>activity. But I guess it's just the haziness of this
>>>"grounding" category that's got me guessing.
>>My take on this point is that Aristotle wants to have it both ways.
>And the question is whether or not the universe has obliged him.
Well, don't keep me in suspense -- has it?
>>In the matter of explaining universalia in rebus, Mill makes a lot
>>more sense with his philistine simplicity.
>Where, please? You can toss in any other good references that
>come to mind as well, as I'm beginning to get interested in the
>issue and have almost nothing on the shelves that deals with it.
See his treatment of numbers in the System of Logic. Frege has a few
choice things to say about that in the Foundations of Arithmetic.
So maybe historical succession is not a logical relation. But surely
just how finely we partition our relativism is not a matter of great
consequence sub specie aeternitatis vel necessitatis. Once we start
dividing unity, how can we know where to stop?
>It's also a very well-motivated analysis. If you think about how
>we evaluate artifacts for goodness--what makes for a good knife or
>a good computer--it fits his analysis. Same with things like what
>it is to be a good pianist, accountant, chess-player. Even animals
>we evaluate like this. What's a good badger? One that is good *at*
>being a badger, one who does the distinctively badgerly things well.
>And why should it be any different for humans. A good man is one
>that is good at being a man. And what is it to be a man? Well,
>just plug in the formula for the essence of man (and clearly it's
>the differentia that's of interest). Makes perfect sense.
>
>Of course, what is opposed to a good man here is...a lousy man,
>and not an evil man. I suppose that might be considered a defect
>in the theory.
>
>What a realist of your stripe can't explain is why a statement like
>"Glenn Gould is a good pianist" does not mean the same as "Glenn
>Gould is good and Glenn Gould is a pianist."
This is a remarkable charge. Why should the alternative reading of
"good" as "good at performing its function", in contradistinction from
the Platonic standard reading thereof as "exemplifying the form of the
Good", present a greater difficulty to a realist of any stripe, than
does the plurality of grammatical functions performed by the verb "to
be", used as a copula to denote identity, equivalence, and synonymy,
as well as application or predication, by way of existence, duration,
occurrence, intention, or obligation? Besides, regardless of how good
Aristotle might be at analyzing goodness as functional fitness, his
case remains unsupported in the absence of a convincing argument to
the effect that goodness, unlike truth, cannot *also* be said in one
special way. But the argument he makes at 1096a19-23, to the effect
that "the term 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in
that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is *per se*,
i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is
like an offshoot and accident of being)", seems to me insufficient to
force the desired conclusion that "there could not be a common Idea
set over all these goods". If you see this matter otherwise, please
explain the relation of logical consequence in this passage.