Our Impotent Military
Brave New Worm
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>Brave New Worm wrote:
>>
>>Brave New Worm <spamsp...@spam.spam> wrote in
>>news:Xns93C66E33B25C7sp...@65.82.44.187:
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>>>> Test...fucking BellSouth.
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>>> Why won't the server post this article?
>>>
>>> http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO307E.html
>>
>>
>>Amazing, if I include the text of the article, it doesn't make it
>>out... After five or six tries.
>
>Official Story on Deaths of Saddam's Sons "Wags the Dog"
>by Michel Chossudovsky
>www.globalresearch.ca 26 July 2003
>The URL of this article is:
>http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO307E.html
>
>Michel Chossudovsky is the author of War and Globalisation, the
>Truth behind September 11 , Global Outlook, 2002
>
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
>---------- -
>
>The deaths of the sons of Saddam Hussein in a high profile
>"shoot-out" in the northern city of Mosul arrive at a most opportune
>moment for President Bush and his entourage.
>Political assassination is tied into the logic of war propaganda.
>The killings were designed by the Pentagon to uphold the shaky
>legitimacy of the Anglo- American military axis in the face of
>Iraqi armed resistance to occupation forces. In the words of
>President Bush: "their deaths show that the former Iraqi regime will
>not be coming back."
>
>By mobilizing media attention Worldwide on Saddam's two sons, the
>Mosul event has served to distract Western public opinion from the
>broader issue of war crimes committed by the Bush administration and
>its indefectible British ally, not to mention the mysterious death
>of David Kelly, the senior MI6 official who "pulled the plug" on
>Tony Blair.
>
>Meanwhile, the fake Niger uranium dossier, used in Bush's State of
>the Union address has been quietly sent to the news archives.
>
>The Mosul shoot-out serves to "reduce the heat" and conceal the
>lies: "The death of the two sons was greeted with jubilation in
>Washington, where President George Bush has been under growing
>political pressure..." (Washington Post, 24 July 2003)
>
>While the entire Western news chain is inundated with the same
>unsavory (syndicated) stories on Saddam's derelict son Uday, the
>more substantive issue of phony intelligence and WMDs is relegated
>to the inner pages of the tabloids.
>
>The fact, amply documented, that the war was based on a fabricated
>pretext is now regarded as a mere technical detail: a 16 words
>"error" which inadvertently slipped into the President's State of
>the Union address.
>
>The Mosul Shoot-out
>There are a number of "holes" in the official story. According to
>the New York Times (23/0703), it was a "walk-in informer" who
>contacted Coalition forces. The media described this as an
>"unexpected tip-off".
>
> "Neighbors saw the owner of the house, Nawaf al-Zaydan, and his son
> Shahlan
>sitting in American vehicles. People asked him what had happened and
>he told them that Uday and Qusay Hussein were inside the house. He
>had gone to bring breakfast for them, he said, when the Americans
>arrested him." (NYT, 23/07/03)
>
>In fact, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was in Mosul, on
>the very day this "walk in informer" first contacted Coalition
>forces:
>
>Mr. Secretary, Monday, you walked the streets of Mosul meeting
>people and it turned out that that was just a few miles from this
>house where Uday and Qusay were hiding. And after you left this
>informant came forward with this information.
>
>(...)
>
>WOLFOWITZ: Well, actually, I think it was while we were meeting with
>the town council in Mosul the first informant came forward, I
>believe. I may be wrong. I'd love to be able say it was because we
>were there and, of course, it had nothing to do with our being
>there. (Pentagon Briefing, CNN, 23 July 2003, bold italics added,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-
>depsecdef0441.html )
>
>Al Jazeera's correspondent in Mosul, describes the events otherwise:
>
> "Nawwaf al-Zaydan. Al-Zaydan used to tell the neighbours that he
> was one of
>the cousins of the former Iraqi president Saddam Husayn, while some
>of his neighbours say that he is from another area and has nothing
>to do with the president, but he only claimed this. At any rate,
>those who attended the interrogation - since he and his son Sha'lan
>were arrested before entering the house - said that the
>interrogation took place at gun point. At first, he was silent, but
>he then collapsed and told the US soldiers that the two sons of the
>Iraqi president, Uday and Qusay, and his grandson Mustafa were
>inside the house, in addition to a member of security, whose name is
>Abd-al-Samad. (See Al-Jazeera Report casts doubt on Official Story
>concerning alleged Deaths of Umay and Qusay Al Jazeera,
>http://globalresearch.ca/articles/ALJ307A.html , 24 July 2003)
>
>"Fortified Site" defended by Three Adults and a Teenager
>Confirmed by the news reports, there were three adults and a
>teenager inside the building: Uday, Qusay, Qusay's 14 year old
>teenage son, and a bodyguard . (AFP, 23/07/03). Nobody else? no
>servants, no other armed men, only one body guard.
>
>The official communiqué confirms that there was a 4-6 hour shoot
>out involving a massive mobilization of Coalition troops and
>military hardware. Troops of the 101 Airborne division entered the
>building. Attack Helicopters were used with 2.75 inch rockets,
>Humvees were used with TOW antitank systems, mounted with M-19 and
>50-caliber machine guns:
>
> "We fired 10 missiles into the house. We believe the missile
> attack was what
>ended up killing Uday and Qusay." ((Pentagon Briefing, CNN, 23 July
>2003, italics added,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-
>depsecdef0441.html )
>
>The US Command claimed to have been under fire from inside the
>house, and, to defend themselves, they were "compelled to call in
>helicopters and tanks to shell the house." (Al-Safir, Beirut, 24
>July 2003). According to an Al Jazeera TV report, the US military
>"received the information the night before and preparations had
>begun since the evening of 21 July and from the early morning until
>nearly 2200 when the storming operation began, and which lasted, as
>I heard, for four hours" (Interview with Dr Subhi Nazim Tawfiq,
>strategic and military expert, Centre for International Studies,
>Baghdad University, Al- Jazeera TV 23 July 2003,
>http://globalresearch.ca/articles/ALJ307A.html )
>
>" I was surprised at such preparations for killing only four people
>seeking refuge in an unprotected house. These preparations included
>armoured vehicles, helicopters, fighter jets, medium machine guns
>and tanks. A siege could have been imposed on the house using much
>smaller numbers and weapons and they could have forced them to
>surrender without killing them. ( Ibid)
>
>The official statement and the reports suggest that there was fierce
>resistance. An entire platoon was effectively held at bay,
>Reinforcements were called in
>
>More than 200 US Airborne troops (according to the reports) equipped
>with TOW missiles and Attack helicopters were pushed back two times
>in the course of this six hour period. According to the reports, the
>building was defended by three adult AK-47 gunmen plus a 14 year old
>teenager.
>
>The operation also included the use of Special forces, the so-called
>"Task Force 20". The latter also included a so-called PSYOPS team
>from the CIA. (Robert Fisk, The Guardian, 23/0703).
>
>Following its initial setback:
>
> "coalition forces requested additional assets, to include a ground
> -- a quick
>reaction force and heavy weaponry, given that we knew that we had a
>fortified site that we were going to have to assault." (Pentagon
>Briefing, CNN, 23 July 2003, italics added,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-
>depsecdef0441.html )
>
>The official narrative conveys the impression that the assault on
>the building was being effectively repealed by more than three
>adults and a teenager, in other words by a number of armed guards.
>
>
>
>There was a second attack on the building, which was again
>effectively repealed, despite the use of OH Helicopters firing
>rockets into the building.
>
>At 1122 hours the second brigade combat team began movement of
>additional ground forces that included an additional antitank
>platoon to reinforce the elements that were already on the ground.
>
>At 1145, during this period the commander had decided that he wanted
>to bring additional assets and we began to employ our OH-58 D
>helicopters with their rocket systems -- 2.75-inch rockets -- and
>50- caliber machine guns to once again continue the prep on the
>target.
>
>At 1150 hours, we had added an antitank platoon, we had a PSYOPS
>team on the ground, and all were on station ready for us to continue
>the assault.
>
>At 1155, the Kiowas completed their preparatory fires.
>
>At this point the commander decided that he would make a second
>attempt to get inside of the house.
>
>At 1200 hours, we attempted to reenter the house. Once again, we
>received fire from the second floor as we attempted to move -- after
>we had secured the first floor -- to move up to the reinforced part
>of the building.
>
>At this stage, as described in the official statement, the operation
>called for more reinforcements, essentially to enable the attack to
>proceed from the the first to the second floor of the building.
>
>At this point, we knew that we had a barricaded site at the top of
>the stairs and the elements -- the subjects were fairly well
>barricaded on that second floor. We decided to continue the
>preparatory fires.
>
>At 1300 hours, we continued the preparation using our 50-caliber
>machine guns, using our M-19s, and at this point we began to employ
>Humvee-mounted TOW missiles. We fired 10 TOW missiles into the
>house.
>
>During this period, we considered employing our Apache helicopters
>and A-10s to come in and finish the preparation and the
>neutralization of the target. However, the decision was made not to
>employ the air power, because of the high risk of collateral damage
>given the neighborhood density that we were faced with.
>
>At the end of this preparation, we believe that it is likely that
>the TOW missile attack was what wound up killing three of the
>adults.
>
>Twenty-one minutes later. at 1321 hours, we entered the building for
>the third time. At this point, we received no fire as we moved up
>the stairs.
>
>As we got up to the second floor, the assaulting elements continued
>to receive fire and they killed the remaining individual that was in
>the second floor. At this point, the enemy had been eliminated and
>the building was cleared in its entirety. We completed securing the
>building at about 1400 hours yesterday afternoon. (Lt. Gen. Sanchez
>Briefing on the Confirmation of the Deaths of Uday and Qusay
>Hussein,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-0443.html ,
>23 July 2003, bold added)
>
>"Three of the adults" were killed in the second assault, according
>to the official statement. And who was this lone remaining gunman
>defending the bunker, against several hundred Coalition forces.?
>According to the news reports, an innocent 14 year old teenager was
>shot down during the third assault on the building.
>
>They [US forces] hit back with least ten anti-tank missiles and
>another hail of machine gun bullets. Apache attack helicopters and
>even A-10 'tankbuster' Warthog planes were called up, with their
>air-to-ground missiles, rockets and deadly chain guns.
>
>But they were not needed. When the last anti-tank blast died away,
>there was silence. 'Even the wind stilled,' said Arif. The gathering
>crowd had yet to realise it, but three of the four men inside were
>dead. Only one - believed to be Qusay's 14-year-old son Mustapha -
>was still alive. As American troops pounded up the stairs, the
>teenager loosed off a final shot before he was cut down. (Daily
>Mail, 24 July 2003)
>
>Political Assassination: No Attempt to Capture
>From the outset, there was no attempt to capture the Saddam sons
>alive.: "TV images of the house did not suggest that it was a
>formidable fortress that could be easily defended from all sides -
>which would force Uday and Qusay to surrender to the Americans after
>a few hours" (Al-Safir, Beirut, in Arabic 24 July 2003, translation
>BBC Monitoring).
>
>Despite the generally supportive tone of the US media, The Boston
>Globe, nonetheless acknowledged that:
>
>"the "killings of the sons looks more like a zealous political
>assassination than a noble act. In 1976, President Ford issued an
>executive order banning assassinations. This was after the CIA was
>exposed and embarrassed by schemes to kill world leaders in
>developing countries. (Boston Globe, 25/07/03)
>
>In the words of South Africa's Mail and Guardian (25/0703) the
>killings constitute:
>
> "thinly veiled extra-judicial executions, [which] are part of a
> growing
>pattern of American lawlessness in dealings with the world since
>9/11".
>
>Why was there no attempt to capture Uday and Qusay, who could have
>provided intelligence on the whereabouts of Saddam? During the
>official press briefing (23/0703), the issue of "capture" and
>"arrest" was casually dismissed by Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez. It
>would appear that the decision to "kill" rather than "capture" was
>taken at the highest levels of the US military:
>
>QUESTION: General, I'd like to try and see if you could address more
>of the first question which we had from our colleague up front. The
>Americans are specialists at surrounding places, keeping people in
>them, holding up for a week, if necessary, to make them surrender.
>
>QUESTION: These guys only had, it appears, AK-47s and you had an
>immense amount of firepower.
>
>Surely, the possibility of the immense amount of information they
>could have given coalition forces, not to mention the trials that
>they could be put on for war crimes, held out a much greater
>possibility of victory for you, if you could have surrounded that
>house and just sat there until they came out, even if they were
>prepared to keep shooting.
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, that is speculation.
>
>QUESTION: No, sir, it's an operational question. Surely, you must
>have considered this much more seriously than you're suggesting.
>
>SANCHEZ: Yes. It was considered and we chose the course of action
>that we took.
>
>QUESTION: Why, sir?
>
>SANCHEZ: Next question, please.
>
> (Lt. Gen. Sanchez Briefing on the Confirmation of the Deaths of
> Uday and Qusay
>Hussein,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-0443.html ,
>23 July 2003)
>
>The Official Body Count
>The official report confirmed that there were only four bodies:
>
>SANCHEZ: "Once we cleared the building, we found we had four bodies
>that were extracted and the bodies were evacuated and moved for
>positive identification.
>
>We removed the bodies. We brought them to Bayap (ph), where we then
>proceeded to work on identification. We believe that we have
>positive identification and that we, in fact, have Uday and Qusay.
>
>The identification was done through multiple means. We had senior
>former regime members do visual identification of the bodies. We had
>four individuals that independently verified that we had both of
>Saddam Hussein's sons.
>
>We also compared X-rays and verified that the injuries on one of the
>bodies were consistent with the injuries that had been suffered by
>this individual during a previous assassination attempt.
>
>Also, we used dental records to identify the bodies, and for Uday
>the match was 90 percent and this was limited only because injuries
>to the teeth made a perfect match impossible. For Qusay the dental
>match was a 100 percent certainty.
>
>Autopsies will follow, but we have no doubt that we have the bodies
>of Uday and Qusay." (Lt. Gen. Sanchez Briefing on the Confirmation
>of the Deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723- 0443.html ,
>23 July 2003)
>
>The press reports confirmed that the bodies were "charred", as a
>result of the missile attacks: "four charred bodies were removed
>and two of them positively identified as Uday and Qusay," (AFP, 23
>July 2003)
>
>Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez stated that they were able to identify
>the bodies of Uday and Qusay, but not those of the other two, which
>included the teenager. Why this discrepancy?
>
>If indeed the teenage son of Qusay was the last to die in a
>shoot-out, as suggested by the news reports, one would expect that
>his body would be easier to identify than those of the other three
>men, whose bodies had been "charred" as a result of the missile
>attack.
>
>The official report is unequivocal with regard to the identity of
>the bodies of Uday and Qusay, while expressing doubts on that of the
>teenager:
>
>QUESTION: Sir, just on the identification. I mean, were the bodies
>in such a condition that it wasn't just apparent from looking at
>their faces who they were?
>
>SANCHEZ: The bodies are in a condition where you could identify
>them.
>
>SANCHEZ: Any other questions?
>
>QUESTION: Sir, there were reports that there was a teenager among
>the four who were killed. Any information on who that might have
>been?
>
>SANCHEZ: We are continuing to work on the other two bodies at this
>point to get the final confirmation on who they are.
>
>OK, this was easy.
>
>(Lt. Gen. Sanchez Briefing on the Confirmation of the Deaths of Uday
>and Qusay Hussein,
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723-0443.html ,
>23 July 2003)
>
>Cold-blooded Murder of a 14 Year-old
>Were there other people inside the building? The official statement
>does not say.
>
>The official story on the shoot-out, does not seem to tally with the
>body count. If there had only been three adult gunmen, the building
>could have been taken in a single assault without the use of rockets
>and TOW missiles.
>
>In the third assault at the end of this four hour period, the
>official story suggests that there was one lone gunman defending the
>building against an entire platoon equipped with missiles and
>helicopters, etc.
>
>The news reports confirm that: "Mustapha, was the last to die." (the
>14 year old teenager).
>
>What is clear from the official statement, is that the killing of
>the teenager by US forces was a gratuitous criminal act.
>
>Was the teenager given the opportunity to surrender or was he simply
>shot by US forces? The official statement confirms that, upon
>entering the building for the third time, there was no resistance:
>"we received no fire as we moved up the stairs. As we got up to the
>second floor, the assaulting elements continued to receive fire
>[from 14 year old Mustapha] and they killed the remaining individual
>that was in the second floor."
>
>According to the official statement, there were no prisoners apart
>from the owner of the house and his son; no witnesses or wounded
>from inside the building...
>
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
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>
>Annex 1
>Release of the Photos
>The photos of the bodies of Uday and Qusay were released (24/07/03).
>
>What is striking in these pictures is that they do not correspond to
>the description provided in the official account and press reports,
>which state that the bodies were "charred" as a result of the
>missile and rocket attacks. No photographic evidence was provided
>regarding the other two bodies, including that of the teenager.
>
>According to the Al Jazeera Correspondent in Mosul:
>
>"Those who saw the bodies could not recognize them. However, one of
>the bodies belonged to a bearded man. But the features of the bodies
>were not recognizable. The interesting thing is that the house is
>still under siege and no one is allowed to enter it. US intelligence
>agents stayed in the house for almost five hours and took samples
>from various parts of the house. They also confiscated videotapes
>and documents. They took samples from the cars that were parked near
>the house. There was a car inside the house as well, which indicates
>that there was perhaps a secret garage for the house to which cars
>could be driven. I saw a car parked inside the house." (
>http://globalresearch.ca/articles/ALJ307A.html )
>
>When 15 "accredited" journalists were allowed to see the bodies in
>a tent at Baghdad airport (25/07/03), US military officials
>acknowledged that the bodies had "undergone facial reconstruction
>with morticians putty to make them resemble as closely as possible
>the faces of the brothers when they were alive," (Reuters, 25 July
>2003). (To see photos after facial reconstruction click here)
>
>There was no confirmation as to whether the bodies had undergone
>preliminary facial reconstruction before the photos were taken.
>
>The bodies were shown with numerous bullet wounds: "five
>photographs showing the bloodied and bruised corpses..."
>
>The official report of the attack states that the "three adults"
>died as a result of the missile attack, i.e. not from bullet wounds:
>
> "we believe that it is likely that the TOW missile attack was what
> wound up
>killing three of the adults." (See News Briefing, op cit)
>
>Bear in mind: this statement, repeated twice during the News Brief,
>was made after the positive identification of the bodies by the US
>military. In other words, Lt. Gen. Sanchez is confirming that the
>three adults, based on the post- mortem, died from the missile
>attack and not from bullet wounds.
>
>Yet his statement on the cause of death, which was made prior to the
>release of the photos, contradicts the photographic evidence
>presented on the 25th of July.
>
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
>---------- -
>
>Copyright Michel Chossudovsky 2003 For fair use only/ pour usage
>équitable seulement .
>
>Michel Chossudovsky is the author of War and Globalisation, the
>Truth behind September 11 , Global Outlook, 2002 (order
>online/mail/fax ) and the Editor of Global Outlook Magazine .
>
>CRG Archive of recent articles by Michel Chossudovsky
>
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
>---------- -
>
>Annex 2
>Transcript of Official Statement and News Briefing
>Source: Federal Documents Clearing House (FDCH), 23 July 2003.
>
>Also available at
>http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030723- 0443.html ,
>
>LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICARDO SANCHEZ (USA) HOLDS DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
>NEWS BRIEFING ON DEATHS OF UDAY AND QUSAY HUSSEIN
>
>SPEAKER: LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICARDO SANCHEZ (USA), COMMANDER,
>COALITION JOINT TASK FORCE
>
>JULY 22, 2003
>
>SANCHEZ: Good afternoon. Now this is a full house today. Glad to see
>you all here. I've got some important messages to relay to all of
>you, to all of our coalition partners and, most importantly, to the
>Iraqi people.
>
>Yesterday was a landmark day for the people and for the future of
>Iraq. Every single day we get closer to the secure and stable
>environment that will allow this country to flourish and assume its
>rightful place in the region and in the community of nations.
>
>(....)
>
>We continue to aggressively go after former regime loyalists, and in
>the past 48 hours my forces have conducted over 4,300 patrols and 48
>raids.
>
>SANCHEZ: Now I will turn to one of those raids that we executed
>yesterday that led to the death of high-value targets number two and
>three, Uday and Qusay Hussein.
>
>First of all, to orient you to the map, at the center of the map is
>Baghdad on the left-hand side. Up in the north is Mosul. This is the
>town where we conducted the operation. The operation, specifically,
>was on the northeastern part of the city. And what you see on the
>lower right of that chart is the neighborhood with the red square
>around the house that was assaulted. As you can see from the bottom
>right-hand side, this is a neighborhood that constrained us to some
>extent in the application of combat power.
>
>The major forces that were involved were elements of the 101st
>Airborne Division. We had an infantry company. We deployed OH-58 D
>Kiowa attack helicopters that come equipped with 2.75-inch rockets
>and machine guns. We had Humvees with TOW antitank systems, Humvees
>that were mounted with M-19 and 50- caliber machine guns. We also
>our AH-64 Apache helicopters on station, however we did not use this
>capability. And also, we had the Air Force on station with A-10s
>ready to be employed should the need arise.
>
>Also, establishing the outer cordon, as you can see on the bottom of
>that slide, was the Iraqi police. They were also participating in
>coordination with our forces on the ground to complete the cordon.
>
>What you see here is an outline of the house that we assaulted. You
>see it's a three-story home. And the actual target area was on the
>second floor which was a fortified part of the house.
>
>Here once again are the forces that were involved in the operation.
>
>The first phase of the operation was what we called setting the
>conditions for us to conduct the assault. The previous night, on the
>21st, we had had an Iraqi citizen walk in and give us information
>that Uday and Qusay might be located at this residence.
>
>Over the course of the night, we planned our operation and we had
>all the conditions set in order for us to initiate our assault by
>1000 hours yesterday morning.
>
>The 101st Airborne Division had antitank platoons and weapon squads
>in place, they had established their cordon to ensure that we had
>isolated the area, and we commenced the operation with an
>interpreter using a bull horn in order to attempt to urge the
>targets -- which we were confident were in there; we knew some folks
>were in there -- in what we call a cordon-and-knock operation.
>
>What we have gone to is this cordon-and-knock versus cordon-and-
>search. What we do is we will cordon an area, go up to the door,
>knock on the door and ask to see if personnel that we are after are
>located in that specific house.
>
>SANCHEZ: In this case, we used the bull horn and we did not get a
>response. And 10 minutes later, at 1010 hours, we began to enter the
>building. Immediately upon entering the building, shots were fired.
>We immediately determined that the targeted individuals were
>barricaded in the fortified portion of the building, which was the
>second floor, and they started engaging with small arms. We believed
>they were AK-47s.
>
>On the initial exchange of gunfire, we had three coalition soldiers
>wounded on the stairs as we attempted to get up to the second floor,
>and we had one coalition soldier that was wounded outside the
>building. At this point, our forces withdrew. The coalition forces
>requested additional assets, to include a ground -- a quick reaction
>force and heavy weaponry, given that we knew that we had a fortified
>site that we were going to have to assault.
>
>Within five minutes, we called in medevac to take care of our
>wounded soldiers and we determined at that point -- the leaders on
>the ground that it was appropriate for us to prep the objective
>prior to reentry.
>
>For the next couple of hours, while we lined up the right resources
>on the ground, we were taking this at a fairly measured pace. We
>knew that we had the area surrounded, and there was no rush -- or no
>reason for us to rush to failure.
>
>We received sporadic gunfire for a while, and at 1045 hours we began
>the prep, with significant M-19 grenade launchers. We fired a couple
>of AT-4 rockets at the house, and also used Humvee-mounted 50-
>caliber machine gun fire to attempt to neutralize the threat.
>
>At 1122 hours the second brigade combat team began movement of
>additional ground forces that included an additional antitank
>platoon to reinforce the elements that were already on the ground.
>
>At 1145, during this period the commander had decided that he wanted
>to bring additional assets and we began to employ our OH-58 D
>helicopters with their rocket systems -- 2.75-inch rockets -- and
>50- caliber machine guns to once again continue the prep on the
>target.
>
>At 1150 hours, we had added an antitank platoon, we had a PSYOPS
>team on the ground, and all were on station ready for us to continue
>the assault.
>
>At 1155, the Kiowas completed their preparatory fires.
>
>At this point the commander decided that he would make a second
>attempt to get inside of the house.
>
>At 1200 hours, we attempted to reenter the house. Once again, we
>received fire from the second floor as we attempted to move -- after
>we had secured the first floor -- to move up to the reinforced part
>of the building.
>
>SANCHEZ: Once again, we opted to withdraw.
>
>At this point, we knew that we had a barricaded site at the top of
>the stairs and the elements -- the subjects were fairly well
>barricaded on that second floor. We decided to continue the
>preparatory fires.
>
>At 1300 hours, we continued the preparation using our 50-caliber
>machine guns, using our M-19s, and at this point we began to employ
>Humvee-mounted TOW missiles. We fired 10 TOW missiles into the
>house.
>
>During this period, we considered employing our Apache helicopters
>and A-10s to come in and finish the preparation and the
>neutralization of the target. However, the decision was made not to
>employ the air power, because of the high risk of collateral damage
>given the neighborhood density that we were faced with.
>
>At the end of this preparation, we believe that it is likely that
>the TOW missile attack was what wound up killing three of the
>adults.
>
>Twenty-one minutes later. at 1321 hours, we entered the building for
>the third time. At this point, we received no fire as we moved up
>the stairs.
>
>As we got up to the second floor, the assaulting elements continued
>to receive fire and they killed the remaining individual that was in
>the second floor. At this point, the enemy had been eliminated and
>the building was cleared in its entirety. We completed securing the
>building at about 1400 hours yesterday afternoon.
>
>Once we cleared the building, we found we had four bodies that were
>extracted and the bodies were evacuated and moved for positive
>identification.
>
>Immediately after this, the 101st Airborne moved task force
>neighborhood elements, engineer elements into the area along with
>civil affairs assets in order to be able to clean up and begin the
>repair of the area in that community.
>
>At this point we continue to secure and exploit and assess the site.
>
>Here on the right you see a picture of the Airborne soldiers firing
>their TOW missiles at the building. And this shows you some of the
>destructive capability of those missiles and the end state of the
>building once we completed securing of the site.
>
>We removed the bodies. We brought them to Bayap (ph), where we then
>proceeded to work on identification. We believe that we have
>positive identification and that we, in fact, have Uday and Qusay.
>
>The identification was done through multiple means. We had senior
>former regime members do visual identification of the bodies. We had
>four individuals that independently verified that we had both of
>Saddam Hussein's sons.
>
>We also compared X-rays and verified that the injuries on one of the
>bodies were consistent with the injuries that had been suffered by
>this individual during a previous assassination attempt.
>
>Also, we used dental records to identify the bodies, and for Uday
>the match was 90 percent and this was limited only because injuries
>to the teeth made a perfect match impossible. For Qusay the dental
>match was a 100 percent certainty.
>
>Autopsies will follow, but we have no doubt that we have the bodies
>of Uday and Qusay.
>
>SANCHEZ: In closing, I must reiterate that the war continues. We
>remain focused on the objective that America and the coalition has
>put before us: that is defeat terrorism, defeat the Saddam Hussein
>regime, ensure that they never come back into power and ensure the
>freedom of the Iraqi people. We will not falter and we will not
>fail.
>
>And oh, by the way, this morning we picked up number 11.
>
>I'll now take your questions.
>
>QUESTION: I would like to ask you, don't you regret the fact that
>you couldn't get Uday and Qusay alive? It would have been probably a
>source of a lot of information got from them both.
>
>Also, wasn't it a failure in a way because you didn't use commandos
>to come and surprise them both? You conducted [the] operation in the
>very traditional way.
>
>How would you describe it? All these attacks preparation was only to
>surround five probably or four people who are armed with large
>weapons.
>
>And also what about the child of Qusay?
>
>SANCHEZ: First of all, we have confirmation that we've got Uday and
>Qusay Hussein, and we've got two other bodies that we're continuing
>the identification process on them.
>
>On whether this was a failure, absolutely not. I would never
>consider this a failure. Our mission is to find, kill or capture. In
>this case, we had an enemy that was defending, that was barricaded
>and we had to take the measures that were necessary in order to
>neutralize the target.
>
>When you look at the possibilities of what you may have gained or
>what you may have lost, that would sheer speculation on my part at
>this point.
>
>QUESTION: Congratulation for your attack, and may God always help
>you in this hearty work. More thanks for you.
>
>My first question is about the owner of this home: Who does it
>belong to? And do you take an idea to discussion by yourself or the
>responsible the attack to take discussion with Uday and Qusay before
>the attack to get themselves out or really you are going to it, the
>attack, and it's what we needed all of Iraq? Thank you.
>
>SANCHEZ: OK, sir, as I understand it, you have two questions. The
>owner of the home; at this point, the 101st is on the ground with
>follow-up operations in order to take care of the problem that
>resulted from the conduct of the operation and the destruction that
>we had to execute in getting to a successful conclusion.
>
>In terms of the discussions, as I stated, we did make an attempt
>with interpreter and with bullhorns to try to attempt to get a
>surrender from the personnel that were in the house. And what we got
>back was return fire. And therefore we had to execute in the fashion
>that we did.
>
>QUESTION: General, I'd like to try and see if you could address more
>of the first question which we had from our colleague up front. The
>Americans are specialists at surrounding places, keeping people in
>them, holding up for a week, if necessary, to make them surrender.
>
>QUESTION: These guys only had, it appears, AK-47s and you had an
>immense amount of firepower.
>
>Surely, the possibility of the immense amount of information they
>could have given coalition forces, not to mention the trials that
>they could be put on for war crimes, held out a much greater
>possibility of victory for you, if you could have surrounded that
>house and just sat there until they came out, even if they were
>prepared to keep shooting.
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, that is speculation.
>
>QUESTION: No, sir, it's an operational question. Surely, you must
>have considered this much more seriously than you're suggesting.
>
>SANCHEZ: Yes. It was considered and we chose the course of action
>that we took.
>
>QUESTION: Why, sir?
>
>SANCHEZ: Next question, please.
>
>QUESTION: How are you going to convince the Iraqi people that
>you've, in fact, killed Uday and Qusay? We still haven't seen the
>bodies yet.
>
>SANCHEZ: In due time, we will provide that to you.
>
>As I stated, we had former regime members that positively identified
>the bodies. Those are members that are in the custody of the United
>States at this point and they had access to the bodies and all of
>them verified that we had the two sons. And also, as I stated, we
>used medical records and dental records to corroborate what we've
>got.
>
>QUESTION: I meant how are you going to convince the Iraqis though?
>Are you going to show the Iraqis in the newspapers or on the radio
>or on local television anything that would prove to them...
>
>SANCHEZ: That is our next step. And that is working within the
>Department of Defense, and we will provide follow-on information
>over the course of the coming days as we complete the autopsies and
>we complete the site exploitation.
>
>QUESTION: With all these former regime members on the deck of cards
>that you've now detained, when are you going to show for the average
>Iraqi person that you actually have them and, you know, bring them
>out in shackles, have a video camera in the detention center where
>you have them; something that will show the average Iraqi that has
>these strange doubts about whether you really are detaining these
>people that, in fact, you have?
>
>SANCHEZ: We've got that under discussion at this point in time with
>decisions to be made on the way ahead with the detainees that we
>have. No policy decision has been made at this point.
>
>QUESTION: (SPEAKING IN ARABIC)
>
>SANCHEZ: As far as personal effects, as I stated, site exploitation
>is ongoing right now. But we will continue the site exploitation in
>order to gather what else may be available in the site.
>
>QUESTION: (SPEAKING IN ARABIC)
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, at this point, we have positive identification of the
>two sons of Saddam Hussein and we continue to work on getting
>conclusive identification on the other two.
>
>QUESTION: General, can you provide any details about the role of
>special forces in both the gathering intelligence for this operation
>and in taking part in the actual operation itself?
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, what I can tell you is this was a joint operation that
>we conducted by elements of the coalition. The intelligence that we
>gathered was from a walk-in source. That's what led us to the site.
>
>QUESTION: (SPEAKING IN ARABIC)
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, that is exactly what we hope for.
>
>SANCHEZ: The death of Uday and Qusay, I believe, is definitely going
>to be a turning point for the resistance and the subversive elements
>that we are encountering. But our mission is not complete.
>
>We still have other elements and individuals on the high-value
>target list that we continue to focus on, the mid-level leadership
>that is still out there conducting operations against our forces,
>and we will not relent. We will continue to focus until we've
>accomplished our mission.
>
>QUESTION: In the streets, the people still want to have a positive
>approval, not just word that you captured Uday and Qusay.
>
>But the bigger question is: What about the money Qusay looted from
>the central banks? How are you going to follow up on all the money
>they took out before the fall of Baghdad?
>
>SANCHEZ: I'm sorry, sir, you're going to have to restate the
>question, because I thought you were speaking in Arabic and that's
>what was getting out of here.
>
>(LAUGHTER)
>
>So you'll have to excuse me.
>
>QUESTION: OK.
>
>Again, the people in the street still want to have a positive
>approval that Uday and Qusay have been really killed and that -- one
>person told me they are like cats with seven lives, so that's -- the
>doubt will -- it's still in the streets.
>
>My second question is: What about Qusay looted the central bank and
>the money he took away with him? What is your strategy to recapture
>and retake all the money they had?
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, first of all, on the cat with nine lives, we are
>certain that we have Qusay and Uday.
>
>We will continue with the exploitation of the site. We will continue
>with the autopsies on the bodies to get final conclusive evidence.
>
>I will await further guidance on the next step to take on how we're
>going to prove to the Iraqi people that we, in fact, have these two
>men.
>
>In terms of the money, at this point there are elements that are
>focused on ensuring that all the money that was looted by the Saddam
>Hussein regime is brought back to the people of Iraq.
>
>QUESTION: I want to ask you -- my English is not good, but do you
>know the problem is not Uday and Qusay. Now the problem is Saddam
>Hussein.
>
>SANCHEZ: Yes, ma'am, absolutely agree with you that the ultimate
>objective is Saddam Hussein and as I've stated before, we maintain
>the focus on all of the high-value targets and we will not fail.
>
>QUESTION: I understand that there is still some cordon around Mosul
>today or parts of it, and that you're looking for additional
>high-value targets there. Does that include Saddam, or is that this
>number 11 that you mentioned early on?
>
>the site that we had to assault to pick up number 2 and number 3.
>That is still continuing, because we're not complete with that site
>yet.
>
>QUESTION: And number 11 was in Mosul?
>
>SANCHEZ: I can't answer that question at this point.
>
>QUESTION: I wanted to find out, first of all, if you had any
>thoughts about the Saddam tape that is out today that apparently was
>made about three days ago?
>
>And secondly, earlier you said that the option to surround the house
>and wait out the individuals in the house was considered and
>rejected. Could you explain to us why?
>
>SANCHEZ: The tape -- I can't answer the question on the tape,
>because I haven't heard or seen the tape at this point.
>
>And the commanders on the ground made the decisions to go ahead and
>execute and accomplish our mission of finding, killing or capturing.
>That was a decision the commander on the ground made, and that was
>the right decision.
>
>QUESTION: What will happen to the bodies that you've recovered after
>they've been subjected to an autopsy? Where will they be buried?
>
>SANCHEZ: Yes, that's a decision that is yet to be made on final
>disposition of the remains.
>
>QUESTION: I want to get back to that point of proving to Iraqis. All
>the Iraqis that I've spoken to today have said they won't accept
>anything less than pictures proving that Uday and Qusay are dead.
>However, during the war the U.S. was quite strong on opposing photos
>or images of dead soldiers being shown on TV.
>
>So do you find yourself in a quandary about how to prove to Iraqis
>that the two men are dead? And do you rule out using pictures, or
>are you still considering that?
>
>SANCHEZ: We have not ruled out any options at this point, ma'am. And
>I don't find myself in any quandary; I'm a soldier.
>
>QUESTION: General, can you describe, discuss the role that Abid
>Hamid Mahmud, number 4 on the most wanted list, played in
>identifying these bodies or giving information to coalition forces
>on the whereabouts of these men?
>
>SANCHEZ: I can confirm that he was one of the individuals that
>independently identified the bodies.
>
>QUESTION: I just wanted to know did you find any clues or hints or
>any other elements which show that Saddam Hussein was in that house?
>
>SANCHEZ: At this point we continue to exploit the site, sir, and
>what we found there is not something that I could reveal.
>
>QUESTION: Who exactly was the commander on the ground?
>
>And how does it come that a question of such wide implication to get
>probably former leaders for trial is left to a small commander on
>the ground?
>
>SANCHEZ: Sir, the commander on the ground made a decision based on
>the conditions that he was facing, and I am in no position to
>question his decisions. He made the right decisions to accomplish
>the mission that had been assigned to him and, as I've stated on
>multiple occasions now, that was to kill or capture.
>
>QUESTION: How has this attack brought the coalition closer to
>detaining, capturing Saddam Hussein?
>
>SANCHEZ: How has it brought us closer? I'm not sure I can measure
>and give you a measure there, but I will tell you that our focus is
>unequivocal.
>
>We know what our targets are. As I mentioned in my previous press
>conferences before, that we remain focused on accomplishing those
>tasks. And I'll tell you one more time that we will not fail.
>
>The Saddam Hussein will never come back into power. The coalition
>has made that statement over and over again that we will ensure the
>freedom of the Iraqi people; that is our purpose and that what will
>in the end be accomplished.
>
>QUESTION: (SPEAKING IN ARABIC)
>
>SANCHEZ: There were a lot of civilians on the ground, but no one was
>hurt. We know of no collateral damage that occurred as a result of
>the operation.
>
>As I stated, we made decisions on the ground that prevented the
>employment of combat power that would create collateral damage. So
>there was no collateral damage that we're aware of at this point.
>
>And I'm sorry, I'm going to have to cut it at this point because I
>have a couple of other commitments with some other elements of the
>press.
>
>OK, thank you all very much. We will in due time here in the coming
>days provide you with additional information on this raid. Thank you
>all very much. Have a great day.
A few more 14-year olds like that, and Iraq could take over the world.
Was he superhuman, or are the military just poofs?
--
Can I borrow a feeling?
http://www.mp3.com/gortician
Bass for your anus:
http://www.mp3.com/manticore
http://www.mp3.com/meterversusyard
http://www.mp3.com/highc
http://www.mp3.com/measurerecs.
"[The artwork of Andrew Penland] is REAL...what I mean by "real" is
that
it made NEW THOUGHTS occur in my head, which would have never
otherwise
occurred." --Full Force Frank
Rolly The Pervert
wrote:
>jr...@dealyplaza.org (Jack Ruby) wrote in
><93C666...@207.14.113.17>:
>
>A few more 14-year olds like that, and Iraq could take over the world.
>Was he superhuman, or are the military just poofs?
>
>
>
>
>
>
Seems to have worked. IF you or anyone else wants to use my server,
email me a username/password
Bolo The Stinky Clown
@blackhelicopter.databasix.com:
> On 28 Jul 2003 13:22:40 -0400 I replied to spamsp...@spam.spam
> (Brave New Worm) on a piece of toilet paper while scribbling their
> name and phone number on the bathroom wall in alt.conspiracy
>
>>A few more 14-year olds like that, and Iraq could take over the world.
>>Was he superhuman, or are the military just poofs?
>
> Or are you just an idiot that wastes bandwidth by not snipping
> irrelevant material.
>
I'm glad you can take a stand and ask the really tough questions.
At least I think it was a question.
Bolo The Stinky Clown
@blackhelicopter.databasix.com:
> On Mon, 28 Jul 2003 13:52:50 -0400 I replied to Rolly The Pervert
> <to...@databasix.com> on a piece of toilet paper while scribbling
> their name and phone number on the bathroom wall in alt.conspiracy
>
>>Seems to have worked. IF you or anyone else wants to use my server,
>>email me a username/password
>
> I'll ask in general when I'm ready dude.
>
Hahahaha. Tell all the killfiling cowards in there I said snootchie
bootches.