Battle of Tsushima: Russian and Jap ships?

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Iacobus

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a
prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the AIII,
Suvarov, etc

She has a smaller main armament (10 inch vs. 12 inch) and I believe she
was lighter armored to give her higher speed.


Markus Stumptner

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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In article <3v3fhh$a...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a
>prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the AIII,
>Suvarov, etc

I used the German spelling, which is certainly a bit different, since I
couldn't recall the English version. Yours may well be correct.

>She has a smaller main armament (10 inch vs. 12 inch) and I believe she
>was lighter armored to give her higher speed.

Quite possible. I don't recall whether the class was 4 or 5 ships.

--
Markus Stumptner m...@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at
Technische Universitaet Wien vexpert!m...@relay.eu.net
Paniglg. 16, A-1040 Vienna, Austria ...mcsun!vexpert!mst
You may just have missed your last chance for incremental garbage collection.

Robin Roberts

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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In <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu> Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>
>On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I

>recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
>defeated. The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
>ships. But the leadership of their fleet was poor at best
(incompetent
>is probably more accurate) and the crews were poorly trained. Togo's
>crews were fresh and well trained plus the ships in his fleet were
>relatively new. (Some of the Russian ships dated from the 1870's).

It is very important not to forget that the Russian fleet had just
sailed virtually around the world to reach the battle. The Russian
Pacific fleet having been destroyed in port by a Japanese surprise
attack [sound familiar?].

Such a long voyage across several oceans virtually without friendly
port facilities meant that the Russian ships and crews were way behind
in essential maintenance and heavily fatigued. The Japanese were as
much in their own backyard as a navy can get.

I believe that this factor alone was enough to decide the battle in the
Japanese favor.

Robin Roberts
--
sci...@ix.netcom.com Thousand Oaks, Ventura County, CA -- DVC
"The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell, there will
be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed."
-Grant Gilmore, Yale Professor of Law
==PGP 2.6 key on request - and if Freeh doesn't like it, he can kiss mine==

Iacobus

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I
recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
defeated. The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
ships. But the leadership of their fleet was poor at best (incompetent
is probably more accurate) and the crews were poorly trained. Togo's
crews were fresh and well trained plus the ships in his fleet were
relatively new. (Some of the Russian ships dated from the 1870's).
Two ships survive from these fleets. They Mikasa is at Yokohama, and the
Russian cruiser Aurora is I believe at St. Petersburg.
I would like to see Dr. Ballard locate and photograph some of the wrecks
from this battle.


Jim Breen

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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ao...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Matthew Beesley) writes:

>The massive defeat of the Russian fleet by the Japanese at Tsushima (May
>27, 1905) has always been a subject of interest to me. Were thr Japanese
>ships so much better armoured, armed and built than their Russian
>adversaries? Or, was it just poor leadership, drunk crews or poor
>training that doomed the Russian fleet?

Yes to both. From the Japanese point of view it was a turkey shoot. For a
fascinating, but not exactly objective account, read "Tsushima : grave of a
floating city" by A. Novikoff-Priboy. He was a "stewards' assistant" or
some such on one of the Russian ships, and his chronicle of the utter
incompetance of the Russian navy is compelling reading. Their ships were
poor (e.g. reduced arms & armour to make room for wood-panelled officers'
suites), untested explosive in HE shells (it didn't work), untrained
crews on the point of mutiny, and dithering leadership. The Japanese
fleet was far better built (British designs, mostly, with some of the
ships built in the UK), and the crews were professional & well-trained.
--
Jim Breen [ジム・ブリーン@モナシュ大学]
Department of Robotics & Digital Technology. Monash University.
Clayton VIC 3168 Australia (p) +61 3 9905 3298 (f) +61 3 9905 3574
j.b...@rdt.monash.edu.au [http://www.rdt.monash.edu.au/‾jwb/]

Markus Stumptner

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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In article <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I
>recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
>defeated.

Hm, you must be quite old (and have a good memory). :-)

Seriously, I believe that "world opinion" favored the Japanese,
who had already dealt successfully with another Russian fleet.
(Although a bit of luck was involved, too.)

>The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
>ships.

Partially correct, at least for the main battlelines. The
Japanese were faster (and used their larger armored cruisers
as an additional squadron in their battleline).

The Russian fleet was extremely inhomogeneous. They had a squadron
of spanking new and fairly good battleships (the Alexander III class,
if I recall correctly, which included AIII, Ossljablja, Borodino,
Suvorov and Orel), in addition, I believe, a number of weaker and
older battleships, and finally a squadron of very old and slow
battleships and coastal defense ships that were absolutely useless
in combat. (Rozhdestvensky actually tried to avoid having to join
this squadron, but coaling at Madagascar took long enough for him
to receive an explicit order to let them catch up. Nebogatov, the
commander of that squadron, wisely surrendered when the Japanese
caught up with him the day after the more modern ships had been
defeated.)

>But the leadership of their fleet was poor at best (incompetent
>is probably more accurate) and the crews were poorly trained.

The main advantage of the Japanese lay in superior speed and crew
training, and better subordinate officers. The speed made it
possible for him to repeatedly cross the Russian T, while the
Russians wasted their superior firepower in the opening minutes
of the battle because of coordination problems that had ships
blocking each others' fields of fire. As for Russian leadership,
there is no doubt that Rozhdestvensky had no clear plan for the
battle (both he and Togo knew the Japanese could dictate the
situation anyway if battle occurred due to their superior speed),
and had not really trained battle formations and gunnery during
the voyage. On the other hand, getting the fleet there at all was
an incredible organizational feat, and being at the end of a
20,000km supply tether also meant that the ships had neither coal
nor shells to waste.

>Togo's
>crews were fresh and well trained plus the ships in his fleet were
>relatively new. (Some of the Russian ships dated from the 1870's).
>Two ships survive from these fleets. They Mikasa is at Yokohama, and the
>Russian cruiser Aurora is I believe at St. Petersburg.

The Aurora was not involved in the battle, she was part of the Baltic
Fleet.

Peter Hay

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
to Matthew,Beesley
Matthew,

Not that I am an expert by any means, but I have studied this battle. There were several
reasons for the Russian Fleet's demise.

1. The russian fleet had just sailed around the world and the crews were quite
tired from the ordeal.

2. The russian crews were not as well drilled as their japanese counterpart, which to
some degree explains the slower rate of fire.

3. Due to some old ships of the russian line, the fleet could not steam at a favourable
speed, and slow targets are easier to hit.

4. The russians had been using their wireless radios generously, and the japanese knew
exactly where they were and what they were doing.

5. The japanese admiral managed to cross the russian "T", so that a high number of
japanese guns were brought to bear on the leading russian ships, which were the
Kniaz Suvarof, Aleksandr III, Borodino and Orel - the newest additions to the imperial
russian navy. When you can concentrate your fire on a small number of enemies without
them responding in ernest, it is possible to eliminate a vastly superior enemy...


The japanese ships were not really superior to the russian, they were actually quite
evenly matched in quality. The japanese had more NEW ships, but included armoured
cruisers in their battle line. The russians had more heavy guns, but due to the
previously mentioned "T", they were only brought into the battle piecemeal, which
favoured the japanese. Had this been a parallell-line style battle, the japanese might
not have won. In fact, the japanese sent most of their navy out to meet the russians -
including quite a variety of obsolete ships.

There is a number of books on the subject available through your local library. They will
provide you with MORE detail on the matter.

As a footnote: I have actually been onboard the AVRORA in St. Petersburg. This ship
partook in the Battle off Tsushima, but managed to escape the carnage


Sincerely, Ken Sharman, Stratford, ON. Canada

Peter Hay

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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Julian Barker

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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In article <3v3e1m$l...@news.tuwien.ac.at>
m...@dbai.tuwien.ac.at "Markus Stumptner" writes:

> In article <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
> >On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I
> >recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
> >defeated.
>
> Hm, you must be quite old (and have a good memory). :-)
>
> Seriously, I believe that "world opinion" favored the Japanese,
> who had already dealt successfully with another Russian fleet.
> (Although a bit of luck was involved, too.)
>
> >The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
> >ships.
>

The Russians could fire a greater weight of metal in their broadside but
because of the age of many of their ships in pounds of metal per minute
they were outgunned 3 to one. This is not including protected cruisers
and DDs where the Japanese had a huge advantage.

>
> The Aurora was not involved in the battle, she was part of the Baltic
> Fleet.
>

Yes she was she was at Tsushima she was interned at Manila after making her
escape.

--
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Julian Barker +
+ jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk +
+ Keep your lies consistent - Ferengi Rules of Acquisition #60 +
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

John Kelleher

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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Matthew Beesley (ao...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA) wrote:
: The massive defeat of the Russian fleet by the Japanese at Tsushima (May

: 27, 1905) has always been a subject of interest to me.

Ditto. Arguable one of the greates naval battles of the century, and
unquestionably the most decisive.

: Were the Japanese ships so much better armoured, armed and built than
: their Russian adversaries?

Not at all. Both sides had a combination of good, modern vessels and
obsolescent vessels. Some comment should be made concerning the
differences in powder, however. The Japanese had a higher quality
powder, and were able to maintain fire with less effect on the gun crews.

: Or, was it just poor leadership, drunk crews or poor training that
: doomed the Russian fleet?

The loss of the Russian's fleet commander early in the battle, and some
ensuing difficulty in change of command, obviously contributed to the
defeat of the Russians. The fact that the Japanese achieved an element
of surprise was at least as significant, however. (The Japanese scouts
spotted the brightly-lit Russian hospital ship that was tailing the
fleet, and surmised correctly that there must be a fleet nearby somewhere.)

Russian crews were not so much drunk as exhausted and perhaps beginning
to relax with home port so close. Their long trip from their home ports,
all around Africa, was unprecedented in the days of powered fleets.
Having to perform at-sea replenishment must have been tiring and
demoralizing, particularly when you remember it was sacks of coal that
had to be transferred, not simply the oil lines of more modern ships.
The vessels themselves, after a long time at sea and having passed
through the tropics, suffered from fouled bottoms, weary equipment and
men, and were in need of refits if not complete overhauls.

Tactically, the element of surprise struck a weak point in Russian
training and preparedness. The Russian battleships sailed in line ahead,
and the Japanese ships lay in wait in a "crossed T" formation. Every
main gun of the Japanese was able to fire as the Russian ships came in
range, while the Russians were limited tothe forward turrets of the lead
ship.

When the overpowering strength of the Japanese disposition was
recognized, the Russians attempted to turn back to reform. However, by
accident or design, they did not perform a simultaneous turnabout.
Instead, each ship in turn sailed forward to execute a turnabout at the
same place in the water. Essentially, they sailed, one at a time, into
the boresights of the Japanese fleet. If you tried to calculate the most
effective way to destroy a fleet, the example presented by the Russians
would have to take the prize!

John
--
kell...@netcom.com

John Kelleher

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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Markus Stumptner (m...@dbai.tuwien.ac.at) wrote:
: In article <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus
: <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:

: >On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I
: >recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
: >defeated.

: Seriously, I believe that "world opinion" favored the Japanese,


: who had already dealt successfully with another Russian fleet.
: (Although a bit of luck was involved, too.)

Only in the same sense that "luck" explains Pearl Harbor. The attack on
Port Arthur was effectively a dress rehearsal for other sneak attacks
that constituted a significant part of Japanese naval doctrine in the
first half of this century.

: The Aurora was not involved in the battle, she was part of the Baltic
: Fleet.

Only because it managed to flee to safety. The Aurora was indeed part of
the fleet, but escaped to the Phillipines where is was interred by the
United States for the duration of the war. It was later released and
returned to St. Petersburg in plenty of time to fire the opening shot of
the Russian Revolution.

John Kelleher

--
kell...@netcom.com

Ed Rudnicki

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Jul 25, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/25/95
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In article <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu> Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I
>recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
>defeated. The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
>ships. But the leadership of their fleet was poor at best (incompetent
>is probably more accurate) and the crews were poorly trained. Togo's
>crews were fresh and well trained plus the ships in his fleet were
>relatively new. (Some of the Russian ships dated from the 1870's).

The Russian ships were also in effect worn out from the trip. Many
were suffering engineering problems, and all were slowed by fouling.
The fouling occurred in part from Rozhestvensky, commander of the
2nd Pacific Fleet (the first group sent around the world, with most
of the modern ships), having to wait for Nebogatoff and his 3rd
Pacific Fleet. The latter was composed almost entirely of
obsolescent units, the theory being that with more targets the
Japanese would have to dilute their fire. They of course did not
oblige, targeting the five modern Russian battleships first.

Togo also had the advantage of position. He knew where the Russians
had to go. Thanks to his superior scouting he also knew when they
got there. And thanks to his speed, he could engage at will.


>Two ships survive from these fleets. They Mikasa is at Yokohama, and the
>Russian cruiser Aurora is I believe at St. Petersburg.

Was AURORA at Tsushima?


>I would like to see Dr. Ballard locate and photograph some of the wrecks
>from this battle.

I'd like to see Ballard stop his ghoulish predation of these ships,
which are in effect graves. Either that or I hope someone does some
"archaeology" at his parents' graves in return :)


Ed Rudnicki erud...@pica.army.mil All disclaimers apply
"Wow! He DOES have eyes in the back of his head!" - Razor

Iacobus

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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I have always said that an archaeologist is just a grave robber with a
degree. :)

Iacobus

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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I have read Novikoff-Priboy's book and recall that it was awarded the
Stalin prize for literature. Though I don't wish to sound reactionary,
what I have read about Stalin's reign makes me wonder if NP's
descriptions were not colored to please the political leadership of his
day.

I have no proof of this, it is just my natural scepticism showing
through.


Graydon

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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Jim Breen (j...@capek.rdt.monash.edu.au) wrote:
: ao...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Matthew Beesley) writes:
: >adversaries? Or, was it just poor leadership, drunk crews or poor

: >training that doomed the Russian fleet?

: Yes to both. From the Japanese point of view it was a turkey shoot. For a

: fascinating, but not exactly objective account, read "Tsushima : grave of a
: floating city" by A. Novikoff-Priboy. He was a "stewards' assistant" or
: some such on one of the Russian ships, and his chronicle of the utter
: incompetance of the Russian navy is compelling reading. Their ships were
: poor (e.g. reduced arms & armour to make room for wood-panelled officers'
: suites), untested explosive in HE shells (it didn't work), untrained
: crews on the point of mutiny, and dithering leadership. The Japanese
: fleet was far better built (British designs, mostly, with some of the
: ships built in the UK), and the crews were professional & well-trained.

There's a comment I encountered once about Tushima that has stuck with me
ever since, that the Japanese had been reading Nelson.

They got a *lot* of British naval aid, and I can well imagine that they
asked for Nelson's writings to go with it, and picked up his doctrine of
the battle of anhiliation, then so far out of vouge as to be an
historical curiousity.

I think it's pretty easy to argue that Nelson's doctrines had a *big*
effect on the Imperial Japanese Navy, but I don't know if anyone with
serious academic credentials has ever attempted to do so.

--
saun...@qlink.queensu.ca | Monete me si non anglice loquobar.

Markus Stumptner

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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In article <kelleherD...@netcom.com>, kell...@netcom.com (John Kelleher) writes:
>Markus Stumptner (m...@dbai.tuwien.ac.at) wrote:
>: In article <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus
>: <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>
>: >On paper the Russian fleet was considered to be the stronger, and as I
>: >recall the world opinion at the time was that the Japanese would be
>: >defeated.
>
>: Seriously, I believe that "world opinion" favored the Japanese,
>: who had already dealt successfully with another Russian fleet.
>: (Although a bit of luck was involved, too.)
>
>Only in the same sense that "luck" explains Pearl Harbor. The attack on
>Port Arthur was effectively a dress rehearsal for other sneak attacks
>that constituted a significant part of Japanese naval doctrine in the
>first half of this century.

I wasn't really referring to the initial torpedo attack, but to two later
incidents: Makarov's death by a mine, which sapped what spirit the Pacific
Fleet had regained after his arrival, and the lucky hit on Retvisan that
killed Wittgeft (who certainly was no Makarov) and spoiled the Russian line
at the Battle of the Yellow Sea at a time when a breakthrough to Vladivostok
would have been a possibility (in that battle, after all, Togo had not
managed to cross the T).

>: The Aurora was not involved in the battle, she was part of the Baltic
>: Fleet.
>
>Only because it managed to flee to safety. The Aurora was indeed part of
>the fleet, but escaped to the Phillipines where is was interred by the
>United States for the duration of the war. It was later released and
>returned to St. Petersburg in plenty of time to fire the opening shot of
>the Russian Revolution.

I stand corrected.

Markus Stumptner

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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In article <3v3hot$4...@news.tuwien.ac.at>, m...@dbai.tuwien.ac.at (Markus Stumptner) writes:
>In article <3v3fhh$a...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>>You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a
>>prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the AIII,
>>Suvarov, etc
>
>>She has a smaller main armament (10 inch vs. 12 inch) and I believe she
>>was lighter armored to give her higher speed.
>
>Quite possible. I don't recall whether the class was 4 or 5 ships.

OK, I checked, and Osliabia was indeed a Peresviet class ship (at least one
of the other two ships of the class was at Port Arthur). The fifth
Borodino class ship (the class was not named after AIII, another slip
of mine, that comes from trusting one's memory) was the Slava, which was
not present at Tsushima.

--
Markus Stumptner m...@vexpert.dbai.tuwien.ac.at


A R BREEN

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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In article <3v3e1m$l...@news.tuwien.ac.at>,
Markus Stumptner <m...@dbai.tuwien.ac.at> wrote:

>>The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
>>ships.
>

>Partially correct, at least for the main battlelines. The
>Japanese were faster (and used their larger armored cruisers
>as an additional squadron in their battleline).
>

Very partially correct... The Russian ships were (in general)
based on French designs with very thick, narrow armour belts
covering the entire waterline of the ship. Above this was a
thin (3" or so) upper belt intended to protect the ship against
QF gunfire. Thus only the waterline was protected against heavy
(8" & above) gunfire. For the round-the-world voyage the Russian
ships were very heavily laden and the resulting increase in draft
put the heavy belt below the waterline. The whole of the ship above
the water was therefore vunerable to HE shells from the Japanese
12" guns. The Japanese ships were all British built (very similar
to the Majestic - Queen groups). In line with British practise
they were 'soft-enders' - the belt normally stopping short of the
bow & stern, with protection at the ends by a domed armoured deck.
However the heavy belt came much higher up the side of the ship
(normally to main deck height) with a thick (6" or so) upper belt
above it. The Japanese flaghip ("Mikasa") was particularly well
protected with a 6" box battery for the secondary guns taking
the armour to the full height of the hull amidships.
The Russian guns were powerful and long-ranged but - even in the
modern ships - could only fire continuously if they were loaded
end-on (Turret swung back to fore-and-aft to load). This meant
that the rate of fire was low - normally in the range of a round
every 2-3 minutes according to the 1904 Janes. The Japanese guns
could be loaded at any angle of training (and, in the case of
the Mikasa's 12"/45 cal guns, at any elevation). The maximum
rate-of-fire was normally around 2 rounds per minute.

>The Russian fleet was extremely inhomogeneous. They had a squadron
>of spanking new and fairly good battleships (the Alexander III class,
>if I recall correctly, which included AIII, Ossljablja, Borodino,
>Suvorov and Orel), in addition, I believe, a number of weaker and
>older battleships, and finally a squadron of very old and slow
>battleships and coastal defense ships that were absolutely useless
>in combat.

An important point. The Japanese battleships were designed to work
together as a squadron & had very similar speeds and turning circles.
This allowed them to manoever much more easily than the Russian
squadron could.

An interesting point is the Japanese use of HE shell throughout the
action, while the Russians favoured AP. Because the Russian ships were
low in the water they were only proteted by the thin upper belts
which the 12" HE shells could penetrate. Japanese HE shells (again,
of British design) were extremely good. The Russian AP shells could
perforate the belts of the Japanese ships but (obviously) the destructive
effect was much smaller. If I remember correctly the three Borodino
class ships sunk were lost by flooding, having been holed on the waterline
(above the - immersed - heavy belt). The Russian fire was concentrated on
"Mikasa" & did severe damage but her Krupp cemented armour saved her.
The same damage would almost certainly have sunk "Fuji" or "Shikishima"
which wern't so well protected.

*************************************************************************
* Andy Breen * Adran Ffiseg/Physics Department *
* Grwp EISCAT group * Prifysgol Cymru Aberystwyth *
* 44 1970 621907 * a...@aber.ac.uk *
*************************************************************************
If these opinions were those of PC-A they'd have to pay me more

Iacobus

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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Another factor of the long voyage of the Russian fleet would be that they
would have been unable to have extensive gunnery drills since they could
get no ammunition resupply during their voyage. They had enough trouble
getting food and fuel.


Simon Shpilfoygel

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Jul 26, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/26/95
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m...@dbai.tuwien.ac.at (Markus Stumptner) writes:

>In article <3v38nq$7...@NNTP.MsState.Edu>, Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:

>Seriously, I believe that "world opinion" favored the Japanese,
>who had already dealt successfully with another Russian fleet.
>(Although a bit of luck was involved, too.)

>>The Russians had more heavy guns and more heavily armored
>>ships.

>Partially correct, at least for the main battlelines. The
>Japanese were faster (and used their larger armored cruisers
>as an additional squadron in their battleline).

>The Russian fleet was extremely inhomogeneous. They had a squadron

Exactly. It was a hogde-podge armada - all the ships afloat were send to the
Eastern Seas.

>of spanking new and fairly good battleships (the Alexander III class,
>if I recall correctly, which included AIII, Ossljablja, Borodino,
>Suvorov and Orel), in addition, I believe, a number of weaker and
>older battleships, and finally a squadron of very old and slow
>battleships and coastal defense ships that were absolutely useless

>in combat. (Rozhdestvensky actually tried to avoid having to join
>this squadron, but coaling at Madagascar took long enough for him
>to receive an explicit order to let them catch up. Nebogatov, the

Rozhdestvensky didn't want to set sail from Madagaskar at all - after he
was notified that Port-Arthur has fallen and the 1st PAcific Fleet is no more.
There was no sense in the movement against superior Japanese forces, but the
Admiralty ordered him to carry on and 'reinforced' him with an antique BB and
a couple of CDBs. His protests were overruled so he cabled in his resignation
upon the arrival in a Russian harbour.

>commander of that squadron, wisely surrendered when the Japanese
>caught up with him the day after the more modern ships had been
>defeated.)

>>But the leadership of their fleet was poor at best (incompetent

>>is probably more accurate) and the crews were poorly trained.

>The main advantage of the Japanese lay in superior speed and crew

>training, and better subordinate officers. The speed made it
>possible for him to repeatedly cross the Russian T, while the
>Russians wasted their superior firepower in the opening minutes

It wasn't superior at all. The broadside of the Japanese was heavier.
The reason was that in 1892(93?) the Russian adopted a light-weight shell
that had very good accuracy at ranges below 3nm. However, when used at longer
ranges it lacked both accuracy and piercing capabilities. The Japanese, having
superior speed, prefered to use heavy HE shells that killed three Russian BBs.
In addition, Japanese HE shells were filled with shimoza ( melinit ) - 7% of
the weight while the Russians used only 2% of their shells' weight for simple
gunpowder. Taking into consideration the absolute weights of the projectiles,
a Japanese 12-incher outpowered its Russian counterpart by an order of magnitude.
Another reason for Togo's victory that Russians BBs had no more than two
rangefinders per ship. The Japanese BBs had one per turret/casemate. You save
money on rangefinders ( both sides were buying them in Britain ) - you lose
your battleships.

>of the battle because of coordination problems that had ships
>blocking each others' fields of fire. As for Russian leadership,
>there is no doubt that Rozhdestvensky had no clear plan for the
>battle (both he and Togo knew the Japanese could dictate the
>situation anyway if battle occurred due to their superior speed),

Uh, well, Rozhd. could've detached his five 18-knot battleships as a 'flying
squadron' to mess Togo's plans. Togo's first battle force ( 4BB, 2 CA ) would
not have any speed advantage while the second battle force ( 6 CA ) won't be
able to cause significant damage to the remains of the Russian fleet ( 2 old
but good BBs, 3 CDB and two older BBs ). However, such a plan required someone
like Beatty or Terwitt, and definitely not Rozhdestvensky.

>and had not really trained battle formations and gunnery during
>the voyage. On the other hand, getting the fleet there at all was
>an incredible organizational feat, and being at the end of a
>20,000km supply tether also meant that the ships had neither coal
>nor shells to waste.

>>Togo's

>>crews were fresh and well trained plus the ships in his fleet were

Togo's repair facilities including drydocks were located near the battlefield.
The Russians had only ONE drydock capable of servicing a battleship, and
it was located in Vladivostok, not in Port-Arthur where the fleet was based.
How did they expect to win a war without repair facilities?

>>relatively new. (Some of the Russian ships dated from the 1870's).

As a matter of fact, Japanese CDB IJN Fuso was a 1870s vintage. The oldest
Russian ships dated back to approximately mid-1880s.

>>Two ships survive from these fleets. They Mikasa is at Yokohama, and the
>>Russian cruiser Aurora is I believe at St. Petersburg.

>The Aurora was not involved in the battle, she was part of the Baltic
>Fleet.

The Aurora did participate in Tsushima - she sailed from Baltic with the 2nd
squadron, fought in the battle and was disarmed in MAnila afterwards. By the
way, she met the beginning of the war in Alexandria - on her way to Port
Arthur. She sailed back to Petersburg only to join the armada.


Just my $0.02 worth,


Simon

---
I am the mail-server of Borg: .sigs are irrelevant.

Jim Breen

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to
Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:

A nice theory, but in fact Novikoff-Priboy's account was written well
before the revolution in Russia, and hidden with relatives for several
years, because its descriptions of the unrest and political foment
on the ships would have been a death sentence for him.

It emerged and was published in the 20s, which make me wonder about
the Stalin Prize, as they started in the 30s. Anyway any story of
incipient revolt against the feudal structure in 1905 was welcome in
the 30s, (and probably frowned on the 40s.)

Jean-Luc Picard

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to
: >>You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a
: >>prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the AIII,
I've seen Osliabia and Oslyabya

: OK, I checked, and Osliabia was indeed a Peresviet class ship (at least one


: of the other two ships of the class was at Port Arthur). The fifth

The other was the Pobieda, which was also there

: Borodino class ship (the class was not named after AIII, another slip


: of mine, that comes from trusting one's memory) was the Slava, which was
: not present at Tsushima.

On this topic; does anyone know which ships joined the Russian main fleet in
Vietnam, and how long each of them had been there?
Also, did the Russians actually think that Japanese torpedo-boats could get
to the North Sea?
M.


Markus Stumptner

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to
In article <1995Jul27.1...@lugb.latrobe.edu.au>, mat...@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Jean-Luc Picard) writes:
>Also, did the Russians actually think that Japanese torpedo-boats could get
>to the North Sea?

It seems they did. It would not have been impossible in theory, since
most of the European powers, in particular the British, sided with the
Japanese at the time, so the Japanese would have had much less trouble
with resupplying their ships. It also would have fitted in with the
Japanese penchant for long-range surprise attacks. The main problem
would have been that of secrecy - someone certainly would have noticed.

Interestingly enough, I saw a TV documentary a long time ago (not of
Russian origin :-) that dealt with the question extensively, considering
what help the Japanese could have expected, and what route they would
have taken if they had tried such a trick. In particular, the authors
claimed they checked the Suez Canal records for the period and found that
there was a gap in the records for a date some weeks before the Russians
set sail in Kronstadt. Apparently a page or two had been removed from the
records. I don't recall if there was mention of a second gap later, but
anyway, I found the notion quite intriguing. :-)

Simon Shpilfoygel

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to
Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:

>Check your math! I think you have been corrupted by Pentium of Borg!

Oops, sorry. Those Pentiums ...

>1995 - 1905 = 90 years of EW!

I stand corrected.

>Interesting point though, first time I have seen the EW factors of
>Tsushima mentioned apart from the usual mention of the Japanese tracking
>the Russians by their wireless traffic.

Glad to be of any use. BTW - where does this 'usual mention' originate from?
The Russians came in a tight formation and didn't have to use radio while the
Japanese had to use radio in order to communicate with their patrols.

Thanks,


Simon

---
I am Solaris of Borg. Memory upgrades are futile. Your newsserver will crash.

Ed Rudnicki

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to

In article <3v6j2i$l...@NNTP.MsState.Edu> Iacobus <jm...@ra.msstate.edu> writes:
>Lord Vader of Borg,

>
>Check your math! I think you have been corrupted by Pentium of Borg!
>
>1995 - 1905 = 90 years of EW!
>
>
>
>Interesting point though, first time I have seen the EW factors of
>Tsushima mentioned apart from the usual mention of the Japanese tracking
>the Russians by their wireless traffic.

Something along these lines was mentioned in an ad about 15 years
ago in Aviation Week, by some company specializing in EW equipment.
The writeup said that a Russian wireless operator on shore jammed
the communications of some Japanese cruisers trying to conduct shore
bombardment, forcing them to either abort the mission, or causing
their fire to be off-target from the spotter vessel closer inshore
being unable to radio corrections. I don't know if it's true or not,
but I recall the painting of the cruiser to have been horribly
inaccurate.

Ed Rudnicki

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to

In article <1995Jul27.1...@lugb.latrobe.edu.au> mat...@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Jean-Luc Picard) writes:
>: >>You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a
>: >>prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the AIII,
>I've seen Osliabia and Oslyabya

Well, I have a Russian postcard of her printed prior to her loss,
and the spelling is "OSLYABYA". In Russian of course, but the
character used is "y" and not "i". FWIW.


>Also, did the Russians actually think that Japanese torpedo-boats could get
>to the North Sea?

Was Japan still buying TBs from UK builders at the time? If so,
there could have been Japanese TBs in the North Sea, but they
wouldn't have had to make the trip from Japan. Japan and the UK were
allies, after all.

Bill Shatzer

unread,
Jul 27, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/27/95
to

In a previous article, kell...@netcom.com (John Kelleher) says:

-snip-


>
>When the overpowering strength of the Japanese disposition was
>recognized, the Russians attempted to turn back to reform. However, by
>accident or design, they did not perform a simultaneous turnabout.
>Instead, each ship in turn sailed forward to execute a turnabout at the
>same place in the water. Essentially, they sailed, one at a time, into
>the boresights of the Japanese fleet. If you tried to calculate the most
>effective way to destroy a fleet, the example presented by the Russians
>would have to take the prize!
>
>John

From what I've read on Jutland, the 'battle turn away' (forget what it
was called in German) where a column of ships simultaneously reverses
direction so the the former tail-end ship ends up in the van with the
column headed the opposite way was considered something of a novel
and dangerous manuever and Hipper was only able to pull it off because
the German battlecruiser squadron had spent some considerable practice
on it. Did the Russian fleet even have a 'battle turn away' in its
tactical manual? Did it have a signal for it? Could the Russian
fleet have turned away from the Japanese in any manner other than the
way it did? Just wondering.

Cheers,
--

"The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it." Oscar Wilde

Bill Shatzer-...@ednet1.osl.or.gov

Markus Stumptner

unread,
Jul 28, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/28/95
to
In article <NEWTNews.24679.8...@phoenix.phoenix.net>, "Donald R. Morris" <drmo...@phoenix.net> writes:
> German for "battle turn" is "Gefechtskehrwendung" -- and at Jutland
>Hipper executed it three times -- and not from column but from echelon.

It was not Hipper who ordered it, it was Scheer. While Hipper's ships
(the BC's used as scouting forces) participated in the first two turns,
they did not do it in the third, because they were ordered to attack as
a cover for the turn of the battleline (the famous "death ride").
And it *was* from column - the whole idea of the Gefechtskehrtwendung
was for the whole column to reverse course in parallel - although by the
time of the third turn, the formation had become somewhat bunched up and
disordered (I think the flagship, Friedrich der Grosse, turned the other
way in the last turn to make a little room in the line, but perhaps I'm
just remembering wrong).

Donald R. Morris

unread,
Jul 28, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/28/95
to

German for "battle turn" is "Gefechtskehrwendung" -- and at Jutland
Hipper executed it three times -- and not from column but from echelon.
Donald R. Morris


Ken Young

unread,
Jul 28, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/28/95
to
Re British assistance there were British observers aboard the Japanese
fleet and their reports helped shape future British designs.

Ken Young
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk

Julian Barker

unread,
Jul 29, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/29/95
to
In article <3v9nt9$j...@ednet1.osl.or.gov>

bsha...@ednet1.osl.or.gov "Bill Shatzer" writes:
>
> From what I've read on Jutland, the 'battle turn away' (forget what it
> was called in German) where a column of ships simultaneously reverses
> direction so the the former tail-end ship ends up in the van with the
> column headed the opposite way was considered something of a novel
> and dangerous manuever and Hipper was only able to pull it off because
> the German battlecruiser squadron had spent some considerable practice
> on it. Did the Russian fleet even have a 'battle turn away' in its
> tactical manual? Did it have a signal for it? Could the Russian
> fleet have turned away from the Japanese in any manner other than the
> way it did? Just wondering.
>
> Cheers,
> --
>
> "The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it." Oscar Wilde
>
> Bill Shatzer-...@ednet1.osl.or.gov
>

It was Scheer not Hipper who ordered the battle turn away which applied to
all the capital ships not just the battlecruisers. One of the reasons this
was a special manouvre was that it could be executed even when the line was
bend or bunched. Both applied to the Germans at the time. A normal turn
together which all navies should be able to perform would lead to total
confusion in those circumstances. The difference with the battle turn away
was that the rear ship turned first and each ship only put the helm over
when the ship immediatly behind began to turn. This gave more space and
time to avoid collision and the line could then be closed up on a new
course afterwards.

Obviously this meant that the ships at the head of the line, which were in
the most danger due to enemy fire had to wait the longest to turn. In one
of the turn aways, (I think it was the second) several ships at the head of
the line turned early and in one turn away at least one ship deliberatly
turned the wrong way due to lack of space.

Despite the above the line was quickly reformed showing the excellent
training in the German battlefleet.

Thomas A. Cooney

unread,
Jul 29, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/29/95
to
> Iacobus writes:
> >Interesting point though, first time I have seen the EW factors of
> >Tsushima mentioned apart from the usual mention of the Japanese tracking
> >the Russians by their wireless traffic.
An interesting book dealing with some of this is "The Fleet That Had to
Die" by Richard Hough, probably available thru the inter-library loan
system. As I remember it, a group of German, Telefunken, experts shipped
aboard the fleet as far as Madagascar installing the radio system. I had
assumed that they had left much of the work undone? The Germans were
apparently not particularly anti-Japanese, except as the Japanese were
allied with the British, but were pleased to usher the Russian fleet out
of the Baltic. The Russians also had a fleet of battleships in the Black
Sea but the Turks, in sympathy with Japan, I suppose, refused permission
for them to exit. As a result, they had to deal with them in WW I.

BTW, does anyone have details of the story about the armed merchant
cruiser LENA, out of Vladivostok, whose crew mutanied and fled to San
Francisco.?

Regards,
Tom Cooney

Julian Barker

unread,
Jul 29, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/29/95
to
In article <3vc8ga$c...@delphi.cs.ucla.edu>

si...@cs.ucla.edu "Simon Shpilfoygel" writes:
>
> >of mine, that comes from trusting one's memory) was the Slava, which was
> >not present at Tsushima.
>
> Yes, she was comissioned too late to sail with the fleet. For a couple of years
> she and the sole survivor of Port Arthur - the Tsesarevitch were the only BBs
> of Russian Baltic fleet. She was sunk in action with two German Kaiser-class
> dreadnoaths in Summer 1917.
>
>
> Just my $.02 worth,
>
>
> Simon
>

If so Slava was the only pre-dreadnought ship sunk in a gun action with
dreadnoughts. I have very little info of the circumstances of this. I know
the ships involved and where it happened but does anyone have a source for
what actually happened?

Scott D. Orr

unread,
Jul 30, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/30/95
to
In <DCDxs...@pica.army.mil> erud...@pica.army.mil (Ed Rudnicki)
writes:
>
>
>In article <1995Jul27.1...@lugb.latrobe.edu.au>
mat...@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Jean-Luc Picard) writes:
>>: >>You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a

>>: >>prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the
AIII,
>>I've seen Osliabia and Oslyabya
>
>Well, I have a Russian postcard of her printed prior to her loss,
>and the spelling is "OSLYABYA". In Russian of course, but the
>character used is "y" and not "i". FWIW.
>

Transliteration from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet is not at all
standardized. Both "ia" and "ya", and for that matter "a" (where
appropriate) are used to represent the Russian letter written as a
"backwards R" and pronounced "ya". As a matter of fact, I've seen
both versions even in a single document, such as the OMRI Daily Report
out of Eastern Europe.

Scott Orr

Joe Zeff

unread,
Jul 30, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/30/95
to

In a previous article, kell...@netcom.com (John Kelleher) says:

>Matthew Beesley (ao...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA) wrote:
>: The massive defeat of the Russian fleet by the Japanese at Tsushima (May
>: 27, 1905) has always been a subject of interest to me.
>
>Ditto. Arguable one of the greates naval battles of the century, and
>unquestionably the most decisive.
>

I've a book somewhere on the battle: The Emperor's Sword. Don't know
author.

>
>Tactically, the element of surprise struck a weak point in Russian
>training and preparedness. The Russian battleships sailed in line ahead,
>and the Japanese ships lay in wait in a "crossed T" formation. Every
>main gun of the Japanese was able to fire as the Russian ships came in
>range, while the Russians were limited tothe forward turrets of the lead
>ship.
>

Correction: The Japanese were sailing in a reverse course to the Russians.
They made a *very*dangerous* "eight point turn" (180 degrees) after the
engagement started, putting them in the same direction as their opponents,
and masking their own guns intermittantly. As they did this near the
front of the Russian line and were faster, they drew ahead, turned again
and crossed the T.
--
-Joe Zeff
-The Guy With the Sideburns

Iacobus

unread,
Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to
Julian Barker <jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk> wrote:

>
>If so Slava was the only pre-dreadnought ship sunk in a gun action with
>dreadnoughts. I have very little info of the circumstances of this. I know
>the ships involved and where it happened but does anyone have a source for
>what actually happened?
>

A stretch could include the S.M.S. Pommern sunk at Jutland,
even though she was killed by British destroyers. I too would
like to learn more of the Slava's fate.


Jim Breen

unread,
Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to
Julian Barker <jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk> wrote:

>If so Slava was the only pre-dreadnought ship sunk in a gun action with
>dreadnoughts. I have very little info of the circumstances of this. I know
>the ships involved and where it happened but does anyone have a source for
>what actually happened?

Have I missed something? Wasn't Sturdee's victory at the Falklands a case
of dreadnoughts sinking pre-dreadnoughts?

Mark Brandon

unread,
Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to

>> So presumably the
>> SSN's surface through this thin new ice which would be anything from
>> 0 cm thickness to maybe, well I am not sure, 1 m is pretty thick right?
>> and why surface through thick stuff when there could be thin stuff a few
>> km away?
>> hope thats of use
>> Mark


>Your getting warmer........but still no cigar!

>BKT(SS) (Bluenose)

I am not sure I can get much more to get that cigar BKT,
But I am surprised that as well as all that sneaking about
you get a coveted Bluenose as well......
I thought you just sodded about playing baseball and having
BBQ's!!!.... and of course it is "warm" under the surface....

In true British tradition i had to almost get frostbite, had to
do a shed load of work got hunted by ice bears, and worst of
all - even the cricket got stopped when the only ball ended up
in an open lead........

cheers
mark

Julian Barker

unread,
Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to
In article <3vhpog$i...@harbinger.cc.monash.edu.au>
j...@capek.rdt.monash.edu.au "Jim Breen" writes:

> Julian Barker <jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >If so Slava was the only pre-dreadnought ship sunk in a gun action with
> >dreadnoughts. I have very little info of the circumstances of this. I know
> >the ships involved and where it happened but does anyone have a source for
> >what actually happened?
>
> Have I missed something? Wasn't Sturdee's victory at the Falklands a case
> of dreadnoughts sinking pre-dreadnoughts?
>
> --

> Jim Breen [?$@%8%`!&%V%j!<%s?(J@?$@%b%J%7%eBg3X?(J]


> Department of Robotics & Digital Technology. Monash University.
> Clayton VIC 3168 Australia (p) +61 3 9905 3298 (f) +61 3 9905 3574

> j.b...@rdt.monash.edu.au [http://www.rdt.monash.edu.au/~jwb/]
>

Wouldn't that make the Ark a pre-dreadnought?

In normal conversation I have never heard the word pre-dreadnought to
apply to anything other than a battleship so sorry for the confusion.

I suppose strictly speaking we should refer to pre-invincible cruisers. :-)

Julian Barker

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Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to
In article <3vhe5l$j...@NNTP.MsState.Edu> jm...@ra.msstate.edu "Iacobus" writes:

> Julian Barker <jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >
> >If so Slava was the only pre-dreadnought ship sunk in a gun action with
> >dreadnoughts. I have very little info of the circumstances of this. I know
> >the ships involved and where it happened but does anyone have a source for
> >what actually happened?
> >

> A stretch could include the S.M.S. Pommern sunk at Jutland,
> even though she was killed by British destroyers. I too would
> like to learn more of the Slava's fate.
>
>

Pommern was blown up after a torpedo hit. I doubt British 4" guns had much
to do with it.

Matt Clonfero

unread,
Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to
In message <3vhpog$i...@harbinger.cc.monash.edu.au> Jim Breen wrote:

> Julian Barker <jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> >If so Slava was the only pre-dreadnought ship sunk in a gun action with
> >dreadnoughts. I have very little info of the circumstances of this. I know
> >the ships involved and where it happened but does anyone have a source for
> >what actually happened?
>

> Have I missed something? Wasn't Sturdee's victory at the Falklands a case
> of dreadnoughts sinking pre-dreadnoughts?

The Battle of the Falkland Islands was battlecruisers vs armoured cruisers.
So while the RN ships were built after HMS Dreadnought, and the German cruisers
before, I think the original post refered to pre- and post- dreadnought BBs.

Aetherem Vincere
Matt.
--
===============================================================================
Matt Clonfero (ma...@aetherem.demon.co.uk) | To err is human,
My employer & I have a deal - they don't | To forgive is not Air Force Policy.
speak for me, and I don't speak for them. | -- Anon, ETPS


Brian K. Thomason

unread,
Jul 31, 1995, 3:00:00 AM7/31/95
to

> Organization: British Antarctic Survey
> ^^^^^^^^^


Have you done both Poles ? On the surface ?


Mark Brandon

unread,
Aug 1, 1995, 3:00:00 AM8/1/95
to

>> Organization: British Antarctic Survey
>> ^^^^^^^^^

>Have you done both Poles ? On the surface ?

whoops - didn't realize it put that down... I guess I should read my own
posts properly...... or get a private id!
answer to question - no not actually at the south one, but south. The ice
there is a lot thinner though ( only about 1.5 m ish) 'cause it grows
almost from scratch each year, and is liable to fracture quickley - which
keeps you on your toes.
And unless you are interested in atmospherics whats the point of going to
the south pole? 8 hours in an LC130 (5 was enough thank you very much),
no wildlife to look at (unless you consider US DV's "wild" - in my experience
hardly!) and once there what can you look at ? I know.....the US flag and a
barbers pole!!!!!
I think I will stick to the icy seas thanks !
My interest with this stuff was I used to work with a scientist (civ) who had
been on some of the British SSN's to the ice - and also one of the old
Oberon class under the MIZ. I am learning quite a lot on this group - I
never realised whales could be such a problem!
cheers

mark

MacLure

unread,
Aug 1, 1995, 3:00:00 AM8/1/95
to
j...@capek.rdt.monash.edu.au (Jim Breen) writes:

>Julian Barker <jul...@rodent.demon.co.uk> wrote:

[SNIP]


>Have I missed something? Wasn't Sturdee's victory at the Falklands a case
>of dreadnoughts sinking pre-dreadnoughts?

[SNIP]

Sturdee had 2 Battlecruisers ( HMS Inflexible/Indefatigable, 8x12" ) and
a pre-dreadnought ( HMS Canopus , 4x12" ) plus Cruisers. Von Spee had
2 Armoured Cruisers ( 8x8.2" ) + Light Cruisers.

IBM
--
################ No Times Like The Maritimes, Eh! ######################
# IBM aka # Ian_M...@QMGATE.arc.nasa.gov (desk) #
# Ian B MacLure # maclure@(remulak/cvsrf1).arc.nasa.gov(currently) #
# Opinions expressed here are mine, mine, mine.(YOOHOO[nuke,drugs,PGP])#
################ No Times Like The Maritimes, Eh! ######################
# IBM aka # Ian_M...@QMGATE.arc.nasa.gov (desk) #
# Ian B MacLure # maclure@(remulak/cvsrf1).arc.nasa.gov(currently) #
# Opinions expressed here are mine, mine, mine.(YOOHOO[nuke,drugs,PGP])#

Ken Young

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Aug 2, 1995, 3:00:00 AM8/2/95
to
No the heavy German ships at the Falklands were armoured cruisers

Ken Young
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk

Peter Skelton

unread,
Aug 3, 1995, 3:00:00 AM8/3/95
to

>Have I missed something? Wasn't Sturdee's victory at the Falklands a case
>of dreadnoughts sinking pre-dreadnoughts?
>
I think the poster meant pre-dreadnought battleships being sunk by
dreadnoughts. There were lots of predreadnought cruisers sunk by
dreadnoughts, for example Black Prince et al at Jutland.

John Kelleher

unread,
Aug 4, 1995, 3:00:00 AM8/4/95
to
Ed Rudnicki (erud...@pica.army.mil) wrote:

: In article <1995Jul27.1...@lugb.latrobe.edu.au> mat...@lux.latrobe.edu.au (Jean-Luc Picard) writes:
: >: >>You might be right about the Aurora, but the Osliabia (is there a
: >: >>prefered spelling of this?) was not of the same class as the AIII,
: >I've seen Osliabia and Oslyabya

: Well, I have a Russian postcard of her printed prior to her loss,
: and the spelling is "OSLYABYA". In Russian of course, but the
: character used is "y" and not "i". FWIW.

One of the great challenges to studying Russian naval records is the
spelling variations noted in translated documents. In the case of this
vessel, it could be transliterated in any of 3 ways:

OSLIABIA - Library of Congress and most library transliterations.
OSLJABJA Most academics/professorial types.
OSLYABYA The mainstream "common man" method.

Most likely the ship was named for Rodion Oslyabya (? - 1398+). He was
hero of the battle of Kulikovo Pole, monk of the Triotse-Sergiev
Monastery, and participated in the Moscow mission to Byzantium in 1398.
For all that cool sounding background, he is just a little bit obscure!
Perhaps his heroic deeds struck a chord in the aristocracy of the day, but
the Bolshevik history books don't say a whole lot.

John Kelleher

--
kell...@netcom.com

Donald Harris

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Feb 16, 2022, 9:12:23 AMFeb 16
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On Wednesday, July 26, 1995 at 3:00:00 AM UTC-4, Iacobus wrote:
> I have always said that an archaeologist is just a grave robber with a
> degree. :)

The ancient Egyptians didn't want their tombs or burials disturbed. Archaeologists dig them up and pat themselves on the back, while non-archaeologists who do the same are considered grave robbers and thieves. Why?
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