Deck Guns - USS Narwhal
McKellar
the twin 6" deck guns carried by the USS Narwhal.
Largest guns ever carried by a US sub.
Veerry impressive.
I know I've got a photo of the ship around here someplace - I'll have to
look it up.
Mark
Ma...@thealliance.com
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>Just returned from a brief visit to the sub base in Groton, Ct. They have
>the twin 6" deck guns carried by the USS Narwhal.
>
>Largest guns ever carried by a US sub.
>
>Veerry impressive.
Unfortunately, the war record of the submarine deck gun is not
impressive. As one WWII skipper described it to me. If it isn't
worth a torpedo, it isn't worth risking the boat. If a deck gun can sink
it, it isn't any risk to the boat. Submarines are poor gun platforms,
and are intensely vulnerable.
vince
Paul Jonathan Adam
> Unfortunately, the war record of the submarine deck gun is not
> impressive. As one WWII skipper described it to me. If it isn't
> worth a torpedo, it isn't worth risking the boat. If a deck gun can sink
> it, it isn't any risk to the boat. Submarines are poor gun platforms,
> and are intensely vulnerable.
> vince
This doesn't square with the experiences I've heard, is all I can say.
The Q-Ship only worked because U-Boat skippers would rather surface and
use their gun on a merchantman, than waste some of their (very limited)
supply of torpedoes. At the start of WW2, US submarines had a 3" deck
gun. Towards the end, typically you might have a 5"/25, a 40mm and a
couple of 20mm guns. Why add so much tophamper if they were proven to be
ineffective?
Friedman, US Naval Weapons, page 54.
"By the end of the war the surface guns had proven extremely useful, so much
so that in January 1945 the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force informally asked
BuOrd to install surface fire control systems for two 5"/25 guns in
several submarine 'gunboats' as soon as possible..."
--
"When you have shot and killed a man, you have defined your attitude towards
him. You have offered a definite answer to a definite problem. For better
or for worse, you have acted decisively.
In fact, the next move is up to him." <R.A. Lafferty>
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
RoundTower
>> Unfortunately, the war record of the submarine deck gun is not
impressive. As one WWII skipper described it to me. If it isn't worth a
torpedo, it isn't worth risking the boat. If a deck gun can sink it, it
isn't any risk to the boat. Submarines are poor gun platforms, and are
intensely vulnerable. <<
The first statement might be b-r-o-a-d-l-y true for most of WW2, but
certainly not for 1945, when the cute phrase above might be more
accurately put, "If it ain't a risk to the boat, and a deck gun will kill
it, don't waste a torp." A great many sub captains of 1945 requested both
5"/25s to be mounted on their boats (the option was generally left up to
the CO). Fire control on an SS was always problematic, at best, but great
efforts in that area were being made in 1945.
The concept of the "submarine cruiser" embodied by the six-inch gun that
was the subject of the original post in this thread certainly never panned
out. Worked for the Germans in WW1, didn't pan out so well for all the
copycats. By 1945, the tactical concept of "sub cruiser" had evolved into
"sub gunboat," and became both tactically and strategically effective.
Friedman's "U.S. Submarines Through 1945" sheds a great deal more light
on this issue than has been published before.
RT
"I speak for myself, only for myself, and for no one but myself."
Jim Christley
into consideration the reasoning behind placing a gun on the deck of a
submarine. Certainly some American Submarine Commanders who had command
during World War II have adverse comments about the usefullness of a
deck gun for completion of their primary mission, however, that belies
the reasoning for having one in the first place.
The war record for the submarine deck gun is indeed impressive. Some
research should have been done before making such a broad statement.
That being covered, I must agree with the gentleman from Australia who
pointed out my inaccuracy about whistle signals given by ships when
getting underway. I researched the subject and found my memory of what
signals were to be given was clouded by a local ruling on the inland
rules of the road for the Submarine Base at New London, CT. Not only
that, but the young man who explained the present rules said, "we
haven't done that for a long time". Now I feel old and dumb, not just
dumb. The ships backing out of the piers at that base now sound one
long blast and three short as if they were backing into a stream from a
pier with obstructed vision. The ships moving out bow first, simply
give one long blast.
Jim Christley
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>"Perfesser Vincent Brannigan" fingered:
>
>>.
> The first statement might be b-r-o-a-d-l-y true for most of WW2, but
>certainly not for 1945, when the cute phrase above might be more
>accurately put, "If it ain't a risk to the boat, and a deck gun will kill
>it, don't waste a torp."
If you could hit it with a torpedo, you used one. most of the deck
actions were agasint very small craft.
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>
> I certainly hope that was a personal opinion because it doens't take
> into consideration the reasoning behind placing a gun on the deck of a
> submarine. Certainly some American Submarine Commanders who had command
> during World War II have adverse comments about the usefullness of a
> deck gun for completion of their primary mission, however, that belies
> the reasoning for having one in the first place.
> The war record for the submarine deck gun is indeed impressive. Some
> research should have been done before making such a broad statement.
>
1) a submarine is a terrible gun platform. The ship is unsteady
the gun has primitive fire controls, It can only be used by putting
the submarine into a very vulnerable situation on the surface, and it
signals the submarine's presence to the enemy. It also slows the
submarine down, consumes weight and requires maintainance.
2) tactically it can never be used in any situation where the
enemy can shoot back even with a machine gun.
Which resoning are you referring to?
Vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Myron Howard
>Vince
I agree with Jim's statement regarding research. Obviously, you don't.
I don't believe I have seen anyone post anything that I took as
espousing the need and desirability of deck guns on today's
submarines. Any discussion of submarine deck guns must consider the
context of their use.
In all of the Navy's history of having deck guns on submarines, they
were worthless against some targets while they were more than adequate
for some. The Chilean Navy asked for the 5" gun on the Springer when
we were getting her ready to turn over to them in 1960. For the
context of their planned use, it was warranted.
As for putting the submarine in a vulnerable position on the surface,
until the non-diesels came along, the majority of the time was spent
on the surface.
Regarding speed, the boats were not the fastest vessels in the fleet
to begin with and a slight loss of submerged speed caused by the small
amount of addditional drag from the deck gun was insignificant.
Submerged speed only ate the batteries which caused the boat to have
to surface so speed was not a great evasive factor.
The weight of the gun only reduced the amount of ballast required to
operate. Again, an insignificant factor.
As for maintenance, that's what Gunner's Mates were for. Just like
Torpedoman worked on torpedoes, Electrician's maintained electrical
gear, Engineman maintained engines and so on and so on.
As far as the enemy and machine guns, they never sank a submarine.
Maybe some damage and maybe wounded and killed some crewman but that
is what happens in war. There were a number of occasions during WWII
where boats on the surface exchanged fire with smaller targets.
Remember, context of use. The sub skippers of WWII were asking for
larger deck guns by the end of the war. If they had thought there was
a potentially negative impact, would they have wanted them?
Myron
--
DBF
Myron Howard ex-EN2(SS)
USS Bream SSK243
USS Springer SS414
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>
> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>
> >Jim Christley <jch...@bbn.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> I certainly hope that was a personal opinion because it doens't take
> >> into consideration the reasoning behind placing a gun on the deck of a
> >> submarine. Certainly some American Submarine Commanders who had command
> >> during World War II have adverse comments about the usefullness of a
> >> deck gun for completion of their primary mission, however, that belies
> >> the reasoning for having one in the first place.
> >> The war record for the submarine deck gun is indeed impressive. Some
> >> research should have been done before making such a broad statement.
> >>
>
>
> >1) a submarine is a terrible gun platform. The ship is unsteady
> >the gun has primitive fire controls, It can only be used by putting
> >the submarine into a very vulnerable situation on the surface, and it
> >signals the submarine's presence to the enemy. It also slows the
> >submarine down, consumes weight and requires maintainance.
>
> >2) tactically it can never be used in any situation where the
> >enemy can shoot back even with a machine gun.
>
>
>
I wrote my undergraduate thesis on Law, morality and Power: a Study
of the U-boat in two world Wars. I presented the key Conclusions at
a seminar at the deutches Museum in Germany One of the sections of
that research dealt with the deck gun and its relationship to the
cruiser rules of the 1930's. Deck guns had a role in the cruiser
rules. Otherwise there was no way to force a ship to stop for
search without threatening it with a torpedo attack, which was
not a permitted option. By WWII this rationale had evaporated.
Arming merchantment in WWII was considered an act w which eliminated
the restrictions of the London treaty.
> I don't believe I have seen anyone post anything that I took as
> espousing the need and desirability of deck guns on today's
> submarines. Any discussion of submarine deck guns must consider the
> context of their use.
>
no one is referring to anything later than ww2
this post is limited to that
period.
> In all of the Navy's history of having deck guns on submarines, they
> were worthless against some targets while they were more than adequate
> for some.
Small unarmed unescorted ships without air coverr,
known to be unequipped with radios would seem to describe a target
The Chilean Navy asked for the 5" gun on the Springer when
> we were getting her ready to turn over to them in 1960. For the
> context of their planned use, it was warranted.
>
all the South american navies had a role for Gunboats of various
kinds. doesn't affect the WW2 missions.
> As for putting the submarine in a vulnerable position on the surface,
> until the non-diesels came along, the majority of the time was spent
> on the surface.
>
Makes no difference The majority of time aircraft sit on the deck of a carrier.
The majority of time tanks are not running. The amjority of time
surface ships are not at battle stations. what matters is how they do
battle. Submarines depend on their ability to submerge in order to do
battle, and their offensive capability is concentrated in their torpedos
Even submarines in a surface night battle have to be able to submerge quickly.
Muzzel flash alone would discourage use in a night battle.
> Regarding speed, the boats were not the fastest vessels in the fleet
> to begin with and a slight loss of submerged speed caused by the small
> amount of addditional drag from the deck gun was insignificant.
there was a general failure to appreciate the importance of underwater
streamiling. I disagree that it is insignficant.
> Submerged speed only ate the batteries which caused the boat to have
> to surface so speed was not a great evasive factor.
My research tells me that battery endurance was a critical limiting factor.
all resistance increased the load on the Battery.
>
> The weight of the gun only reduced the amount of ballast required to
> operate. Again, an insignificant factor.
>
The gun is topside. I am not a naval architect, but everything I
have read indicates that topside weight in a submarine
increased the need for ballast
to counteract it. You have to drag both the weight of the gun and the extra
ballast.
> As for maintenance, that's what Gunner's Mates were for. Just like
> Torpedoman worked on torpedoes, Electrician's maintained electrical
> gear, Engineman maintained engines and so on and so on.
Every extra creman increased the need for accomodation etc. plus you
need the skilled people, and can't use them elsewhere
> As far as the enemy and machine guns, they never sank a submarine.
the gun crew is unprotectd against machine gun fire. removing a wounded man
below also requires exposing the crew to additional fire.
> Maybe some damage and maybe wounded and killed some crewman but that
> is what happens in war. There were a number of occasions during WWII
> where boats on the surface exchanged fire with smaller targets.
Im not saying it didn't happen. Im saying that is was not a
rational response.
> Remember, context of use. The sub skippers of WWII were asking for
> larger deck guns by the end of the war. If they had thought there was
> a potentially negative impact, would they have wanted them?
>
I would be interested in documentaion of this request, especially
whether the inteded targets were armed or unarmed..
even if so, im nost sure that the skippers desire proves that the
mission is worthwhile
Vince
Myron Howard
>and...@hal-pc.org (Myron Howard) wrote:
---snip---snip---
>> >1) a submarine is a terrible gun platform. The ship is unsteady
>> >the gun has primitive fire controls, It can only be used by putting
>> >the submarine into a very vulnerable situation on the surface, and it
>> >signals the submarine's presence to the enemy. It also slows the
>> >submarine down, consumes weight and requires maintainance.
>>
>> >2) tactically it can never be used in any situation where the
>> >enemy can shoot back even with a machine gun.
>>
>>
>> I agree with Jim's statement regarding research. Obviously, you don't.
>>
>I wrote my undergraduate thesis on Law, morality and Power: a Study
>of the U-boat in two world Wars. I presented the key Conclusions at
>a seminar at the deutches Museum in Germany One of the sections of
>that research dealt with the deck gun and its relationship to the
>cruiser rules of the 1930's. Deck guns had a role in the cruiser
>rules. Otherwise there was no way to force a ship to stop for
>search without threatening it with a torpedo attack, which was
>not a permitted option. By WWII this rationale had evaporated.
>Arming merchantment in WWII was considered an act w which eliminated
>the restrictions of the London treaty.
>
Okay, Howard, open mouth, insert foot. Seems the good professor does
do some serious research.
>> I don't believe I have seen anyone post anything that I took as
>> espousing the need and desirability of deck guns on today's
>> submarines. Any discussion of submarine deck guns must consider the
>> context of their use.
>>
>no one is referring to anything later than ww2
>this post is limited to that
>period.
Agreed.
>
>> In all of the Navy's history of having deck guns on submarines, they
>> were worthless against some targets while they were more than adequate
>> for some.
>Small unarmed unescorted ships without air coverr,
>known to be unequipped with radios would seem to describe a target
Just as small craft which contributed to the war were. From Norman
Friedman's _U.S. Submarines Through 1945_ p214:
'Guns proved far more important than had been imagined prewar. The
Japanese deployed many small ASW and other picket craft. Also, by late
in the war, large targets worth torpedoing were quite rare, yet the
numerous small targets remaining were important because, together,
they still carried substantial cargoes of vital materials.'
> The Chilean Navy asked for the 5" gun on the Springer when
>> we were getting her ready to turn over to them in 1960. For the
>> context of their planned use, it was warranted.
>>
>all the South american navies had a role for Gunboats of various
>kinds. doesn't affect the WW2 missions.
Just an example of considering context. Agreed that it had nothing to
do with WWII.
>
>> As for putting the submarine in a vulnerable position on the surface,
>> until the non-diesels came along, the majority of the time was spent
>> on the surface.
>>
>Makes no difference The majority of time aircraft sit on the deck of a carrier.
>The majority of time tanks are not running. The amjority of time
>surface ships are not at battle stations. what matters is how they do
>battle. Submarines depend on their ability to submerge in order to do
>battle, and their offensive capability is concentrated in their torpedos
>Even submarines in a surface night battle have to be able to submerge quickly.
>Muzzel flash alone would discourage use in a night battle.
>
It all depended on what they were going to do battle with.
>> Regarding speed, the boats were not the fastest vessels in the fleet
>> to begin with and a slight loss of submerged speed caused by the small
>> amount of addditional drag from the deck gun was insignificant.
>there was a general failure to appreciate the importance of underwater
>streamiling. I disagree that it is insignficant.
I agree that underwater streamlining was not a major consideration.
Surface operation was the basic design criteria for the hulls and
fairwater, until the age of the non-diesels. My comment regarding drag
being insignificant is based on my vague recollection that drag is
proportional to the projected frontal area of an object. I realize
that there is an increase in turbulence when a gun is mounted versus
no gun, but how much?
>> Submerged speed only ate the batteries which caused the boat to have
>> to surface so speed was not a great evasive factor.
>My research tells me that battery endurance was a critical limiting factor.
>all resistance increased the load on the Battery.
Agreed, although I'm not sure just how much extra load on the
batteries was created by a gun mount.
>>
>> The weight of the gun only reduced the amount of ballast required to
>> operate. Again, an insignificant factor.
>>
>The gun is topside. I am not a naval architect, but everything I
>have read indicates that topside weight in a submarine
>increased the need for ballast
>to counteract it. You have to drag both the weight of the gun and the extra
>ballast.
You are quite correct in that the boat could not be top heavy so a
counter balance was required. My comment was in regard to the amount
of sea water ballast required in the trim and auxillary tanks for
maintaining trim.
>> As for maintenance, that's what Gunner's Mates were for. Just like
>> Torpedoman worked on torpedoes, Electrician's maintained electrical
>> gear, Engineman maintained engines and so on and so on.
>Every extra creman increased the need for accomodation etc. plus you
>need the skilled people, and can't use them elsewhere
The Gunner's Mates were used for lookout, helm and planes watch just
as other crewman were so if you did not have a Gunner, you had
something else. I don't know how many Gunner's were on board a fleet
boat during the war, but we only had one on the Springer. But we were
a reduced crew for a special situation. As for accomodations, from
what I have gathered in this newsgroup, hot-bunking still goes on
today.
>> As far as the enemy and machine guns, they never sank a submarine.
>the gun crew is unprotectd against machine gun fire. removing a wounded man
>below also requires exposing the crew to additional fire.
Agreed, but bad things happen to good people in war.
>> Maybe some damage and maybe wounded and killed some crewman but that
>> is what happens in war. There were a number of occasions during WWII
>> where boats on the surface exchanged fire with smaller targets.
>Im not saying it didn't happen. Im saying that is was not a
>rational response.
>
I suppose it came down to a choice between saving torpedoes for larger
targets or using them on the small stuff. Whether every decision was
rational or not is certainly beyond my knowledge.
>> Remember, context of use. The sub skippers of WWII were asking for
>> larger deck guns by the end of the war. If they had thought there was
>> a potentially negative impact, would they have wanted them?
>>
>I would be interested in documentaion of this request, especially
>whether the inteded targets were armed or unarmed..
Again, from Friedman's _U.S. Submarines Through 1945_, p218:
'Late-war submarines typically had two 5-in/25 gun foundations; the
single gun could be mounted fore or aft. The first submarine with two
5-in/25 (and two 40 mm guns) was Sennet (SS408); her first patrol was
in January 1945. She then operated in a wolf pack with two similarly
armed boats, Haddock (SS231) and Legato (SS371). They were so
succesful that OpNav authorized this battery for any submarine whose
CO wanted it. By September 1945, the approved battery was two 5-in/25s
(of which one was normallly carried). A major early postwar submarine
force goal was to buy enough 5-in guns to provide two for all active
and reserve boats.'
>even if so, im nost sure that the skippers desire proves that the
>mission is worthwhile
Just as some skippers were relieved of command early in the war for
lack of aggression, I'm sure there were some who went to the other
extreme.
>Vince
David Stevens
>> I certainly hope that was a personal opinion because it
>> doens't take into consideration the reasoning behind placing a
>> gun on the deck of a submarine. Certainly some American
>> Submarine Commanders who had command during World War II have
>> adverse comments about the usefullness of a deck gun for
>> completion of their primary mission, however, that belies
>> the reasoning for having one in the first place.
>> The war record for the submarine deck gun is indeed
>> impressive. Some research should have been done before making
>> such a broad statement.
>>
>the gun has primitive fire controls, It can only be used by
>putting the submarine into a very vulnerable situation on the
>surface, and it signals the submarine's presence to the enemy.
>It also slows the submarine down, consumes weight and requires
>maintainance.
>
>2) tactically it can never be used in any situation where the
>enemy can shoot back even with a machine gun.
>
The reason for fitting a deck gun was quite simply to allow
submarines to sink vessels not suitable for torpedo attack either
on account of their low value or their shallow draft. Vince is
of course right - submarines were lousy gun platforms, and only a
brave or foolish captain would normally get in a fight with
anything armed with more than small arms, unless he was sure
that, say, a stern gun could not bear on him. But the value of
the gun against poorly or unescorted targets, particularly
coastal traffic, could be enormous. As an example, compare
Nasmith's first and second patrols in E11 in the Sea of Marmora
in 1915. The first, in May-June, lasted about 17 days, during
which time E11 sank one gunboat, two transports, with a third
forced to beach, two ammo ships and two supply steamers. All of
these were sunk either by torpedo (an E class carried about 10 I
think), or demolition charges laid by a boarding party - a rather
riskier occupation than a guncrew. E11 was then fitted with a
12pdr gun for her second patrol in August. In 29 days, she sank
one "battleship" (Hairredin Barbarossa), one gunboat, six
transports, an armed steamer, and twenty-three sailing vessels;
most of the latter were sunk by gunfire, and at least one of the
transports was also finished off with the gun after a torpedo
hit. In addition, at times in concert with either E14 or E2, E11
bombarded a railway station, bridges and viaducts, and two
infantry formations marching down the coast road to Gallipoli.
There are plenty of other examples from both world wars - U-boats
disrupting fishing fleets, and British and US submarines
attacking convoys of Japanese-controlled coastal craft (often
with local native crews), and innumerable cases of crippled
ships being finished off with gunfire.
David Stevens
Jim Christley
concerning submarine deck guns, he (Mr. Brannigan) replied.
) a submarine is a terrible gun platform. The ship is unsteady
>the gun has primitive fire controls, It can only be used by
>putting the submarine into a very vulnerable situation on the
>surface, and it signals the submarine's presence to the enemy.
>It also slows the submarine down, consumes weight and requires
>maintainance.
>
>2) tactically it can never be used in any situation where the
>enemy can shoot back even with a machine gun.
>
>Which resoning are you referring to?
With reference to 1. above: Any ship not equipped with a gyro
stabilized vertical reference device which is automatically linked to
the servos which control elevation of the gun barrel is a terrible gun
platform. The amount of roll and the quickness of the roll and the
predictability of the roll and pitch relate to the hull design.
Submarines, being essentially a circular hull section with bilge keels
to lengthen the period of roll have a very stable roll feature. The
fact that the crew which operate the gun live aboard gives them a
"feel" for the platform's characteristics and an ability to predict
the motion. This allows a really remarkable accuracy with practice.
Historically, most ships are terrible gun platforms, that is why so
much attention is paid to stabilization strategies. Most merchant
ships, even if armed, were good targets because they also were
"terrible gun platforms" and the crews less practiced than the
submarine crew. The merchant ship was a large target, thus easier to
hit than the smaller and lower submarine. The submarine could take
less hits than the surface merchant and survive, which entered into
the commander's decision on weapons choice.
The gun does indeed slow the ship down, (the concept of consuming
weight, I am afraid I don't understand), and requires maintenance are
true. The speed reduction becomes a design point after, and only
after, you solve the periscope shears, and antenna support problems,
and after you solve the communication antenna design features problems
that allow for short vertical antenna instead of high, rigged, dipole
or twin-wire antenna. A careful look at submarine design history will
reveal that at about the time these problems were solved, the deck gun
was considered redundant and a liablilty and removed.
With reference to 2. above, The deck gun becomes the ultimate superior
weapon in any situation in which its range is greater than the range
of an opponents weapons. In that situation, the submarine needs to
maintain a range from the target which is within the range of its deck
gun and outside the range of the enemy's weapons. This not being
always possible, the commander of the submarine must weigh the risks
involved in using the various weapons systems at his command in
chosing which to use. There are occasions where there is a high risk
to the gun operators and the submarine. I is not my intent to enter
into a risk assesment discussion, but suffice it to say, a cursory
review of the gun actions between submarines and surface and shore
targets appear to have resulted in more casualities and damage to the
various enemies of the submarine than to submarines from those same
enemies. If this review is true is borne out in a more complete
study, then it would appear the commanders of the submarines who
engaged in deck gun actions, for the most part, assessed the risks
correctly.
One must be very careful to look at a particular design concept in the
context of its use. To be sure, Mr. Brannigan is correct in believing
that deck guns have not been terribly useful on submarines in the last
45 years. That lack of usefulness, I believe, is the reason their
were taken off. It is a common mistake if one is not used to doing
careful research and can be a pitfall for all of us. I don't have a
buggy whip in my car, but that does not lead me to assume they never
had a use.
Ken Young
> 5"/25s to be mounted on their boats
operated in the Pacific. It is I hope accepted that the Japanese did not
understand anti submarine warfare. On the other hand Germany totally
abandoned the idea of deck guns in favour of better underwater
performance. Interestingly the only major navy not to build submarine
cruisers between the wars was the German Navy. Their experience with Q
ships during WW1 indicated that a submarine should never engage in gun
combat. The only cases of U boats attempting gun combat during WW2 was
when they had been forced to the surface or were unable to submerge
Ken Young
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>
>.
>
>.
> Submarines, being essentially a circular hull section with bilge keels
> to lengthen the period of roll have a very stable roll feature.
Logs in the water have a stable roll feature. that doesn't make them
stable platforms.
>
> The gun does indeed slow the ship down, (the concept of consuming
> weight, I am afraid I don't understand), and requires maintenance are
> true. The speed reduction becomes a des
It takes energy to move the mass of the gun, its ammunition, its ballast
etc.This is in addition to the streamlining issue.
> With reference to 2. above, The deck gun becomes the ultimate superior
> weapon in any situation in which its range is greater than the range
> of an opponents weapons. In that situation, the submarine needs to
> maintain a range from the target which is within the range of its deck
> gun and outside the range of the enemy's weapons.
and it must know this before it begins the action.
I don't have a
> buggy whip in my car, but that does not lead me to assume they never
> had a use.
The analogy is ppor. Prior to the development of aircraft and
radio submarines could be expected to engage ships on the surface.
Deck guns had a role then. . the problem wit h evaluating the gun actions the way youu
describe
is that we don't
know the opportuity costs of using the gun, (I.E. what opportunities
had to be forgone to use it)
and we have to set it against
total cost of installing and maintaining them on a whole fleet.
Vince
Steve Atkatz
>
> > A great many sub captains of 1945 requested both
> > 5"/25s to be mounted on their boats
> I think you will find that all US sub commanders that requested deck guns
> operated in the Pacific.
Right! 99.9% of US Submarine Operations in WWII were in the Pacific,
where the US Submarine force of 252 boats and 35000 men, about 2% of the
USN, accounted for 54% of Japan's total shipping losses. By the latter
part of 1944 there were so few quality targets left the deck gun came in
handy for trawlers, barges and fishing boats (we were trying to starve
the Japanese and doing a pretty good job of it) that weren't worth a
torpedo. That way you could have some fish left to finish your patrol in
case something worthwhile came by.
>It is I hope accepted that the Japanese did not
> understand anti submarine warfare.
Accepted??? By who??? Gimmee a break! Is it vaguely possible that the
IJN, which was pretty darned good at everything else might not have been
that bad at ASW, just that we were a hell of a lot better with our boats.
>On the other hand Germany totally
> abandoned the idea of deck guns in favour of better underwater
> performance.
Right, there were enough big targets out there that there
was no need for the deck gun to shoot up the small stuff
that couldn't shoot back. Performance became much more
important. Anyway, the results of Allied surface ASW in the
Atlantic weren't really that great. The Battle of the
Atlantic was won by the RAF and the US Jeep Carriers. The
Destroyers, DE's and Corvettes acted primarily as a deterent
to attack. The planes got to the U Boats, and sunk them, (check the
numbers) BEFORE they got within shooting range, many right
in the Bay of Biscay as they left and returned to port.
<snip>
> The only cases of U boats attempting gun combat during WW2 was
> when they had been forced to the surface or were unable to submerge.
That was just heroism (yes, even the Germans could be heroic) in a
futile, losing situation.
> Ken Young
> ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
--
A to Z
***************************************
Age and Treachery will always prevail
Over Youth and Vigor. DBF!!!
Kevin Stewart
>With reference to 1. above: Any ship not equipped with a gyro
>stabilized vertical reference device which is automatically linked to
>the servos which control elevation of the gun barrel is a terrible gun
>platform.
Gyro stabilization and continuous elevation control weren't available
on battleship main armament until WWII, and only on modern US ships
at that. Prior practice was to fire when the roll brought the sights
on, or fractionally before. You are calling all warships built
before this period terrrible gun platforms, which is an exaggeration.
Submarines were bad gun platforms, irrespectively of their GM,
mostly because they had minimal fire control gear of *any* kind,
had negligible freeboard, and were vulnerable to even a single
hit removing their ability to dive.
Having said that, the top scoring submarine of all time, U-35 of
WWI, sank the vast majority of her 224 victims by gunfire.
Of course, most of her kills were prior to convoy and defensive
armament on merchant ships.
Kevin Stewart
TD Bank IMS Technical Support
I don't speak for TD, and they don't speak for me...
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
I am not sure what is happening on my server, but it seems to
delete text after the first snip
vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Arved Sandstrom
We broke through your university computing system firewall last weekend.
Ever since, we've been monitoring your email and scanning your files.
The decision to start suppressing your right to free speech was made on
Thursday, at an NSC meeting. The Attorney-General signed off on the
warrant, and we started clamping down Friday.
Don't bother complaining to anyone. Everything is "black-budgeted", and
we're using guys out of NSA and the Army Intelligence Support Activity
(no, we didn't disband them all, we just gave 'em new names, and
decided not to tell Congress or the White House about it).
You've been reading too many spy novels. Carefully arranging your
underwear, putting hairs in strategic places, and talcum-dusting locks
isn't going to cut it. We've broken in both of the last 2 nights, and
once while you were there. I'll bet you didn't notice the fact that your
new pillow is now miked. Did you know that you snore? And why are you
still dreaming about that girl from high school (yeah, we got her
dossier, too).
The first time we were in, we ran the shower, the stereo, and made the
dog bark, so we could get tapes. Now we've got active sound-cancellation
in, so don't bother whispering with the music playing loud.
There's a parabolic reflector pointed at your deck (which needs to be
re-treated BTW), and we're scanning every window with lasers.
Our lawyer told us that one thing was going too far. So rip off the
third button down on that really tacky suit you like to wear. It's
actually a RAIMU - a Remote Access Individual Monitoring Unit. 200k a
shot, GPS capability, 50 meg micro hard-drive, 2-way satellite comm, the
new dark brown threads in the suit are actually part of the passive
acoustic array, and it's running an AMD chip at about 300 MHz.
Well, to be truthful, our lawyer (good guy, worked on this case in LA
last year, got the guy off, can't remember the name of the defendant,
though) also told us that none of the videotapes we shot at the motel
just off the Beltway would be accepted in court. So we just made copies
and sold 'em.
Have a nice evening, and enjoy the concert tonight with your charming
wife. We like good music, too.
Sincerely,
Your friends at various gov't agencies.
--
Arved H. Sandstro"m | YISDER ZOMENIMOR
Physical Oceanography Group | ORZIZZAZIZ
Dept.of Physics, Memorial Univ. of NFLD | ZANZERIZ
asnd...@crosby.physics.mun.ca | ORZIZ
Bob Keeter
>
<snip>
>
>One must be very careful to look at a particular design concept in the
>context of its use. To be sure, Mr. Brannigan is correct in believing
>that deck guns have not been terribly useful on submarines in the last
>45 years. That lack of usefulness, I believe, is the reason their
>were taken off. It is a common mistake if one is not used to doing
>had a use.
The one overriding reason for the removal of deck guns from submarines
was possibly not so much the drag caused underwater as it was the noise
caused by the mount. At any speed, submerged, the mount would provide
plenty of cavities that could lead to cavitation and the "gurgling" noises
that submariners hate with a passion.
Regards
bk
TAN TOT LIT
: I think you will find that all US sub commanders that requested deck guns
: operated in the Pacific. It is I hope accepted that the Japanese did not
: understand anti submarine warfare. On the other hand Germany totally
: ships during WW1 indicated that a submarine should never engage in gun
I think it is a case of the nature of operation in the pacific
that make deck guns useful.
German subs are used in huge quantities, with the main objective being
attacking convoys, often in a wolf pack. Running out of torpedos are
probably not as often as running out of opportunities to fire the
torpedos. The weather condition is bad for surface combat for
submarines, besides the convoy are usually heavily protected by
destroyers and larger warships, not something that you'll wanna fight
with the tiny deck guns. The water ways tend to be open, with lots
of room to manuveur.
In the pacific, submarines often operate on prolong patrol alone or
in small groups, often in confine waterways when you'll find small
boats (perfect targets for the deck guns) charging at you at the turn
of the corner. Targets are often small group of ships with less
escorts. It is also really easy to have all 24 torps gone. And you'll
just take a hammer and knock yourself if you find an unescorted
merchantman without any torps to sink it. Besides, you should have
heard of the case where a US submarine disabled a japanese ship,
(I think it is a oil tanker but I could be wrong) with a spread,
surfaced and pick the best seat and carry on to dump 8 more torps
into the side of the ship, and none of them detonated. I wonder
what the captain of the boat would pay to get a deck gun added on
the spot :-)
Terrence
--
~Frisky Kitty~
!*% T-5......T-4........T-3.....T-2....T-1................BOOM!!
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>.. Besides, you should have
> heard of the case where a US submarine disabled a japanese ship,
> (I think it is a oil tanker but I could be wrong) with a spread,
> surfaced and pick the best seat and carry on to dump 8 more torps
> into the side of the ship, and none of them detonated. I wonder
> what the captain of the boat would pay to get a deck gun added on
> the spot :-)
If you are referrring to the tonan maru #2 incident. The target had a
deck gun which required the sub to stay submerged.
any submarine that fired all its torpedoes headed for home. It didn't
hang around looking for something to shoot at, without any torpedoes to
use on an escort.
vince
Jim Christley
> Submarines, being essentially a circular hull section with bilge >keels
> to lengthen the period of roll have a very stable roll feature.
.>Logs in the water have a stable roll feature. that doesn't make
>them
>stable platforms.
I didn't say a submarine was a stable platform, I said it had a stable
roll feature which means it could be predicted. If you can predict
the roll, you can lead the target on the roll. This was taught and
practiced.
>
> The gun does indeed slow the ship down, (the concept of consuming
> weight, I am afraid I don't understand), and requires maintenance are
> true. The speed reduction becomes a des
>It takes energy to move the mass of the gun, its ammunition, its >ballast
>etc.This is in addition to the streamlining issue.
The energy require to move the gun, etc., was so small as to be a
third order effect in the design modification discussion. Most of the
weight (topside) was replaced with streamlining fairing weight and
deck modifications. The major reason for the removal of the deck gun
from US submarines in the early 1950's was the change in the methods
of use of submarines and the percieved threats they faced. This point
is discussed in depth in BuShips reports and papers of the period.
> With reference to 2. above, The deck gun becomes the ultimate >superior
> weapon in any situation in which its range is greater than the range
> of an opponents weapons. In that situation, the submarine needs to
> maintain a range from the target which is within the range of its >deck
> gun and outside the range of the enemy's weapons.
>and it must know this before it begins the action.
Absolutely true and there are recorded occasions where mistakes have
been made. This point is exactly what made Q'Ships a viable ASW
options.
I don't have a
> buggy whip in my car, but that does not lead me to assume they never
> had a use.
>The analogy is ppor. Prior to the development of aircraft and
>radio submarines could be expected to engage ships on the surface.
>Deck guns had a role then. . the problem wit h evaluating the gun >actions the way youu
>describe
>is that we don't
>know the opportuity costs of using the gun, (I.E. what opportunities
>had to be forgone to use it)
>and we have to set it against
>total cost of installing and maintaining them on a whole fleet.
>Vince
The analogy is indeed quite correct. It was not about whether
submarines needed deck guns, it was about your analysis of the need
based on your view of submarine technical and design history which, it
would appear is limited. Submarine deck guns were not put on board
until after aircraft and radio became tool sets in the naval warfare
equation also. The US Navy did not put deck guns on until after it
was demonstrated that (by the British and German submarine forces)
that there was a use for them and they were not taken off until it was
demonstrated that the time for their use was over.
You say "we don't know the opportunity costs of using the gun". That
"we" is dangerous. The men whose profession it was to make the
decision did, in fact, know and still do. If there was a use for deck
guns on submarines today, there would be deck guns on submarines.
Your not knowing is insufficient qualification for the overall
statement of "we".
Jim Christley
WILLIAM HAROLD ROLLINS
Prof. Vincent Brannigan (vb...@umail.umd.edu) wrote:
: I am not sure what is happening on my server, but it seems to
: delete text after the first snip
And some of us are really happy about it. ;-)
Bill in New Mexico
Kevin Stewart
> Submarine deck guns were not put on board
>until after aircraft and radio became tool sets in the naval warfare
>equation also.
The WWI U-boats, and WWI British subs, carried deck guns long
before aircraft or effective long range radio communication.
They were quite effective partly *because* there was no
aircraft threat and few of their merchant ship targets carried
radios.
Steve Atkatz
> TMost of the
> weight (topside) was replaced with streamlining fairing weight and
> deck modifications.
<Big Snip again>
>
> >Vince
> Where does weight come into this discussion? I always thought a submarine
must have neutral buoyancy, therefor, you must replace the weight of the
gun with other equipment, ballast, trim, etc. or you don't go down.
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>OK Mr. Brannigan, are you just poking around or do you have a point?
>
I can't possibly have any point worth considering if in the 20th century
someone believes that shooting on the roll is a viable method of fire
control.
As you point out, submarines were not stable, could not shoot at a target
which was known to be armed, and exposed the submarine to specific
countermeasures.
The more interesting point is how decisions on weapon systems get made.
and how institutional inertia sets in. The sub deck gun in WWII is a
small,
but interesting example of such inertia.
Vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
><Big Snip>
>
>> TMost of the
>> weight (topside) was replaced with streamlining fairing weight and
>> deck modifications.
>
><Big Snip again>
>>
>> >Vince
>> Where does weight come into this discussion? I always thought a submarine
>must have neutral buoyancy, therefor, you must replace the weight of the
>gun with other equipment, ballast, trim, etc. or you don't go down.
>
Its perhaps easier to think in terms of mass than weight. It takes energy
to move mass through the water, even at neutral bouyancy. Every bit of
dead mass you carry means that a similar ammount of useful mass is left
behind. Guns,ammunition and ballast are very dense i.e like engines, as
opposed to air people, fuel and food . As you consume stores through the
trip you replace their mass with sea water. However, on the surface, you
can lighten the ship, up to a point, by pumping water out.
I do not have the mass figure for deck guns and their associated stores
ballast etc. obvioulsy the significance of the issue is related to this
point.
vince
Roger Eustis
<vb...@umail.umd.edu> writes:
> snip quote,snip
>
>> If you could hit it with a torpedo, you used one. most of the deck
>> actions were agasint very small craft.
> Gosh Prof (of what?) where do you get this stuff....the Royal Navy's most
celebrated Sub Squadron in WWII (10 SM operating from Malta against Rommel's
supply convoys) used surface gun action against shore targets in Italy to
great effect. They destroyed bridges, railway lines and other targets of
opportunity as well as landing raiding groups. For a gripping account of
submarine warfare in the European theatre I can recommend
John Wingate's book <<< Fighting Tenth>>>.
I have often wondered why, considering the range and rapid loading
characteristics of modern naval guns ie Vospers Mk8 4.5inch, that modern
SSK's (even SSN's?) have totally abandoned the shore bombardment option....
woulda scared the bejasus out of certain ungodly elements occupying Kuwait
city for example... hope deep diving contributors will forgive my ignorance
on the technical aspects!
BTW, I don't think six inch was largest gun calibre fitted in a submersible.
I hazily recall that the French Navy had a monster (SURCOUF?) with a larger
gun turret fitted forward of the sail in 1930's.Never caught on tho'.
Bravo Zulu at the Dip,
Roger;-}
-- .... .. --
" Fortibus es In Ero " - London Transport motto
Ed Rudnicki
In article <3179C6...@tribeca.ios.com>,
Steve Atkatz <ato...@tribeca.ios.com> wrote:
>Ken Young wrote:
>>It is I hope accepted that the Japanese did not
>> understand anti submarine warfare.
>
>IJN, which was pretty darned good at everything else might not have been
>that bad at ASW, just that we were a hell of a lot better with our boats.
No. The Japanese failed to grasp the operational/strategic aspects
of ASW. They never adopted convoys; as a result their merchant fleet
was as sheep to the wolves. I daresay the bold US use of deck guns
would not have occurred against convoys with escorts, which is what
the Germans faced.
>>On the other hand Germany totally
>> abandoned the idea of deck guns in favour of better underwater
>> performance.
>
>Right, there were enough big targets out there that there
>was no need for the deck gun to shoot up the small stuff
>that couldn't shoot back. Performance became much more
Try guessing again. As the war progressed the Germans had to contend
not only with escorted convoys, but independent hunter-killer
groups. Surface gun attacks were simply no longer possible.
In the early days of the war surface gun attacks by U-boats were
possible. The Allies changed their tactics to stop this. The
Japanese never did.
>> The only cases of U boats attempting gun combat during WW2 was
>> when they had been forced to the surface or were unable to submerge.
>
>That was just heroism (yes, even the Germans could be heroic) in a
>futile, losing situation.
No. In the early days of the war surface gun attacks were
successfully conducted, as were surface torpedo attacks.
Ed Rudnicki
erud...@pica.army.mil
Oculis numquam claudentibus
Kevin Stewart
>BTW, I don't think six inch was largest gun calibre fitted in a submersible.
>I hazily recall that the French Navy had a monster (SURCOUF?) with a larger
>gun turret fitted forward of the sail in 1930's.Never caught on tho'.
The Royal Navy had three "submarine monitors" with a single 12" gun,
M-1, M-2 and M-3. They were laid down during WWI. The guns came out
of stocks held for predreadnoughts, and could be fired from periscope
depth (barrel above the surface). It could not be reloaded submerged.
Idea was to pop up, let fly, and submerge again. Apparently it worked
pretty well, although never used in action. Only M1 saw any war
service. M-2 later had the gun removed in favour of a seaplane hanger,
and was lost in an accident in 1933. M-1 was lost in a collision in
1925, M-3 became a minelayer and was scrapped in 1932.
50 12" shells could be carried, along with 8 18" torpedoes for
the four bow tubes.
I think the RN might have found some interesting uses for these
boats had they been available in WWII. Suprisingly, they were
reputed to handle very well and could dive in 90 seconds.
Source: Conways
Andrew Toppan
> BTW, I don't think six inch was largest gun calibre fitted in a submersible.
> I hazily recall that the French Navy had a monster (SURCOUF?) with a larger
> gun turret fitted forward of the sail in 1930's.Never caught on tho'.
Surcouf had two 8" pieces. The Brit submarine monitors of WWI
had a single 12" gun.
--
Andrew Toppan --- el...@wpi.edu --- el...@confusion.net
Railroads, Ships and Aircraft Homepage -- http://www.wpi.edu/~elmer/
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
>
> I.
> > Gosh Prof (of what?) where do you get this stuff...
we were discussing US sub activities in the pacific.
the Royal Navy's most
> celebrated Sub Squadron in WWII (10 SM operating from Malta against Rommel's
> supply convoys) used surface gun action against shore targets in Italy to
> great effect. They destroyed bridges, railway lines and other targets of
> opportunity as well as landing raiding groups. For a gripping account of
> submarine warfare in the European theatre I can recommend
> John Wingate's book <<< Fighting Tenth>>>.
Men died in great numbers to supply malta. certainly any time spentt
by a Malta submarine shelling the Italian coast must be taken as
an Axis victory. Pinpricks in Italy do not stop supplies.
Telling the Enemy where you are is not the way to interdict supplies
It may be magnificent, but it was not war.
Jim Christley
>until after aircraft and radio became tool sets in the naval warfare
>equation also.
>The WWI U-boats, and WWI British subs, carried deck guns long
>before aircraft or effective long range radio communication.
>They were quite effective partly *because* there was no
>aircraft threat and few of their merchant ship targets carried >radios.
I agree with the effective long range radio communication coming after
deck guns, but, radio communication in a code "talk between ships" was
used under limited conditions very effectively and was standard
practice by 1912 for German and British submarines. Americans followed
and by 1915/1916 it had become standard practice to equip American
submarines with radios as new construction.
Their may not have been an actual aircraft threat, but, there was a
percieved one. US, German, French and British submarines were
routinely equipped with "alti scopes" because of the threat. Lake
submarines G-1,2,3 were so equipped.N-Class, F-Class, E-Class US
submarines carried no deck guns but had radios.
This entire discussion is academic, however, because the deck gun was
useful in certain conditions, times and places. Had it not been, they
wouldn't have been put on the boats and the submarine commanders on
the scene, in the battle and making the weapons selection choices
would have demanded they be taken off. They would have gone the way
of the wherry's. The concept was pushed to its limits then the
conditions which made it useful went away, and so did the deck gun.
It was hard to use, awkward, added drag, added weight, and was
generally only accurate with good conditions, practice and luck.
The device did sink ships, large and small. Like the bow and arrow or
the spear, the time for its use came and passed. There still are no
conceivable occasions where one may argue a bow an arrow are usefull
in sea combat, but........I would never say they never had a place.
Jim
Jim Christley
>someone believes that shooting on the roll is a viable method of fire
>control.
>As you point out, submarines were not stable, could not shoot at a >target
>which was known to be armed, and exposed the submarine to specific
>countermeasures.
>The more interesting point is how decisions on weapon systems get >made.
>and how institutional inertia sets in. The sub deck gun in WWII is a
>small,
>but interesting example of such inertia
You are right, a discussion of how this "institutional inertia" would
effect the equipping of submarines with deck guns during WWII would be
interesting. I look forward to your hypothesis.
If you do not have a stable verticle device such as a MK6 gyro stable
platform and have it tied into the traversing and elevation mechanism
of your gun and your gun is on a ship you are required to "fire on the
roll" you have no choice and you must know how. It was a practiced
skill. Not just on submarines. Any shot in any seaway on a target
where elevation is necessary to make the range requires either
stabalization or firing on the roll. US submarines were to be so
equipped in 1946-48 as part of a rudementary fire control system. As
it was deemed at that point unnecessary, the setup never got beyond
the EDM stage. The stable vertical installation was not then required
until submarines became missile firing platforms.
Jim
Kevin Stewart
>I agree with the effective long range radio communication coming after
>deck guns, but, radio communication in a code "talk between ships" was
>used under limited conditions very effectively and was standard
>practice by 1912 for German and British submarines. Americans followed
>and by 1915/1916 it had become standard practice to equip American
>submarines with radios as new construction.
radio on the sub, it's the radio on the target. Short range radios
don't pose much of a threat. Long range ones do.
>Their may not have been an actual aircraft threat, but, there was a
>percieved one. US, German, French and British submarines were
>routinely equipped with "alti scopes" because of the threat. Lake
>submarines G-1,2,3 were so equipped.N-Class, F-Class, E-Class US
>submarines carried no deck guns but had radios.
unarmed, radioless merchant ship by leisurely shellfire without
any real risk of air attack. In fact, many victims were only
*stopped* by shellfire, then boarded and scuttled.
Minimal expenditure of ammunition - and anyway one can
carry far more shells than torpedoes.
A good trivia question: were any WWI
subs sunk by aircraft?
>This entire discussion is academic, however, because the deck gun was
>useful in certain conditions, times and places. Had it not been, they
>wouldn't have been put on the boats
Concurr.
Paul Jonathan Adam
> I can't possibly have any point worth considering if in the 20th century
> someone believes that shooting on the roll is a viable method of fire
> control.
Then most small ships weren't effective gun platforms... Certainly the
small submarine-chasers the American boats were primarily fighting, and the
merchantmen and trawlers they hunted, were likewise ineffective.
> As you point out, submarines were not stable, could not shoot at a target
> which was known to be armed, and exposed the submarine to specific
> countermeasures.
The Japanese submarine chasers were often only armed with machine guns
and depth charges. Surface two miles from one of those and engage with
40mm and 5" guns. Conserve torpedoes and destroy the enemy. The ship had
a speed advantage of perhaps five or six knots, before accounting for
battle damage. Most of the targets, as opposed to the hunters, were
small and unarmed: prime targets for shellfire as opposed to torpedoes.
> The more interesting point is how decisions on weapon systems get made.
> and how institutional inertia sets in. The sub deck gun in WWII is a
> small, but interesting example of such inertia.
Actually, Professor, it isn't. The USN started the war deploring the deck
gun, and ended it by mounting major batteries on its submarines. Hardly
"inertia". In very different conditions, German U-boats went from a gun
and light AA armament, to massive AA armament, to (in the Type XXIs)
light AA cannon faired into the fin only, as in their war they needed
submerged speed far more than surfave firepower. In both cases, the
situation was fluid and responsive to the needs of the war.
--
"When you have shot and killed a man, you have defined your attitude
towards him. You have offered a definite answer to a definite problem.
For better or for worse, you have acted decisively.
In fact, the next move is up to him." R. A. Lafferty
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Paul Jonathan Adam
> we were discussing US sub activities in the pacific.
Where the deck gun was a very valuable weapon.
> Men died in great numbers to supply malta. certainly any time spentt
> by a Malta submarine shelling the Italian coast must be taken as
> an Axis victory. Pinpricks in Italy do not stop supplies.
> Telling the Enemy where you are is not the way to interdict supplies
> It may be magnificent, but it was not war.
If you've attacked a convoy, and you're about to head back to refuel
and rearm, using up some 4" ammo on a railway marshalling yard is more
useful than bringing it home.
And you're not telling the enemy where you are. By the time anyone arrives
to do something about it, the enemy knows where you *were*. Less useful.
Harassing and intimidating the enemy has value too.
David Stevens
Hardly a definitive list, but two incidents worth mentioning:
HM Submarine B.10 was sunk in Venice during an Austrian air-raid
on the harbour 9 August 1916 - whether she was a deliberate
target is probably anyone's guess. In harbour, so perhaps not a
fair test.
With regards to open-sea air attacks, C.25 was crippled by
machine-gun fire from a flock of five German seaplanes in 1918 -
the CO and five crewmen were killed, the pressure hull holed, and
the electric motors smashed. She was only saved by the chance
arrival of an RN E-class submarine which drove off the aircraft
with her 4" gun and towed her home.
David Stevens
Matt Clonfero
In message <830460...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> Paul Jonathan Adam wrote:
> If you've attacked a convoy, and you're about to head back to refuel
> and rearm, using up some 4" ammo on a railway marshalling yard is more
> useful than bringing it home.
Not to mention the fact that some parts of coastal Italy are, like, hilly.
With bridges and stuff. Blowing them up delays supplies - more so than
no doing anything.
> And you're not telling the enemy where you are. By the time anyone arrives
> to do something about it, the enemy knows where you *were*. Less useful.
Right. You total a bridge. The Italians find the bridge is gone the next day.
A sub doing 10 knots is now 240nm away. Arriv.. Arived.. Ciao.
Aetherem Vincere
Matt.
--
===============================================================================
Matt Clonfero (ma...@aetherem.demon.co.uk) | To err is human,
My employer & I have a deal - they don't | To forgive is not Air Force Policy.
speak for me, and I don't speak for them. | -- Anon, ETPS
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> .
>
> The Japanese submarine chasers were often only armed with machine guns
> and depth charges. Surface two miles from one of those and engage with
> 40mm and 5" guns. Conserve torpedoes and destroy the enemy. The ship had
> a speed advantage of perhaps five or six knots, before accounting for
> battle damage. Most of the targets, as opposed to the hunters, were
> small and unarmed: prime targets for shellfire as opposed to torpedoes.
Now this is a fantasy.
Do you have a single example of a submarine egaging a subchaser
voluntarily to conserve torpedoes? No ship could use depth charges.
Sub chasers had to have sufficient speed to escape the blast of their own
depth charges. any submarine at 15 knots could not use its deck gun.
> The more interesting point is how decisions on weapon systems get made.
> > and how institutional inertia sets in. The sub deck gun in WWII is a
> > small, but interesting example of such inertia.
>
> Actually, Professor, it isn't. The USN started the war deploring the deck
> gun, and ended it by mounting major batteries on its submarines. Hardly
> "inertia". In very different conditions, German U-boats went from a gun
> and light AA armament, to massive AA armament, to (in the Type XXIs)
> light AA cannon faired into the fin only, as in their war they needed
> submerged speed far more than surfave firepower. In both cases, the
> situation was fluid and responsive to the needs of the war.
>
By 1945 US Submarines were looking for a missionnany missionn
deck guns allowed us to use expensive, higly trained naval units
to shoot up fishing boats. It was simply a dramatic example of
how our factories could turn out more weapons than we could use.
the Germans had the reverse problem. The Luftwaffe was neverr
willing to provide the needed air cover or recon to give the U boats
a fighting chance in the battle of the Atlantic.
in 1944 German submarines were trying to operate without
air cover through the Bay of Biscay.
Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war,
installing AA guns on German U-boats indicated thay had lost.
Neither one ahd any effect on the war.
Vince
RoundTower
"Perfesser Vink Brnnigan" fingered:
>> By 1945 US Submarines were looking for a missionnany missionn deck guns
allowed us to use expensive, higly trained naval units to shoot up fishing
boats. It was simply a dramatic example of how our factories could turn
out more weapons than we could use. <<
Wonder if he grades on spelling....?
>> Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war,
>> installing AA guns on German U-boats indicated thay had lost. <<
OMIGOD!! An Actual Coherent Point!! But then like so many others, it's
been said before . . .
Now lemme see if I can import a spellchecker into this here browser
program....
RT
"I speak for myself, only for myself, and for no one but myself."
Edwin culver
: BTW, I don't think six inch was largest gun calibre fitted in a submersible.
: I hazily recall that the French Navy had a monster (SURCOUF?) with a larger
: gun turret fitted forward of the sail in 1930's.Never caught on tho'.
The French Navy built at least one submarine (Surcouf?) with 8" guns. The RN
may (memory does not serve well) have built some M-class boats with a 12"/35
gun. Guns disappeared from submarines because they gave up surface action--
a little hole in a pressure vessel makes submerging a bit chancy.
EMC
Paul Jonathan Adam
> > The Japanese submarine chasers were often only armed with machine guns
> > and depth charges. Surface two miles from one of those and engage with
> > 40mm and 5" guns. Conserve torpedoes and destroy the enemy. The ship had
> > a speed advantage of perhaps five or six knots, before accounting for
> > battle damage. Most of the targets, as opposed to the hunters, were
> > small and unarmed: prime targets for shellfire as opposed to torpedoes.
>
> Now this is a fantasy.
> Do you have a single example of a submarine egaging a subchaser
> voluntarily to conserve torpedoes? No ship could use depth charges.
> Sub chasers had to have sufficient speed to escape the blast of their own
> depth charges. any submarine at 15 knots could not use its deck gun.
Well, the engineer across from me at work was on the casing deck during the
last submarine gunnery shoot in the Royal Navy, and he disagrees with most
of your information, Professor.
> By 1945 US Submarines were looking for a missionnany missionn
> deck guns allowed us to use expensive, higly trained naval units
> to shoot up fishing boats. It was simply a dramatic example of
> how our factories could turn out more weapons than we could use.
Not to mention adversely affecting the diet of the Japanese. Protein
deficiency isn't very nice. No fishing boats, no small coasters, in
fact it became almost impossible to move anything by sea.
> the Germans had the reverse problem. The Luftwaffe was neverr
> willing to provide the needed air cover or recon to give the U boats
> a fighting chance in the battle of the Atlantic.
How was it going to do so anyway? And saying the U-boats didn't have
a chance would get you committed for psychiatric care in 1942.
As for air cover, operating fighters or a carrier in the Atlantic wouldn't
really work. Long-range aircraft for reconnaisance and strike? Don't I
remember something called the Focke-Wulf 200?
> Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war
Why? It indicated that the Japanese tactics allowed deck guns to be useful,
nothing more.
> installing AA guns on German U-boats indicated thay had lost.
So when they came off en masse in the Type XXI design, Germany was winning
again?
> Neither one ahd any effect on the war.
Now there's a sweeping statement. You are saying that US and German submarines
could have sailed slick, and there would have been no changes whatsoever?
I think you need to refresh your history of ASW.
Thomas Buell
Prof. Vincent Brannigan wrote (23 Apr 1996 14:57:44 GMT):
: Its perhaps easier to think in terms of mass than weight. It takes energy
: to move mass through the water, even at neutral bouyancy. [...]
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^??
I do not understand your argument. Ever since the laws of nature were
enacted it does take energy to accellerate mass or to move it against the
gravitational force, but not to keep it moving. This is what Newton
has described.
So neither weight nor mass but drag is relevant for the consumption of
propulsion energy. (Or did I simply get you wrong?)
best regards
cand. phys. Thomas Buell
--
| Thomas Buell | tel: +49-5323-4626 |
| Osteroeder Strasse 6, (Zi.27) | email: |
| D-38678 Clausthal-Zellerfeld | bu...@heim1.tu-clausthal.de |
Thomas Buell
Prof. Vincent Brannigan wrote (23 Apr 1996 14:57:44 GMT):
: Its perhaps easier to think in terms of mass than weight. It takes energy
: to move mass through the water, even at neutral bouyancy. [...]
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^??
I do not understand your argument. Ever since the laws of nature were
enacted it did take energy to accellerate mass or to move it against the
gravitational force, but not to keep it moving. This is what Newton
has described.
So neither weight nor mass but drag is relevant for the propulsion power
when a vessel moves through the water at constant speed and level - at
neutral bouyancy.
(Or did I simply get you wrong?)
best regards
cand. phys. Thomas Buell
--
| Thomas Buell | tel: +49-05323-4626 |
ODJennings
> Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war
Wasn't the trend late in the war to remove deck guns during refits?
I recall photos of Mare Island work showing guns being removed. I think we
took off most of the aft guns from most of the fleet boats.
Myron Howard
odjen...@aol.com (ODJennings) wrote:
>Wasn't the trend late in the war to remove deck guns during refits?
>I recall photos of Mare Island work showing guns being removed. I think we
>took off most of the aft guns from most of the fleet boats.
From _U.S. Submarines Through 1945_ by Dr. Norman Friedman, page 28:
' Late war submarines typically had two 5-in gun foundations; the
single gun could be mounted fore or aft. The first submarine with two
5-in/25 (and two 40 mm guns) was Sennet (SS408); her first patrol was
in January 1945. She then operated in a wolf pack with two similarly
armed boats, Haddock (231) and Legato (371). They were so successful
that OpNav authorized this battery for any submarine whose CO wanted
it. By September, 1945, the approved battery was two 5-in/25s (of
which one was normally carried). A major early postwar submarine force
goal was to buy enough 5-in guns to provide two for all active and
reserve boats.'
Seems to me that by war's end, guns were thought to be very important
in the perceived mission of the submarine force of the day. In
Friedman's _U.S. Submarines Since 1945_ on page 43 is a photo of USS
Runner SS476 dated April 17, 1952 after her conversion to a fleet
snorkel and she still carried the 5-in/25 on the aft foundation.The
caption mentions Kraken, Torsk and Medregal as also having retained
their guns. It goes on to say that within a few years all fleet
snorkels had surrendered their 5-in guns. Must have been very few
years because I went on the Bream in 1957 and never saw a deck gun on
any of our boats that I saw during the next 4 years.
--
DBF
Myron Howard ex-EN2(SS)
USS Bream SSK243
USS Springer SS414
Ken Young
The M class were replacement contracts for K18 to 21. While the gun
system worked, fire control was totally inadequate. With the period
control systems a 12 inch battleship could be expected to fire two or
three 4 gun ladders to get a straddle. To get a first shot hit with one
gun you would have had to close to torpedo range anyway.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
Sue Thing
In article <4m1i60$c...@newsbf02.news.aol.com> odjen...@aol.com (ODJennings) writes:
>From: odjen...@aol.com (ODJennings)
>Subject: Re: Submarine Deck Guns
>Date: 29 Apr 1996 00:56:32 -0400
>> Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war
>Wasn't the trend late in the war to remove deck guns during refits?
>I recall photos of Mare Island work showing guns being removed. I think we
>took off most of the aft guns from most of the fleet boats.
IIRC, didn't pre-WWII boats (i.e. S-boats) have deck guns? Thought somebody
said the Narwhal had 2; one fore and one aft of the sail.
Myron Howard
plbu...@indirect.com (Sue Thing) wrote:
>IIRC, didn't pre-WWII boats (i.e. S-boats) have deck guns? Thought somebody
>said the Narwhal had 2; one fore and one aft of the sail.
You recall correctly. If I am reading the Armament Table in Jim
Christley's Submarine Force Information Book correctly, beginning
with the Holland until after WWII, there were only 19 boats without
deck guns. Those with guns included the L, M, T, O, R, S, and Fleet
boats. The Narwhal and the Argonaut both had two 6-in/53s.
Keith
In article <4lt5dg$7...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> writes:
>From: "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu>
>Subject: Re: Submarine Deck Guns
>Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>> .
>>
>> The Japanese submarine chasers were often only armed with machine guns
>> and depth charges. Surface two miles from one of those and engage with
>> 40mm and 5" guns. Conserve torpedoes and destroy the enemy. The ship had
>> a speed advantage of perhaps five or six knots, before accounting for
>> battle damage. Most of the targets, as opposed to the hunters, were
>> small and unarmed: prime targets for shellfire as opposed to torpedoes.
>Now this is a fantasy.
>Do you have a single example of a submarine egaging a subchaser
>voluntarily to conserve torpedoes? No ship could use depth charges.
>Sub chasers had to have sufficient speed to escape the blast of their own
>depth charges. any submarine at 15 knots could not use its deck gun.
Easy! RN subs despatched to the Far East rapidly picked up on the
need to work up their gun-action drills and to max-up their stores of deck
gun ammo. This was especially so in the case of those tasked to coastal
intruder missions from '43 onwards. A typical target at that time was a
500 coaster with maybe a couple of rickety sub-chasers cobbled together from
(say) a steam trawler or motor yacht. One or two depth charges and a
battery of m.g's was about par for the course.
Typical drill was to manoeuver for position, surface and engage the
main target (coaster) -- aim for the bridge and then the waterline. The
usually aggressive response from the escort(s) could then be met
opportunistically by the 3" quickly switching targets. Once the escort was
taken care off, the sub could then quickly close with the coaster. A couple
more 3" rounds and a drum 20mm AAA at the waterline would do the trick.
Edward Young's "One of Our Submarines" fills in some excellent
detail of it all. He made the point that typically a torpedo attack was
really only sensible for targets of about 1500 tons and up, and that these
vessels would usually have quite a powerful escort. Surface gun actions
were thus increasingly the norm as the enemy "ran out of" larger ships and
were obliged to do their business using anything that floated, down to and
including junks and large sampans. Subchasers were thus also often
converted landing craft, fishing boats, etc. with a basic crew, a
detachment of soldiers, a couple of depth charges (if any) and a light
machine gun --- basically dogmeat for a sub's deck armament.
> > The more interesting point is how decisions on weapon systems get made.
>> > and how institutional inertia sets in. The sub deck gun in WWII is a
>> > small, but interesting example of such inertia.
>>
>> Actually, Professor, it isn't. The USN started the war deploring the deck
>> gun, and ended it by mounting major batteries on its submarines. Hardly
>> "inertia". In very different conditions, German U-boats went from a gun
>> and light AA armament, to massive AA armament, to (in the Type XXIs)
>> light AA cannon faired into the fin only, as in their war they needed
>> submerged speed far more than surfave firepower. In both cases, the
>> situation was fluid and responsive to the needs of the war.
>>
>By 1945 US Submarines were looking for a missionnany missionn
>deck guns allowed us to use expensive, higly trained naval units
>to shoot up fishing boats. It was simply a dramatic example of
>how our factories could turn out more weapons than we could use.
>the Germans had the reverse problem. The Luftwaffe was neverr
>willing to provide the needed air cover or recon to give the U boats
>a fighting chance in the battle of the Atlantic.
>in 1944 German submarines were trying to operate without
>air cover through the Bay of Biscay.
>Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war,
>installing AA guns on German U-boats indicated thay had lost.
>Neither one ahd any effect on the war.
Disagree with the last statement. The mission to kill one's
opposition was unchanged, the method simply adjusted to evolving
circumstances.
KRC
Roger Eustis
In article: <4lk6c7$1...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan"
<vb...@umail.umd.edu> writes:
> Path:
demon.co.uk!news.demon.co.uk!dispatch.news.demon.net!demon!btnet!newsfeed.in
ternetmci.com!uwm.edu!math.ohio-state.edu!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!lerc.nas
a.gov!purdue!haven.umd.edu!cville-srv.wam.umd.edu!usenet> Newsgroups: sci.military.naval
> Subject: Re: Deck Guns - USS Narwhal
> Date: 24 Apr 1996 03:15:19 GMT
> Organization: University of Maryland College Park
> Lines: 22
> Message-ID: <4lk6c7$1...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>
> References: <4ku3jm$i...@hecate.umd.edu> <4kvi6g$n...@newsbf02.news.aol.com>
<4l0mth$5...@hecate.umd.edu> <360416...@aaee.demon.co.uk>
> NNTP-Posting-Host: annex8-46.dial.umd.edu
>
> Roger Eustis <ro...@aaee.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> > I.
> > > Gosh Prof (of what?) where do you get this stuff...
>
>
> > celebrated Sub Squadron in WWII (10 SM operating from Malta against
Rommel's
> > supply convoys) used surface gun action against shore targets in Italy
to
> > great effect. They destroyed bridges, railway lines and other targets of
> > opportunity as well as landing raiding groups. For a gripping account of
> > submarine warfare in the European theatre I can recommend
> > John Wingate's book <<< Fighting Tenth>>>.
>
>
> by a Malta submarine shelling the Italian coast must be taken as
> an Axis victory. Pinpricks in Italy do not stop supplies.
> Telling the Enemy where you are is not the way to interdict supplies
> It may be magnificent, but it was not war.
>
war carried out from Malta by Max Horton's boats was a *critical*
element in the defeat of the Afrika Corps. In addition, submarines
carried ammunition, petrol,food and personnel safely into Malta at the
height of the island's siege, not to mention extensive mining of enemy
waters. Don't take my word for it...read the book. It certainly opened
my eyes to the non-traditional role of submarines *including* the
usefulness of deck armament.
> Roger ;-)
--
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
> last submarine gunnery shoot in the Royal Navy, and he disagrees with most
> of your information, Professor.
>
Thats fine, I presume he was engaging a subschaser, since that was the claimm.
> Not to mention adversely affecting the diet of the Japanese. Protein
> deficiency isn't very nice. No fishing boats, no small coasters, in
> fact it became almost impossible to move anything by sea.
on this theoy, we should not have been bombing japanese civilians,
killing them meant that they did not have to be fed. sinking
fishing boats in unpatrolled waters simply had not effect on the war.
>
> > the Germans had the reverse problem. The Luftwaffe was neverr
> > willing to provide the needed air cover or recon to give the U boats
> > a fighting chance in the battle of the Atlantic.
>
> How was it going to do so anyway? And saying the U-boats didn't have
> a chance would get you committed for psychiatric care in 1942.
>
the germans had a major problem crossing the Bay of Biscay, wheree
coastal command culd attack them they needed escort to get out
the open ocean. Leigh Lights and airborne radar made it a very dangerous
passage.
> As for air cover, operating fighters or a carrier in the Atlantic wouldn't
> really work. Long-range aircraft for reconnaisance and strike? Don't I
> remember something called the Focke-Wulf 200?
>
Actually long range fighters able to take on coastal command Bombers
were probably the key
> > Installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war
>
> Why? It indicated that the Japanese tactics allowed deck guns to be useful,
> nothing more.
>
Its not a question of tactics. It meant that the japanese air and
surface threat was eliminated and targets worth a torpedo were scarece
thats what it means to win a siubmarine war.
> > installing AA guns on German U-boats indicated thay had lost.
>
> So when they came off en masse in the Type XXI design, Germany was winning
> again?
>
No, it meant that they were forced to try to duel with aircraft on the surface,
rather than be escorted by their own forces. such a submarine force
has lost its war.
> > Neither one ahd any effect on the war.
>
> Now there's a sweeping statement. You are saying that US and German submarines
> could have sailed slick, and there would have been no changes whatsoever?
> I think you need to refresh your history of ASW.
By sailed slick I assume you mean without deck guns. Germans could not defeat the
aircraft with AA guns. Deck guns on us submarines whad no signficant effect on the
war. I don't see what ASW has to do with it.
vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Roger Eustis <ro...@aaee.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>me spentt
> > by a Malta submarine shelling the Italian coast must be taken as
> > an Axis victory. Pinpricks in Italy do not stop supplies.
> > Telling the Enemy where you are is not the way to interdict supplies
> > It may be magnificent, but it was not war.
> >
> > Er, actually Prof, if you read the book you will learn that the submarine
> war carried out from Malta by Max Horton's boats was a *critical*
> element in the defeat of the Afrika Corps. In addition, submarines
> carried ammunition, petrol,food and personnel safely into Malta at the
> height of the island's siege, not to mention extensive mining of enemy
> waters. Don't take my word for it...read the book. It certainly opened
> my eyes to the non-traditional role of submarines *including* the
> usefulness of deck armament.
> > Roger ;-)
>
I agree completely on the importance of malta submarines in interdicting
supplies. However, any effort spent on shelling random targets
with small calibre deck guns was a waste.
as to submarine "supply" missions, other than the odd passengers or supplies
that could be crammed in when leaving Gibralter or Alex, the contribution
of submarines was slight. Submarines are very small. They are not designed
to carry the quantites of cargo needed to sustain a fortress like malta.
Vince
Kevin Stewart
"Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>as to submarine "supply" missions, other than the odd passengers or supplies
>that could be crammed in when leaving Gibralter or Alex, the contribution
>of submarines was slight. Submarines are very small. They are not designed
>to carry the quantites of cargo needed to sustain a fortress like malta.
Aviation fuel, 3.7" and 40mm ammunition. The RN used the O and P class
boats, designed as minelayers. They made a significant contribution
to keeping the fighters in the air and the AA guns firing.
Jeff Crowell
Ed Rudnicki (erud...@pica.army.mil) wrote:
: No. The Japanese failed to grasp the operational/strategic aspects
: of ASW. They never adopted convoys; as a result their merchant fleet
: was as sheep to the wolves. I daresay the bold US use of deck guns
: would not have occurred against convoys with escorts, which is what
: the Germans faced.
While certainly a lot of Japanese ships traveled unescorted, it seems
to me to be an exaggeration to say that convoys were never adopted.
From what I have read (admittedly, not a lot of heavyweight refs,
mainly US Submarine Ops in WWII), convoys (escorted ones) were
hardly uncommon.
Jeff
--
###################################################################
# #
# Jeff Crowell | | #
# jc...@hpdmd48.boi.hp.com | _ | #
# _________|__( )__|_________ #
# DMD Process Engineer x/ _| |( . )| |_ \x #
# (208) 396-6525 x |_| ---*|_| x #
# O x x O #
# #
###################################################################
Keep It Simple, Stupid.
Peter Skelton
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
ste...@tdbank.ca (Kevin Stewart) wrote:
>
> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>
> >as to submarine "supply" missions, other than the odd passengers or supplies
> >that could be crammed in when leaving Gibralter or Alex, the contribution
> >of submarines was slight. Submarines are very small. They are not designed
> >to carry the quantites of cargo needed to sustain a fortress like malta.
> Aviation fuel, 3.7" and 40mm ammunition. The RN used the O and P class
> boats, designed as minelayers. They made a significant contribution
> to keeping the fighters in the air and the AA guns firing.
earlier in this thread it was suggested that a 500 ton supply
ship was not worth a torpedo. a submarine running supplies to
malta, and with no other mission, might carry 50 tons of munitions
malta's needs were in the hundreds of tons of munitions a day.
a submarine doing nothing else could deliver about 5 tons a day.
It is worth noting that Barnett in ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE
CLOSELY states that "recent analysis of the Axis logistic
problem in norht africa has conclusively shown that British
air and submarine attacks...together achieved no decisive effect on
Rommels ability to campaign. P 525
(he is referring to the 1941-42 time period.After the north african
invaasion the situation changed.
Timothy Manley
I think the concept of the deck gun really depends upon the perceived
mission of the sub. I believe that after the war the mission of the sub
began to change. These new requirements, made deck guns an unnecessary
risk.
--
tim
A R BREEN
In article <4m97ar$8...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
>supplies. However, any effort spent on shelling random targets
>with small calibre deck guns was a waste.
>
>that could be crammed in when leaving Gibralter or Alex, the contribution
>of submarines was slight. Submarines are very small. They are not designed
>to carry the quantites of cargo needed to sustain a fortress like malta.
For several months during the seige of Malta (OK, the seconf seige of Malta ;)
the only supplies getting through were those carried by the big 'Porpoise'
class submarine-minelayers. The Prof. is right about patrol submarines, but
minelayers (by definition) have large void spaces adaptable for carrying
a limited amount of cargo. In a different context one could mention the
german merchantile submarines of WW1.
I believe there were also proposals to use the large 'River' class fleet
submarines, but they were considered too vunerable for the mediterranian.
The first surface ships to break the seige were also minelayers - the
'Abdiel' class fast cruiser-minelayers were used to bring in ammunition,
spares and aero-fuel, but the crisis didn't really pass s until the
'Pedestal' convoy was forced through.
No-one would attempt to supply a fortress by submarine if there was any
alternative, but at the time there wasn't. The 'Porpoise's kept Malta
going for several months (and suffered hideous losses doing so).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Andy Breen | Adran Ffiseg/Physics Department, UW/PC Aberystwyth |
| a...@aber.ac.uk | http://www.aber.ac.uk/~azb Tel: (44) 01970 621907 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unless this posting concerns the solar wind all opinions are purely personal
Paul Jonathan Adam
> > Well, the engineer across from me at work was on the casing deck during the
> > last submarine gunnery shoot in the Royal Navy, and he disagrees with most
> > of your information, Professor.
>
> Thats fine, I presume he was engaging a subschaser, since that was the claimm.
No: *your* claim was that it was impossible to accurately fire a submarine's
deck gun, and more particularly to do so at speed. My friend refutes that
pretty convincingly. With that, you have a 15-knot surfaced submarine armed
with 5", 40mm and 20mm guns fighting against an escort that has a rack of
depth charges and a machinegun or two.
No, you don't fight a surface gun action with a passing destroyer flotilla,
but then when the enemy displaces 500-700 tons, has a surface argument of a
7.7mm MG and an ASW armament of depth charges, you're better off surfacing
2,000 yards away and sinking him with gunfire than wasting torpedoes (and
staying submerged and thus more vulnerable to his depth charges).
> > Not to mention adversely affecting the diet of the Japanese. Protein
> > deficiency isn't very nice. No fishing boats, no small coasters, in
> > fact it became almost impossible to move anything by sea.
>
> on this theoy, we should not have been bombing japanese civilians,
> killing them meant that they did not have to be fed. sinking
> fishing boats in unpatrolled waters simply had not effect on the war.
Whatever you say, Professor. Doubtless mining their home waters was a waste
of time too. Just out of interest, what *did* have an effect on the war?
> > How was it going to do so anyway? And saying the U-boats didn't have
> > a chance would get you committed for psychiatric care in 1942.
> >
> the germans had a major problem crossing the Bay of Biscay, wheree
> coastal command culd attack them they needed escort to get out
> the open ocean. Leigh Lights and airborne radar made it a very dangerous
> passage.
Didn't help a great deal in 1942 and early 1943, though, did it? We couldn't
sink them fast enough in the Bay then. Simple as that.
> > As for air cover, operating fighters or a carrier in the Atlantic wouldn't
> > really work. Long-range aircraft for reconnaisance and strike? Don't I
> > remember something called the Focke-Wulf 200?
> Actually long range fighters able to take on coastal command Bombers
> were probably the key
...without being shot down themselves. Remember the nickname German pilots
gave the Sunderland? "Fliegende Stachelschwein".
> > Why? It indicated that the Japanese tactics allowed deck guns to be useful,
> > nothing more.
>
> Its not a question of tactics. It meant that the japanese air and
> surface threat was eliminated and targets worth a torpedo were scarece
> thats what it means to win a siubmarine war.
So you let targets escape because it's torpedoes or nothing? The enemy
responds by building hordes of 500-1000 ton light transports and moves
all his goods thus. You've still won because the targets aren't worth
a torpedo, yet his sea transport is still there and he's still moving
goods... in fact, you haven't won.
Saying only ships above a certain size count is pointless: by that
criterion, the US won Vietnam. Not many eighteen-wheel trucks or supply
trains moving south, no armoured divisions, so you've totally interdicted
the enemy's supplies? Nope. Lots of trucks, sampans, lots and lots of
small mobile assets.
> > > installing AA guns on German U-boats indicated thay had lost.
> >
> > So when they came off en masse in the Type XXI design, Germany was winning
> > again?
> >
> No, it meant that they were forced to try to duel with aircraft on the
> surface, rather than be escorted by their own forces. such a submarine
> force has lost its war.
If they were duelling on the surface, why were they taking *off* the guns?
The snorkel was there to avoid the need for gunnery duels with aircraft.
The Type XXI lost the guns because it no longer had to operate for
long periods on the surface, and an underwater speed twice that of its
predecessors conferred a near-immunity to conventional depth charging.
> > Now there's a sweeping statement. You are saying that US and German
> > submarines could have sailed slick, and there would have been no changes
> > whatsoever? I think you need to refresh your history of ASW.
>
> By sailed slick I assume you mean without deck guns. Germans could not defeat
> the aircraft with AA guns. Deck guns on us submarines whad no signficant
> effect on the war. I don't see what ASW has to do with it.
German deck guns made MAD and retrobombs obsolete, as an example. A few
VCs were won in cases where Catalinas and Sunderlands were badly shot up
by German submarine AA. Remember, finally, that attacking with depth charges
or bombs against a submarine required considerable accuracy. An aircraft
that expended its ordnance and missed is a success for AA fire, even if it
gets home. In other words, German submarine AA often did "defeat" the
attacking aircraft - why did rockets become popular? Because overflying
a Type VIID's AA guns to drop bombs became very dangerous.
Forcing changes in the enemy's tactics and weapons suggests "an effect",
Professor.
As for US guns, try Friedman's "US Naval Weapons", page 54:
"By the end of the war the surface guns had proven extremely useful, so much
so that in January 1945 the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force informally asked
BuOrd to install surface fire control systems for two 5"/25 guns in
several submarine "gunboats" as soon as possible, to combat small Japanese
picket boats". Three were so equipped, though none saw action."
The enemy didn't have many large ships that merited torpedoes left by war's
end, so they used smaller vessels. You don't win by turning down chances to
hurt the enemy.
ASW comes into it because it shaped the whole process on all sides, made deck
guns either useful, vital or irrelevant at different points in the war.
And it comes into it here when you keep showing you don't seem to know what
you're talking about, or what point you're trying to prove.
Kevin Stewart
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Didn't help a great deal in 1942 and early 1943, though, did it? We couldn't
>sink them fast enough in the Bay then. Simple as that.
As it turned out, Operations Research analysis showed it was better to
use the aircraft to escort targets (i.e. convoys) than attempt
interdiction. There were successes in the Biscay patrols, but mostly
because the U-boats had no radar of their own, and no effective
ESM against the Allied microwave radars. Even so, analysis showed
the Biscay patrols were not the most efficeint use of resources.
>So you let targets escape because it's torpedoes or nothing? The enemy
>responds by building hordes of 500-1000 ton light transports and moves
>all his goods thus. You've still won because the targets aren't worth
>a torpedo, yet his sea transport is still there and he's still moving
>goods... in fact, you haven't won.
The Japanese effectively did this in the Solomons, and as a result,
US PT boats began trading their torpedo armament for more guns.
Torpedoes were useless against such targets; they travelled at night,
which limited the ability of aircraft to interdict the traffic, and
the waters were too confined and shallow for larger US surface
craft, like destroyers, to be an effective counter.
And one might add that no PT boat had what Vince would consider
adequate fire control, but they did the job. Yes, if the Japanese were
winning, they'd steam the 17,000 ton Asama Maru down the Slot right
to New Georgia, or whatever. But that's not to say the traffic they
were running wasn't worth intercepting.
The argument for submarine deck guns is to intercept this kind of
traffic in more remote waters, beyond the range of coastal forces
and martime strike aircraft.
>German deck guns made MAD and retrobombs obsolete, as an example. A few
>VCs were won in cases where Catalinas and Sunderlands were badly shot up
>by German submarine AA. Remember, finally, that attacking with depth charges
>or bombs against a submarine required considerable accuracy. An aircraft
>that expended its ordnance and missed is a success for AA fire, even if it
>gets home. In other words, German submarine AA often did "defeat" the
>attacking aircraft - why did rockets become popular? Because overflying
>a Type VIID's AA guns to drop bombs became very dangerous.
I don't know about MAD, I thought that was used against submerged
targets. The retrobomb came about *because* of MAD - it indicated
when an aircraft was directly over the U-boat, hence the need for a
retarded weapon.
I'd also disagree about AA guns. Granted, LRMP aircraft were big,
slow, ponderous, and valuable, targets. But you need time to man
the guns - and if you have time to man the guns, you have time to
dive, which is much safer. In a situation where continuous air patrols
make diving on contact impractical, guns are one alternative, but
the snorkel is much better.
Gary J. Mac Donald
"Prof. Vincent Brannigan" (vb...@umail.umd.edu) writes:
> as to submarine "supply" missions, other than the odd passengers or supplies
> that could be crammed in when leaving Gibralter or Alex, the contribution
> of submarines was slight. Submarines are very small. They are not designed
> to carry the quantites of cargo needed to sustain a fortress like malta.
I have a sample list of the supplies carried (which I can't find right
now) but I do recall that they carried in about 65,000 tons of supplies.
That might not seem like much, but it was more than all but one convoy
before September or October 1942. It was more than the Pedastal convoy.
It was also timely cargo in that it was the most critically needed stuff
during the long months of 1942.
GaryJ
--
http://www.ncf.carleton.ca/~ar075
It is incredible that authorities will censor anything about making love,
while doing nothing about the 1001 ways to kill and maim that the media
teaches every day. Which is truly obscene: sex or murder?
Roger Eustis
In article: <kcoman.19...@admin.nelpoly.ac.nz>
kco...@admin.nelpoly.ac.nz (Keith) writes:
>
> From: kco...@admin.nelpoly.ac.nz (Keith)
> Newsgroups: sci.military.naval
> Subject: Re: Submarine Deck Guns
> Date: Wed, 1 May 1996 17:44:26
> Organization: Nelson Polytechnic, New Zealand
> Lines: 80
>
> In article <4lt5dg$7...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan"
<vb...@umail.umd.edu> writes:
> >From: "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu>
> >Subject: Re: Submarine Deck Guns
> >Date: 27 Apr 1996 12:54:08 GMT
>
> >Do you have a single example of a submarine egaging a subchaser
> >voluntarily to conserve torpedoes?
>
someone on the casing will chuck him a lifebelt...then again....
-- Roger
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
>> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>.
>No: *your* claim was that it was impossible to accurately fire a submarine's
>deck gun, and more particularly to do so at speed. My friend refutes that
>pretty convincingly.
if you are firing at a stationary target, you don't need speed.
you made the claimwho was your friend with the deck gun firing at?
With that, you have a 15-knot surfaced submarine armed
>with 5", 40mm and 20mm guns fighting against an escort that has a rack of
>depth charges and a machinegun or two.
did he claim to do this? when?
>
>No, you don't fight a surface gun action with a passing destroyer flotilla,
>but then when the enemy displaces 500-700 tons, has a surface argument of a
>7.7mm MG and an ASW armament of depth charges, you're better off surfacing
>2,000 yards away and sinking him with gunfire than wasting torpedoes (and
>staying submerged and thus more vulnerable to his depth charges).
>
Time, date and place where it was done. 700 tons buys you a lot of
subchaser.
>.
>Whatever you say, Professor. Doubtless mining their home waters was a waste
>of time too. Just out of interest, what *did* have an effect on the war
interdiction of the seaborne commerce was critical because of its effect
on the transport of military supplies. shooting up fishing boats in
unpatrolled waters does not. Mining works very well.
>.
>
>Didn't help a great deal in 1942 and early 1943, though, did it? We couldn't
>sink them fast enough in the Bay then. Simple as that.
the waste of planes in bomber command raids on Germany also meant that
air interdiction of the uboats was delayed. The Uboats had no effective
counter to VLR aircraft. interservice rivalyr prevented the most
effective use of aircraft.
>
>.
>> > Why? It indicated that the Japanese tactics allowed deck guns to be useful,
>> > nothing more.
>>
>> Its not a question of tactics. It meant that the japanese air and
>> surface threat was eliminated and targets worth a torpedo were scarece
>> thats what it means to win a siubmarine war.
>
>So you let targets escape because it's torpedoes or nothing? The enemy
>responds by building hordes of 500-1000 ton light transports and moves
>all his goods thus. You've still won because the targets aren't worth
>a torpedo, yet his sea transport is still there and he's still moving
>goods... in fact, you haven't won.
by 1945 any target you could hit with a torpedo was worth a torpedo. We
had no shortage of either topedoes or submarines. 1000 ton ships were
worth a torpedo at all stages of the war. my point was simply that
nothing was left on the surface that we could hit with a torpedo.
>Saying only ships above a certain size count is pointless: by that
>criterion, the US won Vietnam. Not many eighteen-wheel trucks or supply
>trains moving south, no armoured divisions, so you've totally interdicted
>the enemy's supplies? Nope. Lots of trucks, sampans, lots and lots of
>small mobile assets.
I didn't say it, so the response is nonsense. Transport in a ground war
is a totally different issue from a sea campaign. you cant dig bunkers
in the ocean, and its much easier to sink a ship full of tanks than to
blow up the tanks form the air.
>.
>> No, it meant that they were forced to try to duel with aircraft on the
>> surface, rather than be escorted by their own forces. such a submarine force has lost its war.
>
>If they were duelling on the surface, why were they taking *off* the guns?
the earlier submarines tried to duel on the surface. the advaced
submarines did not.
>The snorkel was there to avoid the need for gunnery duels with aircraft.
>The Type XXI lost the guns because it no longer had to operate for
>long periods on the surface, and an underwater speed twice that of its
>predecessors conferred a near-immunity to conventional depth charging.
true but has nothing to do with the gunnery argument.
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Roger Eustis <ro...@aaee.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article: <kcoman.19...@admin.nelpoly.ac.nz>
>kco.
>> Edward Young's "One of Our Submarines" fills in some excellent
>> detail of it all. He made the point that typically a torpedo attack was
>> really only sensible for targets of about 1500 tons and up, and that these
Why would anyone think a 1000 Ton ship was not "worth" a torpedo?
>>
>> Top post Keith....do I spy the holed and sinking SS Brannigan? Perhaps
>someone on the casing will chuck him a lifebelt...then again....
>-- Roger
No he is still waiting for a time place and date where submarines engaged
subchasers with deck guns to avoid wasting a torpedo on a 1000 ton ship.
Vince
Jim Christley
Gentlemen and Ladies:
I have been reading certain submarine oriented issues in this
newsgroup with interest. The usefulness of deck guns during wartime
is one such issue. Mr. Brannigan's generalizations draw good
discussion and I, for one, sincerely hope they are meant soley to do
that, not to be factual. A case in point is the statement that
"installing deck guns on US subs indicated we had won the war" An
interesting hypothesis and worthy of further expansion. I would
request, Mr. Brannigan, that in your expansion, you indicate which
war. The US Navy started installing deck guns on all submarines as a
function of the design and construction with 3"/23 Mk 9 retractable
short barreled version on L-1 in 1914 (a design of 1912) prior to the
outbreak of WW I and every submarine from then to 1945 was equipped
with one or more deck guns.
During the Korean Conflict, the USS Perch landed Royal Marines along
the coast of Korea behind the front lines for the purpose of cutting a
rail line. The operation was sucessful. The ship was equipped with a
40mm antiaircraft gun (Bofors type) on the forward and aft raised
superstructure for use against small North Korean patrol craft which
were the only seaborne threat at the time. These guns could also
provide a certain amount of covering fire for withdrawl of the Marines
or other landing parties.
During the Viet Nam conflict, USS Sterlet was equipped with two .50
cal standard Navy long barreled machine guns so it might be useful at
night coastal junk interdiction. After one or two episodes in this
role, it was decided that the operations could be easier performed by
riverine craft that could follow the small craft into areas that were
prohibited to the submarine because of depth. The sub was black, and
operating on the battery was quiet even on the surface. A battle
surface on a pitchblack night less than 200 yards from a small craft
target (which was normally unarmed) undoubtedly caused the small craft
driver to rethink his/her belief in sea monsters.
In these last two cited examples, the ship's commanding officers
specifically requested the armament. It was used. Maybe it didn't
effect the total war or even a single battle, but the conflict was
different because they were aboard.
So, please in your hypothesis expansion, cite which war to which you
are referring.
The statement about institutional inertia is simply an unsupported
cliche' looking for a place to be accepted by the uninformed.
Looking forward to a common sense, fact based discussion.
Jim Christley
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
ar...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Gary J. Mac Donald) wrote:
>.
>I have a sample list of the supplies carried (which I can't find right
>now) but I do recall that they carried in about 65,000 tons of supplies.
>That might not seem like much, but it was more than all but one convoy
>before September or October 1942. It was more than the Pedastal convoy.
>It was also timely cargo in that it was the most critically needed stuff
>during the long months of 1942.
>
it seems like an unbelievable ammount. Uk Submarines only displaced
about 1000 tons, and only a small fraction of that was available for
munitions.(whether Cargo or war load) US gato class subs carried less
than 50 tons of munitions.
You are talking about more than a thousand trips. Don't think so.
Vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
a...@aber.ac.uk (A R BREEN) wrote:
>.
>For several months during the seige of Malta (OK, the seconf seige of Malta ;)
>the only supplies getting through were those carried by the big 'Porpoise'
>class submarine-minelayers. The Prof. is right about patrol submarines, but
>minelayers (by definition) have large void spaces adaptable for carrying
>a limited amount of cargo. In a different context one could mention the
>german merchantile submarines of WW1.
>I believe there were also proposals to use the large 'River' class fleet
>submarines, but they were considered too vunerable for the mediterranian.
Even a large minelaying submarine would be overloaded with as little as
50 tons of munitions. The 2000 miles RT from gibralter required
125 hours of darkness at 15 knots on the surface. In summer in the Med
you can have 6 hours of darkness at night. If you go in daylight you
increase the risk. but even under the best of circumstances, its a 10 day
RT and each submarine dedicated to the effort is delivering 5 tons per
day employed on this mission. This doesn't even count the losses.
>No-one would attempt to supply a fortress by submarine if there was any
>alternative, but at the time there wasn't. The 'Porpoise's kept Malta
>going for several months (and suffered hideous losses doing so).
Pedestal was forced through at the needed moment albeit at great loss.
Submarine supply could not measureably change the needed date for a
relief convoy.
Vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> .
> No: *your* claim was that it was impossible to accurately fire a submarine's
> deck gun, and more particularly to do so at speed. My friend refutes that
> pretty convincingly. With that, you have a 15-knot surfaced submarine armed
> with 5", 40mm and 20mm guns fighting against an escort that has a rack of
> depth charges and a machinegun or two.
>
Your friend must be using some special ruler. My books don't indicate
any WWII Royyal navy submarin
> No, you don't fight a surface gun action with a passing destroyer flotilla,
> but then when the enemy displaces 500-700 tons, has a surface argument of a
> 7.7mm MG and an ASW armament of depth charges, you're better off surfacing
> 2,000 yards away and sinking him with gunfire than wasting torpedoes (and
> staying submerged and thus more vulnerable to his depth charges).
> .
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> > Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > > Well, the engineer across from me at work was on the casing deck during the
> > > last submarine gunnery shoot in the Royal Navy, and he disagrees with most
snip My friend refutes that
> pretty convincingly. With that, you have a 15-knot surfaced submarine armed
> with 5", 40mm and 20mm guns fighting against an escort that has a rack of
> depth charges and a machinegun or two.
Your friend must be using some special ruler, since no RN submarine
mounted a 5" gun. 3 or 4 inch is more like it. Is that the same ruler
they use for boasting ;-)
> No, you don't fight a surface gun action with a passing destroyer flotilla,
> but then when the enemy displaces 500-700 tons, has a surface argument of a
> 7.7mm MG and an ASW armament of depth charges, you're better off surfacing
> 2,000 yards away and sinking him with gunfire than wasting torpedoes (and
> staying submerged and thus more vulnerable to his depth charges).
lets look at the books on small escorts.
German minesweepers M 233 600 tons, 2 4.1 inch 2 37 mm 8 20 MM 18 knots
French torpilar La flore 610 tons 2 3.9 inch MG and torpedo tubes 33 knots
Italian Sirio 642 tons 3 3.9 inch 6 37 mm 4 torp. 34 knots
Jaspanes Minesweepers 492 tons 2 4.7 inch 2 M.G. 20 knots
No one in their right mind would challenge any of these ships on the
surface with a 3 or 4 inch deck gun. .
Even the US 280 ton PC 468 carried a 3 inch gun and made 20 knots
Maybe your friend is using some special "imperial ton"
2 machine guns and 2 depth charges were my father's weapons in a 50 foot
launch on the pacific side of the panama canal. an no, they couldn't
drop the charges, becasue they were too slow. Their job was to
look for subs and raise the alarm..
Vince
> .
Myron Howard
"Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>it seems like an unbelievable ammount. Uk Submarines only displaced
>about 1000 tons, and only a small fraction of that was available for
>munitions.(whether Cargo or war load) US gato class subs carried less
>than 50 tons of munitions.
>You are talking about more than a thousand trips. Don't think so.
>Vince
While the following does not provide quantitative data, it gives an
idea of one British submarine sailor's memory of the Malta runs.
From_Nautilus, The story of Man Under The Sea_ by Roy Davies, Page 118
the words of a Rorquall crewman, Alfie Betts.
'If it hadn't been for Rorqual, Grampus, Thames and Severn - they were
the big seagoing fleet submarines - especially on their cargo-busting
trips from Gibraltar to Malta, I think Malta would have fallen. I do
really. Ronquil used to carry aviation spirit in her internal tanks
and she used to go to Malta with just about enough fuel to get her
there. And inboard every nook and cranny was food, boxes of everything
you can think of. And when a guy went from aft to forward, or the
other way round, he was bent over, treading on boxes of dehydrated
cabbage or whatever. Dived all the time of course, surfaced at night,
charged the batteries. Daybreak - down you go again on another little
lap and eventually get to Malta. Then you had the minefields laid
outside Malta by the Italians. We always wondered if there had been
new ones put down, or whether the old ones were still there, and so on
and so forth. It was a hazardous affair from beginning to end.'
Seems as though a British submarine sailor remembers supplying Malta.
Myron
Myron Howard
"Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>Roger Eustis <ro...@aaee.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>In article: <kcoman.19...@admin.nelpoly.ac.nz>
>>kco.
>>> Edward Young's "One of Our Submarines" fills in some excellent
>>> detail of it all. He made the point that typically a torpedo attack was
>>> really only sensible for targets of about 1500 tons and up, and that these
>>> vessels would usually have quite a powerful escort. .
>Why would anyone think a 1000 Ton ship was not "worth" a torpedo?
In skimming through John D. Alden's _Submarine Attacks During World
War II_, and the operative word here is skimming, it appears to me
that there were very few ships sunk, by gun or torpedo, in the
1000-1500 ton range. I saw 200 ton patrol craft sunk by torpedo and I
saw a 1500 cargo vessel sunk by gun. There were vessels in between
sunk by each type of attack but most of the gun targets weere smaller
and most of the torpedo targets were larger. I suppose we can draw our
own conclusions. It appears to me that conditions at time of attack,
type of target, and myriad other variables that Alden doesn't present
and those of us involved in this discourse may never know, played a
role in the submarine CO's decision making process.
>>>
>>> Top post Keith....do I spy the holed and sinking SS Brannigan? Perhaps
>>someone on the casing will chuck him a lifebelt...then again....
>>-- Roger
>No he is still waiting for a time place and date where submarines engaged
>subchasers with deck guns to avoid wasting a torpedo on a 1000 ton ship.
I don't know if we will know that without reading all the war patrol
reports, and from what few I have seen, even they may not yield that
information.
Paul Jonathan Adam
> ship was not worth a torpedo. a submarine running supplies to
> malta, and with no other mission, might carry 50 tons of munitions
Never heard of submarine minelayers? And if you fuelled at Gibraltar
you could carry a lot of avgas in your fuel tanks, with only enough
diesel to get you to Malta.
As usual: a trickle's better than nothing.
Gary J. Mac Donald
>>.
>>I have a sample list of the supplies carried (which I can't find right
>>now) but I do recall that they carried in about 65,000 tons of supplies.
>>That might not seem like much, but it was more than all but one convoy
>>before September or October 1942. It was more than the Pedastal convoy.
>>It was also timely cargo in that it was the most critically needed stuff
>>during the long months of 1942.
I was wrong. No convoy before December of 1942 got more than about 55,000
tons of supplies to Malta.
> it seems like an unbelievable ammount. Uk Submarines only displaced
> about 1000 tons, and only a small fraction of that was available for
> munitions.(whether Cargo or war load) US gato class subs carried less
> than 50 tons of munitions.
> You are talking about more than a thousand trips. Don't think so.
A number of subs did this suty. Two of the main ones were Rorqual and
Cachalot, 1500 ton minelayers which carried 200+ tons per trip. They were
dedicated to this duty for some considerable period of time.
Paul Jonathan Adam
> about 1000 tons, and only a small fraction of that was available for
> munitions.(whether Cargo or war load) US gato class subs carried less
> than 50 tons of munitions.
Porpoise and Rorqual - two of the minelaying subs used for these runs -
displaced over 2,000 tons each. Just displacing mines and torpedoes
gave you over a hundred tons of cargo, before you started on deck gun ammo,
removing crew (no deck gun, no torpedoes, so fewer bodies needing feeding
on the cruise, thus more space) and the various "overload" techniques to jam
in as much as possible: and don't forget the sub's own stores are available,
since you only need fuel and food for the round trip from Gibraltar to Malta
(and that for a reduced crew).
> You are talking about more than a thousand trips. Don't think so.
> Vince
Yes, you're absolutely right, Professor. Your carefully-researched
thesis has proved that these runs are entirely fictional. In fact, your
next chapter indubitably demonstrates that Malta is in fact a cardboard
mockup created for propaganda purposes.
If Pat Purdy was still with us, he could point a few veterans of the
Malta runs at you. They might be interested in your opinions, except
of course your historical research invalidates the biased and inaccurate
accounts of those who were mere participants.
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
and...@hal-pc.org (Myron Howard) wrote:
>
> Seems as though a British submarine sailor remembers supplying Malta.
>
>
the small quantities of supplies were to the Island and garrison.
iot is not surprising that a personal participant considers their
own dangerous service to have been critically important.
Unfortunately hazard, heroism and sacrifice are not the test
of strategic impact.
Vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Jim Christley <jch...@bbn.com> wrote:
>
> GeIn these last two cited examples, the ship's commanding officers
> effect the total war or even a single battle, but the conflict was
> different because they were aboard.
> So, please in your hypothesis expansion, cite which war to which you
> are referring.
The statement about institutional inertia is simply an unsupported
> cliche' looking for a place to be accepted by the uninformed.
I thought you were supposed to preface that with "IMHO"
IMHO
The divided command structre at Pearl Harbor is one good example
of institutional inertia
The very long, involved and sterile argument between carrier
and battleship admirals is another
The magnetic exploder/depth control issue is another
the failure to organize ASW on a realistic basis in 1942 is another
institutional inertia occurs when old ideas can triumph over better
new ideas simply because the operational structure favors what
has been done in the past. On the other hand, prematurely accepting
deficient new ideas is the counterpart problem.
Many socio-technical decisions involve balancing these two
problems. In WWII we had such an overwhelming material
superiority over the japanese that we could mask our errors and
learn the wrong lessons.
One of the most important errors is to try to find a mission for
a weapon system that you happen to have around, rather than analyze
the problem and produce the systems you need. A second is to be
sidetracked by minutiae and a third is to allow tactical commanders
to dictate strategy. All three occurred in the case of using
deck guns in the pacific in late WWII. We had a huge machinery for
producing submarines, torpedoes and crews. After the invasion of france
all the UK subs became available. Unfortunately, by the
end of 1944 there was a shortage of targets, and the subs had to share them
with the navy fliers and the AAF. One answer might
have been to give the submariners a lot of medals, and send them to
surface ships to help prepare for the invasion of Japan.
Instead we turned them into gunboats to shoot up fishing boats.
I just think it was a waste, though it had no effect on the war either way.
Vince
Paul Jonathan Adam
vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> >> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >No: *your* claim was that it was impossible to accurately fire a submarine's
> >deck gun, and more particularly to do so at speed. My friend refutes that
> >pretty convincingly.
>
> you made the claimwho was your friend with the deck gun firing at?
A towed target, speed about 15 knots. The submarine was manoevering
to engage on alternate beams. Range was about three miles. All from
his memory.
> >Whatever you say, Professor. Doubtless mining their home waters was a waste
> >of time too. Just out of interest, what *did* have an effect on the war
>
> interdiction of the seaborne commerce was critical because of its effect
> on the transport of military supplies. shooting up fishing boats in
> unpatrolled waters does not. Mining works very well.
But naval gunfire is completely ineffective, as you have sources to prove?
I'm getting tired of providing all the references here. Where do you have
any information suggesting those (expensive, drag-and-noise-inducing)
deck armaments on US submarines were there for any reason other than because
they were useful for sinking the enemy's ships? A cite, Professor, a cite.
We've *given* evidence that this was popular. We've shown that the
US submarine service was asking for more guns and better fire control,
because they were fighting on the surface with their guns. I work with
someone who finds your assertions hilarious. Either come up with some
documentary evidence, or stop waving tattered opinions around.
> >So you let targets escape because it's torpedoes or nothing? The enemy
> >responds by building hordes of 500-1000 ton light transports and moves
> >all his goods thus. You've still won because the targets aren't worth
> >a torpedo, yet his sea transport is still there and he's still moving
> >goods... in fact, you haven't won.
>
> by 1945 any target you could hit with a torpedo was worth a torpedo. We
> had no shortage of either topedoes or submarines. 1000 ton ships were
> worth a torpedo at all stages of the war. my point was simply that
> nothing was left on the surface that we could hit with a torpedo.
Plenty of torpedoes, limited capacity (20 or so) on submarines, hit ratio
for torpedoes about one in three, seven kills per submarine on average.
Smaller targets mean shallower draught, shorter beam, and usually greater
manoeverability, so they're harder to hit. You can carry a lot more shells
than torpedoes, and the fire-control solution is easier with a 40mm shell
(muzzle velocity 2800fps or so) than with a torpedo (muzzle velocity 75 feet
per second).
So, since you can't use torpedoes, you use guns... becuase the dastardly
enemy is still sending small craft to sea, moving his cargoes in penny
packets.
> >Saying only ships above a certain size count is pointless: by that
> >criterion, the US won Vietnam. Not many eighteen-wheel trucks or supply
> >trains moving south, no armoured divisions, so you've totally interdicted
> >the enemy's supplies? Nope. Lots of trucks, sampans, lots and lots of
> >small mobile assets.
>
> I didn't say it, so the response is nonsense. Transport in a ground war
> is a totally different issue from a sea campaign. you cant dig bunkers
> in the ocean, and its much easier to sink a ship full of tanks than to
> blow up the tanks form the air.
You said above, "my point was simply that nothing was left on the surface that
we could hit with a torpedo." That doesn't mean there was nothing left on
the surface, just as the fact that the North Vietnamese never ran major
escorted truck columns south didn't mean they weren't moving supplies.
And the analogy, far from being nonsense, is entirely apt. When the enemy
has sea superiority, disperse your transport assets into many small
vessels: hard to detect, too numerous (you hope) to kill.
Professor Brannigan, when you find a few facts to back your opinion -
when, in fact, you can clearly state your opinion rather than tapdancing
around, claiming conflicting reasons for why submarine gun armament was
useless - then please respond. Otherwise, all you're doing is to annoy
and irritate.
Let's see...deck guns are useless because a submarine is too vulnerable when
using them, was one objection. Vulnerable to what? "Nothing was left on the
surface that we could hit with a torpedo". Since we can't hit with torpedoes,
perhaps using guns would be logical? Evidently not, though you can't quite
explain why.
You suggested gunnery accuracy as a problem until it was demonstrated that
submarines could actually fire accurately, and that by war's end submarines
were being equipped specifically for surface gun actions - naturally, this
was being done because it was ineffective and pointless to do so, and the
Navy did it anyway. You're not sure why, your references are all in New
Jersey at the moment, and anyway no printed matter or eyewitness accout
is up to the standards of your expert analysis.
Any other reasons? Build a case and defend it, instead of relying on
contradicting me (and yourself) without reference or sources.
Steve Atkatz
Prof. Vincent Brannigan wrote:
>
> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >
> > vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> Your friend must be using some special ruler, since no RN submarine
> mounted a 5" gun. 3 or 4 inch is more like it. Is that the same ruler
> they use for boasting ;-)
>
> > but then when the enemy displaces 500-700 tons, has a surface argument of a
> > 7.7mm MG and an ASW armament of depth charges, you're better off surfacing
> > 2,000 yards away and sinking him with gunfire than wasting torpedoes (and
> > staying submerged and thus more vulnerable to his depth charges).
>
>
> German minesweepers M 233 600 tons, 2 4.1 inch 2 37 mm 8 20 MM 18 knots
> French torpilar La flore 610 tons 2 3.9 inch MG and torpedo tubes 33 knots
> Italian Sirio 642 tons 3 3.9 inch 6 37 mm 4 torp. 34 knots
> Jaspanes Minesweepers 492 tons 2 4.7 inch 2 M.G. 20 knots
>
> No one in their right mind would challenge any of these ships on the
> surface with a 3 or 4 inch deck gun. .
>
> Even the US 280 ton PC 468 carried a 3 inch gun and made 20 knots
>
> Maybe your friend is using some special "imperial ton"
>
> 2 machine guns and 2 depth charges were my father's weapons in a 50 foot
> launch on the pacific side of the panama canal. an no, they couldn't
> drop the charges, becasue they were too slow. Their job was to
> look for subs and raise the alarm..
>
> Vince
> > .
Professor,
For years and years I've heard nasty comments about Academics and
Academia in general. Now after a couple of weeks of reading your drivel I
realize that, at least in your case, they're all true.
--
A to Z
***************************************
Age and Treachery will always prevail
Over Youth and Vigor. DBF!!!
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
> thesis has proved that these runs are entirely fictional. In fact, your
> next chapter indubitably demonstrates that Malta is in fact a cardboard
> mockup created for propaganda purposes.
>
the issue is how much cargo You stated 65,000 tons
Lets see, at 200 tons a trip, each sub delivers about 600 tons a month.
65,000 tons took only 325 round trips. at three round trips a
month per sub, assuming no losses.
Either there were more subs, more cargo on each sub, or less was
delivered. I am also interested in the technique of filling
oil tanks with aviation gasoline. It is much lighter, and contamination
is a problem.
all of this is really off the original point.
Vince
Paul Jonathan Adam
vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > with 5", 40mm and 20mm guns fighting against an escort that has a rack of
> > depth charges and a machinegun or two.
>
> mounted a 5" gun. 3 or 4 inch is more like it. Is that the same ruler
> they use for boasting ;-)
We were discussing USN Pacific Fleet submarine performace. However, Mike's
experience indicates that the Royal Navy can manage accurate gunnery from
a submarine deck at speed and against moving targets (which you said was
impossible).
Of course, if you wish to concede the inferiority of the USN, you are welcome
to do so: whether it was crew training, or inadequate ballistics of the
5"/25 compared to the 4" Mike was watching. The fact remains that we were
able to do it. If the USN couldn't, they could have asked us how: you've
produced no evidence other than your opinions to show that, though.
> lets look at the books on small escorts.
>
> German minesweepers M 233 600 tons, 2 4.1 inch 2 37 mm 8 20 MM 18 knots
> French torpilar La flore 610 tons 2 3.9 inch MG and torpedo tubes 33 knots
> Italian Sirio 642 tons 3 3.9 inch 6 37 mm 4 torp. 34 knots
> Jaspanes Minesweepers 492 tons 2 4.7 inch 2 M.G. 20 knots
Japanese Number 4 submarine chaser, 300 tons. Depth charges and 4 MG, 20 knots.
> No one in their right mind would challenge any of these ships on the
> surface with a 3 or 4 inch deck gun. .
#4 Submarine Chaser and her sisters are a perfect target for submarine
gunnery.
> Maybe your friend is using some special "imperial ton"
No, Vincent, he's just an experienced submariner, trained by men who
had been preparing for a Pacific campaign at VJ-Day.
> 2 machine guns and 2 depth charges were my father's weapons in a 50 foot
> launch on the pacific side of the panama canal. an no, they couldn't
> drop the charges, becasue they were too slow. Their job was to
> look for subs and raise the alarm..
And how would they cope with an I-15 engaging them with 5.5" shellfire?
The answer is "badly". Personally I'd use 40mm, but the Japanese didn't
ship that. That's the ASW armament of many Japanese vessels: machine guns
and depth charges. With 20 torpedoes and hundreds of shells, which do you
use?
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> > >> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > >No: *your* claim was that it was impossible to accurately fire a submarine's
> > >deck gun, and more particularly to do so at speed. My friend refutes that
> > >pretty convincingly.
> >
> > if you are firing at a stationary target, you don't need speed.
> > you made the claimwho was your friend with the deck gun firing at?
>
> A towed target, speed about 15 knots. The submarine was manoevering
> to engage on alternate beams. Range was about three miles. All from
> his memory.
the target was at 15 knots or the the sub? the target was an enemy
barge?
> >
> We've *given* evidence that this was popular. We've shown that the
> US submarine service was asking for more guns and better fire control,
> because they were fighting on the surface with their guns. I work with
> someone who finds your assertions hilarious. Either come up with some
> documentary evidence, or stop waving tattered opinions around.
you have given the opinion of sub officer that they like theri deck guns.
you have given no citations that the deck guns were dritical to the
military effort. I know they liked the deck guns.
>
> Plenty of torpedoes, limited capacity (20 or so) on submarines, hit ratio
> for torpedoes about one in three, seven kills per submarine on average.
> Smaller targets mean shallower draught, shorter beam, and usually greater
> manoeverability, so they're harder to hit. You can carry a lot more shells
> than torpedoes, and the fire-control solution is easier with a 40mm shell
> (muzzle velocity 2800fps or so) than with a torpedo (muzzle velocity 75 feet
> per second).
but if your have no shortage of torpedoes or submarines, you dont use the
deck gun on a target you can hit with a torpedo.
> So, since you can't use torpedoes, you use guns... becuase the dastardly
> enemy is still sending small craft to sea, moving his cargoes in penny
> packets.
cargo from where to where? any ocean going ship is worth a torpedo
by 1945.
>
> You said above, "my point was simply that nothing was left on the surface that
> we could hit with a torpedo." That doesn't mean there was nothing left on
> the surface, just as the fact that the North Vietnamese never ran major
> escorted truck columns south didn't mean they weren't moving supplies.
>
> And the analogy, far from being nonsense, is entirely apt. When the enemy
> has sea superiority, disperse your transport assets into many small
> vessels: hard to detect, too numerous (you hope) to kill.
The analogy is precisely nonsense. Even small ships are large compared
to truck traffic. Both Torpedos and guns are designed to actually
hit the unit of tranport i.e. the ship. In land transport the unit of transport is
very small and difficult to hit, so you aim at the bottlenecks, i.e.
railroad tracks, bridges etc. Its a totally different interdiction strategy.
> Let's see...deck guns are useless because a submarine is too vulnerable when
> using them, was one objection. Vulnerable to what? "Nothing was left on the
> surface that we could hit with a torpedo". Since we can't hit with torpedoes,
> perhaps using guns would be logical? Evidently not, though you can't quite
> explain why.
My poit was that if the target was large enough to carry a gun, the submarine
was too vulnerable to try a gun attack. this was the situation
prior to 1945
> You suggested gunnery accuracy as a problem until it was demonstrated that
> submarines could actually fire accurately,
Demonstrated by what? the recall of your friend who shot at a
towed target?
and that by war's end submarines
> were being equipped specifically for surface gun actions - naturally, this
> was being done because it was ineffective and pointless to do so, and the
> Navy did it anyway. You're not sure why, your references are all in New
> Jersey at the moment, and anyway no printed matter or eyewitness accout
> is up to the standards of your expert analysis.
You asserted that they had value to the war effort. How much tonnage
was sunk, and at what cost?
>
> Any other reasons? Build a case and defend it, instead of relying on
> contradicting me (and yourself) without reference or sources.
>
All you have demonstrated is that Submariners liked
deck guns to shoot at undefended targets. I agree that
its much more fun than being transferred to a surface ship and
doing radar picket duty. You have not provided any support for the
suggestion that it had any effect on the war.
That is my point, not the enthusiasm of the participants.
vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> > Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > > and depth charges. Surface two miles from one of those and engage with
> > > 40mm and 5" guns. Conserve torpedoes and destroy the enemy. The ship had
> > > a speed advantage of perhaps five or six knots, before accounting for
> > > battle damage. Most of the targets, as opposed to the hunters, were
> > > small and unarmed: prime targets for shellfire as opposed to torpedoes.
> >
> > Now this is a fantasy.
> > Do you have a single example of a submarine egaging a subchaser
> > Sub chasers had to have sufficient speed to escape the blast of their own
> > depth charges. any submarine at 15 knots could not use its deck gun.
>
> Well, the engineer across from me at work was on the casing deck during the
> last submarine gunnery shoot in the Royal Navy, and he disagrees with most
>
I have reposted this to bring the discussion back to the point where
it was claimed that Submarines could engage subchasers on the surface
with their deck guns to conserve torpedoes. We were talking about combat
actions. My comment on using the deck gun was clearly relating to a combat
situation.It now appears that Mr. Adam's response is actually describing
a "training" exercise. i.e. a submarine in no danger from being shot
at. I am sure that in the safety of a training exercise many things are
possible that are not possible in combat.
Vince
Paul Jonathan Adam
vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > thesis has proved that these runs are entirely fictional. In fact, your
> > next chapter indubitably demonstrates that Malta is in fact a cardboard
> > mockup created for propaganda purposes.
> of course the malta runs took place.
> the issue is how much cargo You stated 65,000 tons
Actually I didn't, but it sounds about right.
> Lets see, at 200 tons a trip, each sub delivers about 600 tons a month.
> 65,000 tons took only 325 round trips. at three round trips a
> month per sub, assuming no losses.
> Either there were more subs, more cargo on each sub, or less was
> delivered.
More subs and more cargo on each sub.
> I am also interested in the technique of filling
> oil tanks with aviation gasoline. It is much lighter, and contamination
> is a problem.
Easy, Professor, you shut the valve and don't draw fuel from that tank. Drain
it down in harbour, and run back with the tank empty. This isn't hard to
do. Some RN submarines, the A-boats for instance, would use fuel in the
ballast tanks to extend the range for Pacific patrols, many ships ballast
by introducing seawater into their fuel tanks, this is a problem sailors are
used to.
Jim Christley
With reference to Mr. Brannigan's discourse on submarine deck gun use:
"i was referrring to WWII, in particualr the pacific war."
Shall we limit the discussion to the period 1940 to 1945 and limit the
geographical area to the land/water bounded by the Rocky
Mountain/Andes in the East to a north south line through the southern
tip of the Indian Subcontinent as the west boundary. I feel we should
include all navies who operated in this area in the given time period.
Do you agree?
I thought you were supposed to preface that with "IMHO"
I really screwed that up. I was following your example in citing
opinion as fact. I should be more careful, my physics training has
taught me that at least. I would probably not use IMHO because my
opinion on some matters is not humble.
Your paragraph on ... something to do with medals, minutiae and
submarines ... the point escapes me but when coupled with the
paragraph on institutional inertia I am able to decypher the ramble.
It is not a position statement. It is obvious that many things could
fit into the area of institutional inertia---for example---university
teaching tenure. As I see your point it is similar to what happened to
Wigner's theories or the added terms in the initial derivations of
Einstein work on the effects of a constant c. You wish to apply this
view to the submarine deck gun as a weapon and derive some conclusion
as to whether, given hindsight, the weapon should have been deleted
from submarines earlier or should have been used at all. Am I
correct in this view of your argument?
Just as an aside...You don't really teach at the institution from
which you address this newsgroup do you? If so, what subject? From
which institution is your degree conferred?
Being from College Park gives you an advantage in this discussion.
That being the immediate access to the original documents that are
source records for the making of the deck gun decisions. I would
suggest not using them, however, as they would do little to bolster
your position.
I am still waiting for a definitive hypothesis statement.
This is as much fun as Maneuvering Debates on long patrols.
Jim Christley
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Steve Atkatz <ato...@tribeca.ios.com> wrote:
>
> P
>
> For years and years I've heard nasty comments about Academics and
> Academia in general. Now after a couple of weeks of reading your drivel I
> realize that, at least in your case, they're all true.
>
Coming from a source who suggests that the Japanese were aces at
anti submarine warfare, didn't know that mass takes energy to move
underwater, and thought subs at the end of the war should save toprpedos
for more worthwhile targets, I'll take that as a compliment.
I'll save my torpedoes for a more worthwhile target.
Vince
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
Jim Christley <jch...@bbn.com> wrote:
>
> Shall we limit the discussion to the period 1940 to 1945 and limit the
> geographical area to the land/water bounded by the Rocky
> Mountain/Andes in the East to a north south line through the southern
> tip of the Indian Subcontinent as the west boundary. I feel we should
> include all navies who operated in this area in the given time period.
> Do you agree?
Gee, I would have thought "the Pacific and Indian Oceans, would be
a more precise identifier, and Dec 7 1941 (washington time) would do nicely.
when coupled with the
> paragraph on institutional inertia I am able to decypher the ramble.
> It is not a position statement. It is obvious that many things could
> fit into the area of institutional inertia---for example---university
> teaching tenure. As I see your point it is similar to what happened to
> Wigner's theories or the added terms in the initial derivations of
> Einstein work on the effects of a constant c. You wish to apply this
> view to the submarine deck gun as a weapon and derive some conclusion
> as to whether, given hindsight, the weapon should have been deleted
> from submarines earlier or should have been used at all. Am I
> correct in this view of your argument?
when I last spoke to Dr. Wigner he was quite elderly, and we
didn't get to the point so close to your heart. But no, physical
science is a poor analogy for the complexity of social interactions.
Physics is a much simpler subject, since it allows for experimental
confirmation. It's so simple it's left largely in the hands of
tenured academics.
> Just as an aside...You don't really teach at the institution from
> which you address this newsgroup do you? If so, what subject? From
> which institution is your degree conferred?
I'm in several well known reference books and even have
a homepage.
> I am still waiting for a definitive hypothesis statement.
Now this is progress:
Deck guns are essentially an interesting "academic" study in the
decisions made about mililtary technology. Their lack of real importance
makes study of the problem more interesting.
The question is "under what set of circumstances could deck guns
be a "worthwhile" contributor to winning the war" The value in those
circumstances is then compared to both the cost of supplying and
carrying the weapons, the opportunity cost of using the weapon
and the risk of using the weapon.
My assumptions about the facts are:
1) deck guns are relatively inefficient firearms. they had no real
fire control mechanism, and submarines are low, rolling gun platforms.
The crew is exposed to spray at any speed.
The crew gets little practice, Firing single guns makes fire control
difficult, numerous hits from a 3,4 or even 5 inch shell may be needed
to sink a ship. While training a gun on a target is relatively
easy, at anything other than short range the elevation problem is tricky.
The effective target may only be 15-20 feet high
2) submarines are designed to operate in a "stealthy" manner ie.
they submerge not only for battle, but try to keep themselves unobserved
attacking a target on the surface always brings you to the enemy's
attention. as opposed to a torpedo attack, which might go unnoticed
if the torpedoes hit.
3) Submarines are highly vulnerable to even small calibre surface
weapons. A three inch gun can be lethal to a submarine, and even machine gun
fire can kill the exposed gun crew. Heavy machine guns
could hit a submarine gun crew at several thousand yards.
Two arguments are normally made for the use of deck guns
A) sink small unescorted unarmed ships that are not "worth" a torpedo
b) sink small unescorted unarmed ships that cannot be hit with a torpedo
obviously suggestion A includes "finishing off" a damaged ship.
My hypothesis is that radio and air escort in the early years
of the war had made a surface gun attack on even a small unarmed
ship an extremely hazardous operation. The ship could summon
assistance and the submarine would be caught on the surface with
its hatches open and crew exposed.
As a a result, in the early years of the war it would be expected
that deck gun operations would be rare. If the ship was large enough
to sink with a torpedo, shoot first and if you get lucky they
can't radio for help. If it's not large enough to sink with
a torpedo, it's not worth disclosing the presence of the submarine.
by 1945 air and surface escort had disappeared along
with the targets. we had a large number of submarines and
lots of torpedos. In 1945
any ship you could hit with a torpedo was "worth" a torpedo.
Now is the interesting part.
Why did we continue to build submarines after it became obvious
by January 1945 that we had completely destroyed japaese commerce,
or could destroy it with the means at hand?
The submarine bases had moved up with the fleet, and operations
had to be tightly controlled to prevent friendly fire incidents.
In a rational world you recognize that the submarines have done their
job and you start cutting back their numbers.
after all, Submarines are expensive,
costing much more per ton than most other warships, and they had
no expanding mission after January 1945., yet we continued to
produce about 8-10 a month.
Enter the deck gun. By using the deck gun to shoot up fishing
boats and coastal barges, you keep your submarine empire employed
and expanding.
Without the deck gun actions, what did the subs do in 1945 that
justified the continued expansion of the force?
or, if you prefer
Did the deck gun actions justify the effort put into
the 1945 submarine force expansion?
As to other posts, I consider absolute fantasy that
a submarine would voluntarily engage a 5-700 ton escort
ship on the surface to "save" a torpedo.
I have never seen a reference to a submarine hitting
an enemy ship with a gun while proceeding at 15 knots
or more.
I have never seen a reference totalling the ships sunk in gun
actions and comparing it to the number of days of submarine patrol
devoted to the activity.
If you have any information on these or other points they would
add to the discussion.
Vincent Brannigan
Matt Clonfero
In message <4mgggo$s...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" wrote:
> Many socio-technical decisions involve balancing these two
^^^^^
I have yet to see a piece of work using this construct that is of
any value to this debate, military science, or humankind as a whole.
Your message was no exception.
Aetherem Vincere
Matt.
--
===============================================================================
Matt Clonfero (ma...@aetherem.demon.co.uk) | To err is human,
My employer & I have a deal - they don't | To forgive is not Air Force Policy.
speak for me, and I don't speak for them. | -- Anon, ETPS
Matt Clonfero
In message <4mdb66$j...@hecate.umd.edu> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" wrote:
> >Whatever you say, Professor. Doubtless mining their home waters was a waste
> >of time too. Just out of interest, what *did* have an effect on the war
>
> interdiction of the seaborne commerce was critical because of its effect
> on the transport of military supplies.
Translation: `It works by affecting their supplies.'
> shooting up fishing boats in
> unpatrolled waters does not.
Translation: `It doesn't work by affecting their supplies.'
> >Didn't help a great deal in 1942 and early 1943, though, did it? We couldn't
> >sink them fast enough in the Bay then. Simple as that.
>
> the waste of planes in bomber command raids on Germany also meant that
> air interdiction of the uboats was delayed. The Uboats had no effective
> counter to VLR aircraft. interservice rivalyr prevented the most
> effective use of aircraft.
Err, hello? Lancaster and Halifax type aircraft were only suitable to precision
bombing of area targets by night. Oh, we should have known it wasn't working
(by asking the Germans) and built liberators instead? Then the Germans would
just keep all those 88 Flaks around the cities and tie up resources in
nightfighter production and crewing?
> by 1945 any target you could hit with a torpedo was worth a torpedo. We
> had no shortage of either topedoes or submarines. 1000 ton ships were
> worth a torpedo at all stages of the war. my point was simply that
> nothing was left on the surface that we could hit with a torpedo.
No specific shortage of torpedoes, but a sub carried a limited amount.
There was a tactical shortage of torpedoes on a patrol but no strategic
shortage at base.
Paul Jonathan Adam
vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > last submarine gunnery shoot in the Royal Navy, and he disagrees with most
> > of your information, Professor.
>
> I have reposted this to bring the discussion back to the point where
> it was claimed that Submarines could engage subchasers on the surface
> with their deck guns to conserve torpedoes. We were talking about combat
> actions. My comment on using the deck gun was clearly relating to a combat
> situation.It now appears that Mr. Adam's response is actually describing
> a "training" exercise. i.e. a submarine in no danger from being shot
> at. I am sure that in the safety of a training exercise many things are
> possible that are not possible in combat.
Well, Prof, in the absence of anything from you other than your opinion,
the fact that this was considered routine and effective (in the right
circumstances) by serving officers - who were, after all, the ones facing
a fiery or watery death if they were wrong - should carry some weight.
And this was the mid-1960s, and the deck guns were coming off (after a
brief renaissance on some A- and O-boats during the Indonesian affair)
to concentrate on ASW, not 1944-45 in the Pacific.
Are we now saying that, because I train for close-quarters infantry combat,
that's not possible in action? It may be dangerous, but it's useful.
Of course, some of us merely rely on experience, rather than the superior
academic analysis uncorrupted by fact which you practice.
Paul Jonathan Adam
vb...@umail.umd.edu "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" writes:
> Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> > A towed target, speed about 15 knots. The submarine was manoevering
> > to engage on alternate beams. Range was about three miles. All from
> > his memory.
>
> the target was at 15 knots or the the sub? the target was an enemy
> barge?
Given that this was about 1965, we were a little short on enemies at the
time. The submarine was making 12-13 knots, the target about 15.
> > We've *given* evidence that this was popular. We've shown that the
> > US submarine service was asking for more guns and better fire control,
> > because they were fighting on the surface with their guns. I work with
> > someone who finds your assertions hilarious. Either come up with some
> > documentary evidence, or stop waving tattered opinions around.
>
> you have given the opinion of sub officer that they like theri deck guns.
> you have given no citations that the deck guns were dritical to the
> military effort. I know they liked the deck guns.
Of course, given that they were the ones who were using them, their opinion
was entirely irrelevant? Please, Prof, a cite, a source, a document, a
study, *anything* other than your opinion.
> > Plenty of torpedoes, limited capacity (20 or so) on submarines, hit ratio
> > for torpedoes about one in three, seven kills per submarine on average.
> > Smaller targets mean shallower draught, shorter beam, and usually greater
> > manoeverability, so they're harder to hit. You can carry a lot more shells
> > than torpedoes, and the fire-control solution is easier with a 40mm shell
>> (muzzle velocity 2800fps or so) than with a torpedo (muzzle velocity 75 feet
> > per second).
>
> but if your have no shortage of torpedoes or submarines, you dont use the
> deck gun on a target you can hit with a torpedo.
Professor, watch my fingers, I'll try to type this slowly and clearly.
It takes a while to get to your patrol area.
You only have so many torpedoes.
You're still hoping the Shinano will cruise across your bow.
Those pesky little lighters and subchasers are very hard to hit with torpedoes.
They are quite easy to hit with gunnery.
When you use up your torpedoes you have to go home and get more.
So you use your guns when you can, to make your torpedoes last longer, so when
the Shinano does appear you can give her a full salvo.
Is that clear enough, or are my words containing too many syllables?
> > So, since you can't use torpedoes, you use guns... becuase the dastardly
> > enemy is still sending small craft to sea, moving his cargoes in penny
> > packets.
>
> cargo from where to where? any ocean going ship is worth a torpedo
> by 1945.
500-1000 ton ships are hard to hit with torpedoes. Simple fact.
500-1000 tons are relatively easy to hit with guns. Especially since they
and their escorts (if any) are usually outgunned by the submarine. Being
small, 5" and 40mm shells have rather nasty effects on them.
If you have an escort with medium-calibre guns, that gets torpedoed. Then
you surface and pick off the others with gunfire.
> > You said above, "my point was simply that nothing was left on the surface
> that
> > we could hit with a torpedo." That doesn't mean there was nothing left on
> > the surface, just as the fact that the North Vietnamese never ran major
> > escorted truck columns south didn't mean they weren't moving supplies.
>
> > And the analogy, far from being nonsense, is entirely apt. When the enemy
> > has sea superiority, disperse your transport assets into many small
> > vessels: hard to detect, too numerous (you hope) to kill.
>
> The analogy is precisely nonsense. Even small ships are large compared
> to truck traffic. Both Torpedos and guns are designed to actually
> hit the unit of tranport i.e. the ship. In land transport the unit of
> transport is
> very small and difficult to hit, so you aim at the bottlenecks, i.e.
> railroad tracks, bridges etc. Its a totally different interdiction strategy.
What do you know about torpedo fire control, Professor? Ever tried plotting
an attack with Mark 8s? It isn't quite as quick, simple or easy as you
seem to believe. Small vessels are shallow-draughted and, uh, small.
Torpedoes tend to have problems with them, even when you include guidance,
which wasn't widely available to the USN at that point.
>> Let's see...deck guns are useless because a submarine is too vulnerable when
>> using them, was one objection. Vulnerable to what? "Nothing was left on the
>> surface that we could hit with a torpedo". Since we can't hit with torpedoes,
>> perhaps using guns would be logical? Evidently not, though you can't quite
>> explain why.
>
> My poit was that if the target was large enough to carry a gun, the submarine
> was too vulnerable to try a gun attack. this was the situation
> prior to 1945
And how many of those targets are large enough to carry guns and actually did?
The Japanese never seemed to consider the Q-Ship a worthwhile tactic.
You can't just make a blanket assertion that because a ship *could* carry a
gun, you can't attack it.
> > You suggested gunnery accuracy as a problem until it was demonstrated that
> > submarines could actually fire accurately,
>
> Demonstrated by what? the recall of your friend who shot at a
> towed target?
Yep. Got anything better, Professor? Got evidence, indication, proof that the
USN were institutionally unable to score hits with their guns? I have Mike,
who said the deck gun could shoot pretty well. All you have is your
uninformed opinion.
> and that by war's end submarines
> > were being equipped specifically for surface gun actions - naturally, this
> > was being done because it was ineffective and pointless to do so, and the
> > Navy did it anyway. You're not sure why, your references are all in New
> > Jersey at the moment, and anyway no printed matter or eyewitness accout
> > is up to the standards of your expert analysis.
>
> You asserted that they had value to the war effort. How much tonnage
> was sunk, and at what cost?
Pass: don't have the figures. 5" and 40mm ammo costs less than torpedoes,
though. Remember, three fired = one hit for normal circumstances. Probably
more like five or six fired per hit for very small targets.
Sounds cost effective to me even at a first look.
> > Any other reasons? Build a case and defend it, instead of relying on
> > contradicting me (and yourself) without reference or sources.
>
> All you have demonstrated is that Submariners liked
> deck guns to shoot at undefended targets. I agree that
> its much more fun than being transferred to a surface ship and
> doing radar picket duty. You have not provided any support for the
> suggestion that it had any effect on the war.
And you, Professor, have failed to do the opposite. You can cheerfully claim
it was more cost-effective to fire four torpedoes than twenty 5" shells or
a few dozen clips of 40mm, but you'd be wrong. You can allege all you like
about fire control, but them that did it say you're wrong: snide claims that
"it was only training" don't cut it. You can say it was easy to hit small
vessels with torpedoes, but then again you'd be wrong. You can even claim
the targets were too small to be useful, but they were by then the only
targets going on most patrols. Oh, and I'm still waiting for any sort of
source, cite or reference for your claims.
I can throw unsubstantiated claims around all I like too, but I choose not
to. This may be why I'm a mere B.Eng.
Paul Jonathan Adam
> > For years and years I've heard nasty comments about Academics and
> > Academia in general. Now after a couple of weeks of reading your drivel I
> > realize that, at least in your case, they're all true.
>
> Coming from a source who suggests that the Japanese were aces at
> anti submarine warfare, didn't know that mass takes energy to move
> underwater, and thought subs at the end of the war should save toprpedos
> for more worthwhile targets, I'll take that as a compliment.
In order: the Japanese sucked at ASW, a perfectly streamlined mass *doesn't*
need energy to maintain its movement - the issue is drag and weight, not
mass - and you've demonstrated your ignorance on torpedo employment
perfectly adequately already.
> I'll save my torpedoes for a more worthwhile target.
> Vince
No, Prof. Surface and give him a few rounds of 5" high-explosive, then
close and finish him with the forties. It's only a training exercise,
after all...
Gary J. Mac Donald
"Prof. Vincent Brannigan" (vb...@umail.umd.edu) writes:
> of course the malta runs took place.
> the issue is how much cargo You stated 65,000 tons
> Lets see, at 200 tons a trip, each sub delivers about 600 tons a month.
> 65,000 tons took only 325 round trips. at three round trips a
> month per sub, assuming no losses.
>
> Either there were more subs, more cargo on each sub, or less was
> delivered. I am also interested in the technique of filling
> oil tanks with aviation gasoline. It is much lighter, and contamination
> is a problem.
1. 65,000 tons was significant. It was more than any single convoy
took to MAlta before December 1942. More than Pedestal, Halberd, etc. etc.
2. Aviation fuel was carried in special tanks built to fit on the
external mine rails of the minelaying subs. They had a lot of trouble
with depth control and such matters, but these problems were solved.
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
> experience indicates that the Royal Navy can manage accurate gunnery from
> a submarine deck at speed and against moving targets (which you said was
> impossible).
we were discussing COMBAT I'll readily concede that in training exercises
all kinds of things are possible. I also did not notice a date for the shoot
you mention. I assume it was during WWII with WWII weapons
> Of course, if you wish to concede the inferiority of the USN, you are welcome
> to do so: whether it was crew training, or inadequate ballistics of the
> 5"/25 compared to the 4" Mike was watching. The fact remains that we were
> able to do it. If the USN couldn't, they could have asked us how: you've
> produced no evidence other than your opinions to show that, though.
In Naval Engineering and American Sea power P 175
McVoy Reinhart and Palmer state "the guns were not stabilized
so it was not easy to hit a target in any sea not mirror flat"
All three are experienced sea officers.
> > lets look at the books on small escorts.
> >
> > German minesweepers M 233 600 tons, 2 4.1 inch 2 37 mm 8 20 MM 18 knots
> > French torpilar La flore 610 tons 2 3.9 inch MG and torpedo tubes 33 knots
> > Italian Sirio 642 tons 3 3.9 inch 6 37 mm 4 torp. 34 knots
> > Jaspanes Minesweepers 492 tons 2 4.7 inch 2 M.G. 20 knots
>
> Japanese Number 4 submarine chaser, 300 tons. Depth charges and 4 MG, 20 knots.
>
> > No one in their right mind would challenge any of these ships on the
> > surface with a 3 or 4 inch deck gun. .
>
> #4 Submarine Chaser and her sisters are a perfect target for submarine
> gunnery.
of course I was responding to your comment on a 500-700 ton escort.
I'm sure if you look long enough you can find a ship small enough to
sink As for a perfect target, of course at 20 knots SC 4 comes straight at you.
heavy machine
guns raking the bridge. These are heavy machine guns, not some popgun.
either you stand your ground, crew exposed, or you run like hell.
you can't submerge , unless you want the depth charges. How close
to the SC do you surface? How far away can you be and be sure that
its not a minesweeper with a 4 inch gun? Your target is only
16 feet wide. Your moving, the Target is shooting at you,
they would like to ram you. If they get wiithing MG range your
deck and guncrew are swiss cheese
Sounds like an exciting movie to me?
Im still waiting for a time and date when an RN submarine
voluntarily surfaced to attack an escort ship.
> > 2 machine guns and 2 depth charges were my father's weapons in a 50 foot
> > launch on the pacific side of the panama canal. an no, they couldn't
> > drop the charges, becasue they were too slow. Their job was to
> > look for subs and raise the alarm..
>
> And how would they cope with an I-15 engaging them with 5.5" shellfire?
> The answer is "badly".
No, they radio and scream that there is a submarine. Its the same job the
japanese were doing when they spotted the Hornet on the Doolittle raid.
If they spot the sub and raise the alarm they have done their job.
Personally I'd use 40mm, but the Japanese didn't
> ship that. That's the ASW armament of many Japanese vessels: machine guns
> and depth charges. With 20 torpedoes and hundreds of shells, which do you
> use?
>
you act sensibly. you avoid the patrol boat and wait
for something worthwhile
you don't charge in and alert the defenders when you don't have
a reasonable target. Unless of course you are the Prince of Wales
and Repulse
Brave men, just like Balaclava
Vince
Jack Love
On Sun, 05 May 96 19:19:11 GMT, Paul Jonathan Adam <Pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>
wrote:
>> Maybe your friend is using some special "imperial ton"
>
>No, Vincent, he's just an experienced submariner, trained by men who
>had been preparing for a Pacific campaign at VJ-Day.
>
>> 2 machine guns and 2 depth charges were my father's weapons in a 50 foot
>> launch on the pacific side of the panama canal. an no, they couldn't
>> drop the charges, becasue they were too slow. Their job was to
>> look for subs and raise the alarm..
>
>And how would they cope with an I-15 engaging them with 5.5" shellfire?
>The answer is "badly". Personally I'd use 40mm, but the Japanese didn't
>ship that. That's the ASW armament of many Japanese vessels: machine guns
>and depth charges. With 20 torpedoes and hundreds of shells, which do you
>use?
>
>--
>"When you have shot and killed a man, you have defined your attitude
>towards him. You have offered a definite answer to a definite problem.
>For better or for worse, you have acted decisively.
> In fact, the next move is up to him." R. A. Lafferty
There was a discussion in a book years ago in which the
option of surface engagement vs a sub-chaser was considered.
The conclusion there was that the sub was a lousy target, had
a tough hull (enough to be considered 'armored' for the purposes of
the engagement), adequate surface speed and would probably
give a *very* good account of itself. The subchaser was considered
a relatively good target, soft-skinned and not heavily armed and certainly
wasn't much faster than the sub. While evasion was considered the
first choice, surface engagement was not out of the question.
We *must* keep the good Dr. from making defense policy for
*anyone*.
>
>Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Keith
In article <4mdbj5$k...@hecate.umd.edu> "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu> writes:
>From: "Prof. Vincent Brannigan" <vb...@umail.umd.edu>
>Subject: Re: Submarine Deck Guns
>Date: 3 May 1996 16:17:41 GMT
>Roger Eustis <ro...@aaee.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>In article: <kcoman.19...@admin.nelpoly.ac.nz>
>>kco.
>>> Edward Young's "One of Our Submarines" fills in some excellent
>>> detail of it all. He made the point that typically a torpedo attack was
>>> really only sensible for targets of about 1500 tons and up, and that these
>>> vessels would usually have quite a powerful escort. .
>Why would anyone think a 1000 Ton ship was not "worth" a torpedo?
1. Edward Young was an experienced RN sub commander: he'd "seen the
elephant", trained his crew and knew his business.
2. Japanese coasters of any consequence (say) 1500 tons and up were
invariably given the best available anti-sub escorts. (Surfacing and
trying to engage a couple of *proper* sub-chasers would have been an act
of folly.) Under those circumstances, a conventional torpedo attack
would thus have been attempted.
3. On a patrol into (say) Indonesian waters, a RN sub would probably carry
about 13 torps. There was always the possibility of encountering a "rich"
target (e.g. light cruiser) that would call for a torpedo salvo or two.
4. In light of (3) above, in waters that were dominated by relatively many
small craft, it would make no sense to blast off torpedos at every little
coaster that were encountered only to be caught short if something really
special hove into view. (Especially when the deck gun would do the job
economically and with dispatch.)
>>>
>>> Top post Keith....do I spy the holed and sinking SS Brannigan? Perhaps
>>someone on the casing will chuck him a lifebelt...then again....
>>-- Roger
>No he is still waiting for a time place and date where submarines engaged
>subchasers with deck guns to avoid wasting a torpedo on a 1000 ton ship.
Read Young's book -- all will be revealed.
Cheers,
KRC