The Hersh Story: Fantasies, Falsehoods and a Forewarning
PakistanPal
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan- In Bob Woodward's book, "Bush at War", he recalls
how when he (Woodward) quoted Hersh to Bush, the latter replied that
Seymour Hersh was a liar! Hersh's article "Defending the Arsenal" in
The New Yorker (November 16, 2009) has predictably caused a stir in
Pakistan. But this always happens after the event; after foreign
journalists have been given excessive access into the corridors of
power in Pakistan. So it has been with Hersh. Now the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) claims Hersh has a well-known "anti-Pakistan"
bias. If that is the case, then did the MFA give an official
perspective on how much access Hersh should have been given in
Pakistan? Did they advise the President to avoid meeting this man or
did they give any official brief to the President on what to say to
him on sensitive issues? Clearly, the Zardari meeting with Hersh has
no reflection of the MFA or any official Pakistani position. Instead,
there is a reflection of ignorance with the President declaring that
our army officers are "British-trained"!
However, leaving aside these minor issues, there are two aspects that
reflect the speculative and often factually incorrect nature of the
piece. First, let us look at some of the inaccuracies, if not outright
falsehoods. The manner in which Hersh has dealt with Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal and his claims that Pakistan and the US began
sensitive nuclear cooperation, reveal a preconceived mindset. The
author set out to make certain points and then sought mostly
unidentified sources to prove his point! This is evident because the
largest single interview cited is of "Colonel Imam" whom Hersh
describes as "the archetype of the disillusioned Pakistani officer"!
Now anyone who knows Col Imam knows he is a maverick, with his own
idiosyncratic perspective and is certainly not typical of even
disillusioned army officers - although how many of those Hersh has
actually met is also questionable.
But for Hersh, Imam provides a logical development to his other
theory, that it is not so much a Taliban seizure of the Pakistani
nukes that is worrisome to the Americans but the fear of a "mutiny"
within the army with extremists believing in the Hizbul Tahrir goal of
setting up a Caliphate taking control of some nuclear assets or even
diverting a warhead. Talk about being far fetched given that there is
no history of mutiny in the army and the organisational interest is
always supreme. Also, to a large extent the prevailing culture within
the army reflects, to a large extent, the leadership at any given
time. Also to assume that extremism is rampant in the military because
generals no longer serve alcohol to visiting journalists is a bit
ridiculous. I had argued on this point long and hard with Hersh after
his last visit to Pakistan, when we met abroad, but clearly when a
point has to be made, it will be made despite evidence to the contrary
and no matter how fanciful the "proof"!
On the nuclear security agreement also, some claims are debatable at
least. For instance, he describes Pakistan's nuclear doctrine as being
based on a de-mating of the warheads from their triggers. This is
absolutely false and nowhere has the military ever claimed this either
in any reference to doctrine. In fact, the weapons are not de-mated at
all but are simply not on hair trigger alert - which they do not need
to be on in any case. So if his source of information is so incorrect,
many of the other assumptions are also subject to doubt. For instance
his claim, and he cites a former US intelligence officer to prove his
point, that the Pakistanis gave the US a virtual look at such
sensitive information as number of warheads, some locations, and so on
is bizarre since even within the nuclear community this knowledge is
not known except by very few. As for giving them information about
command and control, Pakistan is one of the few countries that has put
out a detailed explanation of its command and control structure in the
public space. So what one can assume is the intelligence officer is
confusing the briefing given to some journalists - foreign and
Pakistani - about command and control, the programme and so on as a
"virtual look"! That briefing is impressive and on seeking an
explanation to the Hersh claim from SPD (Strategic Plans Division),
the answer was that this is the only briefing that could have created
the false impression.
Coming to the Mullen news conference of 4th May where Hersh claims the
Admiral spoke openly about increased cooperation on nuclear security
between the US, Mullen did note that the US had worked with the
Pakistanis to improve the security of their nuclear arsenal. Of course
even this limited access to the US military is too much from the point
of view of our arsenal's security, but it does not imply "highly
sensitive understanding" of the US "with the Pakistani military".
There is also little proof that ongoing consultations on nuclear
security between Washington and Islamabad intensified after Obama's Af-
Pak policy - especially since the Af-Pak idea got a cold reception in
Islamabad. Finally, the most far-fetched claim, citing an American
official, in Hersh's piece is that the army is controlled by the
Punjabis who cannot get along with the Pushtuns, so somehow that
creates a simmering undercurrent within the military, creating a
veritable goldmine for mutiny! He really needs to look more carefully
into the Pakistan army and its composition as well as its culture.
Moving on from the actual factual inaccuracies, even falsehoods, to an
equally important issue raised by the article is the question of
access. Why do we allow these people so much access in this country -
right from the President down? President Musharraf talks openly of the
supposedly secret tunnels and so on. Others are equally prone to
spilling their guts out to inquisitive foreign journalists. Why? And
why must we abuse each other through these journalists? Incidentally,
this time round Hersh did not seek the official version from the MFA;
nor did he seek an interview with General Kidwai of SPD. He told me
Hersh had sought access but could not get it, but on checking I found
he did not send in any written request.
Finally, a most disturbing aspect of the piece - and also the most
threatening, is his description of what the US plans are for
Pakistan's nukes. That is what the game is all about - a unilateral US
plan to have a force in Pakistan to attempt to take out the triggers
and thereby decapitate the nukes. Is that why we are seeing so many
covert US personnel coming into Pakistan? There is no deal; but there
is a threatening unilateral US agenda. That Hersh has explained most
vividly!
Article Source : http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2009/11/10/the-hersh-story-fantasies-falsehoods-and-a-forewarning/