Trafalgar Vs Los Angeles
Conor O'Neill
My money would be on the trafalgar, and RN Skippers are trained by the
perisher course to be tacticians and leaders, not just engineers, like
the USN captains. The PCO course is very heavy on engineering.
Also the RN has superior torpedoes. The Spearfish is far better that
the Mk 48.
Murff
(Chiin-...@tanlon.demon.co.uk) wrote:
: Also the RN has superior torpedoes. The Spearfish is far better that
: the Mk 48.
While I have confidence in Mr Adam's heavyweight colleagues' ability to
build good kit, can you provide some figures to justify this claim ?
--
Murff...
Matthew Beesley
> Has this ever happened in a exercise? Does anyone know what happened?
> My money would be on the trafalgar, and RN Skippers are trained by the
> perisher course to be tacticians and leaders, not just engineers, like
> the USN captains. The PCO course is very heavy on engineering.
>
> the Mk 48.
>
I've read that the MK 48 ADCAP is better.
>
Paul Jonathan Adam
> Has this ever happened in a exercise? Does anyone know what happened?
> My money would be on the trafalgar, and RN Skippers are trained by the
> perisher course to be tacticians and leaders, not just engineers, like
> the USN captains. The PCO course is very heavy on engineering.
I'd agree there, but the USN captains are not *just* engineers (at least
not in the fast-attack boats, boomer skippers are another matter :) )
> Also the RN has superior torpedoes. The Spearfish is far better that
> the Mk 48.
Spearfish is still only fielded as a pre-production item and most of the
fleet still has Tigerfish. Although the Mark 24 is an excellent weapon in
its Mod 2 incarnation, for SSN vs. SSN my money's on Mark 48 ADCAP.
Tigerfish has advantages in other arenas, and Spearfish wins hands down if
available, but this is a very specific fight.
The Trafalgars have a manoeverability edge on the Los Angeles boats,
are slightly (*very* slightly - depends who was refitted most recently)
quieter. The Los Angeles have a marginally better sensor suite, again subject
to the above.
The outcome would be very close indeed: I'd like to wrap myself in the
Union Jack, but luck would be the deciding factor in such an engagement:
good boats, good crews, and good weapons. I personally think you'd see a
double knockout: both boats detect each other almost simultaneously,
both fire salvoes of torpedoes, both achieve kills :(
All opinions IMHO from published sources, naturally. I don't speak for
GEC-Marconi Underwater Weapons, as long as they don't speak for me...
--
"When you have shot and killed a man, you have defined your attitude towards
him. You have offered a definite answer to a definite problem. For better
or for worse, you have acted decisively.
In fact, the next move is up to him." <R.A. Lafferty>
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Paul Jonathan Adam
> (Chiin-...@tanlon.demon.co.uk) wrote:
> : Also the RN has superior torpedoes. The Spearfish is far better that
> : the Mk 48.
>
> build good kit, can you provide some figures to justify this claim ?
All figures are to be taken with the obligatory pinch of salt, all data
from open sources, all opinions purely mine, et cetera et cetera, in nomime
padre et fili et spiritus sanctus...
Mark 48 ADCAP burns Otto monopropellant in a swash-plate engine to give
a top speed of 40-55 knots depending on depth. Very good by any standards.
However, radiated noise levels are high compared to British torpedoes.
Spearfish uses Otto with a hexylammonium perchlorate oxidiser, and a small
amount of seawater to raise steam. This drives a Sundstrand turbine to
push the weapon along at 50-70 knots depending on depth. (In both cases,
increasing depth increases the back pressure against which the exhaust has
to be vented, reducing available power). The turbine and the pump-jet
propulsor are also much quieter than the Mark 48 ADCAP.
Spearfish is also newer in its front end, with more computing power for sonar
signal processing and tactical software (although my speciality is
propulsion and control, so here I'm on even shakier ground). Finally, being
quieter it has less self-noise and so has better sonar.
OTOH please don't take the above as a criticism of the Mark 48 ADCAP, which is
an excellent weapon: just designed with different goals in mind, and based on
a (good) existing design rather than Spearfish's clean sheet of paper. I
*would* rather have Spearfish, but then I'm biassed.
Eric Gross
>Has this ever happened in a exercise? Does anyone know what happened?
>My money would be on the trafalgar, and RN Skippers are trained by the
>perisher course to be tacticians and leaders, not just engineers, like
>the USN captains. The PCO course is very heavy on engineering.
>Also the RN has superior torpedoes. The Spearfish is far better that
>the Mk 48.
Hmm, your statement about U.S. skippers being engineers rather than tacticians
and leaders might -- might -- have been appropriate in the height of the
Rickover era, but is not now. U.S. sub captains are trained and expected to
be all these things. You don't build three score of the best attack boats in
the world, intended for up-close and personal work, and give them to pure
theory-heads and numbers-crunchers. (No aspersions meant for engineers.)
You give them to capable leaders and warriors who are expected to act
professionally, cunningly, and with initiative.
Perisher is a great system, granted. But U.S. sub captains don't just walk on
the boat, either . . . .
Matt Clonfero
> The dealing-with-death-by-details and 'no excuses' mindset in a nuke eng
> program aren't *bad* selection criteria; neither is picking the ones who
> maintain their individuality out the other end for the command track.
>
> The time-to-target and time-and-distance calculations necessary for sub
> tactics are also things that require a facility with numbers, and I can't
> imagine that an emotional sense of the passive hostility of inanimate
> objects is a bad thing, either.
Both good points, but on the other hand
The `Extreme-precision-perfect-safety' mindset of nuclear types could be
a disadvantage - it may lead to a tendancy of always looking for a perfect
solution (when there might not be one - just a `least bad' one), or failure
to take even justifiable risks.
The perisher course (formally, the Command Officers Qualifying Course) for
RN sub skippers is very tough, and if you can't sort the calculations out
you just won't pass. You don't need to be a theoretical physicist to be good
at mental arithmatic.
Aetherem Vincere
Matt.
--
===============================================================================
Matt Clonfero (ma...@aetherem.demon.co.uk) | To err is human,
My employer & I have a deal - they don't | To forgive is not Air Force Policy.
speak for me, and I don't speak for them. | -- Anon, ETPS
Graydon
[nuke eng. school first; if you don't make that, you don't drive a boat]
: Despite later experience, such a selection process cannot help but have
: a profound impact on the kind of people we have in charge of our subs.
I dunno, Scott - what do you *want* to select for in a sub skipper?
The dealing-with-death-by-details and 'no excuses' mindset in a nuke eng
program aren't *bad* selection criteria; neither is picking the ones who
maintain their individuality out the other end for the command track.
The time-to-target and time-and-distance calculations necessary for sub
tactics are also things that require a facility with numbers, and I can't
imagine that an emotional sense of the passive hostility of inanimate
objects is a bad thing, either.
What do you feel is being left out? What's the proportional training
time by the time someone's actually commanding an attack boat?
--
saun...@qlink.queensu.ca | Monete me si non anglice loquobar.
Graydon
: The `Extreme-precision-perfect-safety' mindset of nuclear types could be
: a disadvantage - it may lead to a tendancy of always looking for a perfect
: solution (when there might not be one - just a `least bad' one), or failure
: to take even justifiable risks.
True.
There are other routes to that mindset - the nothing-can-be-too-wrong-if-
the-brass-is-shiny-and-the-socks-are-counted one, for instance. I think
that's a general training issue - people are *not* good at thinking in
terms of probabilities, and training that in is hard work.
: The perisher course (formally, the Command Officers Qualifying Course) for
: RN sub skippers is very tough, and if you can't sort the calculations out
: you just won't pass. You don't need to be a theoretical physicist to be good
: at mental arithmatic.
Of course not. However, if you're the boat CO, you *are* responsible for
the reactor, your operating contraints are in many ways dictated by that
reactor, and you need to be a practical physicist to fulfill that
responsibility. Which, like being a practical any other kind of
engineer, means knowing the theory well enough to use it.
I'm quite willing to believe that the engineering details can be
overemphasised; what I'm presently curious about is what the carreer
training time breakdown is for a typical sub skipper.
Graydon
: In message <42o11q$a...@knot.queensu.ca> Graydon wrote:
: > Of course not. However, if you're the boat CO, you *are* responsible for
: > the reactor, your operating contraints are in many ways dictated by that
: > reactor, and you need to be a practical physicist to fulfill that
: > responsibility. Which, like being a practical any other kind of
: > engineer, means knowing the theory well enough to use it.
: Unless you have a trained nuclear engineer to run the reactor. Can you
: imagine a CVN being run by an ex-engineering officer in the nuclear
: power field? Surely the better way is the way the USN do it now - the
: commander is an ex-aviator, and he is supported by an engineer.
Fleet carriers are a)so big that they *must* be run via staff command and
b)not likely to be destroyed by a single engineering casualty.
I would sugguest that sumbarines *must not* be run via staff command -
completely different leadership situation - and that they *are* likely to
be destroyed by a single engineering casualty, and that this changes the
appropriate qualifications for command very much.
Which isn't to say that the CO's tactical sense isn't very important; the
crew needs to have confidence that the CO isn't going to get them all
killed. Breaking the boat through out-of-the-envelope demands on the
power plant is one way to get them all killed, though.
I have the persistent impression that this is an argument about the
appropriate order to teach command track submarine officers these things;
I can think of good arguments for 'teach tactics first' (so it has a long
time to become spinal reflex, and so the spinal reflexes are those of the
young and brave-with-the-conviction-of-their-immortality), and for 'teach
engineering first' (need more engineers than skippers anyway; it tends to
keep the subs from being dominated by Annapolis grads; it's selecting for
a particular kind of competent geeky technophilia useful on a submarine).
Unfortunately, I can't get at the BuPers reports that might allow the
evaluation of the argument.
Matt Clonfero
> Of course not. However, if you're the boat CO, you *are* responsible for
> the reactor, your operating contraints are in many ways dictated by that
> reactor, and you need to be a practical physicist to fulfill that
> responsibility. Which, like being a practical any other kind of
> engineer, means knowing the theory well enough to use it.
Unless you have a trained nuclear engineer to run the reactor. Can you
imagine a CVN being run by an ex-engineering officer in the nuclear
power field? Surely the better way is the way the USN do it now - the
commander is an ex-aviator, and he is supported by an engineer.
> I'm quite willing to believe that the engineering details can be
> overemphasised; what I'm presently curious about is what the carreer
> training time breakdown is for a typical sub skipper.
I've got _100 days_ here. It contains a potted history of Adm Woodward's
career.
1946 - Royal Naval College, Dartmouth (HMS Britannia, a school)
1950 - HMS Devonshire (Training cruiser for cadets)
1950 - HMS Maidstone (submarine depot ship)
1951 - HMS Sheffield (cruiser)
1951 - HMS Zodiac (destroyer).
1952 - Royal Naval College, Greenwich (Junior Officer's War Course).
1952/3 - Portsmouth. Technical schools (aviation, TAS, gunnery, electrical..)
1953 - HMS Dolphin (Submarine School)
1953 - HMS Sanguine (800 ton submarine) Torpedo Officer, then Nav. Officer
1956 - Barrow-in-Furness. Supervising the building of HMS Porpoise
(2300 ton submarine)
1958 - HMS Porpoise launched
1960 - `Perisher' course, HMS Dolphin
1960 - Command of HMS Tireless
1962 - HMS Falmouth (ASW frigate)
1962 - RNC Greenwich - Nuclear Reactor Course.
1963 - ??? - ASW course.
1963/4 - Command of HMS Grampus (?)
1964/5 - Command, HMS Valiant (3500 ton SSN)
1967 - Instructor, HMS Dolphin
1969 - Joint Services Staff Course
1969 - Command, HMS Warspite (SSN)
(Summarised from the text. Accuracy not guaranteed)
Dean F. Kling
saun...@qlink.queensu.ca (Graydon) wrote:
>Of course not. However, if you're the boat CO, you *are* responsible for
>the reactor, your operating contraints are in many ways dictated by that
>reactor, and you need to be a practical physicist to fulfill that
>responsibility. Which, like being a practical any other kind of
>engineer, means knowing the theory well enough to use it.
>
You actually don't need a great deal of reactor theory to fight
a ship well. About 10 years ago I attended the U.S. Submarine Officer's
Advanced Course (SOAC). This was a 6-month department head level couse
that spend a great deal of time specifically on tactics and fighting
the ship. Our class was a combination of nuclear trained and non-nuclear
trained weapon's officers. I didn't see any correlation between nuclear
power training and ability to fight the ship tactically. There were
good ones and less good ones and the range of variablitiy had to do with
the individual's personality and abilities, whatever their career track.
On the other hand to maximixe the useful life of the reactor and ship
in a peacetime environment, and to keep the engineering plant at the
highest combination of readiness and safety, it is probably best that the
C.O. is nuclear trained and a former engineer. It's hard to argue with
40 years of success.
Dean
Dean F. Kling dkl...@ptd.intel.com
No, I am not an authorized spokesman for Intel.
Scott D. Orr
writes:
>Scott D. Orr (sd...@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
>[nuke eng. school first; if you don't make that, you don't drive a
boat]
>: Despite later experience, such a selection process cannot help but
have
>: a profound impact on the kind of people we have in charge of our
subs.
>
>I dunno, Scott - what do you *want* to select for in a sub skipper?
>
with others....Ability to comprehend theoretical nuclear physics ranks
just below "looks good in a blue suit" in my list.
>The dealing-with-death-by-details and 'no excuses' mindset in a nuke
eng
>program aren't *bad* selection criteria...
They are -- while attention to detail is good, insistence on perfection
is bad in a submariner, because submarining is inherently a risky (that
is, uncertain) activity. Cf. Gene Fluckey's (RADM, USN Ret.) comment
on the attack on Namkwang Harbor (by way of explaining why he didn't
deserve the Medal of Honor): "If I hadn't though we had at least of
50/50 chance of surviving, I wouldn't have done it."
..neither is picking the ones who
>maintain their individuality out the other end for the command track.
>
That, in itself, is true, but there's no reason to exclude many such
individuals by "weeding them out" on some irrelevant (but extra-
ordinarily difficult) criterion. And though things are changing now,
in Rickover's day they didn't try to "pick...the ones who maintain[ed]
their individuality.
>The time-to-target and time-and-distance calculations necessary for
sub
>tactics are also things that require a facility with numbers...
"[F]acility with numbers" and knowledge of nuclear theory are two
different things -- probability and statistics would likely be more
useful for tactics. At any rate, time-to-target and time-and-distance
calculations aren't exactly higher math: they're multiplication and
trigonometry, and that's all (which is the main reason they're mostly
handled by computers).
>...and I can't
>imagine that an emotional sense of the passive hostility of inanimate
>objects is a bad thing, either.
>
THAT is a trait not limited to engineers. :)
>What do you feel is being left out? What's the proportional training
>time by the time someone's actually commanding an attack boat?
>
The training time is only one issue -- though in fact I think that most
of the nuclear training is useless for anyone outside the engineering
department (and there's no reason to send officers on the command track
through engineering -- the British don't do it). Training shouldn't
emphasive the guts of the reactor any more than it emphasizes the
insides of the torpedoes or sonar.
However, the more important issue is the selection process: you don't
select the best baseball players by scouting high school football games
(though there may be some relationship between the two sports, it's
just not hte most efficient way to do things), and you don't pick the
best sub captains by picking only from engineers.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
writes:
>
>Of course not. However, if you're the boat CO, you *are* responsible
for
>the reactor, your operating contraints are in many ways dictated by
that
>reactor, and you need to be a practical physicist to fulfill that
>responsibility.
No, it doesn't. The torpedoes and sonar are equally parts of the
submarine, and the CO is not expected to understand the details
of their engineering (even it the CO happens to be, say, an
electrical engineer by training).
>Which, like being a practical any other kind of
>engineer, means knowing the theory well enough to use it.
>
How many car mechanics do you know who can clearly explain and
mathematcially model an internal combustion enginer? How many
of them, do you think, could explain the concept of laminar flow
as it applies to the car's drag coefficient? How many of them
know what a drag coefficient is?
Now, let's go one step further: how many car _drivers_ know all
of the above? In fact, very few, because they don't _need_ to
know it. All they need to know is you push the gas and the car
accelarates, and if something goes, wrong you take it to the
mechanic.
Likewise, the good submarine captain knows how fast the sub
can normally go and he knows the risks (in terms of noise
generation and power plant stress) of moving near or above
those limits. That's all he needs to know -- the engineers
will take care of the rest.
>I'm quite willing to believe that the engineering details can be
>overemphasised; what I'm presently curious about is what the carreer
>training time breakdown is for a typical sub skipper.
>
Before he gets on the boat, he spends about a year (combined) in
Nuclear Power School and Nuclear Prototype, followed by three
months or so in Sub School. After that, it's mostly on-the-job
training (which will theoreticall fill in the holes), though I'm
sure he must go to a command school (probaby a few months) before
becoming an XO.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
writes:
>Fleet carriers are a)so big that they *must* be run via staff command
and
>b)not likely to be destroyed by a single engineering casualty.
>I would sugguest that sumbarines *must not* be run via staff command -
>completely different leadership situation - and that they *are* likely
to
>be destroyed by a single engineering casualty, and that this changes
the
>appropriate qualifications for command very much.
>
but they don't make CO's study metallurgy and fluid flow dynamics --
they simply tell them what happens when they try to dive too deep
or too fast.
>Which isn't to say that the CO's tactical sense isn't very important;
the
>crew needs to have confidence that the CO isn't going to get them all
>killed. Breaking the boat through out-of-the-envelope demands on the
>power plant is one way to get them all killed, though.
>
I say this in all seriousness: this is the part where the engineer
is supposed to scream, "Cap'n, the engines, they'll NO take it!"
Of course a submarine is "staff-run". Otherwise the rest of the
crew (at least the officers) doesn't need to be there. As a matter
of fact, any captain who makes a regular habit of telling the
engineering officer how to do his job is (to put it bluntly) a
pompous ass.
>I have the persistent impression that this is an argument about the
>appropriate order to teach command track submarine officers these
things;
>I can think of good arguments for 'teach tactics first' (so it has a
long
>time to become spinal reflex, and so the spinal reflexes are those of
the
>young and brave-with-the-conviction-of-their-immortality), and for
'teach
>engineering first' (need more engineers than skippers anyway; it tends
to
>keep the subs from being dominated by Annapolis grads; it's selecting
for
>a particular kind of competent geeky technophilia useful on a
submarine).
>
No, it lets the subs be dominated by nuclear engineers, which is worse
than being dominated by Annapolis grads, because the Annapolis grads
(for all their faults and their management training as members of the
"Corporate Navy") have at least seen a textbook in military history
_before_ being sent to command school. And more to the point, they
weren't chosen for their potential as nuclear engineers; they were
chosen (however imperfectly) for their potential as officers.
The U.S. Sub Service won WWII without a single nuclear engineer onboard
any of its hundreds of vessels.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
Kling) writes:
>
>On the other hand to maximixe the useful life of the reactor and ship
>in a peacetime environment, and to keep the engineering plant at the
>highest combination of readiness and safety, it is probably best that
the
>C.O. is nuclear trained and a former engineer. It's hard to
argue with
>40 years of success.
>
war. The most impressives successes of the U.S. Sub Service pre-date
nuclear propulsion.
Scott Orr
David B. Leazer
sd...@ix.netcom.com (Scott D. Orr ) wrote:
>However, the more important issue is the selection process: you don't
>select the best baseball players by scouting high school football games
>(though there may be some relationship between the two sports, it's
>just not hte most efficient way to do things), and you don't pick the
>best sub captains by picking only from engineers.
Hit the nail on the Head Scott! Good leaders are never determined by the
ability to handle math problems or school work; nor how well they manage
computers and reactors. (That's not to say there are not some good Leaders
among the techno-weenies) But as ADM Grace Hopper(sp) said, you lead men
into battle and death, you don't manage them into it..... but given todays
Navy, maybe we do "manage them to death" <g>.
| | | A half a world away! Regards,
)_) )_) )_) in Diego Garcia, BIOT David Leazer
)___))___))___)\ DSN: 370-2228 CTTC USN
)____)____)_____)\\
_____|____|____|____\\\__
--\ /---------
^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^
RONT...@delphi.com
Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>No, it lets the subs be dominated by nuclear engineers, which is worse
>than being dominated by Annapolis grads, because the Annapolis grads
>(for all their faults and their management training as members of the
>"Corporate Navy") have at least seen a textbook in military history
>_before_ being sent to command school. And more to the point, they
>weren't chosen for their potential as nuclear engineers; they were
>chosen (however imperfectly) for their potential as officers.
Just wanted to mention a fair number of the engineers *are*
Annapolis grads.
>The U.S. Sub Service won WWII without a single nuclear engineer onboard
>any of its hundreds of vessels.
>Scott Orr
>.
It also did not have a single nuclear reactor on any of it's
vessels. So we should get rid of all the nuc subs???
RONT...@delphi.com
Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>How many car mechanics do you know who can clearly explain and
>mathematically model an internal combustion engineer? How many
How many of them have you run into of late that could actually
*fix* a car.
>Now, let's go one step further: how many car _drivers_ know all
>of the above? In fact, very few, because they don't _need_ to
How many drivers do you see stopped by the side of the road each
day? How many pull into the above mechanic to have the engine
replaced when the oil light came on about 200 mi ago?
>accelerates, and if something goes, wrong you take it to the
>mechanic.
Ever tried to find a nuc shipyard in the middle of the atlantic?
>Likewise, the good submarine captain knows how fast the sub
>can normally go and he knows the risks (in terms of noise
>generation and power plant stress) of moving near or above
>those limits. That's all he needs to know -- the engineers
>will take care of the rest.
The engineers are generally back aft. They don't have access to
the up to the second info on the situation you may be in. They
should not second guess a command just to protect the reactor.
The situation may come where you have to destroy the reactor or
power plant to protect the sub. The engineers can not take care
of the rest they follow orders first. If the person giving the
orders has not the slightest idea what they ordered you may end
up disabled at 400+ feet.
>Before he gets on the boat, he spends about a year (combined) in
>Nuclear Power School and Nuclear Prototype, followed by three
>months or so in Sub School. After that, it's mostly on-the-job
>training (which will theoretically fill in the holes), though I'm
>sure he must go to a command school (probably a few months) before
>becoming an XO.
>Scott Orr
>.
See my previous post.
I agree a commander *should* know how to fight a ship. They should
also know what will disable it before the fight.
Scott D. Orr
>
> Just wanted to mention a fair number of the engineers *are*
> Annapolis grads.
Yep -- engineering is the traditional degree program in the U.S.
service academies -- I think it dates back to 19th century notions
of the officer as someone who has to understand and apply scientific
principles.
The difference between NUPOC engineers and Annapolis engineers is that
NUPOC's are chosen primary for their ability to get through Nuclear
Power School (of course other things come into play -- but I personally
witnessed someone with NO extra-curricular activities and NO athletic
record whatsoever be heavily courted by a NUPOC recruiter). Annapolis
cadets, on the other hand, are selected on a much broader (if in some
ways equally peculiar) set of criteria.
>
> >The U.S. Sub Service won WWII without a single nuclear engineer
onboard
> >any of its hundreds of vessels.
>
> It also did not have a single nuclear reactor on any of it's
> vessels. So we should get rid of all the nuc subs???
Not at all -- my point was that good sub captains don't have to be
nuclear engineers. Indeed, while many of the WWII captains DID
hold engineering degrees, virtually none of them had the detailed
knowledge of the power plant that modern USN captains do, and they
certainly didn't consider that particular system more important than
any of the others on the boat.
Scott Orr
Jeff Crowell
: >dkl...@ptd.intel.com (Dean F. Kling) writes:
: >On the other hand to maximixe the useful life of the reactor and ship
: >in a peacetime environment, and to keep the engineering plant at the
: >highest combination of readiness and safety, it is probably best that
: the C.O. is nuclear trained and a former engineer. It's hard to
: argue with 40 years of success.
Scott D. Orr (sd...@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
: Success at doing what? It's not like we've been engaged in a major
: war. The most impressives successes of the U.S. Sub Service pre-date
: nuclear propulsion.
Well, Scott, that may be because you don't know what the bubbleheads
have been doing. Shooting torpedoes and launching ICBMs aren't the
only things subs do, and our subs have plenty of tasking in peacetime.
I have personally seen some of the direct results of US sub ops, and
they are bloody impressive.
Without trying to sound like one of the "but then I'd have to kill you"
bunch, if only you knew... In all absolute seriousness, though, anyone
who's in the service or has prior service will tell you that the
debrief you get when you leave is somewhat bloodcurdling. Much as I'd
enjoy clueing you in, no luck. Trust me. 8-)
I was an airplane driver and skimmer, but I do know a bit about subs
and what they do (I even did pretty damn good on the trivia test!), and
spent a couple weeks aboard one while underway. I also had a number of
sub-driver instructors while at USNA (previous digs at Company
Schoolers noted, what is it with you guys anyway?), and the proportion
of them that knew their stuff tactically was, if anything, somewhat
higher than that found in the surface guys. The aviators were pretty
tactical in their thinking, because they tend to be immersed in it.
All that wristwatch-shooting is good practice, I guess.
But the bottom line is that, even if you must qual as an engineer to be
in the boats, so what? The next three tours are spent in other
departments, in most cases. You have all kinds of time to learn
tactics before you get to be the king of the sandbox. If you're simply
grumbling that lots of guys who woulda been good tacticians never get
the chance, so what? Are you saying it isn't fair? Again, so what?
The military doesn't, and must not, give a rats hind parts about
_fair_.
The fact that the Brits have separate command and engineering tracks is
meaningless. What they do works very well for them, but you know what?
We tend to split about 50/50 with them when it comes to winning the
exercises. A blind, slavish devotion to all things British seems to be
convincing you that there is no other way. Ain't so.
Jeff
(all the above in spite of the fact that my ship, USS Chandler
(DDG-996) was the victim of an 'own goal' kill during a joint
US-Canadian exercise. We were Orange force, along with another
destroyer and a sewer pipe, and one evening, after we had ravaged the
formation of the good guys once again, we got a message which stated,
in part [to the best of my recollection, this is a quote]:
"CONDUCTED SUBMERGED ATTACK AGAINST BLUE FORCES AT 1842L, POSITION
XYZ (what, you want Lat/Long after 9 years? Get real!). FIRED 2 MARK
48 TORPEDOES AT SPRUANCE-CLASS DD. TEN SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT, NOTED
DISTINCT SILHOUETTE OF SPS-48 AIR-SEARCH RADAR. SORRY ABOUT THAT."
--
###################################################################
# #
# Jeff Crowell | | #
# jc...@hpdmd48.boi.hp.com | _ | #
# _________|__( )__|_________ #
# DMD Process Engineer x/ _| |( . )| |_ \x #
# (208) 396-6525 x |_| ---*|_| x #
# O x x O #
# #
###################################################################
YOU KNOW YOU'RE A REDNECK IF...
Motel 6 turns off the light when they see you coming.
Jeff Crowell
: Annapolis cadets, on the other hand
^^^^^^
Argh! That's "Midshipmen", thank you very much! "Cadets" are Army,
Air Force, and other lower lifeforms.
8-)
Jeff
--
###################################################################
# #
# Jeff Crowell | | #
# jc...@hpdmd48.boi.hp.com | _ | #
# _________|__( )__|_________ #
# DMD Process Engineer x/ _| |( . )| |_ \x #
# (208) 396-6525 x |_| ---*|_| x #
# O x x O #
# #
###################################################################
If the shoe fits, kick someone.
Scott D. Orr
>
>
>Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>
> >How many car mechanics do you know who can clearly explain and
> >mathematically model an internal combustion engineer? How many
>
> How many of them have you run into of late that could actually
> *fix* a car.
>
get good people. :) Besides which, most of the actual maintenance on
a nuclear power plant (the dirty work) is done by EM's anyway, not the
overly-educated officers (yes, I know that nuke school for EM's is not
exactly a piece of cake -- but it's not the same thing they give the
officers either).
> >Now, let's go one step further: how many car _drivers_ know all
> >of the above? In fact, very few, because they don't _need_ to
>
> How many drivers do you see stopped by the side of the road
each
> day? How many pull into the above mechanic to have the engine
> replaced when the oil light came on about 200 mi ago?
>
Well, to be honest, not many. But then, the average driver doesn't
have an onboard mechanic and staff whose sole job is attending to his
own engine.
To return to the metaphor: _I_ cannot fix a car's engine, I have
only a vague notion of the theory behind it. However, I know when to
put in gas, I know when to refill or change the oil, I know what to do
when it starts to overheat, and I know that if there are any other
problems I have to take it a (trusted) mechanic. By comparison, a
sub captain has it much easier, because he doesn't have to put in
gas very often, and he has a chief engineer to tell him when to change
the oil.
> >accelerates, and if something goes, wrong you take it to the
> >mechanic.
>
> Ever tried to find a nuc shipyard in the middle of the
atlantic?
>
It's pretty easy. It's carried on board on the sub, and fully staffed.
Much more convenient than a garage.
> >Likewise, the good submarine captain knows how fast the sub
> >can normally go and he knows the risks (in terms of noise
> >generation and power plant stress) of moving near or above
> >those limits. That's all he needs to know -- the engineers
> >will take care of the rest.
>
> The engineers are generally back aft.
Oddly enough, so is the power plant. Eerie coincidence, isn't it?
>They don't have access to
> the up to the second info on the situation you may be in.
This is of course why subs have intercom systems.
>They
> should not second guess a command just to protect the reactor.
Of course they should. If the reactor is having problems, they have to
warn the captain of the consequences of his actions. Even if the
captain IS a nuclear engineer himself, the engineers have more info
on the current state of the reactor and have more recent experience
with it, and the captain would be an idiot to make a critical decision
without consulting them.
This is NOT some kind of unique situation on sea-going vessels.
Engineers, isolated back aft, have handled the power plant for
over a century, in hundreds of thousands of ships and subs, without
having to be directly supervised by an engineering-qualified captain.
> The situation may come where you have to destroy the reactor
or
> power plant to protect the sub. The engineers can not take
care
> of the rest they follow orders first. If the person giving
the
> orders has not the slightest idea what they ordered you may
end
> up disabled at 400+ feet.
First off, there is NOT a dichotomy between "not the slightest idea"
and "fully qualifed theoretical nuclear engineer." As I've said
repeatedly, a captain MUST understand the basic parameters of his
systems -- ALL his systems, not just the putt-putt motor. He does
NOT, however, have to understand how to build a nuclear reactor and
why it works exactly like it does, which is what he gets taught at
nuke school.
Secondly, if a captain's orders WOULD result in being disabled at
400+ feet, it's the job of the engineers to tell him that -- THAT'S
WHAT THE ENGINEERS ARE THERE FOR.
> I agree a commander *should* know how to fight a ship.
I should hope he knows how to fight a boat. Fighting a ship won't
do a sub commander any good. :)
>They should
> also know what will disable it before the fight.
>
Okay, then do something for me: tell me, exactly, why the same doesn't
apply to the other criticals systems on the boat?
BlackBeard
D. Orr ) wrote:
>
> In <432j7u$b...@news2.delphi.com> RONT...@delphi.com writes:
> >
>
> >They should
> > also know what will disable it before the fight.
> >
> Okay, then do something for me: tell me, exactly, why the same doesn't
> apply to the other criticals systems on the boat?
God, I've tried to stay out of this one, it's been rehashed here so many
times....And this is with all due respect to mr. Orr, his contributions to
this group are well appreciated, but ;) , I still believe the USN
produces just as many good skippers as the RN. Yes, I served in the US sub
force, I also participated in ops against/with RN boats. The misconception
that all US skippers are engineering geeks is incorrect. There are many
excellent tacticians that endure the engineering requirements in order to
get their hands on a boat. The USN policy is driven more by, every CO will
have handled every division/job on the boat before he is qualified to run
the whole boat, than, we need engineers to run our boats. The engineering
div happens to be the largest and most important div on the boat. So yes,
there is more emphasis on that job. The officer is also required to be a
weps, comm, e-div, m-div, sonar, nav etc. before he can be a CO. He can't
be an engineer if he doesn't know the plant inside out. In the USN, he
can't be the skipper if he hasn't performed ALL the jobs onboard. Having
served as an engineer, does not preclude him from being a great
tactician/boat-driver.
I have seen both types of skippers. My first CO was an awesome skipper.
He knew the plant as well as anyone onboard and ensured he had an Eng. he
could trust, so he let him handle it. He fought the boat in a way that
made the crew willing to sail into Petropavlosk (sp) on the surface if he
would have told us to. We had that much confidence in him.
My second CO was a very good engineer. He was still competent at the
helm, and showed "glimmers" of being a warrior, but unfortunately the
majority of the time he was "less than confidence inspiring".
I would bet you a Guinness that the RN Perisher course has allowed some
"less than awesome" CO slip through also.
BlackBeard
-. .- -..- --.-
De Profundis
BlackBeard
wrote:
>
>
>
> Well, Scott, that may be because you don't know what the bubbleheads
> have been doing. Shooting torpedoes and launching ICBMs aren't the
> only things subs do, and our subs have plenty of tasking in peacetime.
> I have personally seen some of the direct results of US sub ops, and
> they are bloody impressive.
*blush*
>
> Without trying to sound like one of the "but then I'd have to kill you"
> bunch, if only you knew...
stay where you are, someone will be there in 10 minutes. It'll be easier
for you if you go quietly. ;)
> (all the above in spite of the fact that my ship, USS Chandler
> (DDG-996) was the victim of an 'own goal' kill during a joint
> US-Canadian exercise. We were Orange force, along with another
> destroyer and a sewer pipe, and one evening, after we had ravaged the
> formation of the good guys once again, we got a message which stated,
> in part [to the best of my recollection, this is a quote]:
> "CONDUCTED SUBMERGED ATTACK AGAINST BLUE FORCES AT 1842L, POSITION
> XYZ (what, you want Lat/Long after 9 years? Get real!). FIRED 2 MARK
> 48 TORPEDOES AT SPRUANCE-CLASS DD. TEN SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT, NOTED
> DISTINCT SILHOUETTE OF SPS-48 AIR-SEARCH RADAR. SORRY ABOUT THAT."
>
hehehehe....what makes you think it was an *accident* ;)
like we say, theres only two types of ships....
once you sink all the bad guys, any remaining fish may be used on
"friendly" targets ;)
SFD Lyons
> >Likewise, the good submarine captain knows how fast the sub
> >can normally go and he knows the risks (in terms of noise
> >generation and power plant stress) of moving near or above
> >those limits. That's all he needs to know -- the engineers
> >will take care of the rest.
>
> The engineers are generally back aft. They don't have access to
> the up to the second info on the situation you may be in. They
> should not second guess a command just to protect the reactor.
> The situation may come where you have to destroy the reactor or
> power plant to protect the sub. The engineers can not take care
> of the rest they follow orders first. If the person giving the
> orders has not the slightest idea what they ordered you may end
> up disabled at 400+ feet.
>
>
This gives me a great time to interject my favorite TV show, STAR TREK
This argument reminds me of some classic Kirk/Scotty situations.
Wen the commanding officer of a starship, or in the case of our
discussion, a submarine, is in combat and is attempting to either cover
his *expletive* or burst into the scene with a roar, he could care less
about reactor fuel usage curves, stress percentailes, and the like. That
is, by definitiion, the department of the Cheif Engineer.
Regardless of the strain, however, the engineer DOES NOT HAVE the luxury
of crying out "me poor barins!" and punching the intercom and saying,
"Captain! Ye Gotta stoop! She canna take any mooore!" That is all fine and
good on TV, but NOT IN REAL LIFE COMBAT!
In other words, the whole Captain knows nothing but top speed, but
Engineer has right overrule the CO if his barins are stressed argument is
a joke.
Do you guys get the feeling that *someone* besides me watches too much
Star Trek?
Oh well, that is my job. I do, after all run an International Paramilitary
Star Trek Club.
Pel Dar Joy!
SFD Lyons
Sean Mullan
>
>In article <43386u$9...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>, sd...@ix.netcom.com (Scott
>D. Orr ) wrote:
>>
>> In <432j7u$b...@news2.delphi.com> RONT...@delphi.com writes:
>> >
>>
>> > also know what will disable it before the fight.
>> >
>> Okay, then do something for me: tell me, exactly, why the same doesn't
>> apply to the other criticals systems on the boat?
>
>
>that all US skippers are engineering geeks is incorrect. There are many
>excellent tacticians that endure the engineering requirements in order to
>get their hands on a boat. The USN policy is driven more by, every CO will
>have handled every division/job on the boat before he is qualified to run
>the whole boat, than, we need engineers to run our boats. The engineering
>div happens to be the largest and most important div on the boat. So yes,
>there is more emphasis on that job. The officer is also required to be a
>weps, comm, e-div, m-div, sonar, nav etc. before he can be a CO. He can't
>be an engineer if he doesn't know the plant inside out. In the USN, he
>can't be the skipper if he hasn't performed ALL the jobs onboard. Having
>served as an engineer, does not preclude him from being a great
>tactician/boat-driver.
> I have seen both types of skippers. My first CO was an awesome skipper.
>He knew the plant as well as anyone onboard and ensured he had an Eng. he
>could trust, so he let him handle it. He fought the boat in a way that
>made the crew willing to sail into Petropavlosk (sp) on the surface if he
>would have told us to. We had that much confidence in him.
> My second CO was a very good engineer. He was still competent at the
>helm, and showed "glimmers" of being a warrior, but unfortunately the
>majority of the time he was "less than confidence inspiring".
Agreed....the best CO I had was an engineer who went on to Naval Reactors,
and then Command of a tender....
However,
I have also seen engineers who could not grasp the basics of boat driving,
and forcing a contact...
IT DEPENDS ON THE PERSON....SOME CAN DRIVE BOATS, SOME CANNOT.....
Sean Mullan
>
>
>
>(all the above in spite of the fact that my ship, USS Chandler
>(DDG-996) was the victim of an 'own goal' kill during a joint
>US-Canadian exercise. We were Orange force, along with another
>destroyer and a sewer pipe, and one evening, after we had ravaged the
>formation of the good guys once again, we got a message which stated,
>in part [to the best of my recollection, this is a quote]:
> "CONDUCTED SUBMERGED ATTACK AGAINST BLUE FORCES AT 1842L, POSITION
>XYZ (what, you want Lat/Long after 9 years? Get real!). FIRED 2 MARK
>48 TORPEDOES AT SPRUANCE-CLASS DD. TEN SECONDS PRIOR TO IMPACT, NOTED
>DISTINCT SILHOUETTE OF SPS-48 AIR-SEARCH RADAR. SORRY ABOUT THAT."
>
>
little boy: "Daddy, what does a 688 class submarine look like?"
Skimmer dad: "A green flare, son. A stinking green flare."
heh heh heh
Sean Mullan
Former EM2/SS USS Hyman G. Rickover SSN-709
Scott D. Orr
writes:
>Scott D. Orr (sd...@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
>: Success at doing what? It's not like we've been engaged in a major
>: war. The most impressives successes of the U.S. Sub Service
pre-date
>: nuclear propulsion.
>
>
>Well, Scott, that may be because you don't know what the bubbleheads
>have been doing. Shooting torpedoes and launching ICBMs aren't the
>only things subs do, and our subs have plenty of tasking in peacetime.
>I have personally seen some of the direct results of US sub ops, and
>they are bloody impressive.
>
>Without trying to sound like one of the "but then I'd have to kill
you"
>bunch, if only you knew... In all absolute seriousness, though, anyone
>who's in the service or has prior service will tell you that the
>debrief you get when you leave is somewhat bloodcurdling. Much as I'd
>enjoy clueing you in, no luck. Trust me. 8-)
>
else who actually cares) have a pretty damn good idea what the
USN's subs have been doing. It's not a big secret (operational details
are, of course) -- subs have been doing the same things (in more
primitive forms, of course), since World War I.
My point is that the USN's subs have NOT been tested in a real, live,
shooting war, where they have to go out and find the enemy and kill
him before he kills them. A lot of what they've done is great
training for a shooting war, and they have some good people (if they
changed their selection procedures, they'd have even better people).
But the fact remains that they have not been tested by war, and no
one really knows how well they'd do.
>I was an airplane driver and skimmer, but I do know a bit about subs
>and what they do (I even did pretty damn good on the trivia test!) and
>spent a couple weeks aboard one while underway.
Yeah, I did good on the trivia test too, and I've never been on one....
>I also had a number of
>sub-driver instructors while at USNA (previous digs at Company
>Schoolers noted, what is it with you guys anyway?), and the proportion
>of them that knew their stuff tactically was, if anything, somewhat
>higher than that found in the surface guys. The aviators were pretty
>tactical in their thinking, because they tend to be immersed in it.
>All that wristwatch-shooting is good practice, I guess.
>
It's a probably a special chemical stored in those enormous dials....
>But the bottom line is that, even if you must qual as an engineer to
be
>in the boats, so what? The next three tours are spent in other
>departments, in most cases. You have all kinds of time to learn
>tactics before you get to be the king of the sandbox. If you're
simply
>grumbling that lots of guys who woulda been good tacticians never get
>the chance, so what? Are you saying it isn't fair? Again, so what?
>The military doesn't, and must not, give a rats hind parts about
>_fair_.
The problem isn't fairness. In fact, the problem isn't with the
subsequent training -- it's good, largely because it's built on a
good tradition that Rickover, despite his best efforts, was unable
completely to stamp out. The problem is that people are being picked
based on how good they'll do as engineers, not how good they'll do as
leaders and tacticians. It's like picking football players with
IQ tests: no matter how good your coaching staff and training
facilities, you'll still never have the best team (at least not in
quality -- quantity is another matter).
>
>The fact that the Brits have separate command and engineering tracks
is
>meaningless. What they do works very well for them, but you know
what?
>We tend to split about 50/50 with them when it comes to winning the
>exercises. A blind, slavish devotion to all things British seems to
be
>convincing you that there is no other way. Ain't so.
>
The Brits have been winning half the exercises with torpedoes with,
what, one-fourth of the American torpedoes' range? That's pretty
damned impressive.
In fact, I'm not devoted to all things British. Indeed, I don't even
care what the British do. The point is that they happen to do it
right, and the USN does it wrong (not to say it doesn't work for the
USN, but it could work better). One need only look to the oft-cited
anecdote about RN captains sitting around talking about tactics while
USN captains chat about their reactors....
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
writes:
>Regardless of the strain, however, the engineer DOES NOT HAVE the
luxury
>of crying out "me poor barins!" and punching the intercom and saying,
>"Captain! Ye Gotta stoop! She canna take any mooore!" That is all fine
and
>good on TV, but NOT IN REAL LIFE COMBAT!
>
how experienced a nuclear engineer the captain might be, the engineer
is more current with the plant and has more data, and it's his job
to tell the captain what's possible. The captain is free to ignore
him, but it's the engineer's duty to convey the information (just
as sonar and weps are the conduits for tactical information).
>In other words, the whole Captain knows nothing but top speed, but
>Engineer has right overrule the CO if his barins are stressed argument
is
>a joke.
The captain certainly knows more than top speed -- he's got to know
the basic parameters he's operating with (and the consequences of
trying to bend those parameters), just as he does with the weapons,
sonar, hull, dive planes, rudder, and bouyancy systems. However,
he doesn't have to understand the _theory_ behind any of these systems.
And when the sh*t hits the fan (as in a DC situation), it's the
engineer that ultimately has to deal with it.
>
>Do you guys get the feeling that *someone* besides me watches too much
>Star Trek?
>
Hey, I can't stand the show, especially TNG. :)
Scott Orr
Len Mizutowicz
Mullan) wrote:
> heh heh
>
> little boy: "Daddy, what does a 688 class submarine look like?"
>
> Skimmer dad: "A green flare, son. A stinking green flare."
>
> heh heh heh
>
Reminds me of the time we blew flares all around the Vinson in the Indian
Ocean. We even came up and radiated on the radar so the ASW planes could
come running, and then slipped away whenever we felt like it.
I was ship's photographer at the time, and we sent a beatiful panorama
print to the carrier's CO. You could see individual faces on the flight
deck. He was kinda pissed.
Regards;
Len
RONT...@delphi.com
Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>get good people. :) Besides which, most of the actual maintenance on
>a nuclear power plant (the dirty work) is done by EM's anyway, not the
>To return to the metaphor: _I_ cannot fix a car's engine, I have
>only a vague notion of the theory behind it. However, I know when to
>put in gas, I know when to refill or change the oil, I know what to do
>when it starts to overheat, and I know that if there are any other
>problems I have to take it a (trusted) mechanic. By comparison, a
>sub captain has it much easier, because he doesn't have to put in
>gas very often, and he has a chief engineer to tell him when to change
>the oil.
What you are talking about is routine maintenance not the dynamic
situation encountered during an emergency or an attack. Even
during war time the largest part of a ships time (any type of
ship)is spent at steady state. It is the non steady state that
makes the difference.
>> Ever tried to find a nuc shipyard in the middle of the
>atlantic?
>>
>It's pretty easy. It's carried on board on the sub, and fully staffed.
>Much more convenient than a garage.
Sorry it is not. I spent a few years making holes in the ocean
and I have spent a few years at a Nuc shipyard. The crew of a sub
can do a lot but it can't carry the material equipment or manpower
to make all repairs. That is part of the reason you have the
selection process you have, so that you don't have to make the
repairs. If you blister the clad off in chunks the sub crew *can
not just change the oil*.
>This is of course why subs have intercom systems.
>>They should not second guess a command just to protect the reactor.
>Of course they should. If the reactor is having problems, they have to
>warn the captain of the consequences of his actions. Even if the
>with it, and the captain would be an idiot to make a critical decision
>without consulting them.
Subs have MC and JV sound power systems also that is what you generally
pass orders through. If you know that a problem exists yes you tell
people about it. The aft enders do not and should not stand around in
debate about which problem is the more critical. The person in command
is the one to decide what to do. Some conditions require action now
not after consultation. Water entering the overhead of the people tank
means to hell with the reactor and no I don't have time to explain.
Water in the snake pit means time to rag on the AF.
To use another critical system for example...when approaching PD if the
guy on the scope orders full dive you should dive. That is not the
time to debate what will happen to trim.
>This is NOT some kind of unique situation on sea-going vessels.
>Engineers, isolated back aft, have handled the power plant for
>over a century, in hundreds of thousands of ships and subs, without
>having to be directly supervised by an engineering-qualified captain.
The engineers are *not* "directly supervised". I assume that you do
not include civilian ships in this discussion they operate under
different parameters. If so hundreds of thousands may be a bit
overstated. Even given that the ships my be broken down into two main
groups. Those large enough to have more than one power source/engine.
Those that don't.
A large ship has different command problems from a small ship. The
command of a large ship can't be expected to have first hand details
of all systems. The command of smaller ships has generally spent a
great deal of time in all parts of the ship. They need to a small ship
does not carry the resources of a large ship.
>> The situation may come where you have to destroy the reactor
>or
>> power plant to protect the sub. The engineers can not take
>care
>> of the rest they follow orders first. If the person giving
>the
>> orders has not the slightest idea what they ordered you may
>end
>> up disabled at 400+ feet.
>First off, there is NOT a dichotomy between "not the slightest idea"
>and "fully qualified theoretical nuclear engineer." As I've said
>repeatedly, a captain MUST understand the basic parameters of his
>systems -- ALL his systems, not just the putt-putt motor. He does
>NOT, however, have to understand how to build a nuclear reactor and
>why it works exactly like it does, which is what he gets taught at
>nuke school.
That is not quite what is taught. It is a good grounding in how to
build and why it works but not the full course. The reactor is also
more than just the "putt-putt" motor. It is also the source of power
for things like hydraulics (to operate planes and rudder) air
compressors (to do things like blow tanks) and ships service power (for
things like sonar and the air plant). Most of this is provided by
electricity from the TG's. You could argue that a sub also has a
battery but that battery got it's power from somewhere and has a
limited life in any case.
Loss of the reactor puts a crimp in the operation of "ALL his systems".
On a sub you can not switch to number two reactor.
>Secondly, if a captain's orders WOULD result in being disabled at
>400+ feet, it's the job of the engineers to tell him that -- THAT'S
>WHAT THE ENGINEERS ARE THERE FOR.
>> I agree a commander *should* know how to fight a ship.
>I should hope he knows how to fight a boat. Fighting a ship won't
Yes I know tradition calls a sub a boat. If you want we can go
back to the name pig boat. If you want to play the game like
that...since a sub may attack (or be attacked by)a surface craft
the commander should know how to fight a ship. BTW are they
commissioned as a ship or a boat?
>do a sub commander any good. :)
>>They should
>> also know what will disable it before the fight.
>>
>Okay, then do something for me: tell me, exactly, why the same doesn't
>apply to the other critical systems on the boat.
It does. That is *part* of what ship quals are for.
As long as we are asking questions...
Baring an explosion somewhere what other critical system will cause all
other critical systems to fail in a short time?
RONT...@delphi.com
Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>Yep -- engineering is the traditional degree program in the U.S.
>service academies -- I think it dates back to 19th century notions
>of the officer as someone who has to understand and apply scientific
>principles.
So by current notions does the officer apply magic or sci-fi
principles?
>The difference between NUPOC engineers and Annapolis engineers is that
>NUPOC's are chosen primary for their ability to get through Nuclear
>Power School (of course other things come into play -- but I personally
>witnessed someone with NO extra-curricular activities and NO athletic
>record whatsoever be heavily courted by a NUPOC recruiter). Annapolis
>cadets, on the other hand, are selected on a much broader (if in some
>ways equally peculiar) set of criteria.
The Annapolis grads that go nuc generally go to Annapolis first.
That means they go through the Annapolis selection first.
Why do extra-curricular activities and athletic record make you a
good sub commander?
>>
>> >The U.S. Sub Service won WWII without a single nuclear engineer
>onboard
>> >any of its hundreds of vessels.
>>
>> It also did not have a single nuclear reactor on any of it's
>> vessels. So we should get rid of all the nuc subs???
>Not at all -- my point was that good sub captains don't have to be
>nuclear engineers. Indeed, while many of the WWII captains DID
>hold engineering degrees, virtually none of them had the detailed
>knowledge of the power plant that modern USN captains do, and they
>certainly didn't consider that particular system more important than
>any of the others on the boat.
>Scott Orr
Most of the WWII sub commanders that made it past the first few
months of the war were low ranking and had spent a good deal
of time in all parts of the boat.
One thing that WWII proved for subs was that the people you select
for in peace (like battle plans) seldom survive first contact with
the enemy.
Every one has their own theory of how to select a commander for a
ship. Every method has it's good and bad points. It depends a
lot on what you want to accomplish.
One captain I had I would not have wanted to serve with in time of
war. Another liked to try and put signal buoys on surface craft
decks. They got to be captain through the same selection methods.
Ray Chen
Scott D. Orr <sd...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>In <435c34$2...@newsbf02.news.aol.com> sfdl...@aol.com (SFD Lyons)
>writes:
>>
>>Regardless of the strain, however, the engineer DOES NOT HAVE the
>luxury
>>of crying out "me poor barins!" and punching the intercom and saying,
>>"Captain! Ye Gotta stoop! She canna take any mooore!" That is all fine
>and
>>good on TV, but NOT IN REAL LIFE COMBAT!
>>
>Of course he does. That's what the engineer's there for -- no matter
>how experienced a nuclear engineer the captain might be, the engineer
>is more current with the plant and has more data, and it's his job
>to tell the captain what's possible. The captain is free to ignore
>him, but it's the engineer's duty to convey the information (just
>as sonar and weps are the conduits for tactical information).
>The captain certainly knows more than top speed -- he's got to know
>the basic parameters he's operating with (and the consequences of
>trying to bend those parameters), just as he does with the weapons,
>sonar, hull, dive planes, rudder, and bouyancy systems. However,
>he doesn't have to understand the _theory_ behind any of these systems.
>And when the sh*t hits the fan (as in a DC situation), it's the
>engineer that ultimately has to deal with it.
Scott, usually you're pretty sensible but this I think is dead
wrong.
Ultimately, one person has to be able to make decisions and quickly
and those decisions have to be right or you're dead meat.
You can't go with a scheme that says, oops, DC time, now the
chief engineering officer gets to override the captain. Wrong.
Because maybe there's a torpedo bearing down and the right thing
to do is to go beyond the reactor operating envelopes and risk
a reactor problem rather than face an almost certain torpedo hit.
When faced with alternatives like this, you don't have time to
debate. If you do, you worsen your odds of survival.
If the captain is intimately familiar with the reactor and with
all the systems on the boat, he has a better chance of knowing
when to risk bending the parameters and when not to. In my book,
that goes beyond knowing just basic parameters and consequences.
It means knowing the boat and its systems like you'd know the
back of your hand.
Part of tactics is intimate knowledge of your own strengths
and weaknesses including that of your equipment. It's hard
to have that knowledge without understanding a fair amount
of detailed knowledge about all your equipment including the
powerplant.
Ray Chen
r...@sgi.com
Eric Gross
> One thing that WWII proved for subs was that the people you select
> for in peace (like battle plans) seldom survive first contact with
> the enemy.
Yes . . . and no.
It is true that a good percentage of the pre-war boat skippers couldn't cut
the demands when the shooting started. A lot asked to be relieved, some were
relieved regardless, and some were canned for standards not entirely fair
(certain officers tended to blame captains for the poor performance of the
torpedos.) Some of the war's best skippers did come from the ranks of the
young & unknown.
However, what you fail to consider is the VAST difference in doctrine,
training, approach, philosophy, etc., between the pre-WWII sub force and the
Cold War U.S. sub force.
For the past 40 years the USN has operated its subs basically as if we were at
war -- which, in a sense, we were. And this is perhaps nowhere more true than
in the area of submarine warfare. In the intervening period submarines became
capital ships and much of our national defense policy came to rest on the
boats, both the SSBN's and the SSN's. Despite post-Cold War
changes and cutbacks, the sub force is still the closest to be on war footing
of any branch of our service. The level of competition, education,
training, exercise and operational experience under the belt of the average
boat driver today far exceeds that of the average skipper of the mid 1930's.
Today's captains are EXPECTED to be bold, smart, tactical, aggresive and sharp.
Of course all aren't, but that isn't the point. The peace-time sub captain of
the interwar period, though certainly expected to be competent at his job,
operated under a different set of final expectations; thrift, caution and
obedience to doctrine were the valued attributes.
It's a long way from the world of the mid 1930's where skippers weren't
allowed to fire live shots for tests, the navy refused to release target hulks
to test new torpedoes, sub-drivers were institutionally selected to be careful
and cautious and initiative was a synonym for trouble. I'm not saying that
there aren't problems and institutional weak spots in the current service, or
that the pre-WWII service was completely flawed. However, there is a
considerable difference between the two environments and the commanding
officers cultivated and advanced in these environments.
Scott D. Orr
>
>
>Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>
dynamic
> situation encountered during an emergency or an attack. Even
> during war time the largest part of a ships time (any type of
> ship)is spent at steady state. It is the non steady state
that
> makes the difference.
>
_theory_. I can't build an internal combustion engine, but I know
it's going to break if it gets too hot or runs out of oil.
Indeed, in an emergency the level of detail is going to be even
less than that of normal operating conditions, because the time
available for processing is less, and there will be a number of
other streams of data to consider. You do NOT want a CO thinking
about nuclear theory during an attack.
> Sorry it is not. I spent a few years making holes in the
ocean
> and I have spent a few years at a Nuc shipyard. The crew of a
sub
> can do a lot but it can't carry the material equipment or
manpower
> to make all repairs. That is part of the reason you have the
> selection process you have, so that you don't have to make the
> repairs. If you blister the clad off in chunks the sub crew
*can
> not just change the oil*.
>
(Sorry, but) well, DUH....
The point was that a submarine CO, unlike the average driver, not only
has a good idea about the parameters of his power plant, but has a
team of experts to look after it and the tools to perform some
repairs. In that (very limited) sense, there are fewer demands on his
own abilities.
> Subs have MC and JV sound power systems also that is what you
generally
> pass orders through.
Those of us what ain't in the military usually call any system which
passes sound within a building or what have you an "intercom" (short
for "intercommunication device", which means a device that lets
you commumincate between rooms). Technically, yes, a sound-powered
system is not an "intercom", but I try to speak English on Usenet.
>If you know that a problem exists yes you tell
> people about it. The aft enders do not and should not stand around
in
> debate about which problem is the more critical.
Right, they should get to work on the most critical problem
immediately. Their training (and lots of drilling) should
make this an automatic process.
>The person in command
> is the one to decide what to do. Some conditions require action
now
> not after consultation. Water entering the overhead of the people
tank
> means to hell with the reactor and no I don't have time to explain.
Which would would make it the problem of whoever's standing by the
leak, right? Are telling me whoever that is is gonna be standing
around waiting for orders before beginning DC?
> Water in the snake pit means time to rag on the AF.
>
> To use another critical system for example...when approaching PD if
the
> guy on the scope orders full dive you should dive. That is not the
> time to debate what will happen to trim.
>
It's too bad, then, that the guy on the scope hasn't been trained for
over a year in the theory of metallurgy and fluid-flow dynamics,
like he has on nuclear theory. This is a serious failing in USN
training, don't you think?
>
> >This is NOT some kind of unique situation on sea-going vessels.
> >Engineers, isolated back aft, have handled the power plant for
> >over a century, in hundreds of thousands of ships and subs,
without
> >having to be directly supervised by an engineering-qualified
captain.
>
> The engineers are *not* "directly supervised".
That was my point.
> I assume that you do
> not include civilian ships in this discussion they operate under
> different parameters. If so hundreds of thousands may be a bit
> overstated. Even given that the ships my be broken down into two
main
> groups. Those large enough to have more than one power
source/engine.
> Those that don't.
>
> A large ship has different command problems from a small ship. The
> command of a large ship can't be expected to have first hand
details
> of all systems. The command of smaller ships has generally spent a
> great deal of time in all parts of the ship. They need to a small
ship
> does not carry the resources of a large ship.
>
Which part of this explanation covers the reason why the CO has to
know more about the power plant than any of the other systems?
>> >First off, there is NOT a dichotomy between "not the slightest
idea"
> >and "fully qualified theoretical nuclear engineer." As I've said
> >repeatedly, a captain MUST understand the basic parameters of his
>
> >systems -- ALL his systems, not just the putt-putt motor. He does
> >NOT, however, have to understand how to build a nuclear reactor
and
> >why it works exactly like it does, which is what he gets taught at
> >nuke school.
>
> That is not quite what is taught. It is a good grounding in how to
> build and why it works but not the full course.
No, it's not, but the ability to comprehend this is part of the basis
on which officers are selected.
> The reactor is also
> more than just the "putt-putt" motor. It is also the source of
power
> for things like hydraulics (to operate planes and rudder) air
> compressors (to do things like blow tanks) and ships service power
(for
> things like sonar and the air plant). Most of this is provided by
> electricity from the TG's. You could argue that a sub also has a
> battery but that battery got it's power from somewhere and has a
> limited life in any case.
>
> Loss of the reactor puts a crimp in the operation of "ALL his
systems".
> On a sub you can not switch to number two reactor.
>
Loss of the hull is equally crippling. In combat, loss of the
effective use of sonar or weapons might as well be. And yet,
none of these things receives the same degree of attention as
the power plant. Why?
> >Okay, then do something for me: tell me, exactly, why the same
doesn't
> >apply to the other critical systems on the boat.
>
> It does. That is *part* of what ship quals are for.
>
Okay, then let's rephrase the question: why aren't quals adequate for
reactor knowledge? Why don't the selection and training procedures
also focus on these other systems? These system, though equally
critical, are NOT given the same attention.
> As long as we are asking questions...
>
> Baring an explosion somewhere what other critical system will cause
all
> other critical systems to fail in a short time?
>
Hull (diving too deep)
Weapons (a premature detonation or circular run -- yes, this is
an explosion, sorry)
Navigation (running aground)
Sonar (hitting another vessel)
..and of course...
Tactics (losing the fight with the enemy)
Need I remind you that of the three subs the USN has lost in the last
50 years, only one was due to a reactor failure? (Well, that's not
entirely fair, Bonefish didn't have a reactor -- make it two then.)
Scott Orr
tim_mcfeely
>Look, I'm not into flame wars. My point is that, Silent Service or
Neither am I and apologize for a slightly forceful post. I recognise
your right to an opinion however much I disagree with your arguments.
Lets leave it at that. I would like to continue to try and understand your
reasoning though.
<snip>
>That's very good training, and it gives you a good crew. It will
>probably make a good captain better, a mediocre captain good, or
>a poor captain at least mediocre. However, the best proposal I can
>make for training is to start with the best material available,
>which means to pick you officers based on their potential as
>warriors and boat-drivers, not on their potential as engineers.
>This is not some esoteric or academic point -- it's good common
>sense.
What, then, would you propose the selection criteria should be?
>Look, I don't like saying this (because it's not entirely true),
>but I'm not impressed. (In fact, I am quite impressed by the skill,
>dedication, and willingness to sacrifice on the part of submarine
>crews, and I'm impressed by a lot of the things they accomplish.
>What I'm not impressed by is vague references to the sorts of things
>that anyone who's ever read a spy novel can easily guess -- no, I
>don't know operational details, but the outlines are pretty obvious
>in most cases.)
Understandably so, however the nature of the beast is that of intentional
vagueness (more precisely called security). I too (in reference to another thread)
would love to be able to tell no shit sea stories, but I can’t. The reference
to IVY BELLS is public domain. Information can be found in a book
called (I think) _Crystal Palace_. It is a book concerning activities of the NSA.
<snip>
>involved in a real war. Things are different in a shooting war --
>certainties disappear, there are no longer any "perfect plans" or
>"perfect operations". Captains who may have been great at executing
>"dangerous" operations to perfection may well prove incapable of
>handling an environment in which any move could prove fatal, and
>where making the right move is often a matter of picking the
>one that has the _least_ chance of getting you killed (or more
>realistically, the one that _probably_ won't get you killed, but
>probably _will_ do something to advance the war effort).
Agreed, but fear and indecisiveness are not relegated to engineers
alone.
>It could work better. When people's lives are on the line, you want
>every edge you can get, and the USN has chosen not to persue one
>potential edge.
<snip>
>This is true -- this part of the selection process is what you want:
>survival of the fittest.
>However, the fittest would be fitter if you started with a better
>gene pool. They would probably also be fitter if the standards for
>fitness didn't suddenly change from engineering to command ability
>(since some organisms, having adapted to the former, may never
>completely re-adapt to the latter).
These are hard statements to refute from my stand of winning
requires every available asset. I am a strong supporter of cross training
and qualification programs for both the officers and enlisted personnel.
At any given time during normal ops, there are only two officers on watch
(not counting Under Instruction watches), the OOD and the EOOW
(Engineering Officer of the Watch). To qualify as OOD one must first
qualify as EOOW (exceptions to every rule, non-nuke power school
graduates, yes they exist, can possibly qualify OOD first, but then must
qualify EOOW). The EOOW probably has a vague idea of the tactical
situation, the OOD will have a good idea of the reactor status for the current
ship’s operation speed and depth. He may not know exactly which pumps
are running, or the temp of the core, but he will know that at say 24 knots,
x number of RCP’s are running in fast and Tave should be ~ X degrees Cent.
The reverse is not necessarily true. Not all EOOW’s are qualified OOD.
Those that aren’t have neither the tactical experience or familiarity of ships
equipment to be blessed with OOD watches. The method of qualification
makes perfect sense to me and apparently the USN too. Take the young
officers, teach them how to run the boat and all its semi-complex engineering
systems, then after they demonstrate competency in the engineering disciplines,
teach them how to fight the boat. The old saw - ‘know your limitations’ -
applies. If you physically are unaware of the capabilities and are unsure of
the consequences of certain actions to the powerplant and the other vital
engineering systems, you will be reluctant to push the envelope which is
so often required in times of crisis.
As for changing disciplines from engineering to command, you don’t.
Engineering is part of command. Officers expand and grow with the
experience they aquire. The training in math and physics learned during
nuke power school sit very well with later watches as OOD. Driving
the boat in a tactical situation is really nothing more that an complex
exercise in geometry, trig, and a whole lot of vector and speed
calculations. The enlisted personnel provide you with the data, you just have
to do the math (overly simplified version).
>But (at least until the Spearfish), USN and RN subs didn't have
>"comparable weapons". The Tigerfish about 1/3-1/2 the range of
>the Mark 48 and about half the speed (and that's being charitable),
>at least in open sources. Indeed, the published top speed of the
>Tigerfish was actually below that of any of nuclear boat in the
>Western inventory (and most owned by the Soviets). Given this
>(and even given an allowance for the difference between open and
>true performance), I would be most impressed by Trafalgar commander who
>actually obtained a kill on a 688.
This is one of those things that is very hard to determine without discussing
classifed info. I was just pointing out that typical sub vs. sub engagements
happen at ranges were the legs of the weapon are not necessarily a problem
and slow speed of the weapon, while a faster weapon is obviously better, is
not always a disadvantage.
<snip>
>One problem they don't have is that they don't pick boat-drivers based
>on their math and physics skills. The USN does have that problem --
>now, we're agreed that the USN has developed (or rather, maintained)
>impressive measures for solving that problem, but can you honestly
>argue that picking officers on the basis of their engineering potential
>is better than picking them on the basis of their tactical/leadership
>potential?
<snip>
Leadership is not a genetic trait. Leadership characteristics maybe...
but the skills of leadership are taught and/or aquired during lifes little
adventures. The USNA teaches leadership - 4 years worth.
Tactical knowledge comes from experience and training. The USNA
also touches on this. Maybe not as extensively as engineering, but
sufficiently enough that newly commissioned Ensigns, should have
a grasp of tactical terminology and procedures. How do you propose
we select the best tacticians? Give each newly graduated Ensign command
of a FFG in the Chesapeake Bay and conduct a winner takes all war game.
Last one floating gets command of a submarine, the rest become pilots and
skimmers? IMO it won’t work. Send them to a command and let them train
in the environment they will eventually command. Just as it is done now.
>Scott Orr
Scope's under...
Tim McFeely
ex-TM2(SS)...a dying breed
tim...@usa.net
ad...@osfn.rhilinet.gov
###
Graydon
: overall sets of criteria that indicated potential for command --
: this would certainly include some ability to understand
: engineering concepts (there are a lot of technical things on a
: sub); it would also include the ability to assess risks, the
: ability to formulate plans, and the ability to lead men.
: Once such officers were selected, they would be trained on all
: of the systems, in sequence, until they were equally familiar with
: each. They would probably never become an "expert" at any one
: system (or at least no more than one or two), because a point of
: diminishing returns is reached before the "expert" level, at which
: point it's more profitable to start studying another system (or
: broader concepts like tactics) than to continue study of the
: present one -- again, time and mental capacity are limited.
Uh, Scott, what do you *do* with these guys while they're learning?
Nothing quite as useless as the assistant juniour tactical officer; you
dasn't trust them to make decisions, and they can't supervise anything,
and the crew can't tell them to sod off when they give stupid instructions.
Add in that instrumental detetection of tactical ability is very poor,
and I think there are good arguments for training officers to be useful,
then picking the tacticians from that pool. It's not like there's a
desperate shortage of people trying to get into the program.
--
saun...@qlink.queensu.ca | Monete me si non anglice loquobar.
Scott D. Orr
>
>
>Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>
> >service academies -- I think it dates back to 19th century notions
> >of the officer as someone who has to understand and apply
scientific
> >principles.
>
> So by current notions does the officer apply magic or sci-fi
> principles?
>
magic. The scientific method stresses careful and controlled
experimentation (for novel phenomena) and precise application of
known principles (for well-understood phenonomena). Neither of these
things is adaptive behavior in an environment with a high degree
of uncertainty (e.g., combat). (And no, I didn't just make that up,
it's part of an ongoing discussion in the field of military science.)
> The Annapolis grads that go nuc generally go to Annapolis
first.
> That means they go through the Annapolis selection first.
>
> Why do extra-curricular activities and athletic record make
you a
> good sub commander?
>
Personally, I think that athletic record has virtually nothing to do
with fitness for command (the Navy disagrees with me on this -- they
allegedly promote teamwork and physical fitness, which is at least
plausible).
Extra-curricular activities have a very real bearing on leadership
potential -- they indicate an ability to get along with others and
to function in leadership positions, which of course are things
critical for an officer.
My point of course, is that (at least in the NUPOC program), the Navy
throws its normal officer-selection process out the window for the
sole purpose of scrounging up enough warm bodies who can pass nuke
school (and lest you think I speak ill, I must assure you that my
very best friend in the whole world was one of those -- very bright
-- warm bodies).
> Most of the WWII sub commanders that made it past the first
few
> months of the war were low ranking and had spent a good deal
> of time in all parts of the boat.
>
> One thing that WWII proved for subs was that the people you
select
> for in peace (like battle plans) seldom survive first contact
with
> the enemy.
>
> Every one has their own theory of how to select a commander
for a
> ship. Every method has it's good and bad points. It depends
a
> lot on what you want to accomplish.
>
While that's true, to an extent, you might as well pick people based on
a quality you _think_ might be related to the ability you're looking
for, rather than on a quality that almost certainly isn't.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
>
>Statements like the ones above a certainly going to raise the ire of
the Submarine
>community and quite possibly send several large FAE’s in your
direction. By your
>own admission you have never been on a submarine, which makes you
somewhat
>less of an expert on missions and operations conducted by the
submarine community,
>regardless of the country; than say those of us who were blessed to
serve in that
>capacity.
Look, I'm not into flame wars. My point is that, Silent Service or
the occasional hint or headline about a compromised operation, a little
logic and knowledge of military history will tell you that a submarine
will be the unit of choice for any mission in which you a) need to
avoid being detected and/or b) want to get at something that's below
the surface. This is going to include (among other things) ASW,
ASuW, anti-shipping, monitoring enemy fleet movements, ELINT, covert
insertion and extraction in coastal areas, monitoring of underwater/
coastal construction/activities, tapping underwater or coastal
communications cables, mining, special operations assault transport, or
what have you. Of course, these are mostly guesses, since I have no
access whatsoever to classified information (and never have had
any). Most of these things are not the same as warfare, and
most of them, though risky, don't involve getting shot at with live
ammunition (otherwise, subs wouldn't come home with such regularity,
which, thank God, they do).
>Broad based statements concerning the officer selection process and
their ability to wage
>war if necessary, provide little basis for an intelligent discussion
on the capabilities of various
>submarine classes.
Which is why I've made very specific statements about the sorts of
results that might reasonably be expected when you choose leaders
based on how good they are at engineering.
>What do you propose for training? We launched hundreds of weapons on
>the range, conducted drill after drill after drill, spent hours in the
diving/attack/torpedo tube
>trainers practicing every tactic known, but most importantly we took
the knowledge gained and
>the teamwork developed during this training and applied it to our real
life, real time operations.
That's very good training, and it gives you a good crew. It will
probably make a good captain better, a mediocre captain good, or
a poor captain at least mediocre. However, the best proposal I can
make for training is to start with the best material available,
which means to pick you officers based on their potential as
warriors and boat-drivers, not on their potential as engineers.
This is not some esoteric or academic point -- it's good common
sense.
>Certainly, there are public domain operations of which everyone is
familiar: trailing fUSSR/CIS
>submarine assets, CVBG ASW protection, potential TLAM attacks in
places like Bosnia. That
>however is only part of the daily op orders being conducted by the
submarine community. Most
>of which you will never know about, others like IVY BELLS were the
ultimate in SPECOPS
>until some d**khead(s) like the Walkers or Pelton leaked them to the
Soviets.
>
Look, I don't like saying this (because it's not entirely true),
but I'm not impressed. (In fact, I am quite impressed by the skill,
dedication, and willingness to sacrifice on the part of submarine
crews, and I'm impressed by a lot of the things they accomplish.
What I'm not impressed by is vague references to the sorts of things
that anyone who's ever read a spy novel can easily guess -- no, I
don't know operational details, but the outlines are pretty obvious
in most cases.)
>Of all the weapons I launched, happily not one of them was in anger.
That does not diminish
>the tension and pressure of operations conducted in support of
national defense policy. Unless
>you have experienced a SPECOP in decidedly not friendly waters or
spent a few weeks trailing
>an unfriendly submarine without spooking it into some type of decisive
action, I personally
>don’t think you are qualified to say boo about USN submarine
capabilities or their ability to
>perform under pressure.
>
My point (buried somewhere in all this muck) is that the United States
Navy has not lost a submarine to enemy action since the middle of
1945. While submarines, during that period, have performed hundreds
of missions that were, by civilian standards, "dangerous", it can
be inferred, from the fact that no casualties have been incurred,
that the level of risk did not even begin to _approach_ that
involved in a real war. Things are different in a shooting war --
certainties disappear, there are no longer any "perfect plans" or
"perfect operations". Captains who may have been great at executing
"dangerous" operations to perfection may well prove incapable of
handling an environment in which any move could prove fatal, and
where making the right move is often a matter of picking the
one that has the _least_ chance of getting you killed (or more
realistically, the one that _probably_ won't get you killed, but
probably _will_ do something to advance the war effort).
>>The problem isn't fairness. In fact, the problem isn't with the
>>subsequent training -- it's good, largely because it's built on a
>>good tradition that Rickover, despite his best efforts, was unable
>>completely to stamp out. The problem is that people are being picked
>>based on how good they'll do as engineers, not how good they'll do as
>>leaders and tacticians. It's like picking football players with
>>IQ tests: no matter how good your coaching staff and training
>>facilities, you'll still never have the best team (at least not in
>>quality -- quantity is another matter).
>
>OK, you dislike the USN submarine officer selection process, so what?
>We have it, it works.
It could work better. When people's lives are on the line, you want
every edge you can get, and the USN has chosen not to persue one
potential edge.
>Consider the math. Each fast boat has 3-4 ENS/LT j.g.s, 3-4 LT's, 2-4
LCDR’s, and a CDR
>(or rarely a CAPT). After SOBC, SOAC, PXO, PCO, and well over a dozen
years at sea, most
>of those will not get a command. Most will be eliminated because of
attrition (commission expires and
>they had no desire to reup,medical discharge, forced to leave, etc.),
some denied the opportunity for
>various reasons (performance based), and some just don’t want it. It
is generally the well rounded officer
>with the desire to excel that outlasts the grueling road to command.
Sure at the end of the process, some
>slip through the cracks, it happens everywhere (including the RN). I
had one, horrible tactician,
>however he wasn’t to dang bright about the teakettle either,
performing a nuclear no-no resulting
>in his relief. It may not be the best method of officer selection, but
nature has chosen it for it’s
>selection process - survival of the fittest.
>
This is true -- this part of the selection process is what you want:
survival of the fittest.
However, the fittest would be fitter if you started with a better
gene pool. They would probably also be fitter if the standards for
fitness didn't suddenly change from engineering to command ability
(since some organisms, having adapted to the former, may never
completely re-adapt to the latter).
>>The Brits have been winning half the exercises with torpedoes with,
>>what, one-fourth of the American torpedoes' range? That's pretty
>>damned impressive.
>
>Again, so what? Any idea what the typical engagement range would be
for a sub vs. sub
>engagement? It is only impressive to the uninformed. On equally
capable vessels,
>employing comparable weapons, it comes down to the crews. If the 50/50
record is
>the standard, then USN/RN officer selection and crew training must be
even up.
>
But (at least until the Spearfish), USN and RN subs didn't have
"comparable weapons". The Tigerfish about 1/3-1/2 the range of
the Mark 48 and about half the speed (and that's being charitable),
at least in open sources. Indeed, the published top speed of the
Tigerfish was actually below that of any of nuclear boat in the
Western inventory (and most owned by the Soviets). Given this
(and even given an allowance for the difference between open and
true performance), I would be most impressed by Trafalgar commander who
actually obtained a kill on a 688.
>
>In fact, I'm not devoted to all things British. Indeed, I don't even
>>care what the British do. The point is that they happen to do it
>>right, and the USN does it wrong (not to say it doesn't work for the
>>USN, but it could work better).
>
>Ignoring that rarely is a system perfect, what do you base this
statement on? What is
>your criteria for right and wrong? Generalizations are easy to spout.
The RN is a
>topnotch force (and can throw one heck of a party), but just like the
USN, I am sure
>they have their problems too.
One problem they don't have is that they don't pick boat-drivers based
on their math and physics skills. The USN does have that problem --
now, we're agreed that the USN has developed (or rather, maintained)
impressive measures for solving that problem, but can you honestly
argue that picking officers on the basis of their engineering potential
is better than picking them on the basis of their tactical/leadership
potential?
>
>>One need only look to the oft-cited anecdote about RN captains
sitting around talking
>>about tactics while USN captains chat about their reactors....
>
>Maybe, Mr. Orr, this is because the RN Captains feel they are lacking
in their knowledge of
>tactics and USN Captains feel they are lacking in their knowledge of
reactors...
>
Right, I'm sure that must be it. Which one of them is going to learn
more about tactics, in that case?
Scott Orr
Jeff Crowell
: I wrote:
: >Well, Scott, that may be because you don't know what the bubbleheads
: >have been doing.
Scott D. Orr (sd...@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
: Look, I've heard this smug little argument before. I (and everyone
: else who actually cares) have a pretty damn good idea what the
: USN's subs have been doing.
Look, you want smug? How about "No, you don't know." You're guessing,
see? And your guesses are most likely far short of the mark. I know
damn well that my guesses are better than yours, whether you like it or
not. I've seen some pictures, and if they showed me pictures, there's
got to be better stuff than that.
: My point is that the USN's subs have NOT been tested in a real, live,
: shooting war...
Neither has anyone else's, brighteyes. Let's hear your basis for the
claim that other selection and training processes are better. You are
throwing around opinions as if they were facts.
It is a fact, not an observation, that the drills and exercises that
the USN (and Brits and Aussies and younameit) runs are planned out in
excruciating detail to get as close to war conditions as is humanly
possible without actually killing people (it's bad for retention
rates, you know). You just have no stinking idea how tense and
involved people get in these exercises. It may not be an issue of "I
better do good or I will die," but you'd better believe that there is a
lot of unit pride and institutional pride at stake. People work hard
in these exercises.
About the only artificiality introduced is that the subs are forced to
do stuff they would never do in a real tactical situation, just so the
surface and aviation guys can get the occasional sonar or ESM hit. I
spend a good deal of time poking fun at sewerpipe sailors, but it's
just fun-poking and they know it--our submariners are goddam good at
what they do, and it more than a little annoying to see you come in
here with a patronizing attitude that you know more about it than the
people that do it.
: >I was an airplane driver and skimmer, but I do know a bit about subs
: >and what they do (I even did pretty damn good on the trivia test!) and
: >spent a couple weeks aboard one while underway.
: Yeah, I did good on the trivia test too, and I've never been on one....
Well, here's a rubber dog turd for your prize...
: The problem isn't fairness. In fact, the problem isn't with the
: subsequent training -- it's good, largely because it's built on a
: good tradition that Rickover, despite his best efforts, was unable
: completely to stamp out.
If all you're trying to do is criticize F*ckover, I mean Rickover,
you'll have to stand in a loooong line to do it. His engineering
genius aside, I think he did a lot of things which did not help out
the submarine forces.
: It's like picking football players with
: IQ tests: no matter how good your coaching staff and training
: facilities, you'll still never have the best team (at least not in
: quality -- quantity is another matter).
You picked a bad example--all other things being equal, the smarter
player is the better choice because they will learn the plays better
and more quickly, and understand the underlying strategy of the game
better as well. Stupid players make stupid mistakes on the field and
lose the game for their team.
: I don't care what the British do. The point is that they happen
: to do it right, and the USN does it wrong
In your very humble opinion, and you don't _really_ know anything about
the subject. Have I got that right?
Heh. Reminds me of the scene in "Doctor Detroit" where Ackroyd whips
off his suspenders and prepares to fight the Bad Guys, saying "Beware!
I am extensively read in White Crane kung fu." One of the better
cruise movies, actually.
Jeff
--
###################################################################
# #
# Jeff Crowell | | #
# jc...@hpdmd48.boi.hp.com | _ | #
# _________|__( )__|_________ #
# DMD Process Engineer x/ _| |( . )| |_ \x #
# (208) 396-6525 x |_| ---*|_| x #
# O x x O #
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###################################################################
YOU KNOW YOU'RE A REDNECK IF...
You've ever financed a tattoo.
Eric Gross
> I did not fail to consider I just did not expound upon it.
I didn't mean that to sound as snide as it did. Sorry!
> The concept of the role a weapon will fill prior to a war often
> changes after the start of a war. To use a non naval example -
> prior to WWII the world tended to see tanks as support for ground
> troops with the speed needed to keep up with the troops. One
> small western europe nation saw tanks as fast moving attack
> platforms that were supported by the troops. The conventional
> wisdom lost.
Oh, absolutely no argument from me here. Pre-war thinking almost always takes
it on the chin somewhere. War is a dynamic enterprise and filled with
constantly changing variables; interactions of measures and countermeasures.
This is especially true in the modern, high-tech arena. That's why initiative
and flexibility need to be stressed in raising an officer corps.
> I tend to feel that we are close to the proper philosophy of
> operations. But who knows? Perhaps little Joe Schmoe just
> thought up a simple way to defeat some aspect of our plans.
> Something as simple as a glass bottle filled with gas and a
> burning rag in the top, dropped on those tanks I mentioned above.
:) There's always someone out there more clever than yourself. Forget that at
your own peril.
RONT...@delphi.com
Quoting egross from a message in sci.military.naval
>However, what you fail to consider is the VAST difference in doctrine,
>training, approach, philosophy, etc., between the pre-WWII sub force
>and the Cold War U.S. sub force.
>aren't problems and institutional weak spots in the current service,
>or that the pre-WWII service was completely flawed. However, there is
>a considerable difference between the two environments and the
>commanding officers cultivated and advanced in these environments.
>.
Eric
I did not fail to consider I just did not expound upon it.
I agree that the current method of operation (training, philosophy
etc) is much closer to what is needed than pre WWII. Prior to
WWII subs were regarded as the poor second cousin to the fleet.
That led to a do as we say and BUWEPS is always right attitude.
The present attitude puts subs as part of the fleet in a working
position.
It would be hard to understate the difference between the tow
attitudes. However...
The concept of the role a weapon will fill prior to a war often
changes after the start of a war. To use a non naval example -
prior to WWII the world tended to see tanks as support for ground
troops with the speed needed to keep up with the troops. One
small western europe nation saw tanks as fast moving attack
platforms that were supported by the troops. The conventional
wisdom lost.
During peace time one side tends to try and guess the best
operational method for each piece of hardware. The other side
tries to figure out methods to exploit flaws in the way hardware
is being operated. That means that sometimes rules change.
I tend to feel that we are close to the proper philosophy of
operations. But who knows? Perhaps little Joe Schmoe just
thought up a simple way to defeat some aspect of our plans.
Something as simple as a glass bottle filled with gas and a
burning rag in the top, dropped on those tanks I mentioned above.
As I said I agree with you the attitude is different. Is it the
correct attitude? I think so, I hope so. A lot of people spend a
lot of time and effort trying to prove it is not. After every war
or battle one side will always ask "Why didn't we see that flaw
before?"
#define CHANGE TRUE
Dean F. Kling
sd...@ix.netcom.com (Scott D. Orr ) wrote:
>Look, I'm not into flame wars. My point is that, Silent Service or
>no, the rest of us DO know what submarines are for.
[summary of potential missions deleted]
>Most of these things are not the same as warfare, and
>most of them, though risky, don't involve getting shot at with live
>ammunition (otherwise, subs wouldn't come home with such regularity,
>which, thank God, they do).
Correction: Because you haven't been shot at with live weapons doesn't
imply that what you are doing might not be within the other guy's
ROE. If you are very, very good you won't be shot at because they won't
know you are there. That doesn't lessen the fact that the ship and crew
ARE on a war footing and treating the situation no differently than a live
war patrol. If you assume that you don't know what the other guy's ROEs
are exactly, you have to be on that cutting edge, you don't dare assume
you are NOT at war on a personal level.
>Which is why I've made very specific statements about the sorts of
>results that might reasonably be expected when you choose leaders
>based on how good they are at engineering.
Major misconception: leaders are selected by their ability to lead.
In the SSN/SSBN arean, one aspect of that leadership is the ability
to lead the engineering department and to effectively manage the
power plant. The system isn't perfect, and bad tacticians slip
through as often as bad engineers (which is why C.O.'s sometimes
get releaved after an especially bad ORSE), but engineering
competence has never been the sole or primary criterion for
CO selection.
Dean
Dean F. Kling dkl...@ptd.intel.com
No, I am not an authorized spokesman for Intel.
Scott D. Orr
[Wading bravely through some flames.]
>: The problem isn't fairness. In fact, the problem isn't with the
>: subsequent training -- it's good, largely because it's built on a
>: good tradition that Rickover, despite his best efforts, was unable
>: completely to stamp out.
>
>If all you're trying to do is criticize F*ckover, I mean Rickover,
>you'll have to stand in a loooong line to do it. His engineering
>genius aside, I think he did a lot of things which did not help out
>the submarine forces.
>
That, I think, was my point.
>: It's like picking football players with
>: IQ tests: no matter how good your coaching staff and training
>: facilities, you'll still never have the best team (at least not in
>: quality -- quantity is another matter).
>
>You picked a bad example--all other things being equal, the smarter
>player is the better choice because they will learn the plays better
>and more quickly, and understand the underlying strategy of the game
>better as well. Stupid players make stupid mistakes on the field and
>lose the game for their team.
>
Yep. The problem is, if you pick them _only_ by IQ, all other things
are NOT equal, because the guys who picked theirs for general athletic
ability (which, of course, includes brains) are gonna have a bunch of
big, fast guys on their team, and the guys who picked solely on the
basis of IQ are gonna have, on average, a bunch of geeks. Who do you
think is gonna win the game? That's the beauty of that particular
example.
>In your very humble opinion, and you don't _really_ know anything
about
>the subject. Have I got that right?
>
Well, actually, no, you don't have it right. If you want to get right
down to it, comparative military organization is one of my particular
fields of study (which is why this argument interests me), and you
don't know really know a damn thing about THAT, do you? (And just
so you don't waste the effort typing -- knowing about the USN's
organization doesn't qualify as "comparative".)
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
>
>>Look, I'm not into flame wars. My point is that, Silent Service or
>
>Neither am I and apologize for a slightly forceful post. I recognise
>your right to an opinion however much I disagree with your arguments.
>Lets leave it at that. I would like to continue to try and understand
your
>reasoning though.
>
more than I have to....
>>That's very good training, and it gives you a good crew. It will
>>probably make a good captain better, a mediocre captain good, or
>>a poor captain at least mediocre. However, the best proposal I can
>>make for training is to start with the best material available,
>>which means to pick you officers based on their potential as
>>warriors and boat-drivers, not on their potential as engineers.
>>This is not some esoteric or academic point -- it's good common
>>sense.
>
>What, then, would you propose the selection criteria should be?
>
Well, I think that gets to the heart of the question. Actually, I'd
love to know how the British select their officers (and how well
it works). And I'm not particularly enamored of the officer-
selection process used in Annapolis and ROTC -- I don't think, for
instance, that athletic participation (though conceivably valuable)
ought to be a virtual requirement of being an officer.
So I guess that brings me to two conclusions:
1. If you're selecting officers, you need to try and identify
(empirically) some traits that that indicate the potential for a
good tactician and leader of men -- the relationship between these
traits and actual performance isn't going to be perfect, but it's
going to be better than random.
2. Whatever criteria you decide on, apply it to all officers who
are going to be on a "command track". Don't pick officers based
solely on their potential to perform a job that they'll perform
only early in their careers; and if you do have to pick some
specialists (as the RN does its nuclear engineers), don't force
them into the command track (there's room for flexibility if you
later identify good command candidates, but if they're good
engineers and not expected to be as good as boat drivers, give
them an alternate path of advancement).
>Understandably so, however the nature of the beast is that of
intentional
>vagueness (more precisely called security). I too (in reference to
another thread)
>would love to be able to tell no shit sea stories, but I can’t. The
reference
>to IVY BELLS is public domain. Information can be found in a book
>called (I think) _Crystal Palace_. It is a book concerning activities
of the NSA.
>
Hey, I've got no problem with this. I don't want anyone spewing
classified information, or with vagueness per se -- my only problem is
when access to classified information is waved as proof of unquestion-
able expertise. It is _best_ to have all information available,
but it is also possible to carry on an intelligent discussion based
on open sources (particularly when we're talking about organization,
not tactics or technology). I think it should also be recognized that
some of us outside the military community, while lacking in technical
knowledge, may have other information we can bring to bear (for
example, I happen to know a little bit about military organization from
a comparative perspective), which, while completely unclassified, may
not be generally known.
>>involved in a real war. Things are different in a shooting war --
>>certainties disappear, there are no longer any "perfect plans" or
>>"perfect operations". Captains who may have been great at executing
>>"dangerous" operations to perfection may well prove incapable of
>>handling an environment in which any move could prove fatal, and
>>where making the right move is often a matter of picking the
>>one that has the _least_ chance of getting you killed (or more
>>realistically, the one that _probably_ won't get you killed, but
>>probably _will_ do something to advance the war effort).
>
>Agreed, but fear and indecisiveness are not relegated to engineers
>alone.
>
Absolutely not. However, I spent the five years of my undergraduate
education surrounded by thousands of engineers at Georgia Tech; in
fact, I started out in aerospace engineering. I do have some ideas
about how the average engineer thinks, and I know (in general) how a
military commander needs to be able to think, and the disparity
between the two worries me.
The idea of teaching the systems first does not, in itself, bother me.
I fully agree that a commander has to know what's under his command.
My problem with the USN (on the training side) is that too much
emphasis is placed on one system to the detriment of all of the others.
Do you honestly think that if Rickover had been a weapons engineer
that the nuclear plant would today receive so much attention?
The one caveat I would reserve on teaching the systems first is that
you can't entirely ignore tactics and leadership issues for very
long -- if you training someone intensively in a particular mindset
(such as engineering) it may be hard to break him of it later.
And of course, learning about the men under his command is just as
much a part of "teaching the systems" as is learning about the
technology.
>As for changing disciplines from engineering to command, you don’t.
>Engineering is part of command. Officers expand and grow with the
>experience they aquire. The training in math and physics learned
during
>nuke power school sit very well with later watches as OOD. Driving
>the boat in a tactical situation is really nothing more that an
complex
>exercise in geometry, trig, and a whole lot of vector and speed
>calculations. The enlisted personnel provide you with the data, you
just have
>to do the math (overly simplified version).
>
And here we get to the second (and distinct) problem I have with
the USN, which is selection (as distinguisheed from training).
This I think is the bigger problem. While the engineering skills
are important, they aren't the only things an officer has to have --
he's also got to have tactical skills and people skills. If you
pick a substantial portion of your officers based only on the
engineering skills, the median level in the other two areas is
bound to suffer. If it were me, I'd pick based on all three, and
I would go out on a limb and say I'd be willing to accept a lot
of candidates who were adequate engineers (rather than being
superb) if they also showed potential as adequate leaders
and adequate tacticians. You're going to find very few people
who are superb in all three areas, and you have to pick the
candidates who present the best mix of the three.
>This is one of those things that is very hard to determine without
discussing
>classifed info. I was just pointing out that typical sub vs. sub
engagements
>happen at ranges were the legs of the weapon are not necessarily a
problem
>and slow speed of the weapon, while a faster weapon is obviously
better, is
>not always a disadvantage.
>
Right, and I understand that. But I think it would be difficult to
argue that the Tigerfish is comparable to the Mark 48 -- otherwise,
I don't think we'd have seen the Spearfish as soon as we did. I
can't help but think that this must have given U.S. subs some
advantage in many situations -- how much, and how well the USN
used this advantage (if indeed it was even reflected in the
engagement proceedures) I'll gladly conceed I don't know.
Well tactics and leadership can be taught, but so can engineering.
I've done a lot of work with organizations, and a lot of wargaming,
and I can assure you that some people pick up on both leadership
and tactics faster than others, just as some pick up on engineering
faster than others. In all three areas, it's going to be a combination
of genetics, pre-USN education, and training in the USN, and IMHO
you need both the best material and the best training to get the
best officers.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
writes:
>: overall sets of criteria that indicated potential for command --
>: this would certainly include some ability to understand
>: engineering concepts (there are a lot of technical things on a
>: sub); it would also include the ability to assess risks, the
>: ability to formulate plans, and the ability to lead men.
>
>: Once such officers were selected, they would be trained on all
>: of the systems, in sequence, until they were equally familiar with
>: each. They would probably never become an "expert" at any one
>: system (or at least no more than one or two), because a point of
>: diminishing returns is reached before the "expert" level, at which
>: point it's more profitable to start studying another system (or
>: broader concepts like tactics) than to continue study of the
>: present one -- again, time and mental capacity are limited.
>
>Uh, Scott, what do you *do* with these guys while they're learning?
>
difference between what I'm talking about and what the USN does
now is that I'd place less emphasis on the power plant and more
on the other systems -- in other words, I'm advocating _more_
training on most of the boat's systems.
To answer the other question that you implied, yes, I agree,
each of the boat's divisions will be (as they are now) headed
by an "expert", in the sense that he's the guy on the boat with
most experience in that division (with the possible exception
of the CO) and he's the one that's most current (since knowledge
and skills fade with time). He's not an "expert" in the sense
that there are going to be many engineers on land (and a few
enlisted technicians on the boat, in all probabality) who'll
know more about the technical details than he does, for the
simple reason that these true experts spend their entire careers
in one area, whereas Navy officers are cross-trained.
As it stands now, most of the divisions on a sub are headed
by the former sort of "expert" and not the latter. The only
exception is the nuclear reactor.
Scott Orr
Andy Spark
> Well, I think that gets to the heart of the question. Actually, I'd
> love to know how the British select their officers (and how well
> it works). And I'm not particularly enamored of the officer-
> selection process used in Annapolis and ROTC -- I don't think, for
> instance, that athletic participation (though conceivably valuable)
> ought to be a virtual requirement of being an officer.
A candidate approaches the local recruiting officer and is interviewed, only
those passing this interview get an application form.
A two day selection board (The Admiralty Interview Board) is the basis for
selection for Britannia Royal Naval College.
The time spent at BRNC is dependant upon qualification and specialisation. As a
graduate I spent 1 term at BRNC one in the Dartmouth Training Ship and did 9
months Fleet Training in an Aircraft carrier.
>
> 2. Whatever criteria you decide on, apply it to all officers who
> are going to be on a "command track". Don't pick officers based
> solely on their potential to perform a job that they'll perform
> only early in their careers; and if you do have to pick some
> specialists (as the RN does its nuclear engineers), don't force
> them into the command track (there's room for flexibility if you
> later identify good command candidates, but if they're good
> engineers and not expected to be as good as boat drivers, give
> them an alternate path of advancement).
In the RN you join as either seaman engineering or supply, with aviation as a
subset of the seaman officer specialisation. Only Seaman Officers (male or fem
ale) are eligable to command ships at sea. So in the instance of an SSN the
Nuclear Engineers will *NEVR* be eligable for command -unless they become
seamen officers and pass the perisher.
Hope this helps
________________________________________________________________________________
Andrew Spark ph...@siva.bris.ac.uk
I've never outraged nature. I've always listened to
her advice and followed it wherever it went. -Joe Orton
My views only, nothing to do with Bristol University, unless I say so
________________________________________________________________________________
RONT...@delphi.com
Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>>Quoting sdorr from a message in sci.military.naval
>Those of us what ain't in the military usually call any system which
>passes sound within a building or what have you an "intercom" (short
>for "intercommunication device", which means a device that lets
>you communicate between rooms). Technically, yes, a sound-powered
>system is not an "intercom", but I try to speak English on Usenet.
If you can rag on the difference between a boat and a ship (see a
few posts back) you can expect others to quibble when you use an
incorrect phrase.
>It's too bad, then, that the guy on the scope hasn't been trained for
>over a year in the theory of metallurgy and fluid-flow dynamics,
>like he has on nuclear theory. This is a serious failing in USN
>training, don't you think?
Fluid flow and metallurgy *are* part of the nuc course. But you
know what? You are right since the guy on the scope may not be
the CO.
This has been an interesting discussion but I have to leave it now
and I doubt by the time I get back on line it will still be on
going. Good luck to all.
Paul Jonathan Adam
>
> Scott D. Orr (sd...@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
> : My point is that the USN's subs have NOT been tested in a real, live,
> : shooting war...
>
> Neither has anyone else's, brighteyes. Let's hear your basis for the
> claim that other selection and training processes are better. You are
> throwing around opinions as if they were facts.
Ask Captain Hector Bonzo, former CO of the General Belgrano, to pick
that small nit for you. For that matter, the crew of the San Luis might
also disagree with you: they say they carried out several attacks on
the RN, and that only their faulty fire-control gear stopped the torpedoes
from functioning.
Just a minor niggle... Amazing what a good boat can do, even if the
torpedoes were built in 1944.
--
"When you have shot and killed a man, you have defined your attitude towards
him. You have offered a definite answer to a definite problem. For better
or for worse, you have acted decisively.
In fact, the next move is up to him." <R.A. Lafferty>
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Scott D. Orr
>
>In article <43bhv1$b...@ixnews6.ix.netcom.com>, sd...@ix.netcom.com
(Scott D. Orr ) writes:
>> love to know how the British select their officers (and how well
>> it works). And I'm not particularly enamored of the officer-
>> selection process used in Annapolis and ROTC -- I don't think, for
>> instance, that athletic participation (though conceivably valuable)
>> ought to be a virtual requirement of being an officer.
>
interviewed, only
>those passing this interview get an application form.
>A two day selection board (The Admiralty Interview Board) is the basis
for
>selection for Britannia Royal Naval College.
>
What does the application form include?
(From an empirical standpoint, interviewing is viewed by most people
who study selection proceedures to be slightly better than drawing
names from a hat -- however, I'm more interested in what they're
looking for than what means they use to find it.)
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
>
> If you can rag on the difference between a boat and a ship
(see a
> few posts back) you can expect others to quibble when you use
an
> incorrect phrase.
>
call one a "ship", after all the grief they usually give others for
doing so -- it was too much to resist and I apologize for my weakness.
>
> >It's too bad, then, that the guy on the scope hasn't been trained
for
> >over a year in the theory of metallurgy and fluid-flow dynamics,
> >like he has on nuclear theory. This is a serious failing in USN
> >training, don't you think?
>
you
> know what? You are right since the guy on the scope may not
be
> the CO.
>
the scope," not I -- I was merely parelleling his own statement. If
you want to get right down to it, in most cases (when the sub is not at
periscope depth) _no_one_ is looking through the scope. So there.
As far metallurgy and fluid dynamics -- of course they're part of
the _nuclear_ course, but only as applied to the nuclear power plant,
not to the hull and the problems of depth control.
Scott Orr
Ken Young
extensive live fire tests of it's torpedoes was the Japanese. Also my
references state that the Japanese never used magnetic detonators. I
realise this is off topic but the Americans were not the only people to
have problems with torpedoes.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
Andy Spark
> Do you have any insight on what the interviewers are looking for?
The interviewers are lloking for "potential naval officers"
> What does the application form include?
Its pretty much bog standard
>
> (From an empirical standpoint, interviewing is viewed by most people
> who study selection proceedures to be slightly better than drawing
> names from a hat -- however, I'm more interested in what they're
> looking for than what means they use to find it.)
Well the interview with the board is only about 1 hour out of the 48. Other
elements include academic and psychometric tests, leadership tasks of the "get
across that pretend bottomless pit" variety, and similar theoretical exercises
involving hurricanes pregnant women having babies, lost scuba divers, set on
islands with no electricity, the aim is not necessarily t be correct, (there
very often is no correct solution) but to check out your decision making
abilities....
Its all good fun, and they tell you if you've passed there and then....
Andy
> Scott Orr
tim_mcfeely
>Well, I think that gets to the heart of the question. Actually, I'd
>love to know how the British select their officers (and how well
>it works). And I'm not particularly enamored of the officer-
>selection process used in Annapolis and ROTC -- I don't think, for
>instance, that athletic participation (though conceivably valuable)
>ought to be a virtual requirement of being an officer.
Navy physical fitness standards are absurd. It is based on a point
system. I forget the number needed to ‘pass’ (they don’t do
a damn thing if you fail, basically except knock you on your evals
, unless you are overweight, then FATBOY program). But basically
you do as many pushups in 2 minutes as you can, as many situps
as you can in 2 minutes, and run 1.5 miles in something (bit fuzzy)
like 13.75 minutes. The CO is exempt or can choose to exempt
himself.
>So I guess that brings me to two conclusions:
>1. If you're selecting officers, you need to try and identify
>(empirically) some traits that that indicate the potential for a
>good tactician and leader of men -- the relationship between these
>traits and actual performance isn't going to be perfect, but it's
>going to be better than random.
Basically the same standards required for the USNA.
>2. Whatever criteria you decide on, apply it to all officers who
>are going to be on a "command track". Don't pick officers based
>solely on their potential to perform a job that they'll perform
>only early in their careers; and if you do have to pick some
>specialists (as the RN does its nuclear engineers), don't force
>them into the command track (there's room for flexibility if you
>later identify good command candidates, but if they're good
>engineers and not expected to be as good as boat drivers, give
>them an alternate path of advancement).
The only officer on a sub that is expressly forbidden to qualify
OOD is the supply officer (non-line officer). Everyone else is expected
to become OOD (surface and submerged) qualified. If I read your statements
correctly, you suggest that tacticians are placed up front and engineers
aft and ‘never the twain shall meet’. Except of course if there is a capable
tactician aft, who would like to go forward. If, as I said, I understand
you reasoning, then which group does the CO come from?
>Hey, I've got no problem with this. I don't want anyone spewing
>classified information, or with vagueness per se -- my only problem is
>when access to classified information is waved as proof of unquestion-
>able expertise. It is _best_ to have all information available,
>but it is also possible to carry on an intelligent discussion based
>on open sources (particularly when we're talking about organization,
>not tactics or technology). I think it should also be recognized that
>some of us outside the military community, while lacking in technical
>knowledge, may have other information we can bring to bear (for
>example, I happen to know a little bit about military organization from
>a comparative perspective), which, while completely unclassified, may
>not be generally known.
Agreed. The moniker of ‘Military-I know everything classified,
therefore I know everything’ is not necessarily a straight row to hoe.
Granted discussions concerning classified info would enlighten everyone
in this group, however every day people with minimum or no clearance
assist the military in some of it’s hardest decisions. The unfortunate
mindset of most of the military is one of tunnelvision. There is little room
for inclusion of ideas from people non-military. Unless, like me, these
non-military types work for a O-7 that backs them, it is seldom that
operational considerations are based on non-military suggestions. As
an aside R&D is a totally different story.
>Absolutely not. However, I spent the five years of my undergraduate
>education surrounded by thousands of engineers at Georgia Tech; in
>fact, I started out in aerospace engineering. I do have some ideas
>about how the average engineer thinks, and I know (in general) how a
>military commander needs to be able to think, and the disparity
>between the two worries me.
What is the disparity?
>The idea of teaching the systems first does not, in itself, bother me.
>I fully agree that a commander has to know what's under his command.
>My problem with the USN (on the training side) is that too much
>emphasis is placed on one system to the detriment of all of the others.
>Do you honestly think that if Rickover had been a weapons engineer
>that the nuclear plant would today receive so much attention?
>The one caveat I would reserve on teaching the systems first is that
>you can't entirely ignore tactics and leadership issues for very
>long -- if you training someone intensively in a particular mindset
>(such as engineering) it may be hard to break him of it later.
>And of course, learning about the men under his command is just as
>much a part of "teaching the systems" as is learning about the
>technology.
The ‘one system’ makes everything else work. Without it, you ain’t
got nothing else. I will add (somewhat to the detriment of my argument)
that nub ensigns come to the boat with a terrible mindset concerning the
teakettle. It is, in their opinion, the only reasons submarines exist. That
usually ends when they approach a ‘coner’ (non-nuke enlisted) for a signature
on their qual card. Somehow they quickly understand that their life no longer
revolves around RCP’s, the main seawater system, etc. ;-)
There is a very subtle (mostly) relationship between the officers and crew
on a submarine. Non-quals (both officers and enlisted) are treated like
dirt, when it comes to them suggesting something. A non-qual officer
that orders someone to do something that is considered unreasonable, by
the orderee, is usually told to come back when he is qualified. I guess my
point is that learning about the men under his command is important, but
it just doesn’t happen until the officer demonstrates his ability to lead.
>And here we get to the second (and distinct) problem I have with
>the USN, which is selection (as distinguisheed from training).
>This I think is the bigger problem. While the engineering skills
>are important, they aren't the only things an officer has to have --
>he's also got to have tactical skills and people skills. If you
>pick a substantial portion of your officers based only on the
>engineering skills, the median level in the other two areas is
>bound to suffer. If it were me, I'd pick based on all three, and
>I would go out on a limb and say I'd be willing to accept a lot
>of candidates who were adequate engineers (rather than being
>superb) if they also showed potential as adequate leaders
>and adequate tacticians. You're going to find very few people
>who are superb in all three areas, and you have to pick the
>candidates who present the best mix of the three.
Not really any argument here, but again how do you pick the tactical
experts of the bunch? The leaders? In fact even the engineers?
>Right, and I understand that. But I think it would be difficult to
>argue that the Tigerfish is comparable to the Mark 48 -- otherwise,
>I don't think we'd have seen the Spearfish as soon as we did. I
>can't help but think that this must have given U.S. subs some
>advantage in many situations -- how much, and how well the USN
>used this advantage (if indeed it was even reflected in the
>engagement proceedures) I'll gladly conceed I don't know.
It did and still does, but an area which should probably be
dropped from the discussion. Not because I can’t argue it,
but because I can’t argue it here < wink, wink, nod, nod >.
>Well tactics and leadership can be taught, but so can engineering.
>I've done a lot of work with organizations, and a lot of wargaming,
>and I can assure you that some people pick up on both leadership
>and tactics faster than others, just as some pick up on engineering
>faster than others. In all three areas, it's going to be a combination
>of genetics, pre-USN education, and training in the USN, and IMHO
>you need both the best material and the best training to get the
>best officers.
No argument.
>Scott Orr
Scope's under...
Tim McFeely
ex-TM2(SS)...a dying breed
tim...@usa.net
ad...@osfn.rhilinet.gov
###
==========================================================================
Scott D. Orr
>
>Well the interview with the board is only about 1 hour out of the 48.
Other
>elements include academic and psychometric tests, leadership tasks of
the "get
>across that pretend bottomless pit" variety, and similar theoretical
exercises
>involving hurricanes pregnant women having babies, lost scuba divers,
set on
>islands with no electricity, the aim is not necessarily t be correct,
(there
>very often is no correct solution) but to check out your decision
making
>abilities....
>
abilities you're looking for.
This may sound loopy, but is it anything like the RAF's pilot
recruitment tests? I ask because I remember seeing some footage
of those in the first episode of that series the BBC did on
pilot training a few years ago.
Scott Orr
Scott D. Orr
>
>Scott Orr wrote eloquently:
>
>The only officer on a sub that is expressly forbidden to qualify
>OOD is the supply officer (non-line officer). Everyone else is
expected
>to become OOD (surface and submerged) qualified. If I read your
statements
>correctly, you suggest that tacticians are placed up front and
engineers
>aft and ‘never the twain shall meet’. Except of course if there is a
capable
>tactician aft, who would like to go forward. If, as I said, I
understand
>you reasoning, then which group does the CO come from?
>
specialists to perform a particular task (as the RN have done with
their engineers), then let them be specialists. However, I personally
see no reason why someone on the "command track" shouldn't have
experience in _all_ the jobs on the boat; I made the statement about
specialists in case anyone were to assert that service as an engineer
requires greater training than service in the other divisions.
As a matter of fact, even the Brits require a potential CO to attend
a nuclear power course prior to taking command of a sub. IF it is in
fact the case that engineering is "special", requiring more training
than other jobs, I would rather have potential commanders well-trained
in most of the aspects of the boat's operation, to the exclusion of
that one job (a short-coming remedied by later training in the
case of the RN), than to have potential commanders particularly well-
trained in that one job, to the detriment of training on the remaining
aspects of the boat's operation.
>Unless, like me, these
>non-military types work for a O-7 that backs them, it is seldom that
>operational considerations are based on non-military suggestions. As
>an aside R&D is a totally different story.
>
Just curious, but what do you mean by that last bit? Are you referring
to the Byzantine machinations of the procurement process, or to
something else?
>>Absolutely not. However, I spent the five years of my undergraduate
>>education surrounded by thousands of engineers at Georgia Tech; in
>>fact, I started out in aerospace engineering. I do have some ideas
>>about how the average engineer thinks, and I know (in general) how a
>>military commander needs to be able to think, and the disparity
>>between the two worries me.
>
>What is the disparity?
>
As I think I've said before, engineers are trained to take known
principles and apply them to solving well-specified problems.
Engineering training places an emphasis on precise calculation and
caution, and in fact most engineering disciplines teach "overbuilding"
as a design principle -- that is, they teach that any system should
be designed so that failure is almost impossible.
While these traits are admirably suited to designing technology, they
aren't particularly well-suited for an officer in combat. In combat,
the problems may not be well-specified, and more importantly the many
known principles a commander has to work with (in terms of his
equipment) intermixed with a great many unknowns and unknowables,
including enemy locations and intentions and the element of blind
luck. Finally, I think engineering's emphasis on certainty places
engineers at a disadvantage in combat: "war is the province of
uncertainty," and conduction a successful military operation usually
involved the evaluation of a number imperfect plans to determine
which has the best probability of success (at the least probable
cost). I realize that these are generalizations and the that line
is not as bright as I might make it sound here, but I believe that
the line is there nonetheless.
As an additional note, I've also obsevered that engineering and related
disciplines tend to attract (or possibly create) individuals who would
rather deal with the certainties of machines rather than the uncertain-
ties of human beings. I've known a quite a few engineers who seem to
believe that people can _automatically_ be expected to behave with the
consistency of machinery, and this of course isn't a very realistic
viewpoint for a leader of men. Of course, such a view can be
unlearned, but that takes time, and success is never certain.
>The ‘one system’ makes everything else work. Without it, you ain’t
>got nothing else.
Well, that's true, but it's equally true of the hull and (from the
perspective of combat operations, which after all the sub's raison
d'etre) of the sonar and weapons. A submarine is made up a of set
of interdependent systems, each of which ultimately relies on all
of the others for its continued function.
>I will add (somewhat to the detriment of my argument)
>that nub ensigns come to the boat with a terrible mindset concerning
the
>teakettle. It is, in their opinion, the only reasons submarines exist.
That
>usually ends when they approach a ‘coner’ (non-nuke enlisted) for a
signature
>on their qual card. Somehow they quickly understand that their life no
longer
>revolves around RCP’s, the main seawater system, etc. ;-)
>
As you imply, this is a mindset that is quickly unlearned (at least to
an extent). However, why spend a year drilling in an attitude that's
going to be dispelled in the first two weeks at sea? That's a waste
of money and of training time.
>There is a very subtle (mostly) relationship between the officers and
crew
>on a submarine. Non-quals (both officers and enlisted) are treated
like
>dirt, when it comes to them suggesting something. A non-qual officer
>that orders someone to do something that is considered unreasonable,
by
>the orderee, is usually told to come back when he is qualified. I
guess my
>point is that learning about the men under his command is important,
but
>it just doesn’t happen until the officer demonstrates his ability to
lead.
>
Obviously. But by the same token, learning about the power plant
doesn't take place till nuclear power school: in either case, it
makes sense to select officers who are going to show exceptional
ability to learn in the area of interest.
>Not really any argument here, but again how do you pick the tactical
>experts of the bunch? The leaders? In fact even the engineers?
>
Well, we seem to have no problems picking engineers: the NUPOC
program, for example, seeks to recruit college students with high
GPA's in mechanical engineering, nuclear engineering, physics, and
related disciplines. The British, by contrast, actually have a
whole series of tests for picking people with (among other things)
ledership and decision-making potential (see the responses to my
request for information on the RN's selection process). Given that
such procedures exist, why shouldn't the USN make use of them?
Scott Orr
Paul Jonathan Adam
> : > Neither has anyone else's, brighteyes. Let's hear your basis for the
> : > claim that other selection and training processes are better. You are
> : > throwing around opinions as if they were facts.
>
> : Ask Captain Hector Bonzo, former CO of the General Belgrano, to pick
> : that small nit for you.
>
> years back. Do you really think the GB gave them much of a challenge?
> Certainly not enough to suit Scott--even an engineer could have handled
> that one...
Well, considering their surface fleet took no further part in the action
after Conqueror sank Belgrano (despite several SSNs lurking and hoping...)
then I'd say the RN submarines definitely challenged them.
One point where I agree strongly with Scott comes directly from that
incident: the captain, Commander Wredford-Brown, chose to use pre-World War II
straight-running steam torpedoes for the attack (partly for their greater
reliability than the then-trouble-plagued Mark 24, mostly for their much
larger warhead).
He closed to within 4,000 yards, fired four torpedoes, and immediately began
his evasion: what isn't widely reported is that the escorts threw a lot
of depth charges and several homing torpedoes at him while he was leaving,
all of which he successfully avoided.
Now, the Perishers course teaches all this as second nature and a candidate
weak in this area would never be allowed near a submarine. The RN bases its
selection criteria on "who is the best tactician?" The perception we have of
the US Navy is that commanders are chosen largely on their ability to
personally supervise the reactor compartment, learning tactical skills and
knowledge later. Would a US Navy candidate for command be expected to study
the trials history of the weapons on his boat, for instance?
Does it matter? For a captain with experience, I doubt it. A RN ex-Perisher
has had his nose rubbed in the engineering facts of life, a US Navy captain
has been through exercises and real life long enough to learn the tactical
detail his RN colleague knew when he took the boat out on Day One. The question
is, that learning period: what happens if an inexperienced captain is
confronted with a tactical problem whose answer he doesn't know?
The counter-argument, "what if the tactician-CO has an engineering problem?",
is answered in the same way "what if the commo gear/sonar/dive planes go
bad?" The specialist for that department handles it, keeping the CO advised:
the CO needs to know enough to realise what the failure implies, not how
to fix it personally. *Big* difference.
I don't know too much about USN officer selection so have kept fairly
quiet, but the debate seems to indicate a ratio of about 6:1 or more
of "nuclear engineering:rest of the boat" in terms of formal training
(rather than shipborne experience, which is as important or more so).
My gut feeling is that that's a badly skewed ratio and likely to give
you technocrats rather than leaders: but as I said, I don't know the
reality of the system, haven't met many RN sub skippers or AFAIK *any*
USN drivers... so please don't attach too much weight to my words here.
Eric Gross
>He closed to within 4,000 yards, fired four torpedoes, and immediately began
>his evasion: what isn't widely reported is that the escorts threw a lot
>of depth charges and several homing torpedoes at him while he was leaving,
>all of which he successfully avoided.
Just an observation, but it was my understanding that the escort's return of
fire was blind.
Andy Spark
Judging by the low number of survivors, it would be reasonable to conclude that
the escorts ran away
Andy
Matt Clonfero
> Judging by the low number of survivors, it would be reasonable to conclude that
> the escorts ran away
... or that the escorts attempted to locate and sink Conqueror - after all,
if they had stopped to pick up liferafts etc then Conqueror could well have
sunk them too.
Aetherem Vincere
Matt.
--
===============================================================================
Matt Clonfero (ma...@aetherem.demon.co.uk) | To err is human,
My employer & I have a deal - they don't | To forgive is not Air Force Policy.
speak for me, and I don't speak for them. | -- Anon, ETPS
Scott D. Orr
>
>Look, I'm not trying to make low, devious suggestions here, and I'm
not
>criticizing in any way the British command selection process. It
works
>very well. But I have yet to see any evidence that the US way doesn't
>work equally well. Even Scott's point that it increases the selection
>pool isn't particularly significant, tho I'll certaily grant its
>validity.
>
What do you mean it's not significant? If you decrease the size of the
selection pool, and then pull the top candidates out of that pool, you
will, all other things being equal, get a lower average quality of
candidate than if you pull the top candidates out of the full-sized
pool. This is the same reason that A high schools don't play AAAA high
schools in football games.
This, of course, assumes that being a good sub driver has something to
do with innate or prior ability, and not just training, but that's not
a very difficult assumption to support. After all, would the Navy pick
its engineers without any regard to their ability to pass Nuclear Power
School?
Scott Orr
Peter Skelton
>
>In article <egross.216...@mailer.fsu.edu>, egr...@mailer.fsu.edu (Eric Gross) writes:
>>
>>>He closed to within 4,000 yards, fired four torpedoes, and immediately began
>>>his evasion: what isn't widely reported is that the escorts threw a lot
>>>of depth charges and several homing torpedoes at him while he was leaving,
>>>all of which he successfully avoided.
>>
>> Just an observation, but it was my understanding that the escort's return of
>> fire was blind.
>
>
>the escorts ran away
>
>
Could be but check the water temperature and unprotected survival times,
I doubt the Argentine navy has good survival gear or much expertise in
using it.
Jeff Crowell
: >In <DF7oJ...@boi.hp.com> jc...@boi.hp.com (Jeff Crowell) writes:
: >But I have yet to see any evidence that the US way doesn't
: >work equally well. Even Scott's point that it increases the selection
: >pool isn't particularly significant, tho I'll certaily grant its
: >validity.
: Scott D. Orr (sd...@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
: What do you mean it's not significant? If you decrease the size of the
: selection pool, and then pull the top candidates out of that pool, you
: will, all other things being equal, get a lower average quality of
: candidate than if you pull the top candidates out of the full-sized
: pool.
First you have to convince me that there's something different (in
terms of tactical ability) about the people you want to add to the
selection pool. You're fighting on the 'damn lies' side of statistics,
here. Increasing the size of the candidate pool could just as easily
have the opposite effect on the average.
You've been firing this 'larger selection pool' argument in all
directions like a gun. Why are you so sure people who can't handle
nuke school are better tacticians? Got something against engineers?
(not that it takes an engineering degree to pass nuke school)
Jeff
--
###################################################################
# #
# Jeff Crowell | | #
# jc...@hpdmd48.boi.hp.com | _ | #
# _________|__( )__|_________ #
# DMD Process Engineer x/ _| |( . )| |_ \x #
# (208) 396-6525 x |_| ---*|_| x #
# O x x O #
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###################################################################
Try to look unimportant. They may be low on ammo.
Murphy's Laws of Combat
Andy Edgson
>
> Judging by the low number of survivors, it would be reasonable to
> conclude that
> the escorts ran away
>
879 crew survived the sinking and were picked up after 24 hours in life
rafts. Most of the 321 casualties died in the initial explosion.
--
Andy Edgson
Scott D. Orr
1. You have a pool of size X.
2. From that pool, you must pick Y individuals to promote as
commanders.
3. If you use the best selection procedures possible, you will pick
a group of Y individuals that closely (though of course not
perfectly) matches the Y individuals in pool X that are best at the
trait you're looking for (which, in this case, is the ability to be a
good CO). Let us call this group of Y individuals, Group A. Group A
is, by definition, the best group of CO's that can be selected. (This
essentialy what the RN does, with the exception that officers actually
go through two "selection procedures" -- the initial screening, and
then performance evaluation on the job; however, both of these
procedures are designed to test for the same trait [ability to be a
good CO] and can therefore be thought of, conceptually, as one long
selection procedure].)
4. Let us suppose that, before applying the selection procedures for
the desired trait (ability to be a good CO), you first select some sub-
pool based on some other trait (in this case, the ability to be a
nuclear engineer), in effect discarding the rest of the pool; let us
call this new sub-pool Group Z. You then apply the selection
procedures in (3) to Group Z to select a group of Y indivdiduals, which
we will call Group B. Assuming, of course, that Group A and Group B
get the same training (i.e., differences are solely due to prior
ability), one of five things will happen:
a. If the procedures for selecting for the first trait (nuclear
engineer) are correlated _perfectly_ with the procedures used to
select for the second trait (good CO), Group B will be identical to
Group A. This is the best result possible.
b. If the procedures for selecting for the first trait (nuclear
engineer) are not correlated at all with the procedures used to select
for the second trait (good CO), a number of individuals in Group A
equal to, on average, [(# in Group Z)/X] x (# in Group A) will be
excluded before the selection for Group B, and therefore Group B will,
of necessity, be inferior to Group A. This example is analogous to
the comparis between A and AAAA high schools (as area of residence
typically has no correlation with the ability to play football).
c. If the procedures for selecting for the first trait (nuclear
engineer) are correlated perfectly and negatively (that is, the highest
scorer on the test for the first trait is the lowest score on the test
for the second trait, and so on) with the procedures used to select for
the second trait (good CO), a number of individuals in Group A equal to
the smaller of [X - (# in Group Z)] and (# in Group A), A will be
excluded before the selection for Group B, and therefore Group B will,
of necessity, be markedly inferior to Group A, and may well include NO
members of Group A, if the number excluded from Group Z is equal to or
greater than the number of individuals in Group A. This is the worst
result possible.
d. If the procedures for selecting for the first trait (nuclear
engineer) are correlated _imperfectly_ with the procedures used to
select for the second trait (good CO), a number of individuals in Group
A equal to, on average, a number between 0 and the number cited in case
"b" (above), will be excluded before the selection for Group B, and
therefore Group B will be inferior to Group A, though less inferior
than in case "b". As I suspect there _may_ be some correlation between
the ability to be a nuclear engineer and the ability to be a good CO
(though likely not a strong one), I feel that this case is probably
most representative of submarine officer selection in the USN.
e. If the procedures for selectiong for the first trait (nuclear
engineer) are correlated imperfectly and negatively with the procedures
used to select for the second trait (good CO), a number individuals in
Group equal to, on average, a number between the number cited in case
"c" (above) and the number cited in case "b" above, will be excluded
before the selection for Group B, and therefore Group B will be
inferior to Group A -- more inferior than in case "b", but less
inferior than in case "c". If for some reason those individuals who
make good nuclear engineers actualy tend to make bad CO's, this would
be representative of submarine officer selection in the USN; however,
I personally don't think such is the case.
In other words, unless the procedures the USN uses to select the
best nuclear engineers (which is how the USN selects its submarine
officers) ALSO happen to be, by some form of dumb luck, the best
proceedures to select the best CO's, the USN's selection proceedures
will, by necessity, exclude of of the best candidates BEFORE candidates
are screened (on the job) for CO. And I really doubt that the
procedures used to select engineers are going to be the same as the
best procedures to select CO's -- for that to be true, the ability
to be a good engineer and the ability to be a good CO would have to
be almost _perfectly_ correlated; anything less you're not picking
the best people.
Sorry to be so long-winded, but the point seemed obvious to me, and if
it's not obvious to everyone, I figure it needs a full explication.
Scott Orr