[WW2] What if....Tirpitz had sortied with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen?
Barking Mad MKSheppard
the Hood, on a slow day, especially this site:
http://www.warships1.com/GERbb08_Bismarck_history.htm
and one on the HMS Hood,
I found it interesting that in the 1920s, the RN did tests on a mockup
of the HOOD and found that she was vunerable to plunging fire, and
suggested fixes, fixes that were never implemented.
Also, the Warships1.com site has this interesting blurb:
***************************
Operation Rheinübung was to consist of the newly completed battleship
Bismarck, the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with the heavy
cruiser Prinz Eugen under the command of Admiral Gunther Lütjens. In
previous operations the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were ordered not to
engage heavy units of the British Fleet. This resulted in the farcical retreat
of the two modern battlecruisers in the face of the old battleship Malaya,
and the sacking of Fleet Admiral Marschall for disobeying orders and having
the nerve to engage and sink the aircraft carrier Glorious and her two
escorting destroyers.
With Operation Rheinübung permission was granted for Bismarck to engage
any convoy escort while the battle cruisers and Prinz Eugen sank the convoy.
Such a force would also have had the necessary speed to escape from any
concentration of forces that the Admiralty would have been likely to deploy.
The only capital ships in the British fleet, capable of catching them, were the
three battlecruisers (Hood, Renown and Repulse) but these were all old ships
whereas the German vessels were modern.
Before the sailing date Scharnhorst's troublesome boilers needed a refit, reducing
the operational strength to Bismarck, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen.
On the 2nd April 1940, preparatory orders where issued for Gneisenau to rendezvous
with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in the Atlantic for a combined attack on allied shipping.
On 4th April 1940 a bomb landed next to No 8 dock were Gneisenau was berthed
without exploding. Gneisenau was moved to a mooring in the harbour. On the 6th April
she was attacked by Flying Officer Campbell who before he and his crew were killed,
managed to hit her with a torpedo which destroyed a propeller shaft, flooded two engine
rooms and put her out of action for six months.
Operation Rheinübung was now reduced to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Admiral Lütjens
favoured delaying the operation until Scharnhorst or Tirpitz was ready. Captain Topp in
the Tirpitz declared her fit for sailing, however Grand Admiral Raeder was not convinced
and the operation proceeded with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.
***********************
What if Raeder had been convinced that Tirpitz was ready, and sent her out along
with the Bismarck? Does the Bismarck have a chance to survive Operation Rheinübung?
--------------------------------------------------------------------
The real heroes of the EU are the poor TIE pilots who have been
shot down at the hands of KJA and his filthy bag-man, Stackpole.
- Ray Koons (Col. Falkenhorst)
Peter Skelton
Mad" MKSheppard) wrote:
>
>What if Raeder had been convinced that Tirpitz was ready, and sent her out along
>with the Bismarck? Does the Bismarck have a chance to survive Operation Rheinübung?
Probably, he nearly got away with it as it was. Tirpitz, on the
other hand, was not properly worked up (somewhat like PoW), and
stood less chance. The allies still show a profit, the Uboats
were slowed sown significantly as part of the action and that
probably cost more than the surface ships would get. Bismarck
alone was too expensive to pay for what she could catch, the two
together are worse.
The RN would go out and clean up the support ships (B was on the
way to tank up when Hood and PoW ambushed him) which would make
staying out any length of time impractical. Shore-based air
search limited the raiders to a small part of the Atlantic. ASV
radar at the time was not very good against submarines but would
not miss a battleship.
The RN still had two operating carriers, Ark Royal and
Victorious. The Germans would need very good luck to damage them
(a Ubaot might get lucky) and couldn't do much about their
shadowing and attacks. The RN's cruisers would have played a role
too.
They also have five fast capital ships - the BC's & 2 KGV's that
cruised at about the speed of B&T. Faster top speed is nice in a
chase but it doesn't help all that much against pursuit that can
cut the corners. Darymple-Hamilton only missed by 75 miles with
his 23 knot ship (using small values of knot).
I'd guess a short cruise for want of consumables, with some
exciting gunfights and losses to one side or the other, followed
by getting into Brest, followed by a Channel dash.
The day of the North Atlantic surface raider was over.
____
Peter Skelton
Hans-Joachim Zierke
"Barking Mad" MKSheppard schrieb:
> What if Raeder had been convinced that Tirpitz was ready, and sent her out along
> with the Bismarck? Does the Bismarck have a chance to survive Operation Rheinübung?
I do not understand your question. Without the very special torpedo hit,
there is no doubt that the Bismarck would have survived alone - she just
had to make it towards air cover. (This, however, does not mean that she
would have survived being target No. 1 of the RAF in Brest.)
Why do you think that the Tirpitz could change anything about that torpedo
hit? Fighting off the whole home fleet? You're kidding.
hajo
B F Lake
>
> I'd guess a short cruise for want of consumables, with some
> exciting gunfights and losses to one side or the other, followed
> by getting into Brest, followed by a Channel dash.
>
> The day of the North Atlantic surface raider was over.
Yes, but what about effect on say, Torch?
It seems the whole thing relates to the basic strategy problem the Brits had
in 1904ish--naval vs continental, where before they thought France and
Russia were the problem, all of a sudden Germany was. This was because if
the Germans overran France and got ports on the Atlantic, then the RN could
no longer bottle up the HSF because close blockade was no longer possible
because of the torpedo. (subs and TBs) Worse, they would have the whole
continental industrial capacity and the Brits would lose the BB race instead
of out-building just Germany as happened. so they went with ally to France
and committed to landing an army to help France keep the Germans from
getting to the Atlantic. It all happened in 1940, except there was no HSF.
Ok , so Raeder needed to get something going and if he could get the French
fleet he had the makings. Oran stopped that. Ok, so since this is what
if, suppose he did get two BBs into the Atlantic in 41 plus S & G and PE
etc. His wrong move was basing them in Brest where they could be bombed.
He should have picked say , Dakar and maybe also been smarter and maybe got
some French ships like the new R. Ok now he is in business. The Germans
can stop any Torch like moves from the US and things work a lot better for
them?
Regards,
Barry
Keith Willshaw
"B F Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message >
> Ok , so Raeder needed to get something going and if he could get the
French
> fleet he had the makings. Oran stopped that. Ok, so since this is what
> if, suppose he did get two BBs into the Atlantic in 41 plus S & G and PE
> etc. His wrong move was basing them in Brest where they could be bombed.
> He should have picked say , Dakar and maybe also been smarter and maybe
got
> some French ships like the new R. Ok now he is in business. The Germans
> can stop any Torch like moves from the US and things work a lot better for
> them?
>
Basing them at Dakar would not have worked
The problems of supply of munitions, oil and other
requirements would see to that. Without decent air cover
there's nothing to stop the RN raiding with aircraft
from carriers with impunity to say nothing of an
early attack on the colony from British West Africa.
In any event Vichy France was still nominally independent
and neutral.
Keith
B F Lake
> Basing them at Dakar would not have worked
>
> The problems of supply of munitions, oil and other
> requirements would see to that. Without decent air cover
> there's nothing to stop the RN raiding with aircraft
> from carriers with impunity to say nothing of an
> early attack on the colony from British West Africa.
>
> In any event Vichy France was still nominally independent
> and neutral.
Yes, but Rommel is sent west first instead of heading for Egypt to make this
half-ways co-ordinated instead of how those spastic Germans really operated
(thank goodness) . Now Gib isn't doing the Brits any good, the Med is
closed, now the Germans can go after Alex and mid-east oil. (the dumbers
went after this first and forgot to secure their backs from attack via Gib
(thank goodness).
France was such a mess, the Germans could have done anything they wanted
instead of making deals with Petain. The real Germans didn't have a Med
plan early on , but these ones here do!
These Germans here might even get their air force to work with their ships!
(unlike the Brits with all the 4 engine stuff away from coastal command <G>)
They might even use their subs in the coast defence role to help stop Brit
carriers from Taranto-ing Dakar and Casablanca. In fact, as a continental
power the Germans should be using their whole navy in the coastal defence
role (as with preventing Torch) with the advantage the RN cannot close
blockade them and meanwhile use more subs in the Battle of the Atlantic
instead of wasting them in the Med (now closed) They should finish all
this and take the Brits out of the war before attacking Russia too. Luckily
those degenerate slobs and weirdos running things didn't have a clue.
Regards,
Barry
Barking Mad MKSheppard
>Why do you think that the Tirpitz could change anything about that torpedo
>hit? Fighting off the whole home fleet? You're kidding.
It's a fuck lot better and more on-topic than the shit going down in this newsgroup.
Why are respected members of the NG (as I remember them) spending nearly all
of their time on those goddamn female bitch threads?!?!
christophe chazot
"B F Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message
> > Ok , so Raeder needed to get something going and if he could get the
> French
> > fleet he had the makings. Oran stopped that. Ok, so since this is
what
> > if, suppose he did get two BBs into the Atlantic in 41 plus S & G and PE
> > etc. His wrong move was basing them in Brest where they could be
bombed.
> > He should have picked say , Dakar and maybe also been smarter and maybe
> got
> > some French ships like the new R.
Any transfert of french warships to Germany was out of question in that time
(and later in the war).
This is the reason why the main fleet was based in Mers-el-Kebir near Oran,
to be out of range from the german ground forces.
After the british raid on Oran, the fleet moved back to Toulon, where it was
sizeable by the Germans. They attempted to size the fleet in Nov.42 but
everyone knows what happened - and that shows that giving the fleet to the
German was out of question.
Mers-el-Kebir was the only major navy yard in French North Africa (with
Byzerte, Tunisia, as a secondary yard).
Algiers and Dakar had large harbors too, but they lacked shore facilities to
support a naval fleet (the french warships based in Dakar lacked almost
everything : fuel, ammo, spares, toolings). Basing the german heavy vessels
there wouldn't have been a good idea, IMHO.
Regards,
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote
> > Basing them at Dakar would not have worked
> >
> > The problems of supply of munitions, oil and other
> > requirements would see to that. Without decent air cover
> > there's nothing to stop the RN raiding with aircraft
> > from carriers with impunity to say nothing of an
> > early attack on the colony from British West Africa.
> >
> > In any event Vichy France was still nominally independent
> > and neutral.
>
> Yes, but Rommel is sent west first instead of heading for Egypt to make
this
> half-ways co-ordinated instead of how those spastic Germans really
operated
> (thank goodness) .
West of Germany is Britain, Ireland and the USA so I have no notion
what you mean by this.
> Now Gib isn't doing the Brits any good, the Med is
> closed, now the Germans can go after Alex and mid-east oil.
How does holding a mosquito infested equatorial swamp
on the West African coast help with capturing mid east oil ?
> (the dumbers
> went after this first and forgot to secure their backs from attack via Gib
> (thank goodness).
>
The attacks didnt come from Gib , they came from the
suez canal and Egypt
> France was such a mess, the Germans could have done anything they wanted
> instead of making deals with Petain. The real Germans didn't have a Med
> plan early on , but these ones here do!
>
> These Germans here might even get their air force to work with their
ships!
> (unlike the Brits with all the 4 engine stuff away from coastal command
<G>)
You arent going to get much mileage from He-110's if attacking
the Atlantic convoys is the aim.
> They might even use their subs in the coast defence role to help stop Brit
> carriers from Taranto-ing Dakar and Casablanca.
A scheme doomed to failure as was proven in the Channel
and North Sea in 1944.
> In fact, as a continental
> power the Germans should be using their whole navy in the coastal defence
> role (as with preventing Torch) with the advantage the RN cannot close
> blockade them and meanwhile use more subs in the Battle of the Atlantic
> instead of wasting them in the Med (now closed)
Trouble is you want to use them all to protect the anchorage
at Dakar.
> They should finish all
> this and take the Brits out of the war before attacking Russia too.
Luckily
> those degenerate slobs and weirdos running things didn't have a clue.
>
>
They couldnt do that and be Nazis
Keith
B F Lake
> > >
> > > In any event Vichy France was still nominally independent
> > > and neutral.
> >
> > Yes, but Rommel is sent west first instead of heading for Egypt to make
> this
> > half-ways co-ordinated instead of how those spastic Germans really
> operated
> > (thank goodness) .
>
> West of Germany is Britain, Ireland and the USA so I have no notion
> what you mean by this.
I mean he heads west in North Africa and Takes Casablanca so Gib is
neutralized, the Med is closed, the German Navy gets the French Med
dockyards to maintain their ships they can operate from Dakar or where ever
out of range of UK based bombers.
> How does holding a mosquito infested equatorial swamp
> on the West African coast help with capturing mid east oil ?
If you don't like these half-baked ideas , I have others!
>
> > (the dumbers
> > went after this first and forgot to secure their backs from attack via
Gib
> > (thank goodness).
> >
>
> The attacks didnt come from Gib , they came from the
> suez canal and Egypt
Gib kept Malta going which interfered with Rommel's supplies , so his back
wasn't covered. Torch came from that way too.
> You arent going to get much mileage from He-110's if attacking
> the Atlantic convoys is the aim.
Idea is that time Hitler stole a bunch of Doenitz's subs to go to the Med so
his Atlantic campaign fell apart just when it was starting to work ( should
bring a few disputing "corrections" ?) wouldn't have happened, because the
Germans already own the Med. So all the subs etc can get on with forcing
the Brits to quit (making Edward and Wallace the royal family etc--I read
that one!)
> > They might even use their subs in the coast defence role to help stop
Brit
> > carriers from Taranto-ing Dakar and Casablanca.
>
> A scheme doomed to failure as was proven in the Channel
> and North Sea in 1944.
Incorrect example as I understand it.
The whole point is that the UK itself bottles up the Germans in that area,
but the submarine as a coastal defence weapon meant that close blockade of
Atlantic French ports was no longer possible by ~1905 like it was 100 yrs
before, so the Brits had to go to an army strategy in 1905. So if subs used
to protect Atlantic ports where there is room to set up lines of defence and
all that, the carriers can't get in to do the Tarantoing. In the 44
situation the Germans were blocked off physically as usual in the North Sea
and by not having much forces left to get into the Western Approaches from
France either-which is an attack route not a coastal defence anyway.
> Trouble is you want to use them all to protect the anchorage
> at Dakar.
A mere stepping stone! The plan is to join up with Argentina and capture
Brazil to get some real coffee, which is what the Germans wanted most
1939-45! You just don't understand this high strategy stuff.
Regards,
Barry
Matt Clonfero
Willshaw <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>> Ok , so Raeder needed to get something going and if he could get the
>French
>> fleet he had the makings. Oran stopped that. Ok, so since this is what
>> if, suppose he did get two BBs into the Atlantic in 41 plus S & G and PE
>> etc. His wrong move was basing them in Brest where they could be bombed.
>> He should have picked say , Dakar and maybe also been smarter and maybe
>got
>> some French ships like the new R. Ok now he is in business. The Germans
>> can stop any Torch like moves from the US and things work a lot better for
>> them?
>>
>
>Basing them at Dakar would not have worked
>
>The problems of supply of munitions, oil and other
>requirements would see to that. Without decent air cover
>there's nothing to stop the RN raiding with aircraft
>from carriers with impunity to say nothing of an
>early attack on the colony from British West Africa.
Also, it would have been easier to lay minefields outside Dakar than
Brest...
Aetherem Vincere
Matt
--
To err is human
To forgive is not
Air Force Policy
Hans-Joachim Zierke
"Barking Mad" MKSheppard schrieb:
> It's a fuck lot better and more on-topic than the shit going down in this newsgroup.
Try killfiling based on the Xref: header. (The newsgroups header isn't in
the .overview of most servers, and therefore, makes your newsreader crawl
if you use it for the killfile).
hajo
David E. Powell
True, but if B had made port, it would have been a thorn in the side
of the Allies, like Tirpitz was. Also, at the time B sailed, the RN
couldn't have known how things would turn out down the road, it was
still crunch time for them....
>
> Peter Skelton
Maybe it was more fitting for Bismarck to go into history at the guns
of an enemy battleforce, rather than be bombed like the Tirpitz....
DEP
Jörg Bihlmayr
Peter Skelton wrote:
> On Sat, 05 Jan 2002 13:27:32 GMT, ryan...@erols.com ("Barking
> Mad" MKSheppard) wrote:
>
>
>
>>What if Raeder had been convinced that Tirpitz was ready, and sent her out along
>>with the Bismarck? Does the Bismarck have a chance to survive Operation Rheinübung?
>>
<schnipp>
> The RN still had two operating carriers, Ark Royal and
> Victorious. The Germans would need very good luck to damage them
> (a Ubaot might get lucky)
During Rheinübung a german sub even had Ark Royal in its periscope and
was on shooting range. The problem was, that the sub was on the way
home, with not a single Torp left...
Jörg
> and couldn't do much about their
> shadowing and attacks. The RN's cruisers would have played a role
> too.
>
<schnipp>
Ken & Laura Chaddock
What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
and a couple of destroyers ?
...Ken
Andrew Toppan
<chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote:
> Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
>one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
By the time all those could have been complete and operational, RN would not
have been alone. I would not give the Germans good odds against a
USN-supported carrier force.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/
Peter Skelton
<chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote:
The converted Scharnhorsts were going to suck. They were already
overweight, especially forward, the 15" turrets came in
overweight. They were probably better off with the 11", it was a
good enough mount to handle anything they shouldn't run from.
A universe that has that stuff ready, also might have the 5 KGV's
done together with the Hood and QE conversions. The RN would have
at least three modern fleet carriers (the Ark, lusty &
victorious), the three old fast ones and Eagle.
The odds favour the RN. The you look at the map and notice the
geography. Geography is not nice to German sea-power.
____
Peter Skelton
Keith Willshaw
"Ken & Laura Chaddock" <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote in message
news:3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca...
> To expand this basic thread...
>
> What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
> of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
> conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
They'd have met the RN Fast Carriers equipped with Hellcats,
Corsairs and Avengers escorted by the KGV's and Queens .
I wouldnt give a German force with a handful of Me-109's
and JU-87's much in the way of a chance.
> Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
> one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
> twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
> and a couple of destroyers ?
>
Yes given the Ilustrious and Implacable Class carriers
Keith
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
Probably not an issue, as Germany would have needed to have ramped
right back on army and air force to build that fleet, with the result
that someone else (probably the Soviets) would be parking their
tanks in Berlin before the ships completed.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
>On Wed, 09 Jan 2002 22:24:41 -0400, Ken & Laura Chaddock
><chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote:
>
>>To expand this basic thread...
>>
>> What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
>>of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
>>conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
>> Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
>>one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
>>twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
>>and a couple of destroyers ?
>
>The converted Scharnhorsts were going to suck. They were already
>overweight, especially forward, the 15" turrets came in
>overweight. They were probably better off with the 11", it was a
>good enough mount to handle anything they shouldn't run from.
And the german destroyers, frankly, were pretty dire. They couldn't
keep up with the big ships at sea and their guns couldn't be fought
once the weather got iffy. As witness what happened to _Scharnhorst_
after her destroyers got lost off, to say nothing of the Glasgow/
Enterprise action..
>A universe that has that stuff ready, also might have the 5 KGV's
>done together with the Hood and QE conversions. The RN would have
>at least three modern fleet carriers (the Ark, lusty &
>victorious), the three old fast ones and Eagle.
I'd also be willing to bet that the Lions would be putting to sea
about the same time as _Tirpitz_, given that .uk would be free
to devote much more money to the navy (as germany would be putting
less money into tanks and aeroplanes).
The germans are also going to be at the bottom of the carrier-operation
learning curve. That wouldn't help.
>The odds favour the RN. The you look at the map and notice the
>geography. Geography is not nice to German sea-power.
Building a fleet was a mistake for germany. Twice.
Iain Rae
> In article <3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca>,
> Ken & Laura Chaddock <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote:
>
>>To expand this basic thread...
>>
>> What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
>>of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
>>conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
>> Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
>>one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
>>twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
>>and a couple of destroyers ?
>>
>
> Probably not an issue, as Germany would have needed to have ramped
> right back on army and air force to build that fleet, with the result
> that someone else (probably the Soviets) would be parking their
> tanks in Berlin before the ships completed.
>
>
Maybe not, presumably that kind of Germany would have had it's eyes on
Britain's overseas possessions rather than expanding East. So with the
Ribbentrop pact with Stalin covering the Eastern border Hitler might
have had a better chance of winning something.
But if Hitler was pushing that much of a Navy you wonder if we and the
Americans would hold to the battleship limits and the KGV's might have
come out better ships for it (yes I know the timing's probably all wrong
but the latter class ships might have come out as 12 14" and better
speed/endurance)
Keith Willshaw
"Iain Rae" <ia...@dcs.ed.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:3C3D6F2E...@dcs.ed.ac.uk...
> ANDREW ROBERT BREEN wrote:
>
> > In article <3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca>,
> > Ken & Laura Chaddock <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote:
> >
> >>To expand this basic thread...
> >>
> >> What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
> >>of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
> >>conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
> >> Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
> >>one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
> >>twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
> >>and a couple of destroyers ?
> >>
> >
> > Probably not an issue, as Germany would have needed to have ramped
> > right back on army and air force to build that fleet, with the result
> > that someone else (probably the Soviets) would be parking their
> > tanks in Berlin before the ships completed.
> >
> >
>
> Maybe not, presumably that kind of Germany would have had it's eyes on
> Britain's overseas possessions rather than expanding East. So with the
> Ribbentrop pact with Stalin covering the Eastern border Hitler might
> have had a better chance of winning something.
>
I doubt the Soviets would have honored the pact for
very long. It was a mechanism designed to win time
while Stalin rebuilt the army. By 1943 its likely that
a requipped and retrained Red Army would have come pouring
across that border.
>
> But if Hitler was pushing that much of a Navy you wonder if we and the
> Americans would hold to the battleship limits and the KGV's might have
> come out better ships for it (yes I know the timing's probably all wrong
> but the latter class ships might have come out as 12 14" and better
> speed/endurance)
>
The likleihood is that in this scemario the Lions would have been
built. The first 2 were laid down in 1939.
Keith
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
wrote:
> A universe that has that stuff ready, also might have the 5 KGV's
> done together with the Hood and QE conversions.
It could also have had one or more Vanguards. The RS class would have
had to have been scrapped to stay in treaty limits and it is likely
the turrets would have been kept. Given enough priority Vanguard could
have been completed in two years, which was of course the whole point
of the design.
By the way your point on S and G. No detailed work had been done on
this conversion prior to the decision to regun G while battle damage
was repaired. When this was actually started it was found that the
forecastle would have to be rebuilt, not only to increase buoyancy
forward but also to increase blast and recoil resistance.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
Peter Skelton
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>In article <3c3d05ac.461486@news>, skel...@cogeco.ca (Peter Skelton)
>wrote:
>
>> A universe that has that stuff ready, also might have the 5 KGV's
>> done together with the Hood and QE conversions.
>
> It could also have had one or more Vanguards. The RS class would have
>had to have been scrapped to stay in treaty limits and it is likely
>the turrets would have been kept. Given enough priority Vanguard could
>have been completed in two years, which was of course the whole point
>of the design.
I don't think Vnaguards would be built, unless ships were needed
before the turrets for the Lions would be ready. The turrets for
the R's would not be released until completion of the KGV's which
would probably have been too late.
In any event, the treaty was repudiated in 1937, wasn't it?
(whoever posted Lions complete at the same time as Tirpitz was
not thinking of this universe, T & PoW were at roughly the same
state of readiness in May '41)
> By the way your point on S and G. No detailed work had been done on
>this conversion prior to the decision to regun G while battle damage
>was repaired. When this was actually started it was found that the
>forecastle would have to be rebuilt, not only to increase buoyancy
>forward but also to increase blast and recoil resistance.
Yup
____
Peter Skelton
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
>On Thu, 10 Jan 2002 12:10:31 +0000 (UTC),
>ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:
>
>>In article <3c3d05ac.461486@news>, skel...@cogeco.ca (Peter Skelton)
>>wrote:
>>
>>> A universe that has that stuff ready, also might have the 5 KGV's
>>> done together with the Hood and QE conversions.
All 5 KGVs, all 5 QEs fully modernised maybe, Hood, Refit and Repair
all modernised, plus Vanguard (though maybe to her original light-
battleship plan?) and perhaps Rodnol and Nelsol re-engined for 25-26
knots and with better AA. Ouch.
>I don't think Vnaguards would be built, unless ships were needed
>before the turrets for the Lions would be ready. The turrets for
>the R's would not be released until completion of the KGV's which
>would probably have been too late.
Suspect the Rs would have been paying off regardless - the more
time went on the more like a bad proposition they would look (the
C-cruisers would probably have gone for the same reasons, though
the D-conversions with 4x2x4.5" BD would probably still be around
as fleet AA cruisers).
>(whoever posted Lions complete at the same time as Tirpitz was
>not thinking of this universe, T & PoW were at roughly the same
>state of readiness in May '41)
That was me, and I must have been thinking of them completing at
around the same time as any plausible 15" conversion of Salmon
and Gluckstein, given that those conversions would have amounted
to building a new 1/3 ship for each of them[1]. Mea Culpa, anyway.
[1] Which is difficult, especially if you have to design it as
you go along.
Hans-Joachim Zierke
Ken & Laura Chaddock schrieb:
> What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
> of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
> conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
That does not qualify for pro-Navy. Hitler was asked by Raeder, when the
Navy needed to be ready, and was lied at. Telling the truth would have been
pro-Navy, but then, it won't have been Hitler.
In that case, Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser won't
have existed at all, because even the German Navy of 193x did not believe
in white elephants.
hajo
Matt Clonfero
Yes, perhaps... The German Navy was short on Destroyers, especially
after Norway. One way the RN could have handled this group would be
aggressive use of submarines. Also, building the two carriers, upgrading
the BCs, and manning them all is going to put a dent somewhere -
probably either in the Luftwaffe or in other German Naval arms (like
submarines). Neither is good news for Germany.
Jörg Bihlmayr
Matt Clonfero wrote:
> In article <3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca>, Ken & Laura Chaddock
> <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote:
> >To expand this basic thread...
> >
> > What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
> >of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
> >conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
> > Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
> >one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
> >twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
> >and a couple of destroyers ?
>
> Yes, perhaps... The German Navy was short on Destroyers, especially
> after Norway.
And these destroyers weren't really suited for high sea use. They were much
too short legged, the steam plants not always that reliable and their
seakeeping was bad. Especially the series with the 15 cm guns and the twin
mount on the bow.
Jörg
B F Lake
news:slrna3r8uo.1...@hersland.Zierke.com...
This is the key point in all this IMO. The truth is that if the Germans had
been on the ball, and sea-minded, they would have realized they didn't need
a sea-going navy at all! For some strange reason, the Germans did not
hoist in what the Brits did in 1905, that the whole world had gone upside
down on them, and the RN was no longer the primary defence of their little
island.
In 1905, the Brits went over to a continental, army first, policy from the
naval policy they had maintained for hundreds of years. They recognized
first that their safety depended on keeping an enemy army from the invasion
assembly area of the lowlands and also that close blockade of European ports
was no longer possible due to the torpedo in the hands of a coastal defence
navy of submarines and torpedo boats. The Brits needed to keep an enemy
from controlling the Atlantic ports and maintaining a "heartland " economy,
about which the RN could do nothing at all anymore. In WW1, this worked out
and both the RN and German fleet were fundamentally irrelevant to the
outcome. Between the wars, the Brits added air power to this by noting
their defence now also required keeping enemy airfields beyond bombing
range, so their saying that their defence line was now the Rhine which just
reinforced the big-army role on the continent to make sure the Germans
couldn't move west.
The Germans (ignoring those individuals who did but were ignored
themselves) missed seeing this whole structure, and just thought of the
"heartland" as being the grain basket to the east etc. Thus in WW2, when
the fall of France gave the Germans everything they needed that the Brits
were afraid of in 1905, they blew it completely, apparently not realizing
they had won the war if only they tidied up a bit. They did grab Norway
before the Brits/Franch in 1940, but forgot about the south side of their
"heartland" in an incredible display of dumbness , IMO, through not having
the slightest clue about the maritime aspect of the whole thing and what
their role as the continental power was. To complement taking Norway, they
also should have taken western North Africa and closed the "open door" past
Gibraltar. This would have prevented Torch and preserved the 1940 status
quo as long as they wanted.
If the Germans really felt it necessary to knock over the not so rotten
structure of the Soviet Union, they should have , as everyone says, taken
the Brits out of play first. By holding Casablanca, etc, they could have
made it just as nasty to take a convoy past there on the way around Africa
as they did past Norway. Without having to divert naval and air forces to
the Med in 1941, they could probably have won the Battle of the Atlantic in
1941, and (since they didn't waste their efforts on a big ship navy, being
aware in this version, of the maritime strategic situation, they would have
had enough subs plus those not diverted). So Edward and Wallace are back as
the Royal Family, have Petain over for dinner, Churchill is shot, etc, and
now the USA has the problem it most feared.
The USA in 1940 was sweating about the Germans getting the RN as well as
having the French and Italian Navies and sitting "over there" as an
unassailable continental power, much as themselves. Not sure why this
worried them so much, if they wanted to trade and "had a long spoon", but it
may have been worries over what the Germans might then have done in South
America. The Germans being sea-minded should realize they didn't need the
big ships now in their grasp though, and junked them. So no trouble with
the USA.
WW2, was the same as WW1 in that essentially, both the big-ship RN and
German navies were irrelevant, and it didn't matter how many BBs and CVs
either had. All any of them were good for was bashing each other and if
none had been there on the other's side, then they would have had nothing to
do, as indeed the RN big ships found out after the TIRPITZ was gone.
So - everyone agrees , right?
Regards,
Barry
Keith Willshaw
Huh ?
The British forces in 1914 were as far from being continental
army based as it was possible to be. The army was a small
professional force entirely unlike the large conscript armies
of the continent. The Kaiser called the BEF that contemptible
little army as you may recall.
The Royal Navy was central to British Strategy which was
to blockade Germany in the same way Napoleonic
France had been blockaded. The Germans assumed this
meant a close blockade as had been practised in the past
and intended to use the High Seas Fleet to defeat blockading
forces in detail.
In reality the British used a distant blockade strategy and
used the Grand Fleet to contain the High Seas Fleet.
It was this blockade that ultimately caused the German
internal collapse in 1918.
> The Germans (ignoring those individuals who did but were ignored
> themselves) missed seeing this whole structure, and just thought of the
> "heartland" as being the grain basket to the east etc. Thus in WW2, when
> the fall of France gave the Germans everything they needed that the Brits
> were afraid of in 1905, they blew it completely, apparently not realizing
> they had won the war if only they tidied up a bit. They did grab Norway
> before the Brits/Franch in 1940, but forgot about the south side of their
> "heartland" in an incredible display of dumbness , IMO, through not having
> the slightest clue about the maritime aspect of the whole thing and what
> their role as the continental power was. To complement taking Norway,
they
> also should have taken western North Africa and closed the "open door"
past
> Gibraltar. This would have prevented Torch and preserved the 1940 status
> quo as long as they wanted.
>
They didnt 'forget' about anything. Britain was NOT the intended
adversary in 1940, Russia was. Even during the planning for
Sealion Hitler admitted that he didnt want war with Britain and
intended to move on Russia
> If the Germans really felt it necessary to knock over the not so rotten
> structure of the Soviet Union, they should have , as everyone says, taken
> the Brits out of play first. By holding Casablanca, etc, they could have
> made it just as nasty to take a convoy past there on the way around Africa
> as they did past Norway.
How would they take and hold Casablanca without the Naval force
to invade and resupply it ?
Hell they couldnt even resupply the forces in Libya where
they had total air superiority and far shorter sea lines of
communication.
> Without having to divert naval and air forces to
> the Med in 1941, they could probably have won the Battle of the Atlantic
in
> 1941,
Not a hope in hell, they had nothing like enough U-Boats
in operation
> and (since they didn't waste their efforts on a big ship navy, being
> aware in this version, of the maritime strategic situation, they would
have
> had enough subs plus those not diverted). So Edward and Wallace are back
as
> the Royal Family, have Petain over for dinner, Churchill is shot, etc, and
> now the USA has the problem it most feared.
>
How do you invade another continent with no navy ?
> The USA in 1940 was sweating about the Germans getting the RN as well as
> having the French and Italian Navies and sitting "over there" as an
> unassailable continental power, much as themselves. Not sure why this
> worried them so much, if they wanted to trade and "had a long spoon", but
it
> may have been worries over what the Germans might then have done in South
> America. The Germans being sea-minded should realize they didn't need
the
> big ships now in their grasp though, and junked them. So no trouble with
> the USA.
>
That doesnt follow at all. If Germany was invading large
swathes of supposedly neutral Africa the Americans would
be even more concerned.
> WW2, was the same as WW1 in that essentially, both the big-ship RN and
> German navies were irrelevant, and it didn't matter how many BBs and CVs
> either had. All any of them were good for was bashing each other and if
> none had been there on the other's side, then they would have had nothing
to
> do, as indeed the RN big ships found out after the TIRPITZ was gone.
>
> So - everyone agrees , right?
>
I totally disagree. The blockade in WW1 was essential to Allied
victory, the Germans best hope of beating France may well have been
to not build a surface fleet and use the resources to equip more
divisions but they still could not have defeated the Naval blockade.
As for WW2 while its certainly true that the BB's were rather
less important after the German Surface fleet was defeated a
large naval force was definitely required for the amphibious
operations in the Med and Normandy
Keith
Paul J. Adam
Willshaw <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> writes
>In reality the British used a distant blockade strategy and
>used the Grand Fleet to contain the High Seas Fleet.
>
>It was this blockade that ultimately caused the German
>internal collapse in 1918.
A combination of the shortages caused by blockade, the failure of the
1918 spring offensive, and the clear evidence that with the US now in
the war against them that Germany couldn't win on land. (I remember
propaganda leaflets warning the Germans that another US soldier was
arriving in France every eight seconds...)
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Paul J. Adam
<nos...@nospam.com> writes
>In 1905, the Brits went over to a continental, army first, policy from the
>naval policy they had maintained for hundreds of years.
Um, no...
Hence the dreadnought building race of that period.
>They recognized
>first that their safety depended on keeping an enemy army from the invasion
>assembly area of the lowlands and also that close blockade of European ports
>was no longer possible due to the torpedo in the hands of a coastal defence
>navy of submarines and torpedo boats.
No and yes. We couldn't put enough troops across the Channel to stop all
enemies. Nor could we maintain close blockade. But we *could* devastate
any attempt at invasion.
>In WW1, this worked out
>and both the RN and German fleet were fundamentally irrelevant to the
>outcome.
You might want to research how much heartache the British blockade
caused the Germans.
>The Germans (ignoring those individuals who did but were ignored
>themselves) missed seeing this whole structure, and just thought of the
>"heartland" as being the grain basket to the east etc. Thus in WW2, when
>the fall of France gave the Germans everything they needed that the Brits
>were afraid of in 1905, they blew it completely, apparently not realizing
>they had won the war if only they tidied up a bit.
Not with Britain to the west and the USSR to the east, nowhere near.
>To complement taking Norway, they
>also should have taken western North Africa and closed the "open door" past
>Gibraltar.
Firstly... how?
Secondly, the door was never that open - most of the supplies for the
Middle East and North Africa came via Suez.
>If the Germans really felt it necessary to knock over the not so rotten
>structure of the Soviet Union, they should have , as everyone says, taken
>the Brits out of play first. By holding Casablanca, etc, they could have
>made it just as nasty to take a convoy past there on the way around Africa
>as they did past Norway.
Not at that point in the war - they didn't have the resources.
>Without having to divert naval and air forces to
>the Med in 1941, they could probably have won the Battle of the Atlantic in
>1941,
Again, with what? They were still ramping up then.
>WW2, was the same as WW1 in that essentially, both the big-ship RN and
>German navies were irrelevant, and it didn't matter how many BBs and CVs
>either had.
The RN controlled the seas, the Kriegsmarine accepted that and stayed
home... this argument is like saying that the Gulf War and Allied Force
prove that there's no need for fighter aircraft :)
>All any of them were good for was bashing each other and if
>none had been there on the other's side, then they would have had nothing to
>do, as indeed the RN big ships found out after the TIRPITZ was gone.
The battleships, yes - but the carriers, cruisers and especially the
destroyers had plenty of occupation.
Glenn Dowdy
"Paul J. Adam" <ne...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:oiekOnlb...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk...
> In article <1010692953.20137....@news.demon.co.uk>, Keith
> Willshaw <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> writes
> >In reality the British used a distant blockade strategy and
> >used the Grand Fleet to contain the High Seas Fleet.
> >
> >It was this blockade that ultimately caused the German
> >internal collapse in 1918.
>
> A combination of the shortages caused by blockade, the failure of the
> 1918 spring offensive, and the clear evidence that with the US now in
> the war against them that Germany couldn't win on land. (I remember
> propaganda leaflets warning the Germans that another US soldier was
> arriving in France every eight seconds...)
>
Glenn D.
B F Lake
> army based as it was possible to be. The army was a small
> professional force entirely unlike the large conscript armies
> of the continent. The Kaiser called the BEF that contemptible
> little army as you may recall.
Yes, the 1905 decision to make the army primary over the navy was a sudden
shock and came at a bad time. The army was still trying to get modern after
the screwed up Boer War revelations, and was still tiny. Conscription for
army service was not implimented due to tradition plus the whole society
was in flux with social spending demands and reforms making defence spending
difficult, especially with the BB race going on. The Admiratly fought the
army -first policy tooth and nail , and there were many divisions of opinion
between navalists, who persisted in thinking the old ways would still work
and continentalists who were converted by the reality of the new situation.
It happened too fast for consensus but the main thing is the committee for
Imperial defence converted and got the key government people to see it.
Some army progress had been made by 1914, but no where near enough.
>
> The Royal Navy was central to British Strategy which was
> to blockade Germany in the same way Napoleonic
> France had been blockaded.
This changed fundamentally after 1900 when the admiralty admitted it could
not close blockade anymore. The UK strategy then was to use the UK itself
to block the North Sea and close the north exit and the Dover exit. If the
Germans had French ports then they were out of the trap and the Brits were
screwed, and only the French army was in place to save the UK from this
situation, and the Brits weren't too sure that was sufficient, so they had
to put an army on the continent and make sure the French held. Worked in
1914, didn't in 1940.
> It was this blockade that ultimately caused the German
> internal collapse in 1918.
There are studies which "prove" this was not really the case. In these, most
of the food shortage was from the Germans having their farm workers in army
uniform in France. Navalists' studies of course show the navy taking the
credit. There seems to be a bunch of historical books and papers on all
this trying to show whoever's point of view is right. I think the Germans
must have screwed this up since they had the big piece of land. They ran
out of food for sure, but more from bad management? Eat all the cows you
don't get calves. Eat the seed potatoes--, etc ??
> They didnt 'forget' about anything. Britain was NOT the intended
> adversary in 1940, Russia was. Even during the planning for
> Sealion Hitler admitted that he didnt want war with Britain and
> intended to move on Russia
Yes, the Germans didn't have a real plan, and seemed to think they could
keep the war in northern Europe and leave the south to Spain, Vichy, Italy,
and the Turks. My point is they should have pre-empted Torch , but they were
just making it up as they went along and were crazy lunatic thugs at the top
anyway. This thread is a what-if thing for if the Germans had been more
sensible but still nasty (not nazi) aggressors.
> How would they take and hold Casablanca without the Naval force
> to invade and resupply it ?
Rommel goes west first. He had enough supplies to go east so he could go
west instead using the same stuff. And the Germans don't leave southern
France alone but go all the way right away. 8th Army chases them but once
Rommel has Casablanca he turns west and wins Kasserine only from the west
going east this time! Brits flee to Egypt and escape via the Red Sea (
which parts for Parthian shots?) This may not have worked so well for the
Germans unless we still give them the Brits foolishly going to Greece at the
critical moment as happened for real . Could be gamed to see if Brits could
sustain the 8th Army via the Red Sea before they lost the Battle of the
Atlantic themselves. I am assuming the Brits can't do it, but you can never
say never in a real war.
> Hell they couldnt even resupply the forces in Libya where
> they had total air superiority and far shorter sea lines of
> communication.
Exactly why they should have blocked the Med to the west so Malta not
supplied etc etc, now the Italians can swan around in their Mare and no
problems for the Germans in North Afrika
>
> > Without having to divert naval and air forces to
> > the Med in 1941, they could probably have won the Battle of the Atlantic
> in
> > 1941,
>
> Not a hope in hell, they had nothing like enough U-Boats
> in operation
I believe Doenitz was making some progress in the Atlantic in 1941 when
Hitler stole his U-boats for the Med. In this scenario that doesn't happen
, so Doenitz wins. (would he have in real life if those boats weren't
stolen?)
> > The USA in 1940 was sweating about the Germans getting the RN as well
as
> That doesnt follow at all. If Germany was invading large
> swathes of supposedly neutral Africa the Americans would
> be even more concerned.
In 1940 the US was concerned about the fall of France but didn't do anything
about it. Some of them figured the Brits were next and were working on what
to do about that. Invading Europe wasn't the plan for that. Eventually ,
in late 42, they used the opening the Germans left for them (Torch). If the
UK out of the war in 41, the US has the whole Atlantic as a comfort zone,
unless the Germans try it on in Newfoundland, Mexico or Brazil etc, which
the US was also working on stopping in 1940.
> As for WW2 while its certainly true that the BB's were rather
> less important after the German Surface fleet was defeated a
> large naval force was definitely required for the amphibious
> operations in the Med and Normandy
If the UK had come to a cease-fire agreement in 40/41 as supposed above in
the what -if, the RN was no longer relevant even if it went to Canada. To
get a good deal from the Germans, the RN would have had to be handed over or
scuttled though.
There were still some Brits even in WW2 and after who thought the old
navalist policies would still work. I think now a lot of books about WW2
featuring naval aspects reflect more of that than reality would dictate.
(gasp!)
Regards,
Barry
Hans-Joachim Zierke
B F Lake schrieb:
> This is the key point in all this IMO. The truth is that if the Germans had
> been on the ball,
You can't be on the ball and a Nazi. It's as easy as that. While some
German forces were top notch on a tactical level, strategy was based on
Nazi ideology, not on rational decisionmaking by humans outfitted with
brains.
What happened in 1940/41, was really childish. Hitler did not want to make
war with Britain. That's why the German forces stopped short of Dunquerque,
instead of crushing the British army right at that coast.
In the racist worldview of the Nazis, the British people ranked high, as
Aryans, and therefore, were valuable human material. The Nazis were just
unlucky that the British wanted to make war on them, even after loosing
France. That was unexpected and did not fit to the Great Plan of the
Greatest Führer of all Times.
So what do thinking poeple do, if the other side behaves in an unexpected
way? They adapt to the real world and make a new plan. What do Nazis do in
that situation? They carry on, and invade the Soviet Union with its
disposable human material, those Untermenschen, instead of concentrating on
getting rid of that real-world threat from the British Isles.
Therefore, it is quite easy to set up theoretical plans, what the Germans
could have done. Sure, any person with a brain would have avoided to fight
multiple wars all over Europe, and would have concentrated on funelling all
ressources to useful things for fighting Britain. Sure. But then, those
people in strategic command couldn't have been Nazis, and we won't have
been at war anyway.
These people were on a mission, improving the gen pool of planet earth, and
therefore, weren't open to developments that didn't fit to their mission.
> and sea-minded, they would have realized they didn't need
> a sea-going navy at all!
The alternative Navy concept, drawn up in 1933 or 1934 for the event,
that war with Britain would happen earlier than, say, 1946, was to build a
multitude of U-boats and destroyers and maybe a few Panzerschiffe as
surface raiders, plus a high number of support vessels.
> Thus in WW2, when
> the fall of France gave the Germans everything they needed that the Brits
> were afraid of in 1905, they blew it completely, apparently not realizing
> they had won the war if only they tidied up a bit.
Again, you forgot that this wasn't a normal war of normal people, but a
mission to improve the gen pool. Therefore, they HAD to go east, where the
Untermenschen were waiting to get killed.
If France and England hadn't declared war after the Poland invasion, the
likelyhood is high that they had avoided to invade France at all, at least
before 1946 or something like that.
> They did grab Norway
> before the Brits/Franch in 1940, but forgot about the south side of their
> "heartland" in an incredible display of dumbness
The Great Führer Mussolini was supposed to take care of that.
> If the Germans really felt it necessary to knock over the not so rotten
> structure of the Soviet Union, they should have , as everyone says, taken
> the Brits out of play first.
That was the necessity. But people on a mission, with a Great Plan, do not
adapt to necessities, that do not fit to their Great Plan.
> WW2, was the same as WW1 in that essentially, both the big-ship RN and
> German navies were irrelevant, and it didn't matter how many BBs and CVs
> either had.
CVs were needed for Italy and some other tasks. It is right that the Royal
Navy could have done without a single battleship, which served mostly as
big targets for the U-boats.
hajo
Nicholas Smid
B F Lake wrote in message ...
controls the sea and lets you pick you're fights, you support the second
power in Europe against the first. Close blockade wasn't possable
anymore after 1900 odd, but neather was in needed anymore as better
seakeeping and real time coms let a distant blockade work just as well
and let you centralise you're battle fleet. From their involvment in Spain
the Brits had a pretty large army in the field against Napoleon, by the
standerd of the day but armies got hugly larger from the 1850's.
>> It was this blockade that ultimately caused the German
>> internal collapse in 1918.
>
>There are studies which "prove" this was not really the case. In these,
most
>of the food shortage was from the Germans having their farm workers in army
>uniform in France. Navalists' studies of course show the navy taking the
>credit. There seems to be a bunch of historical books and papers on all
>this trying to show whoever's point of view is right. I think the Germans
>must have screwed this up since they had the big piece of land. They ran
>out of food for sure, but more from bad management? Eat all the cows you
>don't get calves. Eat the seed potatoes--, etc ??
>
for effency from, they sertenly didn't show it at a strategic level in
eather
war well the Brits, with their reputation of muddling through actuly got
well orgenised at higher economic levels.
>> They didnt 'forget' about anything. Britain was NOT the intended
>> adversary in 1940, Russia was. Even during the planning for
>> Sealion Hitler admitted that he didnt want war with Britain and
>> intended to move on Russia
>
>Yes, the Germans didn't have a real plan, and seemed to think they could
>keep the war in northern Europe and leave the south to Spain, Vichy, Italy,
>and the Turks. My point is they should have pre-empted Torch , but they
were
>just making it up as they went along and were crazy lunatic thugs at the
top
>anyway. This thread is a what-if thing for if the Germans had been more
>sensible but still nasty (not nazi) aggressors.
>
troops than they deployed, the post Torch buildup was a shambles
and unsustainable beond the short term. The main result would have been
an army too weak to have the slightest hope of stoping Torch, and too
weak to push very far east, they'd probably have ended up fighting
over Tripolitania with the Brits useing El Agheila as a back stop possition.
>> How would they take and hold Casablanca without the Naval force
>> to invade and resupply it ?
>
>Rommel goes west first. He had enough supplies to go east so he could go
>west instead using the same stuff. And the Germans don't leave southern
>France alone but go all the way right away. 8th Army chases them but once
>Rommel has Casablanca he turns west and wins Kasserine only from the west
>going east this time! Brits flee to Egypt and escape via the Red Sea (
>which parts for Parthian shots?) This may not have worked so well for the
>Germans unless we still give them the Brits foolishly going to Greece at
the
>critical moment as happened for real . Could be gamed to see if Brits
could
>sustain the 8th Army via the Red Sea before they lost the Battle of the
>Atlantic themselves. I am assuming the Brits can't do it, but you can
never
>say never in a real war.
>
Rommel goes west, the French scuttle their warships and alot of their
transports. He arives in Casablanca about in time to hear the 8th army
has resupplied and taken Tripoli, and Crete but given the fall of French
North Africa has starteled Churchill he abandons his Greek adventure
and resupplies Westen Desert Force. They now have a sicure forward
port, covered be Malta and Crete, Rommel has to resupply via Tunis
shorter sea crossing but more exspesed now to Britash attack. Brits
push up to somewhere around Mareth where they have a short line
with desent flanks to dig in on. Maybe they can't compeat with Rommel
in a manuver battle but they know how to slog it out in a streight infantry
punch up and Rommel showed he had trouble diging Commonwealth
infantry out of fixed possitions when he couldn't turn a flank. He tryed it
4 times if I recall and it only worked once, against a scratch force with
no co herant centrel command. Tobruk the second time worked for him
but the first time he failed badly and both attacks at El Alamein got stoped
cold.
> > Hell they couldnt even resupply the forces in Libya where
>> they had total air superiority and far shorter sea lines of
>> communication.
>
>Exactly why they should have blocked the Med to the west so Malta not
>supplied etc etc, now the Italians can swan around in their Mare and no
>problems for the Germans in North Afrika
The problem was They had to depend on the Italian Merchant Marin
which simply wasn't up to the job. Unless Spain could be coned into
taking Gibralta the RN has a sub base there to support boats in the
westen Med and one at Alexandrea to support boats in the Easten Med.
About half the convoys to Malta came from the easten end and if needs be
they all could have. Malta takes an even bigger hammering but even if
Rommel somehow preforms miricals he's not going to push through
El Alamein at the end of the supply lines he could support. Befor long
the Italians simply run out of bottoms to supply him with and the 8th Army
rolls him up like a rug.
>>
>> > Without having to divert naval and air forces to
>> > the Med in 1941, they could probably have won the Battle of the
Atlantic
>> in
>> > 1941,
>>
>> Not a hope in hell, they had nothing like enough U-Boats
>> in operation
>
>I believe Doenitz was making some progress in the Atlantic in 1941 when
>Hitler stole his U-boats for the Med. In this scenario that doesn't happen
>, so Doenitz wins. (would he have in real life if those boats weren't
>stolen?)
>
41 was a rough year for the U-boats, they lost alot of their Aces, the RN
was starting to hit its straps, 42 looked good because they had all those
soft kills off the US early 43 was a high point because alot of escorts
were tied up with Torch, and the U-boats were getting numbers out
but the spring of 43 was the end. The dozen boats sent to the Med in
41 couldn't have made enough difference to the kill rate.
>> > The USA in 1940 was sweating about the Germans getting the RN as well
>as
>
>> That doesnt follow at all. If Germany was invading large
>> swathes of supposedly neutral Africa the Americans would
>> be even more concerned.
>
>In 1940 the US was concerned about the fall of France but didn't do
anything
>about it. Some of them figured the Brits were next and were working on
what
>to do about that. Invading Europe wasn't the plan for that. Eventually ,
>in late 42, they used the opening the Germans left for them (Torch). If
the
>UK out of the war in 41, the US has the whole Atlantic as a comfort zone,
>unless the Germans try it on in Newfoundland, Mexico or Brazil etc, which
>the US was also working on stopping in 1940.
>
Given the forces Germany could aforde, and supply in North Africa
Torch would still have been a go, the fighting would have been a good
deal tougher but the US could support more troops across the Atlantic
than the Germans could across the Med.
>> As for WW2 while its certainly true that the BB's were rather
>> less important after the German Surface fleet was defeated a
>> large naval force was definitely required for the amphibious
>> operations in the Med and Normandy
>
>If the UK had come to a cease-fire agreement in 40/41 as supposed above in
>the what -if, the RN was no longer relevant even if it went to Canada. To
>get a good deal from the Germans, the RN would have had to be handed over
or
>scuttled though.
>
Without alot of help from ASB's I can't see any way the Germans could
have beaten Britan so badly in 1940 as to force such drastic peace
terms out of them. About the best Germany could hope for was to force
them to accept, atleast for now, that Germany was going to dominat
Europe compleatly, a pretty major consetion in itself, so the Brits swollow
their pride and call the war off, for now. Well they glower and fume and
work like mad to get ready for the next round at a time conveneant to
them, if less so to Germany.
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> news:1010692953.20137....@news.demon.co.uk...
> >
> > "B F Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message
> >> The British forces in 1914 were as far from being continental
> > army based as it was possible to be. The army was a small
> > professional force entirely unlike the large conscript armies
> > of the continent. The Kaiser called the BEF that contemptible
> > little army as you may recall.
>
> Yes, the 1905 decision to make the army primary over the navy was a sudden
> shock and came at a bad time.
It would come as a hell of a shock to the British Army
if nobody else since the entire available force in 1914
consisted of two army corps of three divisions each, a cavalry division
and supporting artillery and service forces.
> The army was still trying to get modern after
> the screwed up Boer War revelations, and was still tiny. Conscription for
> army service was not implimented due to tradition plus the whole society
> was in flux with social spending demands and reforms making defence
spending
> difficult, especially with the BB race going on.
Now why would their be a BB race going on if the army was
the primary agent of defence ?
> The Admiratly fought the
> army -first policy tooth and nail , and there were many divisions of
opinion
> between navalists, who persisted in thinking the old ways would still work
> and continentalists who were converted by the reality of the new
situation.
> It happened too fast for consensus but the main thing is the committee for
> Imperial defence converted and got the key government people to see it.
> Some army progress had been made by 1914, but no where near enough.
Sorry this wont wash. While its undoubtedly true that plans
were formulated in 1905 for a British intervention force should
Belgium be attacked this was NOT a major rethink in strategy
for the defence of the Realm. The size of the force concerned
was tiny by Contininental standards. A General Staff study recommended that,
if Germany violated Belgian neutrality, two British army corps should be
landed
at Antwerp within twenty-three days.
One of the major problems faced by Germany in WW1
was a shortage of nitrates which were vital both for
use in fertilisers and explosives manufacture.
Prior to the war the Germans imported a large
percentage of these. WIth the loss of supply
came a massive increase in demand. Despite
German production of synthetic substitutes the
shortage of available fertilisers helped cripple
German agriculture.
> > They didnt 'forget' about anything. Britain was NOT the intended
> > adversary in 1940, Russia was. Even during the planning for
> > Sealion Hitler admitted that he didnt want war with Britain and
> > intended to move on Russia
>
> Yes, the Germans didn't have a real plan, and seemed to think they could
> keep the war in northern Europe and leave the south to Spain, Vichy,
Italy,
> and the Turks. My point is they should have pre-empted Torch , but they
were
> just making it up as they went along and were crazy lunatic thugs at the
top
> anyway. This thread is a what-if thing for if the Germans had been more
> sensible but still nasty (not nazi) aggressors.
>
The threat to Germany lay on its Eastern Frontiers, the
Africa campaign was always a side show to them and
was launched to prevent the collapse of Italy not
as a form of neo colonialist adventurism
> > How would they take and hold Casablanca without the Naval force
> > to invade and resupply it ?
>
> Rommel goes west first. He had enough supplies to go east so he could go
> west instead using the same stuff.
No he couldnt. The 8th Army lay to the East. If he went west they'd roll
up his bases of supply in Libya
> And the Germans don't leave southern
> France alone but go all the way right away.
Which will guarantee that Rommel will meet determined resistance
in French North Africa and allow the US to land troops in
Algeria as allies not invaders
> 8th Army chases them but once
> Rommel has Casablanca he turns west and wins Kasserine only from the west
> going east this time!
He'd have no more success against the 8th army at Kasserine
than he had at Alam Halfa
> Brits flee to Egypt and escape via the Red Sea (
> which parts for Parthian shots?)
See Alam Halfa
> This may not have worked so well for the
> Germans unless we still give them the Brits foolishly going to Greece at
the
> critical moment as happened for real . Could be gamed to see if Brits
could
> sustain the 8th Army via the Red Sea before they lost the Battle of the
> Atlantic themselves. I am assuming the Brits can't do it, but you can
never
> say never in a real war.
>
The supplies for the British Armies in the desert
came via the red sea
> > Hell they couldnt even resupply the forces in Libya where
> > they had total air superiority and far shorter sea lines of
> > communication.
>
> Exactly why they should have blocked the Med to the west so Malta not
> supplied etc etc, now the Italians can swan around in their Mare and no
> problems for the Germans in North Afrika
Except that with the British in Tripoli they have no problems suplying
Malta from there and the Italians are in even more trouble
than they were historically. WIth the entire Italian army in
Africa already destroyed and the RAF raiding southern Italy
from bases in Tripoli Mussolini had better be watching his back.
> >
> > > Without having to divert naval and air forces to
> > > the Med in 1941, they could probably have won the Battle of the
Atlantic
> > in
> > > 1941,
> >
> > Not a hope in hell, they had nothing like enough U-Boats
> > in operation
>
> I believe Doenitz was making some progress in the Atlantic in 1941 when
> Hitler stole his U-boats for the Med. In this scenario that doesn't
happen
> , so Doenitz wins. (would he have in real life if those boats weren't
> stolen?)
>
No
> > > The USA in 1940 was sweating about the Germans getting the RN as well
> as
>
> > That doesnt follow at all. If Germany was invading large
> > swathes of supposedly neutral Africa the Americans would
> > be even more concerned.
>
> In 1940 the US was concerned about the fall of France but didn't do
anything
> about it. Some of them figured the Brits were next and were working on
what
> to do about that. Invading Europe wasn't the plan for that. Eventually
,
> in late 42, they used the opening the Germans left for them (Torch). If
the
> UK out of the war in 41, the US has the whole Atlantic as a comfort zone,
> unless the Germans try it on in Newfoundland, Mexico or Brazil etc, which
> the US was also working on stopping in 1940.
>
The Germans couldnt win in 1941- period
> > As for WW2 while its certainly true that the BB's were rather
> > less important after the German Surface fleet was defeated a
> > large naval force was definitely required for the amphibious
> > operations in the Med and Normandy
>
> If the UK had come to a cease-fire agreement in 40/41 as supposed above in
> the what -if, the RN was no longer relevant even if it went to Canada. To
> get a good deal from the Germans, the RN would have had to be handed over
or
> scuttled though.
>
Couldnt be done
> There were still some Brits even in WW2 and after who thought the old
> navalist policies would still work. I think now a lot of books about WW2
> featuring naval aspects reflect more of that than reality would dictate.
> (gasp!)
>
Keith
Alan Lothian
Zierke <Usen...@Zierke.com> wrote:
>
> You can't be on the ball and a Nazi. It's as easy as that. While some
> German forces were top notch on a tactical level, strategy was based on
> Nazi ideology, not on rational decisionmaking by humans outfitted with
> brains.
Fair enough.
> What happened in 1940/41, was really childish. Hitler did not want to make
> war with Britain. That's why the German forces stopped short of Dunquerque,
> instead of crushing the British army right at that coast.
Hmm. Not that straightforward. Wiping out the British at Dunkirk would
likely have been expensive. Good defenses against tanks -- all those
canals etc -- stubborn infantry that can be at least modestly
resupplied for a while. In any case, German armour was way down in
strength (maintenance far more than Allied action) and for all Hitler
or anyone else knew in May, 1940, the Wehrmacht still faced some heavy
fighting to knock France out. Few on the German (or British) side
really appreciated the gross incompetence, shameless defeatism and
political arrogance (an appalling combination; didn't Reynaud say
"France has always feared a coup from victorious generals, never from
defeated ones", or words to that effect) of the French High Command.
Plus the May 1940 Luftwaffe enormously overestimated its anti-shipping
abilities and weapons. (They learned and retrained, of course; cf Crete
almost exactly a year later. The forces that Richthofen deployed
against the RN in the eastern Med really would have made a Dunkirk
evacuation impossible or at least impossibly costly.)
Worth pointing out, too, that even *after* Dunkirk the British were
sending fighting troops to France by the division. (Well, at least one
division.)
> In the racist worldview of the Nazis, the British people ranked high, as
> Aryans, and therefore, were valuable human material. The Nazis were just
> unlucky that the British wanted to make war on them, even after loosing
> France. That was unexpected and did not fit to the Great Plan of the
> Greatest F絹rer of all Times.
Yes: if the Brits had played by the rules, it was definitely
sue-for-peace time. After summer, 1940, there wasn't much they could do
to harm the Germans. Except wait for the Americans, of course.
Churchill at least knew the clock was ticking in his favour. Hitler
should have, too: but here again your point about Nazi ideology comes
in. The Americans, after all, were a Mischung of degenerate races who
could only build automobiles and refrigerators.
<snip reasonable stuff about Nazi refusal to adapt to reality>
>
>
>
> > and sea-minded, they would have realized they didn't need
> > a sea-going navy at all!
>
> The alternative Navy concept, drawn up in 1933 or 1934 for the event,
> that war with Britain would happen earlier than, say, 1946, was to build a
> multitude of U-boats and destroyers and maybe a few Panzerschiffe as
> surface raiders, plus a high number of support vessels.
You mean the Z-plan? Or is this something different, with no Graf
Zeppelin etc?
> > Thus in WW2, when
> > the fall of France gave the Germans everything they needed that the Brits
> > were afraid of in 1905, they blew it completely, apparently not realizing
> > they had won the war if only they tidied up a bit.
Except that "tidying up a bit" meant making peace with Britain. An
absolute imperative, even if it meant a certain generosity in the hour
of victory. Bismarck would have known what to do, but then he was the
last German leader to understand the making of war, as opposed to the
winning of battles. In fact, for those interested in what-ifs: just
what would a Bismarck have done in 1940?
<more snips>
>
>
> > They did grab Norway
> > before the Brits/Franch in 1940, but forgot about the south side of their
> > "heartland" in an incredible display of dumbness
>
> The Great F絹rer Mussolini was supposed to take care of that.
Well, Benito M did make one remark that always seemed to me to be
extremely cogent. He said (to Ciano, I think; I am quoting from memory)
"Dolfo is always going on about his Thousand Year Reich. So why does he
have to do everything in the first six months?"
<snips>
>
> > WW2, was the same as WW1 in that essentially, both the big-ship RN and
> > German navies were irrelevant, and it didn't matter how many BBs and CVs
> > either had.
>
> CVs were needed for Italy and some other tasks. It is right that the Royal
> Navy could have done without a single battleship, which served mostly as
> big targets for the U-boats.
Well, Tirpitz & S&G meant that the RN had to keep some BB strength
handy. Arguably the Germans won that tradeoff, not on the BB vs BB
side, but because the RN BBs required a large number of fleet
destroyers on hand (so did the German BBs; they just didn't have the
destroyers, though.). And these ships would have been very, very
useful elsewhere.
--
"The past resembles the future as water resembles water" Ibn Khaldun
If you wish to email me, try alan dot lothian at blueyonder dot co dot uk
Keith Willshaw
"Alan Lothian" <nob...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
news:110120021157480245%nob...@nowhere.com...
> In article <slrna3sgfo.1...@hersland.Zierke.com>, Hans-Joachim
> Zierke <Usen...@Zierke.com> wrote:
>
>
> Except that "tidying up a bit" meant making peace with Britain. An
> absolute imperative, even if it meant a certain generosity in the hour
> of victory. Bismarck would have known what to do, but then he was the
> last German leader to understand the making of war, as opposed to the
> winning of battles. In fact, for those interested in what-ifs: just
> what would a Bismarck have done in 1940?
>
Offer generous terms to Britain,allowing it keep its empire
and allowing it a free hand in Africa and the Mid east while
getting them to stop interfering in Europe. In addition make
speeches about what a shame we have to fight
such a valiant nation when we should be friends and
rule the world as partners etc.
AndrSwllw
<smi...@xtra.co.nz> writes:
>It dose make you wounder just where the Germans got their reputation
>for effency from, they sertenly didn't show it at a strategic level in
>eather
>war well the Brits, with their reputation of muddling through actuly got
>well orgenised at higher economic levels.
>>
Separate Strategic and Tactical actions.
Having worked for a German company, during peace time things
change sufficiently slowly that they can use 5 year plans. They
may replan every year but 4 of them are the nearly the same as
last years plan.
If the German military are using the same idea, it could be
précised as
Year 1 - What war with the British?
Year 2 - War with the British, that not in the plan!
Year 3 - Discover at war with British. Plan attack in Year 4.
Prepare supplies. Move men into place.
Year 4 - Fight British
Year 5 - Win (that's what the plan says).
Any fighting in the first 3 years was basically tactical. The
attacks on France and Russia would have been planned
strategically at least 4 years before hand.
WW1 only lasted 4 years 1914 to 1918.
Andrew Swallow
Keith Willshaw
"AndrSwllw" <andr...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20020111084130...@mb-mn.aol.com...
The Germans had a strategy for WW1 and WW2, trouble
is it was basically the same one
1) Build a navy big enough to be costly but small
enough to be useless.
2) Attack France through Belgium and knock
them out of the war
3) Attack Russia and knock them out of the
war
4) Use U boats and raiders to starve the British into
submission while destroying civilian morale
through bombing
5) Ignore minor problems like lack of resources and
the British blockade
6) Discover 3 years into the war that your economy
isnt properly geared up for war production
7) Lose
Keith
B F Lake
> >
> > Yes, the 1905 decision to make the army primary over the navy was a
sudden
> > shock and came at a bad time.
>
> > army -first policy tooth and nail , and there were many divisions of
> opinion
> > between navalists, who persisted in thinking the old ways would still
work
> > and continentalists who were converted by the reality of the new
> situation.
> > It happened too fast for consensus but the main thing is the committee
for
> > Imperial defence converted and got the key government people to see it.
> > Some army progress had been made by 1914, but no where near enough.
>
> Sorry this wont wash. While its undoubtedly true that plans
> were formulated in 1905 for a British intervention force should
> Belgium be attacked this was NOT a major rethink in strategy
> for the defence of the Realm. The size of the force concerned
> was tiny by Contininental standards. A General Staff study recommended
that,
> if Germany violated Belgian neutrality, two British army corps should be
> landed
> at Antwerp within twenty-three days.
It looks like an interpretation problem. The historians (I've been reading
Paul Kennedy's 1976 book "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" which
I largely buy into especially as it explains the economic background that
had been confusing me--and he has a bibliography a yard long showing all
sorts of scholarly work by lots of people ) who see 1905 as the key moment,
base that on the implications of the commitment to land an army on the
continent rather than stay out of any land battle there, not so much on the
actual changes to military structure five minutes after the commitment was
made.
Others, who would downplay this key moment's significance, can point to what
the Brits actually did, which was to keep building BBs and not do much about
increasing the army. Them as mattered knew that the commitment to even a
small army on the continent meant it would inevitably have to be reinforced
and increased in any fighting due to the huge size of the German army, so it
is seen as the time the army replaced the navy as the senior service in
actual fact. The navy and its supporters didn't see this at all , which was
what all the arguing at the time and since was about. From this distance,
it is easy to see from what happened in WW1 that the 1905 moment was the
turning point, IMO.
Churchill etc kept trying to turn the clock back, especially as trench
warfare set in with such losses, and go back to the "British way" of
periferal warfare, but it couldn't be done, the western front (as seen by
the Germans) was everything. In WW2 , Churchill still tried to avoid the
continent and pretend it was still 1860 or whenever and the Empire was still
viable etc , and the RN could pretend so too, except they had their money
cut off by post-war realists.
IMO, most of the stuff I have been reading to do with the naval part of WW1
and 2 has reflected the navalist point of view and somehow all this other
writing by (British) experts on things somehow never gets a mention. I
recommend Kennedy's book to get a different perspective. I will say he too
emphasizes things to make his point. eg he says Jutland was only
significant for the time the BBs turned away from the DD torpedo attack,
which strengthens the importance of the torpedo. He says the key moment was
really later, in August 1916, when after a bad scare during a sortie with
the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe forbade the big ships from going anywhere in a big
chunk of the North Sea from fear of submarines , essentially leaving it as
a free sailing zone for the HSF. He was supported in this by Beatty who
tightened it more when he took over. Kennedy sees this event as another key
turning point when people realized the BB was finished, but of course the
BBs were not all scrapped the next day!
1905 is also key for two reasons to do with Tsushima. First, the British
strategy from ~1870 to then was to counter France and Russia which had big
navies and threatened each end of the Med trading route to India etc etc.
All of a sudden, the Russian navy was gone! Unfortunately the German Navy
popped up just then, and it was not stuck in the Baltic. The other Tsushima
thing was the "lesson" on the gun vs torpedo that was worrying the navy so
much. The navalists saw what they wanted to see (IMO) and decided the
torpedo wasn't so bad after all and that nothing had changed for the BB
navy. IMO they should have seen the truth, but that would be asking too
much of human nature.
The new HSF threat in 1905 was seen as a support for a German army advance
to the Lowlands and an invasion threat to the UK (see 1588). Much worry
about the way the HSF was concentrated and had the initiative to stike first
anywhere and the RN was scattered about the Britian and so had to be way
bigger than the HSF etc, but the thing is this was part of, not a denial of,
the new reality that the threat to the UK was from the German army advance
to the west and could only be stopped by an army. The RN was only there to
fend off the HSF from helping the German army, making the British/French
armies' task easier. So the RN was in a secondary role, not the old primary
role when it used to do the blockade while the army operated on the
perifery.
Naturally lots of books can be produced proving anybody was right and the
others are nuts--sort of a slow smn! Seems that's what universities are
for :)
The same thing seems to be happening in the States right now , as strategies
are worked out with some people saying nothing has changed so lets have lots
of (pick favorite harware) while others say we need (pick favorite hardware)
instead. It is another historical moment which is hard to see clearly when
you are in the middle of it at the time IMO.
Regards,
Barry
Iain Rae
In what way is this is a change in policy from the decision to land and
support Wellingtons army in the pennisular war?
I'm with Sir Humphrey on this, British foreign policy wrt Europe has not
changed in 500 years.
Which they exploited how?
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote
>
> It looks like an interpretation problem. The historians (I've been
reading
> Paul Kennedy's 1976 book "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery"
which
> I largely buy into especially as it explains the economic background that
> had been confusing me--and he has a bibliography a yard long showing all
> sorts of scholarly work by lots of people ) who see 1905 as the key
moment,
> base that on the implications of the commitment to land an army on the
> continent rather than stay out of any land battle there, not so much on
the
> actual changes to military structure five minutes after the commitment was
> made.
>
This is really no different from traditional British practise
Defence of the Realm was first and foremost a naval issue
To prosecute a prolonged war and achieve the desired balance
of power on the Continent a large army may need to
be committed, as was done under Marlbrough during the
war of Spanish succession and again under first Sir John Moore
and later Wellington in the Napoleonic wars.
In both cases the initial deployments were small and
some years would pass before the army became large
enough to be effective.
It was the job of the Navy to hold the line meantime.
> Others, who would downplay this key moment's significance, can point to
what
> the Brits actually did, which was to keep building BBs and not do much
about
> increasing the army. Them as mattered knew that the commitment to even a
> small army on the continent meant it would inevitably have to be
reinforced
> and increased in any fighting due to the huge size of the German army, so
it
> is seen as the time the army replaced the navy as the senior service in
> actual fact. The navy and its supporters didn't see this at all , which
was
> what all the arguing at the time and since was about. From this
distance,
> it is easy to see from what happened in WW1 that the 1905 moment was the
> turning point, IMO.
>
I'd have to disagree. In my opinion the change to a continental
strategy came in about 1948 when the centre of gravity of
British military strategy moved to the defense of the line
between Eatsern and Western Europe.
From that point the front line of defense for these Islands
was no longer the Channel/ North Sea but the Fulda Gap
Sorry this is wrong. The RN certainly learned lessons from
Tsushima. It is no coincedence that Dreadnought was laid
down in 1906.
If anything Tsushima reinforced the importance of maintaining
naval supremacy.
> The new HSF threat in 1905 was seen as a support for a German army advance
> to the Lowlands and an invasion threat to the UK (see 1588). Much worry
> about the way the HSF was concentrated and had the initiative to stike
first
> anywhere and the RN was scattered about the Britian and so had to be way
> bigger than the HSF etc, but the thing is this was part of, not a denial
of,
> the new reality that the threat to the UK was from the German army advance
> to the west and could only be stopped by an army. The RN was only there
to
> fend off the HSF from helping the German army, making the British/French
> armies' task easier. So the RN was in a secondary role, not the old
primary
> role when it used to do the blockade while the army operated on the
> perifery.
>
This makes no sense. The Germans and British both knew that
control of the North Sea was critical to the outcome of the war.
That was why Jellicoe was so cautious with his ships.
He described himself. As Churchill said "he is the only man who can lose
the war in an afternoon"
That is why the Fleet was moved to bases in Scotland and Northern
England where it could more easily intervene. I the mediterannean
the other major naval powers (France and Italy) were our allies
as were the Japanese in the Pacific
Keith
Keith Willshaw
> B F Lake wrote:
>
>
> In what way is this is a change in policy from the decision to land and
> support Wellingtons army in the pennisular war?
>
Or
Marlbrough's role in the war of the Spanish succession
Or
The British troops in the Netherlands fighting the
Spanish in the 16th Century
etc etc
Keith
B F Lake
> In what way is this is a change in policy from the decision to land and
> support Wellingtons army in the pennisular war?
That counts as periferral and classic policy. I'm not sure if 1815 counts
either since the mass size of the French army was much reduced by then?
I cannot do justice to Kennedy's book from memory in a few lines, so it
would be better to see if you agree with him first hand to be fair about it.
If I followed it correctly, it is a matter of scale. Previous British army
interventions were relatively small. The German army threat from ~1870
plus represented a whole new thing where railways allowed rapid mobilization
of vast armies backed by the new industrial economies of the new age. The
continental armies could be in the millions while the British army was still
in the thousands, yet naval blockade of the French coast was no longer
possible to bring the continental power to its knees, so the only thing left
was to win the army battle head on. The British didn't like being
dependent on the French army <G> so they had to get with it and move up from
having a wog-bashing little outfit to fielding a proper army.
>
> I'm with Sir Humphrey on this, British foreign policy wrt Europe has not
> changed in 500 years.
Maybe it looks that way because it has come full circle? ie 1588 looks a
lot like 1905 and ever since, but after 1588, the British knocked out the
Dutch, Spanish, and French using maritime strategy now considered classical,
but which did not apply before or since? So it is possible to relate now to
Tudor times and say nothing changed? Just playing around with this arm wavy
idea, needs a lot of analysis --anyway read Kennedy for a compelling
explanation. (I think this is the same guy who got carried away after
writing this good book and started to make a lot of generalizations broader
in scope about all the superpowers and has lost some credibility? Is he the
"end of history" guy? Vague on that.)
>
>
which strengthens the importance of the torpedo. He says the key moment was
> > really later, in August 1916, when after a bad scare during a sortie
with
> > the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe forbade the big ships from going anywhere in a
big
> > chunk of the North Sea from fear of submarines , essentially leaving
it as
> > a free sailing zone for the HSF.
>
>
> Which they exploited how?
Apparently they went out in 1917 (twice?) and were not opposed but didn't
do much. They had their own problems being outnumbered so they were
basically stuck in port too.
Regards,
Barry
Alan Lothian
Keith Willshaw <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
That's certainly a good starting point; the offers have to made
publicly, of course.
I always liked Len Deighton's suggestion (I think it's in
_Blitzkrieg_): at the end of June, 1940, Germany declares unilateral
peace on Britain. While German military units (land, air and sea) will
reserve the right to defend themselves, there will be no further
offensive action. Only fighter squadrons will be stationed at French
airbases (US observers invited to verify) and, best of all, British
PoWs are returned, unconditionally, under Red Cross auspices.
The gesture costs Germany almost nothing. It pulls the rug away
completely from Churchillian belligerence, which had more than a few
enemies in the British establishment anyway.
Now, Bismarck just might have thought of that. Hitler? Ha ha ha. Of
course, people might conceivably have believed Bismarck.
Keith Willshaw
> "Iain Rae" <ia...@dcs.ed.ac.uk> wrote
>
> > In what way is this is a change in policy from the decision to land and
> > support Wellingtons army in the pennisular war?
>
> That counts as periferral and classic policy. I'm not sure if 1815 counts
> either since the mass size of the French army was much reduced by then?
>
The Peninsular war ran from 1808 to 1815 and was one of the
major factors in reducing the French Army
Napoleon referred to it as his Spanish Ulcer. It was in fact a
classic insurgency war and was in fact the origin of the
term guerilla. In 1813 Wellingtons troops were fighting
on French soil at Bayonne and Orthez.
One of the factors that brough about napoleon's abdication in 1814
was the presence of the Wellingtons army in the South of France
after they had crossed the Pyrenees.
Keith
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Keith Willshaw
> In article <1010753773.12579....@news.demon.co.uk>,
> Keith Willshaw <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
>
> > Offer generous terms to Britain,allowing it keep its empire
> > and allowing it a free hand in Africa and the Mid east while
> > getting them to stop interfering in Europe. In addition make
> > speeches about what a shame we have to fight
> > such a valiant nation when we should be friends and
> > rule the world as partners etc.
>
>
> That's certainly a good starting point; the offers have to made
> publicly, of course.
>
Of course, the whole point is to get people grumbling
about a pointless war.
Alan Lothian
Willshaw <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
> "B F Lake" <nos...@nospam.com> wrote in message
> news:u3smae4...@corp.supernews.com...
<snips: Keith speaks next>
> It would come as a hell of a shock to the British Army
> if nobody else since the entire available force in 1914
> consisted of two army corps of three divisions each, a cavalry division
> and supporting artillery and service forces.
>
Actually, to reinforce your point, the two corps had only *two*
divisions each. The Cavalry division had about 5,000 men, btw.
> > The army was still trying to get modern after
> > the screwed up Boer War revelations, and was still tiny. Conscription for
> > army service was not implimented due to tradition plus the whole society
> > was in flux with social spending demands and reforms making defence
> spending
> > difficult, especially with the BB race going on.
>
> Now why would their be a BB race going on if the army was
> the primary agent of defence ?
Quite so. Also Mr Lake by bashing on about 1905 ignores (I suspect in
the sense of the French ignorer) that other key date in British
history: 1906. When a "left-liberal" government began introducing a
series of fairly massive and expensive reforms. Eg an old-age pension
scheme almost as good as the one Bismarck had got going in Germany in
the 1880s. And although you could sell Dreadnoughts to an
unmilitaristic population, Army expansion was not on.
> > The Admiratly fought the
> > army -first policy tooth and nail , and there were many divisions of
> opinion
> > between navalists, who persisted in thinking the old ways would still work
> > and continentalists who were converted by the reality of the new
> situation.
> > It happened too fast for consensus but the main thing is the committee for
> > Imperial defence converted and got the key government people to see it.
> > Some army progress had been made by 1914, but no where near enough.
>
> Sorry this wont wash. While its undoubtedly true that plans
> were formulated in 1905 for a British intervention force should
> Belgium be attacked this was NOT a major rethink in strategy
> for the defence of the Realm. The size of the force concerned
> was tiny by Contininental standards. A General Staff study recommended that,
> if Germany violated Belgian neutrality, two British army corps should be
> landed
> at Antwerp within twenty-three days.
>
Agreed. (Hard not to, since this is a succinct summary of the
historically available facts.) The interesting thing is how these plans
moved on to "staff conferences" and how those "staff conferences" in
effect committed Britain to France without a formal alliance. Was it
Joffre (or Foch in an earlier staff role) who said to Robertson, or
whoever the CIGS was in about 1910 : "Your job is to bring one English
soldier to France. We will ensure that he is killed." Quote not
verbatim, but near enough.
<snips: mostly requoted Lake post. Keith again:>
>
> One of the major problems faced by Germany in WW1
> was a shortage of nitrates which were vital both for
> use in fertilisers and explosives manufacture.
>
> Prior to the war the Germans imported a large
> percentage of these. WIth the loss of supply
> came a massive increase in demand. Despite
> German production of synthetic substitutes the
> shortage of available fertilisers helped cripple
> German agriculture.
Hmm. This is a "yes, but." The Haber process to fix atmospheric
nitrogen made things a lot easier; the demand for horses (agricultural
horses: the only ones there were) by the military made things much
worse; and after Hind and Lud got a screwy sort of command economy
going, things went from worse to worse still.
<This is Mr Lake:>
>
> > > They didnt 'forget' about anything. Britain was NOT the intended
> > > adversary in 1940, Russia was. Even during the planning for
> > > Sealion Hitler admitted that he didnt want war with Britain and
> > > intended to move on Russia
So Hitler was like a bridge player who *intended* to play his long
diamonds but couldn't be bothered to worry about the two big trumps in
West's hand. (Whether his diamonds were long enough on their own is, of
course, another story.)
> > Yes, the Germans didn't have a real plan, and seemed to think they could
> > keep the war in northern Europe and leave the south to Spain, Vichy,
> Italy,
> > and the Turks. My point is they should have pre-empted Torch , but they
> were
> > just making it up as they went along and were crazy lunatic thugs at the
> top
> > anyway. This thread is a what-if thing for if the Germans had been more
> > sensible but still nasty (not nazi) aggressors.
They could not possibly have pre-empted Torch. If I may return to my
bridge metaphor, that's like pre-empting a solid partnered 3 spades
with four small diamonds in hand. Wow. This is the first time I have
employed bridge metaphors for history. Talk m e out of it, chaps.
>
> The threat to Germany lay on its Eastern Frontiers, the
> Africa campaign was always a side show to them and
> was launched to prevent the collapse of Italy not
> as a form of neo colonialist adventurism
Exactly. The NA campaign was desperately important for the British
because it was the only place their soldiers were head-to-head with the
Germans. By the standards of the Eastern Front, the whole thing was a
platoon action. A logistically nightmarish platoon action, of course.
Of which the US was (both rightly and wrongly) deeply suspicious.
Rightly, because the US Army saw it quite correctly as an unnecessary
sideshow. But wrongly, because it was a good idea to learn how to fight
the Germans somewhere relatively cheap.
<snip Keith demolishing Mr Lake>
>
> The supplies for the British Armies in the desert
> came via the red sea
It's amazing how many people think that all that stuff came through the
Med. Well, it did once or twice: Crusader? But until spring '43, more
than 90% of 8 Army supplies went all the way around the Cape. (Which is
why a certain Japanese raid caused deep consternation, but that's
another story. Still, it's Obsmn.
>
> > > Hell they couldnt even resupply the forces in Libya where
> > > they had total air superiority and far shorter sea lines of
> > > communication.
> >
> > Exactly why they should have blocked the Med to the west so Malta not
> > supplied etc etc, now the Italians can swan around in their Mare and no
> > problems for the Germans in North Afrika
>
> Except that with the British in Tripoli they have no problems suplying
> Malta from there and the Italians are in even more trouble
> than they were historically. WIth the entire Italian army in
> Africa already destroyed and the RAF raiding southern Italy
> from bases in Tripoli Mussolini had better be watching his back.
It's possible to argue that the desert campaign was fought as much to
save Malta as Malta fought to save the desert campaign. Not by design,
of course: I mean, the way things worked out. If Fall Hercules had been
attempted and succeeded, the Germans might actually have ended up worse
off.
<more snips>
> >
>
>
> The Germans couldnt win in 1941- period
Exactly. Bite, yes. Chew, no.
Alan Lothian
<keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> The Peninsular war ran from 1808 to 1815 and was one of the
> major factors in reducing the French Army
>
> Napoleon referred to it as his Spanish Ulcer. It was in fact a
> classic insurgency war and was in fact the origin of the
> term guerilla. In 1813 Wellingtons troops were fighting
> on French soil at Bayonne and Orthez.
A well-supplied regular army, its supply train (in this case by sea)
utterly outwith the enemy's ability to interdict, plus a brutal popular
uprising.... can't beat it. Cf Vietnam. Costs a ****lot**** for the
peasant population, though. Anyone remember CS Forester's _TheGun_?
The Spanish prefer the spelling guerrilla (which, incidentally, means
"little war" , not "little warrior", while -illa is often an
*affectionate* diminuitive ending ) but that is a nitpick and no
attempt to start a spelling flame. I can't help being a pedant, despite
years of treatment.
> One of the factors that brough about napoleon's abdication in 1814
> was the presence of the Wellingtons army in the South of France
> after they had crossed the Pyrenees.
Interestingly, there was no guerilla (I prefer that spelling in English
myself, too) war in France. Why not? Exhaustion, no doubt; but the fact
that the British Army paid for everything in gold helped, and
Wellington was notoriously willing to hang the odd looter. (Not the
even ones; depended what mood he was in.) But the invading army paid
for almost everything not in scrip, but in gold.
Perfidious Albion, indeed.
Alan Lothian
<keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> >
>
> Of course, the whole point is to get people grumbling
> about a pointless war.
How's this for a first draft:
There was that famous speech of Hitler's in, when, late July 1940?
"...Wann kommt er? Er kommt!" (... they are asking themselves in
England, when is he coming? He is coming!"
Howls of glee from victory-drunk German audience.
here's the revised version, from Adolf Bismarck-Hitler:
Comrades, alterkaempfer:
We are here to celebrate a great victory in the West. And although the
casualty lists were very small compared to what those of us, throughout
all of Europe, remember from a generation ago, we are here to mourn and
celebrate our dead.
This war was unnecessary, and I would even say unwise.
[deep indrawn breath from crowd]
But it was not the unwisdom of the German Volk that brought the bloody
fighting about. We have no great quarrel with the French -- who
declared war on us. We have even less with the British, who are our
close Aryan cousins. But yes, they also declared war on us.
Alterkaempfer, Junger, it was not we who declared war upon them.
The British Empire -- yes, I know there are many among you who would
wish to bring it down in ruin -- has brought Aryan civilization to
benighted nations across the globe. While to the East, there are
millions upon millions of Bolshevik slaves whose entire ambition is the
destruction, yes, the destruction, of Aryan civilization.
[roar from crowd]
So I say to you all: we must think it through. We have shown that we
can fight, and who doubted it?
[roar from crowd]
And so we have earned the right to think, and I beseech our British
cousins to think, too. This is an historic moment, my people. It is
time, long past time, to end the foolish war that old men have made us
fight. Let us end it now, this very day.
I say to our British cousins: enough is enough. We do not wish to
invade your green island, even if we did not know how valiantly you
would defend your shores. I, the Fuehrer of the German Volk, will not
send our young men to kill your young men on your beaches and in the
ruins of their homes. I will not send our Luftwaffe to bring terrible
destruction upon the cities that were once the workshop of the world
and from which we have learned so much, I am not ashamed to say.
If that is my policy -- and peace, my people, is my policy --
[roar from crowd]
then I must humble myself. I feel proud to do so, with your support. I
will speak directly to the British people, over the heads of their
fearful and warmongering governments....
You can write the rest of it yourselves.
Hey, maybe I should have been Hitler's speechwriter. Probably have paid
a helluva lot better than what I am doing now.
Ken & Laura Chaddock
> "Ken & Laura Chaddock" <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote in message
> news:3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca...
> > To expand this basic thread...
> >
> > What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
> > of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
> > conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
>
> They'd have met the RN Fast Carriers equipped with Hellcats,
> Corsairs and Avengers escorted by the KGV's and Queens .
Would they have arrived on the scene that late ? Bismarck was
ready as it was in August 1940, presumable if Hitler had been
pushing it she could have been ready earlier as could Tirpitz. S & G
could have been converted even before 1939.
If, as I seem to recall, Graf Zeppelin about 70% complete in late
1939 she could have been to sea in mid 1940. Peter Strasser would
have taken longer but Bismarck with 15" armed S & G and Graf
Zeppelin would have presented the RN with a nasty dilemma in mid to
late 1940.
>
> I wouldnt give a German force with a handful of Me-109's
> and JU-87's much in the way of a chance.
>
> > Could the RN have coped with two German fast battlegroups,
> > one based upon the Bismarcks, the other upon the Sharnhorst
> > twins, each with a carrier (with 40 + fighters and attack aircraft)
> > and a couple of destroyers ?
> >
>
> Yes given the Ilustrious and Implacable Class carriers
>
> Keith
Alistair Gunn
> Hey, maybe I should have been Hitler's speechwriter. Probably have paid
> a helluva lot better than what I am doing now.
Perhaps you should've been ... However, on the whole, I feel it's
probably better that you where not! <grins>
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...
Keith Willshaw
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > "Ken & Laura Chaddock" <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote in message
> > news:3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca...
> > > To expand this basic thread...
> > >
> > > What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
> > > of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
> > > conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
> >
> > They'd have met the RN Fast Carriers equipped with Hellcats,
> > Corsairs and Avengers escorted by the KGV's and Queens .
>
> Would they have arrived on the scene that late ? Bismarck was
> ready as it was in August 1940, presumable if Hitler had been
> pushing it she could have been ready earlier as could Tirpitz. S & G
> could have been converted even before 1939.
Hardly
In the case of S&G the 15" guns werent available, the first of the
38 cm/52 (14.96") SK C/34 not being available until 1939,
thats why they were built with the 11" turrets.
As it turned out the extra weight would have required
the entire fore part of the ship be rebuilt.
Bismarck want ready in August 1940, that was her commisioning date
she needed to work up after that. As for Tirpitz she was in commision
at the time of the Bismarck incident but was still working up (May 41)
> If, as I seem to recall, Graf Zeppelin about 70% complete in late
> 1939 she could have been to sea in mid 1940.
Work was suspended when the ship was 90% complete in
May 1940. She'd have needed at least a year to complete,
commission and work up her air group.
Personally I wouldnt want to try to operate ME-109's of
a carrier at all but by 1941 they'd be meeting Martlets
and Sea Hurricanes.
> Peter Strasser would
> have taken longer but Bismarck with 15" armed S & G and Graf
> Zeppelin would have presented the RN with a nasty dilemma in mid to
> late 1940.
>
I think the better word is target. Without the losses of the Norway campaign
they'd face Hood, KGV, 5 QE's, Nelson and Rodney , the R's , Renown, Repulse
Furious, Glorious, Ark Royal and possibly Illustrious.
Keith
Paul J. Adam
<nob...@nowhere.com> writes
>In article <1010753773.12579....@news.demon.co.uk>,
>Keith Willshaw <keith_w...@compuserve.com> wrote:
>> Offer generous terms to Britain,allowing it keep its empire
>> and allowing it a free hand in Africa and the Mid east while
>> getting them to stop interfering in Europe.
>That's certainly a good starting point; the offers have to made
>publicly, of course.
>
>I always liked Len Deighton's suggestion (I think it's in
>_Blitzkrieg_): at the end of June, 1940, Germany declares unilateral
>peace on Britain.
Peter Fleming made the same suggestion in "Invasion 1940", for exactly
similar reasons.
Hans-Joachim Zierke
Alan Lothian schrieb:
> I always liked Len Deighton's suggestion (I think it's in
> _Blitzkrieg_): at the end of June, 1940, Germany declares unilateral
> peace on Britain. While German military units (land, air and sea) will
> reserve the right to defend themselves, there will be no further
> offensive action. Only fighter squadrons will be stationed at French
> airbases (US observers invited to verify) and, best of all, British
> PoWs are returned, unconditionally, under Red Cross auspices.
>
> The gesture costs Germany almost nothing. It pulls the rug away
> completely from Churchillian belligerence, which had more than a few
> enemies in the British establishment anyway.
And it would have fitted perfectly to the ideological and political goals
of the Nazis, yes.
> Hitler? Ha ha ha.
Exactly. If turned down, this guy would have thought that he had lost his
face, not understanding the implications.
But then again, a wise man won't dream up Nazi ideology, so it all fits
together.
hajo
Hans-Joachim Zierke
Alan Lothian schrieb:
> Hmm. Not that straightforward. Wiping out the British at Dunkirk would
> likely have been expensive. Good defenses against tanks -- all those
> canals etc -- stubborn infantry that can be at least modestly
> resupplied for a while. In any case, German armour was way down in
> strength (maintenance far more than Allied action) and for all Hitler
> or anyone else knew in May, 1940, the Wehrmacht still faced some heavy
> fighting to knock France out.
At least, your expectations weren't the reason. It was Hitler's lone
decision to stop the troops short of Dunquerque, while the commanders in
the field couldn't believe it.
> Plus the May 1940 Luftwaffe enormously overestimated its anti-shipping
> abilities and weapons.
Right. Mr. Großmaul telling Hitler that they would sink all those ships may
have played a role, but the common assumption is, that Hitler's decision
was based on ideology, and on the assumption that crushing those troops
would blow any chances to achieve peace in the west. It is hard to know
what leads a lone decision, though.
> Worth pointing out, too, that even *after* Dunkirk the British were
> sending fighting troops to France by the division. (Well, at least one
> division.)
It wasn't my intention to say they couldn't. It was meant as an example for
a war steered by ideology, not by military considerations. The German
military, if in decisionmaking position, won't have stopped short of that
beach.
> You mean the Z-plan? Or is this something different, with no Graf
> Zeppelin etc?
It is really a long time ago that I was interested in the German WWII Navy,
approx. 25 years. Back then, I did a lot of reading about the subject,
including Raeder's memoirs. If my fading memory serves me right, Raeder
even went personally to Hitler, urging for an answer wether they had to
expect war with Britain earlier, and telling that the "normal" and accepted
fleetbuilding program would leave Germany mostly unprotected and unable to
do anything useful on the Navy side.
The alternative plan called for as many U-boats as possible, plus coastal
craft, minelayers, destroyers, plus some surface raider capability, but no
battleships or carriers, since those won't be ready anyway. In short: Build
as strong a poor man's Navy as possible, since there is no time to do
anything else.
It was no far-foresighted "battleships are useless" cleverness, but a "we
don't want to spend precious money on things that aren't operational
anyway" cleverness.
> Well, Tirpitz & S&G meant that the RN had to keep some BB strength
> handy.
Carriers would have done just fine, but the RN didn't understand that at
the time given.
And I thought of a situation where there won't have been GErman
battleships, leaving Britain with a high humber of expensive ships without
usefulness.
BTW: In reality, S&G should have been enough to make Britain keep those
very expensive forces around.
hajo
Jack Love
One of the points of "A War To Be Won" was that the Germans never had
a strategy. They assumed, if they thought that far at all, that if
one won enough battles 'victory' was assured.
For example, Raeder pressed very hard, to be allowed to attack US
shipping simply because it would make the U boat campaign easier,
ignoring the overall issue of bringing the US into the war with both
feet. [probably not as vehemently as Pearl Harbor but still with
substantial vigor].
>Keith
>
Nicholas Smid
B F Lake wrote in message ...
BB with room to manuver had little to fear from Torpedo craft. Tied up in
port yes they were vanrable, already cripeled from the preveous days
fighting, yes isolated damaged BB's were brought down the night after
Tsushima, but those still able to manuver fought them off with few real
problems. It also showed that well other types could contest the sea only
the Battle Fleet could control it.
>Churchill etc kept trying to turn the clock back, especially as trench
>warfare set in with such losses, and go back to the "British way" of
>periferal warfare, but it couldn't be done, the western front (as seen by
>the Germans) was everything. In WW2 , Churchill still tried to avoid the
>continent and pretend it was still 1860 or whenever and the Empire was
still
>viable etc , and the RN could pretend so too, except they had their money
>cut off by post-war realists.
>
desided to spend the money on other things, this wasn't all bad but it was
over done, many would argue its still being over done. In 1940-43 there
were only two choises in stratagy, do nothing, exsept rather inefective
bombing, or fight on the edges, the Allies simply lacked the strength to
make an effective landing in Europe. This is classic UK stratagy, fight
around the edges untill you weaken the oposition enough to go for his
hart.
>IMO, most of the stuff I have been reading to do with the naval part of WW1
>and 2 has reflected the navalist point of view and somehow all this other
>writing by (British) experts on things somehow never gets a mention. I
>recommend Kennedy's book to get a different perspective. I will say he too
>emphasizes things to make his point. eg he says Jutland was only
>significant for the time the BBs turned away from the DD torpedo attack,
>which strengthens the importance of the torpedo. He says the key moment
was
>really later, in August 1916, when after a bad scare during a sortie with
>the Grand Fleet, Jellicoe forbade the big ships from going anywhere in a
big
>chunk of the North Sea from fear of submarines , essentially leaving it
as
>a free sailing zone for the HSF. He was supported in this by Beatty who
>tightened it more when he took over. Kennedy sees this event as another
key
>turning point when people realized the BB was finished, but of course the
>BBs were not all scrapped the next day!
>
Given the speed of WWI torpedos, and there short range, a turn away
quite often let you out run them. By the same token a turn into the attack
might well have been a better idea. Still for all the torpedo attacks made
on BB's relitivly few got any result and it was older ships that suffered
worst.
>1905 is also key for two reasons to do with Tsushima. First, the British
>strategy from ~1870 to then was to counter France and Russia which had big
>navies and threatened each end of the Med trading route to India etc etc.
>All of a sudden, the Russian navy was gone! Unfortunately the German Navy
>popped up just then, and it was not stuck in the Baltic. The other
Tsushima
>thing was the "lesson" on the gun vs torpedo that was worrying the navy so
>much. The navalists saw what they wanted to see (IMO) and decided the
>torpedo wasn't so bad after all and that nothing had changed for the BB
>navy. IMO they should have seen the truth, but that would be asking too
>much of human nature.
>
Basic UK stratagy, I forget the PM who said it but " The UK has no
permanent friends or enamies, only permanent interests", befor 1870
France was the dominante European land power so Britan supported
the Prussians to balance them. After 1870 Germany was the domanent
land power so the Brits moved round to supporting France against them
Russia was a seperat issue more to do with compatition in the Middle East.
>The new HSF threat in 1905 was seen as a support for a German army advance
>to the Lowlands and an invasion threat to the UK (see 1588). Much worry
>about the way the HSF was concentrated and had the initiative to stike
first
>anywhere and the RN was scattered about the Britian and so had to be way
>bigger than the HSF etc, but the thing is this was part of, not a denial
of,
>the new reality that the threat to the UK was from the German army advance
>to the west and could only be stopped by an army. The RN was only there
to
>fend off the HSF from helping the German army, making the British/French
>armies' task easier. So the RN was in a secondary role, not the old
primary
>role when it used to do the blockade while the army operated on the
>perifery.
>
You're missing one vital point, nothing that happend in the ground fighting
nomatter how catestrophic, could immedeatly cost Britan the war. To use
another quote about Jellico, 'He was the only man who could lose the war
in an afternoon'. Nothing he did could win the war for the Brits but if he
got
it wrong had got a large chunk of his fleet sunk, or even seriously shot up
he could lose control of the sea lanes the country depended on and with
that the war was over.
Avalon
"Hans-Joachim Zierke" <Usen...@Zierke.com> wrote in message
news:slrna408p5....@hersland.Zierke.com...
>
> Alan Lothian schrieb:
>
> > Hmm. Not that straightforward. Wiping out the British at Dunkirk would
> > likely have been expensive. Good defenses against tanks -- all those
> > canals etc -- stubborn infantry that can be at least modestly
> > resupplied for a while. In any case, German armour was way down in
> > strength (maintenance far more than Allied action) and for all Hitler
> > or anyone else knew in May, 1940, the Wehrmacht still faced some heavy
> > fighting to knock France out.
>
> At least, your expectations weren't the reason. It was Hitler's lone
> decision to stop the troops short of Dunquerque, while the commanders in
> the field couldn't believe it.
>
> > Plus the May 1940 Luftwaffe enormously overestimated its anti-shipping
> > abilities and weapons.
>
> Right. Mr. Großmaul telling Hitler that they would sink all those ships
may
> have played a role, but the common assumption is, that Hitler's decision
> was based on ideology, and on the assumption that crushing those troops
> would blow any chances to achieve peace in the west. It is hard to know
> what leads a lone decision, though.
I had always assumed from my reading and various documentaries that the idea
of saving of the British troops to bolster a peace offer was a post war
myth. The reason that Hitler stopped the tanks temporarily before Dunkirk
was that he didn't think it was good tank territory, he didn't want to loose
any more before the final battle for France, and very importantly Goering
had claimed that his aircraft would finish the job. The Luftwaffe tried very
hard to finish the job, but were unable to do it in the face of the
determined struggle put up by Park.
Peter FitzGerald-Morris
B F Lake
> You're missing one vital point, nothing that happend in the ground
fighting
> nomatter how catestrophic, could immedeatly cost Britan the war. To use
> another quote about Jellico, 'He was the only man who could lose the war
> in an afternoon'. Nothing he did could win the war for the Brits but if he
> got
> it wrong had got a large chunk of his fleet sunk, or even seriously shot
up
> he could lose control of the sea lanes the country depended on and with
> that the war was over.
The army was the only way to win vs the continental power, so it becomes
the senior service.(gasp) But without overseas/cross channel support the
army can't hold off the enemy (counts as a win) so since the navy is the
only one to prevent that, it is still the senior service?
So Jellicoe is right that the navy can cause the loss. But so could the
army by not holding the line even with good supplies etc.(gets
out-generalled, say) You get 1940 sometime in WW1. The RN is just fine,
but there is no way for Britain to get France back on its feet and then beat
the Germans.
So those who want to say the navy is still primary can, but there was a
significant change in that it now could only help prevent a loss; it could
not create a win as before by blockade. This would have eventually led to
a change in the traditional fighting spirit of the RN, where risk-taking
would now be frowned upon. It is a good thing people do not change as fast
as circumstances then, so the RN still had lots of "go" in WW2 with many of
the same people still in uniform?
Regards,
Barry
Keith Willshaw
> "Nicholas Smid" <smi...@xtra.co.nz> wrote in message news:AH508.1908$
>
> So Jellicoe is right that the navy can cause the loss. But so could the
> army by not holding the line even with good supplies etc.(gets
> out-generalled, say) You get 1940 sometime in WW1. The RN is just fine,
> but there is no way for Britain to get France back on its feet and then
beat
> the Germans.
>
>
It may have escaped your notice Mr Lake but Britain
did not in fact lose the war in 1940 and more than they
did against Napoleon in 1805 or the Armada in 1588
In all of those cases defending the home islands
and playing for time was a consistent winning strategy.
Keith
Keith Willshaw
"Avalon" <Ava...@isis.softnet.co.uk> wrote in message
news:a1qpvq$5pn$1...@paris.btinternet.com...
>
> I had always assumed from my reading and various documentaries that the
idea
> of saving of the British troops to bolster a peace offer was a post war
> myth. The reason that Hitler stopped the tanks temporarily before Dunkirk
> was that he didn't think it was good tank territory, he didn't want to
loose
> any more before the final battle for France, and very importantly Goering
> had claimed that his aircraft would finish the job. The Luftwaffe tried
very
> hard to finish the job, but were unable to do it in the face of the
> determined struggle put up by Park.
>
> Peter FitzGerald-Morris
>
>
There's also the fact that the Panzer divisions were exhausted,
were down to 50% strength and were far ahead of the infantry a
and had outrun their supplies.
Keith
B F Lake
> > It may have escaped your notice Mr Lake but Britain
> did not in fact lose the war in 1940 and more than they
> did against Napoleon in 1805 or the Armada in 1588
>
> In all of those cases defending the home islands
> and playing for time was a consistent winning strategy.
I would say Britain did lose the war in 1940, with the fall of France. It
depends on your definition of when you have lost. If you fall from a high
roof, you have lost your life even though you have not reached the part
that hurts at the bottom of your fall. So Britain lost in 1940, but
somewhere between after passing the fifth floor on the way down and before
reaching the fourth floor level, Superman swooped in and caught the fair
Britannia in mid-air saving her from her fate.
Seems UK respondents are a little touchy about any suggestions of Britain
being a loser, even on a whimsical what-if basis? <G>
Regards,
Barry
Iain Rae
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote
>
>
>>> It may have escaped your notice Mr Lake but Britain
>>>
>>did not in fact lose the war in 1940 and more than they
>>did against Napoleon in 1805 or the Armada in 1588
>>
>>In all of those cases defending the home islands
>>and playing for time was a consistent winning strategy.
>>
>
> I would say Britain did lose the war in 1940, with the fall of France. It
> depends on your definition of when you have lost.
In terms of warfare It's usually when you sign a document headed
something along the lines of "Declaration of Surrender" or when the
opposing commander takes over, in order, your house, your car and your
mistress.
> If you fall from a high
> roof, you have lost your life even though you have not reached the part
> that hurts at the bottom of your fall.
> So Britain lost in 1940, but
> somewhere between after passing the fifth floor on the way down and before
> reaching the fourth floor level, Superman swooped in and caught the fair
> Britannia in mid-air saving her from her fate.
Bit of a bugger if she was having a go at BASE jumping though.
Shit we must have lost the Napoleonic war when Sir John Moore's army
retreated from spain in 1809, so how come I'm not typing this in French?
Keith Willshaw
> "Keith Willshaw" <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote
>
> > > It may have escaped your notice Mr Lake but Britain
> > did not in fact lose the war in 1940 and more than they
> > did against Napoleon in 1805 or the Armada in 1588
> >
> > In all of those cases defending the home islands
> > and playing for time was a consistent winning strategy.
>
> I would say Britain did lose the war in 1940, with the fall of France. It
> depends on your definition of when you have lost.
That usually is said to occur at the end of a war , not 20%
of the way through it.
On this basis Britain could have been said to have
lost the Napoleonic wars and the wars agaisnt the
Spain of Phillip II
> If you fall from a high
> roof, you have lost your life even though you have not reached the part
> that hurts at the bottom of your fall.
Unless you happen to land on something soft
As they used to say in Vaudeville, it aint over
till the fat lady sings.
> So Britain lost in 1940, but
> somewhere between after passing the fifth floor on the way down and before
> reaching the fourth floor level, Superman swooped in and caught the fair
> Britannia in mid-air saving her from her fate.
>
> Seems UK respondents are a little touchy about any suggestions of Britain
> being a loser, even on a whimsical what-if basis? <G>
>
You have an odd definition of defeat and victory <shrug>
Keith
B F Lake
> Shit we must have lost the Napoleonic war when Sir John Moore's army
> retreated from spain in 1809, so how come I'm not typing this in French?
Because back in 1809 ish Britain was an industrial superpower , superior to
the continental economy even if in united form, and her balance of payments
remained advantageous (mostly) without the continent In 1940 , the
continental economy was potentially superior and could out-do Britain's at
max capacity, so Britain was basically screwed after France fell to the
Germans.
Apparently, from ~1870 on , Britain gradually lost her industrial advantage
over the US and Germany and was unable to make enough money from exporting
industrial goods because they became uncompetative due to lack of
reinvestment in more productivity type plant and all that. Britain had vast
income from investment overseas, from the money they had made earlier before
the decline at home, so she did not go broke from the loss of export trade
money until that investment income too was lost. Seems Britain had to sell
her overseas investments to pay for the War(s) and after that no more
income! This left her with a home industry that had not been re-invested in
(because the money guys spent it instead building railways and modern
factories overseas and sent the income from that to the City--the very
investments that put their home factories out of business. This situation
got turned around after 1979 :)
This meant that Britain could no longer stand alone in 1940 because she was
unable to out-produce the continent from home industry, had insufficient
income from overseas, couldn't sell ill-manufactured exports to the US
customer, and maxed out her credit card. In other words she was flat on
her ass and no way to get up. That counts as having lost . Good thing
the Germans were insane and wandered away to attack the Russians and then
declared war on the US when they didn't have to! I don't think Britain can
take credit for a "win" just because their opponent was crazy.
Churchill was right not to surrender in 1940 while he played the FDR card.
The what-if there is would the FDR card have done any good if the Germans
had not attacked the Russians and gone to a total war economy after France
fell instead of relaxing for a few beers and letting the civvies think it
was all over for a wasted year before getting serious again? Britain went
total war but her max with small population and sorry industry couldn't
compete with a fully geared up Germany-Europe.
(as for the blame game , glass houses and throwing stones, guess what I
think of Canada's performance since 1956?) also, some think the USA is now
in the same fix the Brits were in after 1870, by living off investment
income while the home industry is neglected and imports are used instead.
I cannot follow all this economic stuff how the US was tits -up in the 80s
and suddenly came out top-dog again (or did it?) and what the true
situation is. If you try to figure it out you realize you don't even know
what money really is! Luckily, it doesn't matter whether I understand it or
not.
I expect the usual scathing posts from smners who have it all figured out
<G>
Regards,
Barry
AndrSwllw
<jack...@earthlink.net> writes:
Never had a strategy? Or never had a strategy against UK and US?
They could have had a partial strategy against France and
Germany. The presence of Britain meant that the previous
strategy did not fit and needed a total rewrite. Rewrite to be
completed within a month, rather than the peace time 5 years.
Andrew Swallow
Jörg Bihlmayr
Keith Willshaw wrote:
> "Ken & Laura Chaddock" <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote in message
> news:3C3FA29A...@hfx.eastlink.ca...
>
>>Keith Willshaw wrote:
>>
>>
>>>"Ken & Laura Chaddock" <chad...@hfx.eastlink.ca> wrote in message
>>>news:3C3CFB69...@hfx.eastlink.ca...
>>>
>>>>To expand this basic thread...
>>>>
>>>> What If: Hitler was "pro-Navy" and had pushed completion
>>>>of Bismarck, Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser and the
>>>>conversion of Sharnhorst and Gnesneau to 15 inch artillery ?
>>>>
>>>They'd have met the RN Fast Carriers equipped with Hellcats,
>>>Corsairs and Avengers escorted by the KGV's and Queens .
>>>
>> Would they have arrived on the scene that late ? Bismarck was
>>ready as it was in August 1940, presumable if Hitler had been
>>pushing it she could have been ready earlier as could Tirpitz. S & G
>>could have been converted even before 1939.
>>
>
> Hardly
>
> In the case of S&G the 15" guns werent available, the first of the
> 38 cm/52 (14.96") SK C/34 not being available until 1939,
> thats why they were built with the 11" turrets.
The other reason was, they didn't want to *upset* the UK when using 15"
guns. So they used the 11" istead.
>
Jörg
>
<schnipp>
Paul Holloway
Guess it depends on your definition of victor or loser.
Britain wasn't going to lose. The RN ruled the surrounding seas and even
if Hitler would have been dead serious about invading (he wasn't), the
Germans simply weren't capable of conducting a succesful amphibious invasion
of the British Isles.
Reading through many of your posts, you seem to imply that the RN was
irrelevant sometime after 1905, and that navies in general were a luxury
that weren't needed. History proves this to be flat out wrong.
B F Lake
>
> Britain wasn't going to lose. The RN ruled the surrounding seas and even
> if Hitler would have been dead serious about invading (he wasn't), the
> Germans simply weren't capable of conducting a succesful amphibious
invasion
> of the British Isles.
Not yet. If they had waited a while till they were ready, (and unless the
Russians or Americans did something, nobody could stop them getting ready) ,
they had the whole continental industrial economy plus millions of men , so
they could pick their moment. Obviously they were unready in summer 1940 in
real life because they had no long-term plan or preparations.
>
> Reading through many of your posts, you seem to imply that the RN was
> irrelevant sometime after 1905, and that navies in general were a luxury
> that weren't needed. History proves this to be flat out wrong.
Wrong inference. The RN could not win the war anymore that's all; still
needed to conduct its part of the warfare. My poor job of explaining
things I guess. Recommend everyone read Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall
of British Naval Mastery" and see what you think. Easy read and gets the
brain going, no law says you have to agree with it all natch.
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
<nos...@nospam.com> wrote:
>"Paul Holloway" <pau...@exis.net> wrote in message news
>>
>> Britain wasn't going to lose. The RN ruled the surrounding seas and even
>> if Hitler would have been dead serious about invading (he wasn't), the
>> Germans simply weren't capable of conducting a succesful amphibious
>invasion
>> of the British Isles.
>
>Not yet. If they had waited a while till they were ready, (and unless the
>Russians or Americans did something, nobody could stop them getting ready) ,
>they had the whole continental industrial economy plus millions of men , so
>they could pick their moment. Obviously they were unready in summer 1940 in
>real life because they had no long-term plan or preparations.
Their problem with waiting until they were ready is that they
were not set up to integrate conquered territories into their
empire. They raped conquered plants, to the glory of Krupp &
others. As a result, the conquered territories seemed to give
them less than they did before the conquest.
The big if onlies from the German side were:
1) If only they'd had a way of ending hostilities with France
that would leave the French economy supporting their turn east,
and France brokering peace with Britain.
2) If only they'd been set up to take advantage of the
restiveness of Stalin's minorities. They could have doen well as
liberators.
Of course, Hitler and his cronies were light years away from
winning policies. There was no chance of this sort of thing.
____
Peter Skelton
Alan Lothian
<skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
> Of course, Hitler and his cronies were light years away from
> winning policies. There was no chance of this sort of thing.
I always liked the "Now here's my plan" analysis. Bright young staff
officer rushes up to Dolfo and says, "Sir, sir, we are desperately
short of scientists and engineers."
"Now here's my plan. Let's gas all the Jewish ones."
BYSO appears again: "Sir, sir, the Americans have jumpstarted their
economy until it is about 4.5 times the size of the Reich"
"Now here's my plan. Let's declare war on them."
BYSO yet again: "Sir, sir, the Ukrainians want to fight for us against
the Bolshevik hordes."
"Now here's my plan. Let's kill them all."
etc etc etc.
An aside to this: in 1941, the only major power *incapable* of beating
the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany. OK, I know this isn't
soc.history.what-if; but imagine the US, spam and all, invading Russia
in 1941.....
*Especially* the spam.
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
ROBERT BREEN) wrote:
> (the
> C-cruisers would probably have gone for the same reasons, though
> the D-conversions with 4x2x4.5" BD would probably still be around
> as fleet AA cruisers).
I have a feeling the remaining unconverted ships would have been
converted. By the way all the AA cruisers I have found references for
mounted 4 inch guns except for Delhi which had US 5 inch guns. The
number of guns varied. The first ships converted had ten singles,
later ships had 4 twin mounts with increased light AA.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
<ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <a1k8lr$74f5$1...@central.aber.ac.uk>, a...@aber.ac.uk (ANDREW
>ROBERT BREEN) wrote:
>
>> (the
>> C-cruisers would probably have gone for the same reasons, though
>> the D-conversions with 4x2x4.5" BD would probably still be around
>> as fleet AA cruisers).
> I have a feeling the remaining unconverted ships would have been
>converted. By the way all the AA cruisers I have found references for
>mounted 4 inch guns except for Delhi which had US 5 inch guns. The
>number of guns varied. The first ships converted had ten singles,
>later ships had 4 twin mounts with increased light AA.
The C class AA conversions had 8-10 4", either in single or twin
mounts (depending on the ship) and with a single multiple pom-pom
as a CIWS. The D-clss conversions (which were cancelled with the
outbreak of war) were to have four twin 4.5", which actually ended
up being used in some of the Didoes when the planned 5.25" mounts
weren't ready in time - Brown discusses this in 'Nelson to Vanguard'.
The early Cs were pretty marginal on weight once converted, and as
radar and (one would hope) better HA fire control became available
in the extra time before the balloons went up this problem would
only get worse - hence my suggestion that the early Cs at least
would have gone before the outbreak of a 1944-45 war: pressure on
manpower would have pointed that way too. Could be that instead
there'd have been more Hunts (possibly looking more like the Thorneycroft
Batch IVs?) or (much better) something like the 2000-ton escort that
Brown moots in N->V, with two or three twin 4" and a quad pom-pom
and 25 knots from machinery removed from scrapped R and S class
destroyers. There'd certainly have been more Vair and Wair destroyer
conversions - probably all the surviving ships (some, the oldest,
wopuld probably have gone for scrap). For that matter, with the new
J, K, L, M, N et seq. destroyers a-building, I could imagine classes
A->I gradually converting to a mainly HA armament along the lines of
the Wairs. If that happened then thee'd be less need for the (maintainance
and crew heavy, and notoriously wet) Cs.
--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)
Jack Love
wrote:
>In article <3c435f7a.181127660@news>, Peter Skelton
><skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
>
>
>> Of course, Hitler and his cronies were light years away from
>> winning policies. There was no chance of this sort of thing.
>
>
>I always liked the "Now here's my plan" analysis. Bright young staff
>officer rushes up to Dolfo and says, "Sir, sir, we are desperately
>short of scientists and engineers."
>"Now here's my plan. Let's gas all the Jewish ones."
>BYSO appears again: "Sir, sir, the Americans have jumpstarted their
>economy until it is about 4.5 times the size of the Reich"
>"Now here's my plan. Let's declare war on them."
>BYSO yet again: "Sir, sir, the Ukrainians want to fight for us against
>the Bolshevik hordes."
>"Now here's my plan. Let's kill them all."
>
>etc etc etc.
>
>An aside to this: in 1941, the only major power *incapable* of beating
>the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany. OK, I know this isn't
>soc.history.what-if; but imagine the US, spam and all, invading Russia
>in 1941.....
>
>*Especially* the spam.
Perhaps we should have offered all the spam they could eat to the USSR
that might have made their disposition a little bit more pleasant.
Never thought of spam as the ultimate cold war weapon!
David E. Powell
news:3c435f7a.181127660@news...
> On Mon, 14 Jan 2002 15:07:30 -0800, "B F Lake"
> <nos...@nospam.com> wrote:
>
> >"Paul Holloway" <pau...@exis.net> wrote in message news
> >>
> >> Britain wasn't going to lose. The RN ruled the surrounding seas and
even
> >> if Hitler would have been dead serious about invading (he wasn't), the
> >> Germans simply weren't capable of conducting a succesful amphibious
> >invasion
> >> of the British Isles.
> >
> >Not yet. If they had waited a while till they were ready, (and unless
the
> >Russians or Americans did something, nobody could stop them getting
ready) ,
> >they had the whole continental industrial economy plus millions of men ,
so
> >they could pick their moment. Obviously they were unready in summer 1940
in
> >real life because they had no long-term plan or preparations.
>
> Their problem with waiting until they were ready is that they
> were not set up to integrate conquered territories into their
> empire. They raped conquered plants, to the glory of Krupp &
> others. As a result, the conquered territories seemed to give
> them less than they did before the conquest.
Not to mention it hurting them in Russia by turning people that were glad to
see anyone but Stalin rolling into town into fierce partisans, screaming "Za
Stalina, Za Rodina!" as they sabotaged/shot/blew up Axis forces.
> The big if onlies from the German side were:
>
> 1) If only they'd had a way of ending hostilities with France
> that would leave the French economy supporting their turn east,
> and France brokering peace with Britain.
Yes. The idea of the Nazis harnessing the arms works of Europe was pointed
out earlier, as something they could have done. They did in a way, looking
at least at all the small arms they made by doing so (Despite locals
probably taking the process as slow as possible) in Czechoslovakia, Belgium,
etc. In a naval sense, in terms of ships, it is not only building, but
manning. For instance, the loss of the French fleet at Oran might have
really hurt them, but would they have ever ordered it into battle?
Reliability is the tough thing. Even under threat, a French crew and command
might turn their ship over to the Allies, or pull a swerve and start
blasting any German ship that might happen to be sailing with them. Maybe
wait until it gets dark/the sun behind them, and sneak a torpedo salvo,
followed by a barrage? Jean Bart fired on Torch forces, but the Germans
never managed to get her or any other French BBs/etc. on the ways
completed - even if they had, how would they have manned them? All French
crews? French crews with German officers? An all German crew would have to
train on the new systems, munitions specific to the French made ships
manufactured, etc. (Remember how one of the French BBs, ISTR, had to have
her barrels relined to take British RN 15 inch shells?) Plus commonality
would be a problem for logistics in other parts as well, not to mention
crossover training, etc.
With all German crews, a French BB would take as much men and officers as an
awful lot of U-Boats. Even then, by 1942 a sortie would be a tough prospect,
what with the USN in the war, and the British patrol/bomber forces at higher
strength. A sortie from a French port would be a tricky deal. Now, if the
Germans could have converted something on the ways to a Carrier, and got a
CVBG into the Atlantic in 1942....
Of course, I could also talk about the Italian surface fleet, and how that
was also something the German command probably figured on being a better
deterrent to the RN, but....
> 2) If only they'd been set up to take advantage of the
> restiveness of Stalin's minorities. They could have doen well as
> liberators.
Indeed. See the comments about the starved Ukranians, etc. - They hated
Stalin, but what to do when both sides are killing you? Poor bastards.
> Of course, Hitler and his cronies were light years away from
> winning policies. There was no chance of this sort of thing.
From my perspective as Devil's advocate, they "should" have listened to
Donitz. We are all fortunate they did not.
> Peter Skelton
Robin Paul
Jack Love <jack...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:svu84u8qgbnv1uum0...@4ax.com...
> On Tue, 15 Jan 2002 01:15:24 GMT, Alan Lothian <nob...@nowhere.com>
> wrote:
>
> >In article <3c435f7a.181127660@news>, Peter Skelton
> ><skel...@cogeco.ca> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Of course, Hitler and his cronies were light years away from
> >> winning policies. There was no chance of this sort of thing.
> >
> >
> >I always liked the "Now here's my plan" analysis. Bright young staff
> >officer rushes up to Dolfo and says, "Sir, sir, we are desperately
> >An aside to this: in 1941, the only major power *incapable* of beating
> >the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany. OK, I know this isn't
> >soc.history.what-if; but imagine the US, spam and all, invading Russia
> >in 1941.....
> >
> >*Especially* the spam.
>
> Perhaps we should have offered all the spam they could eat to the USSR
> that might have made their disposition a little bit more pleasant.
> Never thought of spam as the ultimate cold war weapon!
The Russian name for spam (they got sent a lot of it) was "second front".
The gag was, they kept calling for a second front, and they kept getting
spam...
Rob Paul
Nicholas Smid
B F Lake wrote in message ...
>
>> > It may have escaped your notice Mr Lake but Britain
>> did not in fact lose the war in 1940 and more than they
>> did against Napoleon in 1805 or the Armada in 1588
>>
>> In all of those cases defending the home islands
>> and playing for time was a consistent winning strategy.
>
>I would say Britain did lose the war in 1940, with the fall of France. It
>depends on your definition of when you have lost. If you fall from a
high
>roof, you have lost your life even though you have not reached the part
>that hurts at the bottom of your fall. So Britain lost in 1940, but
>somewhere between after passing the fifth floor on the way down and before
>reaching the fourth floor level, Superman swooped in and caught the fair
>Britannia in mid-air saving her from her fate.
>
that matters, and when fighting Britain the only point that realy matters,
is
that to defeat Britain you have only two real options both of them naval.
A/ You gain control of the channel for long enough to pass an army across
and support it long enough to occupy the country. Willy the Conc. and Welly
of Orange both managed this trick, the one befor there was a RN the other
because the RN eather stood aside or activly supported him. To my knolage
nobody ealse has managed more than raids.
B/ You establish a blockade and eather stave the country out or cause its
econamy to colapse. Lots of people have tryed that too, but to do it
effectivly
requires you somehow destroy or otherwise nutralise the RN's battle fleet,
Like I said lots tryed and the best they seem to have managed were a couple
of embarisingly near run things, against the Dutch and French in the 1600's.
The French tryed hard with Privateers, it made a good number of French
ship owners outstandingly rich but long term it failed. The Germans tryed
with U-Boats they too did alot of damage but failed.
So they only way to defeat Britain is to first defeat the RN desisivly
enough
that it can nolonger control home waters and the lines of supply. Failing
that
they just retreat behind a 20 mile moat and start looking for soft spots to
poke.
>Seems UK respondents are a little touchy about any suggestions of Britain
>being a loser, even on a whimsical what-if basis? <G>
>
and losing the war.
>Regards,
>Barry
>
>
Ken & Laura Chaddock
It is my understanding that this is the real reason and that the
original design
of S & G was for 15 inch artillery which was rejected by the politicians
because
of expected British and French "sensitivity" so they were actually
constructed with
triple 11" but designed to be (relatively) easily converted to twin
15/47's.
Now I agree that, *historically* the 15/47 twins weren't available
prior to 1939
but if Hitler had been pushing a naval revitalization I suspect that they
could have
since the 15/47s were a development of the Bayern class' 15/45s not a
completely
new design.
...Ken
Drazen Kramaric
<keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>There's also the fact that the Panzer divisions were exhausted,
>were down to 50% strength
Their commanders (Guderian and Rommel) were perfectly willing to lead
them towards Dunkirk.
>and were far ahead of the infantry
The whole army group of infantry was coming from the north maintaining
the contact with the very same BEF, panzers were about to trap.
>a and had outrun their supplies.
If logisticians would have had a final word, Montgomery would have
been universally recognised as the ultimate general of WW2. Yet, we
keep listening about various Pattons and Guderians outrunning their
supplies and trapping entire armies.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>Hmm. Not that straightforward. Wiping out the British at Dunkirk would
>likely have been expensive.
Not at all. Rommel was about to trap two British divisions still
fighting around Arras when the "halt order" came. Guderian had
Boulogne and Calais besieged and was accross the Aa canal on his way
to Dunkirk when he has been stopped.
It can be easily argued that without the "halt order" (inspired by
Runstedt), BEF would have been unable to deploy around the perimeter
and would have been defeated in detail.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
<Usen...@Zierke.com> wrote:
>So what do thinking poeple do, if the other side behaves in an unexpected
>way? They adapt to the real world and make a new plan. What do Nazis do in
>that situation? They carry on, and invade the Soviet Union with its
>disposable human material, those Untermenschen, instead of concentrating on
>getting rid of that real-world threat from the British Isles.
>
>Therefore, it is quite easy to set up theoretical plans, what the Germans
>could have done. Sure, any person with a brain would have avoided to fight
>multiple wars all over Europe, and would have concentrated on funelling all
>ressources to useful things for fighting Britain.
The scenario you put above is a wet dream of vast majority of WW2
wargamers. Instead of marching towards Russia, they rather send their
panzers, stukas and U-boats to Med in desperate attempt to somehow
force Britain into submission by conquering such important hexes like
Gibraltar, Malta or Suez.
The only remaining question is how this anti-British strategy solves
the main German strategic problem - lack of oil to pursue such
strategy. The historical ammount of planes and ships were inadequate
to defeat Britain and was capable of operating only because Stalin was
willing to contribute oil.
Also, such anti-British strategy would have demanded from Germany to
give up the their most powerful asset - army and expertise in land
warfare and engage in their least powerful field of operations - sea
against world's prime naval power.
Let's get serious, Germany was continental power with the most
powerful army in the world, supported by most powerful air force in
the world. These armed forces served the country who had no oil and
the only oil within reach was in the East.
Anti-British strategy would have demanded from Germany to give up all
the advantage they gained in pre-war rearming and successful campaigns
in 1939/40 and spend expensive resources in order to build up navy and
anti-shipping air force capable of defeating Britain. And for all that
effort, Germany would have got resourceless island while its sole
source of oil would have been on the mercy of Red Army with 20+
mechanised corps armed with T-34s and KV-1s.
Drax
Drazen Kramaric
>Britain wasn't going to lose. The RN ruled the surrounding seas and even
>if Hitler would have been dead serious about invading (he wasn't), the
>Germans simply weren't capable of conducting a succesful amphibious invasion
>of the British Isles.
The unfeasibility of invasion of British Isles (Sea Lion) has been
debated to death usually with the conclusion that German success was
highly unlikely.
(It would take something like Kriegsmarine surviving Norwegian
campaign intact, paratroopers suffering little loss in Netherlands,
BEF captured in Dunkirk, Fighter Command fully commited and
attritioned in the Battle for France, Royal Navy doing some
Halsey-at-Leyte type of blunder allowing Germans to capture a working
port in vicinity of usable airport and committed Hitler willing to
gamble his prestige in launching the invasion in the first place).
What I would like to explore is the 1941 Sea Lion. With Hitler
dedicated to the invasion of Britain sometime in 1941 and turning the
military production in full motion towards producing aircraft and
vessels necessary for the invasion.
The Battle for Britain continues as historically while German industry
concentrates on building aircraft and amphibious vessels to replace
the Rhine barges.
Who would have profited more from the delay? RAF or Luftwaffe?
Drax
Keith Willshaw
"Drazen Kramaric" <drazen....@zg.hinet.hr> wrote in message
news:3c506f5c...@news.hinet.hr...
The RAF in my opinion
The Germans in 1939 were in a clearly superior position
with regard to Air power. They had a reserve of trained
and experienced pilots and aircraft that was second to none.
The expansion of the RAF only staarted in earnest in 1938
but by 1940, despite the losses in France they were able
to fight the Luftwaffe to a standstill.
The Empire Air training scheme meant the RAF could turn
essentially unlimited numbers of trained pilots from establishments
safely beyon enemy range in Canada, Australia. South Africa
and Rhodesia
At the same time the shadow factory scheme had dispersed
aircraft production and both bomber command and fighter
comamnd were much stonger than they had been in 1940
Also by 1941 RCAF squadrons were begiining to arrive in
Britain and serious qunatities of American built aircraft
like the Kittyhawk and Mustang I
The coastal defences were much improved with major
reinforcement of the defenses along the Kent and Sussex
coasts. The army had been much expanded and requipped
and the navy had been strengthened considerably.
Given that Comrade Stalin was busily rebuilding his
army to the east the main threat axis to the reich surely
lay in that direction. Germany could not invade
Britain and Britain could not invade Europe
but a 1000 miles of land border to the East
was vulnerable.
Keith
Keith Willshaw
> On Sun, 13 Jan 2002 12:20:46 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> <keith@kwillshaw_NoSpam.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>
> >There's also the fact that the Panzer divisions were exhausted,
> >were down to 50% strength
>
> Their commanders (Guderian and Rommel) were perfectly willing to lead
> them towards Dunkirk.
>
Indeed they were but their commander, Von Rudstedt
was not. They may have been right incidentally but the
German high command was not prepared to take the
risk when there was a large French army still in the field.
> >and were far ahead of the infantry
>
> The whole army group of infantry was coming from the north maintaining
> the contact with the very same BEF, panzers were about to trap.
>
Correction
Part of the infantry was maintaining contact with the BEF, most
was pressing on inland towards Paris and the French interior
> >a and had outrun their supplies.
>
> If logisticians would have had a final word, Montgomery would have
> been universally recognised as the ultimate general of WW2. Yet, we
> keep listening about various Pattons and Guderians outrunning their
> supplies and trapping entire armies.
>
Actually Pattons armies ground to a halt in 1944 and left
a bulge in their lines as you may recall. Tanks dont run well
without fuel and a column of tanks without fuel or gas is
damm all use to anyone.
Keith
Hans-Joachim Zierke
Drazen Kramaric schrieb:
> The scenario you put above is a wet dream of vast majority of WW2
> wargamers. Instead of marching towards Russia, they rather send their
> panzers, stukas and U-boats to Med in desperate attempt to somehow
> force Britain into submission by conquering such important hexes like
> Gibraltar, Malta or Suez.
Please cite a posting of mine, suggesting that.
hajo
--
> IIRC, when the new 12.7 mm multipurpose round from Raufoss was
> used first time in a firing display the NATO audience was stunned.
And from a near-miss, too. These bureaucrat-sensing fuses may change the
whole art of war. Alan Lothian