"The Japs have gone on radio silence up in the North Pacific," an
Army intelligence officer remarked to Krick one day in late May, 1942.
"What do you make of that?"
Krick studied the weather maps for the region and saw that there was a
cold front between the place where the enemy had been known to be, and
the Aleutian Islands, curving south-westward in a long arc from the
Alaskan mainland.
He knew that US planes, flying reconnaissance out of Alaska, were
unable to penetrate this cold front without icing up and therefore
wouldn't know what the enemy was up to.
They could be planning to attack the Aleutians," Krick said.
He studied the maps further, then he stuck his forefinger on the
calendar and said:
"This is the day they'll attack Dutch Harbor- June 3."
The intelligence officer reported the conversation to his chief,
General George Strong, who rushed Krick before General George C.
Marshall, Army Chief of Staff. Marshall immediately ordered an airlift
of troops and supplies to Alaska, so that when the Japanese attacked,
hitting Dutch Harbour with four bombers and about fifteen fighters on
the very day Krick had predicted, the Americans were ready.
The raid "was not a surprise and the station was pre- pared to meet
it," reported Rear Admiral C. S. Freeman, commandant of the 13th Naval
District, as quoted by the United Press. Afterward, Army staff
intelligence asked and received verification of the accuracy of
Krick's Alaska forecast.
Weather Bureau Chief Reichelderfer, knowing nothing about that
forecast, meantime kept after him. In a long memorandum to Krick the
day after the forecast was verified, Reichelderfer repeated that he
considered long-range forecasting humbug, no better than "those to be
expected by random process, that is, without skill.
" Indeed" Reichelderfer wrote, "None of the long-range methods now
under development by the Joint Weather Central [a grouping of Army,
Navy, and Weather Bureau forecasters under the Weather Bureau's roof,
all making their own forecasts] is as yet appreciably superior to pure
guesswork for periods beyond three or four days."
The fact that there had been acceptance of Krick's work, Reichelderfer
went on, presumably having in mind Krick's paying clients, wasn't
enough to prove anything.
"For example [astrologers] enjoy a popular reputation for far-
sightedness, yet their predictions have been proven valueless."
General Arnold, much impressed by Krick's Alaska forecast, wanted him
in Air Force uniform. He wrote to Admiral Ernest King, commander in
chief of the Navy, asking for Lieutenant Krick's release.
In no time Krick was out of the Navy and in the Air Force but only
with the rank of major, inferior to the colonels (his former students)
he would be working with.
***
Chapter ends:
Millikan's message bore the name of Paul S. Epstein in addition to his
own.
Epstein had been characterized by President Karl Compton of MIT as
"the dean of American theoretical physicists."
Millikan wrote two letters to General Arnold, including the message
from the Colonels. In praise of Krick he wrote:
"A number of us who had a chance to observe the work of Dr. Krick for
the past ten years . . . have been impressed by the sanity and
intelligence of his approach to meteorological problems as we saw
them . . . We had also become pretty thoroughly convinced that he was
introducing some new methods which had a good deal of promise for the
ultimate development of very valuable long-range forecasts . . ."
In his second letter to Arnold, Millikan included this striking
comment by Epstein:
"Before Krick's theory of weather types and sequences was advanced,
the problem of long-range forecasting was so vague and diffuse as to
be altogether hopeless. But with the help of Krick's theory (which I,
personally, regard not as a theory but as an established fact) the
problem can be given a precise mathematical formulation."
>
http://weathersage.com/texts/boesen/chapter4.htm
I don't know where to get the reanalysis for that part of the world
from those days. I have got WetterZentrale's upper air charts (500
millibars) for the North Atlantic for June 1944.
It is interesting to note that in the PDF Keith gave a link to one of
his adversaries ascribed the day before the landing as too dangerous.
It doesn't appear to be, as far as the chart goes, granted it is only
upper atmosphere.
What was required was light, upper and surface level stability and bad
weather to the north and east.
Also required were more days to follow the initial landings so that
the supplies could get through IIRC the book said 400 tons per legion
(per week?)
How the Met Office and the official US weather bods camew up with that
isn't mentioned. Just the disp[araging remark about the day too soon -
which was not true as far as I can tell (which isn't reliable enough
to go to court with I admit.)
I am pretty certain that WetterZentrale also holds the SSPs for the
relevant dates but I forget how to find them.
I don't think Patton's region will be covered by the North Atlantic
Charts either but here are the dates for that:
For the landings along the coast of French Morocco in North Africa,
General Patton called for at least three days with sea swells below
eight feet.
The weather where the boats were putting in should be clear so that
the Air Force could support the landings, dropping men and supplies.
Once the landings were committed, there could be no turning back.
At the same time, to the east and north, where enemy aircraft would
strike from, it would be well to have cloudiness that screened the
landings from air attack until they were well under way and Allied
airfields were established.
It was a demanding order.
Krick talked things over with Professor H. H. Sverdrup, Director of
the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at La Jolla, California, an
expert on Pacific Sea swell prediction.
Combining Professor Sverdrup's expertise in sea behavior with his own
in long-range weather prediction, Krick, on October 17, prepared a
chart for transmission to General Patton aboard the flagship of
Operation...
[text missing]
... occur between November 7 and November 14.
On the seventh, the sea would be at a peak of fifteen feet, extremely
high for that time of year, but it would be falling, reaching five
feet or less by the fourteenth of the month.
As it turned out, the peak came on November 1, two days early.
If the time of the peak had been two days late instead, the landings
could have been a disaster. But they were successfully carried out
beginning on November 8.
Following the success of the sea and swell forecasts for Operation
Torch, a number of Air Force weathermen were trained in the method
used.
They were assigned to perform this function for all amphibious
landings for the rest of the war. Two such specialists were stationed
in the British Admiralty to handle the task for the Allies during the
invasion of Normandy.
So far as Colonel Zimmerman was concerned, however, Krick was a total
loss.
As General Patton's tanks pushed farther into Africa and started the
enemy on his long retreat, Zimmerman characterized his performance as
"unsatisfactory" in the four efficiency report categories of handling
officers and men, performance of field duties, administrative and
executive duties and leadership.
In the space provided for "a brief general estimate of this officer
in your own words," Zimmerman wrote, among other things, that Krick:
"...has repeatedly disregarded instructions to deal through
established military channels. In my judgement he is also disloyal and
unreliable.
In comparing this officer with all other officers of his grade and
component known to me, I would place him among the lower third."
Had these deficiencies been brought to Krick's attention before this
report was written?
"Yes," Zimmerman wrote.
Had there been any improvement?
"None."
General Arnold dissented with Zimmerman.
Glancing at the report, he quickly drew a heavy line through the
middle of the sheet and boldly wrote, "EXCELLENT-SUPERIOR!" and signed
his name
>
http://weathersage.com/texts/boesen/chapter5.htm
I have placed the relevant charts on my blog. I will also create
animations of them too, when I have settled into this new OS (Zorin is
slightly superior to Ubuntu 11:04 but The Gimp is not behaving like it
should.)
>
http://my.opera.com/Weatherlawyer/albums/show.dml?id=12397352
>
http://my.opera.com/Weatherlawyer/albums/show.dml?id=12397302