Marine Corps and Naval Surface Fire Support
Andy Tompkins
Samuel L. Morison - 6/27/2005
In present and future U.S. military, a question about the Marine Corps
has been seriously raised about abolishing the Marine Corps. Today's
senior Marine Corps leaders are running their troops into the ground
and nobody seems to know or care enough to do anything about it. Even
their own Inspector General in a June 20, 2005 report to Congress has
indicated such. Chesty Puller, a true Marine Corps leader, must be
rolling in his grave in anguish and disgust over the current state of
the Marine Corps! Today's Marine Corps are turning into a Naval
Infantry. Thirty thousand men and women of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF), for example, are being deployed in Iraq! This is due
primarily to the fact that a series of senior Marine Corps leaders,
including today's leaders, have proven to be gutless when it comes to
standing up for valid Marine Corps requirements. A primary example is a
requirement for Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS).
Back in the days of Chesty Puller, a Marine Corps general officer
routinely put himself on the line to protect his people. Meanwhile,
today's senior Marine Corps generals are putting their people at
"considerable risk" to protect their own careers by not standing up to
the Navy, as well as to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Because it
has failed to stand up for there legitimate requirements, including
NSFS, the Marine Corps has become a vassal of the Navy and a second
Land Army, which contradicts the Department of Defense Directive 5100,
prohibiting the Marines from being such.
An essential component of amphibious operations and amphibious warfare
doctrine is NSFS. Since decommissioning the last of the Iowa Class
Battleships in April 1992, the Navy has promised the necessary NSFS to
the Marine Corps via a combination of at least six different ship and
gun/missile programs, the latest being the "black pit" known as the
DD(X). All the programs started off credibly enough, but one by one
they were constantly revised downward in capability or subsequently
canceled. Program after program has failed, the latest being the
Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM) program when after spending
$598.4 million in research and development (R & D) funds spent over six
years, the Navy finally gave up and cancelled it April 2005. The DD(X),
originally planed as a class of 30 units has become nothing but a
developmental bridge for the larger CG(X) with no more than 12 units
now scheduled to be built.
In his June 13, 2005 "Washington Times" Op-Ed piece a proponent of the
DD(X), Rear Admiral Charles S. Hamilton referred to the DD(X) as "the
mighty ships of the future". The piece is heavily rigged to reflect
the Navy's wishful thinking of the Navy rather than the facts. An
excellent example of where the facts contradict the Navy's claims is
Admiral Hamilton comparison of the DD(X) to the Battleship. He states
that battleships would not be able to fire munitions "as far as 115
miles in a life-saving time of only three minutes." That statement is
absurd. There has never been any ship that is could fire munitions 115
miles. Contrary to his claims that Long Range munitions for the
Battleship could not be quickly developed, tested and fielded with the
next few years, it has already been done. One extended range munition,
the EX-148 munition, a 13" Sabot round (NAVSEA Project No. S-1894) was
developed in 12-18 months and repeatedly and successfully test fired
over 100 times from USS IOWA from April 1987 to June/July 1990 reaching
an ultimate range of 45nm. During these tests none failed or melted in
the barrel as the ERGM munitions tended to do. The 13" sabot round was
designed to carry a 450 lbs. warhead of 555 M-46 sub-munitions which is
a warhead 19 times bigger than the new Long-Range Land Attack
Projectile (LRLAP) round.
Before any more money is squandered on the DD(X), $13.3 billion to
date, it is time to provide a near-term (within 2 years) NSFS solution.
It's time to reactivate and modernize the battleships Iowa (BB-61) and
Wisconsin (BB-64), not because they're Battleships, but because of
the NSFS and other capabilities they have/will have when modernized.
Reactivation and modernization costs are estimated to be between $750
million to $1 billion per ship compared to the R & D funds already
spent on the DD(X). According to the a recent Government Accountability
Office Report (GAO 5-301), the Navy's acquisition life cycle for the
DD(X) will ensure that U.S. ground forces will be without NSFS until
2030. We need credible NSFS now, not in a distant future.
North Korea is a prime example of where reliable NSFS would be needed.
The two battleships could not only provide an effective "bubble" with
which U.S. forces could project power ashore; but with most of North
Korea's defenses and industry being underground, as was the case in
North Vietnam, only the battleship's 16-guns with their 1,900 lb HE and
2,700 lb armor piercing rounds would be successful in destroying deeply
buried targets. In North Korea, 70% of all targets are within range of
the battle-ships' guns. This alone gives the U.S. a strategic deterrent
we realistically do not have now. An amphibious landing or forced
entry, such as Inchon, requires lethal, accurate, voluminous and
sustained NSFS. Modernized, the battleships would truly be a
transformational weapons system, empowering U.S. Forces with a credible
ability to perform Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).(a fancy
word for amphibious warfare).
In 1996, the Senate recognized that since Operation "Desert Storm", the
Navy has been incapable of meeting valid Marine Corps NSFS requirements
to support amphibious landings or other amphibious requirements. The
Senate also recognized the fact that battleships could provide a
platform for surface fire support capability unmatched by any other
Navy weapons system and that there was an ongoing concern to regarding
the Department of the Navy's apparent lack of commitment to provide for
the surface fire support capability necessary for amphibious assaults.
The ability of the Marine Corps and the Navy to conduct forcible entry
by amphibious assault is an essential element of the Department of the
Navy's strategic concept for littoral warfare. "The conferees believe
that the Department of the Navy's future year's defense program,
presented with the fiscal year 1996 budget, could not produce a
replacement fire support capability comparable to the battleships until
well into the next century. The conferees consider retention of the
battleships in the fleet's strategic reserve a `prudent measure' " and
in doing so, Congress passed Public Law 104-106 to maintain two
battleships, Iowa (BB-61) and Wisconsin (BB-64) on the Naval Vessel
Register in reserve as Mobilization assets until the Secretary of the
Navy can certify in writing to Congress that the Navy has an NSFS
capability that equals or surpasses the Iowa Class capabilities.
Sadly, nearly ten years later, the situation with the NSFS requirement
remains unchanged. A letter dated August 27, 1996 from the Marine
Corps' Warfighting Development Integration Division, Quantico, VA.
stated the following: "If we project our capability forward, based on
the programs in development today, to the 2006 time frame, we would see
a limited ability to perform Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)
like operations.""Projecting further to the 2015 time-frame, we expect
to fully realize the capability to execute OMFTS." The bottom line is
that the Marine Corps, for at least ten years, will be forced to
perform future amphibious operations similar the World War II landings
at Tarawa and Iwo Jima where the Marine Corps suffered horrific
casualties. Without NSFS, it would be even worse, much worse. It is
ultimately, the responsibility of the senior Marine Corps leadership to
ensure that the Marines get what they need to perform their mission and
survive on the battlefield; even if it means telling the Navy and
Congress in clear and certain terms it needs the battleships.
Tragically, the situation is about to get worse. The Navy leadership
has now convinced a few key members of Congress to do away with PL
104-106, in effect leaving the Marine Corps and the Army with NO NSFS
AND NO VIABLE PROGRAM to replace the capability of the battleships.
Specifically, in the FY 2006 defense bill before Congress proposes that
the last remaining battleships, Iowa (BB-61) and Wisconsin (BB-64) are
proposed to be officially retired and turned in to museums. To date,
not one senior Marine leader, including the Commandant, General Michael
Hagee, has raised an objection. By their inaction and silence in
defense of the use of the battleships, as an interim source of reliable
NSFS platform senior Marine Corps leaders are in fact making themselves
culpable in the unnecessary deaths of today's and future Marines when
they have to make the next amphibious landing.
Since 1992, the senior Marine Corps leaders have testified annually
before Congress that NSFS is an essential element of amphibious warfare
and have in great detail articulated its NSFS requirements to the Navy.
Yet, every year, the Navy fails to produce a replacement NSFS
capability to which the Marine Corps does little but "keep a stiff
upper lip." Clearly, if the Marine Corps is not willing to go to the
mat for something that is "essential" (essential being defined as that
which if not present or successfully performed will result in mission
failure or significant loss of life). It prefers to go to argue about a
recent study that the Marines do not need rough terrain forklifts for
use in Afghanistan. Clearly, if forklifts are a priority for Marine
Corps leadership and NSFS is not, the Marine Corps has poor leadership
and performing the amphibious mission is becoming untenable. If the
Marine Corps cannot perform the amphibious forcible entry without
unacceptable losses, then the very need for a Marine Corps is called
into question. Without NSFS, does our new expensive amphibious fleet
make sense? One highly regarded former Commandant, General P.X. Kelley
fears that by de-emphasizing its amphibious role, the Marine Corps
greatly risks being seen as duplicating the Army with potentially grave
results in terms of reduced funding and support for the Corps.
If the Marine Corps leadership fails to stand up and make a concerted
effort to save the Battleships, the Marine Corps should be abolished
and it's 178,000 authorized manpower strength turned over to the Army.
In doing this the U. S. taxpayers could save over $15.1 billion dollars
annually by not having to pay for an amphibious fleet that will have no
amphibious mission. It's time for the Marine leadership to stand-up for
what is right and honorable and make Chesty Puller proud.
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ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
andyto...@hotmail.com (Andy Tompkins) wrote:
> Samuel L. Morison - 6/27/2005
Andy, why do you keep quoting this person?
Ken Young
zzbu...@netscape.net
Well since both the Navy and Rumsfeld's Air Farce have
become vassals of Exxon and Haliburton, DoD directives
make no difference to military capabilty anymore,
unless the navy and marines, and the Kennedy elite are
planning to invade IBM and Maine.
Since the Air Farce has already invaded North Carolina.