How would the U.S. Navy have fared against the Royal Navy or other European powers during the American Civil War?
bunker
fared against the European powers during the American Civil War. What's
your opinion on how an all-out war would turn out on the high seas?
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david pearce
I'm not knowledgable enough o comment but am a big Civil War and Navy
buff so I hope you get some good responses here and I'll learn a good
bit.
Servant if the Glorious Laparka
Andrew Toppan
>My friends and I have a disagreement about how the U.S. Navy would have
>fared against the European powers during the American Civil War. What's
>your opinion on how an all-out war would turn out on the high seas?
In a real all-out naval war, the US wouldn't even be a contender. In 1860 the
Royal Navy had over 50 screw ships-of-the-line, and correspondingly large
number of vessels of other types. The largest US Navy vessels were 6 screw
frigates. Do the math here; the US Navy doesn't stand the slightest chance.
In addition, the Royal Navy was just entering on the age of seagoing ironclad
warships - something the US Navy didn't figure out until 30 years later, when
the 'modern' battleship appeared.
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more
DN736
>warships - something the US Navy didn't figure out until 30 years later, when
>the 'modern' battleship appeared.
>
>
What do you think? HMS Warrior Vs. USS
Monitor or CSS Virginia.
Peter Skelton
Warrior steams by at moderate speed. Her wash swamps MONITOR which has to
unseal her turret to fight. If the waves are more than a couple of feet
high, Warrior does not have to steam by. If MONITOR does not unseal her
turret, she's going to take some serious incoming shelling with no payback.
Virginia is little better.
--
Peter Skelton
Andrew Toppan
> Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have noticed
>the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
And we didn't defeat RN then, we just discouraged them from mucking about on
this side of the pond. RN wasn't "defeated".
Larry G. Smith
acto...@gwi.net wrote on 4/14/00 7:30 PM:
> ship...@aol.com (DN) wrote:
>
>> Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have noticed
>> the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
>
> And we didn't defeat RN then, we just discouraged them from mucking about on
> this side of the pond. RN wasn't "defeated".
True. We had nothing that could have very well stood up to an RN ship of the
line. But we did clean their clocks in a number of frigate duels. And Lake
Champlain is worth recalling.
Michael
Larry G. Smith
on 4/14/00 7:55 PM:
> Present the same scenario a half century later, with GB risking that the
> US might attract a greedy Continental ally (in extremis, pacts with the
> Devil or the Russians become permissible), the less than overwhelming
> success of amphibious ops and land campaigns in the Crimean War,
> improved US coast defenses, an Atlantic littoral along the coast from
> Cape Charles to the Rio Grande capable of absorbing and bogging down
> grand armies without a single pitched battle, and a handful of sail plus
> screw frigates employed annoying commerce in far places (Let's face it,
> a couple of ALABAMAs could have put a kink in even the Lion's beard or
> Victoria's wimple.), and the RN is reduced to flailing about the oceans,
> dispatching squadrons and reinforcements to every station, attempting to
> blockade a hundred ports from Kittery to Boca Chica, and a winnable war
> becomes one in which the rewards of victory are pretty ephemereal
> (although might include a N. California-BC littoral plus Hawaii, pretty
> valuable in the long haul).
Gosh, TM, you've opened up a speculative wonderland of mind-boggling
proportions. But I must confess I'm not too clear on the politics of the
situation you are describing here. Are you suggesting that in the period
1862 onward that GB would have taken on the US and the CSA *both*? Seems
that it would have served their interests better to make allies with one
side, preferably the weaker (CSA) against the stronger (USA) and then after
that conflict had been resolved deal with the survivor as interest dictated.
That would at least mean that they wouldn't have to defend against the
depredations of the CSS Alabama and her ilk. It would also mean that they
would have friendly seaports at which to unload their armies, once they got
through the Union blockade.
Actually, I think we can all be glad that GB wasn't in the mood for a fight
at that moment. Even if they couldn't have helped the South obtain a
victory, they could have prolonged what was already a vicious and bloody
war.
Michael
DN
>Royal Navy had over 50 screw ships-of-the-line, and correspondingly large
>number of vessels of other types. The largest US Navy vessels were 6 screw
>frigates. Do the math here; the US Navy doesn't stand the slightest chance.
>
the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
Actually, I tend to agree with you, the USN didn't want to get into a
shooting war with the RN....especially at the beginning of the war. Towards
the end of the war, the USN was more ready........to defend it's harbors with
monitors, etc; still not what you could call a great "blue water" navy.
>In addition, the Royal Navy was just entering on the age of seagoing ironclad
>warships - something the US Navy didn't figure out until 30 years later, when
>the 'modern' battleship appeared.
>
The USN never really did get into the concept of seagoing ironclads...
DN
DN
>Monitor or CSS Virginia.
I think it's just as well for both those ships they never had to face
WARRIOR; neither ship was much more than a floating battery, WARRIOR was a
man-of-war. To have such a battle, WARRIOR would just about have to come into
harbor to fight since neither of them could really fight at sea.
DN
Olivers
D. N. raises interesting speculation....
The results of individual ship or fleet v. fleet matchups are the stuff
of childish table games. Reality requires that the nature of conflict
and the commitment of the contenders be well defined. Certainly, the RN
would consider 1812 an aberration, its principal opponent France and her
occupied clients, not so dangerous as preTrafalgar, but still more
frightening than a handful of frigates, even big frigates. But for the
US, involved in a defensive struggle, too weak for anything more than a
token guerre de course, the results must have seemed terribly
satisfying. On the rare occasions that ships got to sea, they created
vast problems for the RN, occupying assets all out of proportion to
their number (as later did GRAF SPEE and BISMARCK). Victory in a
handful of single ship actions, plus the British failure to invade in
any fashion greater than a quick "come and go" raid, sealed the war's
outcome (aside from NOL which after the fact shouldn't count).
Present the same scenario a half century later, with GB risking that the
US might attract a greedy Continental ally (in extremis, pacts with the
Devil or the Russians become permissible), the less than overwhelming
success of amphibious ops and land campaigns in the Crimean War,
improved US coast defenses, an Atlantic littoral along the coast from
Cape Charles to the Rio Grande capable of absorbing and bogging down
grand armies without a single pitched battle, and a handful of sail plus
screw frigates employed annoying commerce in far places (Let's face it,
a couple of ALABAMAs could have put a kink in even the Lion's beard or
Victoria's wimple.), and the RN is reduced to flailing about the oceans,
dispatching squadrons and reinforcements to every station, attempting to
blockade a hundred ports from Kittery to Boca Chica, and a winnable war
becomes one in which the rewards of victory are pretty ephemereal
(although might include a N. California-BC littoral plus Hawaii, pretty
valuable in the long haul).
--
TMOliver - el pelon sinverguenza
"Alle kunst ist unsonst,
wenn ein Engel in das Kundloch prunst."
Random
wrote:
>ship...@aol.com (DN) wrote:
>
>> Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have noticed
>>the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
>
>And we didn't defeat RN then, we just discouraged them from mucking about on
>this side of the pond. RN wasn't "defeated".
Disregarding, for the moment, the initial poster's question of, how
would the US do against the RN of the time on the high seas, how would
the US have faired against the RN if they had decided to attack the US
or Southern ports? There were extensive fortifications along most of
the Altantic and California coasts that would have kept even ironclad
warships at arms length. I think, if push came to shove, the Union
fleets could have adopted the screw and armor far more rapidly than
could the RN. After all, the defense budget and innovation during a
shooting war is far more flexible than it is following the conclusion
of another stalemated war with its usual drastic declines in the
defense budget and building rates. What the RN had at the outbreak of
the war was a result of the Crimean war; what the USN would have if
there had been such intervention would probably have rivaled and
exceeded anything in the RN at the time.
I'd have to dig up Fisher's memoirs of a later time, again, but I seem
to remember that he said that, "the government wanted to build no more
than three dreadnoughts, the navy proposed 4 dreadnoughts and we
compromised on six dreadnoughts." I doubt this would have been so
during the time of the War between the States.
regards,
random
Random
>DN wrote:
>
>Present the same scenario a half century later, with GB risking that the
>US might attract a greedy Continental ally (in extremis, pacts with the
>Devil or the Russians become permissible), the less than overwhelming
>success of amphibious ops and land campaigns in the Crimean War,
>improved US coast defenses, an Atlantic littoral along the coast from
>Cape Charles to the Rio Grande capable of absorbing and bogging down
>grand armies without a single pitched battle, and a handful of sail plus
>screw frigates employed annoying commerce in far places (Let's face it,
>a couple of ALABAMAs could have put a kink in even the Lion's beard or
>Victoria's wimple.), and the RN is reduced to flailing about the oceans,
>dispatching squadrons and reinforcements to every station, attempting to
>blockade a hundred ports from Kittery to Boca Chica, and a winnable war
>becomes one in which the rewards of victory are pretty ephemereal
>(although might include a N. California-BC littoral plus Hawaii, pretty
>valuable in the long haul).
I meant to snip and trim but would you believe all of the above is
just one sentence?!!!!
I agree with most of what was written but, IIRC, Fort Mason and the
other forts and batteries guarding the entrance to San Francisco Bay,
could, by the middle of the war, have stood off any attack from the
sea by any RN squadron or fleet.
This may not be regarded by some as N California, but I so regard it
and I agree with everything else in that incredible sentence. :)
regards,
random
Paul J. Adam
<rand...@ix.netcom.com> writes
>I'd have to dig up Fisher's memoirs of a later time, again, but I seem
>to remember that he said that, "the government wanted to build no more
>than three dreadnoughts, the navy proposed 4 dreadnoughts and we
>compromised on six dreadnoughts."
It was Churchill, describing the 1909 Naval Estimates. "The Admiralty had
demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally
compromised on eight."
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Kerryn Offord
"Larry G. Smith" wrote:
>
<SNIP>
> Gosh, TM, you've opened up a speculative wonderland of mind-boggling
> proportions. But I must confess I'm not too clear on the politics of the
> situation you are describing here. Are you suggesting that in the period
> 1862 onward that GB would have taken on the US and the CSA *both*? Seems
> that it would have served their interests better to make allies with one
> side, preferably the weaker (CSA) against the stronger (USA) and then after
> that conflict had been resolved deal with the survivor as interest dictated.
Siding with the CSA would have broken the Union blockade, allowing the
free transit of Southern cotton to Europe, providing funds for the South
to arm with better weapons (the only thing in the way of this would have
been the Southern attitude to slavery, but that was changing to a line
that UK etc could have accepted in an ally).
>
> That would at least mean that they wouldn't have to defend against the
> depredations of the CSS Alabama and her ilk. It would also mean that they
> would have friendly seaports at which to unload their armies, once they got
> through the Union blockade.
It would have meant that CSS Alabama and her ilk would have concentrated
more on the Union merchant fleet.
>
> Actually, I think we can all be glad that GB wasn't in the mood for a fight
> at that moment. Even if they couldn't have helped the South obtain a
> victory, they could have prolonged what was already a vicious and bloody
> war.
Actually, UK/RN involvement would have also allowed blockade of Union
ports and shipping, which could cripple/damage their war effort (it
would certainly upset the Union/northern merchants if they couldn't
export to europe because of blockade).
I'm not sure of the history/time line, but a blockade of the north/union
would interfere with exports of Maize to Europe, this would either cause
famine etc, or/and allow the maintenance of good farm commodity prices
in Europe (Maintaining farm commodity prices would be to the advantage
of the powers that be in Europe as they are/were also the land owning
class).
Gee, aren't "What ifs" fun.
Peter Skelton
>>n a real all-out naval war, the US wouldn't even be a contender. In 1860 the
>>Royal Navy had over 50 screw ships-of-the-line, and correspondingly large
>>number of vessels of other types. The largest US Navy vessels were 6 screw
>>frigates. Do the math here; the US Navy doesn't stand the slightest chance.
>>
> Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have noticed
>the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
I guess you didn't notice but the RN beat the crap out of the USN. The USN
wound up blockaded in harbour. A couple of minor ship to ship victories
don't make much difference in the long run, if the other side has enough
ships. American commerce was swept off the seas.
American privateers did well but given the number of starving, unemployed
seamen available to crew, that is not very surprising.
> Actually, I tend to agree with you, the USN didn't want to get into a
>shooting war with the RN....especially at the beginning of the war. Towards
>the end of the war, the USN was more ready........to defend it's harbors with
>monitors, etc; still not what you could call a great "blue water" navy.
Not a navy that could deal with an RN blockade.
>>In addition, the Royal Navy was just entering on the age of seagoing ironclad
>>warships - something the US Navy didn't figure out until 30 years later, when
>>the 'modern' battleship appeared.
>>
>
> The USN never really did get into the concept of seagoing ironclads...
--
Peter Skelton
Norman G. Purves
bunker <dfilkohaz...@microtree.com.invalid> wrote in article
<01296e80...@usw-ex0107-050.remarq.com>...
> My friends and I have a disagreement about how the U.S. Navy would have
> fared against the European powers during the American Civil War. What's
> your opinion on how an all-out war would turn out on the high seas?
>
If the British had tried to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy, I think
the outcome would have strongly depended on *when* the intervention took
place. In 1861, the RN would have had a decided advantage: more ships. Even
though USN ships were faster and better armed (the excellent Dahlgren
guns), they would have been badly outnumbered. The RN would have made short
work of it.
By mid-'62, the situation had changed: the outcome would then have depended
upon what sort of strategy the RN adopted. If the British opted to support
the Confederacy by raiding US commerce, the Union would have been in a bad
way: as effective as the *Monitors* were in calm water, they would have had
great difficulty fighting in the open ocean. The USS New Ironsides was the
only ironclad that approached real seagoing capabilty. HMS Warrior might
have had her hands full dealing with this vessel, but, once again, New
Ironsides would have been badly outnumbered. OTOH, if the Brits tried to
directly break the blockade, they would probably have been defeated: they
would have had to come in close to shore, where the *Monitors* were in
their element. *Warrior*, trying to force its way past blockading
*Monitors*, would have been shot to pieces.
If the British strategy had been to land an army in Canada, they could have
done so in '62. But to land an army large enough to challenge the Union
forces would have been nearly impossible, even then.
By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding capacity had
expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any conceivable
British fleet. Remember that the possibility of British intervention was
ended by the outcome of Antietam in the fall of '62, but if that outcome
had been different, and British intervention was imminent, the USN would
probably have been provided with ships with which to challenge the RN. More
*New Ironsides* -class, or even improved versions, would have been sliding
down the ways in numbers that could not be matched by Britain, and the type
of impromptu armor applied to such superb cruisers as *Kearsarge* (the ship
that eventually sunk the CSS Alabama) all would have made the USN dominant.
No conceivable British strategy could have been successful. A trio or more
of *Kearsarge* types, with armor added, and/or *New Ironsides* types,
armed with the 15-in Dahlgrens that were available by then, facing
*Warrior*, would have won. Also, by then, the USN had plenty of tough
combat-experience which the RN would not have enjoyed. American gunnery was
superior, in power, accuracy, and rate-of-fire, to anything else in the
world. A draw might have been acheived by the British, given the spirit of
Nelson, but not much more.
In '64 and afterwards, British intervention would have been certain
suicide. The RN would have been outnumbered, outgunned, facing superior
ships manned by sailors of a USN at the peak of efficiency. A full-fleet
action would have no doubt resulted in the utter annihilation of the RN.
Breaking the blockade would have been a quixotic effort, and an attempt at
the interruption of commerce would have been fruitless, since, by then, the
Confederate raiders had induced the Union to carry most foreign commerce in
foreign bottoms. There was no US merchant marine to raid. The US Army would
have quickly subjugated Canada, regardless of the presence of the largest
conceivable British expeditionary force, which in any case would have been
decimated by the USN during the crossing. By the end of the war in the
spring of '65, US land and naval forces were so enormous and so powerful
that it is entirely conceivable that the USN could have ferried an army to
invade Britain itself, an army so big, so powerful, and so combat-efficient
that had this happened, Old Glory would be flying above Buckingham Palace
this very day.And the Duke Of York would now be someone named something
like Ulysses S. Grant V....
Aloha
Norman
Peter Skelton
finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
Peter Skelton
"Larry G. Smith" <em...@olypen.com> wrote:
>in article 38F7F666...@calpha.com, Olivers at ol...@calpha.com wrote
>on 4/14/00 7:55 PM:
>
>> Present the same scenario a half century later, with GB risking that the
>> US might attract a greedy Continental ally (in extremis, pacts with the
>> Devil or the Russians become permissible), the less than overwhelming
>> success of amphibious ops and land campaigns in the Crimean War,
>> improved US coast defenses, an Atlantic littoral along the coast from
>> Cape Charles to the Rio Grande capable of absorbing and bogging down
>> grand armies without a single pitched battle, and a handful of sail plus
>> screw frigates employed annoying commerce in far places (Let's face it,
>> a couple of ALABAMAs could have put a kink in even the Lion's beard or
>> Victoria's wimple.), and the RN is reduced to flailing about the oceans,
>> dispatching squadrons and reinforcements to every station, attempting to
>> blockade a hundred ports from Kittery to Boca Chica, and a winnable war
>> becomes one in which the rewards of victory are pretty ephemereal
>> (although might include a N. California-BC littoral plus Hawaii, pretty
>> valuable in the long haul).
>
>Gosh, TM, you've opened up a speculative wonderland of mind-boggling
>proportions. But I must confess I'm not too clear on the politics of the
>situation you are describing here. Are you suggesting that in the period
>1862 onward that GB would have taken on the US and the CSA *both*? Seems
>that it would have served their interests better to make allies with one
>side, preferably the weaker (CSA) against the stronger (USA) and then after
>that conflict had been resolved deal with the survivor as interest dictated.
>
>That would at least mean that they wouldn't have to defend against the
>depredations of the CSS Alabama and her ilk. It would also mean that they
>would have friendly seaports at which to unload their armies, once they got
>through the Union blockade.
>
>Actually, I think we can all be glad that GB wasn't in the mood for a fight
>at that moment. Even if they couldn't have helped the South obtain a
>victory, they could have prolonged what was already a vicious and bloody
>war.
>
>Michael
>
--
Peter Skelton
Navydude
naval combat, certainly a lot less than most of the folks who post
here. But even I, with my modest knowledge, have a hard time
believing that the USN could have beaten the RN in a blue-water fleet
action, at any time during the 19th century (possibly excepting the
very end of the century, during the Spanish-American War). IIRC, a
lot of the USN experience during the Civil War was in riverine combat,
a form of naval warfare vastly removed from open-ocean combat. So, if
you would be so kind as to elaborate on this posting, or maybe quote
some sources, I'd be much obliged.
On Sat, 15 Apr 2000 13:26:44 GMT, "Norman G. Purves"
<n...@ilhawaii.net> posted to this great public forum:
:
:bunker <dfilkohaz...@microtree.com.invalid> wrote in article
:<01296e80...@usw-ex0107-050.remarq.com>...
:> My friends and I have a disagreement about how the U.S. Navy would have
<<<big ol' snip for briefness>>>
:conceivable that the USN could have ferried an army to
:invade Britain itself, an army so big, so powerful, and so combat-efficient
:that had this happened, Old Glory would be flying above Buckingham Palace
:this very day.And the Duke Of York would now be someone named something
:like Ulysses S. Grant V....
Mark
"Not On MY Ship, Not In MY Navy!"
ht2sw....@bellatlantic.net
remove "nospam" to reply
Nothing that I post represents the opinions of my employer, just my own....
Andrew Toppan
>By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding capacity had
>expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any conceivable
>British fleet.
Oh, please....about 95% of our 'big' ships built during the Civil War was
incapable of combat outside protected rivers and bays. The Brits could have
very conveniently blockaded just offshore, and we would have been powerless to
stop them. They still had a _vast_ numerical advantage.
Andrew Toppan
>action, at any time during the 19th century (possibly excepting the
>very end of the century, during the Spanish-American War).
Even then it would have been impossible...we had a grand total of one (1)
effective seagoing battleship; the Brits had a dozen or more, and of better
design.
Andrew Toppan
>Disregarding, for the moment, the initial poster's question of, how
>would the US do against the RN of the time on the high seas,
On the high seas...forget it. We had no effective seagoing line of battle.
> how would
>the US have faired against the RN if they had decided to attack the US
>or Southern ports?
That's a rather different question; attack and invasion would have been
difficult - the defender always has a big advantage. But a blockade would go
in RN's favor.
thor-ms
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote in message
news:60lffscmkrrbg898b...@4ax.com...
> ship...@aol.com (DN) wrote:
>
> > Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have
noticed
> >the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
>
on
> this side of the pond. RN wasn't "defeated".
>
> Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
> US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online -
http://www.uss-salem.org/
> Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more
>
knowlege, and in 1812 we didnt defete them, nor did we in the revolution,
remember, they had to come here from across the atlantic. though we did send
some ships to europe. anyway, no, the english had a much better navy at the
time and we could not have defeted them around 1860
Shane
Nick Theodorakis
Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote:
> "Norman G. Purves" <n...@ilhawaii.net> wrote:
>
> >By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding capacity
had
> >expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any
conceivable
> >British fleet.
>
> Oh, please....about 95% of our 'big' ships built during the Civil War
was
> incapable of combat outside protected rivers and bays. The Brits
could have
> very conveniently blockaded just offshore, and we would have been
powerless to
> stop them. They still had a _vast_ numerical advantage.
>
But didn't the USN build the ships they needed at the time? Their
opponent was the CSA, not GB, and they needed ships to fight on the
coast, in harbors, and in rivers -- and lots of them. If they really
needed to have a blue water navy, wouldn't they have built them?
Also, in this kind of "what if" analysis, the Russian navy, which
wintered on the west coast, would big a big wild card.
Nick
--
_______________________________________________
Nick Theodorakis
nicholas_t...@urmc.rochester.edu
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Cheng Tseng
>Also, in this kind of "what if" analysis, the Russian navy, which
>wintered on the west coast, would big a big wild card.
Six sailing ships. Against European powers with broadside ironclads.
Hmmmm.....
C.T.
Cheng Tseng
>By mid-'62, the situation had changed: the outcome would then have depended
>upon what sort of strategy the RN adopted. If the British opted to support
>the Confederacy by raiding US commerce, the Union would have been in a bad
>way: as effective as the *Monitors* were in calm water, they would have had
>great difficulty fighting in the open ocean. The USS New Ironsides was the
>only ironclad that approached real seagoing capabilty. HMS Warrior might
>have had her hands full dealing with this vessel, but, once again, New
>Ironsides would have been badly outnumbered. OTOH, if the Brits tried to
>directly break the blockade, they would probably have been defeated: they
>would have had to come in close to shore, where the *Monitors* were in
>their element. *Warrior*, trying to force its way past blockading
>*Monitors*, would have been shot to pieces.
How many Monitors do you have? Remember, the first members of PASSIAC-class
do not go into commission until November of 1862.
Just how much coastal defenses does the Union hold at this time? Remember,
since the RN is breaking the Union blockade, most of ports are going to be
defended by the South.
<snip>
>By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding capacity had
>expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any conceivable
>British fleet. Remember that the possibility of British intervention was
That is a matter of opinion. Britain was still the shipbuilding leader for
fifty years after the Civil War - I highly doubt the Union would have acquired
a shipbuilding capacity to challenge both the British shipbuilding capacity
AND the existing British fleet.
Besides, we were not building WARRIOR-type vessels - we were building
monitors, a lot more wooden-steam-screw-driven ships to serve on blockader
duty (Like the KEARSARGE.) and gunboats.
Hardly a blue-ocean force.
>ended by the outcome of Antietam in the fall of '62, but if that outcome
>had been different, and British intervention was imminent, the USN would
>probably have been provided with ships with which to challenge the RN. More
>*New Ironsides* -class, or even improved versions, would have been sliding
Wait a minute...How many broadside ironclads due you think the Union built?
How long do you think we could have built them? This was before Antietam, BTW.
Now consider how MANY existing ironclad ships the RN had in 1862?
>down the ways in numbers that could not be matched by Britain, and the type
>of impromptu armor applied to such superb cruisers as *Kearsarge* (the ship
>that eventually sunk the CSS Alabama) all would have made the USN dominant.
Except for the part that everyone done it.
That does not sound like much of an advantage to me.
>No conceivable British strategy could have been successful. A trio or more
>of *Kearsarge* types, with armor added, and/or *New Ironsides* types,
The KEARSARGE were wooden, steam sloops. They were hardly the type to get
iron armor.
>armed with the 15-in Dahlgrens that were available by then, facing
>*Warrior*, would have won. Also, by then, the USN had plenty of tough
>combat-experience which the RN would not have enjoyed. American gunnery was
Garbage. You really think the British would have sent just ONE ironclad at
the Union if it came to blows?
>superior, in power, accuracy, and rate-of-fire, to anything else in the
>world. A draw might have been acheived by the British, given the spirit of
>Nelson, but not much more.
Again, conclusions hardly warranted by the facts.
>In '64 and afterwards, British intervention would have been certain
>suicide. The RN would have been outnumbered, outgunned, facing superior
>ships manned by sailors of a USN at the peak of efficiency. A full-fleet
You are using the adjectives here to describe the wrong side.
Besides, have you ever heard of something called Gettysburg?
>action would have no doubt resulted in the utter annihilation of the RN.
Not likely.
>Breaking the blockade would have been a quixotic effort, and an attempt at
>the interruption of commerce would have been fruitless, since, by then, the
>Confederate raiders had induced the Union to carry most foreign commerce in
>foreign bottoms. There was no US merchant marine to raid. The US Army would
>have quickly subjugated Canada, regardless of the presence of the largest
>conceivable British expeditionary force, which in any case would have been
>decimated by the USN during the crossing. By the end of the war in the
Okay, this is wandering into never-never land for real here.
>spring of '65, US land and naval forces were so enormous and so powerful
>that it is entirely conceivable that the USN could have ferried an army to
>invade Britain itself, an army so big, so powerful, and so combat-efficient
>that had this happened, Old Glory would be flying above Buckingham Palace
>this very day.And the Duke Of York would now be someone named something
>like Ulysses S. Grant V....
You know, you might be able to write some decent fiction, a la Harry
Turtledove.
Unfortunately, that's all that the last paragraph is made-of.
C.T.
B F Lake
It appears Britain gave up thoughts of making the USA do anything by force
by 1840. They folded on the issue of the Maine border, the Oregon
boundary, and the follow-up San Juan Islands dispute in the 1850s. The
real transfer of power took place about this time. The USN even had local
dominance in the eastern Pacific . The RN was large but thinly spread with
many ships not in commission and their guns didn't work too well.
Britain was already having money troubles, while the USA was on the up
trend. Between 1815 and 1840 the US population had exploded while Britain
was still in economic trouble (as always)
Britain had decided in 1840's that it was better to trade with countries
than to colonize them and had no desire to get into fights. They
basically let the USA have what is now Washington State even though they
might have held it in 1846 because they thought trading with the east coast
USA to get cotton for Britain's textile mills was more important.
Many believe the only thing that saved British Columbia from being
occupied by squatters and then highjacked into the USA was the coming Civil
War after gold was discovered in BC in the 1850's. The 1850s free trade
agreement between Canada and the US held the monster at bay until the War
came. When the huge Northern Army did not occupy Canada in 1865 it was
considered a miracle and there was nothing Britain could have done.
The weakness of the USN for the rest of the 19th cent seems to have been
by choice , not a sign of American weakness. The strength of the RN was an
illusion as the economy that supported it was on thin ice, and this was
broken by the battleship race with Germany right after. ( Puzzle- if the
British policy was trade, not fight, why did they get confused and bankrupt
themselves in the opposite direction??)
The blur in this picture seems to be the steel industry, where Carnegie
from Scotland imported British expertise in this area and got the USN some
armour for its battleship race some years later on. Supposedly this could
have been done earlier if circumstances had required it?
Bottom line is that the USN/USA did not "take over" from RN/UK in 1922;
it happened more like in 1842, IMO.
Regards,
Barry
Andrew Toppan
>But didn't the USN build the ships they needed at the time? Their
>opponent was the CSA, not GB, and they needed ships to fight on the
>coast, in harbors, and in rivers -- and lots of them. If they really
>needed to have a blue water navy, wouldn't they have built them?
Well...they tried to build seagoing ironclad ships...and pretty much failed
miserably.
Peter Skelton
time after 1890.
American predominance on the continiental US was based on self-sufficiency
and population in the south and on better transportation in the north (The
Erie canal won the west and if there'd been a war, it would have been the
key to Canada.) Continental power is not the same thing as global
dominance.
The US iron & steel industry operated flat out making railways, and other
civil engineering through 1890 (with a brief pause during the Civil war).
Several studies have been published of the extreme difficulty the USN had
getting it to pay any attention to armour requirements before about 1890.
(The US GB around 1880 is in many ways like China US now.)
Peter Skelton
--
Peter Skelton
Keith Willshaw
B F Lake <bfl...@coastnet.com> wrote in message
news:01bfa6fb$3a734c20$LocalHost@bflake...
>The strength of the RN was an
> illusion as the economy that supported it was on thin ice, and this was
> broken by the battleship race with Germany right after.
You do recall that Germany lost the race dont You ?
> Puzzle- if the
> British policy was trade, not fight, why did they get confused and
bankrupt
> themselves in the opposite direction??)
> The blur in this picture seems to be the steel industry, where Carnegie
> from Scotland imported British expertise in this area and got the USN some
> armour for its battleship race some years later on. Supposedly this could
> have been done earlier if circumstances had required it?
> Bottom line is that the USN/USA did not "take over" from RN/UK in 1922;
> it happened more like in 1842, IMO.
> Regards,
> Barry
This diatribe bears scant realtionship with the facts
The British Economy in 1862 was larger than that of the
US.
The RN was immeasurably more powerful and could have
sunk the USN in an afternoon
The real advantage the US had as Peter Skelton has already
said is that they could threaten Canada with an invading force that
could not be countered
Of course the reality is that the Anti-slavery lobby was so
powerful in Britain at the time that there was no way
any Government could be seen to aid the slave holders
even with the economic damage that loss of Southern Cotton was
causing.
Keith
Lachlan Sturrock
is true, the second date might be a bit ropey though.
"Between 1776 and 1815 the Royal navy lost 238 frigates, of which 36 were to enemy
action"
While not totally on topic its an interesting titbit.
In 1812 the Shannon and the Cheasapeake(sp?) met and fought of the east coast. The
Shannon chased the Cheasapeake into a harbour and sent a boat in demanding that
the Cheasapeake come out and fight. The captain of the Cheasapeake offered the
captain of the Shannon a duel which was accepted. The two ships sailed out and
anchored 15yds apart, the captain of the Shannon offered (can you believe that!)
the captain of the Cheasapeake first shot. He declined. The battle lasted 15
minutes one ship firing then the other. The Shannon won, the total number of
survivors on both ships numbered 150.
"Larry G. Smith" wrote:
> in article 60lffscmkrrbg898b...@4ax.com, Andrew Toppan at
> acto...@gwi.net wrote on 4/14/00 7:30 PM:
>
> > ship...@aol.com (DN) wrote:
> >
> >> Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have noticed
> >> the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
> >
> > And we didn't defeat RN then, we just discouraged them from mucking about on
> > this side of the pond. RN wasn't "defeated".
>
William Hamblen
wrote:
>I'd have to dig up Fisher's memoirs of a later time, again, but I seem
>to remember that he said that, "the government wanted to build no more
>than three dreadnoughts, the navy proposed 4 dreadnoughts and we
>compromised on six dreadnoughts."
That was Winston Churchill writing in The World Crisis. In 1909 The
Admiralty wanted 6 dreadnoughts and the economists wanted 4 so they
compromised on 8. Churchill was on the Board of Trade at the time and
was on the side of 4 ships. Later when he was at the Admiralty he was
glad to have them.
Lachlan Sturrock
Nick Theodorakis wrote:
> In article <v91hfsohr8bp9t4ka...@4ax.com>,
> Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> wrote:
> > "Norman G. Purves" <n...@ilhawaii.net> wrote:
> >
> > >By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding capacity
> had
> > >expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any
> conceivable
> > >British fleet.
> >
> > Oh, please....about 95% of our 'big' ships built during the Civil War
> was
> > incapable of combat outside protected rivers and bays. The Brits
> could have
> > very conveniently blockaded just offshore, and we would have been
> powerless to
> > stop them. They still had a _vast_ numerical advantage.
> >
>
> But didn't the USN build the ships they needed at the time? Their
> opponent was the CSA, not GB, and they needed ships to fight on the
> coast, in harbors, and in rivers -- and lots of them. If they really
> needed to have a blue water navy, wouldn't they have built them?
Maybe, but a decent ship requires a lot of resources. You're still fighting
the south as well remember. Could the north build enough ships to seriously
challenge the RN and fight the CSA as well?
>
>
> Also, in this kind of "what if" analysis, the Russian navy, which
> wintered on the west coast, would big a big wild card.
See the Russian war scare circa 1885ish
Lachlan Sturrock
B F Lake wrote:
> Norman G. Purves <n...@ilhawaii.net> wrote :
> snipped to shorten
>
> The blur in this picture seems to be the steel industry, where Carnegie
> from Scotland imported British expertise in this area and got the USN some
> armour for its battleship race some years later on. Supposedly this could
> have been done earlier if circumstances had required it?
> Bottom line is that the USN/USA did not "take over" from RN/UK in 1922;
> it happened more like in 1842, IMO.
The reason the british ecomy was in trouble in 1922 was because of something called
WWI.
Unlike just about everybody else after WWI the UK paid back all its debts.
>
> Regards,
> Barry
B F Lake
> The British Economy in 1862 was larger than that of the
> US.
> The RN was immeasurably more powerful and could have
> sunk the USN in an afternoon
sort of facts:
A. After 1815 war over, a long and severe economic depression in Britain
due overstocking no buyers , unemployment, with over 400,000 unemployed
servicemen piled on that.
B. 1821 deflation of the currency- more turmoil in 1820s over protectionist
trade rules, total chaos socially reform movements etc
C. 1830s country on verge of civil war but reforms pushed through, finally
D. 2nd Peel cabinet, 1841 turned first to the deficit "the most pressing
problem" changing tariffs,
E. 1844 Bank Charter Act to stop printing great quantities of paper money
at a time when British gold reserves were being depleted by shipments
abroad , largely to the United States.
F. 1845 adoption of free trade policy
I do not understand what was going on after that in terms of the British
"economy" since it is not clear to me who controlled the money- a few rich
guys or the government for the purposes of paying for a navy etc, and
whether India and China were a drain or a boost. There were continuing
internal problems and at least one severe depression in 1879. The 1889
two -power standard was adopted for the size of the navy so big bucks
needed there and by 1909 the huge deficit from naval expenditures and
social programs forced the government to change the tax burden from
producers of wealth to possessors of wealth which was fought out in the
1910 election with the Lords finally being denied the veto on a money bill.
Hense the question of who had the money before that and when you refer to
the "economy" how much was at the government's discretion, etc? I would
like to know a lot more about that.
G. 1918 we start a re-run of the post 1815 economic woes more or less up
to today same old same old
So my spin is that the so-called strength of the British economy in the
19th cent was something of a sham and having a big RN was a Potemkin
storefront, while the USA's economy was for real. Best I can do to defend
my corner for now, and I could be way off . I can't figure out where all
these huge sums come from to finance the Suez Canal etc and the
government's money and private "financiers' " money and what counts as the
"economy." It matters for war-fighting potential in terms of what is real
and whether Britain really did have "deep pockets" type economic strength
vs the USA.
Regards,
Barry
Cheng Tseng
> It appears Britain gave up thoughts of making the USA do anything by force
>by 1840. They folded on the issue of the Maine border, the Oregon
>boundary, and the follow-up San Juan Islands dispute in the 1850s. The
>real transfer of power took place about this time. The USN even had local
>dominance in the eastern Pacific . The RN was large but thinly spread with
>many ships not in commission and their guns didn't work too well.
>Britain was already having money troubles, while the USA was on the up
>trend. Between 1815 and 1840 the US population had exploded while Britain
>was still in economic trouble (as always)
Great Britain also happened to be the strongest economic power in the world at
that point, whereas America was still very much a developing economy.
Sounds like you need to rethink that part.
>Britain had decided in 1840's that it was better to trade with countries
>than to colonize them and had no desire to get into fights. They
>basically let the USA have what is now Washington State even though they
>might have held it in 1846 because they thought trading with the east coast
>USA to get cotton for Britain's textile mills was more important.
Britain could afford not to fight. After all, peace is generally the more
deserved state of international relations.
And remember, American claims north of the modern border were further then
British claims south.
> Many believe the only thing that saved British Columbia from being
>occupied by squatters and then highjacked into the USA was the coming Civil
>War after gold was discovered in BC in the 1850's. The 1850s free trade
And especially due to the agreement that settled the NW Territory
problem...much earlier.
>agreement between Canada and the US held the monster at bay until the War
>came. When the huge Northern Army did not occupy Canada in 1865 it was
>considered a miracle and there was nothing Britain could have done.
And it WOULD have provoked an immediate response by the British.
Unlike the case of Mexico, the Lincoln Administration (With the exception of
Stanton, maybe.) never entertained the idea of invading Canada with military
force. There was no reason to, and the Monroe Doctrine did not apply.
> The weakness of the USN for the rest of the 19th cent seems to have
been>by choice , not a sign of American weakness. The strength of the RN was
an>illusion as the economy that supported it was on thin ice, and this was
>broken by the battleship race with Germany right after. ( Puzzle- if the
You got it half right. The USN was weak by choice, but the Royal Navy was NOT
weak (Think about how many dreadnoughts Britain and Germany possessed on
August 1, 1914. It would have safer to say that Germany came nearer to
straining its economy to the limit, since unlike the British, it needed a
strong army even more.).
>British policy was trade, not fight, why did they get confused and bankrupt
>themselves in the opposite direction??)
What the...? I have no idea where this comes from.
> The blur in this picture seems to be the steel industry, where
Carnegie>from Scotland imported British expertise in this area and got the USN
some>armour for its battleship race some years later on. Supposedly this could
>have been done earlier if circumstances had required it?
IIRC, when the USN begun to build modern ships post-Civil War, American
steel armor plating was not only inferior, it was non-available, because of
the huge commercial demand for everything else made in steel. And it really
far more time to develop the specialty to do so.
Meanwhile, the British had a mature, steel plate industry.
Hmmm....
> Bottom line is that the USN/USA did not "take over" from RN/UK in
1922; >it happened more like in 1842, IMO.
Nonsense.
The US did not overtake Britain as the world leading economic power until
around the beginning of the 20th Century.
The US NAVY did not begin to overtake the British until World War 1, because
Theodore Roosevelt was hardly a majority in American political life.
C.T.
Larry G. Smith
n...@ilhawaii.net wrote on 4/15/00 6:26 AM:
> The US Army would
> have quickly subjugated Canada, regardless of the presence of the largest
> conceivable British expeditionary force
May I point out that the Union had its hands full just beating the South? It
would have had all it could do to resist a serious simultaneous attack from
Canada had GB felt inclined to mount one. To suggest that the US would
successfully invade and conquer that nation surpasses belief.
>By the end of the war in the
> spring of '65, US land and naval forces were so enormous and so powerful
> that it is entirely conceivable that the USN could have ferried an army to
> invade Britain itself, an army so big, so powerful, and so combat-efficient
> that had this happened, Old Glory would be flying above Buckingham Palace
> this very day.And the Duke Of York would now be someone named something
> like Ulysses S. Grant V....
By the end of the war, the American people were sick and tired of war. They
had already rioted against conscription and were extremely resentful of the
taxation necessary to fund the conflict. The South was bankrupt and
impoverished so nothing could be had from it. In fact it was a drain on
Union resources as it had to be garrisoned at that time.
Your scenario reminds one of the old joke about a an ant climbing up an
elephant's leg with rape on its mind...
Michael
Larry G. Smith
on 4/15/00 7:10 AM:
> While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
> finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
> Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
> US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
> that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
But could the North fight a successful war on two fronts against two enemies
simultaneously?
Michael
Larry G. Smith
nt...@my-deja.com wrote on 4/15/00 9:20 AM:
> But didn't the USN build the ships they needed at the time? Their
> opponent was the CSA, not GB, and they needed ships to fight on the
> coast, in harbors, and in rivers -- and lots of them. If they really
> needed to have a blue water navy, wouldn't they have built them?
But this gets us back to the same problem that often comes up regarding such
discussions in this group: How much would the government and people of the
US have been willing and able to pay for? At this time, the US was still a
smaller economy than GB. They would have had to overcome the initial
(considerable) advantage in both numbers and quality that the RN possessed,
and the RN would not likely have been sitting still either.
Michael
Cheng Tseng
> Maybe I am getting the wrong impression, but I take my spin from these
>sort of facts:
>A. After 1815 war over, a long and severe economic depression in Britain
>due overstocking no buyers , unemployment, with over 400,000 unemployed
>servicemen piled on that.
>B. 1821 deflation of the currency- more turmoil in 1820s over protectionist
>trade rules, total chaos socially reform movements etc
>C. 1830s country on verge of civil war but reforms pushed through, finally
>D. 2nd Peel cabinet, 1841 turned first to the deficit "the most pressing
>problem" changing tariffs,
>E. 1844 Bank Charter Act to stop printing great quantities of paper money
>at a time when British gold reserves were being depleted by shipments
>abroad , largely to the United States.
>F. 1845 adoption of free trade policy
<snip List>
> I do not understand what was going on after that in terms of the British
>"economy" since it is not clear to me who controlled the money- a few rich
>guys or the government for the purposes of paying for a navy etc, and
>whether India and China were a drain or a boost. There were continuing
India should have been a boast, but since the Royal Government did not
actually own it until the 1850s...
>internal problems and at least one severe depression in 1879. The 1889
Same with the US. We had at least THREE of what is now referred to as
"economic downturns" during the periond 1865-1914.
>two -power standard was adopted for the size of the navy so big bucks
>needed there and by 1909 the huge deficit from naval expenditures and
Or maybe it was the accepted reality of the situation.
Every wonder about the number of battleships possessed by the major naval
powers in 1889?
>social programs forced the government to change the tax burden from
>producers of wealth to possessors of wealth which was fought out in the
>1910 election with the Lords finally being denied the veto on a money bill.
> Hense the question of who had the money before that and when you refer
>to the "economy" how much was at the government's discretion, etc? I would
>like to know a lot more about that.
The same goes for the US government.
From American history, the entire issue of just whole much the government
could control the economy was part of the appeal of the Populists (Later,
William Jennings Bryan and the "Cross of Gold" speech, that sort of thing.).
>G. 1918 we start a re-run of the post 1815 economic woes more or less up
>to today same old same old
And the fact that more of the world is competing against you in trade might
not have something to do with it?
> So my spin is that the so-called strength of the British economy in the
>19th cent was something of a sham and having a big RN was a Potemkin
>storefront, while the USA's economy was for real. Best I can do to defend
That is opinion. But from where I see it, opinion not based on hard facts.
>my corner for now, and I could be way off . I can't figure out where all
>these huge sums come from to finance the Suez Canal etc and the
>government's money and private "financiers' " money and what counts as the
>"economy." It matters for war-fighting potential in terms of what is real
>and whether Britain really did have "deep pockets" type economic strength
>vs the USA.
Which the British had more of, then the United States.
C.T.
B F Lake
>> It matters for war-fighting potential in terms of what is real
> >and whether Britain really did have "deep pockets" type economic
strength
> >vs the USA.
>
> Which the British had more of, then the United States.
If one has a population that consumes its own production and a population
that is growing like Topsy, it has real economic strength. If the other's
population is in poverty, cannot consume its production and must export to
get the money, and has to import food and pay for that plus the raw
materials (cotton etc) for its production, then isn't all the money washing
around that is its "economy" just sizzle not the steak? Where is the
strength? Japan was "strong" recently and the US was supposedly in the
dumps. What was real as we now know the answer? How much like 1980
Japan was 1880 Britain?
I fully admit I do not understand Big Money and all that, but as this is a
discussion, that is my spin, and everyone can blast away <G> Maybe I'll
learn something- usually do on smn :)
Regards,
Barry
Larry G. Smith
ls...@globalnet.co.uk wrote on 4/15/00 1:48 PM:
> In 1812 the Shannon and the Cheasapeake(sp?) met and fought of the east coast.
> The
> Shannon chased the Cheasapeake into a harbour and sent a boat in demanding
> that
> the Cheasapeake come out and fight. The captain of the Cheasapeake offered the
> captain of the Shannon a duel which was accepted. The two ships sailed out and
> anchored 15yds apart, the captain of the Shannon offered (can you believe
> that!)
> the captain of the Cheasapeake first shot. He declined. The battle lasted 15
> minutes one ship firing then the other. The Shannon won, the total number of
> survivors on both ships numbered 150.
O'Brian offers an interesting fictional version of this action in
_The_Fortune_of_War_. He locates the action off Boston Harbor.
Michael
Andrew Toppan
>In 1812 the Shannon and the Cheasapeake(sp?) met and fought of the east coast. The
>Shannon chased the Cheasapeake into a harbour and sent a boat in demanding that
>the Cheasapeake come out and fight. The captain of the Cheasapeake offered the
>captain of the Shannon a duel which was accepted. The two ships sailed out and
>anchored 15yds apart, the captain of the Shannon offered (can you believe that!)
>the captain of the Cheasapeake first shot. He declined. The battle lasted 15
A lovely story, but sadly lacking in accuracy.
Larry G. Smith
foxb...@aol.com wrote on 4/15/00 6:08 PM:
> On Sat, 15 Apr 2000 15:28:23 -0700, "Larry G. Smith"
> <em...@olypen.com> wrote:
>
>> in article 01bfa6e1$c0a5b180$87140ccf@txleckuj, Norman G. Purves at
>> n...@ilhawaii.net wrote on 4/15/00 6:26 AM:
>>
>>> The US Army would
>>> have quickly subjugated Canada, regardless of the presence of the largest
>>> conceivable British expeditionary force
>>
>> May I point out that the Union had its hands full just beating the South? It
>> would have had all it could do to resist a serious simultaneous attack from
>> Canada had GB felt inclined to mount one. To suggest that the US would
>> successfully invade and conquer that nation surpasses belief.
>
> The US was only taxed by the CSA because they did not mobilize to
> anywhere near the same extent as the CSA did. The CSA was taking
> everybody, the USA wasn't.
That's right, and there were reasons for that. The South was unified in its
outlook in a way that the North was not. Lincoln had all he could do to keep
the Union in the war.
> If the USA becomes involved in a war with
> Britain, consider everybody mobilized.
Really? I wonder. New England was the center of fervent anti-slavery
feeling, but New England was also economically dependent on trade with Great
Britain. Wouldn't their abolitionism have faltered a bit if it had cost them
their livelihood? Plus there were those people in the Border States who were
already unhappy with the war and would have rather seen the end to it. The
issue is not as clear-cut as you are making it out here.
Michael
Larry G. Smith
foxb...@aol.com wrote on 4/15/00 6:12 PM:
> On Sat, 15 Apr 2000 14:10:28 GMT, skel...@home.com (Peter Skelton)
> wrote:
>
>> While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
>> finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
>> Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
>> US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
>> that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
>
> Out of curiosity, why is the Erie Canal so important? Even if the US
> ignores the (Webster-Ashburton?) treaty that demilitarized the Great
> Lakes a force on the Great Lakes isn't going to do much- the USN
> controlled the lakes after Champlain and Erie in 1812 and didn't force
> anything through. Canada is too large to be controlled by a seaborne
> force, it requires a large army to come through and conquer it, and
> the Erie Canal only simplifies the logistics of supplying that army,
> it doesn't really make success certain.
I too would like to see Peter's elucidation of this subject. I am frankly
too ignorant of it to comment, and that annoys me no end. ;-)
Michael
Chris Manteuffel
<em...@olypen.com> wrote:
>in article 01bfa6e1$c0a5b180$87140ccf@txleckuj, Norman G. Purves at
>n...@ilhawaii.net wrote on 4/15/00 6:26 AM:
>
>> The US Army would
>> have quickly subjugated Canada, regardless of the presence of the largest
>> conceivable British expeditionary force
>
>May I point out that the Union had its hands full just beating the South? It
>would have had all it could do to resist a serious simultaneous attack from
>Canada had GB felt inclined to mount one. To suggest that the US would
>successfully invade and conquer that nation surpasses belief.
The US was only taxed by the CSA because they did not mobilize to
anywhere near the same extent as the CSA did. The CSA was taking
everybody, the USA wasn't. If the USA becomes involved in a war with
Britain, consider everybody mobilized. (As Shelby Foote says, when the
Harvard-Yale Regatta went on in 1864, not one of the participants had
even registered for the draft, the USA had resources they weren't
tapping).
Chris Manteuffel
History, n. An account mostly false, of events mostly unimportant,
which are brought about by rulers mostly knaves, and soldiers mostly
fools. - Ambrose Bierce, "The Devil's Dictionary
Chris Manteuffel
wrote:
>While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
>finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
>Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
>US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
>that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
Out of curiosity, why is the Erie Canal so important? Even if the US
ignores the (Webster-Ashburton?) treaty that demilitarized the Great
Lakes a force on the Great Lakes isn't going to do much- the USN
controlled the lakes after Champlain and Erie in 1812 and didn't force
anything through. Canada is too large to be controlled by a seaborne
force, it requires a large army to come through and conquer it, and
the Erie Canal only simplifies the logistics of supplying that army,
it doesn't really make success certain.
Chris Manteuffel
Peter Skelton
reference, but reliable enough.
Lawrence won command of the newly recommissioned Chesapeake for his victory
over Peackck. There was a serious shortage of money and energy ashore (crew
not paid etc.)
Broke had been in command of Shannon about six years. He was a bit
strog-headed about gunnery. Shannon was slightly weaker on paper.
Shannon and Tenedos were the inshore blockade. Tenedos left. Broke,
Shannon's captain sent a polite letter to Lawrence challenging him to
battle, but he did not receive it.
Why Lawrence sortied from Boston in plain sight of Shannon is not known.
About half the officers and hands were new to the ship (two leutenants were
midshipmen). The day was calm, Shannon kept her royal yards up throughout.
Broke headed out some distance and hove to, leaving Lawrence the choice of
weather or lee gauge.
Lawrence chose the weather, and ships came to grips running free at close
range. The fire was intense and accurate, both ships receiving serious
casualties. After a few minutes, Chesapeake lost the use of her head-sails
and rounded up in consequence, receiving a half-raking broadside in the
process. This swept the quarter-deck, leaving a midshipman in temporary
command (the second Leutenant was on the main deck and unaware he had
succeeded to command.). Chesapeake's quarter came into contact with
Shannon's bow. Shannon boarded, and carried the ship.
Peter Skelton
Larry G. Smith" <em...@olypen.com> wrote:
>in article 38F8D593...@globalnet.co.uk, Lachlan Sturrock at
>ls...@globalnet.co.uk wrote on 4/15/00 1:48 PM:
>
>> In 1812 the Shannon and the Cheasapeake(sp?) met and fought of the east coast.
>> The
>> Shannon chased the Cheasapeake into a harbour and sent a boat in demanding
>> that
>> the Cheasapeake come out and fight. The captain of the Cheasapeake offered the
>> captain of the Shannon a duel which was accepted. The two ships sailed out and
>> anchored 15yds apart, the captain of the Shannon offered (can you believe
>> that!)
>> the captain of the Cheasapeake first shot. He declined. The battle lasted 15
>> minutes one ship firing then the other. The Shannon won, the total number of
>> survivors on both ships numbered 150.
>
>O'Brian offers an interesting fictional version of this action in
>_The_Fortune_of_War_. He locates the action off Boston Harbor.
>
>Michael
>
--
Peter Skelton
Peter Skelton
>On Sat, 15 Apr 2000 14:10:28 GMT, skel...@home.com (Peter Skelton)
>wrote:
>
>>While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
>>finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
>>Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
>>US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
>>that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
>
>Out of curiosity, why is the Erie Canal so important?
Uninterruptable resupply on short lines. The Ottawa-Rideau route was longer
and much lower capacity.
Even if the US
>ignores the (Webster-Ashburton?) treaty that demilitarized the Great
>Lakes a force on the Great Lakes isn't going to do much- the USN
>controlled the lakes after Champlain and Erie in 1812 and didn't force
>anything through.
Britian controlled Lake Ontario, the one that mattered defensively.
(Champlain mattered to the US defensively)
>Canada is too large to be controlled by a seaborne
>force, it requires a large army to come through and conquer it, and
>the Erie Canal only simplifies the logistics of supplying that army,
>it doesn't really make success certain.
Check out the relative populations and the distance to industry.
Upper Canada could be taken by taking Kingston, the logistics centre of the
day. Toronto would have to fall shortly. Quebec city, and possibly Montreal
could be held.
--
Peter Skelton
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Peter Skelton wrote in message
. This swept the quarter-deck, leaving a midshipman in temporary
>command (the second Leutenant was on the main deck and unaware he had
>succeeded to command.).
RAH refers to this action in _Starship Troopers_.
"This young officer was the most junior in a navy vessel--wet navy, of
course--wind-powered, in fact. This youngster was about the age of most of
your class and was not comissioned. He carried the title of 'temporary
third lieutenant'--note that this is the title you are about to carry. He
had no combat experience; there were four officers in the chain of command
above him. When the battle started his commanding officer was wounded. The
kid picked him up and carried him out of the line of fire. That's all--make
a pickup on a comrade. But he did it without being ordered to leave his
post. The other officers all baought it while he was doing this and he was
tried for 'deserting his post of duty as /commanding officer/ in the
presence of the enemy..' Convicted. Cashiered."
p 153-154, Berkely edition.
--
K.B.
If they _are_ out to get you, are you still paranoid?
kmsimmons
>
> in article 38f865a8.4340091@news, Peter Skelton at skel...@home.com wrote
> on 4/15/00 7:10 AM:
>
> > finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
> > Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
> > US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
> > that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
>
> simultaneously?
>
> Michael
In the famous Ken Burns Civil War documentary, historian Shelby Foote
makes the point that the North was never more than 50% mobilized at any
time during the Civil War. Given that, I would say they could, given
time to fully mobilize.
Mike
Michael P. Reed
> "Norman G. Purves" <n...@ilhawaii.net> wrote:
>
> >By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding capacity had
> >expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any conceivable
> >British fleet.
>
> Oh, please....about 95% of our 'big' ships built during the Civil War was
> incapable of combat outside protected rivers and bays. The Brits could
have
> very conveniently blockaded just offshore, and we would have been powerless
> to
> stop them. They still had a _vast_ numerical advantage.
True, but in iron vs wooden ships numerical advantage meant very little.
Hampton Roads proved that. The reason that most of our ships, especially the
ironclads, built during the war were brown water were because that is what
was required at the time. If Britain were to enter the war, then naturally
more *seagoing* heavy ships would have been built. Would Britain have
stripped the Isles of her ironclads to blockade (and the ability of steam
only ships in that era to blockade was very limited) the US coastline?
--
Regards,
Michael P. Reed
Michael P. Reed
> > Gee Andrew, glad nobody did the math in 1812 or they might have
> noticed
> >the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
>
> I guess you didn't notice but the RN beat the crap out of the USN.
Yeah, like at Put-In-Bay and Lake Champlain. :o)
The USN
> wound up blockaded in harbour. A couple of minor ship to ship victories
> don't make much difference in the long run, if the other side has enough
> ships. American commerce was swept off the seas.
And how well did Britain's commerce fare? Though the RN blockade was
effective, it was less important than it would have been during the CW.
Sure, it hurt the merchant economy of NE, but it was already suffering as a
result of the Embargo (ever wonder why New England was the most
anti-Republican). The oveeall effect on the economy, outside of NE, was
fairly small as the US was pretty much self sufficient. Now the treasury,
OTOH, was damaged mightily, because Gallitin continued to try to maintain the
Treasury on Tariff duties alone even into 1814. IIRC, it was Cochrane's
vandalism in DC that finally led the Madison Administration to raise revenues
from sources other than Import Tariffs.
> American privateers did well but given the number of starving, unemployed
> seamen available to crew, that is not very surprising.
They had been "starving" ever since 1808.
>
> > Actually, I tend to agree with you, the USN didn't want to get into a
> >shooting war with the RN....especially at the beginning of the war.
> Towards
> >the end of the war, the USN was more ready........to defend it's harbors
> with
> >monitors, etc; still not what you could call a great "blue water" navy.
No, but a war with Britain would have pushed construction more to a blue
water navy, than the historical brown water building program. Furthermore,
the Great Big Bad British Navy could do little to influence what occurred
inland.
> Not a navy that could deal with an RN blockade.
How many Ironclads could the RN spare, and how long could they remain on
station? Station keeping with Iron clads was no easy chore.
Michael P. Reed
> ht2sw....@bellatlantic.net (Navydude) wrote:
>
> >action, at any time during the 19th century (possibly excepting the
> >very end of the century, during the Spanish-American War).
>
> Even then it would have been impossible...we had a grand total of one (1)
> effective seagoing battleship; the Brits had a dozen or more, and of better
> design.
And how many did France have? Would Britain have pulled all those ships away
from the British Isles? How long could they remain on station so far from a
major naval base?
The biggest naval threat to the US was not the RN but British AND CS
privateers.
Michael P. Reed
> While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
> finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
> Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
> US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
> that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
And, of course, Michigan. Canada's survival numbered in the matter of months
(or the time it would take to divert some of the troops and supplies and
mount an invasion). There was the militia, of course, but militia being
militia, I do not count for much. In 1864, *after* the reinforcements of 1862
and 1863, the British had in Canada (or what we know today as Canada) the
following troops.
New Brunswick
1st Bn, 15th Foot
Halifax
2nd Bn, 16th Foot
2nd Bn, 17th Foot
Quebec
1st Bn, 17th Foot
4th Bn, 60th Foot
Montreal
30th Foot
47th Foot
62nd Foot
Toronto
1st Bn, 16th Foot
Hamilton
1st Bn, Rifle Brigade
London
63rd Foot
[Source: Hart's Army List for 1864]
Michael P. Reed
> Siding with the CSA would have broken the Union blockade, allowing the
> free transit of Southern cotton to Europe, providing funds for the South
> to arm with better weapons (the only thing in the way of this would have
> been the Southern attitude to slavery, but that was changing to a line
> that UK etc could have accepted in an ally).
> It would have meant that CSS Alabama and her ilk would have concentrated
> more on the Union merchant fleet.
Um, ALABAMA, SHENENDOAH, etc *did* concentrate on the US merchies.
> Actually, UK/RN involvement would have also allowed blockade of Union
> ports and shipping, which could cripple/damage their war effort (it
> would certainly upset the Union/northern merchants if they couldn't
> export to europe because of blockade).
The US was still pretty self sufficient in those days. Arms imports,
especially from Britain (lot of Federal Regiments went into battle with
Enfields) would have been cut, and there might have been some initial rifle
shortages, but a blockade of a coast line as long as the US is very
probablamatical, and requires a great deal of ships with logistical support,
and even though it had many more seagoing Ironclads, the RN was still almost
entirely composed of wooden ships, which did not last long against Ironclads,
which meant that the blockade would have to be conducted a fair ways
offshore, and thus become somewhat pourous. Moreover, Britain would have few
bases to help maintain the blockade. Halifax, and perhaps some reopened
southern port (if that could be accomplished), but Canada would be lost to
Britain in a very short time, so the cost of Britain siding with the South
would be high.
> I'm not sure of the history/time line, but a blockade of the north/union
> would interfere with exports of Maize to Europe, this would either cause
> famine etc, or/and allow the maintenance of good farm commodity prices
> in Europe (Maintaining farm commodity prices would be to the advantage
> of the powers that be in Europe as they are/were also the land owning
> class).
Now, this is a good point.
The South would have been better served by having France on her side than
Britain. More than opened trade, and better arms, the south needed manpower,
and that is one commodity Britain did not have to give her.
Michael P. Reed
> True. We had nothing that could have very well stood up to an RN ship of
the
> line. But we did clean their clocks in a number of frigate duels. And Lake
> Champlain is worth recalling.
And Lake Erie which was one of the most decisive moments of the entire war.
What is generally disregarding in discussions of the naval war of 1812 was
that it was the actions on the lake, and the Guerre de Course that counted,
not duels between ships. The War on the Lakes was decidedly in the US favor
(though Ontario was a study in mutual timidity).
Cheng Tseng
>Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net> :
>> ht2sw....@bellatlantic.net (Navydude) wrote:
>>
>> >action, at any time during the 19th century (possibly excepting the
>> >very end of the century, during the Spanish-American War).
>>
>> Even then it would have been impossible...we had a grand total of one (1)
>> effective seagoing battleship; the Brits had a dozen or more, and of better
>> design.
>And how many did France have? Would Britain have pulled all those ships away
>from the British Isles? How long could they remain on station so far from a
>major naval base?
Look at how eager Napoleon III was eager in intervening in the Civil War on
the side of the South.
If the British entered the war, Napolean III and France would not have been
far behind.
C.T.
Cheng Tseng
>Cheng Tseng <cxt...@psu.edu> wrote
>>> It matters for war-fighting potential in terms of what is real
>> >and whether Britain really did have "deep pockets" type economic
>strength
>> >vs the USA.
>>
>> Which the British had more of, then the United States.
> If one has a population that consumes its own production and a population
>that is growing like Topsy, it has real economic strength. If the other's
Ah...all populations consume their own production...
>population is in poverty, cannot consume its production and must export to
>get the money, and has to import food and pay for that plus the raw
>materials (cotton etc) for its production, then isn't all the money washing
>around that is its "economy" just sizzle not the steak? Where is the
What about the US, whose industry required imports of sophisticated goods,
because they just could not make enough of it?
What about the fact that every country, unless blessed with unlimited amounts
of gold (Which creates its own problems.), need to export to buy imports?
How about a difference between a mature, developed economy, with a
faster-growing developing one?
You seem to have a quaint notation of economic strength here. An autarky is
generally considered a bad idea.
>strength? Japan was "strong" recently and the US was supposedly in the
>dumps. What was real as we now know the answer? How much like 1980
>Japan was 1880 Britain?
The comparison fails. Japan's economy was NEVER bigger then the USA, even
when it seemed the Japanese was buying everything American. Great Britain, on
the other hand, WAS bigger then the USA, economic-wise. That changed by the
beginning of the 20th Century, but during the Civil War, it was true.
That translates into military potential.
An odd detail I like to point-out was that its was the wealth Great
Britain gotten by being the first great industrial power that helped America
enjoy its massive growth between 1865-1914. If a lot of Englishmen decided to
be stingy about their gold, America's growth would have been a lot slower.
There is something ironic that Great Britain financed the growth of the
economy that would overtake it.
C.T.
Eric Pinnell
wrote:
>In a real all-out naval war, the US wouldn't even be a contender. In 1860 the
>Royal Navy had over 50 screw ships-of-the-line, and correspondingly large
>number of vessels of other types. The largest US Navy vessels were 6 screw
>frigates. Do the math here; the US Navy doesn't stand the slightest chance.
>
>In addition, the Royal Navy was just entering on the age of seagoing ironclad
>warships - something the US Navy didn't figure out until 30 years later, when
>the 'modern' battleship appeared.
>
>--
>Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
>US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
>Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more
I thought Monitor predated HMS Warrior?
Eric Pinnell
Qui Desiderat Pacem, Praeparet Bellum
(Let Him Who Desires Peace, Prepare For War)
Flavius Vegetius Renatus - 3rd Century BC
Eric Pinnell
<dfilkohaz...@microtree.com.invalid> wrote:
>My friends and I have a disagreement about how the U.S. Navy would have
>fared against the European powers during the American Civil War. What's
>your opinion on how an all-out war would turn out on the high seas?
How about "All American ships get sunk". In 1776, the US didn't
have a navy really. Even in 1812, the US couldn't stop the British
fleet.
Mind you, after that time, things got ugly for the Brits.
Chris Manteuffel
<em...@olypen.com> wrote:
>Really? I wonder. New England was the center of fervent anti-slavery
>feeling, but New England was also economically dependent on trade with Great
>Britain. Wouldn't their abolitionism have faltered a bit if it had cost them
>their livelihood? Plus there were those people in the Border States who were
>already unhappy with the war and would have rather seen the end to it. The
>issue is not as clear-cut as you are making it out here.
If Lincoln's smart (and from the evidence, he seems to be) he is able
to unite the border states, nothing like an outsider interfering with
internal affairs to unite a divided country. The West loves it 'cuz
they've coveted Canada for a long time. As for New England, it is my
understanding that most of their trade is already limited by the
Southern depredations (I believe it's in Musicant Naval history of the
Civil War that he claims that the southern raiders formed the
beginning of the decline of the American merchant fleet), most of your
merchants are already moving away from the seas.
Here's my problem with a British blockade:
1) Blockades require massive sustained logistics, I can't imagine the
British grabbing local bases, because unlike the USA vs. CSA blockade,
the Union can put a *lot* more troops at a given point than the Brits
can match. Capturing any sort of logistic base is going to be
interesting (see Charleston or Fort Wagner or heck, even Fort McHenry
from 40 years before), possible but annoying. Keeping them is going to
be even more interesting. With the mobility of railroads I don't see
the British as able to maintain the logistics bases needed for
blockades. The Union could against the CSA, but again, the Union has
more railroad track and more troops than the CSA does.
2) I don't see the Brits coming to play in the shallow littoral (why
expose themselves to armored warships if they don't have to), if
they're smart they stay far out to sea, but distant blockading
requires more resources in numbers of ships. Either they send lots of
armored ships (they don't have enough to blockade every American
port), meaning they build lots of armored ships, slowing down their
campaign against the US, or they keep their wooden ones and stay far
away, where the monitors can't reach, and now they need lots of ships
to cover the wider arcs. These lots of ships are going to tax the
minimal logistic resources that the British can hold.
I don't see the USN being successful in any sort of offensive or deep
water actions, Rule Britannia, yatta yatta yatta, but I don't think
the Brits can dominate the American Littoral. Not to the extent that
the smaller British Army can make a difference. Now if the British
could combine with the French (as good ole Napoleon III wanted to do),
then Russians becoming involved... (at this point things get far too
complex for my simple mind, I don't know whether the Russians come in
at all or what would happen, but we'd have a new series of wars
racking Europe, maybe WW1 50 years early?)
Olivers
>
>
> Gosh, TM, you've opened up a speculative wonderland of mind-boggling
> proportions. But I must confess I'm not too clear on the politics of the
> situation you are describing here. Are you suggesting that in the period
> 1862 onward that GB would have taken on the US and the CSA *both*? Seems
> that it would have served their interests better to make allies with one
> side, preferably the weaker (CSA) against the stronger (USA) and then after
> that conflict had been resolved deal with the survivor as interest dictated.
>
> That would at least mean that they wouldn't have to defend against the
> depredations of the CSS Alabama and her ilk. It would also mean that they
> would have friendly seaports at which to unload their armies, once they got
> through the Union blockade.
>
> Actually, I think we can all be glad that GB wasn't in the mood for a fight
> at that moment. Even if they couldn't have helped the South obtain a
> victory, they could have prolonged what was already a vicious and bloody
> war.
>
...but I'm postulating an even grander scenario.....
With Britan to fight in the late 1840s - early 1850s, there would have
been no WBTS, a continued Democrat majority in both Houses, likely an
internationalist Prez with aggressive Caribbean expanisionistic
policies, not a Midwestern with domestically-centered program.
Semmes would have been CO of a commerce raider. Lee would have
succeeded Scott as El Supremo, While Jackson would have kept on
teaching, McClellan would have had to repulse a landing at Dam Neck for
a raid on Norfolk. Without 47-1 superiority in numbers, he would have
failed.
Move the conflict to 1870, with US manufacturing well ahead of its
earlier levels, a Hell of a lot of leftover, hungry semi-well trained
but combat experienced sojers in the South, and Kingston, Jamaica
becomes Port Grant and Montreal, Mount Lincoln. GB's island possessions
become tradeouts, unsupportable in a guerre de course which functions of
a brand new layer of vulnerability, colliers, without which all those
far flung foreign outposts are no more than unwaterd house plants.
--
TMOliver - el pelon sinverguenza
"Alle kunst ist unsonst,
wenn ein Engel in das Kundloch prunst."
F. Voros
"Michael P. Reed" <mpr...@removeme.tdi.net> wrote in message news:38f9333c$0
> mount an invasion). There was the militia, of course, but militia being
> militia, I do not count for much. In 1864, *after* the reinforcements of
1862
I'm not saying the militia could have held but they would have done better
than
this comment would indicate. It was primarily militia that defeated the
Fenians
who were mainly made up of Union vetrans.
Frank
Larry G. Smith
foxb...@aol.com wrote on 4/15/00 10:38 PM:
> Here's my problem with a British blockade:
> 1) Blockades require massive sustained logistics, I can't imagine the
> British grabbing local bases, because unlike the USA vs. CSA blockade,
> the Union can put a *lot* more troops at a given point than the Brits
> can match. Capturing any sort of logistic base is going to be
> interesting (see Charleston or Fort Wagner or heck, even Fort McHenry
> from 40 years before), possible but annoying. Keeping them is going to
> be even more interesting. With the mobility of railroads I don't see
> the British as able to maintain the logistics bases needed for
> blockades. The Union could against the CSA, but again, the Union has
> more railroad track and more troops than the CSA does.
> 2) I don't see the Brits coming to play in the shallow littoral (why
> expose themselves to armored warships if they don't have to), if
> they're smart they stay far out to sea, but distant blockading
> requires more resources in numbers of ships. Either they send lots of
> armored ships (they don't have enough to blockade every American
> port), meaning they build lots of armored ships, slowing down their
> campaign against the US, or they keep their wooden ones and stay far
> away, where the monitors can't reach, and now they need lots of ships
> to cover the wider arcs. These lots of ships are going to tax the
> minimal logistic resources that the British can hold.
So in other words, the Brits had ample reason to stay out of it. Which is
pretty much as I had thought.
> I don't see the USN being successful in any sort of offensive or deep
> water actions, Rule Britannia, yatta yatta yatta, but I don't think
> the Brits can dominate the American Littoral. Not to the extent that
> the smaller British Army can make a difference. Now if the British
> could combine with the French (as good ole Napoleon III wanted to do),
> then Russians becoming involved... (at this point things get far too
> complex for my simple mind, I don't know whether the Russians come in
> at all or what would happen, but we'd have a new series of wars
> racking Europe, maybe WW1 50 years early?)
I tread lightly here, but it is my impression that Russia really had no
interest of any significance in the New World. They were only too happy to
clear out of California and to unload Alaska.
Nappy III might have liked to go adventuring, but don't you suppose that
would have meant that Bismark would just have cleaned his clock a year or
two sooner?
Michael
Larry G. Smith
on 4/15/00 11:11 PM:
What have you been drinking and can I have some? :-)
Michael
Kerryn Offord
"Michael P. Reed" wrote:
>
<SNIP>
> And how many did France have? Would Britain have pulled all those ships away
> from the British Isles? How long could they remain on station so far from a
> major naval base?
If UK joined on the side of the South: Available bases were (Maybe:)
Bermuda,
Halifax (or any other Canadian port,
Bahamas (and Caribbean possessions),
CSA controlled ports (Norfolk, and points south).
NB. At the time (1860's) France and UK were actually on the same side
and one or both could have come to the aid of the south without (real)
conflict.
Keith Willshaw
Eric Pinnell <epi...@ibm.net> wrote in message
news:38f9501e...@news-s01.ny.us.ibm.net...
>
> I thought Monitor predated HMS Warrior?
>
Nope HMS Warrior
Launched December 29th 1860
Commissioned August 1st 1861
Entered Service June 1862, in the Channel Squadron
patrolling coastal waters and sailing to Lisbon and Gibraltar.
Keith
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
(Norman G. Purves) wrote:
> By '63, Union shipyards were so efficient, and shipbuilding
> capacity had
> expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any
> conceivable
> British fleet
I have been checking by the end of 1862 Britain had completed two
Warrior class and two Defence class broadside ironclads. Fourteen more
were in various stages of construction with the majority having iron
hulls. Whats more all of these ships made their designed speed on
trials. Very few of the American ships seem to have made their design
speed.
Now I don't have figures for the 15 inch Dahlgren which was not
mounted on the New Ironsides anyway. But British ships had proper
watertight compartmentalising which was more than any wooden ship had.
Also I don't care how good you think American gunnery was given the
fire control systems of the time maximum engagement range was 400 to
600 yds. The 68pdr smooth bore was one of the most powerful guns of
it's time. All British armour was rolled in one thickness it was never
necessary to use multiple layers.
Now you think that the US could have improved it's building rate. I
don't see how. The US managed to complete a total of 4 ships of over
4000 tons during the entire war period. The massive US commercial
shipyard industry was entirely in wood and depended on the cheapness
of wood in North America. With the switch to iron ships there was a
collapse of commercial shipbuilding in America.
Ken Young
ken...@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
Tseng) wrote:
> Now consider how MANY existing ironclad ships the RN had in 1862?
Four with 14 under construction.
Peter Skelton
The midshipman left in command was not the midshipman acting as third
Leutenant. That worthy left the upper deck under conditions that lead to a
court-martial. Forester does not say whether he carried Lawrence below, but
someone did.
--
Peter Skelton
B F Lake
> gold (Which creates its own problems.), need to export to buy imports?
Nobody on the other side of the argument from me has pointed out yet that
the RN could have done something here whereas the South navy was unable to.
> An odd detail I like to point-out was that its was the wealth Great
> Britain gotten by being the first great industrial power that helped
America
> enjoy its massive growth between 1865-1914. If a lot of Englishmen
decided to
> be stingy about their gold, America's growth would have been a lot
slower.
> There is something ironic that Great Britain financed the growth of the
> economy that would overtake it.
economy would also have made Britain stronger. Instead Britain ended up
going broke. This indicates the smart money just left the sinking ship.
To replace the gold that was being shipped to the US from Britain's
reserves in the 1840s, eventually they got gold in South Africa? but that
was 40 yrs later. Meanwhile all the tea in China <G> couldn't save them.
All the money that went to build the battleships pre-WW1 that was spent by
the government going in the hole- where did the money go? The shipyard
owners, steelmakers, coal companies, etc- what did they do with all that
money? Why didn't that add to the British "economy" instead of ruining it?
Is it correct that the Germans and the US could afford their BBs while the
British couldn't?
So my spin is that the US got their finances sorted out in the various
money /banking events in the 19th CT mentioned, but that the Brits were
running on empty and forgot to put something back in when they were taking
it out - possibly a fatal flaw due to the upper classes with the bucks not
being required by the government to keep "public funds" in the black, due
in turn to a certain lack of democracy since these people were in charge of
the government. I do not mean that the government should run the economy,
just that the capitalists should at least mind the store so their own
country does not go broke.
Like I said , I do not understand Big Money. :)
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
>skel...@home.com (Peter Skelton) :
>
>> While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
>> finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
>> Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
>> US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
>> that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
>
>And, of course, Michigan. Canada's survival numbered in the matter of months
>(or the time it would take to divert some of the troops and supplies and
>mount an invasion). There was the militia, of course, but militia being
>militia, I do not count for much. In 1864, *after* the reinforcements of 1862
>and 1863, the British had in Canada (or what we know today as Canada) the
>following troops.
>
>New Brunswick
> 1st Bn, 15th Foot
>
>Halifax
> 2nd Bn, 16th Foot
> 2nd Bn, 17th Foot
>
>Quebec
> 1st Bn, 17th Foot
> 4th Bn, 60th Foot
>
>Montreal
> 30th Foot
> 47th Foot
> 62nd Foot
>
>Toronto
> 1st Bn, 16th Foot
>
>Hamilton
> 1st Bn, Rifle Brigade
>
>London
> 63rd Foot
>
>[Source: Hart's Army List for 1864]
>
>--
Without disagreeing with your main point, this list is somewhat misleading.
There were garrisons in other places (Kingston, Prescott, Niagara. . .). I
think your list is the location of headquartes establishments.
This is important because the garrisons trained, stiffened and worked with
the local militias. While Canada could not really be defended as a whole,
the troop quailty should have been comparable to the American army of the
day. It would have been bloody.
--
Peter Skelton
Keith (no, not that Keith)
Peter Skelton wrote in message <38f9b0c8.89120757@news>...
Heinlein did not mean the Navy "third Lieutenant", but rather the equivalent
infantry rank, i.e. a midshipman (or ensign). If the 2nd Lieutenant was on
the gun deck, the four officers ahead of the middie in rank would have been:
Captain; 1st Lt; 3rd Lt; and 4th Lt. But this does not quite match RAH's
description - he appears to mean that the Captain, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Lts
were incapacitated.
Peter Skelton
>in article 38fb12aa....@news.erols.com, Chris Manteuffel at
>foxb...@aol.com wrote on 4/15/00 6:12 PM:
>
>> On Sat, 15 Apr 2000 14:10:28 GMT, skel...@home.com (Peter Skelton)
>> wrote:
>>
>>> While the Brits could hardly have lost at sea, once the Erie canal was
>>> finished, Canada was indefensible from American attack (The Atlantic
>>> Provinces were defensible, but not part of Canada until 1867). By 1862, the
>>> US had the Erie, and an extensive rail network in New York State (the one
>>> that matters, it borders on Lakes Champlain, Ontario and Erie).
>>
>> Out of curiosity, why is the Erie Canal so important? Even if the US
>> ignores the (Webster-Ashburton?) treaty that demilitarized the Great
>> Lakes a force on the Great Lakes isn't going to do much- the USN
>> controlled the lakes after Champlain and Erie in 1812 and didn't force
>> anything through. Canada is too large to be controlled by a seaborne
>> force, it requires a large army to come through and conquer it, and
>> the Erie Canal only simplifies the logistics of supplying that army,
>> it doesn't really make success certain.
>
>I too would like to see Peter's elucidation of this subject. I am frankly
>too ignorant of it to comment, and that annoys me no end. ;-)
I posted a bit before, here's another spin on it.
The US eastern seaboard is a series of pretty good harbours backed by a
strip of arable land, that varries widly in fertility and width, then a
ridge of old mountains. The European settlers were pushing through these
mountains before the revolution but not in great numbers.
It isn't clear just where the Western border of the US was after the
revolution. The US had a claim, so did the British (the Mississippi valley
had been explored by the French from Canada, the British inherited that
through conquest), so did the Spanish through Louisiana and so did the
natives who lived there.
Unless they have the misfortune to be living in a strategic space or
occupying a lot more resources than they can protect, the inhabitors of an
area generally control it. Things stayed reasonably static for a decade or
two after the revolution while the US filled its seaboard, developed its
governance built its economy and things like that.
Still, population pressure was building up in the east. In Europe pressures
were building as well. These would be released through emmigration to the
US, but not until Napoleon had shot his bolt.
In 1800, Napoleon acquired Louisiana from Spain. France was a somewhat less
comfortable neighbour than Spain, both Britain and the US felt a response
was needed. Napoleon sold Louisiana to the US in 1803. Britain decided to
protect its claim by bolstering the Indian nations holding the land,
especially in the north.
Americans were percolating into the west in small numbers, causing friction
(ambushes, mayhem, rape and slaughter, with both sides behaveing very badly
by modern standards). Their numbers were too few to take over but the
rewards for coming were high enough to ensure they would not stop. (This is
one of the causes of the silly, brutal conflict in 1812-14.) Unless large
numbers of Americans arrived, it looked as if the natives, with British
supoprt could maintain a stalemate.
There are a few ways through the American eastern mountains. Roads or paths
had existed for some time through the central portion, but the important
ones, at least early on, are at the north and the south. The southern one
is by sea to Louisiana and up the Mississippi. It has an important history
but it is a long way by sea from the north-eastern power centre of the
early nineteenth-century US. At that time, the important route was up the
Hudson valley, to the Mohawk at Albany, then west to Lake Erie.
The possibility of building a canal was noticed by 1800. The politics of
getting it done from the public purse was a big deal in the New York State
legislature for the next couple of decades. (Marc Brunnel, the blocks and
boots guy was involved briefly.) In 1825 the main route from Lake Erie to
teh Atlantic was finished. By a decade later, all the side routes (Lake
Ontario, Champlain) were finished. By 1850, railway competition, and
competition from the St. Lawrence route made it obsolescent.
The whole route is easily defended, if Lake Champlain can be held. (The US
did very well on Lake Champlain.) The Canadian St. Lawrence route is not
defensible in summer (in 1812-14 heavy supplies were dragged up the ice in
winter) The military Rideau-Ottawa route (completed in 1832) is long and
ran through unsettled country. It joins a port, rather than an industrial
centre, to the potential area of conflict. The port is several weeks from
the production centres. The Caadian Canal past Niagara (1829) is very near
the US and largely on land occupied by the US in 1813.
Given that the American services were somewhere near British in quality (a
fairly safe assumption, IMHO) a conflict over Canada would come down to
numbers and logistics. The US already had the numbers, the Erie gave it the
logistics.
(Once the Erie was finished, the US had a cheap, high volume transportation
system as far as Chicago and Sault St. Marie. The position of the Indians
was untennable, as far more settlers would arrive than could be opposed.)
--
Peter Skelton
Peter Skelton
>On Fri, 14 Apr 2000 17:51:12 -0400, Andrew Toppan <acto...@gwi.net>
>wrote:
>
>>In a real all-out naval war, the US wouldn't even be a contender. In 1860 the
>>Royal Navy had over 50 screw ships-of-the-line, and correspondingly large
>>number of vessels of other types. The largest US Navy vessels were 6 screw
>>frigates. Do the math here; the US Navy doesn't stand the slightest chance.
>>
>>In addition, the Royal Navy was just entering on the age of seagoing ironclad
>>warships - something the US Navy didn't figure out until 30 years later, when
>>the 'modern' battleship appeared.
>>
>>--
>>Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
>>US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
>>Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more
>
> I thought Monitor predated HMS Warrior?
>
Warrior, launched 1860, in service 1862.
Monitor vs. Virginia 1862.
Contemporaries.
--
Peter Skelton
Peter Skelton
Losing Ontario meant losing the west (the holder of Ontario can pick off
Erie at leisure). The only victory on ontario worth risking the fleet for
was to take and hold Kingston or Oswego. Up to 1814, Kingston could not be
taken and Oswego could not be held. By 1814, the US was on the ropes on
Ontario, in 1815 it would have been desperate. It was a building race, the
US lost, badly.
--
Peter Skelton
Andrew Toppan
> I thought Monitor predated HMS Warrior?
Let's see....
WARRIOR - keel laid 25 May 1859, completed 24 Oct 1881
MONITOR - keel laid 25 Oct 1861, completed 24 Feb 1882
So WARRIOR was complete before MONITOR's keel was even laid.
Andrew Toppan
>was required at the time. If Britain were to enter the war, then naturally
>more *seagoing* heavy ships would have been built. Would Britain have
But it's questionable whether we *could* have built effective seagoing
ironclad ships. We tried - i.e. DICTATOR - but failed.
Keith Willshaw
B F Lake <bfl...@coastnet.com> wrote in message
news:01bfa79d$c52fa000$LocalHost@bflake...
>
> IMO, if the British "economy " were strong then investing in a growing US
> economy would also have made Britain stronger. Instead Britain ended up
> going broke. This indicates the smart money just left the sinking ship.
When Exactly did the British Economy go broke in the 19th century ?
I must have missed it since I recall that Britain had a larger economy than
the US until the turn of the century. This is the period when Britain
was referred to as the workshop of the world and even today
Railway locos and steamships of that era still turn up on every
continent
> To replace the gold that was being shipped to the US from Britain's
> reserves in the 1840s, eventually they got gold in South Africa? but that
> was 40 yrs later. Meanwhile all the tea in China <G> couldn't save them.
> All the money that went to build the battleships pre-WW1 that was spent by
> the government going in the hole- where did the money go? The shipyard
> owners, steelmakers, coal companies, etc- what did they do with all that
> money? Why didn't that add to the British "economy" instead of ruining
it?
> Is it correct that the Germans and the US could afford their BBs while the
> British couldn't?
Frankly NO
The RN won the Naval Building Race and entered WW1 with a significant
advantage over the High Seas Fleet
> So my spin is that the US got their finances sorted out in the various
> money /banking events in the 19th CT mentioned, but that the Brits were
> running on empty and forgot to put something back in when they were taking
> it out - possibly a fatal flaw due to the upper classes with the bucks not
> being required by the government to keep "public funds" in the black, due
> in turn to a certain lack of democracy since these people were in charge
of
> the government. I do not mean that the government should run the economy,
> just that the capitalists should at least mind the store so their own
> country does not go broke.
> Like I said , I do not understand Big Money. :)
That's clear
Keith
Eric Pinnell
wrote:
>epi...@ibm.net (Eric Pinnell) wrote:
>
>
>> I thought Monitor predated HMS Warrior?
>
>Let's see....
>
>WARRIOR - keel laid 25 May 1859, completed 24 Oct 1881
>MONITOR - keel laid 25 Oct 1861, completed 24 Feb 1882
>
>So WARRIOR was complete before MONITOR's keel was even laid.
>
>--
>Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
>US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
>Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more
Uh, Andrew, you mean completed 1861 and 1862 respectively, right?
Andrew Toppan
> Uh, Andrew, you mean completed 1861 and 1862 respectively, right?
Doc. Fat fingers...
At least I didn't write 1962...
--
Andrew Toppan --- acto...@gwi.net --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/
US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem - http://www.uss-salem.org/
Chris Manteuffel
<"kao16(RemoveThis)"@its.canterbury.ac.nz> wrote:
>
>
>"Michael P. Reed" wrote:
>>
><SNIP>
>> And how many did France have? Would Britain have pulled all those ships away
>> from the British Isles? How long could they remain on station so far from a
>> major naval base?
>
>
>If UK joined on the side of the South: Available bases were (Maybe:)
>Bermuda,
>Halifax (or any other Canadian port,
>Bahamas (and Caribbean possessions),
>CSA controlled ports (Norfolk, and points south).
Norfolk was controlled by the Union for almost the entire war. Part of
Longstreet's corps (I think including the Georgian himself) missed the
battle of Chancellorsville to besiege Sufolk, a town inland from
Norfolk, which was occupied by a Union force. They failed to capture
the town. Norfolk isn't going to make a good base for a blockade of
the North anyway, because the Union has strong fortifications (Lee
built the fort at Point Comfort, and never ever even discussed
assaulting it, he knew it was too strong). As you get further south,
the logistics of maintaining a blockade in the north become worse and
worse.
The Union practice was to capture small, outlying bases near each
major port to maintain the blockade (they captured islands off
Galveston, Mobile, Charleston, Albermerle sound, etc.) so this
suggests that in order to maintain their blockade, the British will
have to do something similar. But the Union has far more troops
available for battle than the Brits do (even if they mobilize fully
they can't support enough troops on the far side of the Atlantic to
face the Union) so they can take these logistics bases back from the
British.
Of course, the British really don't need to blockade at the port's
edge- they have enough wooden hulled ships that all they really need
is a bunch of frigates way off in blue water to stop and detain the US
flagged ships they meet. If a few raiders could smash that much of the
US merchant fleet, imagine what the entire British fleet could do!
Cheng Tseng
>Cheng Tseng <cxt...@psu.edu> wrote:
>> gold (Which creates its own problems.), need to export to buy imports?
> The North got gold from California which came by ship to pay for the WBS.
> Nobody on the other side of the argument from me has pointed out yet that
>the RN could have done something here whereas the South navy was unable to.
Hmmm....silver (There is a reason why enough people moved to Nevada during
the Civil War to make it a state.) more like it, and taxation.
The Californian gold supply had pretty finished as a viable soource of income
without major mining companies involved in extracting it, by the time of the
Civil War.
>> An odd detail I like to point-out was that its was the wealth Great
>> Britain gotten by being the first great industrial power that helped
>America
>> enjoy its massive growth between 1865-1914. If a lot of Englishmen
>decided to
>> be stingy about their gold, America's growth would have been a lot
>slower.
>> There is something ironic that Great Britain financed the growth of the
>> economy that would overtake it.
> IMO, if the British "economy " were strong then investing in a growing US
>economy would also have made Britain stronger. Instead Britain ended up
>going broke. This indicates the smart money just left the sinking ship.
Great Britain fought a hugely-expensive war in 1914-1918. That is what
bankrupt it.
However, your statement is not true (Not in how it is phrased.) because the
British were investing in foreign ventures that had a higher return.
Railroads and plantations in Africa, agriculture around the world. I hope you
are not planning to tell me that Africa had a stronger economy then Britain
had?
> To replace the gold that was being shipped to the US from Britain's
>reserves in the 1840s, eventually they got gold in South Africa? but that
>was 40 yrs later. Meanwhile all the tea in China <G> couldn't save them.
Gold standard does not work that way. Any excess amount of gold possessed by
any ONE country will eventually be redistributed back into the whole evenly.
Eventually, the British got returns on their investments in something more
then just the gold from Witswaterand and the Yukon (The two major gold strike
which helped prolong the gold standard.).
> All the money that went to build the battleships pre-WW1 that was
>spent by
>the government going in the hole- where did the money go? The shipyard
>owners, steelmakers, coal companies, etc- what did they do with all that
>money? Why didn't that add to the British "economy" instead of ruining it?
Give me a break with this line! The money the government spent on procuring
weapons went into the economy, which goes to pay suppliers, workers, and the
rest. The workers spend the money from their wages, etc. So it re-circulated
in the economy.
Granted, it does it less efficiently then if the market just had the money to
spend, but the cash does circulate in the economy.
What ultimately ruined the British economy was a matter of attitude (On many
things, but not any you covered.) and the fact that Britain was extensively
involved in a major war between 1914-1918.
> Is it correct that the Germans and the US could afford their BBs
>while the British couldn't?
No, because your conclusion in based on faulty assumptions.
Britain could easily afford the dreadnoughts that it built. For much of the
century leading-up to 1914, it was the world's first economic power. Even
around 1914, it was the third, domestically - and it had an
empire/commonwealth that could help it along (Witness the BCs AUSTRALIA, NEW
ZEALAND, and MALAYA.).
Whereas Germany had to pay for both an large Navy and a large Army (Indeed,
the same year of the Naval Scare 1909, the Reichmarine was forced to reduce
the next-year estimates because of the need to expand the Army.).
US actually did not participate much in the Naval build-up because of
attitudes - Americans did like to pay for it, and Congress did not like to
authorize it.
> So my spin is that the US got their finances sorted out in the various
>money /banking events in the 19th CT mentioned, but that the Brits were
>running on empty and forgot to put something back in when they were taking
>it out - possibly a fatal flaw due to the upper classes with the bucks not
Hmmm...Ever heard of the time when the US government had to be bailed-out by
J.P. Morgan and friends?
That thing never happened to the British in the same fifty years. There is a
REASON why London was the world's capital for banking, finance, and
investment capital.
Investment in foreign ventures is not proof that the foreign economies are
stronger then the domestic, or that the domestic economy is going down the
tubes.
>being required by the government to keep "public funds" in the black, due
>in turn to a certain lack of democracy since these people were in charge of
>the government. I do not mean that the government should run the economy,
>just that the capitalists should at least mind the store so their own
>country does not go broke.
You see to have a strange view of how government take money. I feel the need
to shout "Low taxes are not bad things!"
Look at the US between 1865-1914. Congress was not spending money very well,
and it was not for the public good. Yet, the American economy grew
considerably.
> Like I said , I do not understand Big Money. :)
Clearly. You also show a marked dislike for it.
C.T.
DN
>>the RN was unbeatable then too.......what were the odds then?
>
>And we didn't defeat RN then, we just discouraged them from mucking about on
>this side of the pond. RN wasn't "defeated".
>
>--
In other words "mission accomplished", I didn't intend to convey the
impression that I felt the USN "Defeated" the RN in 1812; although there are
those who would push the issue and say that defeating them in almost every
engagement constitutes, in fact, defeating them period.....but I'm not one of
them. I guess that what I WAS trying to say is that we couldn't have fought
the RN's kind of war with any success but we COULD fight the kind of war we DID
fight which was, essentially, hit and run.
DN
DN
>I would have to agree with Andrew, i have never seen him give bad info to my
>knowlege,
Now THAT is a definative statement if I've ever seen one. Does that mean
you disagree with me?? What exactly did I say that you disagree with? Have
you ever seen ME give any bad info......... to your knowledge?
and in 1812 we didnt defete them, nor did we in the revolution,
Well, it's true we didn't occupy London but it seems like most of the naval
war was concentrated on frigate actions and, again it seems, that we won most
of them, or do you disagree? Hint, Andrew didn't disagree with that statement
so be careful.....
>remember, they had to come here from across the atlantic. though we did send
>some ships to europe.
Best way to do it.......across the Atlantic I mean.....if you want to come
here from England.....do you suppose they were low on fuel when they got here??
Do you know that Canada and the Maritime Provinces were British possessions
and that they had a naval base a Halifax?
anyway, no, the english had a much better navy at the
>time and we could not have defeted them around 1860
>
Good point, I hadn't looked at it that way.
DN
>Shane
>
Andrew Toppan
>Norfolk was controlled by the Union for almost the entire war. Part of
Silly me, I though the Union burned the ships at Norfolk and destroyed
equipment at the Navy Yard there so the Confederates wouldn't capture said
ships and equipment intact...and that the Confederates indeed did capture
Norfolk and the burnt-out hulks there, and rebuilt one of those hulks as CSS
VIRGINIA...perhaps you've heard of her?
DN
>wound up blockaded in harbour. A couple of minor ship to ship victories
>don't make much difference in the long run, if the other side has enough
>ships. American commerce was swept off the seas.
>
No Peter, I didn't notice that. What were the names of the major fleet
engagements that the RN beat the crap out of the USN?? All I can recall were
some frigate actions (minor ship to ship victories)
which forced the RN to send a much larger naval force to North America than
they really wanted to.....something about a war with France going on....and
directing their Frigate captains that one-on-one match-ups with US Frigates
would not be looked upon kindly by their lordships at the Admiralty.
No, I don't think the USN could have kicked butt on the RN in
1812....that's why I didn't say it (if anyone bothered to notice) but just
responded to what seemed to me to be an automatic discounting of the USN (or
anyone else) when the RN was involved....wonder if that attitude is what got
the C.O. of HMS JAVA in trouble for instance??
>American privateers did well but given the number of starving, unemployed
>seamen available to crew, that is not very surprising.
>
Point of fact; American Frigates....part of the American Navy...did very
well also. This is espcially true if one counts the engagement to victory
ratio....
>> Actually, I tend to agree with you, the USN didn't want to get into a
>>shooting war with the RN....especially at the beginning of the war. Towards
>>the end of the war, the USN was more ready........to defend it's harbors
>with
>>monitors, etc; still not what you could call a great "blue water" navy.
>
>Not a navy that could deal with an RN blockade.
>
No, I left the quote to show I said "defend" so there would be no
misunderstanding.
DN
DN
>Even then it would have been impossible...we had a grand total of one (1)
>effective seagoing battleship; the Brits had a dozen or more, and of better
>design.
>
Just out of curiosity, what was the one (1)???
DN
DN
>from the British Isles? How long could they remain on station so far from a
>major naval base?
>privateers.
Britain wasn't at war with France during our civil war.....in fact, they
may very likely have been allies had they entered the war on the side of the
Confederacy. Second, GB had bases in the West Indies such as Jamaica. They
had Bermuda, they had a major naval base then at Halifax. Don't forget you are
talking about a time when Great Britain almost literally owned the world!!!
DN
DN
>expanded so much, that the US Navy could have outmatched any conceivable
I think that is a bit much...yes, their capacity had expanded but not in
the right direction for a blue water naval conflict. The USN was geared up for
a riverine and inshore war including a blockade, not a naval war with Britain.
I think by the time you are talking about, the USN could have probably been
effective in defending it's own harbors but couldn't have even maintained the
blockade of Southern ports. I wouldn't have wanted to face HMS WARRIOR with
USS NEW IRONSIDES. As I said in an earlier post, one was an armored warship
the other was an armored, self propelled (and, from what I understand, just
barely) floating battery. Let's put it this way, the WARRIOR could fight NEW
IRONSIDES off the coast of New Jersey but NEW IRONSIDES wouldn't be meeting
WARRIOR off Dover....get it?
USS KEARSARGE is still another story, I'm not belittling her, her captain
and crew, or her battle with ALABAMA but it was suicide for ALABAMA to go out
to fight her in the first place for a long list of reasons. KEARSARGE was NOT
a ship that could have faced the RN...not even a fleet of KEARSARGE's. There
are some who say she might not as done so well in her famous battle had she
faced a ship that had not just spent almost two years at sea all over the
world.....i.e. one that was in as good condition as SHE was.
I think you are dreaming but it's very patriotic so don't stop......
DN
DN
>But didn't the USN build the ships they needed at the time? Their
>opponent was the CSA, not GB, and they needed ships to fight on the
>coast, in harbors, and in rivers -- and lots of them. If they really
>needed to have a blue water navy, wouldn't they have built them?
>
Very well said. As for a blue water Navy, the answer is probably yes but
not in time to do anything to stop the RN....a fleet in being is worth more
than anything on the drawing boards.
DN
DN
>ironclad ships. We tried - i.e. DICTATOR - but failed.
>
the big transition in time to make it mean anything.
The gent who pointed out that the USN was building ships it needed for
the war it was fighting hit the nail right on the head, an intervention by the
British would have changed the war it was fighting.....I just can't see them
granting us time to "get ready" and make the shift.....added to the fact, which
you point out, that our design efforts in that direction weren't exactly what
one could call stellar.
DN
Andrew Toppan
[speaking of the Spanish-American War era...]
IOWA (BB 4).
The previous class (OR, MA, IN) were coast defense ships (only), and TEXAS was
hopelessly obsolete.
Keith Willshaw
DN <ship...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20000416151707...@ng-ci1.aol.com...
Still the point about Britain not wanting to leave its home waters
undefended IS Valid. The Government of the day spent a fortune
on building a system of defenses around Portsmouth that
became known as Palmerston's Follies
Keith
Patrick Hayes
> But it's questionable whether we *could* have built effective seagoing
> ironclad ships. We tried - i.e. DICTATOR - but failed.
Had the need been more than nonexistant at the time, The USA would
certainly have tried again and learned from DICTATOR. It certainly
wouldn't have stopped at one trial vessel...
Pat
B F Lake
> The Californian gold supply had pretty finished as a viable soource of
income
> without major mining companies involved in extracting it, by the time of
the
> Civil War.
seemed pretty important to keep that gold coming for the North. If CT
says the gold was gone by then, I'll let those two worry about it :)
> > All the money that went to build the battleships pre-WW1 that
was
> >spent by
> >the government going in the hole- where did the money go? The shipyard
> >owners, steelmakers, coal companies, etc- what did they do with all that
> >money? Why didn't that add to the British "economy" instead of ruining
it?
>
> Give me a break with this line! The money the government spent on
procuring
> weapons went into the economy, which goes to pay suppliers, workers, and
the
> rest. The workers spend the money from their wages, etc. So it
re-circulated
> in the economy.
That is what should happen. ISTR Carnegie paid his workers more as he
realized this would make him better off too. Henry Ford did the same thing
later on, so workers could afford the cars they built. IMO. the Brits
never did this and that is why their "economy" failed.
No money, no tax base, give the workers a Council flat so the government
goes in the hole instead of collecting money and workers buy their own
place. The whole country is a coal field and they were making people buy
coal one lump at a time from a coin machine etc etc. Ridiculous! The
money did not circulate as CT says IMO the money disappeared overseas and
into bank accounts while the government went farther in the hole . Proof:
From "Encyclopedia of World History"by William L Langer, Harvard U.
First about the panic of 1893 in the US:
"Depression spread over western world in 1890 when Barings banking house
collapsed due to Argentine bad investments, so British investors in
American securities began to sell, so gold movement from US, Overexpansion
in rails due to the import of British capital created a boom which
collapsed...."
So here is an idea, that not only did the British money not circulate at
home but it went abroad and was lost! OK US recovered nicely and was in
boom from 1897-1901 featuring "great concentration of control by banking
interest in the business world" etc
Meanwhile over 'ome:
(following account of 90 yr struggle over economy between free traders and
protectionists etc etc) culminates in 1909 Lloyd George budget "facing a
large deficit chiefly the result of naval expenditure and social
legislation ..budget aiming to shift tax burden from producers to
possessors of wealth in the form of income and inheritance taxes ...passed
after hot fight..but rejected by Lords.....(election etc)... 1910 Commons
resolution that the Lords should have no right to veto a money bill... "
(this got done in Aug 1911)
So the whole 19th cent history of Britain economically and socially turns
on this long battle, which shows my spin that the British "economy"
(measured how BTW- GDP meaning money transactions- but what measure is that
of the ability of the government to stay in the black and still build a big
navy etc- my idea of "strength"?) was not functioning as a national
business- they needed and did not have an Alan Greenspan to keep everyone
focused.
> What ultimately ruined the British economy was a matter of attitude (On
many
> things, but not any you covered.)
Is this attitude not what I've been saying here re the Lords etc????
> Britain could easily afford the dreadnoughts that it built.
Then what was the 1909 budget all about? Who is "Britain" in your view?
The Economy? OK Lord FFolks-SSmyyth-Feathers could buy them all (BBs) if
he sold his GGs , but the government was going broke.
>For much of the
> century leading-up to 1914, it was the world's first economic power.
Measured how?
eg (don't get upset) I have a dollar and you have a watch. I pay you a
dollar to tell me the time. Now you have my dollar. The government
announces that GDP has gone up by a dollar due to the information economy
heating up. Now I offer to sing a song if you give me a dollar. Now I
have my dollar back. The government announces that GDP has gone up 100%
and doubled due to the explosion in the entertainment industry. The
government suggests that since the economy is growing so much everyone
should have "consumer confidence" and buy a new car! Meanwhile we are
still standing there, I still have one dollar and you have your watch, and
neither one of us has made a dime. So when you say the British economy
was so strong what exactly is this based on, and how do you measure
strength as opposed to just activity? (I know damn well this isn't how
they do it, but it seems like it)
> You see to have a strange view of how government take money. I feel the
need
> to shout "Low taxes are not bad things!"
Agreed. Too high, chokes off spending, less taxable activity etc.
> > Like I said , I do not understand Big Money. :)
> Clearly. You also show a marked dislike for it.
Nope, can't get enough of that lovely stuff. or "Old money is the kind
of money that money can't buy" :)
Just annoyed at suspect numbers being thrown about that I can't figure
out what was really going on. Luckily, everyone else does understand, and
were short last Thursday and are fabulously wealthy today!
Everyone can try for the last word on this- that was "my nickel" :)
Regards,
Barry
Peter Skelton
<s>
>>American privateers did well but given the number of starving, unemployed
>>seamen available to crew, that is not very surprising.
>>
> Point of fact; American Frigates....part of the American Navy...did very
>well also. This is espcially true if one counts the engagement to victory
>ratio....
So victorious thy finished teh war in port. So victorious congress wouldn't
even come up with the money to refit them or pay their crews.
--
Peter Skelton
Larry G. Smith
on 4/16/00 7:18 AM:
> I posted a bit before, here's another spin on it.
[sniperoo]
Okay, thanks, Peter. Most of this I knew, but you have given it a slant that
hadn't occurred to me. Looks like I'll have to spend some more time with my
atlases and history books. :-)
Michael
Keith Willshaw
What UTTER hogwash. Council flats didnt come along until decades
later. The British Industrialists did EXACTLY what the Americans
did and built company owned housing. Most workers also ended up spending
their money at the company store so they got em both ways
They were all good capitalists and when times were good and labor
scarce they had to pay more. There were so-called enlightened
owners who built model company towns but for the most part
there was little difference between Pittsburgh and Sheffield
> The whole country is a coal field and they were making people buy
> coal one lump at a time from a coin machine etc etc. Ridiculous!
Please provide any evidence that British workers bought
their coal in any different way from Americans. Note one of
the perks of being a collier was you got yours free
> The money did not circulate as CT says IMO the money disappeared overseas
and
> into bank accounts while the government went farther in the hole . Proof:
> From "Encyclopedia of World History"by William L Langer, Harvard U.
> First about the panic of 1893 in the US:
> "Depression spread over western world in 1890 when Barings banking house
> collapsed due to Argentine bad investments, so British investors in
> American securities began to sell, so gold movement from US, Overexpansion
> in rails due to the import of British capital created a boom which
> collapsed...."
Your going to base your whole theory of the 19th century on
the collapse of ONE bank Sheesh
The decline of Britain as an Industrial power had more to do
with the anti-technological bias of the intelligentsia and
the governing elite than any other single factor.
British Univesities turned out far fewer graduates in the sciences
and engineering subjects than American or German Institutions and
the road to advancement for the bright student lay through the
classics at Oxford or Cambridge rather than engineering
References
Barnett, Correlli. The Collapse of British Power. London, 1972.
Barnett, Correlli. "Could do better: The failure to educate Britons to
compete." Times Literary Supplement pp. 4-5. [Review Sanderson, Education
and Economic Decline]
Sanderson, Michael. Education and Economic Decline in Britain, 1870 TO THE
1990s.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Wiener, . English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit.
Keith